French President Emmanuel Macron said French services received no CIA warning about a possible Russian drone attack from Mediterranean merchant ships, pushing back on an El Mundo report that US intelligence had alerted France, Italy, and Spain, RTL reported.

Macron’s denial comes amid drone attacks and sabotage cases that European governments have linked to Russia. France is preparing stronger defenses against that wider threat, even as Macron says its services received no specific CIA warning. Italy’s defense minister has also cautioned against fueling alarm over an unconfirmed report.

Asked about the report during a televised interview on 24 September, Macron said: “The CIA did not inform French services of such an attack.” He said Russia was multiplying hostile and sometimes criminal acts against European countries. Covert acts such as sabotage and cyberattacks are often described as hybrid warfare. Asked whether France itself could be attacked, Macron answered yes.

Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto separately wrote on X that El Mundo’s alert “finds no confirmation.” He said it served no one to add “more fuel to the fire” at an already tense time.

The Spanish newspaper reported that the possible operation would use Gerbera drones, small Russian aircraft capable of carrying several kilograms of explosives. The drones would be hidden in shipping containers aboard merchant ships and launched toward targets along Europe’s southern coast. El Mundo cited a source close to Lithuania’s Defense Ministry, and analysts familiar with a CIA report said to have circulated among European foreign ministries. Euromaidan Press covered the account on 24 September. Bythe time of publication, neither Spain’s government nor the CIA had publicly addressed it.

Macron pointed to the failed attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport in eastern Germany in August. A drone carrying explosives was found near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft. German officials attributed the attempt to Russia. Macron said France had not experienced a comparable incident.

The wider hybrid warfare threat

Beyond the disputed Mediterranean alert, authorities have investigated other incidents throughout Europe as possible Russian sabotage.

Germany followed its accusation over Leipzig with diplomatic measures against Moscow. Berlin ordered Russia’s last consulate in Germany closed and ended an agreement permitting a Russian cultural center. German investigators also identified two suspects, including a Russian man they linked to military intelligence. Moscow denied involvement.

Poland’s justice and interior ministers said Russian intelligence ordered the May 2024 arson of Warsaw’s Marywilska 44 shopping center.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb said Russia would continue such attacks to frighten Ukraine’s allies into reducing support. He urged vigilance without overreacting, saying Finnish intelligence saw no imminent military threat.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) published a map in its analytical report on 24 September that contrasts the claimed Russian encirclement with the location of Russian forces as assessed by the experts. Based on the evidence observed by ISW, the nearest area where Russian forces are present is 10.2 kilometers from the southeastern outskirts of Dobropillia.

Russia has been spreading disinformation about its successes around Dobropillia as part of what ISW calls a cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse. Russia's Defense Ministry published a map claiming the city was surrounded. ISW's own map challenges it. The Ukrainian military says the city remains under its control.

Russian Defense Ministry claims it is already destroying encircled Ukrainian troops in Dobropillia and moving further

Units of Russia's Center Grouping of Forces continue combat operations against encircled Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillia area of Donetsk Oblast while simultaneously advancing toward Oleksandrivka, the Russian Defense Ministry claimed. ISW analysts, meanwhile, said they have not observed evidence supporting Russia's claim that the city is encircled. They also noted that Ukrainian officials "directly refute" the claim.

ISW observed evidence that Russian infiltrators, small groups, were operating east and northeast of Dobropillia on 19 and 20 September. The institute did not assess that these infiltrators had consolidated their positions.

Ukrainian forces maintain positions south and northeast of Dobropillia, military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets said on 20 September, according to ISW.

Russian forces have not made major gains in the Dobropillia direction, the chief of staff of an artillery reconnaissance battalion said on 22 September, according to the institute. On the same day, a Russian milblogger described the "alleged Russian encirclement of Dobropillia" as potentially meaning not the direct presence of infantry, but only the establishment of fire control over Ukrainian logistics, including roads west of Dobropillia and toward Sviatohorivka, according to ISW.

ISW noted that Russia's pervasive military culture of lying—what Russian milbloggers themselves call "beautiful reports"—has degraded the Defense Ministry's own ability to understand the battlefield and enabled inflated claims like the Dobropillia encirclement.

Russia uses this disinformation as a "diversion"

In its statement, the Russian Defense Ministry itself described Dobropillia as a "strongly fortified settlement" whose seizure would threaten key Ukrainian supply lines running from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast toward the Fortress Belt—the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka urban agglomeration.

Russia has recently renewed its attempts to break through toward Dobropillia.

Third Army Corps Commander Andrii Biletskyi said that Russian forces sought to bypass the fortified cities through Dobropillia and link up with troops advancing from north of Lyman, rather than launch a direct assault. ISW noted on 16 September that the Vivaldi operation disrupted Russia's two-pronged plan. In its 24 September report, ISW said Russia's claims about Dobropillia were partly intended to divert attention from Ukraine's elimination of the Russian salient north of Lyman, which has likely forced Russia's command to rethink its wider encirclement plans.

Several recent incidents across Europe were conducted by Russia or are likely attributable to Russia, ISW assessed in its 24 September report, though authorities have not officially linked the Polish and German incidents to Moscow.

Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine has expanded into a parallel campaign of provocations against European defense and logistical infrastructure. The Kremlin is using drones, arson, and undersea cable sabotage to degrade Europe's will and ability to support Ukraine, while deliberately intensifying the frequency of airspace violations to erode the boundary between hybrid and kinetic war.

Drones over Moldova and Romania

Four Russian drones flew over Bukovyna and targeted an energy facility and border crossings with Moldova and Romania, Chernivtsi Oblast Military Administration head Ruslan Osypenko reported. Ukrainian forces shot down three. The fourth flew toward Suceava County in northeastern Romania.

A drone crashed in Cernița, Florești district, Moldova—preliminarily identified as a Russian Gerbera type, the first such device found in the country. It carried an onboard camera, hit a tree, and exploded, Moldovan police said. Romania's Defense Ministry reported a second aerial vehicle entered Romanian airspace for four minutes and crashed near Solca in the same border region; geolocated footage confirmed it was also a Gerbera, ISW noted. Poland evacuated the Hrubieszów and Dorohusk border crossings for 30 minutes, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said. Three countries were put on alert by a single night of Russian strikes.

"Intentional and accidental Russian drone incursions into NATO and Moldovan airspaces are likely part of the Kremlin's efforts to normalize airspace violations by intensifying their frequency," ISW assessed.

Sabotage in Poland and Germany

A fire engulfed the power system and backup generator at a Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska, central Poland, on the evening of 23 September. Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski confirmed it was sabotage aimed at cutting internet access, including for Ukraine's military. Authorities have not identified who was responsible, but the act aligns with Russia's "new" doctrine of attacks, Gawkowski said. The station is now operating normally.

German authorities suspended operations at Berlin-Brandenburg airport for 45 minutes the same evening after staff reported a drone sighting, Die Zeit reported. Federal police could not confirm it. ISW assessed both incidents fit Russia's wider pattern of sabotage against European defense assets, though neither has been officially attributed to Russia.

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Russian attack puts three countries on alert as drones enter Moldova and Romania

Western intelligence warnings

A Lithuanian Defense Ministry source reported on 23 September that Russia could launch Gerbera drones from a shipping container in the Mediterranean against Spain, France, and Italy. Danish Defense Intelligence assessed on 24 September that Russia will intensify its hybrid war in coming months, including destructive cyber attacks and sabotage carrying a high risk of casualties, and that there is a low but growing risk of a limited Russian military attack on a NATO border state. It sees no indications of an outright invasion. The CIA reportedly warned Poland that Russia may sabotage underwater cables to disrupt its banking system, according to Newsweek Polska journalists.

NATO tracked and confronted Russian submersibles rehearsing deployment of a new cable-disabling weapon near Svalbard in spring 2026—no cables were damaged, but the operation demonstrated Moscow's intent, Reuters reported. Shadow fleet vessels likely served as drone-launch platforms for incursions into NATO airspace, ISW noted.

"The increasing frequency of such warnings suggests that Western intelligence agencies are picking up indicators that the Kremlin is looking to diversify its platforms and means for conducting attacks against NATO and European states and is considering conducting such attacks," ISW assessed.

ISW said it has not yet seen evidence that Russia has conducted the attacks the warnings describe.

Denmark's assessment—that a limited Russian military strike on a NATO border state could come in the coming months—suggests the boundary between hybrid provocations and military action is narrower than European policy has assumed. ISW's synthesis reframes what governments have treated as separate incidents into one campaign.

"Intentional and accidental Russian drone incursions into NATO and Moldovan airspaces are likely part of the Kremlin's efforts to normalize airspace violations by intensifying their frequency," ISW assessed.

"The increasing frequency of such warnings suggests that Western intelligence agencies are picking up indicators that the Kremlin is looking to diversify its platforms and means for conducting attacks against NATO and European states and is considering conducting such attacks," ISW assessed.

Indian police arrested the foreigners on terrorism allegations in March but later downgraded the charges

Russian President Vladimir Putin has again told US officials that Russia can capture Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast within several months, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Speaking to the UN General Assembly on 24 September, Zelenskyy said this was the latest in a long series of similar promises as Russia has spent nearly five years trying to seize the region. He said Putin has made such promises 17 or 18 times, repeatedly pushing the deadline further back.

He contrasted those promises with Russia’s heavy battlefield losses and relatively limited territorial gains.

Russia has paid a huge price for its Donetsk offensive

Zelenskyy said Russian forces suffered 248,964 troops killed or severely wounded between January and August 2026.

He said Russia had captured only slightly more than 1,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory this year, while Ukraine had already liberated a significant portion of those gains.

Zelenskyy presented the figures as the human cost of Putin’s continued attempt to seize Donetsk, arguing that Russia is paying an enormous price for relatively limited territorial gains.

“Always the same: ‘Just a few more months,’” Zelenskyy said, adding that Putin would again fail to meet his latest deadline.

The Russian offensive is also facing a recent setback in northern Donetsk. Ukraine launched Operation Vivaldi in September to clear Russian infiltrators and retake ground near Lyman, disrupting Russia’s plan to encircle the fortified cities of the Donetsk “Fortress Belt.”

Ukrainian forces have reported retaking several settlements and clearing up to 125 square kilometers in the operation, although the full scope of the offensive remains undisclosed.

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Ukraine retakes ground in a region Russia has fought for years to capture. “Vivaldi” is only getting started but is already “one of the most important victories for Ukraine in 2026”

Zelenskyy also warned that Russia’s ambitions extend beyond Donetsk. After saying Putin would again fail to capture the region, he said Russia would continue seeking other Ukrainian cities, naming Odesa, Kharkiv and Dnipro, while also pointing to Russian pressure on Moldova and threats toward Poland and the Baltic states.

Russia continues to pour missiles and drones into Ukraine

The battlefield campaign has been accompanied by a sustained Russian long-range attack campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

Since the beginning of 2026, Russia has launched more than 2,100 missiles against Ukraine, including more than 950 ballistic missiles, according to Zelenskyy.

Ballistic missiles are particularly difficult for Ukraine to counter because it has a limited supply of interceptors capable of engaging them. Russia’s heavy use of ballistic weapons is therefore contributing directly to civilian deaths and infrastructure destruction.

Over the first eight months of the year, Russia also used 63,000 attack drones of various types, Zelenskyy said. More than 7,700 were jet-powered Geran drones, which he described as particularly destructive and dangerous.

The newer jet-powered drones are faster and more advanced than earlier Shahed-type models, making them harder to intercept and adding to the pressure on Ukraine’s air defenses as Russia attacks cities and infrastructure.

Zelenskyy said Russia was using the drones continuously to disrupt economic activity and normal life in Ukrainian cities, including by making it harder for children to attend school.

The figures show the scale of the Russian campaign beyond the front line. Alongside its ground offensive, Russia is using sustained missile and drone strikes to kill civilians, destroy infrastructure, and exhaust Ukraine’s air-defense resources.

North Korean troops add to Russia’s war effort

Zelenskyy also highlighted North Korea’s direct involvement in Russia’s war, saying its troops have suffered heavy losses while gaining battlefield experience alongside Russian forces.

He said North Korea’s military capabilities were also benefiting from its cooperation with Russia, pointing to improvements in its ballistic missiles and drone capabilities.

Ukraine recently transferred two North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea. Zelenskyy said capturing the soldiers alive had been difficult and described one prisoner’s attempt to take his own life after realizing he was about to be captured.

He said the soldiers had been conditioned to believe they had to die rather than surrender.

“Do you really want to give such a force more time to learn how to fight?” Zelenskyy asked.

Zelenskyy calls for de-escalation before winter

Zelenskyy separately warned that Russia could again target Ukraine’s energy and heating infrastructure this winter.

Russia has already intensified attacks on Ukraine’s energy system ahead of the cold season.

Russia has also explicitly threatened to “freeze” Ukraine this winter, with its Defense Ministry linking the threat to attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. The country spent much of the previous winter dealing with the consequences of Russian strikes on power and heating infrastructure, including blackouts and disruptions to heat supplies.

Zelenskyy said Ukraine expects the coming winter to be difficult but warned that if Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy and heating systems, Ukraine will make the winter painful for Russia as well.

He called for steps toward de-escalation before winter, saying that diplomacy and military strength were both needed to end the war.

Within 24 hours of claiming Ukrainian troops were surrounded near Dobropillia, Russia’s Defense Ministry and pro-war channels expanded the narrative to several supposed encirclements in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Evidence supports none of that, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has said.

The claims come as Ukrainian forces make gains in several frontline sectors, according to ISW. Near Dobropillia, Russian bloggers described the ability to fire on supply roads rather than troops surrounding the town. At the same time, Ukrainian forces said they had prevented Russia from physically cutting the routes.

Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed its forces had captured Krasnyi Yar and Potykhonove northeast of Kharkiv. Pro-war bloggers then claimed Russian troops threatened to trap Ukrainian units near Riznykove and had already surrounded others near Rublene. One asserted that roughly 1,500 Ukrainian soldiers were encircled across 460 square kilometers.

ISW found no evidence for those claims. A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson said Russian forces were still shelling settlements they claimed to hold and described positions in the area as heavily intermingled, with no clear front line.

Around Dobropillia, the Kremlin-linked Rybar channel claimed Russian troops were infiltrating toward nearby settlements and making tactical gains south of the town. It did not claim Russian forces had secured those settlements or show an encirclement on its map, ISW noted.

Another Russian blogger said neither side currently had the forces needed to establish and sustain a genuine encirclement.

Russia’s push toward Dobropillia continues

Russia’s Defense Ministry had claimed on 22 September that its troops surrounded Dobropillia, a transport hub on the approach to Ukraine’s fortified cities in Donetsk Oblast.

ISW found no evidence for that claim and linked its timing to the UN General Assembly and Ukraine’s recent battlefield gains. A Ukrainian officer said Russian troops had made no major advances near the town.

Russian assaults continue despite that setback. A Ukrainian staff sergeant reported a sharp increase in the number of small groups trying to reach Dobropillia. On 23 September, Ukraine’s 1st Azov Corps said its forces had prevented Russian troops from physically cutting supply routes toward Dobropillia and Druzhkivka.

The US has arrested the CEO of Virginia-based digital forensics company Oxygen Forensics and a Russian national over allegations that they concealed the company’s Russian ownership and the fact that its software was developed in Russia while selling it to US government agencies, according to the US Justice Department.

The case highlights a potential route through which Russian-linked networks could seek access to sensitive US institutions: concealing Russian ownership and influence behind seemingly legitimate American companies.

Lee Reiber, 55, and Oleg Sergeyevich Davydov, 52, are charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The US Justice Department alleges that five Russian nationals, including Davydov, owned and controlled Oxygen Forensics through a Cyprus-based holding company, while its software was developed by a team in Russia.

Software sold to US government agencies

According to the criminal complaint, Oxygen Forensics presented itself to US agencies as an independent American company with no foreign ownership or control.

The company sold digital forensic software used to recover and analyze data from electronic devices to the US Department of War and three Department of Homeland Security components: the Secret Service’s National Computer Forensics Institute, Homeland Security Investigations, and the DHS Office of Inspector General.

The National Computer Forensics Institute awarded Oxygen Forensics a five-year contract in September 2024. The award file included a certification from Reiber stating that the company had no immediate or highest-level owner, according to the affidavit.

The Justice Department alleges that this was false. The Russian owners allegedly continued to make significant company decisions, set Reiber’s compensation, control payments and retain signatory authority over bank accounts after their names were removed from public corporate filings.

Russian software development allegedly concealed

The complaint says the same five Russian nationals also owned a Russian company founded by Davydov in 2000, previously known as Oxygen Software and now called MKO Systems.

According to the affidavit, the Russian company developed the software used by Oxygen Forensics, with developers working in Russia under Davydov’s direction. MKO Systems also sold its software in Russia under different product names to customers that reportedly included the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Russian Investigative Committee and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

After the US expanded sanctions against Russia in 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian owners allegedly agreed with Reiber to conceal both the company’s ownership and its Russian development operations.

Reiber was installed as CEO, president and chairman in March 2022, while the Russian owners were removed from the company’s public filings, according to the Justice Department.

The complaint alleges that the arrangement did not end the Russian owners’ control. One of them was later appointed to the company’s board using a Turkish identity, according to the affidavit.

OSINT investigators had traced Russian software links

Militarnyi separately reported that OSINT investigators from InformNapalm had previously traced corporate and technological links between Oxygen Forensics and Russia’s Oxygen Software, now known as MKO Systems.

According to Militarnyi, the Russian company’s products were supplied to Russian security and law-enforcement agencies, including the FSB and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The investigation traced a common corporate and technological origin between the Russian and US software ecosystems.

