Frontline Rolls, a documentary photography project by Ukrainian photographer Serhii Melnychenko, began in February 2025, when Serhii started sending disposable film cameras to soldiers serving in different areas of the front line. He asked them to document their daily lives, routines, and work.

The project has since been published as a standalone photobook and adapted into an exhibition, with photographs, handwritten letters, and artifacts returned by the participants. In 2026, it won the PhMuseum 2026 Photography Grant Main Prize.

The Ukraine War Archive calls Russia’s war against Ukraine the most documented war in history. Frontline Rolls records it from the soldiers’ own perspective through their photographs, letters, and chosen objects.

How Frontline Rolls began

Serhii spent nearly all of 2024 working on Along the Dnipro. Since he did not have time to travel to soldiers’ positions but wanted to document their experiences, he began looking for alternative ways. He asked himself one question:

“Do I really have to be there in person to document this?” Serhii writes in the foreword to the book, the project’s print format.

The answer was for the soldiers themselves to document their lives for a period of time. Serhii reached out to Fotovramci, which agreed to provide him with disposable film cameras free of charge.

The photographs that came back document the soldiers’ daily lives and the spaces in which they served.

Project participants also shared their stories in the book:

“I joined because I have to protect my family from the orcs. Before the full‐scale invasion I was an artist–designer, worked in advertising. Now a tank commander and reconnaissance pilot on a Mavic. In my free time I decorate shell‐casings and send them to volunteers for help,” says Oleksii, a soldier and participant in the project who goes by the call sign “Lapa.”

“For almost 3½ years I have remained in my soul a civilian. This system is very alien to me. In it I suffer a lot, in particular due to the huge restrictions on freedom. But I am here so that my country remains free. And for my values and convictions I have already paid a considerable price. If I had the option to choose another path—I would still choose this one,” says Oleksii “Photographer,” a soldier and project participant.

“I don’t have a callsign, because everyone knows me as Holikov. In the military since November 2023. From the very start of the full‑scale invasion I volunteered, but with each trip to the front I felt that I was doing not enough and decided to join the ranks of the 109th Separate Brigade of Territorial Defence,” says Viktor Holikov.

“In the army I... feel calmer. I have finally found a certain peace of mind during the full‐scale invasion, despite the difficulties. Partly I still feel that I’m doing not enough, but now it doesn’t haunt me like it used to,” says Kseniia, a servicewoman who goes by the call sign “Jane.”

“The army for me is, first of all, what is called brotherhood. It is hard to describe—you can only understand it by being inside,” says Danylo “Doc.”

The artifacts tell their own stories

Participants returned handwritten letters and personal objects with the exposed film. Serhii describes the resulting collection as a record of “personal experiences, struggles, and memories.”

“I collected artifacts that will remain part of our nation’s history after victory, reminding us of these challenging times,” Serhii says in the book.

Frontline Rolls travels beyond Ukraine

In 2026, Serhii also received the PhEST International Award in Italy, ex aequo with photographer Victorine Alisse.

The photographs were also presented in Copenhagen as part of The War They Live, an exhibition curated by The Kyiv Independent photo editor Irynka Hromotska together with Serhii. The project was also shown at the Athens Photo Festival in 2026. According to Serhii, the exhibition is also scheduled to open at Fotografiska Stockholm in October 2026.

“I sincerely hope that when the war ends, every participant in this project will be alive. Because each of them has become much more to me than just a contributor—they’ve become true friends,” Serhii concludes the foreword to the book.

Russian forces have gained ground on the eastern approaches to Sloviansk and continue to prioritize an eastern route toward the city, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Their earlier push from the northeast had bogged down, and Russia now aims to set up a future assault on one of the last major cities Ukraine still holds in Donetsk Oblast. A quick move on the city itself remains extremely unlikely, ISW said.

Russia's 2026 summer campaign in the east has advanced through field edges and small villages rather than the breakthroughs the Kremlin keeps promising, the grinding pattern that has defined the fighting across Donetsk Oblast for years.

Explore further

Kostiantynivka: Why one city in Donbas matters so much that Putin lies about having captured it

The eastern approach

Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forward units are advancing across several tactical areas at once in the Sloviansk direction. He said the command of Russia's 3rd Combined Arms Army rushes assault infantry forward right after each successful infiltration. Russian troops reached the southeastern edge of Pyskunivka, east of Sloviansk, from the east and northeast, moving off positions they had seized on the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets, Mashovets said. Zakitne lies northeast of Pyskunivka and Kryva Luka southeast of it, and ISW read the advance as evidence Russia has consolidated positions in both.

They also infiltrated the southern and southeastern outskirts of Mykolaivka from western Rai-Oleksandrivka. ISW assessed that Russia is running a dual effort to connect its units near Kryva Luka with those at Rai-Oleksandrivka, so it can assault Mykolaivka from dominant terrain to the east and south at once. Mashovets added that other Russian groups slipped through three settlements along the E-40 Bakhmut-Sloviansk highway, trying to hold the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and reach the river just east of the city.

ISW observed reports on 23 August that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian infiltration attempt in Mykolaivka.

Oleksandr Borodin, spokesperson for Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps, said the Lyman direction falls in his corps' zone and that Russia's goal there is to half-encircle the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the flank—first securing bridgeheads across the rivers, then cutting logistics. He called those plans unrealistic:

"We have quite serious defensive positions there and have been preparing for a long time. The capabilities they currently have to try to accomplish this task are insufficient even to come close to achieving such a goal."

Why Moscow switched directions

Russia prioritized attacking Sloviansk from the northeast through Lyman when it opened its spring-summer 2026 offensive, but that effort has largely stalled. The Siverskyi Donets River, which loops north and northeast of the city, together with a web of canals, handed Ukrainian defenders a natural moat. So Russian commanders now treat Mykolaivka as a key prize. Taking it would let them strike west toward Sloviansk from the east, skirting the water obstacles that blocked the northeastern route.

Explore further

Ukrainian intelligence units will not help: Analyst warns that once Russia breaks into Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, reinforcing them only delays inevitable

A slow road into the Fortress Belt

Sloviansk anchors the northern end of Ukraine's Fortress Belt, a chain of fortified cities that has blunted Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast since 2014. ISW cautioned that Russian forces are extremely unlikely to make fast gains west of Mykolaivka, since they still need to seize several more settlements first.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 23 August that Putin has ordered his army to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by 31 December. By ISW's count, it is the 15th such deadline since 2022, and Russia has missed every one that has come due.

Zelenskyy put Russia's frontline casualties this year at around 267,000, including about 155,000 killed, and said 70% to 80% of them fall in the Kostiantynivka direction. Russia holds about 79.89% of Donetsk Oblast, by ISW's count, and Zelenskyy said the Kremlin is preparing to mobilize around 300,000 men after the 18–20 September State Duma elections, partly to reinforce Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Ukrainian prosecutors have formally accused a captured Russian marine of executing a Ukrainian unit commander near Pokrovsk, the Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office said on 20 August. Investigators allege he took the 34-year-old captive to a forest belt after an interrogation and shot him in the back of the head on his superior’s order.

The case comes as Ukraine steps up efforts to prosecute Russian troops accused of executing or abusing Ukrainian POWs. Ukrainian investigators and UN monitors have documented a growing pattern since 2024 of Russian forces executing Ukrainian troops after capture.

The alleged gunman is now in Ukrainian custody, opening the way for an in-person trial. Russian troops also shot dead a second Ukrainian prisoner, prosecutors said.

Russian assault units had been trying to seize Shakhove on the Pokrovsk front since May 2025, according to the prosecutor’s office. On 10 October 2025, a small Russian infantry group entered the village’s outskirts and captured two Ukrainian service members, including the commander, the office alleges.

After the interrogation, the suspect took the commander to a forest belt and killed him with an automatic rifle, prosecutors said. The other Ukrainian prisoner was also shot dead. The statement names neither victim.

Investigators identified the suspect as a 34-year-old native of Russia’s Krasnoyarsk Krai who used the call sign “Tai” and served as a rifleman in the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade.

Ukrainian forces later captured him during fighting in the same sector, according to prosecutors. The office did not say when he was taken prisoner.

Prosecutors formally accused him of cruel treatment of prisoners of war resulting in death, a war crime under Ukrainian law.

Ukraine’s other cases against captured Russian soldiers

Ukraine has previously brought cases against other captured Russian soldiers over POW executions. A Zaporizhzhia court sentenced Dmitry Kurashov to life imprisonment in November 2025—the first time Ukraine convicted a Russian soldier of executing a surrendered Ukrainian POW.

In a separate case, the Security Service of Ukraine charged Sergey Tuzhilov over the execution of one bound Ukrainian POW and his alleged role in killing two others near Vovchansk in June 2024.

Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya denied reports that Moscow could launch another mass mobilization after September’s parliamentary elections, saying none was planned or expected “as far as I know,” The Moscow Times reported

Russia has avoided another draft since its 2022 mobilization triggered protests and an exodus, relying instead on contract soldiers. Ukraine says those recruits no longer replace battlefield losses, and Moscow may mobilize several hundred thousand people after the elections. That could replenish its forces and support new offensives, although Ukrainian intelligence sees no preparations now.

Nebenzya’s remarks followed a question about more than 20,000 people crossing Russia’s Verkhny Lars border checkpoint into Georgia in one day amid fears of post-election mobilization, Meduza reported.

His comments extend a series of Russian denials. Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev dismissed reports of another mobilization as “nonsense” in late July. The State Duma’s defense committee said a mass compulsory call-up was not under consideration because the army was recruiting contract soldiers, The Moscow Times reported.

Russia has avoided another mass draft since its September 2022 mobilization triggered protests and an exodus. Officials had also denied that mobilization was planned shortly before President Vladimir Putin announced it, Meduza noted.

Russian government seeks new wartime penalties

Moscow is separately seeking penalties for people and companies that ignore mobilization and military-supply orders issued by regional authorities. The bill would not itself order a new call-up.

The government submitted it to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, on 20 August, The Moscow Times reported. Companies could face fines of up to 1 million rubles or suspension for up to 90 days.

Russian law already punishes such defiance in areas under martial law but imposes no nationwide penalty elsewhere in Russia, according to the bill. Its authors said a “significant number” of violations had been recorded.

Ukraine says a new draft could provide troops for a northern offensive

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 August, citing Ukrainian military intelligence, that Russia planned to mobilize several hundred thousand people after the elections and roughly the same number in 2027.

HUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, later assessed that a post-election mobilization could enable Russia to build a strike force for a northern offensive by February 2027. Its deputy chief, Vadym Skibitskyi, stressed, however, that the agency currently sees no evidence that such preparations have begun.

Ukraine is asking Elon Musk to let it arm deep-strike drones with his Starlink network and turn them on Russian ballistic-missile launchers far inside Russia, the Financial Times reported. The plan needs Musk's approval — and US President Donald Trump was cool to the idea when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy raised it at the White House on 28 July, with people present expecting Musk to refuse.

Kyiv is chasing the workaround because its air defenses are stretched: Russia keeps escalating its missile and drone strikes, and Ukraine is running low on the Patriot interceptors that are its only dependable answer to Russian ballistic missiles. As Russia builds more missiles and drones, Ukraine's interceptor needs run into the hundreds before the year is out.

At the meeting, FT reported, Zelenskyy pressed Trump to lobby Musk for permission to fly Starlink-linked drones across the Russian border. He capped the pitch at 200 km into Russia — far enough to reach launch sites, command posts, and other targets — on the calculation that a shallower limit might make Musk likelier to agree.

Starlink could extend Ukrainian drone strikes

Riding SpaceX's satellites, Starlink drones hold a steadier link to their pilots at long range than ordinary radio allows, and they shrug off the jamming that grounds other drones. The drones have already shown their worth in the fighting at home, and Vienna-based military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady said that across the border they "could be very useful in hunting" Russian launchers, FT wrote.

Kyiv's best channel to Musk has also just closed: Zelenskyy recently fired his defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who had a direct line to the billionaire.

Speaking to a Ukrainian podcast on 6 August, Fedorov said that even with a channel to Musk still open after his firing, he had made no progress on cross-border Starlink use—"a difficult task right now."

Explore further

The Fedorov protesters lost. But they backed a man for what he built, not what he promised—and that may be new in Ukraine.

Musk’s Starlink decisions have affected both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian war

Musk has backed Ukraine's heavy dependence on Starlink for military command and comms. In 2022, Musk declined to extend Starlink coverage for Ukrainian troops mid-operation near occupied Crimea, citing his fear of triggering a nuclear escalation.

He has also acted against Moscow: in February, at Fedorov's direct request, Musk shut down the Starlink terminals that Russian forces had been operating illicitly against Ukraine.

Now, Musk answered Fedorov's Monday post with a line about "trying to do the right thing" and wanting peace — and said nothing about the Starlink ask.

Russia's propaganda machine has mobilized against Ukraine's new defense minister within days of his appointment. Russian resources have spread more than 1,000 posts in two days against Ukraine's new Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara, the Center for Strategic Communications reported.

The effort aims to portray Khmara as a "terrorist" and again push the Kremlin narrative of "Ukraine as a terrorist state," running through the same coordinated pipeline of Russian outlets and laundering networks that Russia uses to seed disinformation abroad.

The campaign ran through a familiar pipeline

The disinformation has followed a coordinated path. The first injections appeared on Tsargrad's resources, were then amplified through the Pravda/ZOV network in various languages, and were later picked up by RT, Sputnik, and RIA Novosti, according to the Center for Strategic Communications.

A narrative seeded on a fringe Russian outlet, amplified through a multilingual network, then carried by Russia's state media, reaches foreign audiences looking like independent reporting rather than a Kremlin operation, the method Russia uses to push its narratives into Western information spaces.

The false claims and their purpose

Russia's outlets attached fabricated accusations to Khmara. As purported "proof," the propagandists attribute to him involvement in the Kerch Bridge explosion, the Crocus City Hall attack, and the car bombing of Darya Dugina, while also pushing claims of "total corruption" and "external control" of Ukraine.

These are assertions Russia makes, not established facts, and Ukraine's monitors identify them as disinformation designed to serve the "terrorist state" narrative. The choice of accusations, tying Khmara to attacks Russia blames on Ukraine, is meant to frame Ukraine's defense leadership as criminal and justify Russia's war to audiences at home and abroad.

The campaign targets foreign audiences

The operation was built to travel. About 65% of the identified posts appeared on Telegram, and about 30% on web resources, and the campaign is being translated into English, French, Spanish, and other languages to reach foreign audiences, according to the Center for Strategic Communications.

A Russian strike damaged the Ukrainian warehouse of a company that helps fund Russia's budget. As a result of Russia’s massive August 20 attack, a warehouse storing Yves Rocher cosmetics in Ukraine was heavily damaged.

According to Leave Russia, French cosmetics brand Yves Rocher continues to operate in Russia. Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) has included Yves Rocher on its list of international sponsors of war.

In 2022, the company’s Russian subsidiary, Yves Rocher Vostok, paid approximately $6 million in taxes to the Russian budget, contributing to the financing of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

At the same time, Yves Rocher’s Ukrainian office and stores continue to operate.

The strike disrupted Ukrainian operations

“We are temporarily suspending online orders and working to restore operations,” the company said.

Customers who have already placed orders will be informed of their status once the attack's consequences are assessed.

Yves Rocher boutiques remain open, although the range of products available may be limited, the company adds.

The strike on Yves Rocher’s warehouse is part of a broader Russian campaign against Ukrainian businesses and critical commercial infrastructure. Russian attacks have repeatedly targeted companies involved in food production, storage, and distribution, disrupting supply chains and local economies.

As a result of the strikes, some food products are already becoming scarce in shops. People are also clearing products off the shelves, apparently stocking up amid concerns over further disruptions. In some stores, supplies of salt and flour are already running low.

Almost the entire arsenal on one city

The Russian attack took place on 20 August and killed 15 people. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said a children's hospital and a school were also damaged in the capital.

Russia used almost its entire arsenal, launching ballistic and Zircon hypersonic missiles at Kyiv and the surrounding region. Kyiv’s air defenses intercepted nearly all of the cruise missiles. However, ballistic missiles remain a major challenge as the US has not supplied Ukraine with enough Patriot interceptors.

Now held in a POW camp in western Ukraine, Anton does not consider himself a traitor. He calls Putin “my President” and said he joined Russia’s army to defend “my land,” the BBC reported.

The BBC interviews show what more than a decade of Russian rule has produced in occupied Donbas. Moscow has replaced Ukrainian schools, media, and public institutions while presenting the occupied regions as permanent parts of Russia. It also recruits residents or forces them to fight against Ukraine.

The BBC said prisoners could refuse and were interviewed without guards or cameras.

Almost all its Ukrainian-born interviewees from territories occupied since 2014 said they had enlisted willingly. Anton said he was not a traitor and called Vladimir Putin “my President.”

His friends also volunteered. Messages announcing their deaths followed: “Dead, dead, dead.”

Forced conscription of Ukrainians in occupied territory

One prisoner from Donetsk Oblast told the BBC he had been forced to fight. He wanted only to return to his wife and children.

The BBC cited an official intelligence-based estimate that Russia forcibly conscripted more than 50,000 Ukrainians in occupied areas. It noted that other estimates were higher.

Ukrainian veteran Pavlo Pshenychnyi told Hromadske that occupation authorities used planted drug evidence to push him into Russia’s army. They threatened him with up to 12 years in prison.

Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits occupying powers from compelling protected residents to serve in their armed forces.

Anton and the Russification of occupied Ukrainian territory

Russia took control of Anton’s home while he was still in primary school. By adulthood, he called himself Russian and dismissed his Ukrainian surname as irrelevant.

Putin’s 2025 policy decree set a 95% target for “all-Russian civic identity” by 2036 and ordered the integration of occupied Ukrainian regions into Russian education, culture, and media.