CEO allegedly denied Russian involvement

The Justice Department says Reiber repeatedly certified to US authorities that the company had no foreign ownership or control.

In March 2026, he allegedly told DHS personnel that no Russian was involved in developing Oxygen Forensics’ software and that no one in Russia had access to its development environment. Days later, he published a statement saying the company had no development presence in any restricted jurisdiction.

The complaint alleges that the software was in fact written and managed by a team in Russia, using a cloud environment administered by one of the Russian owners.

The affidavit also describes a November 2023 exchange in which Reiber allegedly told the Russian owners that public reporting about the company’s Russian connections could jeopardize a pending US government contract.

Arrests and seizures

Reiber was arrested in Idaho on 20 September and released on bond after appearing in federal court. Davydov was arrested the same day at London Heathrow Airport before boarding a flight to Istanbul. The US says it will seek his extradition.

Separately, a federal judge authorized the seizure of Oxygen Forensics’ corporate bank accounts, around 57 domains and other cyber infrastructure allegedly used in the scheme. The domains and related infrastructure were seized on 20 September.

The case is being investigated by the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, with assistance from the Department of War Office of Inspector General’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service.

Each could face up to 20 years in federal prison if convicted.

Moldova’s Defense Ministry reported four drone incursions, Romania’s Defense Ministry confirmed a drone crash, and Poland’s Operational Command scrambled fighters twice during Russia’s 24 September attack on Ukraine.

The strike wave forced Moldova to close part of its airspace, Romania to warn residents and launch F-16 fighter jets, and Poland to activate aircraft, air defenses, and radar. No casualties were reported in the two confirmed crashes, and Poland detected no incursion during its first deployment. Moldova has recorded dozens of Russian drone incursions this year.

The drones approached from Ukraine’s Vinnytsia, Odesa, and Chernivtsi oblasts, according to Moldova’s Defense Ministry. Authorities temporarily closed part of the country’s northern airspace.

Near Cernița in northern Moldova, one drone struck a tree, fell into a field beside a farm, and exploded, police said. No casualties were reported.

Investigators preliminarily identified the camera-equipped wreckage as a Gerbera, a low-cost Russian drone often used during attacks on Ukraine. Police said it was the first device of that type found in Moldova.

Police also reported a resident’s account of another explosion near Vadul Rașcov, but said they were still investigating the location.

Romanian radar first tracked an aerial target over Ukraine near the border before it entered northern Romania, the Defense Ministry said. Romania launched two F-16s and sent emergency alerts to residents’ phones in the area. The drone remained in Romanian airspace for about four minutes before crashing near Solca, the ministry said. Officials reported no casualties or damage and had not identified the drone’s origin.

Poland’s Operational Command launched fighters twice in response to Russian strikes on western Ukraine. The first Polish deployment ended around 08:00 with no airspace violation detected; the command announced a second at 09:07. It also activated ground-based air defenses and radar.

The incursions came amid a wider assault. Ukraine’s Air Force said Russia launched 282 drones of various types, along with ballistic and other missiles, overnight into 24 September. Ukrainian officials reported detecting four drones over Chernivtsi Oblast, the Ukrainian region bordering Moldova and Romania, and shooting down three.

Moldova’s repeated airspace breaches

The latest incident followed several breaches in August. An unidentified drone exploded near Crocmaz on 9 August. Another object exploded near Talmaza on 17 August after Moldova briefly closed part of its airspace.

President Maia Sandu said Russian drones had entered Moldovan airspace 39 times in 2026, compared with 17 times throughout 2025. Moldova has portable air-defense weapons and electronic warfare equipment, but Sandu said these chiefly protect individual sites. Her government is working with partners to expand air-defense coverage and speed up threat warnings.

A court in Pula ruled that Ukrainian diving instructor Volodymyr Zhuravliov may be extradited to Germany over the September 2022 blasts that damaged the Nord Stream gas pipelines between Russia and Germany and caused major leaks in the Baltic Sea, RBC-Ukraine reported, citing his lawyers.

A Polish court refused to extradite Zhuravliov last year, but its ruling did not cancel Germany’s EU-wide arrest warrant. Croatia could therefore arrest him and decide Germany’s request for itself. The pipelines at the center of the case were built to carry Russian gas to Germany while bypassing Ukraine.

The firm Katerynchuk, Moor & Partners said it expected to receive the written ruling shortly and was preparing to challenge it in Croatia’s appellate court and before international judicial bodies. Zhuravliov also plans to announce an indefinite hunger strike. His lawyers said the Croatian court had disregarded the earlier Polish decision.

The Warsaw court refused to surrender Zhuravliov in October 2025, finding that the pipelines could be treated as a legitimate military target during an armed conflict. It released him from custody.

His Polish lawyer, Tymoteusz Paprocki, said Zhuravliov understood that the ruling applied only within Poland: under a European arrest warrant, the country where a suspect is arrested decides whether to send them to the country seeking them.

Germany amended the warrant in early September to add a war-crime classification, according to Zhuravliov’s lawyers. The change prompted the Croatian court to postpone an earlier hearing. The lawyers’ account of the amendment has not been independently confirmed.

How the Nord Stream case reached Croatia

Nord Stream 1 and 2 were built to carry Russian gas directly to Germany while bypassing Ukraine. Explosions on 26 September 2022 damaged three of their four lines; Nord Stream 2 had never entered service.

Germany issued a warrant for Zhuravliov in 2024. German prosecutors say he helped place explosives on the pipelines near Denmark’s Bornholm island. He denies involvement. Croatian police arrested him in Pula on 19 August 2026 under the European warrant.

Another Ukrainian suspect, Serhii Kuznietsov, was arrested in Italy in 2025 and later sent to Germany, where prosecutors have charged him over the explosions. He denies involvement. No court has established who ordered the attack.

US intelligence has warned Spain, France, and Italy that Russia may be preparing to launch drones at one of them from merchant ships in the Mediterranean, El Mundo reported on 23 September, citing sources familiar with the alert. Neither the CIA nor the three governments have confirmed it.

Russia has intensified a campaign of sabotage, airspace incursions, and other provocations against European states supporting Ukraine while keeping its actions below the threshold of open conflict with NATO. A maritime drone attack would extend that campaign into southern Europe, turning the Mediterranean into a launch zone for deniable strikes on civilian or military infrastructure.

El Mundo based its account on a source close to Lithuania's Defense Ministry and analysts familiar with a CIA report circulated among European foreign ministries. The reported plan would hide small Russian Gerbera drones inside shipping containers aboard merchant ships and launch them from the Mediterranean.

According to El Mundo, a Gerbera drone can travel up to 600 kilometers depending on payload and wind, potentially putting targets along NATO's southern coast within reach of a ship offshore.

The Gerbera drone's reported 4–5 kilogram explosive payload would be unlikely to destroy a large facility, the newspaper said, but could start a fire, damage exposed equipment, or temporarily close an airport or port.

All three countries hold elections in 2027 and have political forces capable of exploiting fear and fatigue with Ukraine, with connections to Kremlin interests especially visible in France and Italy, El Mundo reported. Keir Giles, a British defense analyst, said frontline states are not necessarily the targets—the target will be wherever Europe's weakest point is, naming the UK and Spain as countries that have not invested in air and missile defense adequate to the Russian threat.

El Mundo placed the warning alongside earlier Russian drone incidents on NATO territory. In September 2025, 19 unarmed drones strayed into Polish airspace. German authorities later attributed an explosive-carrying drone incident at Leipzig airport to Russia.

The war has reached Mediterranean shipping

Russia's oil shipments and naval presence, alongside reported Ukrainian operations, have brought the conflict into the region in several ways.

A source cited by Ukrainian media said Ukraine's Security Service struck a Russian shadow-fleet tanker there in December 2025. Such vessels carry Russian oil outside Western sanctions, making the sea a route for Moscow's war revenue and a target for Kyiv.

The French outlet RFI later reported that Ukraine may have established a drone launch site in Libya for strikes on Russian shipping. Kyiv has not confirmed the reported site.

Russia's military position in the region has also shifted. British intelligence assessed in January 2025 that its Mediterranean naval force lacked access to its Syrian base at Tartus after Bashar al-Assad's fall.

A new bilateral security agreement puts Australia's support for Ukraine on a long-term footing, the Australian government said. The pact bundles fresh money for Kyiv, wider sanctions on Russia, and a new role for Australia in a multinational effort to rebuild Ukraine's Navy.

Australia sits half a world from the front, yet it wants what Ukraine has learned. The deal runs both ways—Australia sends money and equipment, and treats more than four years of Ukrainian war-fighting as a lesson for its own forces. One-off aid packages are giving way to long-term security pacts as Ukraine's partners lock in support—and, more and more, ask to learn from the force that has spent years fighting Russia.

A bigger package and new sanctions

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the agreement on 24 September. Albanese pledged an additional A$60 million ($42 million) in support. It splits into A$45 million ($32 million) of Australian Defence Force equipment, A$10 million for Ukraine's Energy Support Fund, and A$5 million in humanitarian aid. That lifts Australia's total contribution to almost A$1.9 billion ($1.3 billion). Australia also widened its sanctions on Russia to almost 1,900 measures and listed nearly 300 shadow-fleet vessels—the aging tankers Moscow uses to move oil around Western price caps.

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Australia will also join the Maritime Capability Coalition for Ukraine, a UK- and Norway-led group building up Ukraine's Navy. The government cast the move as another two-way exchange: it helps Ukraine at sea while giving Australian planners insights into advanced maritime capabilities and their operational use.

Lessons that run both ways

The agreement frames the partnership as a trade in know-how, not just aid. Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles said that through deeper cooperation Australia could "lend our strengths and insights to help grow Ukraine's defence industrial base, and likewise learn from the hard-fought lessons of Ukraine's resistance in developing our future capabilities." Ukraine has shown what an innovative, agile force can do in a drone-heavy war, and Canberra wants the lessons. Australia has already supplied 49 retired M1A1 Abrams tanks and 120 Bushmaster protected vehicles, hardware Ukrainian crews took straight into frontline use. Two Australian companies are also developing Arrow interceptor drones for delivery to Ukraine.

Russia's propaganda center Rybar ran a covert filming operation across multiple European countries, Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) reported, citing a Czech investigation by Seznam Zprávy. The founder of the project, Mykhailo Zvinchuk, has been under sanctions by the European Union and the UK.

The EU's sanctions justification states that Rybar is a member of a working group established by Vladimir Putin in December 2022 to coordinate Russia's mobilization efforts in connection with the war against Ukraine.

Moscow has recently escalated covert influence operations and disinformation across Europe, yet years of sanctions have not stopped its operatives from working inside the EU. The Rybar case shows how thin the enforcement of those measures remains.

Rybar crew posed as documentarians in Prague

Russians moved freely within the Schengen Area, holding residence permits for EU countries, particularly Germany. They traveled to Prague posing as documentary filmmakers and attempted to record interviews with local experts and politicians. The stated pretext was a documentary series on Europe's sociopolitical situation.

When Seznam Zprávy journalists confronted the film crew at the meeting location, the propagandists fled. The investigation identified Boris Dvorkin as the Moscow-based producer of the operation. One of his projects received funding from the History of the Fatherland Foundation, established by Putin's decree and headed by Sergei Naryshkin, chief of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

Operations planned across multiple countries

Similar filming operations were allegedly planned or already carried out in Czechia, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Serbia, France, and other countries, the CCD said.

The UK sanctioned Rybar and Zvinchuk in December 2025, citing the network's interference in elections in Moldova and Armenia. It added ten more Rybar staff members in July 2026 for their role in destabilizing Ukraine. In 2024, the US State Department offered a $10 million reward for information on Zvinchuk and eight others tied to the project.

Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed on 22 September 2026 that it had surrounded Dobropillia, but the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) found no evidence to support the announcement. Dobropillia is a small town in Donetsk Oblast, known as the "pearl of the Donbas" for its coal industry, which has helped make Ukraine's Fortress Belt cities, holding the region from Russians since 2014, per RBC Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Vivaldi counteroffensive in Donetsk Oblast broke the northern arm of Russia’s plan to surround the fortified cities. ISW says Moscow’s Dobropillia claim diverts attention from that setback and portrays Ukrainian defenses as collapsing during the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, held on 21-28 September. The institute says Russia is likely spreading such claims to support its push for Ukraine’s capitulation.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian officers say Russian assault groups are still trying to break through toward Dobropillia, but have made no major gains.

Russia’s encirclement claim clashes with Ukrainian battlefield reports

Russia’s Ministry of Defense has claimed its troops were advancing toward Oleksandrivka, a village northwest of Dobropillia, but published no map to support its account.

At the same time, Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets said Ukrainian troops still held positions south and northeast of the city, which the experts said was inconsistent with the claimed encirclement.

ISW reported that a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion chief of staff said on 22 September that Russia had made no major advances near Dobropillia. He said Russian commanders kept postponing deadlines because of heavy losses and a gap between their plans and battlefield conditions.

A Ukrainian battalion officer said Russian troops were still trying to slip through Ukrainian lines in small groups.

How Dobropillia fits Russia’s plan to surround the fortress belt

Dobropillia is a transport hub on the southwestern approach to Ukraine’s “fortress belt,” which includes Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk. These cities have anchored Ukraine’s defense in Donetsk Oblast since 2022.

Ukraine’s Third Army Corps commander, Andrii Biletskyi, whose corps is conducting the Vivaldi counteroffensive north of Lyman, explained that Russian forces advancing through Dobropillia were meant to join another force coming from north of Lyman, behind the fortified cities, encircling them rather than attacking them head-on.

ISW had already assessed on 16 September that Vivaldi had made the two-sided plan infeasible. In its 22 September report, ISW said Russia’s false claim about Dobropillia partly aims to divert attention from those Ukrainian gains.

Russian assaults toward Dobropillia continue

The setback north of Lyman has not stopped Russia’s push toward Dobropillia. Ukrainian staff sergeant Dmytro Davydenko reported on 14 September a sharp increase in assault groups moving toward the city, sometimes more than his unit could engage. He said Ukrainian troops had mined, blocked, or destroyed the main approaches.

ISW reported that Russia was preparing armor and drone support for possible assaults using armored vehicles this fall. A Ukrainian battalion officer said fog might help Russia move that equipment, although Ukrainian reconnaissance and drones would make it difficult. He said Russian glide bombs continued to strike infrastructure in the area.

Ukraine's Vivaldi counteroffensive rolled back a Russian advance north of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast. However, Moscow shifted part of its forces south, Roman Pohorilyi, co-founder of the Ukrainian battlefield mapping project DeepState, told Radio NV. Russian troops are now infiltrating Mykolaivka, a key strongpoint on the approach to the fortress city of Sloviansk, Pohorilyi said.

The halted advance was one arm of Russia's plan to encircle Ukraine's Donetsk fortress belt—the fortified cities of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. Pohorilyi warned that losing Mykolaivka would create serious problems for Sloviansk's defenders. Russia is still pressing toward Dobropillia on the belt's southwestern flank.

Pohorilyi said Russia formed a "claw" north of Lyman by exploiting Ukrainian brigades short of personnel and pushing small groups into their lines. Ukraine's Third Army Corps stabilized the area, built up forces, and counterattacked. The push "multiplied all [Russia's] previous efforts by zero," he said.

Russian forces had repeatedly tried to capture or bypass Lyman, Pohorilyi said. Russian groups still infiltrate the approaches to the city, although Ukrainian forces have stabilized the situation there.

The corps says Vivaldi's first two phases regained control of 125 square kilometers, including 50 that had been under Russian occupation. It reported liberating Shandryholove and Derylove, securing Drobysheve, and inflicting more than 3,000 Russian personnel losses. Those battlefield figures have not been independently verified.

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Pohorilyi noted that the area around Mykolaivka had, until recently, been under the responsibility of Ukraine's 11th Army Corps and is now under the Third Army Corps.

Ukrainian troops must now find and stop infiltrating Russian groups before they establish control, he said. Personnel shortages on the Lyman axis persist, although he said reinforcements are being distributed more evenly.

Operation Vivaldi and the wider fight for Donetsk's fortress belt

The Third Army Corps first disclosed Operation Vivaldi on 15 September after conducting the counteroffensive north of Lyman under information silence. Commander Andrii Biletskyi said the announced gains were only the first phase; the corps said its attacks had disrupted Russian supply routes.

A 60th Mechanized Brigade captain said Ukrainian units quietly assembled near Derylove and Drobysheve, then struck Russian drone launch sites at planned times so infantry could advance. The corps disclosed a second phase on 20 September.

Farther southwest, Dobropillia faces even heavier pressure, Pohorilyi said. Russia has concentrated large forces there and is pushing with relentless infantry across a wide front, backed by thousands of drones each month—reconnaissance, strike, FPV, and Lancets—with numbers still rising. Russian troops are moving on settlements south of Dobropillia to establish a strongpoint and push deeper into Donetsk Oblast.

The pressure is not new: Biletskyi said Ukrainian troops halted a Russian incursion there last year. After Moscow claimed on 22 September to have encircled the town, the Institute for the Study of War found no evidence to support the claim.

We have come to know the Kremlin's energy playbook well: "Europe will freeze without Russian gas," "sanctions hurt Europe more than Russia," "a managed, indefinite return to Russian supply is simply pragmatic." The respected European project EUvsDisinfo has repeatedly exposed these false narratives, carried by Russian state media, proxy outlets, and paid commentators. But Kremlin-friendly energy narratives do not travel only through obvious propaganda channels. They also enter policy debate through expert commentary, think tanks, media quotes, and institutional platforms, where they are far harder to see.

None of the apocalyptic forecasts came true. Europe cut Russian gas imports from 45% in 2021 to 13% by 2025 without blackouts or economic collapse. Yet the narratives predicting ruin kept circulating, sometimes from unexpected addresses. One of them, in my view, is worth a closer look: the work of Katja Yafimava, of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

Across nearly two decades, in my reading, her analysis has landed with remarkable consistency where Gazprom would want it. Gazprom's trading arm was once among the sponsors of her program. The record is public, and it is worth reading in full.

The narrative you don't notice

The most effective version of Kremlin-friendly energy messaging does not shout. It hedges, reframes, and omits. It raises "legitimate concerns" about sanctions costs, stresses the "legal complexities" of an LNG ban, and warns of "supply disruption risks" from moving too fast, without weighing Ukrainian lives or the cheaper, homegrown clean-energy alternative. Real concerns about European energy security did exist. What is worth noting is how reliably certain voices amplified concerns and how rarely they weighed counter-evidence.

This is not abstract. Surging oil and gas prices since the Iran war have handed Russia windfall revenues averaging, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, €604 million a day, money that funds the missiles falling on Ukrainian cities. Every argument for delay has a price, and Ukrainians pay part of it.

The Oxford label, and the money behind it

Katja Yafimava is a Senior Research Fellow at the OIES, which she joined in 2006. The institute is an independent charity rather than a department of the University of Oxford, which recognizes it as a separate independent research center. It carries the Oxford name, and its researchers appear regularly as authoritative, independent voices in UK and European media.

That independence has been questioned. Democracy for Sale, an investigative outlet, has documented the proximity between Russian oil and gas industry money and OIES, which previously received funding from Gazprom and its subsidiaries. OIES's own website and annual reports up to 2020 list Gazprom Marketing and Trading among over 20 organizations that sponsored equally its Natural Gas Research Programme, where Yafimava works, alongside Nord Stream 2 financiers Shell, OMV, Uniper, and Wintershall.

None of that, on its own, tells you what any individual researcher believes. What makes it worth raising is the alignment between that funding context and a published record that, across nearly two decades, has been remarkably convenient for Gazprom's positions.

Remarkable consistency

Consider the pattern. In 2017, Yafimava argued that Poland's legal challenge to the European Commission decision widening Gazprom's access to the OPAL pipeline risked letting political objectives override regulatory rules, a framing that would sit comfortably in Gazprom's own filings. She framed the EU's Gas Directive amendment as an instrument "aimed primarily at Nord Stream 2" in a 2019 paper. Russian state media have quoted her approvingly in pieces casting Brussels or Washington as acting in bad faith.

In September 2021, as suspicion grew that Gazprom was deliberately holding back gas to squeeze Europe before winter, she told Bloomberg she did not subscribe to that view, insisting the company "has not abused" the tight market and "has not manipulated it," and had "honored all of its contractual supply obligations to Europe." Within months, Russia's supply cuts had become the opening move of an energy war. In January 2022, the head of the IEA said Russia's cuts were creating "artificial tightness" in European markets.

Each judgment is defensible in isolation. It is the direction of the whole series that is striking: over years and across cases, the analysis lands where Gazprom would want it to land.

The pattern holds as the war grinds on

Through 2022 and 2023, Yafimava warned that cutting Russian gas too fast risked "unavoidable" blackouts in Central and Eastern Europe. The blackouts never came. In a 2025 paper, she and two OIES colleagues accepted that the phase-out would be manageable for markets, but argued that the EU's proposed ban risked undermining the commercial and legal positions of European importers, and that it was "not obvious" the risk was worth taking to end modest volumes of Russian gas after 2027. A competing Forum Energii report concluded that full EU independence from Russian fuel by 2027 is feasible, and that Russia needs EU markets more than the EU needs Russian supply. In early 2026, she wrote that no complete phase-out "will happen either by 2027 or by 2028."

A forecast is not a crime. But the forecasts, like the analyses, keep pointing one way.

She has also stepped beyond technical commentary. On 27 January 2026, responding to a Financial Times report on US security guarantees for Ukraine, she posted on X that "reliable security guarantees could only be achieved via common European security architecture that would have to include Russia," a framing that mirrors a longstanding Kremlin strategic goal.

Katja Yafimava's current position as Vice-Chair of the UNECE Group of Experts on Gas gives her a visible role in a UN forum that helps shape discussion on European gas policy, security of supply, and the energy transition. In January 2026 she co-opened and concluded the Group's workshop on implementation of the EU Methane Regulation. The arguments she repeatedly advances can have policy effects closely aligned with Russian commercial and strategic interests. At a UNECE/OIES workshop in 2025, for example, she explicitly examined the possibility of a "limited return" of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine, while her subsequent OIES paper argued that the EU ban on Russian gas could undermine European importers and security of supply and questioned whether ending the remaining Russian imports after 2027 was worth the associated risks.

The alignment is a matter of record. Why independent analysis, over nearly twenty years, has tracked so reliably the interests of a company that once helped fund her program is a question that deserves an answer.

Here is what the arguments for delay leave out: the alternative to Russian energy is not economic ruin. It is cheaper renewable power. The International Renewable Energy Agency found that in 2024, 91% of new renewable projects were cheaper than any fossil-fuel alternative; solar came in 41% below fossil power, and onshore wind 53% below. Renewables saved $467 billion in fossil-fuel costs in 2024 alone, and battery storage has fallen more than 93% in price since 2010.

This is the point that "supply disruption" warnings tend to bury, and it is why the warnings matter. Every year of delay, justified by the risks of moving too fast, is a year of continued payments to Moscow when a cheaper, domestic, un-weaponizable alternative already exists. Renewables reached 47% of the EU electricity mix in 2025; EU gas demand fell more than 17% between 2022 and early 2025; and the gas import ban agreed in December 2025 phases out Russian pipeline gas and LNG by the end of 2027, precisely the direction the delay arguments have worked against. The transition is not the risk. The delay is.

What should change

Editors, producers, and conference organizers could apply to energy analysts the conflict-of-interest standards already routine for pharmaceutical research: prior employment or program funding from Gazprom, Sberbank, or Russia-linked entities disclosed clearly every time such an analyst is presented as independent. UNECE could ask whether agenda-setting roles over European energy policy are well placed with analysts whose published record aligns so consistently with Kremlin positions. And Europe could close the transparency gaps that let think tanks with Russian-adjacent funding operate without disclosure requirements.

Every euro Russia earns from energy funds the war against Ukraine. The least we can do is know who is arguing for delay, and who once funded the programs they work in.

Disclosure: the author was involved in a March 2026 Razom We Stand research concerning the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and Katja Yafimava, and works as a strategic advisor to the organization. Euromaidan Press reached out to Dr. Yafimava for a comment, but received no answer at publication date.

Oleh Savytskyi

Oleh Savytskyi is a world-class climate and energy policy expert. Oleh has ten years of experience in the field – from youth climate activism to consulting the Ministry of Environment of Ukraine to managing international advocacy campaigns at Razom We Stand. Oleh is a fellow of the Michael Succow Nature Conservation Fund and an alumnus of the Agora Energiewende EnerTracks training program for energy transition professionals.

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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Cities around the country are ditching Flock’s automatic license plate reader (ALPR) cameras, and replacing them with equivalent cameras from law enforcement contracting giant Axon. That move in large part comes in response to 404 Media’s coverage of how local cops performed lookups in Flock for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and how a cop in Texas searched Flock cameras nationwide to look for a woman who self-administered an abortion.

That brings up questions: what are cities and law enforcement agencies using Axon ALPRs for? And who are they in turn sharing that data with? 404 Media has started to find out, but needs the help of local residents and community members to figure out what is happening across the country.

Over the last few weeks, 404 Media has filed requests with various cities and police departments for Axon “activity reports” and “sharing reports.” These show in granular detail when a police officer searched Axon’s ALPRs, the name of the officer, their badge number, the license plate they reached, and, most importantly, the stated reason why. These activity reports are essentially Axon’s version of Flock’s “network audits,” which has been the basis of much of 404 Media’s Flock reporting, and local and national media outlets’ around the country. You can see an example of one here:

So far, 404 Media has obtained activity reports from the Benton County Sheriff's Office, WA; Falmouth Police Department, ME; Johns Creek Police Department, GA; Ocean Shores Police Department, WA; Pleasanton Police Department, TX; and Red Wing Police Department, MN.

But we need your help. Has your local police department or city switched to Axon ALPR cameras? Were they already using Axon? And do you want to know what they’re using those cameras for?

We’re asking interested readers to file the below public records request. You can simply copy this language, tweak it a little if necessary to apply to your state, then file the request with the relevant agency. You can do this by finding their relevant public records request email address, or by filing it through Muckrock. This is the platform we use for sending and organizing our records requests.

The Internal ALPR Activity report is the one shown above. The Network ALPR Activity report shows what other agencies the police department or city shares their data with. The ALPR Data Sharing report provides a history of when other agencies were invited, or removed, to receive the data. And the ALPR Hostlist Management Audit report details changes made to alerts the agency may receive.

If you file a request and get data back, please feel free to email it to us at joseph@404media.co. We’ve seen with the nationwide conversation about Flock that local residents can do a lot to reveal how surveillance technology is being used in their own communities. We hope we can find out a bit more about how agencies are using Axon’s cameras too.

To Whom It May Concern:

Pursuant to the [YOUR STATE’S PUBLIC RECORDS LAW], I hereby request the following records:

1. Internal ALPR Activity report in Axon.

The report should include data logged from the period of January 1, 2025, to the date this request is processed. Per Axon's documentation, the Internal ALPR Activity report is available within the LPR > ALPR Search > LPR Audit menu. You can find instructions to locate this here: https://www.axon.com/help/fusus/software/fusus/alpr/alpr-audit.htm

2. Network ALPR Activity report in Axon.

The report should include data logged from the period of January 1, 2025, to the date this request is processed. Per Axon's documentation, the Network ALPR Activity report is available within the LPR > ALPR Search > LPR Audit menu. You can find instructions to locate this here: https://www.axon.com/help/fusus/software/fusus/alpr/alpr-audit.htm

3. ALPR Data Sharing report in Axon.

The report should include data logged from the period of January 1, 2025, to the date this request is processed. Per Axon's documentation, the ALPR Data Sharing report is available within the LPR > ALPR Search > LPR Audit menu. You can find instructions to locate this here: https://www.axon.com/help/fusus/software/fusus/alpr/alpr-audit.htm

4. ALPR Hotlist Management Audit report in Axon.

The report should include data logged from the period of January 1, 2025, to the date this request is processed. Per Axon's documentation, the ALPR Hotlist Management Audit report is available within the LPR > ALPR Search > LPR Audit menu. You can find instructions to locate this here: https://www.axon.com/help/fusus/software/fusus/alpr/alpr-audit.htm

The requested documents will be made available to the general public, and this request is not being made for commercial purposes.

In the event that there are fees, I would be grateful if you would inform me of the total charges in advance of fulfilling my request. I would prefer the request filled electronically, by e-mail attachment if available or CD-ROM if not.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. I look forward to receiving your response within the time period that the statute requires.

Sincerely,

[YOUR NAME]

Ce texte est le deuxième d’une série consacrée aux transformations de la lecture. Après avoir discuté de l’hypothèse d’une société « postlittéraire », à partir de l’article de Rose Horowitch, The End of Reading Is Here, je m’intéresse ici à l’autre versant de la question : qu’est-ce qui fait qu’une société demeure une société de lecteurs et de lectrices?

Chaque 12 août, depuis maintenant plus d’une décennie, l’initiative J’achète un livre québécois! invite les Québécoises et les Québécois à entrer dans une librairie et à repartir avec un livre d’ici. Si on en a les moyens, le geste est simple : choisir un livre, l’acheter, peut-être le lire, le donner ou en parler. Et pourtant, cette journée dit quelque chose d’important sur la lecture : une culture du livre ne se maintient pas toute seule. Elle se construit, se transmet et s’entretient.

Cette réflexion s’est aussi nourrie des conversations que j’ai eues autour du 12 août, d’abord avec Alexandre Sirois dans La Presse, puis à ICI Côte-Nord, avec Catherine Paquette et mon collègue Mathieu Dauphinais, de la Bibliothèque de Sept-Îles. Plutôt que de rester prisonniers et prisonnières de la question spectaculaire de « la fin de la lecture », je voudrais donc déplacer le regard vers ce qui permet à la lecture de continuer à occuper une place dans nos vies : si nous voulons demeurer une société de lecteurs et de lectrices, quelles conditions devons-nous collectivement préserver?

Car on ne devient pas lecteur ou lectrice par la seule force de sa volonté. On le devient parce que des livres se trouvent à portée de main. Parce que quelqu’un nous en a lu lorsque nous étions enfants. Parce que nous avons parfois grandi dans une famille où les livres étaient présents, où lire allait de soi, où certaines habitudes, dispositions et familiarités avec la culture nous ont été transmises. La lecture est aussi affaire d’héritage culturel, au sens où l’entendaient Pierre Bourdieu et Jean-Claude Passeron — et cet héritage est inégalement distribué.

Mais ce qui n’est pas hérité peut aussi se construire ailleurs. Parce qu’une personne enseignante nous a fait découvrir un livre qui nous parlait. Parce qu’une bibliothécaire a su nous conseiller. Parce qu’une librairie existe dans notre quartier ou qu’une bibliothèque scolaire ou publique nous permet d’emprunter gratuitement. Parce que nous avons vu d’autres personnes lire, entendu parler de livres, reçu des recommandations, participé à une heure du conte ou à un club de lecture.

C’est là que les institutions et les communautés prennent toute leur importance : elles peuvent élargir, prolonger, parfois même compenser ce qui n’a pas été transmis dans la famille. Au contact de ces personnes, de ces lieux et de ces expériences se construisent progressivement les capacités, les habitudes, l’attention, le désir et la motivation nécessaires pour entrer dans un texte et y demeurer. Autrement dit, la lecture est une pratique sociale avant d’être seulement une compétence individuelle.

L’infrastructure de la lecture

On parle beaucoup de l’accès aux livres. Avec raison. Mais avoir des livres disponibles ne suffit pas à faire des lecteurs et des lectrices. Entre la présence d’un livre sur une tablette et son appropriation par une personne existe tout un monde de médiations : familles, écoles, bibliothèques, librairies, maisons d’édition, médias, organismes communautaires, auteurs et autrices, enseignants et enseignantes, bibliothécaires, événements littéraires, politiques culturelles et éducatives. C’est cette infrastructure de la lecture qui m’intéresse.

Le mot infrastructure peut sembler étrange lorsqu’il est question de lecture. Nous l’associons plus spontanément aux routes, aux réseaux électriques ou aux télécommunications. Mais les pratiques culturelles reposent elles aussi sur des infrastructures, certaines matérielles, d’autres sociales et institutionnelles. Elles sont souvent peu visibles, comme nous l’a enseigné Susan Leigh Star, précisément parce que, lorsqu’elles fonctionnent bien, nous finissons par les tenir pour acquises.

Une société de lecteurs et de lectrices repose ainsi sur une véritable écologie de la lecture : des livres, certes, mais également des lieux où les rencontrer, des personnes qui les font circuler, des institutions qui en garantissent l’accès, des communautés dans lesquelles on peut en parler et, chose peut-être de plus en plus précieuse, du temps et de l’attention pour les lire.

Cette manière d’envisager la lecture rejoint aussi les travaux que nous avons menés autour de la littératie communautaire. Celle-ci invite précisément à ne pas considérer la littératie comme une compétence qui se développerait uniquement dans l’individu ou dans l’école, mais à regarder l’ensemble des milieux, des relations, des acteurs et actrices qui contribuent à la rendre possible. Les pratiques de littératie sont situées : elles prennent forme dans des communautés, des institutions et des contextes sociaux particuliers, traversés par la diversité et par des conditions d’accès inégales.

Cette perspective permet alors et surtout de déplacer le regard de la responsabilité individuelle vers une responsabilité partagée. Familles, écoles, bibliothèques, organismes communautaires, librairies, institutions culturelles et politiques publiques ne jouent évidemment pas le même rôle, mais leurs actions sont interdépendantes et peuvent se renforcer mutuellement. Soutenir la lecture revient alors moins à demander aux individus de lire davantage qu’à construire intentionnellement et collectivement les conditions dans lesquelles lire devient possible, significatif et désirable.

Les bibliothèques : créer les conditions de la rencontre

Les bibliothèques constituent un bon observatoire de cette écologie. Selon les données de l’Enquête annuelle sur les bibliothèques publiques, qui couvre les bibliothèques publiques autonomes, les bibliothèques affiliées aux Réseaux BIBLIO (CRSBP) ainsi que BAnQ, compilées par l’Institut de la statistique du Québec, les bibliothèques publiques québécoises ont enregistré en 2023 environ 52 millions de prêts de documents, dont 42 millions de livres imprimés. Le volume des prêts avait ainsi retrouvé 96 % de sa moyenne des cinq années précédant la pandémie. La même année, elles ont enregistré environ 24 millions d’entrées, soit une hausse de 21 % par rapport à 2022.

Mais un autre chiffre retient particulièrement mon attention : les activités proposées par les bibliothèques ont attiré 1,5 million de participations, soit 33 % de plus qu’en 2022. La reprise de la participation aux activités a donc été plus rapide que celle des entrées physiques — même si, dans les deux cas, les niveaux demeuraient encore inférieurs à ceux d’avant la pandémie.

Il ne faudrait pas faire dire à ces chiffres davantage qu’ils ne permettent d’établir. Ils ne prouvent pas que les Québécois et les Québécoises fréquentent désormais les bibliothèques davantage pour leurs activités que pour leurs collections. Ils nous rappellent cependant quelque chose que l’on ne peut plus ignorer : une bibliothèque ne se contente pas de mettre des livres à disposition.