Kherson-based outlet MOST reported that Russia will introduce compulsory textbooks on 1 September, presenting four occupied Ukrainian regions as historically Russian.

Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation reported in 2025 that more than 100 teenagers from occupied Luhansk attended a Russian military camp. They received firearms, drill, and guard-duty training.

The center described the camp as part of a wider effort to spread Russian war propaganda and hostility toward Ukraine.

Petro Yatsenko of Ukraine’s POW Coordination Headquarters told the BBC that these prisoners were strongly pro-Russian. He said their national identity was “very blurred.”

Ukraine still considers them Ukrainian and treats Russia’s control of their home regions as temporary, the BBC noted.

In an interview with Army Inform, Colonel Illia Petryna, commander of the 25th Separate Sicheslav Airborne Brigade, said the brigade created a ground-robotics company as a pilot unit and that it was among the first Ukrainian brigades to organize ground robots this way.

The company was initially created to test how the systems could work in combat. They are now being used for different battlefield tasks, Petryna said. Some robots carry supplies. Others are used for evacuation or provide fire support.

The move is part of Ukraine's broader effort to build dedicated units around ground robots. In February 2025, Ukraine's Defense Ministry said the military was forming units focused on unmanned ground systems after testing that had begun in summer 2024. The systems were already being used for logistics, fire strikes, and evacuating wounded soldiers.

Ukraine has since continued expanding their use. By March 2026, 167 units were using ground robots, up from 67 in November 2025. More than 9,000 combat and logistical missions were conducted with unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that month, according to the Defense Ministry.

Learning from the battlefield

The 25th's robotic company also gives soldiers a way to test systems and report problems directly to manufacturers.

“Cooperation with manufacturers is the basis,” Petryna said. “They draw information from us about what is needed now, what is relevant at the front.”

Soldiers use the machines in combat, identify what does not work, and pass that information back to manufacturers. The next versions can then be adapted to conditions at the front.

That creates a direct feedback loop between the battlefield and the companies developing the technology.

Petryna sees that constant adaptation as necessary because the technology and tactics of the war keep changing.

“Probably, right now, no statute in the world fits how this war is being fought,” he said. “The war has changed fundamentally.”

For the 25th, the robotic company is one way to keep adapting as the battlefield changes.

Ukraine has brought another 103 servicemembers home from Russian captivity in the first stage of a new prisoner exchange, the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported on 19 August 2026. Most of the returning defenders are wounded or seriously ill after captivity that, for some, reached back to 2022, the year of Russia's full-scale invasion. The United States and the United Arab Emirates helped organize the swap, the headquarters said.

Who came home

The freed group covers nearly every branch of Ukraine's forces. It includes members of the Armed Forces, the Navy, Territorial Defense, the National Guard and the State Border Guard Service. Alongside soldiers and sergeants, several officers were released.

The Coordination HQ detailed the composition. The Defense Ministry accounted for 92 of those freed, and the Interior Ministry for 11. Two of the returnees are officers, the rest enlisted personnel and NCOs. Interior Minister Ivan Vyhivskyi said his ministry's 11 broke down into five National Guardsmen and six border guards.

The defenders had been captured across the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Sumy directions, as well as at Mariupol. The single largest share, 72, fell on the Donetsk front. The youngest freed defender was born in 2000, and the oldest is 59.

Years behind Russian bars

The captures span the entire full-scale war. One of those freed had been held since 2022, 16 since 2023, and 48 since 2024. Another 31 were seized in 2025 and seven this year. By the same tally, the International Committee of the Red Cross had confirmed the captivity of 102 of the group before the handover, with a single case verified through other sources.

A previous swap in late June returned 160 defenders, all of them held since 2022.

Wounded and ill

The released defenders will undergo full medical examinations, receive physical and psychological rehabilitation, and obtain the state payments provided by law. The head of the President's Office, Kyrylo Budanov, said doctors were already doing everything necessary for the returnees, most of whom came back with wounds and serious illness.

Their condition fits a wider pattern Ukrainian officials have described, in which Russia starves most captives and executes many surrendered soldiers on the battlefield.

"We remember everyone still in captivity"

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the freed included men who had defended Mariupol. 

"We remember every man and every woman still held captive. We are doing everything possible to bring all our people home," he said.

The Security Service of Ukraine noted the swap ran through the joint center it operates to coordinate the search and release of prisoners. Oleh Ivashchenko, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) and head of the Coordination Headquarters, met the returning defenders in person. 

Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) sees no battlefield signs that Russia is preparing for a ceasefire, deputy chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi said in an interview with RBC-Ukraine on 18 August 2026. The agency expects no peace agreement before the end of 2026.

Russia’s General Staff plans to capture the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by year-end, Skibitskyi said. Meanwhile, HUR estimates that Russian personnel losses exceeded contract recruitment in June and July, leaving Moscow unable to create new military formations without mobilization.

HUR estimates Russia lost more troops than it recruited in both June and July. Losses exceeded new contract personnel by 3,000 in June and by at least 1,000 in July, leaving recruitment unable to replace battlefield losses. The agency says Russia’s operational reserve is only about one-tenth the size of the part already engaged in combat against Ukraine.

Russia has set a 2026 target of recruiting 409,000 personnel. Without mobilization, however, Moscow cannot create new formations or turn existing brigades into divisions because it lacks personnel, Skibitskyi said. The recruitment plan for Russia’s unmanned-systems forces is only 30% complete, and the command is trying to fill the gap with personnel from other military branches, he added.

If Russia mobilizes after its September parliamentary elections, it could assemble a powerful strike group by around February 2027, according to HUR. Skibitskyi did not rule out its use for a northern offensive. At present, however, HUR sees no conditions, indicators, or troops for such an operation.

Russia previously targeted September for Donbas

In April, Skibitskyi told the Financial Times that Moscow aimed to capture all of Donbas by September, after missing its deadlines to take Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. Russia was transferring 20,000 troops from strategic reserves to sustain the offensive, although this amounted to less than one month's worth of its battlefield losses.

By early August, DeepState reported 36 square kilometers of additional Russian-controlled territory across Ukraine in July, a figure that included map corrections for May and June. Without those corrections, Russia gained about 88 square kilometers.

DeepState reported limited progress near Rodynske and Kostiantynivka and toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the heart of Ukraine’s “fortress belt.” At that pace, Russia had “no chance” of capturing all of Donetsk Oblast even by 2027, the group said. It cautioned that another wave of mobilization or a wider deployment of North Korean troops could change the forecast.

The 1st Corps of Ukraine's National Guard, known as Azov, says it destroyed 67 Russian fuel tanks holding 4,221 tons of fuel in occupied Donetsk Oblast, in an operation it named Hell-2. The unit released video of the strikes on 17 August, saying it had spent a month tracking where Russian forces moved and stored the fuel before hitting it.

Fuel is the blood of Russia's war, which is why its forces increasingly hide storage sites and route deliveries through improvised logistics hubs. Strikes on those hubs strip Russian units of what they need to move, supply, and fight. There have already been cases of Russian forces concealing fuel in grain trucks in occupied territories.

Azov warned the Russian forces before the strike

Azov says it flagged the fuel sites a month before hitting them, and struck when the Russians kept using them anyway.

“A month ago, we warned the occupier: ‘Azov sees your movements and will strike at the right moment.’ But some units of the Russian Armed Forces continued to store fuel in occupied Donetsk Oblast,” Azov said.

Azov emphasizes that it does not attack civilian gas stations or civilians. The operation targeted facilities used to supply Russian occupation forces. At the same time, according to Azov fighters, Russian military infrastructure remains a legitimate target.

The Russians didn’t get the message the first time

Hell-2 is likely a follow-up to the Hell operation, during which the first series of strikes, Azov also targeted the fuel logistics of Russian forces in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

On 12 July, Azov reported striking a secret Russian fuel base in Novoamvrosiivka. Drone operators from the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard conducted reconnaissance and used Hornet drones to strike the facility. The strikes damaged fuel tanks and the base’s infrastructure and blocked the railway track.

According to the report, the Russians used the facility as a logistics hub to supply their occupation forces. After the strike, they were forced to abandon the base and move their logistics operations from the occupied territory into Russia.

An unidentified aerial object exploded in a cornfield outside Talmaza in southeastern Moldova, tearing a crater about two meters wide and 50 centimeters deep, Moldovan police said on 18 August. The shock wave spread across roughly 45 by 20 meters, but nobody was injured.

Russia has intensified its attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube ports, bringing drones and missiles close to Moldova’s border. Moldova has recorded three aerial incidents in nine days, with the latest forcing authorities to close part of the country’s airspace.

Investigators recovered fiberglass body fragments, damaged electronics, and a turbojet engine, which Militarnyi noted is also used by the Banderol. Police said the components resembled those of a jet-powered missile-drone but could not identify the aircraft conclusively.

Ukraine's Air Force reported on 17 August that a Russian Banderol had crossed from Odesa Oblast toward Moldova. Militarnyi identified the weapon as an S8000 and placed the crossing near the Moscow-backed breakaway region of Transnistria.

Moldova’s Defense Ministry separately said it had tracked an unidentified object flying from Kuchurhan toward Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria.

Authorities closed central Moldovan airspace for 15 minutes before the object disappeared from radar near Talmaza, Militarnyi said.

Moldova’s Foreign Ministry called the incident a serious violation of its sovereignty and a threat to public safety.

Talmaza blast follows two recent drone incidents in Moldova

The Talmaza explosion followed two similar incidents near Moldova’s border with Ukraine. On 9 August, an unidentified aircraft exploded in a field 12 kilometers from Ukraine and started a fire. Another object entered Moldovan airspace the following evening and was believed to be a jet-powered Shahed.

The recent incidents continue a longer pattern. Six Russian drones entered Moldova during an attack on Ukraine in November 2025, and one landed on a civilian roof.

Explore further

More than 100 drones detected near Romania in four days, NATO jets scrambled seven times

President Maia Sandu has called for counter-drone technology capable of intercepting and destroying hostile drones that violate Moldovan airspace, acknowledging that the country currently lacks such capabilities.

Russia’s port campaign reaches Moldova’s border

Across the border, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports have reached a recent high, with Romania detecting more than 100 drones during seven recent attacks, interim Defense Minister Radu Miruță said.

Kyiv and Chișinău are also discussing a rail route through Moldova to Romania’s Constanța port as Russian strikes disrupt Ukraine’s maritime exports. Ukraine estimates the route could carry only about 10 percent of its grain exports.

Ukraine has knocked out seven of the 10 largest logistics hubs run by Russia's biggest online retailer, the US-based Institute for the Study of War assessed. The strikes are part of a campaign to wear down Russia's defense industry and the dual-use supply lines that feed its war. The newest raids hit two warehouses near Moscow overnight.

Two hubs near Moscow burned overnight

On 15-16 August, Ukrainian drones struck Wildberries' single largest hub, a 250,000-square-meter depot in the Koledino Industrial Park in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast. Ukraine's Defense Ministry reported the hit, about 420 kilometers from the border.

Explore further

“One of the most massive” Ukrainian drone attacks hits Moscow Oblast: two major warehouses ablaze

Wildberries confirmed the fire and said it had to reorganize its supply chains. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov acknowledged the strike, and geolocated footage showed the depot ablaze.

Drones also hit a second warehouse the same night, in Domodedovo, roughly 430 kilometers from the border. Footage showed a fire at the Severnoye Domodedovo complex.

Why the warehouses are targets

Ukrainian officials say Wildberries helps supply the Russian military, moving drone components and navigation gear. Kyiv folded the retailer into a deep-strike campaign that began in mid-July.

The company is Russia's answer to Amazon, its largest online marketplace. Its sprawling depots make broad, hard-to-defend targets.

The damage keeps growing

By early August, the strikes had destroyed at least 1.18 million square meters of Wildberries storage, about a fifth of its capacity, ISW noted. The toll has climbed since.

The losses ripple outward to independent sellers who rent space in the hubs. Many have watched their stock burn with no compensation.

486 Africans recruited into Russia’s armed forces are dead, while Ukraine is holding 35 citizens from 17 African countries as prisoners of war, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne in findings published on 16 August 2026. Its overall tally rose only slightly from May, climbing from 2,965 recruits from 36 countries to at least 2,982 from 37.

Russia’s recruitment in Africa is part of a broader effort to enlist foreigners for its war. A joint human-rights investigation found that Russia had recruited at least 27,000 people from more than 130 countries since 2022. The system helps Moscow replenish its forces while shifting battlefield risk onto foreigners, many of whom are drawn in by financial pressure, deception, or coercion.

The largest groups of recruits came from Kenya, Egypt, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Algeria, and Mali, the ministry told Suspilne.

Russia’s wider recruitment pipeline in Africa

Russian security services use a “broad arsenal of manipulative methods,” the Ukrainian MFA said. Recruiters promise civilian jobs, education, high salaries, Russian citizenship, or migration benefits. In many cases, foreigners must sign Russian-language military contracts under threat of deportation or imprisonment.

The FIDH–Truth Hounds–KIBHR report found recruiters using social media and intermediaries to advertise civilian jobs. Of 16 foreign POWs interviewed, 13 said they had been promised they would not fight. Most reached combat positions within weeks.

The human toll on African recruits

Kenyan engineer Francis told journalist Dmytro Karpenko, who interviews prisoners captured while fighting for Russia, that he thought he had accepted a security job. In Russia, he received a military uniform instead. After two weeks of training, he reached the front and was captured.

Nigerian recruits Hamzat Kazeen Kolawole and Mbah Stephen Udoka died in an assault after receiving little or no training, Ukrainian military intelligence said. Botswana reported “heartbreaking calls” from its citizens describing “perilous conditions” at the front.

Ukraine’s response to Russia's recruitment campaign

Ukraine’s diplomatic missions regularly inform African officials about the recruitment of their citizens and run awareness campaigns, according to the ministry.

The MFA and Ukraine’s POW Coordination Headquarters also launched Stop Russian Recruiters, a website that explains recruitment methods, shares victims’ accounts, advises people at risk and their families, and accepts reports about recruiters.

Russian forces shelled and struck front-line and border regions across northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine over the past 24 hours, killing at least eight civilians and wounding more than 40, regional authorities reported on 17 August. Sumy, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts reported deaths, while people were wounded in Kharkiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, and Odesa Oblasts.

Russia's daily strikes have hit populated areas and civilian infrastructure both near the front line and far behind it. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that 13 regions had come under attack over the past week, with more than 1,550 attack drones, nearly 1,560 guided aerial bombs, and 62 missiles, most of them ballistic, launched at Ukraine.

North: FPV drone attacks firefighters’ vehicle

In Sumy Oblast, Russian forces carried out more than 50 strikes on 24 settlements across 11 communities. A drone strike in the Sumy community killed a 75-year-old man and a 72-year-old woman and wounded another civilian, the Sumy military administration said. It also said two more people were wounded in the Seredyna-Buda community. A mass drone attack on Sumy caused large fires and wounded at least one person, Sumy city military administration head Serhii Kryvosheienko said.

In Chernihiv Oblast, a 41-year-old man was wounded in a Geran drone strike on the Kozelets community, Head of the Regional Military Administration Viacheslav Chaus said. He added that Gerbera drones destroyed a hangar and farm equipment in the Kholmy community. In a border village in the Horodnia community, an FPV drone struck a yard, and a second FPV drone hit a firefighters' vehicle that had arrived at the scene. A house later caught fire. A critical infrastructure facility was also hit.

In Kharkiv Oblast, six people were wounded in strikes on Kharkiv and nine other settlements. The heaviest damage was reported in Izium, where 19 houses and four apartment blocks were damaged, head of the Regional Military Administration Oleh Syniehubov said.

East: Russian strikes destroy 30 stalls

In Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces killed two residents of Kramatorsk and wounded 18 people across the region, Head of the Regional Military Administration Vadym Filashkin said. In Sloviansk, round-the-clock strikes damaged critical infrastructure and destroyed 30 stalls at the Lisnyi market, Sloviansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Liakh said.

In Poltava Oblast, two industrial facilities were hit, causing fires, and drones also attacked another industrial facility in Myrhorod district, Head of the Regional Military Administration Vitalii Diakivnych said. No casualties were reported.

In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Russian forces attacked four districts nearly 20 times from the evening of 16 August, wounding five people, Head of the Regional Military Administration Oleksandr Hanzha said. He added that houses and outbuildings caught fire in Pavlohrad and Nikopol district.

In Zaporizhzhia district, two people were killed and three wounded, Head of the Regional Military Administration Ivan Fedorov said. He also reported 1,217 strikes on 60 settlements across the oblast, including 20 air strikes, about 846 drone attacks, and 350 artillery strikes.

South: strike damages civilian vessel flying the flag of Togo

A dog was caught in mesh beside a frontline road and could not free itself. Ukrainian soldiers stopped their vehicle, cut away the netting, and released it, as footage Ukrainian serviceman Denys Lysak posted on 10 August 2026 shows.

The netting is meant to shield traffic from Russian FPV drones, but it can also trap animals left in the combat zone. The roadside rescue reflects how Russia's war against Ukraine has adversely impacted animals throughout Ukraine, while also highlighting a familiar relationship along Ukraine’s front, where soldiers feed, shelter, and sometimes take in the animals they encounter.

Lysak wrote that animals left without owners suffer greatly in areas affected by fighting. Ukrainian troops try to feed, evacuate, or shelter them, he said. Many units have taken in several rescued cats and dogs.

“Unfortunately, you can’t help all of them, but we try,” Lysak said.

The animals Ukrainian troops find at the front

Across Ukraine, animals are caught in the crossfire—injured, stranded, or driven from their habitats. Sometimes Ukrainian troops reach them in time, as they did during the Special Operations Forces' (SSO) “Operation Bambi.”