Heures du conte, clubs de lecture, rencontres avec des auteurs et autrices, ateliers, conférences et autres formes de médiation littéraire sont autant d’occasions de faire découvrir des textes, d’en parler et de créer des relations entre des personnes, des œuvres et des idées. Et ces initiatives débordent souvent les murs de la bibliothèque : elles s’inscrivent dans des réseaux de littératie communautaire où bibliothèques publiques et scolaires, écoles, organismes communautaires et autres acteurs du milieu peuvent conjuguer leurs interventions dans le contexte québécois.

L’accès et la médiation sont deux choses différentes, mais complémentaires. Nous avons beaucoup travaillé, à juste titre, à démocratiser l’accès aux livres et à l’information. Le défi de notre temps pourrait être aussi de préserver — et peut-être de renforcer — les conditions sociales de leur appropriation.

Quand l’infrastructure se fragilise

Cette infrastructure n’a cependant rien d’acquis. Elle peut se fragiliser par petites ruptures, lorsque disparaissent certains des lieux, des ressources ou des médiations qui permettent aux livres de circuler et d’être lus. On vient par exemple d’annoncer la fin d’ateliers de lecture en milieu carcéral. Dans le réseau de l’éducation, les récentes décisions budgétaires en donnent une autre illustration : quelque 38 millions de dollars auparavant consacrés à l’achat de livres pourront désormais être utilisés à d’autres fins.

Les effets se font sentir au-delà des murs de l’école. Lors du récent Congrès mondial d’IBBY à Ottawa, j’ai entendu des maisons d’édition jeunesse québécoises témoigner directement des répercussions de ces mesures sur leurs ventes. J’y étais moi-même pour présenter une étude sur les contestations et la censure des livres jeunesse en matière de sexualité ainsi que de diversité sexuelle et de genre au Canada, ce qui rappelle une autre manière dont cette infrastructure peut être compromise : non seulement lorsque les ressources diminuent, mais lorsque certains livres sont retirés, déplacés, restreints ou rendus plus difficiles d’accès.

On pourrait encore allonger la liste. Un bilan critique récent fait ainsi état d’une « érosion silencieuse » de la mission de BAnQ. Il faudrait aussi parler du financement longtemps jugé insuffisant dans le milieu des CRSBP (Réseaux BIBLIO), malgré les bonifications récentes, alors que ceux-ci jouent un rôle déterminant dans l’accès aux bibliothèques sur une grande partie du territoire québécois. Ces institutions ont ceci de particulier qu’elles relèvent, à des degrés divers, d’une responsabilité nationale plutôt que strictement municipale — comme les bibliothèques scolaires — et qu’elles semblent pourtant demeurer dans l’angle mort des politiques publiques. À filer la métaphore de l’infrastructure, les nids-de-poule ne manquent pas sur la route historique de la littératie au Québec.

Ces phénomènes sont évidemment différents, mais ils invitent à regarder l’ensemble du réseau du livre et de la lecture, plutôt qu’une simple chaîne linéaire. Lorsqu’un de ses nœuds s’affaiblit, ce sont les possibilités de rencontre entre une diversité d’œuvres et leurs publics, jeunes ou moins jeunes, qui se réduisent. Le paradoxe est alors frappant. D’un côté, nous nous inquiétons du recul de la lecture chez les jeunes et cherchons des moyens de leur donner le goût des livres. De l’autre, nous fragilisons parfois les conditions mêmes qui leur permettent de les rencontrer.

Lorsque nous constatons que certains jeunes lisent moins, la question ne peut donc pas être uniquement : Pourquoi ne lisent-ils pas davantage? Elle doit également être, encore une fois : quelles conditions leur donnons-nous pour devenir lecteurs et lectrices?

Le 12 août : rendre visible une écologie du livre et de la lecture

C’est ce qui donne au 12 août une portée qui dépasse l’achat individuel d’un livre. J’achète un livre québécois! met en lumière, pendant une journée, tout un réseau : des auteurs et autrices écrivent, des maisons d’édition publient, des librairies font circuler les œuvres, des bibliothèques et des écoles les rendent accessibles, des médiateurs et médiatrices les font découvrir, des lecteurs et lectrices les lisent, les recommandent et les transmettent.

Acheter un livre québécois ne « sauvera » évidemment ni la lecture ni « la civilisation » — ce n’est d’ailleurs pas l’ambition de l’initiative. Mais l’événement accomplit quelque chose de moins sensationnel mais peut-être de plus intéressant : il rend le livre visible et socialement désirable.

Car les pratiques culturelles ne se développent pas sur le seul mode de l’injonction : il faut lire davantage. Elles se nourrissent de désir, de curiosité, de rencontres et d’une communauté qui leur accorde de la valeur. À sa manière, le 12 août contribue à entretenir une culture dans laquelle les livres et la lecture comptent.

Et les jeunes?

La question devient particulièrement pressante lorsqu’on observe le recul de certaines pratiques de lecture chez les jeunes. Il est tentant d’en chercher la cause du côté des écrans, de TikTok, des téléphones ou du manque d’attention. L’intelligence artificielle ajoute toutefois une dimension nouvelle. La technologie peut désormais non seulement concurrencer la lecture, mais accomplir une partie de son travail à notre place.

Les outils d’intelligence artificielle générative peuvent résumer un livre, expliquer un texte difficile, répondre à des questions sur son contenu et même produire une analyse qui donne toutes les apparences de la compréhension. Ils peuvent certes soutenir l’apprentissage, mais ils rendent aussi possible quelque chose d’assez radical : obtenir certains des produits de la lecture sans avoir accompli soi-même le travail de lecture.

C’est pourquoi la lecture profonde (Deep Reading) me paraît devenir, paradoxalement, plus importante à l’ère de l’IA — cette forme de lecture attentive, réflexive et exigeante à laquelle se sont notamment intéressées Maryanne Wolf et Naomi Baron, et sur laquelle je reviendrai dans un prochain billet. Ce qui est en jeu n’est pas tant la survie du livre comme objet que l’expérience de la lecture elle-même : entrer dans un texte complexe, y consacrer du temps et de l’attention, l’interpréter, le confronter à d’autres idées et construire son propre jugement.

L’enjeu pour les bibliothèques comme pour les différentes instances des réseaux de littératie, sera donc moins d’empêcher l’usage de ces outils que de faire en sorte qu’ils soutiennent l’apprentissage et la pensée plutôt qu’ils ne nous dispensent de penser.

Entretenir une culture de la lecture

C’est peut-être là que le diagnostic d’une société « postlittéraire » devient utile, à condition de ne pas en faire une prophétie. La lecture n’est peut-être pas en train de disparaître. Elle devient une pratique qu’il faut activement soutenir. Non pas en idéalisant un âge d’or où tout le monde aurait lu de longs romans — il n’a probablement jamais existé — ni en opposant systématiquement le livre aux écrans. Mais en nous demandant quelles expériences de lecture nous jugeons suffisamment précieuses pour vouloir les transmettre et les préserver.

Cela suppose bien sûr des livres, des lieux et des personnes qui les font circuler. Mais aussi quelque chose de plus difficile à protéger : du temps et des espaces pour lire, réfléchir et discuter sans être constamment sollicités ailleurs. Acheter un livre québécois le 12 août est un geste culturel. Faire en sorte que nous ayons encore le désir, le temps et la capacité de le lire est un projet social.

Ce billet reprend le mot d’ouverture prononcé dans le cadre du marathon d’écriture « Wikipédia – 25 ans, fière et engagée », organisé à l’Université du Québec à Montréal le 26 mars, à l’occasion du Printemps de la recherche et de la création en collaboration avec Wikimédia Canada et l’Institut de recherches et d’études féministes. Cet événement, porté aussi par le collectif Les sans pagEs – Montréal, dans lequel je suis impliquée, visait à soutenir la création et l’amélioration d’articles consacrés à des femmes chercheuses, militantes, ainsi qu’à des personnes issues de communautés encore trop peu visibles en ligne.

-> À noter que le support de présentation utilisé lors de cette intervention est disponible à la fin du billet.

Je suis très heureuse d’être avec vous aujourd’hui pour ouvrir ce marathon d’écriture Wikipédia. Je me présente brièvement : je suis Marie D. Martel, professeure à l’EBSI, à l’Université de Montréal, et impliquée dans le groupe Les sans pagEs Montréal, un collectif engagé dans l’amélioration de la représentation des personnes s’identifiant comme femmes et marginalisées sur Wikipédia. Merci pour cette invitation, merci à Simon Côté-Lapointe, bibliothécaire à l’UQAM, pour la qualité de son engagement et de l’organisation.

Fondée en 2001, Wikipédia célèbre ses 25 ans cette année. En un quart de siècle, elle est devenue une infrastructure majeure du savoir, avec plus de 60 millions d’articles, dont plus de 2,5 millions en français, dans plus de 300 langues, et des centaines de millions de consultations chaque mois. Mais il faut insister sur un point fondamental : Wikipédia ne fait pas que diffuser le savoir, elle contribue aussi à définir ce qui est visible, reconnu et documenté. Une personne sans page Wikipédia est beaucoup moins visible, moins citée, moins reconnue ; à l’inverse, le simple fait d’y être présent contribue à sa reconnaissance dans l’espace public.

Lorsque l’on regarde les données, le constat est clair. Environ 19 % des biographies dans les projets Wikimédia concernent les personnes identifiées comme femmes, et à peine plus de 20 % sur Wikipédia en français. Les autres identités de genre restent presque invisibles, autour de 0,15 %. Du côté de Wikidata, la base de données qui structure ces contenus, on observe également des écarts : environ 24% de femmes pour le Canada, contre 33 % à l’échelle globale. Ce sont des chiffres qui ne traduisent pas seulement un manque : ils révèlent un déséquilibre structurel dans la manière dont le savoir est produit et rendu visible.

Ce déséquilibre s’explique en grande partie par la composition de la communauté contributrice. Les enquêtes de la Wikimedia Foundation montrent que celle-ci reste encore largement masculine, historiquement entre 80 et 90 % de personnes identifiées comme hommes y contribuent. Cela a des effets directs : moins d’articles sur les personnes identifiées comme femmes, certains sujets moins développés, et plus largement, il y a une reproduction des hiérarchies existantes dans les sources. 

Quand on dit qu’il y a une « reproduction des hiérarchies existantes dans les sources », on veut dire que Wikipédia dépend fortement de sources déjà reconnues — comme les articles dans les médias, les articles et les ouvrages académiques ou les institutions. Or, ces sources ne sont pas neutres. Historiquement, elles ont davantage documenté : les hommes, les figures institutionnelles, les trajectoires dominantes Et beaucoup moins : les femmes, les personnes autochtones, les actrices communautaires ou certaines figures locales.

Or,  Wikipédia s’appuie sur ces sources pour l’écritute des articles… et donc, ce faisant, elle reproduit les mêmes déséquilibres. Autrement dit, Wikipédia ne fait pas que refléter le monde, elle contribue aussi à perpétuer et structurer certaines inégalités dans la production et la circulation du savoir.

Dans le cas du Québec, la situation se complexifie encore. Les contributeurs de Wikipédia en français sont majoritairement européens, et notamment français. La présence canadienne y est relativement faible : on l’estime autour de 7 %, avec environ 300 personnes contributives actives canadiennes contre près de 4000 françaises. Mais on ne dispose pas de données précises permettant d’identifier la part de la contribution québécoise, ni celle des contributrices. 

Cette absence de données est en soi révélatrice : elle rend difficile la mesure des inégalités tout en contribuant à invisibiliser des dynamiques territoriales, sociales et culturelles bien réelles. 

À cela s’ajoute une reconnaissance moindre de certaines sources québécoises dans les protocoles d’évaluation, notamment lorsque le statut de médias comme Le Devoir ou La Presse comme sources nationales est questionné. Alors, les effets sont cumulatifs : invisibilisation des personnes identifiées comme femmes, invisibilisation des figures québécoises, et sous-documentation de nombreuses trajectoires locales. Nous sommes donc face, à tout le moins, à un double biais, à la fois de genre et géographique.

C’est dans ce contexte que s’inscrit le projet Les sans pagEs qui vise à combler le fossé des genres sur Wikipédia, notamment à travers des éditathons comme celui d’aujourd’hui, et aussi par la formation et l’accompagnement à l’écriture. Mais il ne s’agit pas seulement de produire des articles : il s’agit aussi de créer des communautés, de rendre la contribution plus accessible et de valoriser d’autres trajectoires et d’autres savoirs. 

Il existe plusieurs autres initiatives : Art + féminisme, WikiGap, le projet Women in Red, le marathon d’aujourd’hui. Ce sont des initiatives très fortes, mais elles ont leurs limites : elles reposent largement sur le bénévolat, elles restent ponctuelles et elles ne transforment pas automatiquement les structures qui produisent les inégalités.

C’est ici qu’intervient la notion de féminisme des données. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’ajouter des femmes dans les données, mais de transformer les conditions mêmes de production du savoir. Les travaux de Catherine D’Ignazio et Lauren Klein montrent que les données ne sont jamais neutres : elles sont produites dans des contextes sociaux et reflètent des rapports de pouvoir. Cela implique de se demander qui décide des critères, quelles sources sont reconnues, qu’est-ce qui rend visible — ou invisibilise — certains savoirs. L’enjeu n’est donc pas seulement de combler un manque, mais de transformer le système qui le produit.

Aujourd’hui, en participant à ce marathon, vous pouvez faire encore bien plus qu’écrire des articles. On peut aussi s’exercer à développer une conscience critique et envisager d’autres niveaux d’action dans une perspective de féminisme des données.

À un second niveau, nous chercherons, en outre, à analyser les biais et à rendre plus visibles les inégalités. Comment ? En mesurant les écarts, en identifiant les absences, en repérant les déséquilibres dans les contenus ou les catégories. Il s’agit également de montrer comment les systèmes de classification participent eux-mêmes à l’invisibilisation de certaines figures, afin de mieux comprendre ces mécanismes. C’est dans cette perspective que Simon Villeneuve et moi avons travaillé à quantifier le fossé des genres dans les ressources biographiques, en particulier canadiennes, en incluant notamment les projets Wikimédia.

Cette étape est cruciale, car elle permet de situer précisément les problèmes, d’en objectiver les manifestations afin de mieux les déjouer et d’orienter des pistes d’amélioration. Toutefois, elle ne suffit pas entièrement.

À un autre niveau, il devient nécessaire de chercher à transformer le système lui-même. Cela implique d’agir sur les sources, de questionner les critères de notoriété, d’accompagner activement de nouvelles contributrices, de mobiliser différents acteurs du réseau documentaire dans une forme convergence par rapport à ces enjeux, en plus d’améliorer la structuration des données afin de rendre certains contenus plus visibles. À titre d’exemple, j’ai créé il y a quelques années la catégorie « bibliothécaire québécoise », précisément pour mettre en évidence un angle mort dans la structuration des savoirs. Ce type d’intervention, à la fois modeste et stratégique, participe d’un travail plus large de reconfiguration des infrastructures informationnelles.

Et dans le contexte québécois, par exemple, cela peut vouloir dire constater le manque de biographies de personnes s’identifiant comme femmes ou issues des diversités sexuelles et de genre, mais aussi agir concrètement sur les sources : documenter ces figures dans des publications reconnues (articles scientifiques, presse nationale et régionale), soutenir la production de contenus éditoriaux (catalogues d’exposition, ouvrages collectifs), mobiliser des archives existantes souvent peu visibles, améliorer leur repérabilité (indexation, métadonnées, numérisation) et leur admissibilité selon les standards de Wikipédia. Cela implique également de traduire ou adapter certaines sources pour les rendre davantage mobilisables, de diversifier les corpus de référence en intégrant des savoirs situés ou communautaires, et de renforcer les liens entre institutions (bibliothèques, centres d’archives, milieux culturels) afin de consolider l’écosystème documentaire. Autrement dit, il s’agit d’intervenir à la fois sur la production, la reconnaissance, la structuration et la circulation des sources afin de rendre ces figures plus admissibles et visibles dans l’encyclopédie.

C’est ce que l’on entend lorsque l’on affirme qu’il ne s’agit pas seulement de combler des absences, mais de comprendre — et d’agir sur — les mécanismes qui les produisent. Le chemin est plus exigeant, mais il permet d’avoir un impact plus profond et ouvre la voie à une véritable forme de justice sociale.

L’exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté : Chansons de résistantes dans les prisons nazies » offre une relecture forte et poignante de l’engagement de la bibliothécaire et résistante Yvonne Oddon. Autour de 19 chansons documentées par cette dernière à son retour des prisons et camps nazis, cette exposition musicale et documentaire révèle comment les arts populaires et la création poétique ont pu devenir des armes de survie, d’espoir et de résistance. En donnant à entendre ces voix de femmes emprisonnées et déportées, l’exposition témoigne aussi d’une part oubliée d’une histoire culturelle et mémorielle.

Sur l’air de la liberté : quand chanter devient résister

Conçue, dans le cadre de la chaire de recherche du Canada en musique et politique, sous la direction de Marie-Hélène Benoit-Otis avec la collaboration de Cécile Quesney, l’exposition réunit les tapuscrits originaux des chansons, les partitions et les airs populaires sur lesquels elles ont été chantées. Le fonds provient de la Bibliothèque La Contemporaine, Nanterre (France).

L’exposition présente également des reconstitutions vocales a cappella ou accompagnées au piano que l’on a pu entendre lors d’un récital mémorable présenté lors du vernissage à la Maison de la culture Côte-des-Neiges (Montréal, Québec). Offerte en formats physique et numérique depuis le 28 mars 2025 jusqu’au 2 mai, on peut la voir et l’entendre au Centre d’études allemandes et européennes de l’Université de Montréal (Pavillon 3744 rue Jean Brillant, 5e étage) ; elle est hébergée sur un site web dédié, enrichi de contenus analytiques et historiques.

La version itinérante est appelée à circuler dans plusieurs institutions au Québec et en France, prolongeant ainsi l’impact pédagogique et mémoriel du projet. Ce projet s’inscrit dans une démarche de recherche-création et qui a donné lieu à diverses publications scientifiques qui approfondissent le sujet des dynamiques de résistance à l’œuvre dans ces chants de détention.

Yvonne Oddon, pionnière oubliée de la bibliothéconomie

Yvonne Oddon, la plus américaine des bibliothécaires françaises, occupe une place importante dans le livre « Bâtisseuses de la lecture publique », publié en 2024 aux Presses de l’ENSSIB, sous la direction d’Isabelle Antonutti. Cet ouvrage remarquable réhabilite la mémoire de soixante pionnières de la lecture publique en France. En s’appuyant sur des archives souvent fragmentaires, cet ouvrage met en lumière le rôle fondamental joué par les femmes dans la structuration de la profession, dans un univers historiquement façonné au masculin et où les figures des bibliothécaires sont longtemps restées invisibilisées. Préfacé par Arlette Farge, cette recherche fait émerger une véritable histoire sociale des travailleuses de bibliothèque, en exposant leurs réalisations, leurs luttes pour la reconnaissance, et leur apport dans l’évolution de la lecture publique. Un article et plusieurs entrées dans cet ouvrage sont consacrés à Yvonne Oddon.

Née en 1902, Yvonne Oddon suit une formation à l’American Library School à Paris, puis part en stage à l’université du Michigan, aux États-Unis, où elle s’étonne de constater la place centrale accordée aux bibliothèques dans la vie universitaire. De retour en France, elle contribue activement au développement des bibliothèques dans les régions dévastées, notamment par la mise en place du tout premier bibliobus à Soissons en 1933. En 1929, elle est recrutée comme bibliothécaire du musée d’ethnographie du Trocadéro, devenu musée de l’Homme en 1937, où elle introduit des standards innovants inspirés des pratiques américaines : libre accès, classement méthodique, réseaux d’échange de périodiques, et une photothèque documentaire.

Résistante dès 1940, elle cofonde le réseau du Musée de l’Homme avec Boris Vildé et Anatole Lewitsky. Elle affirme, dans une archive sonore qui contient un extrait d’entretien diffusé sur France Culture en 1963, que son engagement est né d’une réaction instinctive face aux «fausses nouvelles», alors qu’elle effectuait, à titre de bibliothécaire, un travail de dépouillement de la presse. Il s’agissait donc, dès le départ, d’une posture résolument antipropagandiste, en réponse à la machine de désinformation nazie. Peu à peu, elle s’est engagée dans une résistance tous azimuts : fabrication de tracts, création du journal clandestin Résistance, contacts avec l’Angleterre pour « transmettre des renseignements nécessaires à la France libre », « transports de volontaires et d’évadés », « organisation de groupes de combat avec dépôts d’armes », etc. Suite à une dénonciation, elle arrêtée en 1941. Elle échappe à la peine de mort, mais elle est déportée et incarcérée dans plusieurs prisons et camps nazis, dont Ravensbrück et Mauthausen. C’est au cours de sa détention qu’elle compose avec ses compagnes de captivité ces chansons de résistance, rassemblées à son retour. Ce matériel constitue aujourd’hui un témoignage bouleversant de la vie culturelle au quotidien dans un contexte de violence extrême.

Après la guerre, elle reprend ses fonctions de bibliothécaire; elle participe activement à la création de l’ICOM (Internationa Council of Museums), collabore avec l’UNESCO, et réédite avec Charles-Henri Bach le Guide du bibliothécaire, devenu une référence. Elle poursuit des missions internationales en Afrique et en Haïti, où elle forme des professionnel.les de la documentation. Yvonne Oddon s’est éteinte en 1982, mais où on se souvient d’elle à la bibliothèque du Musée de l’Homme qui porte son nom.

L’exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté », devrait, à plus d’un titre, faire partie du circuit des bibliothèques et des centres d’archives, car elle appartient à l’histoire professionnelle de ces travailleuses de la mémoire et du savoir.

Nous avons besoin cette énergie de résistance que portait Yvonne Oddon, alors que nous nous abandonnons peut-être en ce moment à une forme de résignation feutrée, souvent maquillée en pragmatisme, qui banalise les reculs en matière de liberté, de justice et de mémoire collective.  Le courage d’Oddon, sa créativité, et sa vision d’une bibliothèque comme lieu vivant, solidaire et émancipateur, résonnent avec une acuité particulière dans le monde actuel. Entre démarches individuelles et actions collectives, émerge aussi une injonction à maintenir vivant et bien audible l’ espoir pour des futurs alternatifs — un appel que le parcours de Oddon vient puissamment relayer en écho.

Don’t Look Away : dans l’air du temps, un écho

Ainsi, la plus américaine des bibliothécaires françaises serait sans doute en accord avec R. David Lankes, qui, face à la vague de censure et de persécutions visant les bibliothécaires aux États-Unis, répondait avec force : « Don’t look away. » Ne détournez pas le regard. C’est exactement ce qu’Yvonne Oddon a refusé de faire et qu’il faut entendre : résister, agir et documenter.

Dans ce texte percutant, publié le 26 mars dernier et que j’ai traduit ici, Lankes s’inquiète de la dérive autoritaire actuelle aux États-Unis, où les bibliothèques et institutions culturelles, loin d’être simplement fermées, sont en voie de devenir des instruments de propagande. Il évoque les attaques contre les agences fédérales, les bibliothèques universitaires, les chercheurs et les archivistes, ainsi que la montée inquiétante de la censure, des listes de mots interdits, et des persécutions de bibliothécaires accusés d’être trop « libéraux ». Face à l’inquiétude grandissante de la communauté internationale, il appelle à ne pas détourner le regard.

Plutôt que de se contenter de déclarations officielles ou de pressions diplomatiques, l’auteur exhorte les bibliothécaires à documenter activement cette nouvelle forme de « McCarthysme anti-woke » : archiver les documents censurés, recueillir les témoignages, créer des canaux de soutien, favoriser les discussions critiques et protéger la mémoire du moment. Il insiste aussi sur la nécessité d’agir à l’échelle locale, là où les bibliothèques restent profondément ancrées dans la confiance des communautés. En cultivant des espaces de dialogue, de solidarité et de résistance, les bibliothécaires peuvent, ici comme ailleurs, défendre la démocratie. Mais pour cela : don’t look away.

Rendre visibles les invisibles, les oubliées

Yvonne Oddon faisait également partie de ces nombreuses femmes notables sans image sur Wikipédia. Pour remédier à cette absence visuelle, je me suis permis de dessiner un portrait inspiré d’un remix composite d’images disponibles (vidéo, photo… c’est toujours un défi particulier), afin de rendre hommage à sa mémoire et de contribuer à la visibilité de son engagement. Ce geste s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’initiative portée par Les sans pagEs qui lancent un appel aux illustrateurs et illustratrices pour créer des portraits de femmes dont les biographies sur Wikipédia n’ont pas d’image. Ce projet vise à réduire le biais de genre sur la plateforme en enrichissant les articles consacrés aux femmes, aux féminismes et d’autres sujets sous-représentés.

Je note, par ailleurs, que dans l’article consacré au journal Résistance sur Wikipédia, Yvonne Oddon n’est pas mentionnée parmi les créateurs de cette publication. J’en ai fait un sujet de discussion. Mais, selon le Musée de l’Homme, ce serait bien le cas; elle serait d’ailleurs à l’origine du nom du journal. C’est aussi ce qui est affirmée sur le site du Musée de la résistance en ligne.

Sources principales

Antonutti, Isabelle (dir.) (2024). Bâtisseuses de la lecture publique. Presses de l’ENSSIB.
Chapitre consacré à Yvonne Oddon, dans une étude collective sur les pionnières de la lecture publique en France.
https://books.openedition.org/pressesenssib/13279

Épisode SoundCloud – Se souvenir d’Yvonne Oddon
Témoignage audio retraçant le parcours et l’héritage de cette figure de la bibliothéconomie et de la Résistance.
https://soundcloud.com/contact-742433234/se-souvenir-dyvonne-oddon

Musée de l’Homme – Portrait d’Yvonne Oddon
Bibliothécaire du Musée de l’Homme et résistante, cofondatrice du réseau du Musée de l’Homme.
https://www.museedelhomme.fr/fr/yvonne-oddon-1902-1982

Musée de la Résistance en ligne – Biographie d’Yvonne Oddon
Notice complète illustrée retraçant les grandes étapes de sa vie, de sa formation à ses engagements résistants.
https://museedelaresistanceenligne.org/media10456-Yvonne-Oddon

Wikipédia – Yvonne Oddon (voir aussi la section bibliographie)
Article biographique détaillé retraçant sa carrière bibliothéconomique et son engagement dans la Résistance.
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yvonne_Oddon

Sur le projet d’exposition

Balado Sonorités – « Chansons de résistantes dans les prisons nazies »
Discussion avec Marie-Hélène Benoit-Otis, Cécile Quesney et Catherine Harrison-Boisvert sur les chansons notées par Yvonne Oddon, leur portée historique et musicale.
https://podcast.ausha.co/sonorites/chansons-de-resistantes-dans-les-prisons-nazies

Exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté : chansons de résistantes dans les prisons nazies » (2025).
Projet dirigé par Marie-Hélène Benoit-Otis avec la collaboration de Cécile Quesney. Reconstitution musicale de 19 chansons documentés par Yvonne Oddon. https://chansonsresistantes.crcmp.org/

UdeM Nouvelles – « Quand des détenues chantaient dans les prisons nazies » (2023)
Entrevue avec Marie-Hélène Benoit-Otis sur l’exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté » et le travail de mémoire autour des chansons notées par Yvonne Oddon.
https://nouvelles.umontreal.ca/article/2023/08/28/quand-des-detenues-chantaient-dans-les-prisons-nazies

On May 3, an unusual procession moved through Washington DC. Several hundred people walked beneath the monuments of the American capital carrying portraits of Red Army soldiers. Children waved Soviet flags. A live orchestra played wartime songs at the World War II memorial. The Russian embassy had filed the permit; the DC Metropolitan Police provided an escort. Russian state media celebrated the event as proof that, with the return of Donald Trump, historical truth too had returned to America.

One organizer told Russian state television: “We love, respect Russia, honor the memory of our heroes.”

Similar marches took place in Paris, Amsterdam and Busan. In Berlin, authorities announced that Soviet flags, Russian symbols and military songs would once again be banned near Soviet war memorials during May 8 and 9 commemorations.

But in Moscow, Victory Day itself appeared haunted by fear.

For decades, May 9 has been Russia’s most sacred annual political ritual, binding victory, patriotism and state power into a single language. But this year, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov was reduced to announcing that the Immortal Regiment march in Moscow would continue only “in electronic format.”

The run up to this year’s Victory Day became the most anxious Moscow has experienced in recent memory. The Kremlin canceled the traditional procession in the Russian capital, moving it online. Military equipment was removed from the parade. Mobile internet access across Moscow was intermittently shut down in the days leading up to May 9. Spectator numbers in St. Petersburg were reportedly slashed from thousands to just a few hundred. The Victory Parade in Kaliningrad was canceled entirely. Russian media outlets published extraordinary reports about Vladimir Putin retreating deeper into protected bunkers amid fears of Ukrainian drone strikes and assassination attempts.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry even warned foreign governments to evacuate diplomats from Kyiv before May 9, threatening massive retaliation if Ukraine targeted the celebrations with drones.

And then came another extraordinary twist. Volodymyr Zelensky publicly “allowed” the parade to proceed. In a deliberately tongue-in-cheek decree issued after negotiations around a temporary ceasefire, the Ukrainian president formally excluded Red Square from Ukraine’s operational strike plans for the duration of the celebrations, even listing the exact geographic coordinates of the square itself.

Watching it all unfold, I kept wondering whether empires collapse more easily than the systems of feeling they create. The Soviet Union fell apart more than 30 years ago, but the architecture built around victory, sacrifice and historical grievance survived it, stretching across borders, diasporas and rival political projects. What began as Soviet myth-making about liberation has evolved into a transnational political language through which governments, activists, diasporas and rival ideological movements compete over legitimacy, victimhood and belonging.

Over the years, at Coda, in our Rewriting History current, we have tracked how the remembrance of World War II became central to Putin’s machinery of legitimacy and repression. Soon after he came to power, Russian public culture became saturated with stories of the Great Patriotic War. Watching Russian state television often felt as if the war had ended yesterday. New films, schoolbooks, drama series, speeches, parades and television specials turned victory into the emotional foundation of Putin’s Russia. Scholars of Russian memory politics have described how, under Putin, collective memory of the war became a tool for claiming legitimacy, discrediting opposition and presenting the Russian state as the eternal defender against fascism.

 It resonated because it tapped into genuine emotion passed on for generations. It was never just propaganda. It rested on something real: the scale of Soviet loss and the private grief carried by millions of families.

The Immortal Regiment began in 2012 in the Siberian city of Tomsk as a local act of remembrance. Ordinary people walked through the streets carrying photographs of relatives who died in the war. By 2015, Putin was leading the Moscow procession himself, while state-backed organizations coordinated chapters in dozens of countries. But in Putin’s Russia, where victory had already become the central organizing myth of the state, the boundary between private mourning and political mythology dissolved.

The speed of that transformation still feels important to me. It says something about the way modern political systems absorb private emotion and fold it back into the language of the state.

The Kremlin framed these Victory Day rituals as a defense against what it called Western attempts to “rewrite history” by minimizing the Soviet role in defeating fascism or equating Stalinism with Nazism. Ukraine and many Eastern Europeans came to see the marches instead as vehicles for imperial nostalgia and wartime propaganda. 

But the argument, it seems, is no longer only about what happened in the past. It is about who gets to turn memory and grief into political legitimacy in the present.

This year Germany found itself in the extraordinary position of having to ban Soviet flags and military songs near Soviet memorials, effectively regulating the symbolic language of antifascism itself. Historian Timothy Snyder once warned that “if fascists take over the mantle of antifascism, the memory of the Holocaust will itself be altered.” That is precisely the moral and historical dilemma Berlin has now forced into the open. What happens when the symbols of genuine antifascist sacrifice become inseparable from the imagery of an ongoing war? When the flags carried by the soldiers who liberated Auschwitz are also flown at embassy-organized rallies while Russian bombs fall on Kharkiv? 

At Coda, we explored some of these tensions years ago, in our documentary “What To Do With Stalin,” which examined the strange afterlife of Stalin’s image across the former Soviet world. While filming in Georgia, we encountered arguments that now feel strikingly familiar: whether remembering Stalin represented patriotism or denial, historical pride or historical amnesia.

Even then, it was obvious these battles were never really about the past.

Putin himself acknowledged as much during this year’s Victory Day speech, describing the war in Ukraine as a “just” continuation of the struggle against fascism and accusing the West of fueling confrontation with Russia “to this day.” Hours later, he suggested the war might finally be over. “I think that the matter is coming to an end,” he told reporters.

Victory Day 2026 may ultimately be remembered not for the military parade itself, but for revealing how unstable that memory system has become. Moscow performed triumph while fearing attack. Berlin restricted Soviet symbols in the name of democratic security. Washington hosted embassy-linked Soviet commemorations beneath American monuments.

I was ten years old when the Soviet Union collapsed. For those of us who grew up inside it, the end of the empire felt at once chaotic and exhilarating. Borders opened, old certainties disappeared and ideology lost its grip almost overnight. I still feel fortunate that, as a child, I witnessed an empire built on terror and repression collapse into history.

In the decades that followed, we watched Russia slowly turn the symbols and emotional reflexes of the Soviet system into instruments of political power once again. Victory Day became one of the most potent of these instruments: a ritual that fused together grief, patriotism, historical trauma and state legitimacy into a single, powerful sentiment.

Russia’s ambassador to Washington, Alexander Darchiev, praised what he described as the Trump administration’s dramatically changed attitude toward Victory Day commemorations. The holiday, he said, now played “an unequivocally positive role” in Russia-US relations. He pointed specifically to the marches held in the center of Washington, DC.

But the more I think about this year’s Victory Day, the less it feels like a story about Russia alone. When the Soviet Union collapsed, many of us assumed its emotional architecture would disappear with it. Instead, parts of it were patiently cultivated and repurposed for a new era by the men in charge of Putin’s Russia.  

The emotional logic that once underpinned the Soviet system no longer belongs only to Russia and the shattered geography of its former empire. Grievances, historical trauma and rituals of belonging now shape political life all around the world. Digital networks and algorithmic systems did not create these emotional impulses, but they amplified them at a scale the Soviet state could only dream of. Perhaps that is the true afterlife of an empire: not the survival of its borders or ideology, but of the emotional systems it builds to organize fear, belonging and historical destiny.

Additional research by Masho Lomashvili and Irina Matchavariani

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A funny thing happened on the day OpenAI announced it was shutting down Sora, its video generation app: Iran went all in on synthetic propaganda and very quickly started winning the global meme war. The timing is a coincidence, no doubt, but it is the kind of coincidence that illuminates. 

Watching the explosive virality of the clips offers a powerful lesson in asymmetric media operations. They deploy cultural sophistication, an understanding of online communities and the enormously powerful creation tools made available by American tech companies, tools that give everyone on the internet access to a personal reality distortion field — drones, but for your feed.