Rangers from the 6th Separate Special Operations Regiment found a frightened fawn while clearing a Russian position, according to footage the SSO released on 15 August. The video shows the animal nestled against one soldier as the unit moved out.

Some animals remain with the units that find them. Euromaidan Press reported in 2022 on Max, a Belgian shepherd abandoned by a Russian National Guard unit in Mykolaiv Oblast. A villager sheltered him before handing him to Ukraine’s National Guard, where handlers began teaching the former Russian service dog to follow commands in Ukrainian.

The fawn’s destination remains unknown. The SSO said only that it had been evacuated from the danger zone. Kharkiv volunteers had evacuated 18,800 animals by October 2024, but only around one-fifth had been reunited with their owners.

Russia's assault on Ukraine's ecosystem

Russia’s war has also affected wildlife beyond the trenches. Marine biologist Ivan Rusev estimated that more than 100,000 Black Sea dolphins have died since 2022, with sonar, underwater blasts, mines, and pollution among the suspected causes.

Russia’s destruction of the Kakhovka Dam dealt another blow. The floodwaters swept through areas holding 70% of the world’s Nordmann’s birch mice and half its sandy blind mole-rats, while killing tens of thousands of nesting birds.

Ukrainian emergency services confirmed a large fire at the Pochaina book market in Kyiv’s Obolonskyi district after an overnight Russian ballistic attack on 16 August. Several rows of stalls were burned. The strike comes amid mounting losses across Ukraine’s book industry, as Russian strikes burn printing houses, markets, and the millions of books within them.

Pochaina’s latest fire is at least the third to damage the market or adjoining trading rows since mid-June. For decades, the sprawling market has served as part bookshop, part flea market, and part archive of Kyiv life — a place to hunt through rare titles, vinyl, and remnants of the 20th century. Officials have not said Russia deliberately targeted it, however, the damage lands amid repeated attacks on Ukraine’s publishing chain and efforts to remove Ukrainian literature under occupation.

By 9:36 a.m., rescuers had extinguished fires at four locations in Kyiv and were dismantling damaged structures. Three people were hospitalized: two in moderate condition and one with light injuries. Pochaina metro station remained open, but damage to its glass entrance temporarily closed one vestibule.

Founded in 1997, Pochaina grew into Kyiv’s largest book market, offering everything from novels to specialist literature, according to a 2020 preservation petition. Independent vendors organized to defend it after plans emerged to clear the site for another shopping center. The campaign described the market as a cultural institution that supported thousands of jobs.

The adjoining weekend flea market endured the invasion and disappearance of tourists. In 2023, the Associated Press found hundreds browsing stalls stocked with vintage medals, ceramics, VHS tapes, and cracked guitars.

Russia destroys books as part of its war against Ukraine

Russian attacks have damaged publishing houses, printing plants, warehouses, libraries, bookshops, and markets across Ukraine.

The 16 August attack was not the first time Russia had hit Pochaina. A Russian attack damaged book-market pavilions in mid-June. On 30 July, falling missile debris ignited nearby stalls and destroyed collections of antiques, vinyl, and Ukrainian household artifacts, Suspilne reported.

Russia's war against Ukraine has particularly devastated Ukraine's publishing houses and their infrastructure. A 2024 Russian strike on Kharkiv’s Factor Druk printing house killed seven workers and burned 50,000 books. On 1 August 2026, a drone destroyed about eight million books at publisher Ranok’s warehouse.

Reuters reported that Russian strikes destroyed more than 10 million books in recent months.

In occupied areas, Russian forces have also seized Ukrainian history books and burned Ukrainian literature in boiler houses, Ukrainian authorities say.

Yet the Ukrainian book industry continues to thrive, despite Russia's assault. In 2025, Ukraine registered a record 117 new publishing businesses.

Russian assault troops spent days crawling through a pipe to reach Ukrainian lines, and most of them were killed before reaching the place. Russian soldiers walked 28 kilometers, then came under fire on emerging and ultimately surrendered, Ukraine's 71st Separate Air Assault Brigade reported.

This is a portrait of how Russia spends its infantry who enlist voluntarily for the war against Ukraine. The soldiers were sent on a grueling underground infiltration with bad information and no proper food, ordered forward despite wounds, and largely killed.

The 28-kilometer crawl

The group reached Ukrainian positions through underground infrastructure. The Russians covered about 27 to 28 kilometers moving inside a reinforced-concrete pipe roughly a meter and a half in diameter, spending three days on the way, sleeping inside the pipe, the 71st Brigade reports.

Their command had lied to them about what waited. The soldiers were told they were only going to reinforce a battalion and that there were no Ukrainian troops in the forest, a captured Russian says. On arrival, the opposite was true, and they were sent onward without a normal food supply, forced to forage on their own. Many of the assault troops, the prisoner said, are recruited from prison colonies, signing contracts to avoid long sentences.

From 16 to four

When the group emerged onto open ground, Ukrainian troops hit them. Of the 16 Russians who set out, only about 8 reached the forest, and later, just 4 survived.

The wounded were abandoned by their own side. Russian command was in no hurry to evacuate them, and despite wounds and Ukrainian drone strikes, the assault troops were ordered only to keep moving forward, per the captured soldier. The survivors eventually ran into fighters of the 71st Brigade, laid down their weapons, and asked the Ukrainians not to shoot.

"No money is worth this"

The captured soldier was given medical care and made an appeal to other Russians. He urged them not to go to war against Ukraine.

"I will not advise anyone to go to war. No money is worth this, nor any benefits they promise us. To die and go to a foreign land, for what? For whom? Let them put me in prison. As long as they don't send me here, I will never come here again," the prisoner said.

A 12-year-old with a high fever died without medical care in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast, Hola Prystan official in exile Svitlana Linnyk told Ukrinform on 13 August 2026.

No medicine or medical worker was available locally, and the child’s mother could not reach an ambulance pickup point, she said.

The child's reported death comes amid a wider humanitarian crisis in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast. UN and OSCE monitors found drone attacks, mines, and movement restrictions obstructing medical aid and evacuations around Oleshky and Hola Prystan, two occupied communities across the Dnipro from Kherson city. About 6,000 civilians, including 200 children, remained in and around the two communities as of May. Similar medical shortages span occupied Ukraine, while access to free medicines has been tied to having a Russian passport.

The Hola Prystan community where the child died has no operating hospital or rural medical post, Linnyk said. Only two pharmacies remain: one in the city of Hola Prystan and another in the nearby village of Nova Zburivka. Both are selling their remaining supplies.

The nearest hospital is in Skadovsk, an occupied Black Sea port about 60 kilometers by road from Hola Prystan. Nova Zburivka’s ambulance has not operated since 2025. 

Russian occupation authorities have distributed no humanitarian aid for at least eight months to villages surrounding Hola Prystan, or for over a year in the city itself, Linnyk said. 

Linnyk said a Moscow Patriarchate priest occasionally brought supplies but gave them only to Russian passport holders. This reflects a broader pattern of tying basic services in occupied Ukraine to accepting Russian citizenship.

Ukrainian children face a medical system stripped bare 

The medical dangers surrounding the 12-year-old’s death are not confined to Hola Prystan.

In April 2025, Ukraine’s National Resistance Center reported that occupation officials were administering vaccines to children under six in Luhansk Oblast. It described the vaccines as uncertified and of unknown origin.

That November, the Center said a Russian inspection found Crimea’s main children’s hospital lacked breathing bags and cardiac monitors. It said infant mortality on the occupied peninsula had risen 9% over the previous year.

Aid comes with a Russian passport

Hola Prystan is not the only occupied community where access to care has depended on Russian citizenship.

In 2023, Russian-installed officials in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast threatened to deny medical care to residents without Russian passports. A 2025 Kremlin policy later tied free medicines for chronic illnesses to Russian citizenship.

Ukraine’s Health Ministry reported in July 2024 that Russian forces had destroyed 214 medical facilities. It said the full toll remained unknown because authorities had limited access to occupied territories. 

The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War said the remains arrived on 13 August, and that investigators will now work to establish the identities.

Ukraine recovered the 261 bodies as part of repatriation measures carried out with Russia, the Coordination Headquarters reported. Russia claims the dead are Ukrainian servicemen, but law enforcement investigators and forensic experts will conduct the identification before any confirmation.

The return of the dead remains one of the few channels that still functions between Kyiv and Moscow during Russia's war against Ukraine. Each handover lets families of the missing bury their relatives, and it again relied on the International Committee of the Red Cross, which helped coordinate the exchange.

Ukraine's Interior Ministry, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Armed Forces, the Office of the Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, the State Emergency Service, and the Secretariat of the Commissioner for Missing Persons under Special Circumstances all took part, the Coordination Headquarters said. Units of the Armed Forces transported the remains and passed them to police and to medical examiners under the Health Ministry for identification.

Previous exchanges

The handover is the latest in a long series of transfers Russia has carried out during its war against Ukraine, and in each case it has claimed the dead were Ukrainian servicemen or citizens, an account Ukrainian forensic experts verify independently. The exchanges have followed the Istanbul agreements that Kyiv and Moscow reached on 2 June 2025. Over the course of that June, Russia returned 6,057 bodies, and on 17 July 2025 it handed over another 1,000. Further transfers of 1,000 followed on 19 August, 18 September, 23 October, and 20 November 2025, before Russia returned 1,003 bodies on 19 December. The exchanges continued into 2026 with 1,000 bodies on 26 February and another 1,000 on 9 April, after which the totals fell to 522 on 18 June and 501 on 16 July, ahead of the 261 returned on 13 August.

Taken together, the transfers have returned thousands of the dead since mid 2025, which makes the repatriation of remains one of the most consistent forms of contact that still survives between Kyiv and Moscow.

Russia is forcing Ukrainian prisoners into its own army and starving others while "fattening" a few for show, Andrii Pasternak of the SBU's Joint Center for coordinating the search and release of prisoners says. Ukrainian intelligence also has information about Moscow creating battalions from Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), UkrInform reports.

As of May 2026, approximately 7,000 Ukrainian service members were held in Russian captivity, while the number of civilian detainees is estimated at between 10,000 and 20,000, according to Vice Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Olena Kondratiuk.

Russia is forming units from Ukrainian prisoners

Pasternak described the POW battalions as confirmed and monitored.

"We know about such battalions. Together with our colleagues from foreign intelligence and military intelligence, we track and record this. Such facts exist," he stated.

Forcing prisoners of war to serve in the captor's forces is itself a war crime. The Geneva Conventions prohibit compelling a POW to fight against their own country, and turning captured Ukrainian soldiers into Russian units, if confirmed at scale, would be a grave violation on top of the coercion required to make men fight the country they were defending.

Russia feeds up some prisoners and starves others

The coordinator also pointed to a practice of staging appearances before exchanges. Knowing whom it will hand over, Russia brings those prisoners, including civilians, into "normal form" through a process he called "fattening," drawing on testimony from released Ukrainian defenders and returned civilians.

The starvation behind it is deliberate and selective. Pasternak characterized it as an element of torture: some prisoners are deliberately not fed, while others are fed up so they look more or less normal for the swap. Ukraine's negotiators note at every meeting that the two sides' prisoners differ starkly, he added. The returning Ukrainians are almost all very thin, with only a few in decent condition, while the Russian POWs Ukraine hands back are genuinely well-fed.

Russian forces have executed at least 345 Ukrainian soldiers who surrendered since the start of the full-scale war, Ukrainian Ombudsperson Dmytro Lubinets said at a press conference at Ukrinform.

The figure is the latest point on a documented and rising curve of a systematic war crime. Ukraine's prosecutors and international monitors have tracked these killings from 268 confirmed by July 2025 to over 330 by March 2026. Financial Times investigation found the executions appear to be systematic military policy directed from Russian command, with intercepted orders to "shoot prisoners on the spot."

The victims had surrendered

Lubinets described people killed after they had given up.

"It means that they laid down their weapons, came out with raised hands, lay on the ground, and showed they were no longer fighting," he said, and Russian soldiers examined them and confirmed they were unarmed.

Then the soldiers killed them.

"We have recorded cases where they fully demand that the clothes be removed. And after that, they force them to lie on the ground the same way, and shoot the Ukrainian soldiers at point-blank range," Lubinets added.

Killing a surrendered soldier is a war crime

Lubinets stressed the legal character of the act. The killing of soldiers who have surrendered is a distinct war crime, he said.

The prohibition is absolute. Under the Geneva Conventions, a soldier who lays down arms and surrenders is protected, and killing a prisoner of war is a grave breach of international law. Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds" against those who have laid down their arms, with no battlefield circumstance that permits it, per the ICRC.

The count keeps rising and accountability lags

Ukraine documents each case for eventual prosecution, but most perpetrators are in Russia, beyond reach, and Russian courts and media have glorified the killings rather than punished them.

In an 11 August 2026 address, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated Russia is preparing a new mass mobilization drive after its parliamentary elections this fall, citing an assessment by Ukrainian military intelligence.

Moscow plans to mobilize several hundred thousand people by the end of 2026 and roughly the same number by the end of 2027, he said. The mobilization would come on top of continuing contract recruitment. 

Moscow has relied on contract soldiers and foreign troops to avoid the political cost of another compulsory draft. But Russia has struggled to recruit soldiers as quickly as it loses them. A mass call-up could replace losses and maintain offensive operations, although Ukrainian officials say it may initially do little more than offset battlefield losses.

Zelenskyy said internal Russian documents support the intelligence assessment. The documents have not been published. 

According to Zelenskyy, Putin plans to wait until after Russia’s parliamentary elections, then use the result to claim the Russians support continuing the war. He described the vote as an “imitation,” claiming every party allowed to compete opposes peace. Russia’s Supreme Court barred Yabloko, the country’s only officially registered party opposing the war, from contesting the election, Reuters reported.

Russia avoided a second draft since 2022. Now recruitment can't keep up

The Kremlin has largely avoided another compulsory call-up since its September 2022 mobilization triggered mass protests and an exodus of Russians. Instead, Moscow has used financial incentives and recruited prisoners and foreigners to replenish its forces in Ukraine.

In March 2026, then-Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Russia aimed to recruit 409,000 troops during 2026 and form at least 11 divisions. Ukrainian intelligence then warned in July that Moscow could mobilize 500,000 people that fall. 

195,000 new contracts signed—but losses keep outpacing recruitment

Russia has struggled to meet those targets while covering battlefield losses. Ukraine said Moscow had failed to replace its losses for five consecutive months by April. By mid-July, Russia had signed 195,000 military contracts against a target of 204,500, while Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service estimated its 2026 personnel losses at 196,700.

In his 11 August 2026 address, Zelenskyy claimed Russia is losing at least 30,000 personnel monthly, 60% of them killed, and that its force in Ukraine is gradually shrinking. The figures could not be independently verified.

Zelenskyy also said Putin expects the recruits and North Korean troops to prolong the war and expand Russian offensive capacity. The president stated that he had ordered Ukraine’s intelligence agencies and special services to make Moscow’s plans harder to carry out, but gave no details.

Ukraine's first-person-view (FPV) drones are not being displaced by newer unmanned systems, a Ukrainian officer told Ukrinform. They remain a central tool for precision strikes, while Ukrainian forces claim a separate advantage in larger bomber drones.

Unmanned systems have become a defining weapon of Russia's war against Ukraine, and both sides race to out-innovate each other, a contest in which a cheap UAV can down a platform costing dozens of times more.

FPVs remain central

"Since FPVs appeared in service, they have become a leading means of precision engagement. This trend will continue," said Captain Anton Bobrovskyi, who commands a company training unmanned-systems specialists at the 199th Training Center of the Air Assault Forces.

Bobrovskyi conceded that Russia also uses drones effectively and that Ukraine learns from it, but said Ukraine keeps a lead in one category: bomber drones.

Explore further

Ukrainian drone that downed Russia’s rarest spy UAV just bagged its anti-drone interceptor too

Ukraine's bomber-drone advantage

Russian forces fear Ukrainian bomber drones, according to Bobrovskyi. He said Ukraine outmatches Russia many times over in such systems, and that Russian troops who encounter one often do not know what to do with it.

The distinction matters because bomber drones work differently from single-use FPVs. Rather than flying into a target and exploding, larger bomber drones carry and release munitions, then fly on. Euromaidan Press has documented the growing role of these systems, including reusable platforms capable of returning to base after dropping their payloads. Developers have also adapted them to fly through Russian electronic warfare, with upgraded Vampire drones built to resist jamming.

Explore further

Sea drones, jet drones, and Neptune missiles hit one Russian port in a single night

Bobrovskyi said Ukraine's advantage does not mean Russia lacks comparable technology. Instead, he argued that Ukrainian forces and society initiated many of the current battlefield drone trends and have kept the initiative in using them.

Each new drone class draws a countermeasure, so the side that keeps iterating fastest holds the battlefield initiative. How long Ukraine's bomber-drone edge lasts will depend on its ability to keep protecting and upgrading those platforms.

Russia wants its tanks moving again after two years of Ukrainian drones freezing its armored assaults, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported. Its main bet is a tank-mounted system that fires interceptors at incoming drones. The system worked on at least one tank, but Russia lost it anyway.

Since 2022, cheap Ukrainian FPV drones have turned the open approach to any position into ground where armor rarely survives, forcing Russia into slow, infantry-led assaults and years of experiments to armor its tanks against drones.

The shield shot down some drones. Ukraine still killed the tank.

In early August, footage surfaced of Ukrainian drones destroying a Russian tank fitted with the Arena-M active protection system in the Dobropillia sector of Donetsk Oblast. Militarnyi identified the vehicle as a T-72B3A, side number 133, and Militarnyi reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) released the clip. ISW geolocated the footage near occupied Volodymyrivka, east of Dobropillia.

Explore further

Russia took the cages off its newest tanks. The new Arena-M shield bought them a few minutes.