On Wednesday, as Donald Trump was trying desperately to talk down the oil markets with hints of a deal, a stream of videos, carefully calibrated for U.S., regional and third country audiences rolled out on X via embassy accounts, Russia Today, and disaffected Maga influencers. The clips, by broad social media consensus, are good. Some lean heavily on the extremely online grammar of the U.S. right. Some remix Hollywood characters and likenesses in exactly the way that OpenAI’s now nixed billion-dollar deal with Disney was supposed to sanction. Others lean more heavily into Islamic iconography, featuring Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu as worshippers of Baal, the foreign demon god who figures in both the Quran and the Hebrew Bible. The Lego movie is an especially rich resource, but so are TikTok formats, and the kind of idealized AI figures beloved of Trump administration meme makers. You can watch a few of them here.

Notably, faked war footage is far from the dominant format. All of these clips foreground and celebrate their own artificiality: some are sentimental, some triumphal, many are full of the gleeful adolescent wit of gamers on discord forums. 

Researchers have long been warning that generative tools will undercut the authority of visual evidence, compounding and accelerating the damage created by slower, cruder forms of fakery: photoshop, selective editing, even gaming clips passed off as combat footage. Of course, we are already there, and have been for a while. Russia has been the paramount master of this game, in Ukraine and in its ongoing influence operations around the world. But others have learned quickly. Last year, when India and Pakistan were engaged in a brief aerial battle, social media bullshit overwhelmed and compromised traditional coverage. More recently, Israel’s obliteration of Gaza was accompanied by a sustained and comprehensive blizzard of visually compelling misinformation, propaganda, and official lies. 

That continues. On March 28, Israel killed three journalists in a targeted strike in Southern Lebanon, claiming without evidence that one of them, Ali Shoaib, was a member of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces. They later distributed a photograph of him in military fatigues to reinforce the point, but explained to Fox news that in fact, they’d had to photoshop the uniform in because no such picture existed.

Meanwhile, in the Trump administration’s domestic war on immigrants and political opponents, we’ve seen a complete resetting of norms around the tone of official communication and any expectation that it is rooted in fact. Nowhere was that more evident than in the altered footage posted by the White House of the arrest of the prominent Minneapolis activist Nekima Levy Armstrong in January. In the video, shared by the official White House handle, a handcuffed Levy Armstrong is sobbing, her skin visibly darkened. In fact, she had faced arrest calmly. 

Questioned by reporters about this blatant falsification, deputy White House communications director Kaelan Dorr responded: "Enforcement of the law will continue. The memes will continue.” Collapsing the distinction between a meme and the factual record with the aid of AI is the final step in this administration's insistence that its preferred narrative simply is reality.

The problem for the White House and its allies is that their choices in tech policy, official communication, and press freedom level the playing field for information war in ways that Tehran’s media strategists understand and they, for all their immersion in online worlds, do not.

Iranian propagandists know that the currency of visual information online has already been completely debased. They’ve dealt with it plenty, and no doubt practiced it themselves in regional battles for narrative dominance. Their insight is that as cheap and easy as it is to create and distribute fakes, returns on the effort of mobilizing what disinformation researchers call “coordinated inauthentic action” are diminishing. They still do it, but it isn’t where the action is.

Sam Altman, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg have, in a very practical sense, wrought this moment in concert with Peter Thiel, Alex Karp, JD Vance and Donald Trump. At their urging, the U.S. has surrendered unrivaled dominance in scarce, expensive information and cultural assets in exchange for a political economy of media that widely distributes cheap, abundant ones.

Tech leaders and conservative politicians have worked consistently for a decade to deprecate the trustworthiness of American journalism and constrain its liberties. They have smeared its practitioners as “enemies of the people”; they have captured the commanding heights of the broadcast and culture industries through crony deals, and they have launched an assault on both press freedom and standards, two assets that once made American news outlets the envy of the world. Needless to say, the economic collapse of traditional media companies fostered by Google’s  and Meta’s advertising duopoly only served to deepen the damage. Jeff Bezos’s Washington Post shuttered its Middle East bureaus just days before the war began.

Meanwhile, lying from agency podiums and the Oval Office, makes Karoline Leavitt barely distinguishable from Baghdad Bob, Iraq’s minister of information in 2003 whose surreal, truth-dodging press conferences during the U.S.-led invasion made him a global laughingstock. And the DOGEing of both the nominally independent Voice of America, as well as the state department’s Global Engagement Center leaves the administration with neither broadcast nor digital counter-propaganda assets. 

When no one can be trusted with the actual truth, we are left with the AI equivalent of 19th-century editorial cartoons, produced at industrial scale and distributed globally. America has little advantage in that war, particularly when it is at a moral, political and legal nadir.

If anything, Iran, which combines repression with an enormously rich literary culture, film scene and advertising market brings serious capabilities to the fight.

Of course, the ebbing of information power was already under way during the first Trump administration, and during Joe Biden’s term in ways that are indissociable from broader democratic decline. The “trust and safety” architecture adopted by big platform companies was designed — implicitly if not always visibly — to conserve information authority, and ensure that it functioned in broadly pro-democratic ways. 

After the disastrous failures of the Rohingya genocide — which rights groups and UN investigators blamed Facebook for facilitating — and the fears surrounding the manipulation of the U.S. electoral environment in 2016, there was a clear threat to the commercial and political health of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Tech companies, governments, researchers and human rights experts devised rules and norms for content moderation grounded in existing standards, tools for detecting coordinated inauthentic behavior, and a framework for crisis response.

The community of practitioners and institutions that sprung up to combat the flesh-eating virus attacking the body politic were working with bandaids in the battlefield hospital even before Covid, a coordinated attack from the right, and the second Trump victory hit them, but they succeeded in imposing some limits. That project now lies in ruins. 

The Stanford Information Laboratory has been shut down. Trust and Safety teams at Meta and X have been disbanded. The national security arm of the project, centered around the State Department is gone, and private funding for countering misinformation has largely dried up.

Where are the hyperscalers, the AI titans, whose tools are being so effectively deployed, in all of this?

The trust and safety people who do work at OpenAI are dutifully putting out reports every few months. They are detailing how they foiled efforts to use ChatGPT for a Chinese influence campaign aimed at Sanae Takaichi, the Japanese prime minister, and exposing a Russian content mill feeding African newspapers. “Pro-tip for governments,” wrote Head of National Security policy Sasha Baker on LinkedIn of the February report. “Please don’t use our products to spread lies online.”

Governments, in the world of Sam Altman’s “democratic AI” do not include that of the United States. OpenAI has not mentioned a single U.S. ally — let alone the administration itself — in these reports. 

OpenAI has hired multiple ex-Clinton, Obama and Biden officials, and in their work a weird, attenuated piece of the old national security approach to information integrity lives on, alongside the project of selling products to the Pentagon. The company’s leaders clearly treat these issues  as a complement to messaging around Western AI, or a picayune adjunct to the bigger questions of AI risk, which are handled way up in the organizational stratosphere, as they are at Anthropic.

Perhaps the larger lesson is that you can’t really shut down Sora, or put AI-generated video back in its box. If you choose to prosecute an illegal war of choice after surrendering the hard-won high ground of a robust, democratic information environment, high tech weaponry will not offset the deficit. On the contrary, you will have compounded the risk of both tactical failure and strategic geopolitical defeat. When that happens, and in some ways it already has, those who made this war, and their enablers in Silicon Valley, will have only themselves to blame.

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Ukraine has synchronized its sanctions against Russia with the last three packages of economic penalties imposed by the European Union, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 8.

"Three more packages of EU sanctions are fully effective in Ukraine," Zelensky said in his evening address.

Earlier on July 8, the president announced a new round of sanctions, including restrictions on five Chinese-registered companies accused of supplying components found in Russian Shahed-type drones used to attack Ukraine.

Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Zelensky's sanctions commissioner, told reporters on July 8 that the latest decrees bring Ukrainian penalties in line with the EU's 15th, 16th, and 17th packages of sanctions against Russia.

The 15th package targets individuals from Russia, Belarus, and China, among other countries, according to Vlasiuk. It includes the Russian pilot Alexander Azarenkov, who was involved in the deadly attack on the Okhmatdyt children's hospital in Kyiv. Zelensky signed the sanctions decree on the one-year anniversary of the strike.

The 16th package includes individuals from Russia, China, Turkey, and other nations. It also targets the Voin Center, Russia's military-patriotic education organization operating in occupied Ukrainian territories, and Pivdennyi Flot LLC, which transports Russian oil via its "shadow fleet," Vlasiuk said.

The 17th package designates firms from Russia, China, Turkey, and other countries, including the gold-mining company Petropavlovsk and the Chinese company Skywalker Technology Co. Ltd, produce drone parts for Russia.

The EU is expected to approve its 18th package of sanctions against Russia later this week, after facing opposition from pro-Kremlin bloc members Slovakia and Hungary.

Ukraine has taken measures to coordinate sanctions with international partners in order to amplify pressure on Moscow. Zelensky on June 27 signed a decree to synchronize Ukraine's sanctions against Russia with those imposed by the EU and Group of Seven (G7).

Ukraine war latest: Trump reportedly pledges to send 10 Patriot missiles to Ukraine, asks Germany to send battery

* Trump reportedly pledges to send 10 Patriot missiles to Ukraine, asks Germany to send battery * ‘They have to be able to defend themselves’ — Trump says US will send additional weapons shipments to Ukraine, criticizes Putin * EU to impose ‘toughest’ sanctions on Russia in coordination with US senators, French foreign minister says * Russia’s Black Sea Fleet shrinks presence in key Crimean bay, Ukrainian partisans say * Putin signs decree allowing foreigners to serve in Russian army during

The Kyiv IndependentThe Kyiv Independent news desk

The International Criminal Court (ICC) said on July 8 that it had issued arrest warrants for two senior Taliban leaders, accusing them of crimes against humanity and gender-based persecution following the group's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

The move follows Russia's recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government on July 3. Russia, which had previously designated the Taliban as a banned terrorist group, became the first country in the world to recognize it.

In a statement, the ICC named Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Afghanistan's top judge Abdul Hakim Haqqani as suspects in a campaign of systematic oppression targeting women, girls, and others who do not conform to the group's rigid gender ideology.

The court said the alleged crimes took place across Afghanistan from the Taliban's return to power on August 15, 2021, and continued at least until Jan. 20, 2025. The suspects are believed to have played key roles in the enforcement of Taliban policies that led to "murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance."

The persecution was not limited to women and girls, according to the ICC. The court said that men perceived as allies of women or opponents of Taliban ideology were also targeted.

The ICC emphasized that the Taliban implemented a state-led policy of repression that violated fundamental human rights and freedoms across the country.

Most of the international community has refused to formally recognize the Taliban regime due to its human rights abuses and failure to meet international standards.

Meanwhile, since Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the Kremlin has deepened relationships with authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, Iran, and now the Taliban. Russia has expanded trade with Afghanistan and allowed Taliban officials to participate in Russian forums.

In December 2024, the Russian State Duma passed a law allowing certain groups, including the Taliban, to be removed from the country's list of banned terrorist organizations. The move paved the way for official recognition.

Putin has referred to the Taliban as "allies," and Lavrov has called them "sane people," despite the group's ongoing enforcement of strict Islamic law, including gender apartheid, public executions, and bans on women's education.

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The Kyiv IndependentDr. Gary E Myers

U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 8 he was "not happy" with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"We get a lot of bullsh*t thrown at us by Putin," he said at a cabinet meeting. "He's very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless."

Trump has vacillated for months between criticizing Putin and praising the Kremlin. So far, he has failed to increase military aid to Ukraine or sanction Russia despite Moscow's refusal to accept a ceasefire.

During his election campaign, Trump repeatedly pledged to end the war in Ukraine within "24 hours." However, his efforts to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia have seen no progress.

Trump also addressed U.S. legislation on sanctions, saying the Senate's Russia sanctions bill was "totally optional" for him to implement or terminate.

"I'm looking at it very strongly," Trump said.

The bill would impose 500% tariffs on imports from countries purchasing Russian oil, gas, uranium, and other products. It was introduced in April but has seen no progress since then.

Earlier, Trump signaled growing openness to tougher measures against Moscow, ABC News reported on June 29.

According to Senator Lindsey Graham, Trump privately told him it was "time to move" the Russia sanctions bill.

"I’m confident the president is ready for us to act," Graham said.

The Senate is expected to vote on the bill after Congress returns from a break in July.

"(Putin is) killing a lot of people — his soldiers and their soldiers mostly. And it's now up to 7,000 a week," Trump said on July 8, referring to Russia's battlefield losses.

In recent weeks, Trump has been critical of the Russian president. Following a phone call with Putin on July 3, Trump said he was "very disappointed," signaling growing frustration with the Kremlin.

When asked by a journalist on July 8 whether he would take action, Trump responded: "Wouldn't be telling you... We want to have a little surprise."

Trump also commented on the the current pause in weapons deliveries to Ukraine. He pointed to the previous transfer of advanced systems, including Javelin anti-tank missiles and Patriot air defense systems, calling them "the best equipment in the world."

His remarks come after the United States halted military aid shipments to Ukraine on July 2 amid an internal Pentagon review of stockpile capacity. The freeze coincided with a surge in Russian aerial attacks, leaving Ukraine increasingly vulnerable amid a shortage of U.S.-supplied air defense systems.

The U.S. halted weapons shipments to Ukraine amid a capability review, the White House and Pentagon previously confirmed, with Trump later denying the pause.

On July 7, the Pentagon said it would renew shipments, saying the additional defensive weapons were intended to help Ukraine protect itself while the U.S. works toward "a lasting peace."

Dnipropetrovsk village likely contested despite Russia’s claim of its capture

The village of Dachne in the southern part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast appears to be contested, according to the Finnish Black Bird Group open-source intelligence collective. The Russian Defense Ministry on July 7 claimed to have seized Dachne, which would mark the first village to be under Russian control in the industrial Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, located just west of the war-torn Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian military denied the claimed capture, calling it “disinformation.” Viktor Tregubov, spok

The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

Russia's crude oil shipments have dropped to their lowest level since February, as refinery processing outpaces production growth and trims available export volumes, Bloomberg reported on July 8.

Russia has used its revenues from energy exports to finance the war in Ukraine.

Seaborne crude flows averaged 3.12 million barrels a day over the four weeks to July 6, a 3% decline from the previous period ending June 29, according to tanker-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg. That's the lowest level recorded since the four-week period ending Feb. 23.

The gross value of Moscow's oil exports rose by about $100 million, or 8%, to $1.36 billion for the week ending July 6, Bloomberg said. That increase was due to higher volume, although average export prices declined for a second consecutive week.

Most of Russia's oil continues to head to Asia. Shipments to the region averaged 2.73 million barrels per day, slightly lower than the previous month. Flows to Turkey fell to 370,000 barrels a day, and shipments to Syria held steady at 25,000 barrels a day.

The European Union is seeking to tighten sanctions on Russia. Ambassadors have yet to approve the EU's 18th sanctions package due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia. The bloc failed to adopt the new package on June 27.

The new package includes restrictions targeting Russia's energy and banking sectors, as well as transactions linked to the Nord Stream gas pipeline.

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The unexplained death of a top Russian oil executive on July 4 is fueling renewed scrutiny over the rising number of high-profile Russian officials and businessmen who have died under mysterious circumstances, specifically, have fallen out of windows. Andrei Badalov, vice president of Transneft, Russia’s largest state-controlled pipeline transport company,

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy

Three men were found guilty on July 8 in connection with an arson attack on Ukraine-linked businesses in London, which British authorities say was orchestrated by Russia's Wagner mercenary group, Reuters reported.

The alleged ringleader, Dylan Earl, 21, had already pleaded guilty to aggravated arson over the 2024 blaze targeting companies that were supplying Elon Musk's Starlink satellite equipment to Ukraine, according to Reuters.

The systems are considered vital to Ukraine's communications and defense against Russia's ongoing invasion.

Earl also became the first person convicted under the U.K.'s National Security Act after admitting to a separate plot to attack a wine shop and restaurant in London’s upscale Mayfair district and to kidnap its owner, a prominent critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Two others, Jake Reeves, 23, and Earl’s associate, also pleaded guilty to aggravated arson, with Reeves admitting to a charge under the National Security Act for receiving a material benefit from a foreign intelligence agency.

A jury at London's Old Bailey court convicted three additional men, Nii Kojo Mensah, 23, Jakeem Rose, 23, and Ugnius Asmena, 20, of aggravated arson. They had denied the charges. A fourth man, Paul English, 61, was acquitted.

Two other defendants, Ashton Evans, 20, and Dmitrijus Paulauskas, 23, were charged with failing to disclose knowledge of terrorist activity. Evans was convicted on one count and cleared of another. Paulauskas was acquitted of both charges and reportedly broke down in tears as the verdict was read.

Commander Dominic Murphy of the London Metropolitan Police reportedly said he was confident the Wagner Group and the Russian state were behind the attacks.

The U.K. has designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization.

Earl had exchanged hundreds of encrypted messages with a supposed Wagner handler using the alias "Privet Bot" on Telegram. According to reporting by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), the account was previously advertised by Grey Zone, a Wagner-affiliated channel.

Prosecutors said Earl expressed interest in fighting for Wagner and was encouraged to recruit contacts from British soccer hooligan networks, Irish republican groups, and organized crime circles, Reuters reported. He and Evans also admitted to unrelated charges of dealing cocaine.

The Russian Embassy in London has denied any involvement in the warehouse attack and accused the British government of blaming Russia for domestic issues.

The Kremlin has consistently rejected accusations of sabotage and espionage, despite growing evidence and convictions tied to Russian-linked operations across Europe.

‘Neither side wasted time’ — Ukraine’s economy minister on minerals deal negotiations with Trump’s ‘business-oriented’ administration

Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko says her task is simple — to get the investment fund behind the closely watched minerals deal with the U.S. off the ground, and prove its detractors wrong. “There are so many criticisms from different parties that this fund is just a piece of paper we can put on the shelves — that it won’t be operational,” Svyrydenko, who is also Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, tells the Kyiv Independent at Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on July 4, the morning

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

U.S. President Donald Trump has promised to send 10 Patriot interceptors to Ukraine - a smaller number than had been paused previously while en route to the country, Axios reported on July 8, citing its sources.

Trump has also suggested that Germany sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine, according to three sources cited by Axios. They said the U.S. and European allies would split the cost of the purchase.

The discussion comes as Ukraine is calling upon its allies, particularly the United States, to support Ukrainian air defense by supplying "life-saving" Patriot systems and relevant missiles.

The Pentagon said on July 2 that some military assistance to Ukraine had been halted as the U.S. Defense Department conducts a review of foreign aid deliveries.

On July 7, the Pentagon said it would renew shipments, saying the additional defensive weapons were intended to help Ukraine protect itself while the U.S. works toward "a lasting peace."

Merz called Trump to request the release of the paused interceptors, according to Axios. During the call, Trump proposed that Germany sell one of its own Patriot batteries to Ukraine.

While no agreement has been reached, officials on both sides say negotiations are ongoing. German officials maintain that Berlin has already sent a higher share of its available Patriot systems to Ukraine than any other NATO country, including the U.S.

Russia has escalated its aerial campaign against Ukraine in recent weeks, launching large-scale missile and drone attacks that have killed and injured hundreds of civilians across multiple cities.

The suspension of U.S. arms deliveries, which include Patriots and precision-guided munitions, drew criticism from Kyiv. During a July 4 phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump said he was not responsible for halting the aid, according to the Wall Street Journal.

He reportedly told Zelensky that a review of U.S. munitions stockpiles was initiated after last month's U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, but denied ordering a full pause in shipments.

NBC News reported that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth halted the shipments unilaterally on July 2, despite internal Pentagon assessments that the move would not jeopardize U.S. military readiness.

Special Envoy Keith Kellogg and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov are set to meet in Rome later this week to discuss resuming the stalled military aid, Politico reported on July 7.

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The Kyiv IndependentDr. Gary E Myers

President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an order on July 8 imposing sanctions on five Chinese-registered companies accused of supplying components found in Russian Shahed-type drones used to attack Ukraine.

The decree follows a statement by Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), which said it recovered Chinese-made parts from downed drones during a July 4 air assault on Kyiv.

Sanctions were imposed on Central Asia Silk Road International Trade, Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing, Shenzhen Royo Technology, Shenzhen Jinduobang Technology, and Ningbo BLIN Machinery.

The list was published on the Presidential Office's website alongside the official decision by Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council.

Russia's domestically produced drones based on Iran's Shahed-136 is a loitering munition extensively used by Russia to target Ukrainian cities, and is assembled with components sourced from around the world. Kyiv has warned that some of these parts continue to flow through countries that have not joined Western sanctions.

China has emerged as one of Moscow's key wartime partners, helping Russia circumvent sanctions and becoming the largest supplier of dual-use goods aiding its defense sector.

Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president's commissioner for sanctions, told journalists on July 7 that Russia's growing ability to sustain weapons production is being driven by a flow of Chinese components and materials.

Zelensky has repeatedly accused China of backing Russia and providing technological and logistical support for its war effort. On May 29, he said Beijing had blocked the sale of drones to Ukraine while continuing to supply them to Russia.

Ukraine has already sanctioned several Chinese companies tied to Russia's war effort.

As Russian-Chinese relations deepen, Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit China in September, where he is scheduled to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Putin signs decree allowing foreigners to serve in Russian army during mobilization

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilization decree from Sept. 21, 2022, remains in force and has never been formally rescinded.

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 7 permitting foreigners to serve in the Russian army during periods of mobilization, expanding military recruitment efforts.

Putin's partial mobilization decree from Sept. 21, 2022, remains in force and has never been formally rescinded. Ending it would require a separate presidential decree specifying a termination date.

Previously, it was allowed only during states of emergency or under martial law. Despite its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has avoided formally declaring martial law.

According to the document, the Kremlin is also permitting qualified specialists who have reached the age limit to sign contracts with Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal Security Service (FSB), or other state security agencies.

The changes aim to strengthen recruitment as Moscow tries to keep up the pace of troop replenishment without causing another wave of unpopular conscription. The Kremlin has heavily relied on financial incentives and aggressive campaigns to attract new volunteers.

Moscow currently recruits 30,000 to 40,000 individuals into its army each month, sources familiar with U.S. and EU intelligence told the Wall Street Journal.

On March 31, Putin authorized the spring conscription of 160,000 men — the country's largest call-up in 14 years. Though Russian officials claim conscripts are not sent to the front, human rights groups and relatives have reported that many are pressured into signing contracts.

In May, Russia's Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin said 20,000 naturalized migrants were sent to fight in Ukraine after failing to register for military service.

In the summer of 2024, Russian lawmakers passed a law allowing the revocation of citizenship for naturalized individuals who do not comply with military registration requirements.

Rotterdam port prepares for NATO arms shipments amid Russia threat

Rotterdam has previously handled weapons shipments, but this marks the first time that it will designate a special berth for military use.

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy

Less than a month after his release from Russian captivity, 57-year-old soldier Valery Zelensky died of injuries sustained under torture, Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne reported on July 6.

Zelensky had spent 39 months in Russian captivity. He was released as part of the landmark 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner deal on May 25. Just 22 days later, on June 16, his heart stopped.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, his unit delivered weapons to Ukrainian forces in Mariupol, his daughter, Valeria Zelenka, said.

"When the offensive began, they were told that volunteers were needed to go on the assault. Out of 40 (people), eight said, 'We're going.' My father was one of them," she added.

The family did not immediately find out that he had been taken prisoner for some time, and he was considered missing in action. During his years in captivity, Zelensky's family received only one letter. He had long appeared on prisoner exchange lists but did not return until this year.

"The torture was not just cruel, it was inhuman. But he endured it," his daughter told Suspilne.

"He told me, 'Daughter, I endured it because of Kyokushin (a style of karate). I have discipline, I'm tough. My body and muscles protected me.'"

Valeria said her father had been overjoyed to come home and meet his grandson for the first time. He also expressed a desire to learn Ukrainian after years of speaking Russian.

Doctors initially treated him for suspected pancreatic issues, but his condition quickly deteriorated. During surgery, they discovered his organs were severely damaged. He died in intensive care days later.

"My father told me, 'Three people died among us from torture. And when I was in a very bad state, I asked God: Please let me see the eyes of my beloved,'" his daughter said.

A medical report listed extensive injuries. He had a non-functioning shoulder and arm and showed signs of multiple organ failures.

"The first feeling is inexhaustible pain that your loved one is no longer here. He was simply tortured," Valeria said. "And there is relief that he no longer feels that torture."

Zelensky's return was part of a wider prisoner exchange agreed during a first round of direct talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Istanbul.

The case is the latest in a number of Ukrainian soldiers' deaths after their return from Russian captivity, highlighting the effects of "widespread and systematic" torture of prisoners of war (POWs) in Russian prisons, reported by the U.N.

Serhii Dobrovolskyi, a Ukrainian soldier who had been in Russian captivity since 2023, died just a month after his release at the end of May as part of a 1000-for-1000 prisoner swap, an official from the soldier's home region announced on June 21.

In 2023, a high-ranking officer from the "Azov" brigade, Oleh Mudrak, died at 35 years old, months after his release from Russian captivity.

As a POW, he survived the Olenivka camp explosion and endured a dramatic weight loss in just 100 days, as seen in the photos published by Stanislav Aseyev, a Ukrainian writer and activist.

Dmytro Shapovalov, a 32-year-old defender of Ukraine who was exchanged in 2023 after over a year in Russian prisons, died on June 9, according to Suspilne.

Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian captivity often face torture, abuse, and inhumane treatment, according to Ukrainian officials and human rights groups.

Many former POWs have reported beatings, starvation, and psychological pressure.

The exact number of Ukrainians currently held by Russia remains unknown. Kyiv continues to call for a full all-for-all exchange. Moscow has repeatedly rejected the offer.

‘Beyond cynical’ – Russian doctor carved ‘Glory to Russia’ scar on POW during operation, Ukraine says

After more than three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, each new revelation of cruel treatment of Ukrainians in Russian captivity hardly surprises anyone. But when a photo recently emerged online, showing a “Glory to Russia” scar on the body of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW), it sent shockwaves

The Kyiv IndependentDaria Shulzhenko

In anticipation of a potential war with Russia, the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands has begun reserving space for NATO ships carrying military cargo and is mapping out logistics routes for weapons transfers, the Financial Times reported on July 8.

The decision comes as NATO allies increasingly warn of the risk of a large-scale war with Russia within five years. Rotterdam has previously handled weapons shipments, but this marks the first time that it will designate a special berth for military use.

Part of the container terminal will be repurposed to ensure the safe transfer of ammunition and other equipment between vessels. Military supply logistics will be coordinated with the port of Antwerp in neighboring Belgium.

"We see each other less and less as competitors," Boudewijn Siemons, Chief Executive of the Port of Rotterdam Authority, said, referring to the port of Antwerp.

"If large volumes of military goods would have to be shipped, we'd look to Antwerp or other ports to take over some capacity and the other way around."

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Siemons added that not all terminals are equipped to handle military-grade cargo, making the logistical coordination crucial, particularly for shipments from the U.S., U.K., and Canada.

In May, the Dutch Defense Ministry confirmed that space would be allocated for military supplies at NATO's request. The move is part of broader efforts by European allies to reduce dependence on the U.S. for defense logistics.

Russia's military spending has surged amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow's 2024 defense budget rose by 42% in real terms, reaching $462 billion, surpassing the combined total of all European countries.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on July 5 that a Chinese military move against Taiwan could prompt Beijing to encourage Russia to open a second front against NATO states.

Rutte has repeatedly warned that Russia could rebuild its military capabilities fast enough to pose a direct threat to NATO territory, urging allied governments to act swiftly and decisively.

‘Neither side wasted time’ — Ukraine’s economy minister on minerals deal negotiations with Trump’s ‘business-oriented’ administration

Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko says her task is simple — to get the investment fund behind the closely watched minerals deal with the U.S. off the ground, and prove its detractors wrong. “There are so many criticisms from different parties that this fund is just a piece of paper we can put on the shelves — that it won’t be operational,” Svyrydenko, who is also Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, tells the Kyiv Independent at Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on July 4, the morning

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

After failing to approve 18th package of sanctions against Russia due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia, EU countries are expected to finalize an agreement this week, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna said on July 7.

Since EU sanctions require unanimous approval, a single veto could prevent implementation. In late June, EU ambassadors did not approve the sanctions package because of objections from Budapest and Bratislava.

"According to my information, European countries will still reach an agreement this week on the 18th package of sanctions, together with Slovakia and Hungary," she told Ukrainian broadcaster ICTV.

The delay followed earlier signs of resistance from both governments, despite the package being introduced shortly after the previous round of sanctions took effect on May 20.

"It is noteworthy that during the previous period, when the decision on the 17th package was being made, Hungary did not vote for this decision until the last day," Stefanishyna said.

"There was even almost a day when these sanctions were not put into effect."

Unlike Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has consistently opposed sanctions and military aid for Ukraine, Slovakia has not previously attempted to block new EU measures.

Bratislava requested a delay in adopting the latest package until the bloc clarifies the financial implications of RePowerEU — an initiative to end reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2030.

"Without radical political leadership in the European Union, it will be very difficult," Stefanishyna said, warning of future veto threats by individual member states.

The 18th package includes new restrictions targeting Russia's energy and banking sectors, as well as transactions linked to the Nord Stream pipeline project.

These measures are part of a broader European effort to tighten pressure on Moscow as it continues to reject calls for an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.

While the EU pushes forward with additional restrictions, the United States has not imposed new sanctions on Russia since President Donald Trump took office in January.

‘Neither side wasted time’ — Ukraine’s economy minister on minerals deal negotiations with Trump’s ‘business-oriented’ administration

Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko says her task is simple — to get the investment fund behind the closely watched minerals deal with the U.S. off the ground, and prove its detractors wrong. “There are so many criticisms from different parties that this fund is just a piece of paper we can put on the shelves — that it won’t be operational,” Svyrydenko, who is also Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, tells the Kyiv Independent at Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on July 4, the morning

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

At least nine civilians were killed and 81 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past 24 hours, regional authorities reported on July 8.

Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 54 drones overnight, including Iranian-designed Shahed-type attack drones, and fired four S-300/400 guided missiles.

Air defenses intercepted 34 drones, while another eight were likely used as radar-jamming decoys. Drones struck five locations across the country.

The overnight assault was repelled using aircraft, electronic warfare, mobile fire groups, and missile defense systems, the military said.

In Kharkiv Oblast, one person was killed and 40 others were injured, including three children, as the city of Kharkiv and seven other settlements came under attack, Governor Oleh Syniehubov reported.

Russian strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast injured 20 people and damaged at least 64 houses and apartment buildings, Governor Ivan Fedorov said.

In Donetsk Oblast, three civilians were killed — two in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and one in Novotroitske — and 10 more were injured, according to Governor Vadym Filashkin.

In Sumy Oblast, four people were killed and four more injured in Russian strikes, the local administration reported.

One person was killed and four others were injured in Kherson Oblast, where Russian forces hit residential areas and public infrastructure, damaging two apartment buildings and 17 houses, according to Governor Oleksandr Prokudin.

Three people were injured in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Russian troops attacked with first-person-view (FPV) drones, Governor Serhii Lysak said.

The wave of attacks follows Russia's ongoing refusal to accept a ceasefire and comes amid rising use of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure.

‘They have to be able to defend themselves’ — Trump says US will send additional weapons shipments to Ukraine, criticizes Putin

“They’re getting hit very hard. We’re gonna have to send more weapons, your defensive weapons primarily,” U.S. President Donald Trump said.

The Kyiv IndependentVolodymyr Ivanyshyn

Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) identified Russian Armed Forces Major Denis Sheynov as allegedly involved in the July 2024 missile strike on Kyiv's Okhmatdyt children's hospital, HUR reported on July 8.

The strike, which killed two adults and injured at least 34 people, directly hit the country's largest pediatric medical center, where 627 children were receiving treatment at the time.

According to HUR, Sheynov is the head of the special engineering service of the 121st Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, part of Russia's 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, tasked with executing the strike.

Sheynov, born in Saratov on Jan. 30, 1978, was reportedly responsible for the technical preparation of the X-101 air-launched cruise missiles used in the attack.

He graduated from the Saratov Higher Military Command Engineering School Missile Forces, and previously served in Syria in 2018. Sheynov has been awarded several medals by the Russian government, including for participation in the Syrian war.

Ukrainian authorities previously charged Russian Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash in absentia for ordering the strike, which was widely condemned internationally.

Kobylash gave the order at around 9:15 a.m., while the hospital was struck at 10:45 a.m.

‘They have to be able to defend themselves’ — Trump says US will send additional weapons shipments to Ukraine, criticizes Putin

“They’re getting hit very hard. We’re gonna have to send more weapons, your defensive weapons primarily,” U.S. President Donald Trump said.

The Kyiv IndependentVolodymyr Ivanyshyn

Striletska Bay near Sevastopol, once a key base for Russian warships in occupied Crimea, is now nearly empty and used primarily for mooring tugboats and small patrol craft, the Atesh partisan group reported on July 8.

According to the group, Russia now uses the bay mainly for maintenance work and rare anti-sabotage defense drills, having pulled most major vessels from the area.

"Recently, the bay has been practically empty... The degradation of the occupation fleet in Sevastopol is becoming increasingly obvious. Striletska Bay, which previously housed a large number of combat vessels, is now idle." Atesh said.

The remaining combat units are periodically rotated and redeployed in an apparent effort to avoid detection by Ukrainian reconnaissance.

"Every object is under control — no ship will go unnoticed," Atesh said, adding that all ship movements are being tracked and shared with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Sevastopol has served as the base for Russia's Black Sea Fleet since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Repeated Ukrainian attacks using naval drones, missiles, and long-range drones have forced the Kremlin to reduce its naval presence in occupied Crimea.

Ukraine has destroyed several Russian vessels, including the Caesar Kunikov landing ship, the Sergei Kotov patrol ship, the Ivanovets missile corvette, and multiple high-speed landing crafts.

The shrinking Russian presence in Sevastopol comes as Ukraine steps up drone attacks against other Black Sea Fleet locations. On July 6, drones struck the fleet's facilities in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, a key port east of Crimea across the Kerch Strait.

‘They have to be able to defend themselves’ — Trump says US will send additional weapons shipments to Ukraine, criticizes Putin

“They’re getting hit very hard. We’re gonna have to send more weapons, your defensive weapons primarily,” U.S. President Donald Trump said.

The Kyiv IndependentVolodymyr Ivanyshyn

Russia has lost 1,028,610 troops in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported on July 8.

The number includes 1,070 casualties that Russian forces suffered over the past day.

According to the report, Russia has also lost 10,995 tanks, 22,967 armored fighting vehicles, 54,456 vehicles and fuel tanks, 30,034 artillery systems, 1,434 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,192 air defense systems, 421 airplanes, 340 helicopters, 44,230 drones, 28 ships and boats, and one submarine.