Dmytro Putiata, a Ukrainian combat drone specialist who posts as kriegsforscherD, spoke with the unit involved. On that tank, Arena-M shot down seven drones before its magazine ran dry, he said.

"Unfortunately, it works," Putiata wrote.

It still wasn't enough. Ukrainian crews finished the tank off with more drones. It took 15 to 20 first-person-view (FPV) drones to kill each vehicle, Putiata said. Footage shows the tank moving with its interceptor cells empty. It was the first time the Arena-M was credited with shooting drones down in combat.

Russia keeps sending tanks into that ground for a reason

Russian forces are experimenting with new technology to restore mechanized maneuver and break out of positional warfare—the static, trench-like fighting that has defined the front, ISW reported. They are fitting tanks with active protection systems to help armor survive in the "kill zone," the open ground where drones and other weapons destroy almost anything that moves.

Explore further

Russia’s weirdest armored vehicle was built to fight infantry. The infantry stopped coming

ISW judged that Arena-M alone cannot shield Russian assaults from the drones, let alone the rest of Ukraine's weapons. Russian commanders have largely kept tanks off the roads because drones kill them faster than factories rebuild them. In these assaults, the tank's job is less to fight than to survive long enough to drop infantry closer to Ukrainian lines. Russia will likely keep trying to restore maneuver even after its late-July mechanized assault in the Dobropillia sector failed, ISW added.

Why Russia wants the shield: the cages don't let tanks fight

The bolt-on armor carries a cost. Cope cages and "turtle" shells weigh tanks down and often jam the turret so the main gun can't aim. That trade-off is part of why Russia wants Arena-M: protection without the bulk, so a tank can still move and shoot. Russia recently sent tanks stripped of the welded cages, carrying the shield instead.

Arena-M is not new. Active protection systems like it were first built to stop anti-tank missiles, and Russia adapted this one to catch drones. The system's lineage dates back to the late Soviet era, and Russian industry has for years claimed mass deployment that never came. Designers worked on fitting it to T-72B3 and T-90M tanks since at least 2019, yet only single vehicles turned up by 2024—some used to shoot a propaganda film rather than fight.

Exclusives

Ukraine's cardboard protests look like democracy working. In a war, that's also the risk.. Three weeks on, the protests go on—smaller but daily. Fedorov's old seat is filled by an acting minister, and Fedorov himself won't join the crowds demanding his return.

Military

"What happens here affects next 50 years": why American left Pennsylvania to fight in Ukraine's 47th Brigade. "Lighthouse", a soldier in the 47th Brigade's reconnaissance company, came from Pennsylvania after the full-scale war.

"This is money of his accomplices burning": Russian partisans and Ukraine hit Siberian plant tied to Putin's inner circle. The plant is located over 2,000 km away from the Ukrainian border and is one of Russia's largest.

Ukraine's Crimea campaign could strike seven times more targets with faster funding, Brovdi says. To clear the skies over the peninsula, the force destroyed more than 300 Russian air defense assets in recent months, its commander said.

Russia's advance in Ukraine slows as casualties per square kilometer rise 3.5-fold, Radio Svoboda reports. Ukrainian drone operators say Russian infiltration units moving on foot lose all but one soldier out of every fifteen.

Zelenskyy says Russia could receive up to 50,000 North Korean troops. Kyiv says North Korean deployment numbers have grown from hundreds to tens of thousands within roughly two months, according to Ukrainian estimates.

Drones strike Russian oblasts overnight: thick smoke over a Nizhnekamsk refinery as Crimea's Krasnoperekopsk industrial zone burns. Unmanned aircraft reportedly hit a Tatarstan oil hub and the occupied peninsula, with satellite sensors flagging heat signatures and 15 airports halting flights.

Russian electric locomotive was named target of Ukrainian partisan operation. It carried military supplies toward Kharkiv front. The ATESH partisan movement says its agents destroyed the cab of an electric locomotive.

Intelligence and technology

Forged end-user certificates through eight countries: how one network kept European tech flowing into Russian missiles. Austrian counterintelligence exposed an international network that funneled high-tech industrial equipment to Rostec-linked Russian defense firms.

70 ballistic missiles and 12 launchers: Ukraine lines up deep-strike refill from an unlikely supplier. The M39 ATACMS flies about 165 kilometers the short-range original, carrying a warhead that scatters 950 bomblets over troops and air defenses.

Russian plants are overfulfilling monthly missile production quotas by 110-120% and unlikely to pause strikes, Ukraine's intelligence says. Moscow met its full-year Zircon and Onyx output targets by early August, seven months into 2026, Ukraine's deputy intelligence chief said.

New Iranian loitering munition has started reaching Ukraine, analyst says. It's built to hit deep behind front. Iran is improving its Shahed-107 kamikaze drones based on the Ukraine war, adding shrapnel elements.

International

Ukraine gave up 1,900 nuclear warheads in 1994 on Western promises that didn't work. New plan would replace them with Britain's shield instead. Plan pairs Britain's nuclear deterrent with Ukraine's army as Europe doubts US protection and struggles to deter Russia.

The Atlantic: US firms may fear cheaper Ukrainian Patriots, Republican official says. A Republican congressional official says intellectual-property concerns may mask fears of Ukraine being able to make Patriots more cheaply and more quickly.

Humanitarian and social impact

A $20,000 "welcome bonus" that was never paid: how a Colombia-registered recruiter sent Peruvians into Russia's war. Russia has deceived more than 450 Peruvian citizens into its army, and some have already been killed.

Occupied Ukraine's schools get a new Russian ideology class, a separate military-training track, and behavior grades from 1 September. Behavior grades for children as young as the second grade, a standalone military-training course, and a compulsory Russian identity subject take effect together across the temporarily occupied territories from 1 September.

A Russian missile took Oleksandra Paskal's leg at six. At 10, she competes in rhythmic gymnastics across five continents. She returned to the gym roughly seven months after the amputation, and now trains as hard as any girl in her group, on a prosthesis.

July was Ukraine's deadliest month for civilians since 2022 — and Russia is scaling its ballistic missile salvos toward 200 at once. Kyiv's unmanned-forces commander warns the Kremlin is racing to swamp a depleted air shield, echoing intelligence that Moscow now overfulfills its monthly weapons plans.

ISW: Russia strikes the Mayaki bridge linking southern Ukraine to Romania and Moldova. Moscow's overnight hit on the M-15 highway forced Kyiv to halt traffic toward the Danube ports, its main grain outlet after sea exports collapsed.

Political and legal developments

Sweden says it stopped Russian operation to discredit country and EU. But no one will be prosecuted. Sweden's Säpo exposed a Russian intelligence operation that recruited an agent in a foreign diplomatic mission to undermine Swedish decision-making.

A Russian who moved to Ukraine got 13 years the moment he visited relatives back home. Eleven alleged transfers of about 100 hryvnias ($2.23) each led Ivan Stolbov to a harsh sentence after he returned to Russia.

Zaluzhnyi, Fedorov, and Budanov lead Ukraine's trust ranking as Zelenskyy places fourth – KIIS. Three of Ukraine's most recognizable wartime figures now command the strongest public confidence, a late-July sociological study found, even as the president's standing lags noticeably behind.

Read our earlier daily review here.

The Dance of Freedom tour, featuring young Ukrainian gymnast Oleksandra Paskal, has carried her from Paris to Tokyo, Akhmetov Foundation reported. Behind it lie a seaside home reduced to rubble, 15 days in a coma, and a place among the more than 3,200 children Russia's war has killed or wounded.

Russia has spent the war striking the cities where Ukrainian families live, turning apartment blocks and holiday coasts into places where children are wounded far from any front line. For every Ukrainian child whose recovery becomes a story the world follows, many more carry injuries and losses that never surface beyond a case file.

In May 2022, three months into Russia's full-scale invasion, a missile struck a home in Zatoka, a resort village on the coast of Ukraine's Odesa oblast. No air-raid siren sounded in the neighborhood, the family says. Beneath the collapsed concrete lay Oleksandra Paskal, six years old, her leg pinned under a slab.

Her mother, Maria, lost consciousness in the blast. Maria later recounted the scene to the Museum of Civilian Voices. She described what she saw when she came to: a heavy concrete slab lying across her daughter's leg, the girl's arm dislocated with the bone exposed, a finger hanging loose, her head badly bruised. Neighbors helped lift the slab. Sasha, as the family calls her, spent 15 days in intensive care in a medically induced coma. Doctors first feared a severe head injury. Then they found that blood had stopped circulating to her left leg. They amputated.

Four years later, Oleksandra is 10 and a competitive rhythmic gymnast performing on five continents.

Her case is at once singular and representative. In the fifth year of Russia's full-scale war, the fighting is still killing and wounding Ukrainian children, even as global attention fades. Oleksandra survived and found a stage; most children harmed by the war never have their stories told beyond Ukraine. The distance between the scale of that harm and the world's diminishing notice is what her tour is built to close.

The return took roughly seven months.

She learned to walk with a prosthesis, returned to the gym, and won her first post-amputation competition in Chornomorsk.

"My passion for sport is bigger than my loss," she told CNN Sports.

In 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and First Lady Olena Zelenska awarded her the "Future of Ukraine" honor. Earlier this year, she took gold at Carla's Rhythmic Cup, an international competition in Romania, where she competes against children without disabilities.

The performances abroad are part of the Dance of Freedom tour, an initiative of the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation in partnership with the football club Shakhtar Donetsk, timed to the 35th anniversary of Ukraine's independence on 24 August. Over two weeks, Oleksandra performed her routine in Paris, in New York's Times Square, in Rio de Janeiro, in Nairobi, and finally in Tokyo. In New York, she met the boxer Oleksandr Usyk, visited Ukraine's mission to the United Nations, and stood beneath the Statue of Liberty.

For Oleksandra, the travel is partly an escape. "I'm really happy to travel because it's an opportunity to distract myself from what's going on in Ukraine," she said. Her mother frames it as a purpose.

"She's so strong and motivated," Maria said. "Although she's very young, she's a role model for many people with similar circumstances. We never pushed her. What she's doing comes from her."

Oleksandra's story is singular, but the injury that shaped it is not. According to UNICEF, more than 3,200 Ukrainian children have been killed or wounded since Russia launched its full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. These are UN-verified casualties, a count that captures only the cases investigators have been able to confirm, so the real toll is almost certainly higher. Almost 2.6 million, more than a third of the country's children, remain displaced. More than 1,700 schools and other educational facilities have been damaged or destroyed. Every stop on the tour, her mother says, is meant to hold that reality before an international audience.

Oleksandra's own ambitions run past the tour. She wants to compete at the Paralympics in Brisbane in 2032 and win gold if rhythmic gymnastics is included in the program. In New York, Usyk gave her a method: write down that you are an Olympic champion, and read it every day. When they met, Zelenskyy gave her a sentence to carry: never give up and move forward.

While much of the media industry focused on the churn of headlines, we became increasingly interested in the undercurrents beneath them: the hidden systems, infrastructures and ideologies shaping events across borders and over time.

Again and again, our reporting led us back to the same realization: for a long time, the struggle over information was understood primarily as a question of censorship or access. Who controls information? Who gets to publish? Who gets silenced?

Those questions still matter. But they no longer fully describe the world we live in.

Today, the struggle over information is about who builds the systems through which reality is organized, distributed and trusted. From state propaganda to algorithmic feeds, from platform monopolies to AI-generated noise, the battle is not over facts. It is over the infrastructures that determine which narratives spread, which voices are amplified and which communities remain connected.

Over the past year, these questions led to a collaboration between Coda and The Continent, the pan-African newspaper founded in Johannesburg by Simon Allison and Sipho Kings. Although our reporting emerges from very different histories and geographies, we found ourselves arriving at remarkably similar conclusions about power, fragmentation and the future of journalism in an age of informational instability.

This two-chapter essay is the beginning of that collaboration, and marks the start of a new project called The Atlas. Pilot edition is available here — please feel free to share with friends, family and colleagues, preferably in its entirety.

In Chapter One, I return to the world of my Soviet childhood: propaganda, samizdat and the search for trustworthy signals through noise.

In Chapter Two, The Continent co-founder Simon Allison presents the Parable of Sinn Sisamouth: the story of how some of the greatest songs ever written were nearly lost, and then found, and then lost again. 

Taken together, these essays ask what journalism becomes in a world where information is no longer organized primarily to inform, but to capture attention, manufacture reaction and shape perception at planetary scale.

The Atlas grows out of that question.

Chapter One: Through the Static

Whenever I am asked why I decided to become a journalist, an image from my childhood pops into my head. It’s dusk. I am 10, sitting in the kitchen with my mom. She is glued to a shortwave radio. Outside, the Soviet Union is on the cusp of collapse. Georgia, where we are, is on the brink of civil war. We didn’t use the term back then, but fake news was all we got through official channels. Real news — coming from the West — felt like a lifeline. I was in awe of the crackling radio that held my mother’s full attention. I wanted to become that voice.

Years later, I got my dream job at the BBC and spent much of my adult life moving between wars, uprisings and authoritarian states. Again and again, I found myself in places where truth was contested terrain: Baghdad, Damascus, Donetsk, Sana’a. But over time I realized something fundamental had changed. Modern authoritarianism no longer relied primarily on suppressing information. It had discovered something more effective.

Information could simply be drowned out by static.

That realization became stark for me in eastern Ukraine in the summer of 2014. I arrived in a field of bright yellow sunflowers where the bodies from Flight MH17 still lay scattered across the ground. A Russian missile had blown the passenger plane out of the sky, killing all 298 people on board. Yet almost immediately, the Kremlin flooded the information space with competing explanations. It was a Ukrainian fighter jet. A failed assassination attempt on Putin. The plane had been filled with corpses before takeoff. Each theory contradicted the next, but that hardly mattered. The point was not to persuade, it was to exhaust. It was to create so much noise that truth itself began to feel unstable.

Over the following years, I watched versions of the same logic spread far beyond Russia. Social platforms transformed public conversation into a permanent stream of outrage, performance and distraction, collapsing vastly different kinds of information into the same endless feed. War footage, propaganda, conspiracy theories, journalism and gossip all began competing inside systems designed not to inform people but to capture and hold attention.

Noise became the new censorship.

And increasingly, I found myself thinking about the world of my childhood again. Not because history was repeating itself neatly, but because the emotional landscape felt strangely familiar: confusion, exhaustion, distrust, the constant sense that reality itself was becoming slippery. Back then, people searched desperately for clear signals through the static of Soviet propaganda. Today, we are drowning in a different kind of static, but the instinct, the search for clarity feels remarkably similar.

In the Soviet Union, people developed ways of navigating that confusion. Among my strongest memories from that time is the sound of my parents’ typewriter late at night. Friends would pass around copies of banned Soviet literature and my parents would sit at the kitchen table all night, retyping them page by page so they could be shared again. It was my first encounter with samizdat, although I didn’t know the word then.

Looking back now, what strikes me is that samizdat was never simply about forbidden texts. It was about building trusted alternative systems of circulation when official systems had lost credibility.

At Coda, we have spent years building journalism against the logic of noise. We slowed stories down. We followed themes instead of headlines. We built a reporting system designed to connect events across borders and over time, helping readers see patterns instead of fragments. But as our globally distributed newsroom adapted to an increasingly fractured information landscape, it became clear that journalism alone was not enough. Distribution shapes understanding as much as reporting does.

Around the same time, in Johannesburg, Simon Allison, Sipho Kings and their team were building something that challenged many of the assumptions dominating digital media. The Continent, their pan-African newspaper, spreads largely through direct sharing networks: passed from reader to reader rather than pushed by algorithms.

Different histories had brought us to remarkably similar questions. What does journalism look like when trust is collapsing, attention is fragmented and the systems that carry information have themselves become instruments of power?

Out of that convergence came The Atlas: a new publication that brings together Coda’s methodology of following systems across borders and over time with The Continent’s radically distributed model for reaching readers beyond algorithmic feeds.

The Atlas is built on a shared conviction: as fragmentation, distrust and informational overload spread across the world, some of the clearest ways through will come from places that have already spent decades navigating propaganda, instability and contested reality. Places once treated as peripheral are becoming essential to understanding the defining question of this age: how can meaning survive systems designed to overwhelm it.

Chapter Two: The second silencing of Sinn Sisamouth

Imagine if your favourite song disappeared, forever. 

Almost every album I have ever loved was recommended to me by my friend An-Rui. A few months ago, he sent me a track by the undisputed King of Khmer Music, the Golden Voice, the Cambodian Elvis himself – Sinn Sisamouth.

I had never heard of him.

I didn’t respond at first, so he nudged me. That night, after the kids were asleep, I put on my headphones, sat in the garden and immediately lost myself in Cambodia’s psychedelic rock scene of the 1960s and ‘70s. I don’t know enough about music to explain exactly what I fell in love with, but within weeks I was, according to Spotify, among the top one percent of Sinn Sisamouth listeners worldwide.

An-Rui had added a note to his recommendation. “the songs are happy but since i know what his fate was and i don’t understand the words, it sounds incredibly sad to me”.

The story goes something like this: A small-town boy with an extraordinary voice moves to the big city, and conquers all before him. He writes hundreds of songs, bridging Khmer musical traditions with new western influences: jazz, rock & roll, bossa nova, blues, the Beatles, and, of course, Elvis Presley. He toured the country. He toured the world. He made music with an actual King, Norodom Sihanouk, and became Cambodia’s most beloved rockstar.

Then, in 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized power. In the course of committing a genocide, the communist regime disappeared Sinn Sisamouth, and banned his music. He has never been seen, or heard from, again.

But his music never died. It lived on brittle records, hidden for generations under floorboards. It lived on scratchy cassettes, passed hand to hand among the diaspora.

It was only decades later that his music was digitised and remastered, and made available on streaming platforms to the likes of me.

When I listen to Sinn Sisamouth, I can’t help but think about how easily we could have lost his masterpieces entirely. And I wonder what else might have been lost that we have not been able to recover.

And then it happened again.

There’s a particular track that I like to play in my car, where I can turn the bass up as high as it goes. I was driving one afternoon and looked for it on Spotify. It was gone, even though the rest of the album was there. 

I looked again on my laptop at home. Nothing. Gone from Spotify. Gone from Apple Music. Gone from YouTube. Like it had never been there in the first place. I started to wonder if I had gone crazy, and maybe imagined the song entirely. And then I started to panic: What if I never heard it again?

Eventually, I found a bootleg YouTube version, using a different transliteration of the Khmer title – Kanlang Pnheu Pran, instead of Konlong Phner Bran. Before I tracked that down, I had to wade through dozens of AI-generated Sinn Sisamouth ‘cover versions’, all uploaded to YouTube within the last few months. If I had never heard it before, I would never have been able to tell which was the original.

It’s not unusual for songs to disappear from the Internet, especially when the music is from non-English-speaking countries. I’ve had similar experiences with the music of Sharhabil Ahmed, the Sudanese jazz legend, and Ethiopia’s Tilahun “The Voice” Gessesse.

In fact, it’s not unusual for other kinds of information to disappear from the internet; to be edited after the fact; or to be simply lost among all the digital noise. Digital information is incredibly precarious, and becoming more so by the day. AI slop is taking over social media platforms. Algorithms determine what information we can and can’t see, shaping our cultural and political preferences. And powerful interests are becoming increasingly bold when it comes to brazenly manipulating information in their favour – or, of even greater concern, restricting the flow of information across borders.

Amazon changes the contents of books on people’s Kindles without telling anyone. News websites quietly alter critical stories, post-publication, to remove evidence of wrongdoing (my favourite example: the Financial Express published a story critical of India’s richest family; only to replace it with a glorified press release a few days later. They neglected to amend the URL, however, which contains the original headline). Governments shut down internet access on a whim, or legislate which apps and websites are available to specific populations.

For journalism, this is an existential threat. Our job is not just to hold power to account – it is also to write the first draft of history. But if we can’t preserve that first draft, or distribute it effectively, then what, exactly, is the point?

The Continent and Coda Story are working together to try something different. We want to publish news about the world, produced and verified by humans, that cannot be edited after the fact; and to distribute it in a way that dramatically decreases our reliance on unaccountable algorithms or search engine optimisation. The Atlas — pilot edition available here — is our answer to the precarity of information online. It’s a work in progress.

Stay tuned: if we’re going to succeed, we’ll need your help. And if we do succeed, the secret of our success will be those very same transnational networks that kept the music of Sinn Sisamouth alive. Communities of like-minded people, of friends and families will always find a way to stay connected, no matter how vast the distances between them, or how great the obstacles. So what does a global newspaper look like if we design it with exactly these communities in mind?

As soon as I found that bootleg on YouTube, I ripped an MP3 copy and sent it to An-Rui on Signal. “KEEP THIS SAFE,” I told him. I don’t know what happened to the song on Spotify, or if it is ever coming back. But I can’t take the risk of never hearing that bassline again. And here it is, in case you want to hear it too.

Related Articles

Welcome to the age of exile

Natalia Antelava

Captured: how Silicon Valley is building a future we never chose

Isobel Cockerell

The capture of journalism and the illusion of objectivity

Natalia Antelava

The post The new samizdat appeared first on Coda Story.

My name is Darina,” says an elfin teen, ponytail pulled through the back of her cap, and “next year I’ll be earning 150,000 rubles (nearly $2,000) a month.” Darina works at what she calls “the world’s largest drone factory,” helping to assemble versions of the Iranian Shahed drone. “My parents are proud of me. Wanna do the same?” She asks as she advertises a polytechnic in Tatarstan. The Russian government, in the face of war and looming demographic disaster, has been relaxing child labor laws since 2022, making it easier to put 14-year-olds to work. Now, legislators are open about the need to reform “outdated” restrictions on employing minors in industries that were “considered dangerous 20 years ago.” Drone production is not the only part of the war effort to which teenagers are being recruited. This month in a “content camp” in Moscow, soldiers and state media propagandists trained 120-plus teens on how to make videos, use AI, and grow their audiences as aspiring influencers. Vladislav Golovin, a former soldier and a leader of Russia’s Young Army Cadets National Movement, said the program had “created a huge team of kids who understand how to broadcast government values.” 

But many young people, subject to year-round conscription, subject to internet shut downs and subject to surveillance, have little desire to spread propaganda. Instead, according to Google Trends data, growing numbers of Russians are seeking information on how to emigrate. A new exodus would accelerate Russia’s deep demographic crisis. Already, up to a million people are thought to have left Russia since the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to one recent count, nearly 210,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in the war with Ukraine, with other estimates suggesting over 1.2 million casualties, including 325,000 deaths. And Russian fertility rates are the lowest they have been for 200 years. Anton Kotyakov, the labor minister, has told Vladimir Putin that the country faces a labor shortage of 11 million people by 2030.

So concerning is this crisis that Rosstat, the national statistics agency, has stopped publishing monthly demographic data. State officials and local governors have been told to compete to come up with the most innovative solutions to a seemingly intractable problem. The pressure on Russian officials and the Kremlin is leading to desperate measures, including guidance from the Russian health ministry that women who say they do not want to have children should be referred to a psychologist. Nothing the Russian state has tried has worked, from financial incentives (extended even to schoolgirls under 18) to banning advertising that supposedly promotes “child-free” lifestyles and so-called “LGBTQ propaganda.”   

Alongside “anti-woke” policies disguised as family values, is rising xenophobia and anti-immigrant rhetoric that has led to a marked decline in the number of foreigners living in Russia. The Kremlin’s anti-migrant policies include a new system to monitor migrant workers through biometric registration, location tracking, and intensified police oversight. The Russian parliament is currently debating enhancing the number of offences that can be punished by deportation or substantially increased fines. Much of it is targeted at Russia’s Central Asian migrants who make up an overwhelming majority of immigrant labor. Some Central Asian governments, notably Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have now urged their citizens to think twice about going to Russia for work. 

Russia has been publicizing political stunts such as its “shared values visa” in which applicants from 46, largely developed, nations are given temporary residence permits if they profess to support “traditional Russian values.” The visa, the Kremlin has said, is “Russia’s response to what it perceives as the harmful effects of Western neoliberal policies.” But only a tiny fraction of the immigrants Russia needs will be Westerners who apply for such a visa; instead, Russia has been diversifying its pool of migrant workers by looking further east. Around 72,000 work permits were issued to Indian nationals in 2025, up from just 5,000 in 2021. Russian officials have signaled they are ready to accept “unlimited” numbers of workers from South Asian countries like India, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.

While the Kremlin is looking to South Asia and Africa to address its immediate need for workers (and soldiers), the ambition in the longer term is to boost Russian birthr rates, despite the signal failure of ongoing attempts. 

In the U.S., there have been several moves borrowed from the Kremlin’s playbook, including the restriction of abortion, the attempt to deny women birth control, and even alarm at the fall in teen pregnancies. But data released this month showed that women in the U.S. gave birth to 710,000 fewer babies in 2025 than they did in 2007, a reflection of two decades of steadily dropping birth rates. Russian demographer Salavat Abylkalikov, at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Germany, says “if the birth rate has fallen below the level of simple reproduction, it is almost impossible to raise it back.” Especially when financial incentives cover just a fraction of childcare costs. 

In any case, Abylkalikov says, “in Russia, death is much more profitable than birth: in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, the government provides around 1,000,000 rubles (about $12,000) for each child, but if one person goes to war and dies, the family receives up to 12 million rubles in total. That's more than $120,000. This is the economy of death.” The evidence, from countries like Russia, Hungary and the U.S., is that appeals to tradition, to religion and to female “responsibility” do not work, when support for families is limited. And while migration is an obvious fix to demographic questions everywhere, it’s politically toxic.

Russia knows it is hurtling towards demographic doom but can do little to halt the momentum. Its policies are riddled with inconsistencies — a strong line in anti-migration rhetoric and bullying, while being forced to import workers and soldiers from Asia and Africa; a patriarchal view of women’s roles, mostly confined to the domestic, while increasingly reliant on women to take the jobs of the men who are fighting and dying in Putin's war; and encouraging more women to give birth, while employing children to build drones. With family values like these, no wonder young Russians are hesitant to procreate.

Related Articles

Welcome to the age of exile

Natalia Antelava

The Identitarians are back: How a discredited worldview dominates the global agenda

Josephine Lulamae

As the war drags on, Ukrainian refugees wonder: should we go home?

Misha Friedman

The post Teens making drones: Russia’s demographic collapse appeared first on Coda Story.

Someone recently asked me what mark out of 10 I’d give for the efforts of governments to tackle financial crime. It got me thinking about that one bright spot of recent times — the West’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago — and how it is now looking. Back in 2022, a lot of us were pleasantly surprised by the speed and ambition with which Western governments sanctioned the Russian government, state-owned companies and wealthy individuals. While Western pressure did not prevent the war, the asset freezes did impose a real cost on those conducting it. Four years on, however, those sanctions are beginning to look a bit shopsoiled. If they began at 7/10, they’re now scoring a lot lower.

There are reasons for this: Donald Trump does not appear particularly interested in Ukraine; the now former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has been snarling things up; and so on, as laid out in this analysis from Tom Keatinge. To make things worse, Trump’s latest adventure in Iran has pushed the oil prices sharply higher, earning more money for Russia while also giving Trump cover to lift sanctions, a temporary measure he has recently extended.

Keatinge argues that European countries need to be far more focussed on going after Russia’s payment mechanisms, particularly digital. “The extent to which crypto activity supports Russia’s war effort is clear,” he writes, “yet repeated initiatives to elevate the importance of opening a concerted line of effort on this issue are ignored. This must change.”

I agree, though it won’t be easy, considering the diffuse crypto ecosystem, and the increasing sophistication of Russian involvement in it. As long as Telegram is willing to host markets, the markets will continue to function to some extent whatever Western countries do (see the story of Xinbi, a Chinese-language hub for illicit crypto.) However, it does look like someone somewhere has lost patience with the ease with which Russia is funding itself.

“The sanctioned Russia-linked cryptoasset exchange Grinex announced an immediate suspension of its operations, citing a ‘large-scale cyberattack,’” reports Elliptic. According to the statement, which Kyrgyzstan-registered Grinex posted on Telegram, it lost around $13 million worth of USDT in the hack, blaming the theft on Western intelligence agencies.

“Today the attempts to destabilise our fatherland’s financial sector hit a new level, with the direct theft of the assets of Russian citizens and companies with the involvement of complex cyberattacks,” the statement said. Grinex is the successor to Garantex, which was shut down just over a year ago after years of effort by Western law enforcement. I would be surprised if Western countries had decided to take direct action against Grinex, as the exchange claims they did. Westerners tend to be a bit too legalistic for this kind of smash-and-grab, and I would expect any operation to more closely resemble what worked a year ago, conducted with Tether’s cooperation.

Instead, I suspect this attack is the work of hacktivists, perhaps working for or with the Ukrainians. Whatever the answer, it is embarrassing for the Russians, shows their crypto-security is not impregnable, and has made a noticeable dent in trading volumes of the A7A5 ruble-denominated stablecoin, which has become a key sanctions evasion tool. Three birds with one stone.

The important point is that sanctions were never supposed to be permanent: they are a foreign policy tool, not a law enforcement one. Hundreds of billions of Russian-owned dollars are languishing in various frozen bank accounts, and Western countries need to start thinking about what to do with them. They can confiscate them, investigate them or — if they’re feeling brave — use their potential return as leverage to persuade wealthy Russians to break with the Kremlin. What they shouldn’t do is leave them as they are to gather dust.

Hopefully, now that Orbán is out of the way, European countries will be able to take firmer collective action but they also need to be imaginative, and to start behaving as if they actually want Ukraine to win, rather than just not lose.

A defeat for transparency 

Of course, the United States will have a lot to say about that too, and what it ends up saying about how to tackle the Russian crypto operations will depend on what happens in the midterm elections this year. So, it strikes me as a big deal that crypto firms are once more pouring tens of millions of dollars into campaign vehicles in their quest for, what they euphemistically refer to as, “regulatory clarity.” Among them, of course, is Tether.

If you’re wondering quite how it’s possible to spend that much money on elections, I draw your attention once more to the great Integrity Index, with its records for who’s been spending what. It boggles my mind that, for example, the three Democratic rivals to the Republicans’ Susan Collins for the Maine Senate seat have raised more than $17 million just for the primary. Collins herself has raised over $10.5 million. There really shouldn’t be that much money in politics.

Besides, when it comes to value for money, investing in court cases beats investing in politics every day of the week. I don’t know how much the (ironically) anonymous plaintiffs in the 2022 case against corporate transparency in Luxembourg paid their lawyers, but its effects just seem to keep compounding to the benefit of those who want to hide their wealth from society. 

The European Union’s retreat from revealing the ownership of shell companies has given cover for Britain’s tax havens as they resisted efforts from London to force them to open up their own corporate registries. It looks like those efforts may have finally failed. “We are committed to full transparency, but I don’t think there will be any turning back,” said the British Virgin Islands’ Junior Minister for Financial Services Lorna Smith in comments confirming that the islands are in fact very much not committed to full transparency.

A version of this story was published in this week’s Oligarchy newsletter. Sign up here.

Related Articles

How dodgy digital finance destroys democracy

Oliver Bullough

Our corrupt world, run by oligarchs for oligarchs

Oliver Bullough

Sanctions against Russia are working, but they alone can’t end kleptocracy

Oliver Bullough

The post Why Europe must disable Russia’s crypto ecosystem appeared first on Coda Story.

In 2016, when Peter Thiel killed Gawker, he insisted that he wasn’t attacking journalism writ large. 

On the contrary, he told the New York Times, he’d spent $10 million secretly backing Hulk Hogan’s lawsuit against the news outlet because: “I saw Gawker pioneer a unique and incredibly damaging way of getting attention by bullying people even when there was no connection with the public interest… if I didn’t think Gawker was unique, I wouldn’t have done any of this. If the entire media was more or less like this, this would be like trying to boil the ocean.” 

10 years later with the aid of an “AI tribunal,” a team of intelligence and law enforcement veterans, and a political climate vastly more hostile to press freedom, he is trying to do exactly that, bypassing the courts, short-circuiting the first amendment, and making it much, much cheaper to indulge in the quasi legal harassment of journalists.

Objection.ai is a new startup funded by Thiel, and cofounded by Aron D’Souza, who worked closely with him on the Gawker case. It promises “a fast affordable way to challenge statements in the media.” Anyone can file an objection, which will trigger an investigation by a team hired, the company says, from the CIA, FBI, and British intelligence agencies. Targeted outlets and reporters will have an opportunity to respond, and the results will be fed to an AI model, which will render a verdict. The complainant, and the target, are asked to agree to binding arbitration, with an unspecified range of potential consequences. Financial details are vague, but the company has said the process will cost around $2,000 — far less than the retainer of a crisis communications expert.

An initial slate of cases includes objections against the New York Times, for reporting on how Thiel’s fellow traveller David Sacks, former PayPal chief operating officer and Donald Trump’s former “AI and Crypto Czar,” uses his White House position to benefit Silicon Valley connections; The Wall Street Journal for its revelations about the doodle contributed by Donald Trump to Jeffrey Epstein’s birthday book (a case recently dismissed by a federal judge); and British reporter Hannah Broughton for an aggregated story in the UK tabloid the Mirror about allegations that Amazon workers were told to continue working while a colleague lay dead on the warehouse floor. A smattering of social media provocateurs (Candace Owens) and politicians (Bernie Sanders) round out the roster, but the aggregate effect is indisputable: Thiel’s animus was about journalism all along. Indeed, the Objection.ai team couldn't be clearer about that.

“Gawker was not unique,” writes D’Souza on the company’s website. “It was simply the first large media company to be tested against reality in the age of clicks, outrage, and algorithmic amplification. Since then, the same structural failure has spread everywhere.”

“Peter Thiel and I … did not just fight Gawker,” he goes on. “ — We demonstrated that facts still mattered if someone was willing to enforce them.”

This is worse than revisionism. D’Souza is banking on everyone having forgotten that the Hulk Hogan case had nothing to do with “reality.” It was undisputed that the sex tape published by Gawker was real. The original suit, which failed, was for copyright infringement and the ultimate $140 million award that bankrupted the company was for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional harm. 

This foundational lie is important, because it is a warning against the temptation to engage Objection.ai on the merits. It would be easy enough to conduct a good faith debate to take at face value D’Souza’s argument that tech platforms and algorithms amplify false claims to millions, that courts are expensive and slow, media ombuds toothless, and fact-checkers partisan. And it would not be hard to demonstrate that he is harnessing widely shared concerns about a disordered information environment to mobilize support for an AI powered justice system controlled by a hyperpartisan private company with a track record of attacking the very institutions that are holding the line on consensus reality.

It would also be a mistake. There is nothing good faith about this effort. Rather, it is classic Thiel: an attempt to hack the principles of accountability, and turn them against journalism. Leave it to his less sophisticated Silicon Valley peers to rail against the media, create in house news outlets or buy them. The PayPal co-founder is going for the heart of the system, and financing infrastructure that will enable anyone who can afford a used Honda Civic to launch a harassment campaign, cloaked in the language of legitimate investigation. James O’Keefe, but with the judicial rather than journalistic process as its governing metaphor.

It will be tempting, too, to question the likely financial sustainability of Objection. That will be the least of its founders' concerns. The for-profit structure supports a story about the company’s purpose. It may work, or not, but its goals are nonfinancial. We reached out to Thiel for comment on Objection.ai before publication and will update this article as soon as he responds.

Providing funding, alongside Thiel, is Balaji Srinivasan, the investor and author of “The Network State,” a book about social networks with “a sense of national consciousness” replacing the nation state. He once outlined an early version of the Objection.ai model in an email to the far right theorist Curtis Yarvin about dealing with critical coverage. "If things get hot,” he suggested “it may be interesting to sic the Dark Enlightenment audience on a single vulnerable hostile reporter to dox them and turn them inside out with hostile reporting sent to *their* advertisers/friends/contacts."

These men understand the limits of the Gawker verdict’s impact. It bankrupted the company, a personal victory for Thiel, but perhaps the least important outcome of the case. At a more systemic level, it struck fear into the hearts of media insurers and newsroom counsel, focusing attention on third party litigation finance as potential threat. 

If people with limitless resources could sponsor litigation against news organizations they disliked, constitutional protections would be no match for the sheer cost and complexity of defense.

Now, they’ve found an AI-assisted way to supercharge those effects. 

The Gawker case routed around the First Amendment by relying on a privacy claim. Objection.ai does so by building a hallucination of the legal process. Any journalist foolish enough to agree to binding arbitration by the company probably deserves what they get, but that will be a vanishingly small minority. For those who don’t, a phone call, or a knock on the door from a former FBI agent, or defense intelligence operative, will be chilling, and an ex-parte verdict rendered by Thiel’s custom-tuned AI will act as a cudgel on social media and via traditional PR. Journalists will be assigned a “trust score” to act as an additional goad.

In an environment of less peril for press freedom, it might be easy to laugh off Objection.ai as the confection of a thin-skinned millenarian. Right now, with the crony capture of broadcast news far advanced, swathes of the tech community openly hostile to journalism, and the White House onside, it would be wise to take it seriously. That starts with seeing it for what it is, and refusing to engage with a process which, unlike the real courts, Peter Thiel has no legal power to compel. 

Related Articles

Memeification and digital slop: AI and the fog of war

Nic Dawes

The capture of journalism and the illusion of objectivity

Natalia Antelava

First, they came for the journalists

Isobel Cockerell

The post Peter Thiel is building a parallel justice system — Powered by AI appeared first on Coda Story.

Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister since 2010, faces an election dogfight. Behind in the polls, he has been effectively endorsed by both the Kremlin and the White House, and a host of conservative world leaders. As wars in Iran and Ukraine exacerbate the fissures that have weakened NATO, as well as the U.S.’s relationship with the European Union, this is an election that is being followed with bated breath in Washington, Moscow, Kyiv and Brussels. 

Before the elections on April 12, a scandal engulfed the Hungarian government. On leaked recordings, foreign minister Péter Szijjártó can be heard deferentially acquiescing to his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov and passing on information from EU meetings. Szijjártó appeared willing to help the Kremlin’s cause in Brussels, to remove oligarchs and their relatives from the EU blacklist, and to block efforts to aid Ukraine. Hungary’s advocacy for the Kremlin’s agenda culminated in its recent veto of fresh sanctions on Russia and over $100 billion in loans to Ukraine. On X, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk wrote that while “Hungary is and will be in the European Union, Victor Orbán and his foreign minister left Europe long ago.” And the Irish taoiseach Micheál Martin described Szijjárto’s calls with Lavrov as both “sinister” and “alarming.”

Szijjárto alleged that “foreign intelligence services, with the active involvement of Hungarian journalists, have been intercepting my phone calls.” It is a plot, the Hungarian government claims, to influence the upcoming polls. Orbán directly blames Ukraine for seeking to unseat his government. The opposition, led by Peter Magyar, has a healthy lead in the polls and describes the Hungarian government’s closeness to the Kremlin as “treason.” According to European intelligence reports, Moscow sent a three-person team to Hungary, overseen by Putin confidant Sergei Kiriyenko who ran an operation to interfere in the Moldovan election back in September. His tactics encompassed “vote-buying networks, troll farms, and on-the-ground influence campaigns.” A Kremlin-linked media consultancy, facing EU sanctions, was hired to dismiss Magyar as a Brussels stooge and portray Orbán as the only candidate strong enough to to be treated as an equal by world leaders, as evidenced by the strength of his relationship with Trump. 

Despite a war with Iran that doesn’t appear to be going entirely to plan, the U.S. president took time out to back Orbán with enthusiasm and at considerable length on Truth Social. Trump said Orbán was “a true friend, fighter, and WINNER.” JD Vance, the vice president, is scheduled to visit Hungary on April 7, just five days before the election. And secretary of state Marco Rubio went to Hungary in February. It is now part of the U.S. National Security Strategy to work towards “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.” To that end, notes the U.S. government, “the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives cause for great optimism.” Orbán speaks MAGA’s language on immigration, traditional values and the Christian essence of Western societies. He is, like Putin and Trump, in MAGA’s view, an implacable opponent of secular, progressive, globalist politics as symbolised by Brussels.

Orbán, the longest serving current head of government in the EU, has become a figurehead for populist, nationalist movements across the world. The recent CPAC Hungary summit was attended by several of these leaders including France’s Marine Le Pen, Italian deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini, and the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders,who called Orbán “a lion on a continent led by sheep.” Latin American leaders close to Trump , including Javier Milei of Argentina and Jose Antonio Kast of Chile, also attended. Milei, who gave the longest speech at the summit, said Orbán was “a beacon for all… who refuse to accept that the West's destiny is one of managed decline.” This international network, with the United States and Russia included, has a vested ideological interest in seeing Orban continue to remain a thorn in the EU's side. 

But what can Brussels do? The answer, it appears, is not much. The EU is consensus driven; it needs all its parts to act in concert, giving holdouts like Orbán considerable power to hold the whole bloc hostage. But given Orbán’s prominence as an ideologue, when Hungary blocks sanctions or delays support for Ukraine, it is more than a single nation going rogue. Alice Weidler, co-chair of the far-right AfD, the largest opposition party in the German Bundestag, was among those who spoke at the CPAC Hungary conference last month. Robert Fico, prime minister of Slovakia, is an Orbán ally. On April 19, Bulgaria will have its eighth general election in just five years. Former president Rumen Radev’s new Progressive Party leads the polls and shares Orbán’s pro-Kremlin, anti-EU inclinations.

So polarized is the Hungarian election, that right wing groups are deploying their own observers from Argentina, Austria, the Czech Republic, Kenya, Poland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Serbia, Tanzania and the United States to monitor proceedings. EU observers have said the Hungarian government controls the national media and a recent documentary alleges that a desperate government is resorting to vote-buying, gerrymandering and intimidation tactics. It’s hard to see how either Orbán or Magyar will accept the election result without protest, unless the margin is crushing. But, given Trump’s disdain for NATO allies and the EU, an Orbán election defeat would be a much-needed victory for European unity. 

A version of this story was published in this week’s Coda Currents newsletter. Sign up here.

Related Articles

The Orbán precedent

John Shattuck

The Trump corollary: Latin America swings right

Phineas Rueckert

In Hungary, it’s Central Asia to the rescue

Katia Patin

The post How much longer will Orbán be Putin and Trump’s man in Brussels? appeared first on Coda Story.

A funny thing happened on the day OpenAI announced it was shutting down Sora, its video generation app: Iran went all in on synthetic propaganda and very quickly started winning the global meme war. The timing is a coincidence, no doubt, but it is the kind of coincidence that illuminates. 

Watching the explosive virality of the clips offers a powerful lesson in asymmetric media operations. They deploy cultural sophistication, an understanding of online communities and the enormously powerful creation tools made available by American tech companies, tools that give everyone on the internet access to a personal reality distortion field — drones, but for your feed.

On Wednesday, as Donald Trump was trying desperately to talk down the oil markets with hints of a deal, a stream of videos, carefully calibrated for U.S., regional and third country audiences rolled out on X via embassy accounts, Russia Today, and disaffected Maga influencers. The clips, by broad social media consensus, are good. Some lean heavily on the extremely online grammar of the U.S. right. Some remix Hollywood characters and likenesses in exactly the way that OpenAI’s now nixed billion-dollar deal with Disney was supposed to sanction. Others lean more heavily into Islamic iconography, featuring Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu as worshippers of Baal, the foreign demon god who figures in both the Quran and the Hebrew Bible. The Lego movie is an especially rich resource, but so are TikTok formats, and the kind of idealized AI figures beloved of Trump administration meme makers. You can watch a few of them here.

Notably, faked war footage is far from the dominant format. All of these clips foreground and celebrate their own artificiality: some are sentimental, some triumphal, many are full of the gleeful adolescent wit of gamers on discord forums. 

Researchers have long been warning that generative tools will undercut the authority of visual evidence, compounding and accelerating the damage created by slower, cruder forms of fakery: photoshop, selective editing, even gaming clips passed off as combat footage. Of course, we are already there, and have been for a while. Russia has been the paramount master of this game, in Ukraine and in its ongoing influence operations around the world. But others have learned quickly. Last year, when India and Pakistan were engaged in a brief aerial battle, social media bullshit overwhelmed and compromised traditional coverage. More recently, Israel’s obliteration of Gaza was accompanied by a sustained and comprehensive blizzard of visually compelling misinformation, propaganda, and official lies. 

That continues. On March 28, Israel killed three journalists in a targeted strike in Southern Lebanon, claiming without evidence that one of them, Ali Shoaib, was a member of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces. They later distributed a photograph of him in military fatigues to reinforce the point, but explained to Fox news that in fact, they’d had to photoshop the uniform in because no such picture existed.

Meanwhile, in the Trump administration’s domestic war on immigrants and political opponents, we’ve seen a complete resetting of norms around the tone of official communication and any expectation that it is rooted in fact. Nowhere was that more evident than in the altered footage posted by the White House of the arrest of the prominent Minneapolis activist Nekima Levy Armstrong in January. In the video, shared by the official White House handle, a handcuffed Levy Armstrong is sobbing, her skin visibly darkened. In fact, she had faced arrest calmly. 

Questioned by reporters about this blatant falsification, deputy White House communications director Kaelan Dorr responded: "Enforcement of the law will continue. The memes will continue.” Collapsing the distinction between a meme and the factual record with the aid of AI is the final step in this administration's insistence that its preferred narrative simply is reality.

The problem for the White House and its allies is that their choices in tech policy, official communication, and press freedom level the playing field for information war in ways that Tehran’s media strategists understand and they, for all their immersion in online worlds, do not.

Iranian propagandists know that the currency of visual information online has already been completely debased. They’ve dealt with it plenty, and no doubt practiced it themselves in regional battles for narrative dominance. Their insight is that as cheap and easy as it is to create and distribute fakes, returns on the effort of mobilizing what disinformation researchers call “coordinated inauthentic action” are diminishing. They still do it, but it isn’t where the action is.

Sam Altman, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg have, in a very practical sense, wrought this moment in concert with Peter Thiel, Alex Karp, JD Vance and Donald Trump. At their urging, the U.S. has surrendered unrivaled dominance in scarce, expensive information and cultural assets in exchange for a political economy of media that widely distributes cheap, abundant ones.

Tech leaders and conservative politicians have worked consistently for a decade to deprecate the trustworthiness of American journalism and constrain its liberties. They have smeared its practitioners as “enemies of the people”; they have captured the commanding heights of the broadcast and culture industries through crony deals, and they have launched an assault on both press freedom and standards, two assets that once made American news outlets the envy of the world. Needless to say, the economic collapse of traditional media companies fostered by Google’s  and Meta’s advertising duopoly only served to deepen the damage. Jeff Bezos’s Washington Post shuttered its Middle East bureaus just days before the war began.

Meanwhile, lying from agency podiums and the Oval Office, makes Karoline Leavitt barely distinguishable from Baghdad Bob, Iraq’s minister of information in 2003 whose surreal, truth-dodging press conferences during the U.S.-led invasion made him a global laughingstock. And the DOGEing of both the nominally independent Voice of America, as well as the state department’s Global Engagement Center leaves the administration with neither broadcast nor digital counter-propaganda assets. 

When no one can be trusted with the actual truth, we are left with the AI equivalent of 19th-century editorial cartoons, produced at industrial scale and distributed globally. America has little advantage in that war, particularly when it is at a moral, political and legal nadir.

If anything, Iran, which combines repression with an enormously rich literary culture, film scene and advertising market brings serious capabilities to the fight.

Of course, the ebbing of information power was already under way during the first Trump administration, and during Joe Biden’s term in ways that are indissociable from broader democratic decline. The “trust and safety” architecture adopted by big platform companies was designed — implicitly if not always visibly — to conserve information authority, and ensure that it functioned in broadly pro-democratic ways. 

After the disastrous failures of the Rohingya genocide — which rights groups and UN investigators blamed Facebook for facilitating — and the fears surrounding the manipulation of the U.S. electoral environment in 2016, there was a clear threat to the commercial and political health of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Tech companies, governments, researchers and human rights experts devised rules and norms for content moderation grounded in existing standards, tools for detecting coordinated inauthentic behavior, and a framework for crisis response.

The community of practitioners and institutions that sprung up to combat the flesh-eating virus attacking the body politic were working with bandaids in the battlefield hospital even before Covid, a coordinated attack from the right, and the second Trump victory hit them, but they succeeded in imposing some limits. That project now lies in ruins. 

The Stanford Information Laboratory has been shut down. Trust and Safety teams at Meta and X have been disbanded. The national security arm of the project, centered around the State Department is gone, and private funding for countering misinformation has largely dried up.

Where are the hyperscalers, the AI titans, whose tools are being so effectively deployed, in all of this?

The trust and safety people who do work at OpenAI are dutifully putting out reports every few months. They are detailing how they foiled efforts to use ChatGPT for a Chinese influence campaign aimed at Sanae Takaichi, the Japanese prime minister, and exposing a Russian content mill feeding African newspapers. “Pro-tip for governments,” wrote Head of National Security policy Sasha Baker on LinkedIn of the February report. “Please don’t use our products to spread lies online.”

Governments, in the world of Sam Altman’s “democratic AI” do not include that of the United States. OpenAI has not mentioned a single U.S. ally — let alone the administration itself — in these reports. 

OpenAI has hired multiple ex-Clinton, Obama and Biden officials, and in their work a weird, attenuated piece of the old national security approach to information integrity lives on, alongside the project of selling products to the Pentagon. The company’s leaders clearly treat these issues  as a complement to messaging around Western AI, or a picayune adjunct to the bigger questions of AI risk, which are handled way up in the organizational stratosphere, as they are at Anthropic.

Perhaps the larger lesson is that you can’t really shut down Sora, or put AI-generated video back in its box. If you choose to prosecute an illegal war of choice after surrendering the hard-won high ground of a robust, democratic information environment, high tech weaponry will not offset the deficit. On the contrary, you will have compounded the risk of both tactical failure and strategic geopolitical defeat. When that happens, and in some ways it already has, those who made this war, and their enablers in Silicon Valley, will have only themselves to blame.

Related Articles

The AI-powered ‘forever wars’ start now

Simon Allison

The influencer bubble: Can content creators continue to airbrush the Gulf?

Irina Matchavariani

As Iran burns, a new age of nuclear proliferation begins

Victoria Jensen

The post Memeification and digital slop: AI and the fog of war appeared first on Coda Story.

Julia E, an 18-year-old influencer from Germany, was hanging out with her family on the Palm Jumeirah beach when she heard a blast and saw a fireball erupt into the sky. She knew tension was mounting following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran the previous day, but she didn’t imagine Dubai would be on the frontline. “I was a little scared,” she says. “Usually you just read about it in the newspapers, you see it online, but when you see it in front of you, it’s a different feeling — like your heart just drops.”

The fear was not an emotion she expressed on Instagram. Julia’s family moved to Dubai from Germany in 2024, tempted by the business potential of an emirate that aggressively marketed itself as the influencer capital of the world — a digital utopia carved out of the desert, with its gleaming skyscrapers and Insta-ready waterfronts. Dubai’s state-backed Creator HQ offers content creators long-term residencies, legal support, networking opportunities, training and an environment geared towards digital entrepreneurship. Influencers need a permit to legally operate in Dubai but taxes are negligible — 5% VAT on taxable income from clients in the UAE over AED 375,000 (about $102,000), and a flat 9% corporate tax on income exceeding AED 1,000,000 (about $272,000). It has attracted over 50,000 content creators to Dubai, which has a population of about 4 million.

With 60,000 followers on TikTok and Instagram, Julia is looking to build her own marketing company in Dubai. In an effort, she says, to comfort her younger brother, she recorded a video shortly after witnessing the explosion. It showed Julia, a palm tree and the glittering night skyline behind her, with the caption: “You live in Dubai, aren’t you scared?” The video cuts to a montage of Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and other Emirati sheikhs: “No, because I know who protects us.” The short video is set to an AI-generated rendition of the Belgian singer Stromae’s ‘Papaoutai’, a song that laments the loss of a father.

According to Julia, she was the first content creator to post an ‘Are you safe?’-style video, a now viral trend across the Gulf as influencers counter the narrative of a region in turmoil. 

“I decided to make that video,” she says, “because I did feel safe. And I wanted to spread some positivity and my perspective that we are still being protected and we still have someone behind us here.” As Iranian drones hit the Gulf, including luxury tourist hotels destinations like Fairmont, The Palm hotel and the Burj Al Arab hotel, there was a wave of schadenfreude online. Some users outside Dubai could not contain their glee that the city’s glossy surface, its influencer-curated image of sunkissed luxury, had been ripped apart. The distress of those who spend their working hours flaunting luxury and throwing shade at the cities they come from, were, it has to be admitted, amusing to many.

But Dubai’s influencers doubled down, as the war spiralled and airports shut down, stressing the city’s safety, walking around in crowded public spaces, praising “the best air defense systems” and the men behind it: a reaction so seemingly choreographed that people questioned whether it was part of a government PR campaign. 

On March 3, the UAE’s president and crown prince were conspicuously filmed on a stroll through a Dubai mall, reassuring bewildered shoppers. It was eerily reminiscent of Volodymyr Zelensky’s “The President is here” video from four years ago, when Russia invaded Ukraine. Vogue Arabia, headquartered in the UAE, praised Gulf leaders and wrote about the influencer campaigns and the people’s “unwavering faith in their nation’s leadership and its steadfast commitment to protecting those who call it home.” 

As inviting as Dubai is to influencers, they must acquire advertiser permits that can cost up to $4,000 and are told to respect the state and avoid circulating rumors and unverified information or any content that can harm the UAE’s foreign relations or “offend or compromise national unity or social cohesion.” In the wake of Iran’s strikes, the UAE’s Public Prosecution announced that "anyone who shares or republishes content from unknown sources may face legal accountability under the country’s applicable laws, even if they are not the original creator of the content.”

There is a sense of vulnerability among Dubai’s influencers, says Zoe Hurley, associate professor of media at the American University of Sharjah and author of the 2023 book ‘Social Media Influencing in the City of Likes: Dubai and the Postdigital Condition’. “They haven't necessarily been trained professionally. They don't have institutional guardrails protecting them, or any formal buffer zones that might have protected people who are putting themselves out there.” she said. Hurley made a distinction between “influencers who are here on holiday who don't live here and who are followed by, say, people in the UK” and homegrown ones, representing diasporas in Dubai — from South Asia, the Levant and Europe — “who people are turning to because they're the thought leaders in their communities.”

None of the influencers we contacted in Dubai or across the Gulf confirmed ever being prompted or paid to post positive content. The German NTV network, however, reported concerns voiced by German influencers: "I don't know what I'm allowed to say and what I'm not allowed to say," one posted, "We're not allowed to post anything!” said another. These stories and reels have since been deleted.

Julia made another video, responding to the accusations that influencers were essentially providing a PR service for Dubai. “I will tell you exactly how much I got paid,” she says. “Dubai pays me in business… in safety… in connections… with weather.” She adds that, unlike in Dubai, she would never venture outside alone in her native Germany after 8 at night.

This point about Dubai’s safety — leaving things in the car without being scared to be robbed, or walking alone at night — is echoed widely among European expatriates in the Emirates and Saudi Arabia who compare it to the relative anxiety they feel in Europe. Telegram’s CEO, Pavel Durov recently made the same point: “Unfortunately, I had to leave Dubai for Europe a week ago — so I’m not only missing the free fireworks from Iran, but also exposing myself to greater risk. Given Europe’s crime rates, Dubai is statistically safer even with missiles flying.” Elon Musk shared the sentiment, writing that “No country is perfect, but Dubai and UAE broadly are objectively safer and better run than many areas of Europe.” Notorius influencer and ‘manosphere’ icon, Andrew Tate, still facing human trafficking and rape charges in Romania, posted a video of himself dancing on a yacht “as bombs fall.” His brother Tristan Tate chimed in, comparing air attacks in Dubai to stabbings in London. 

What these influencers don’t discuss is Dubai’s underbelly, an invisible city occupied by an underpaid migrant workforce, their treatment explained away on the grounds that they make more money in Dubai than they would in the poor countries in South Asia and Africa that they come from. While the influencers enjoy government-sponsored benefits and status, these other migrant workers remain bound under the kafala (sponsorship) system that binds their residency status to their employer. Despite reforms, under the system their status remains uncertain, their earnings precarious, and imprisonment or fines for relatively minor offences is common. There are no golden visas for laborers and maids, never mind darker reports about human trafficking and sexual and physical abuse. 

London-based barrister Caoilfhionn Gallagher described the UAE’s exploitation of migrant workers as a “grubby reality, with rampant human rights abuses.” She said she had “acted for people prosecuted and jailed in the UAE for daring to work with human rights organisations or criticise the authorities,” referring to the mass trial in 2024, when 43 people, among them human rights activists, had been “subjected to enforced disappearance, solitary confinement and incommunicado detention.” 

The contrast between the city that influencers show their followers and the city built on the abuse of migrant labor is one that governments across the Gulf want to bury. The UAE’s 2031 vision sees creative industries contributing up to 5% of the country’s GDP. 

For decades now, the UAE has been trying to diversify its economy, to pivot away from its reliance on hydrocarbons. It is betting on the digital economy and tourism to be the cornerstones of economic growth. 

But for all the bravado on display, rich people and Western influencers are fleeing the Gulf, as war with Iran continues. Influencers unable or unwilling to leave, must keep grinding. Narcissus could not stop staring at his reflection even as he was dying. Will Dubai’s influencers be allowed to look away from their reflections in the city’s famous mirrored skyscrapers?

Related Articles

The strike, the illusion of regime change, and what comes next

Jim Muir

Turn off, tune out: Australia takes its kids off social media

Isobel Cockerell

What we miss when we talk about the “Middle East”

Natalia Antelava

The post The influencer bubble: Can content creators continue to airbrush the Gulf? appeared first on Coda Story.

“The impunity of the giants must end,” posted Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez on X. His government has instructed the public prosecutor to “investigate the crimes that X, Meta and TikTok may be committing through the creation and dissemination of child pornography by means of their AI.” Sánchez has said the state “cannot allow” platforms to affect the “mental health, dignity and rights of our sons and daughters.” But Republican legislators, seemingly in response, released Part II of a report, titled ‘The Foreign Censorship Threat’, in which it accuses the European Commission of “directly infringing on Americans’ online speech.”

Almost simultaneously, Ireland’s Data Protection Commission launched an investigation into Grok, X’s generative AI chatbot, for producing sexualized deepfakes which might have included personal data of Europeans, including children. Even British prime minister Keir Starmer, who has signed a sweeping “Technology Prosperity Deal” with the U.S. has, spoken about the need to “protect children’s wellbeing” from Grok. And earlier this month, French police searched the Paris offices of X as part of a process that X described as a “politicized criminal investigation.” 

With Australia having set a precedent for “age-gating” the Internet through legislation, France’s under-15 ban is now due to come into force in September. The UK already requires age verification for certain content via the Online Safety Act, and Spain, Slovenia, Denmark, Germany, and Greece are among those considering similar measures. ​​The social and political consensus is striking. A 30-country Ipsos survey found strong majorities in every country supporting bans for under-14s.

Elon Musk responded to the Spanish prime minister’s comments about social media being essentially a failed state, rife with criminality and a disregard for law, by calling him “a tyrant and traitor to the people of Spain.” The U.S. government has only been marginally more restrained. The House Judiciary Committee’s report accused Europe of mounting a decade-long campaign to “censor the global internet.” 

The involvement of the U.S. government, and its consistent defence of U.S. tech companies, means the battle is increasingly less about European regulators and Silicon Valley and more about what appears to be a profound ideological mismatch. “Though often framed as combating so-called ‘hate speech’ or ‘disinformation’,” said the Republican legislators’ report, the EU was working to “censor true information and political speech about some of the most important policy debates in recent history — including the Covid-19 pandemic, mass migration, and transgender issues.” Meanwhile, a recently published report in Europe shows how Silicon Valley companies spent 151 million euros lobbying far right European parliamentarians in 2025 to water down regulations. 

Big Tech forging links to the European far right dovetails with a Trump administration in which senior figures, including Donald Trump himself, endorse certain candidates in elections and routinely repeat far right talking points as part of an “unapologetic defense of Western civilization.” And now the U.S. State Department has openly touted the building of a “freedom.gov” portal that enables people to access restricted content, even if it contravenes local laws in sovereign countries.

But European regulations are not the only challenge to the impunity with which social media platforms seem to be able to act. As momentum builds to hold social media platforms to account in Europe, in the U.S. Meta owner Mark Zuckerberg has been defending Instagram in a Los Angeles courtroom. He was testifying in a lawsuit, one of several hundred filed in U.S. civil courts, alleging that social media platforms are addictive, harm the mental health of children and that platforms are aware of these effects but do little to safeguard teenage users from harm. 

The lawsuits have the effect of making the Australian, European, and perhaps global attempt to ban teens from setting up social media accounts appear necessary. But Paige Collings, a digital policy expert at the Electronic Frontier Foundation and board member at European Digital Rights, said that bans are politically attractive precisely because they are simple. “Complex problems require complex solutions,” she said. “It’s more expensive. It’s longer-term. It can’t just be implemented overnight. But blocking under-16s from social media — that is something you can implement overnight.” 

Collings is among a growing chorus of experts that are cautious about embracing bans as a comprehensive solution. For instance, she explains, to ban children, platforms first need to know who is a child. This relies on national digital ID systems, facial recognition, and third-party age verification. In all scenarios, Collings said, “we are trusting that these services and platforms are not storing this information, not selling the information,” often without meaningful guardrails to ensure that is the case. 

When the UK introduced age restrictions last summer, searches for VPNs surged as users of all ages tried to avoid giving away personal information. Now the government has floated expanding restrictions to VPN usage to plug enforcement gaps. The purpose of a VPN itself is to preserve the privacy of its user, however imperfectly. VPNs are essential tools for businesses to secure communications, for journalists to protect sources, and for citizens in restrictive environments to access independent information. Forcing identification to use them fundamentally undermines their purpose. And when the argument for banning them is framed around the protection of children, it reinstates the urgency of an entire infrastructure required to keep children off the internet and risks normalizing identity checks as conditions for access to online spaces. In a digital economy where personal data is highly valuable, such measures raise the question of who ultimately benefits.Beyond privacy concerns, Collings points out that age-gating can become “a fantastic tool for censorship with no accountability or remedy.” It does, in fact, do in part what the U.S. government and Silicon Valley companies say it does, which is restrict speech. At an AI summit in Delhi, French president Emmanuel Macron dismissed Silicon Valley’s invocation of censorship as a defense against European regulation. “Free speech,” he said, “is pure bullshit if nobody knows how you are guided through this… having no clue about how the algorithm is made, how it is tested and where it will guide you — the democratic biases of this could be huge.” But, forcing accountability and improving safety would perhaps be better than a blanket ban where the cutoff is 14 or 16, leaving everyone else to take cover as best they can in a “digital Wild West,” to borrow the Spanish prime minister’s phrase.

Subscribe to our coda currents newsletter

Insights from the Coda newsroom on the global forces that shape local crises.

Try again

Subscribe

Related Articles

Turn off, tune out: Australia takes its kids off social media

Isobel Cockerell

The global battle to age-gate the internet

Lydia Morrish

Lying about your age? This AI will see right through it

Chris Stokel-Walker

The post Europe vs Big Tech: A battle for democracy? appeared first on Coda Story.

The European Commission is discussing with EU member states various options to cover Ukraine's budget deficit for next year, which could range from $8 billion to $19 billion, the Financial Times reported on July 8.

International partners have provided Ukraine with over $39 billion for its wartime economy so far this year, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced.

The financial hole in Ukraine's budget is linked to reduced U.S. support and the lack of prospects for a swift ceasefire with Russia that Europe had hoped for, the Financial Times reported.

A senior EU official told the publication that many of Ukraine's partners had previously counted on a peace deal in 2025, but are now forced to revise their funding plans.

This includes the European Commission, which has already adjusted spending from Ukraine-related funding streams.

Without support from Western partners, Kyiv would face a budget deficit of $19 billion in 2026, according to the Financial Times. However, even if additional international financing for the wartime economy can be secured, a gap of at least $8 billion would remain.

To support Ukraine's budget, Europe is considering providing military aid in the form of off-budget grants that would be recorded separately as external transfers but would count toward NATO member countries' national defense spending targets.

One EU diplomat told the Financial Times that military support for Ukraine is viewed as a contribution to the defense of all of Europe.

In a document for G7 countries reviewed by Financial Times, Kyiv proposed that European allies co-finance Ukrainian forces, framing this as a service to strengthen continental security.

Other support options under discussion include potentially accelerating payments from the existing $50 billion G7 loan program and reinvesting frozen Russian assets in higher-yield financial instruments that the EU allocated to help service the debt.

According to the Financial Times, two sources confirmed that the commission planned to discuss these options with EU finance ministers on July 8.

The funding issue will also be raised at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome on July 10-11, dedicated to Ukraine's reconstruction needs. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will attend the event.

The United States has only about 25% of the Patriot missile interceptors it needs to meet Pentagon military plans, a shortage that led U.S. President Donald Trump's administration to pause a major transfer of weapons to Ukraine, the Guardian reported on July 8.

The decision to halt the delivery, made on July 2, followed an internal review showing low stockpiles of critical air defense systems. The depletion was largely due to recent U.S. operations in the Middle East, including the interception of Iranian missiles after strikes on the American Al Udeid airbase in Qatar, according to the Guardian.

According to officials familiar with the matter, the Pentagon's munitions tracker, used to measure the minimum supplies needed for U.S. war plans, showed Patriot interceptor levels had fallen below acceptable levels. That prompted concerns that sending more to Ukraine could put U.S. defense readiness at risk, the Guardian wrote.

The freeze reportedly affected Ukraine's two key arms transfer methods: drawdowns from Pentagon stockpiles and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), through which the Defense Department orders new weapons from contractors.

Because U.S. orders take priority, Ukrainian requests for new weapons, including Patriot missiles, face years-long delays.

The pause came at a critical time for Kyiv, as Russia intensifies large-scale aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities. With limited options to acquire precision-guided and other key munitions, Ukrainian forces have increasingly relied on Western-supplied air defenses to counter the growing threat.

For its latest aid package, the U.S. had planned to send dozens of Patriot interceptors, along with Hellfire missiles, air-to-air Sparrows, GMLRS rockets, and anti-tank weapons, according to the Guardian.

NBC News reported on July 4 that U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth unilaterally halted a weapons shipment to Ukraine despite internal military assessments showing the aid would not compromise American military readiness.

The assessment concluded that while some munitions stockpiles, including precision weapons, were low, they had not fallen below critical thresholds.

Amid the ongoing questions over Washington's weapons pause, Trump has apparently promised to send 10 Patriot interceptors to Ukraine, Axios reported on July 8. Sources also told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that Trump claimed he wasn't behind the decision to halt arms to Kyiv in a recent phone call with President Volodymyr Zelensky.

How to enter Ukraine’s defense market: A short guide for foreign companies

Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent. For editorial coverage of Ukraine’s weapons procurement, the country’s Defense Ministry and the scandal-ridden Defense Procurement Agency click on the links

The Kyiv IndependentVladyslav Bandrovsky

U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 8 he was "not happy" with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"We get a lot of bullsh*t thrown at us by Putin," he said at a cabinet meeting. "He's very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless."

Trump has vacillated for months between criticizing Putin and praising the Kremlin. So far, he has failed to increase military aid to Ukraine or sanction Russia despite Moscow's refusal to accept a ceasefire.

During his election campaign, Trump repeatedly pledged to end the war in Ukraine within "24 hours." However, his efforts to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia have seen no progress.

Trump also addressed U.S. legislation on sanctions, saying the Senate's Russia sanctions bill was "totally optional" for him to implement or terminate.

"I'm looking at it very strongly," Trump said.

The bill would impose 500% tariffs on imports from countries purchasing Russian oil, gas, uranium, and other products. It was introduced in April but has seen no progress since then.

Earlier, Trump signaled growing openness to tougher measures against Moscow, ABC News reported on June 29.

According to Senator Lindsey Graham, Trump privately told him it was "time to move" the Russia sanctions bill.

"I’m confident the president is ready for us to act," Graham said.

The Senate is expected to vote on the bill after Congress returns from a break in July.

"(Putin is) killing a lot of people — his soldiers and their soldiers mostly. And it's now up to 7,000 a week," Trump said on July 8, referring to Russia's battlefield losses.

In recent weeks, Trump has been critical of the Russian president. Following a phone call with Putin on July 3, Trump said he was "very disappointed," signaling growing frustration with the Kremlin.

When asked by a journalist on July 8 whether he would take action, Trump responded: "Wouldn't be telling you... We want to have a little surprise."

Trump also commented on the the current pause in weapons deliveries to Ukraine. He pointed to the previous transfer of advanced systems, including Javelin anti-tank missiles and Patriot air defense systems, calling them "the best equipment in the world."

His remarks come after the United States halted military aid shipments to Ukraine on July 2 amid an internal Pentagon review of stockpile capacity. The freeze coincided with a surge in Russian aerial attacks, leaving Ukraine increasingly vulnerable amid a shortage of U.S.-supplied air defense systems.

The U.S. halted weapons shipments to Ukraine amid a capability review, the White House and Pentagon previously confirmed, with Trump later denying the pause.

On July 7, the Pentagon said it would renew shipments, saying the additional defensive weapons were intended to help Ukraine protect itself while the U.S. works toward "a lasting peace."

Dnipropetrovsk village likely contested despite Russia’s claim of its capture

The village of Dachne in the southern part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast appears to be contested, according to the Finnish Black Bird Group open-source intelligence collective. The Russian Defense Ministry on July 7 claimed to have seized Dachne, which would mark the first village to be under Russian control in the industrial Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, located just west of the war-torn Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian military denied the claimed capture, calling it “disinformation.” Viktor Tregubov, spok

The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

Russia's crude oil shipments have dropped to their lowest level since February, as refinery processing outpaces production growth and trims available export volumes, Bloomberg reported on July 8.

Russia has used its revenues from energy exports to finance the war in Ukraine.

Seaborne crude flows averaged 3.12 million barrels a day over the four weeks to July 6, a 3% decline from the previous period ending June 29, according to tanker-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg. That's the lowest level recorded since the four-week period ending Feb. 23.

The gross value of Moscow's oil exports rose by about $100 million, or 8%, to $1.36 billion for the week ending July 6, Bloomberg said. That increase was due to higher volume, although average export prices declined for a second consecutive week.

Most of Russia's oil continues to head to Asia. Shipments to the region averaged 2.73 million barrels per day, slightly lower than the previous month. Flows to Turkey fell to 370,000 barrels a day, and shipments to Syria held steady at 25,000 barrels a day.

The European Union is seeking to tighten sanctions on Russia. Ambassadors have yet to approve the EU's 18th sanctions package due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia. The bloc failed to adopt the new package on June 27.

The new package includes restrictions targeting Russia's energy and banking sectors, as well as transactions linked to the Nord Stream gas pipeline.

Death of top Russian oil executive fuels fresh scrutiny of elite’s ‘window falls’

The unexplained death of a top Russian oil executive on July 4 is fueling renewed scrutiny over the rising number of high-profile Russian officials and businessmen who have died under mysterious circumstances, specifically, have fallen out of windows. Andrei Badalov, vice president of Transneft, Russia’s largest state-controlled pipeline transport company,

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy

Three men were found guilty on July 8 in connection with an arson attack on Ukraine-linked businesses in London, which British authorities say was orchestrated by Russia's Wagner mercenary group, Reuters reported.

The alleged ringleader, Dylan Earl, 21, had already pleaded guilty to aggravated arson over the 2024 blaze targeting companies that were supplying Elon Musk's Starlink satellite equipment to Ukraine, according to Reuters.

The systems are considered vital to Ukraine's communications and defense against Russia's ongoing invasion.

Earl also became the first person convicted under the U.K.'s National Security Act after admitting to a separate plot to attack a wine shop and restaurant in London’s upscale Mayfair district and to kidnap its owner, a prominent critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Two others, Jake Reeves, 23, and Earl’s associate, also pleaded guilty to aggravated arson, with Reeves admitting to a charge under the National Security Act for receiving a material benefit from a foreign intelligence agency.

A jury at London's Old Bailey court convicted three additional men, Nii Kojo Mensah, 23, Jakeem Rose, 23, and Ugnius Asmena, 20, of aggravated arson. They had denied the charges. A fourth man, Paul English, 61, was acquitted.

Two other defendants, Ashton Evans, 20, and Dmitrijus Paulauskas, 23, were charged with failing to disclose knowledge of terrorist activity. Evans was convicted on one count and cleared of another. Paulauskas was acquitted of both charges and reportedly broke down in tears as the verdict was read.

Commander Dominic Murphy of the London Metropolitan Police reportedly said he was confident the Wagner Group and the Russian state were behind the attacks.

The U.K. has designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization.

Earl had exchanged hundreds of encrypted messages with a supposed Wagner handler using the alias "Privet Bot" on Telegram. According to reporting by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), the account was previously advertised by Grey Zone, a Wagner-affiliated channel.

Prosecutors said Earl expressed interest in fighting for Wagner and was encouraged to recruit contacts from British soccer hooligan networks, Irish republican groups, and organized crime circles, Reuters reported. He and Evans also admitted to unrelated charges of dealing cocaine.

The Russian Embassy in London has denied any involvement in the warehouse attack and accused the British government of blaming Russia for domestic issues.

The Kremlin has consistently rejected accusations of sabotage and espionage, despite growing evidence and convictions tied to Russian-linked operations across Europe.

‘Neither side wasted time’ — Ukraine’s economy minister on minerals deal negotiations with Trump’s ‘business-oriented’ administration

Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko says her task is simple — to get the investment fund behind the closely watched minerals deal with the U.S. off the ground, and prove its detractors wrong. “There are so many criticisms from different parties that this fund is just a piece of paper we can put on the shelves — that it won’t be operational,” Svyrydenko, who is also Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, tells the Kyiv Independent at Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on July 4, the morning

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

U.S. President Donald Trump has promised to send 10 Patriot interceptors to Ukraine - a smaller number than had been paused previously while en route to the country, Axios reported on July 8, citing its sources.

Trump has also suggested that Germany sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine, according to three sources cited by Axios. They said the U.S. and European allies would split the cost of the purchase.

The discussion comes as Ukraine is calling upon its allies, particularly the United States, to support Ukrainian air defense by supplying "life-saving" Patriot systems and relevant missiles.

The Pentagon said on July 2 that some military assistance to Ukraine had been halted as the U.S. Defense Department conducts a review of foreign aid deliveries.

On July 7, the Pentagon said it would renew shipments, saying the additional defensive weapons were intended to help Ukraine protect itself while the U.S. works toward "a lasting peace."

Merz called Trump to request the release of the paused interceptors, according to Axios. During the call, Trump proposed that Germany sell one of its own Patriot batteries to Ukraine.

While no agreement has been reached, officials on both sides say negotiations are ongoing. German officials maintain that Berlin has already sent a higher share of its available Patriot systems to Ukraine than any other NATO country, including the U.S.

Russia has escalated its aerial campaign against Ukraine in recent weeks, launching large-scale missile and drone attacks that have killed and injured hundreds of civilians across multiple cities.

The suspension of U.S. arms deliveries, which include Patriots and precision-guided munitions, drew criticism from Kyiv. During a July 4 phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump said he was not responsible for halting the aid, according to the Wall Street Journal.

He reportedly told Zelensky that a review of U.S. munitions stockpiles was initiated after last month's U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, but denied ordering a full pause in shipments.

NBC News reported that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth halted the shipments unilaterally on July 2, despite internal Pentagon assessments that the move would not jeopardize U.S. military readiness.

Special Envoy Keith Kellogg and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov are set to meet in Rome later this week to discuss resuming the stalled military aid, Politico reported on July 7.

Seeing war through the lens of narcissism

We usually think of narcissism as a personal flaw — a grandiose ego, a craving for attention, a lack of empathy. But what if narcissism is not just a diagnosis, but a lens? A way of understanding how individuals — and even entire nations — cope with wounds too painful to face directly?

The Kyiv IndependentDr. Gary E Myers

President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an order on July 8 imposing sanctions on five Chinese-registered companies accused of supplying components found in Russian Shahed-type drones used to attack Ukraine.

The decree follows a statement by Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), which said it recovered Chinese-made parts from downed drones during a July 4 air assault on Kyiv.

Sanctions were imposed on Central Asia Silk Road International Trade, Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing, Shenzhen Royo Technology, Shenzhen Jinduobang Technology, and Ningbo BLIN Machinery.

The list was published on the Presidential Office's website alongside the official decision by Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council.

Russia's domestically produced drones based on Iran's Shahed-136 is a loitering munition extensively used by Russia to target Ukrainian cities, and is assembled with components sourced from around the world. Kyiv has warned that some of these parts continue to flow through countries that have not joined Western sanctions.

China has emerged as one of Moscow's key wartime partners, helping Russia circumvent sanctions and becoming the largest supplier of dual-use goods aiding its defense sector.

Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president's commissioner for sanctions, told journalists on July 7 that Russia's growing ability to sustain weapons production is being driven by a flow of Chinese components and materials.

Zelensky has repeatedly accused China of backing Russia and providing technological and logistical support for its war effort. On May 29, he said Beijing had blocked the sale of drones to Ukraine while continuing to supply them to Russia.

Ukraine has already sanctioned several Chinese companies tied to Russia's war effort.

As Russian-Chinese relations deepen, Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit China in September, where he is scheduled to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Putin signs decree allowing foreigners to serve in Russian army during mobilization

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s partial mobilization decree from Sept. 21, 2022, remains in force and has never been formally rescinded.

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 7 permitting foreigners to serve in the Russian army during periods of mobilization, expanding military recruitment efforts.

Putin's partial mobilization decree from Sept. 21, 2022, remains in force and has never been formally rescinded. Ending it would require a separate presidential decree specifying a termination date.

Previously, it was allowed only during states of emergency or under martial law. Despite its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has avoided formally declaring martial law.

According to the document, the Kremlin is also permitting qualified specialists who have reached the age limit to sign contracts with Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal Security Service (FSB), or other state security agencies.

The changes aim to strengthen recruitment as Moscow tries to keep up the pace of troop replenishment without causing another wave of unpopular conscription. The Kremlin has heavily relied on financial incentives and aggressive campaigns to attract new volunteers.

Moscow currently recruits 30,000 to 40,000 individuals into its army each month, sources familiar with U.S. and EU intelligence told the Wall Street Journal.

On March 31, Putin authorized the spring conscription of 160,000 men — the country's largest call-up in 14 years. Though Russian officials claim conscripts are not sent to the front, human rights groups and relatives have reported that many are pressured into signing contracts.

In May, Russia's Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin said 20,000 naturalized migrants were sent to fight in Ukraine after failing to register for military service.

In the summer of 2024, Russian lawmakers passed a law allowing the revocation of citizenship for naturalized individuals who do not comply with military registration requirements.

Rotterdam port prepares for NATO arms shipments amid Russia threat

Rotterdam has previously handled weapons shipments, but this marks the first time that it will designate a special berth for military use.

The Kyiv IndependentTim Zadorozhnyy

Less than a month after his release from Russian captivity, 57-year-old soldier Valery Zelensky died of injuries sustained under torture, Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne reported on July 6.

Zelensky had spent 39 months in Russian captivity. He was released as part of the landmark 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner deal on May 25. Just 22 days later, on June 16, his heart stopped.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, his unit delivered weapons to Ukrainian forces in Mariupol, his daughter, Valeria Zelenka, said.

"When the offensive began, they were told that volunteers were needed to go on the assault. Out of 40 (people), eight said, 'We're going.' My father was one of them," she added.

The family did not immediately find out that he had been taken prisoner for some time, and he was considered missing in action. During his years in captivity, Zelensky's family received only one letter. He had long appeared on prisoner exchange lists but did not return until this year.

"The torture was not just cruel, it was inhuman. But he endured it," his daughter told Suspilne.

"He told me, 'Daughter, I endured it because of Kyokushin (a style of karate). I have discipline, I'm tough. My body and muscles protected me.'"

Valeria said her father had been overjoyed to come home and meet his grandson for the first time. He also expressed a desire to learn Ukrainian after years of speaking Russian.

Doctors initially treated him for suspected pancreatic issues, but his condition quickly deteriorated. During surgery, they discovered his organs were severely damaged. He died in intensive care days later.

"My father told me, 'Three people died among us from torture. And when I was in a very bad state, I asked God: Please let me see the eyes of my beloved,'" his daughter said.

A medical report listed extensive injuries. He had a non-functioning shoulder and arm and showed signs of multiple organ failures.

"The first feeling is inexhaustible pain that your loved one is no longer here. He was simply tortured," Valeria said. "And there is relief that he no longer feels that torture."

Zelensky's return was part of a wider prisoner exchange agreed during a first round of direct talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Istanbul.

The case is the latest in a number of Ukrainian soldiers' deaths after their return from Russian captivity, highlighting the effects of "widespread and systematic" torture of prisoners of war (POWs) in Russian prisons, reported by the U.N.

Serhii Dobrovolskyi, a Ukrainian soldier who had been in Russian captivity since 2023, died just a month after his release at the end of May as part of a 1000-for-1000 prisoner swap, an official from the soldier's home region announced on June 21.

In 2023, a high-ranking officer from the "Azov" brigade, Oleh Mudrak, died at 35 years old, months after his release from Russian captivity.

As a POW, he survived the Olenivka camp explosion and endured a dramatic weight loss in just 100 days, as seen in the photos published by Stanislav Aseyev, a Ukrainian writer and activist.

Dmytro Shapovalov, a 32-year-old defender of Ukraine who was exchanged in 2023 after over a year in Russian prisons, died on June 9, according to Suspilne.

Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian captivity often face torture, abuse, and inhumane treatment, according to Ukrainian officials and human rights groups.

Many former POWs have reported beatings, starvation, and psychological pressure.

The exact number of Ukrainians currently held by Russia remains unknown. Kyiv continues to call for a full all-for-all exchange. Moscow has repeatedly rejected the offer.

‘Beyond cynical’ – Russian doctor carved ‘Glory to Russia’ scar on POW during operation, Ukraine says

After more than three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, each new revelation of cruel treatment of Ukrainians in Russian captivity hardly surprises anyone. But when a photo recently emerged online, showing a “Glory to Russia” scar on the body of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW), it sent shockwaves

The Kyiv IndependentDaria Shulzhenko

In anticipation of a potential war with Russia, the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands has begun reserving space for NATO ships carrying military cargo and is mapping out logistics routes for weapons transfers, the Financial Times reported on July 8.

The decision comes as NATO allies increasingly warn of the risk of a large-scale war with Russia within five years. Rotterdam has previously handled weapons shipments, but this marks the first time that it will designate a special berth for military use.

Part of the container terminal will be repurposed to ensure the safe transfer of ammunition and other equipment between vessels. Military supply logistics will be coordinated with the port of Antwerp in neighboring Belgium.

"We see each other less and less as competitors," Boudewijn Siemons, Chief Executive of the Port of Rotterdam Authority, said, referring to the port of Antwerp.

"If large volumes of military goods would have to be shipped, we'd look to Antwerp or other ports to take over some capacity and the other way around."

Join our community

Support independent journalism in Ukraine. Join us in this fight.

Support Us

Siemons added that not all terminals are equipped to handle military-grade cargo, making the logistical coordination crucial, particularly for shipments from the U.S., U.K., and Canada.

In May, the Dutch Defense Ministry confirmed that space would be allocated for military supplies at NATO's request. The move is part of broader efforts by European allies to reduce dependence on the U.S. for defense logistics.

Russia's military spending has surged amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow's 2024 defense budget rose by 42% in real terms, reaching $462 billion, surpassing the combined total of all European countries.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on July 5 that a Chinese military move against Taiwan could prompt Beijing to encourage Russia to open a second front against NATO states.

Rutte has repeatedly warned that Russia could rebuild its military capabilities fast enough to pose a direct threat to NATO territory, urging allied governments to act swiftly and decisively.

‘Neither side wasted time’ — Ukraine’s economy minister on minerals deal negotiations with Trump’s ‘business-oriented’ administration

Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko says her task is simple — to get the investment fund behind the closely watched minerals deal with the U.S. off the ground, and prove its detractors wrong. “There are so many criticisms from different parties that this fund is just a piece of paper we can put on the shelves — that it won’t be operational,” Svyrydenko, who is also Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, tells the Kyiv Independent at Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on July 4, the morning

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

After failing to approve 18th package of sanctions against Russia due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia, EU countries are expected to finalize an agreement this week, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna said on July 7.

Since EU sanctions require unanimous approval, a single veto could prevent implementation. In late June, EU ambassadors did not approve the sanctions package because of objections from Budapest and Bratislava.

"According to my information, European countries will still reach an agreement this week on the 18th package of sanctions, together with Slovakia and Hungary," she told Ukrainian broadcaster ICTV.

The delay followed earlier signs of resistance from both governments, despite the package being introduced shortly after the previous round of sanctions took effect on May 20.

"It is noteworthy that during the previous period, when the decision on the 17th package was being made, Hungary did not vote for this decision until the last day," Stefanishyna said.

"There was even almost a day when these sanctions were not put into effect."

Unlike Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has consistently opposed sanctions and military aid for Ukraine, Slovakia has not previously attempted to block new EU measures.

Bratislava requested a delay in adopting the latest package until the bloc clarifies the financial implications of RePowerEU — an initiative to end reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2030.

"Without radical political leadership in the European Union, it will be very difficult," Stefanishyna said, warning of future veto threats by individual member states.

The 18th package includes new restrictions targeting Russia's energy and banking sectors, as well as transactions linked to the Nord Stream pipeline project.

These measures are part of a broader European effort to tighten pressure on Moscow as it continues to reject calls for an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.

While the EU pushes forward with additional restrictions, the United States has not imposed new sanctions on Russia since President Donald Trump took office in January.

‘Neither side wasted time’ — Ukraine’s economy minister on minerals deal negotiations with Trump’s ‘business-oriented’ administration

Ukraine’s Economy Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko says her task is simple — to get the investment fund behind the closely watched minerals deal with the U.S. off the ground, and prove its detractors wrong. “There are so many criticisms from different parties that this fund is just a piece of paper we can put on the shelves — that it won’t be operational,” Svyrydenko, who is also Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister, tells the Kyiv Independent at Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers on July 4, the morning

The Kyiv IndependentLiliane Bivings

At least nine civilians were killed and 81 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past 24 hours, regional authorities reported on July 8.

Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 54 drones overnight, including Iranian-designed Shahed-type attack drones, and fired four S-300/400 guided missiles.

Air defenses intercepted 34 drones, while another eight were likely used as radar-jamming decoys. Drones struck five locations across the country.

The overnight assault was repelled using aircraft, electronic warfare, mobile fire groups, and missile defense systems, the military said.

In Kharkiv Oblast, one person was killed and 40 others were injured, including three children, as the city of Kharkiv and seven other settlements came under attack, Governor Oleh Syniehubov reported.

Russian strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast injured 20 people and damaged at least 64 houses and apartment buildings, Governor Ivan Fedorov said.

In Donetsk Oblast, three civilians were killed — two in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and one in Novotroitske — and 10 more were injured, according to Governor Vadym Filashkin.

In Sumy Oblast, four people were killed and four more injured in Russian strikes, the local administration reported.

One person was killed and four others were injured in Kherson Oblast, where Russian forces hit residential areas and public infrastructure, damaging two apartment buildings and 17 houses, according to Governor Oleksandr Prokudin.

Three people were injured in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Russian troops attacked with first-person-view (FPV) drones, Governor Serhii Lysak said.

The wave of attacks follows Russia's ongoing refusal to accept a ceasefire and comes amid rising use of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure.

‘They have to be able to defend themselves’ — Trump says US will send additional weapons shipments to Ukraine, criticizes Putin

“They’re getting hit very hard. We’re gonna have to send more weapons, your defensive weapons primarily,” U.S. President Donald Trump said.

The Kyiv IndependentVolodymyr Ivanyshyn