Russia striking NATO while China invades Taiwan ‘plausible’ scenario, experts say

If Beijing moves against Taiwan, NATO might soon find itself in a two-front war with China and Russia — or so the alliance’s secretary general believes. “If Xi Jinping would attack Taiwan, he would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin… and telling him, ‘Hey, I’m going to do this, and I need you to to keep them busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory,’” Secretary General Mark Rutte said in a July 5 interview with the New

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

The EU will introduce the "toughest sanctions... imposed (on Russia) in the last three years" in coordination with U.S. senators, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said in a television interview on July 7.

"(Russian President Vladimir) Putin is no longer advancing on the front and is now limited to shelling residential areas with drones and missiles. This is leading to numerous casualties among the civilian population. This must stop," Barrot said.

U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham said on June 29 that U.S. President Donald Trump was ready for the Senate to vote on a bill to impose new sanctions on Russia. The Republican senator has repeatedly called for implementing additional sanctions against Moscow.

Barrot noted the EU is planning to impose the strongest sanctions against Russia that the bloc has introduced since 2022.

"This (war) cannot continue; it must stop. To achieve this, in coordination with American senators, Europe is preparing to introduce, based on French proposals, the toughest sanctions we have imposed in the last three years," he said.

"They will directly deplete the resources that allow Vladimir Putin to continue his war," Barrot added.

In the U.S., senators have been working on a sanctions bill, with Graham saying voting on a bill is expected to begin following the end of the July congressional break.

Graham, earlier on July 7, said he expects "the Senate will move the bipartisan Russian sanctions bill that will allow tariffs and sanctions to be placed on countries who prop up Putin’s war machine and do not help Ukraine."

The bill led by Graham has been in the works for several months as the White House has failed attempts to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia.

"Ukraine has said yes to ceasefires and to any and all meeting requests while Putin continues to defy peace efforts. It is now time to put more tools in President Trump’s toolbox in order to end the war," he said.

Russia has relied on its partners, including Belarus, China, and Iran, for trade and to bypass Western sanctions meant to inhibit Moscow's ability to continue its war against Ukraine.

Ukraine war latest: Russian airports cancel nearly 300 flights amid drone attacks on Russia

Key developments on July 7: * Russian airports cancel nearly 300 flights amid drone attacks on Russia * BRICS summit statement condemns attacks on Russian railways, avoids urging Russia to cease war efforts in Ukraine * Ukrainian drone strike hits major oil refinery in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai, HUR source claims * Ukraine confirms drone strike on Russian chemical plant near Moscow * Russia strikes conscription offices in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine says Several Russian airports have

The Kyiv IndependentThe Kyiv Independent news desk

The United States will send "more weapons" to Ukraine amid intensified Russian strikes, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters on July 7, adding that he is disappointed in Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"We're gonna send some more weapons we have to them, they have to be able to defend themselves, they're getting hit very hard now," Trump said alongside a U.S. and Israeli delegation at the White House.

The U.S. halted weapons shipments to Ukraine amid a capability review, the White House and Pentagon previously confirmed, with Trump later denying the pause.

Trump previously said he was disappointed in Putin for not making progress to end Russia's war against Ukraine, following a phone call between the two leaders on July 3.

On July 7, Trump again said he was unhappy with Putin for failing to cooperate with U.S. efforts to end the war in Ukraine.

"It's a horrible thing, and I'm not happy with President Putin at all," Trump said. "I'm disappointed frankly that President Putin hasn't stopped."

He noted that the additional assistance the U.S. will supply to Ukraine will mainly consist of defense weapons amid increased Russian attacks.

"They're getting hit very hard. We're gonna have to send more weapons, your defensive weapons primarily, but they're getting hit very, very hard. So many people are dying in that mess," Trump said.

Later on July 7 the Pentagon released a statement confirming more weapons would be sent to Ukraine.

"At President Trump's direction, the Department of Defense is sending additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure the Ukrainians can defend themselves while we work to secure a lasting peace and ensure the killing stops," it read.

‘Neither side wasted time’ — Ukraine’s economy minister on minerals deal negotiations with Trump’s ‘business-oriented’ administration

Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko says her task is simple — to get the investment fund behind the closely watched minerals deal with the U.S. off the ground, and prove its detractors wrong. “There are so many criticisms from different parties that this fund is just a piece of paper we can put on the shelves — that it won’t be operational,” Svyrydenko, who is also Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, tells the Kyiv Independent at Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on July 4, the morning

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

"Our framework for POTUS to evaluate military shipments across the globe remains in effect and is integral to our America First defense priorities."

President Volodymyr Zelensky has previously said he and Trump discussed supplying Ukraine with additional Patriot missile systems following a phone call between the two on July 4.

Zelensky described his recent phone call with Trump as "the best conversation in all this time" in an evening address on July 5.

"Patriot (missiles) are key to protection from ballistic (missiles). We discussed several other important issues that our teams will work out in detail at meetings in the near future," he said.

Trump described his July 3 conversation with Putin as disappointing, saying that the call "didn't make any progress" in stopping Russia's war against Ukraine.

"I'm very disappointed with the conversation I had today with President Putin," Trump told journalists. "Because I don't think he's there. And I'm very disappointed.  I don't think he's looking to stop this fighting."

Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell confirmed on July 2 that some military assistance to Ukraine has been halted as the U.S. Defense Department conducts a review of foreign aid deliveries.

"This capability review... is being conducted to ensure U.S. military aid aligns with our defense priorities... We see this as a common-sense, pragmatic step towards having a framework to evaluate what munitions are sent and where," Parnell said.

Despite the Pentagon announcement, Trump did not acknowledge a halt in U.S. weapons shipments to Ukraine.

"Why did you pause weapons shipments to Ukraine?" a reporter asked Trump as the U.S. president prepared to board Air Force One on July 3.

"We haven't," Trump replied. "We're giving weapons."

Ukraine war latest: Russian airports cancel nearly 300 flights amid drone attacks on Russia

Key developments on July 7: * Russian airports cancel nearly 300 flights amid drone attacks on Russia * BRICS summit statement condemns attacks on Russian railways, avoids urging Russia to cease war efforts in Ukraine * Ukrainian drone strike hits major oil refinery in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai, HUR source claims * Ukraine confirms drone strike on Russian chemical plant near Moscow * Russia strikes conscription offices in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine says Several Russian airports have

The Kyiv IndependentThe Kyiv Independent news desk

A former deputy chief of the Russian army's General Staff, Colonel General Khalil Arslanov, was sentenced to 17 years in prison on July 7 over a scheme involving the theft of over 1 billion roubles ($12.7 million) from Defense Ministry contracts, Russia's state-owned TASS news agency reported.

A closed-door military court found Arslanov and others guilty of embezzling millions from state contracts with Voentelecom, a company providing telecommunications services to the Russian military.

Arslanov was also convicted of extorting a 12 million rouble ($152,400) bribe from the head of a military communications company. Two co-defendants, Colonel Pavel Kutakhov and military pensioner Igor Yakovlev, received seven and six years in prison, respectively.

Arslanov, a former head of the Russian military's communications unit, served as deputy chief of the army's General Staff from 2013 until his removal in 2020 and was named a colonel general in 2017.

This high-profile conviction is the latest in a series of corruption scandals that have implicated top echelons of the Russian military establishment over the past year. Russia has significantly stepped up prosecutions of senior defense officials.

Just last week, on July 1, former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov was sentenced to 13 years in a penal colony after being found guilty of corruption. It was the harshest verdict in a series of high-level military corruption cases until Arslanov's sentencing on July 7.

Authorities initially detained Ivanov in April 2024 on bribery allegations, later adding embezzlement charges in October. His trial, like Arslanov's, was held behind closed doors reportedly due to national security concerns.

Ivanov's co-defendant, Anton Filatov, a former logistics company executive, received a 12.5-year sentence.According to state media, the embezzled amount totaled 4.1 billion roubles ($48.8 million), primarily funneled through bank transfers to two foreign accounts. Ivanov pleaded not guilty.

The court stripped him of all state honors and ordered the confiscation of property, vehicles, and cash valued at 2.5 billion roubles, including a luxury apartment in central Moscow, a three-storey English-style mansion, and a high-end car collection featuring brands like Bentley and Aston Martin.

Russia striking NATO while China invades Taiwan ‘plausible’ scenario, experts say

If Beijing moves against Taiwan, NATO might soon find itself in a two-front war with China and Russia — or so the alliance’s secretary general believes. “If Xi Jinping would attack Taiwan, he would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin… and telling him, ‘Hey, I’m going to do this, and I need you to to keep them busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory,’” Secretary General Mark Rutte said in a July 5 interview with the New

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

Russia's crude oil production in June fell below its agreed-upon OPEC+ target, according to individuals familiar with the data interviwed by Bloomberg.

Russian producers reportedly pumped 9.022 million barrels per day last month, a figure 28,000 barrels per day below the required level, including compensation cuts. This marks the largest gap between Russia's output and its monthly quota this year, based on Bloomberg's calculations.

Historically, Russia, which co-leads the OPEC+ alliance with Saudi Arabia, has faced criticism for poor compliance with production quotas. However, the nation has shown improved adherence for most of 2025, often pumping below its required levels, according to analysis of Russian data. This increased focus on production discipline follows earlier critiques from Riyadh.

Under the terms of the OPEC+ agreement, Russia's daily production quota for June had increased by 78,000 barrels to 9.161 million barrels. However, Moscow had also committed to a 111,000 barrel-a-day compensation cut for the month, bringing its actual output target to 9.050 million barrels per day.

On July 5, eight OPEC+ nations collectively agreed to raise production by 548,000 barrels per day in August, aiming to capitalize on strong summer consumption. Analysts suggest these additional barrels may be quickly absorbed but could contribute to a crude surplus later in the year.

Independent verification of Russia's oil output data has become challenging since Moscow classified official figures after Western sanctions targeting the nation's energy industry following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, market watchers now largely rely on indicators such as seaborne exports and domestic refinery runs to track trends in Russia's oil production.

Russia striking NATO while China invades Taiwan ‘plausible’ scenario, experts say

If Beijing moves against Taiwan, NATO might soon find itself in a two-front war with China and Russia — or so the alliance’s secretary general believes. “If Xi Jinping would attack Taiwan, he would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin… and telling him, ‘Hey, I’m going to do this, and I need you to to keep them busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory,’” Secretary General Mark Rutte said in a July 5 interview with the New

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

The United Kingdom has imposed new sanctions on Russian individuals and an organization involved in the use and transfer of chemical weapons in Ukraine, the British government announced on July 7.

According to the updated sanctions list published on the U.K. government's official website, the new measures target Russia's Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry, as well as Lieutenant General Alexei Rtishchev, head of Russia's Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops, and his deputy, Andrei Marchenko.

The U.K. government said that both of them "have been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons."

The Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry was sanctioned for providing Russia's military with handheld chemical grenades, which have been used against Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The new British sanctions come amid growing international concern over Russia's escalating use of banned chemical agents in its war against Ukraine.

On July 4, the Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) reported that Russian troops are increasingly deploying chemical weapons— including chloropicrin, a highly toxic World War I-era agent, in the field.

The agents are reportedly dropped by drones to flush Ukrainian soldiers from trenches, leaving them exposed to further drone or artillery strikes. While Russia previously used tear gas, the confirmed use of chloropicrin, a substance banned under international law, is "absolutely unacceptable," Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans said.

Ukrainian authorities say Russia has conducted more than 9,000 chemical attacks since the full-scale invasion began in 2022. At least three Ukrainian soldiers have reportedly died from direct exposure.

Exclusive: Ukraine pitches deepwater gas, oil refinery projects to US under landmark minerals deal

Projects Kyiv has submitted to the U.S. for consideration as part of a profit-sharing deal for Ukraine’s resources include a shelf and deepwater project and an oil refinery that comes under frequent attack by Russia, Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko told the Kyiv Independent in an interview published on July 7. After months of hard-fought negotiations around the investment agreement — known more widely as the “minerals deal” for its focus on Ukraine’s critical minerals — the two sid

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

Russia’s growing ability to sustain weapons production despite Western sanctions is being driven by a flow of Chinese components and materials, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president’s commissioner for sanctions, told journalists on July 7.

Vlasiuk’s statement comes as Russia escalates its drone and missile strikes on Ukraine, while the U.S. continues to hold back on imposing tougher sanctions against Moscow and foreign-made components are still being found in Russian weapons used in the attacks.

Ukraine has previously documented that Chinese companies have contributed electronics and materials used in the production of these drones.

Just days earlier, after a large-scale Russian attack on July 4, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha shared on social media a photo of a component from a Shahed-136/Geran-2 combat drone discovered in Kyiv. According to Sybiha, the part was manufactured in China and delivered recently.

"The trend of China’s (role) is increasing," Vlasiuk told journalists.

He said that the presence of Chinese-made components and materials in Russian weapons is on the rise, adding that Beijing is expanding its technological capabilities and can now replicate some American technologies.

When asked by Kyiv about the Chinese parts found in Russian weapons, Beijing responded by claiming that such support is "non-lethal," the president's commissioner for sanctions said.

Beijing remains one of Russia's key wartime partners, helping Moscow evade Western sanctions and emerging as the leading supplier of dual-use goods used by the Russian defense industry.

In April, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that China, alongside Iran and North Korea, is supplying weapons to Russia.

His remarks followed reports that Ukrainian soldiers had captured Chinese nationals fighting together with Russia's army in Donetsk Oblast. Later, Zelensky revealed that at least "several hundred" Chinese nationals are fighting on Russia's side in Ukraine.

Ukraine has already sanctioned several Chinese companies tied to Russia’s war effort.

The South China Morning Post reported that China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told the EU's top diplomat Kaja Kallas on July 3 that the country cannot afford for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine amid fears Washington would shift focus towards Beijing.

Experts echo Rutte’s warnings on Russian-Chinese threat to NATO, Taiwan

If Beijing moves against Taiwan, NATO might soon find itself in a two-front war with China and Russia — or so the alliance’s secretary general believes. “If Xi Jinping would attack Taiwan, he would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin… and telling him, ‘Hey, I’m going to do this, and I need you to to keep them busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory,’” Secretary General Mark Rutte said in a July 5 interview with the New

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

Editor's note: This story was updated with the latest information from the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office.

Russian drones struck Ukrainian conscription offices in the cities of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia early on July 7, injuring at least three people in Kharkiv, while also damaging military infrastructure, Ukraine's Ground Forces said. At least one soldier was wounded in Zaporizhzhia.

The attack comes as Russia increases its efforts to disrupt mobilization in Ukraine.

"As a result of the attack, (Russian) drones hit the building of the Kharkiv conscription office and the surrounding area, as well as near the Zaporizhzhia conscription office," the Ground Forces said.

Two other districts of Kharkiv came under attack that same day, in which one woman was killed and over 80 people, including eight children, were reported injured or suffered shock in Kharkiv, according to the local prosecutor's office.

The strikes are the latest in what Ukrainian military officials describe as a deliberate Russian campaign to target enlistment infrastructure and undermine mobilization efforts.

On July 3, a deadly Russian strike on the central city of Poltava killed two people and injured 47 others. The attack caused a fire at the city's military conscription office and heavily damaged nearby civilian buildings, including civilian houses.

Speaking on national television after the Poltava attack, Ukraine's Ground Forces spokesperson Vitalii Sarantsev said Russia was intentionally striking enlistment centers to disrupt Ukraine's ability to replenish its Armed Forces.

"We will continue to strengthen our army, train our troops, and involve more people in defense to deliver a strong response to the enemy," Sarantsev said.

HUR publishes Russian military order, claims proof of Moscow increasing military footprint in Armenia

HUR first made the claim on July 5, saying Russia was increasing its forces at the Gyumri base to exert greater influence in the South Caucasus and “destabilize the global security situation.”

The Kyiv IndependentChris York

Major shutdowns at Russia's key airports on July 5–6 caused by Ukrainian drone attacks could cost Russian airlines around 20 billion rubles ($254 million), the pro-Kremlin outlet Kommersant reported on July 7, citing airline representatives and industry experts.

Since the start of mass disruptions on July 5, a total of 485 flights were canceled, 88 were diverted to alternate airports, and another 1,900 were delayed across major hubs, according to Russia's aviation agency Rosaviatsiya.

The drone attacks prompted operational shutdowns that triggered widespread logistical and economic consequences. Over 94,000 passengers were housed in hotels, 43,000 refunds were processed, and hundreds of thousands of vouchers for food and drinks were issued.

The estimated financial toll includes direct airline losses from canceled Boeing 737-800 flights, which can run between 15 million and 23 million rubles ($190,000–$292,000) each depending on the route, as well as costs for delays, diversions, and passenger care.

Experts say the true cost could be far higher. Dmitry Datsykov of EXPO.UAV estimated tens of billions of rubles in additional indirect losses, including missed connections, taxi and hotel losses, and supply chain disruptions.

Ukraine has not publicly claimed responsibility for the disruptions but has acknowledged that its drone strategy aims to undermine Russian logistics and force the war's consequences closer to the Russian public.

The economic fallout comes amid growing scrutiny of Russia's transport sector. On July 7, President Vladimir Putin dismissed Transport Minister Roman Starovoit following the aviation chaos and a high-profile ammonia leak at the Ust-Luga port.

The Kremlin has increasingly struggled to protect critical infrastructure from Kyiv's deep-strike drone campaign, which in recent months has expanded to include refineries, radar plants, and now Russia's busiest airports.

Russian transport minister fired by Putin reportedly shoots himself dead

According to Russian media, ex-Transport Minister Roman Starovoit’s body was found near Moscow. Preliminary findings suggest that the suicide may be linked to a possible criminal case.

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy