© Taiwo Aina for The New York Times
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has questioned Russia's ability to attack NATO countries, as it is not "even capable of defeating Ukraine," he said in an interview with French TV channel LCI on June 8.
"The Russians are too weak for that," Orban said. "They're not even capable of defeating Ukraine, so they're incapable of really attacking NATO."
Over three years into its full-scale war, Russia has failed to achieve Ukraine's surrender or at least the complete occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which was reportedly among the Kremlin's demands in Russia's first peace proposal in 2022.
Russian troops have recently intensified their offensive, moving deeper into Sumy Oblast, as well as closing in on Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Russian propaganda has for years insisted that NATO and its further expansion pose a threat to Moscow. The Kremlin has also claimed that Ukraine's ambition to join NATO was a major trigger for its invasion, although in 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea and started the war in the Donbas region, Ukraine's chances and desires of joining the alliance were low.
Orban, widely regarded as the European Union's most pro-Russian leader, said that it is not in the interests of the EU, including Hungary, to have "a direct conflict with Russia" or "a threat of war," so Ukraine must not join NATO.
"Europe must be strengthened in the long term, and there must be a strategic agreement with Russia," Orban said, adding that sanctions against Russia are "destroying Hungary and the whole of Europe."
Under the Orban regime, Hungary has become widely regarded as the most Kremlin-friendly state in the EU.
Budapest has been blocking the opening of EU accession negotiation clusters with Kyiv and signaled further obstruction in recent weeks after Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) said it had uncovered a Hungarian spy network in western Ukraine.
Orban also encouraged Hungarians to vote in a non-binding national poll on Ukraine's EU bid that the government launched in early March. The poll has garnered criticism for low turnout and manipulative questions, written to encourage citizens to reject Ukraine's accession.
The Kyiv IndependentWojciech Jakóbik
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban railed against Ukraine's future accession to the European Union in a social media post on June 3, promising to "do everything" to prevent Ukraine from joining the bloc.
Under the Orban regime, Hungary has become widely regarded as the most Kremlin-friendly state in the EU. Budapest has been blocking the opening of EU accession negotiation clusters with Kyiv and signaled further obstruction in recent weeks after Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) said it had uncovered a Hungarian spy network in western Ukraine.
In a Facebook post on June 3, Orban called EU expansion "a noble idea" but excoriated "the bureaucrats in Brussels" for promoting Ukraine's membership.
"For Brussels, Ukrainian accession is a vital issue: political damage control and good business in the midst of a losing war," he wrote.
Orban claimed that Kyiv's membership would hurt Hungarian interests and have economic drawbacks for Europe.
"Ukraine would suck up every euro, forint and zloty that we have spent so far on strengthening European families, European farmers, and European industry. ... In 10 years, I would not be able to answer my conscience to myself, my grandchildren, or the country if I did not do everything now to protect Hungary and the European Union from the Brussels fever dream of Ukrainian accession."
Orban encouraged Hungarians to vote in a non-binding national poll on Ukraine's EU bid that the government launched in early March. The poll has garnered criticism for low turnout and manipulative questions, written to encourage citizens to reject Ukraine's accession.
Kyiv formally applied for EU membership in 2022 and began accession talks in June 2024. EU leaders have set 2030 as a tentative target date for Ukraine's potential entry. As a member state, Hungary holds veto power over each phase of the process.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on May 9 that while the EU would prefer to secure unanimous support, it has alternative plans if Hungary vetoes Ukraine's accession to the bloc.
After the scandal regarding the alleged spy ring broke out in early May, Budapest announced it is suspending talks with Ukraine on "national minority rights," long presented by Hungary as the main roadblock in accession negotiations.
The Kyiv IndependentSergey Melnitchenko
Allies confirm that Ukraine’s path to NATO is irreversible at the Vilnius summit. At the Bucharest Nine and Northern European summit in Vilnius on 2 June, Ukraine’s partners reaffirmed that the country is firmly on course to join NATO and approved new aid packages, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says.
Russia has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine and other neighboring countries never join NATO, making a written guarantee to halt NATO’s eastward expansion a key condition for ending the war.
The Bucharest Nine format includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Northern European nations Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden joined the group.
The summit aimed to align security positions, boost cooperation along NATO’s eastern flank, and discuss support for Ukraine ahead of the NATO summit in The Hague, UkrInform reports.
President Zelenskyy briefed the participants of the Vilnius summit on the Security Service of Ukraine’s Web operation, calling it a demonstration of what modern warfare looks like and the importance of technological superiority.
On 1 June, Ukraine carried out an unprecedented special operation targeting four Russian military airfields. The drone strikes damaged 41 aircraft, including strategic bombers A-50, Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160. This represents around 34% of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers based at key airfields, hit by drones launched from wooden crates placed inside trucks.
Earlier, Swedish politician and former Prime Minister Carl Bildt, referring to this operation, said that even 007 movies haven’t imagined something like this.
Russia cannot produce new Tu-160s or Tu-95s — only repair Soviet-era ones, says expert after Ukraine’s historic Spiderweb operation
The Bucharest Nine and Northern European countries pledged continued political, military, economic, and humanitarian support to Ukraine in pursuit of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace.
The summit declaration also emphasized that the upcoming NATO summit in The Hague must demonstrate the Alliance’s unwavering support and commitment to Ukraine.
The choice of Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital, as the venue for the recent summit of the Bucharest Nine and Nordic countries sends a clear signal of NATO’s unity amid rising Russian threats to the Baltics and Poland.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed that all 32 NATO allies in Washington reaffirmed Ukraine’s irreversible path to membership, though no timeline has been set.
He added that Russia remains a long-term threat to NATO, rapidly building its military potential and working closely with China, North Korea, and Iran. To address these threats now and in the next 3, 5, or 7 years, NATO allies must increase defense spending and strengthen the defense industry.
The declaration adopted at the summit also condemns any form of support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, calling for an end to all aid enabling it from China, Iran, and North Korea.
Global press freedom is at its lowest since 2002, says Reporters Without Borders. Independent media face pressure worldwide—from authoritarian regimes, economic collapse, and disinformation networks, including Russia’s unchecked propaganda.
At the 2025 Lviv Media Forum, held from 15 to 17 May, Pulitzer-winning journalist Anne Applebaum and disinformation researcher Dorka Takácsy warned that democracy is breaking down not just from censorship, but from the erosion of truth itself. Applebaum described how Trump’s second presidency has filled government with figures hostile to US institutions. Takácsy pointed to Hungary, where Viktor Orbán has silenced independent media through loyalist networks, political purges, and narratives amplified by the Kremlin.
Moderating the panel, Ukrainian media strategist Yevhen Hlibovytskyi added a wartime perspective: Can a country like Ukraine uphold media freedom when public trust falters and international support fades?
Yet a deeper issue cuts across all borders: traditional media is losing the public. While outlets like CNN bleed viewers, independent podcasters and investigators are gaining ground among audiences who see them as more authentic and less compromised. The problem isn’t just propaganda—it’s that people no longer believe the press.
What you’ll learn from this panel:
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: When there is an enemy narrative that the government projects onto someone and creates a scapegoat—which, for instance, is currently Ukraine—propaganda messages spread very easily because there is the enormous empire that operates through coordinated messaging.
Dorka Takácsy: We are incredibly impactful. Of course, there are also independent outlets that are doing really great work. They are heroic, under-financed, and struggling, as has happened in other places as well. But obviously, they cannot serve as a counterweight to a large propaganda empire that works with coordinated messages.
Once the foundation of the discourse is established, the public broadcasters will also fall in line. Just imagine if the BBC’s leaders were, one way or another, simply dismissed, and if they happened to be replaced and restructured by the government—it would be quite a scandal, right?
At the moment, if you are a public broadcaster and you go down almost to the regional level, people were replaced. People were dismissed. And it was all very calculated to meet the needs and desires of the government. So there is this entire network of 480 outlets: public broadcasters, radio stations, and all of this. Also, the loyalist media. So altogether, the whole media environment has changed drastically.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: We’re talking about revenge. The Orbán (Hungarian Prime Minister) who returned was not the same Orbán as before. I think one of the themes of the US elections was that we had Trump as the 45th president of the United States, and it was not that damaging. But now, the Trump administration, as the 47th president, is actually quite different in how it approaches policy and in what it does.
Is revenge something that we should be looking at? Is this an indicator that we should all pay attention to from the perspective of the media or think tanks? Is this a factor?
Anne Applebaum: Leaders who lose power and return often have transformed agendas—look at Orbán, Trump, and Hugo Chávez, who staged a coup, was imprisoned, then came back. Trump’s second presidency was always going to be different after his assault on the Capitol and his election denial, though many Americans underestimated this shift.
Trump’s appeal centers on revenge and resentment—targeting elites, the wealthy, or whoever people blame for their problems. This pattern appears throughout history: 1990s Venezuela, 1930s Germany, the Dreyfus Affair. Politicians who build on anger at chosen elites often succeed.
Anne Applebaum: The key difference is Trump’s coalition. His first term featured relatively mainstream officials from government, military, and business who wanted to improve existing systems. Over four years, he’s attracted fundamentally different people who want to overthrow or radically transform American institutions entirely.
This isn’t traditional conservatism. It includes Silicon Valley tech authoritarians wanting America run like a corporation, Christian nationalists seeking religious rule over secular government, and those wanting to reverse social changes since the 1960s. Trump has elevated long-marginalized figures—vaccine opponents and others outside mainstream professions.
The result is an administration where officials actively dislike the very institutions they now lead—the CIA, healthcare system, and others. You’re witnessing the state being attacked from within. This surprises many, but anyone watching closely over the past four years should have seen it coming.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: As a former newspaper editor, I’m asking myself: what do I need to make visible for my audience? Should I focus more on theories of change? On resentment? On revenge? On what comes next if basic services like water purification fail?
Anne Applebaum: The main difficulty in journalism now—even at prosperous magazines with many journalists—is that we can’t cover everything. We know about stories we don’t have time or capacity for.
The main challenge is knowing what to prioritize. You could write about vaccines and healthcare, kleptocracy and corruption, foreign policy, or civil rights.
The main job of journalists is, first, to investigate and establish what actually happened, as opposed to what propagandists claim. Second, to build trust with readers. You’re obligated to build a community—through social media, reader clubs, or public events—of people who want to understand what you’re saying.
It’s not enough just to write; you need to actively create trust, because we’re in a moment when the President lies daily on TV. He says gas prices went down when they went up. He claims to have achieved peace between India and Pakistan when the Indian government says he had nothing to do with it.
This constant lying means there needs to be a daily attempt to write truthfully and create bonds of trust with people willing to listen. It’s a very difficult job.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: What this means is that the job description for editors and journalists has become more sophisticated, because you don’t only have to follow the standards and procedures of journalism, but you also have to have expertise in what you’re writing about. You have to see the underwater currents. Is this what the Hungarian media missed?
Dorka Takácsy: If I think back to all the steps that were taken, obviously there were major milestones—the creation of the Media Council and all these things I mentioned were major milestones on this sad trajectory.
But there were also smaller steps that I think we don’t recognize in time. Probably because, just like we see now on the bigger stage worldwide, too many things happen and there aren’t enough journalists. The sector is already underfunded, everyone is overwhelmed, and you can understand that because we are all human.
For such a sector, it’s very difficult to see all the complexity of certain things. But there are definitely external factors too, because in other cases the problems were already visible—not as bad as now, but present. When the problems were big enough, many were reflected in different EU organs and institutions. And the EU was often simply too slow, and when there was political will from the outside, you could flag whatever you wanted, but certain steps were also missed.
Now looking back, it all comes together. Obviously it’s easier now to see the whole trajectory we underwent. But when it was happening, I think we missed it.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: Does that mean we’re seeing a kind of religious combat where people don’t understand or apply rational thinking, but just apply what they believe in? This isn’t necessarily about God—it’s about vaccines and whatever. So is this a challenge to rationalism as an approach that was predominant in educational systems, governance, and institutions in the developed world over the 20th and 21st centuries?
Anne Applebaum: Yes. What we’re seeing, not just in the US but in many places, is a challenge to Enlightenment thinking—that there’s a difference between things that are true and not true, that there’s a scientific method that can determine truth, that there are trusted institutions like scientific journals, journalism, and government agencies that can be trusted to at least try to find truth in good faith.
Instead, we find people completely rejecting those things under the banner of “do your own research.” I wrote about this regarding the Romanian election and the candidate Călin Georgescu, who won the first round before the election was banned.
Anne Applebaum: Georgescu described himself as a spiritual person anointed by God with special powers. He filmed himself swimming in a lake—it was very cold and snowing outside—saying his belief in God kept him from becoming ill. He also rejected vaccines.
His appeal was anti-rational, not just anti-institutional—anti-science. Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who is now Secretary of Health and Human Services overseeing the CDC, has a very similar anti-rational appeal.
Interestingly, both RFK and Georgescu have expressed pro-Russian and pro-Putin feelings. Georgescu has been openly pro-Russian regarding Ukraine and supportive of Putin. We know he was supported illegally by a social media campaign. I won’t make the same claim about RFK, although—who knows.
There’s a clear, concerted attempt to win over people who no longer trust scientific thinking. There’s a link between that and authoritarian thinking. These things are somewhat vague—I don’t want to draw clear lines—but they are connected.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: If you’re talking about the end of the Enlightenment, if we could say so, that means if you’re talking about the lack of efficiency that such an approach would have, then it’s only natural for autocrats to limit competition and preserve themselves with whatever inefficient policies they’re offering. Because otherwise, they would be swept away at the next elections.
Anne Applebaum: The problem is even deeper than that. Democracy itself, especially American democracy, is a kind of Enlightenment project. The idea of democracy is that we created this system with rules, and the rules allow us to have debates about reality. Through those debates, we decide what government policy should be.
So democracy requires some agreed-upon reality. You can have your right-wing or left-wing opinion, you can believe there should be more highways or fewer highways. But you have to agree on the number of highways. You have to have some way of counting them. Once you don’t agree, once there’s no shared reality, then you can’t really have a democratic debate.
Anne Applebaum: The system doesn’t work, and autocracy appeals instead to this deeply irrational idea: “we need a leader who somehow embodies the will of the people”—not through reasoned debate or voting, but because he has emerged from the people and expresses their will.
Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin used to talk like this. This idea doesn’t belong to the right—Hitler spoke like this, too. The idea that the autocrat has some magical link and makes good decisions just because he somehow represents us—this is anti-Enlightenment, anti-rational, and anti-democratic.
Democracy needs this basis in the real world, or it doesn’t work. If you want to get to the deepest layer, the deepest problem we have today, I think that’s it.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: My question is about the experience of a country that is in Central Europe, that has been part of the European cultural discourse all along. Was there a lack of sense of urgency?
Dorka Takácsy: Yes.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: That, you know, “we are a member of the European Union, nothing bad is going to happen to us because we will be protected one way or another through the instruments of the European Union or NATO or whatever.” Was there a lack of understanding that the house may be on fire?
Dorka Takácsy: Despite anti-Western propaganda, polls show most Hungarians still view the EU positively. But their reasons are purely practical—they can work abroad, cross borders easily, and sometimes receive EU funds. It’s not about values, freedom, or European identity—just pragmatism.
These positive numbers don’t mean Hungarians maintain a European mentality. It’s simply practical appreciation.
Dorka Takácsy: Hungary clearly shows how autocrats mask bad policies through external support. For years, Hungary prospered largely from EU accession and cohesion funds. Even with poor government policies, results seemed favorable because EU money created an impression of success. People tolerated media manipulation and propaganda because they felt economically secure.
That magic is now broken. The EU has frozen most funds for two years, exposing the true quality of Hungarian policies. Economic and social policies were always poor, but their impact wasn’t felt while EU money flowed. Now the impact is obvious.
When budgets are healthy, autocrats can buy votes with direct payments. That’s no longer viable. So the propaganda machine intensifies—amplifying narratives and pouring extra resources into messaging. When you can’t pay for votes, you must amplify the propaganda. That’s exactly what we’re seeing now.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: What I can’t understand from the outside is this disconnect: I read excellent articles in The Atlantic and New York Times opinion pages, but I don’t see real urgency in the opposition. There’s no visible concern even within the Republican Party itself. It’s just “Okay, this is happening, we don’t like it”—but no sense of emergency.
Is this hidden from view due to media optics, or does the American system simply work differently than we expect?
Anne Applebaum: There are two key points. First, this isn’t a parliamentary system—there’s no single leader of the opposition and won’t be. Asking “who’s the leader?” reflects an authoritarian mindset. There will eventually be another presidential candidate, but until then, no single leader. That’s not how our system works.
Many people are involved—Congress members, senators, local officials, media figures, podcasters. Alarming content exists constantly. If you’re on the right Instagram algorithm, you’ll see it; if not, you might miss it. There’s significant activity happening. You’d need to follow specific people to see more. Nationwide protests have occurred, with groups planning regular ones.
Second, people are angry at Democrats for not stopping Trump, but they lack the tools. Without control of Congress, there’s no way to prevent executive actions. They can’t physically stop what’s happening.
Much of what Trump has done is illegal. Cases are moving through courts now, and I expect courts will begin blocking actions. Then we’ll see an interesting moment—will the Trump administration try to overrun the courts? We’ll find out.
Within the Republican Party, there’s a strange dynamic. Some opposition exists, with many uncomfortable Republicans. But something not understood from outside—many Republican politicians are physically scared. They worry that voting against the president means facing physical attacks at home or their children being harassed at school. This is new in American politics over the last four years.
With widespread firearms, people are genuinely frightened. Many Republicans left Congress for this reason. Most who voted for Trump’s impeachment are gone—either forced out like Liz Cheney or they quietly departed.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: Is CNN being the preferred Democratic voice and Fox News being the preferred Republican voice? Is this the end of independence? Are we going into pluralism as an alternative, or is editorial independence still a value that is still being pursued or should be pursued?
Anne Applebaum: First, CNN isn’t the voice of the Democratic Party at all. CNN has tried to do something different, which isn’t quite working. But CNN, Fox, and MSNBC—ten years ago, all these networks had more editorial independence than now.
They used more neutral tones and presented discussions more neutrally, but that was also because we lived in a less polarized moment when people were less angry.
Anne Applebaum: The business model now for much of media is appealing to your base. You make money by building a base and appealing to one partisan segment of the population. The neutrality business model, designed to appeal broadly, has mostly failed.
When I started in journalism, The Washington Post was essentially the only newspaper in Washington. The Post had an interest in appealing to a wide readership—it wanted Republicans and Democrats to read it, and local businesses to advertise. It was like a monopoly—someone described it to me as a public utility, like the gas company.
That’s not true anymore. There’s no business model where you win over a broad swath of people with neutral commentary. You’ve had this siloing of newspapers and TV. No, it’s not good. Some things were gained—the neutrality sometimes concealed laziness or refusal to be clear. There were things lost in that earlier period we don’t miss.
But the partisan role has been dictated by the business environment.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: One unconventional thing we have in Ukraine is a strong public broadcaster (Suspilne). Is a public broadcaster a potential source of stabilization for the entire media market? Is it important to have an independent public broadcaster for private media to thrive and be less dependent on niche, ideological platforms?
Anne Applebaum: If you can have it—and as Hungary proves, it’s very easy to undermine an independent public broadcaster if you don’t have good laws—but if you can have it and it’s able to build wide trust, something like the BBC (though even the BBC has lost trust in recent years), then it is one of the things that can keep politics centered.
Even the fact that the BBC—it’s a little bit fake, but during election campaigns they insist every political program has a member of each party on a panel—is really useful. You don’t have that on Fox News. Having somebody legally obliged to at least try to be neutral can be extremely important.
Of course, we don’t have this in the United States at all. We have a sort of public broadcaster, but it’s very niche and not even fully government funded.
Dorka Takácsy: Yes, it’s absolutely vital, because otherwise look at what happens if you don’t have a real public broadcaster. It’s not the only source of problems in Hungary, but it’s clearly an indicator that something is wrong.
Unfortunately, we live in an era where polarization is extremely important. This creates a vicious circle because media outlets need to survive, and it’s easier to appeal to emotions. The center is slowly becoming more radical on both sides, and this kind of news further increases polarization.
If you can have a public broadcaster that can afford not to go for emotions—to be dry and professional, though probably less interesting than outlets that live purely from the market—then you have to preserve it, because there’s chaos all around.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: We’ve been discovering how bad the situation is in our neighboring areas, and there might or might not be a light at the end of the tunnel. But considering that Ukraine is still trying to Euro-integrate, and seeing the dissolution of institutions in the US and many European countries… Are we screwed?
Anne Applebaum: No, no. I think the answer is that you should democratize Ukraine and build institutions there not to get into the EU or to someday be accepted into NATO. You should do it because it’s good for Ukraine.
Following the lead of other countries or seeking to appeal to them—you’re not going to appeal to them. That’s a fool’s game. There’s no point to it.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: Without an international network of support—considering that we are at war, the challenges we have, the pain inside Ukrainian society—we’re actually at risk of not having sustainable democracy. Not because we cannot sustain it as a society, but because we cannot sustain it as a society in these circumstances. How reliably should we expect external support for the cause of democracy and freedom in Ukraine?
Anne Applebaum: I can’t tell you what will happen in the distant future. Current European leaders strongly support Ukraine. There’s a fantastic photograph of your president, President Macron, the German chancellor, and the Polish prime minister all standing in a row, talking and looking happy and friendly. I think that was real.
Among that group, there’s a commitment to Ukraine—to Ukraine’s sovereignty and democracy. Germany has exceeded spending limits to buy weapons—unprecedented for them. You have genuine friends in Europe, plus supporters in the US Congress, public, and business community. Don’t count the US out yet.
Dorka Takácsy: I’m not pessimistic. Ukraine has shown tremendous strength, and we can see clear examples of what to avoid. The support is there, especially with current EU leadership.
They see the bad examples too. Take Hungary—I can say with confidence that the EU is slowly but surely finding its way. Yes, many problems should have been solved earlier, and they don’t always see future consequences in time. But now we clearly see that at many levels, the EU has started recognizing the problems and is growing stronger.
This is encouraging for Ukraine. We can really benefit from this strengthening.
Yevhen Hlibovytskyi: Well, part of adult life is knowing that not all questions will be answered.
Hungary and Slovakia continue to rely heavily on Russian oil, gas, and nuclear fuel, despite having technical and economic capacity to switch to alternative sources, according to a detailed joint report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD, Bulgaria) and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA, Finland). Both countries “have shown no real intention of phasing out Russian crude oil,” the report states. Similar conclusions are made regarding the Russian gas and nuclear projects.
The report, titled The Last Mile. Phasing Out Russian Oil and Gas in Central Europe, reveals that both countries have used EU sanctions exemptions not as a path to energy independence, but as a shield to deepen ties with Russian suppliers, significantly undermining EU unity and energy security strategy.
The report presents a stark picture: Hungary and Slovakia have not reduced their imports of Russian oil and gas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. On the contrary, Hungary increased its Russian crude reliance from 61% in 2021 to 86% in 2024. Slovakia’s dependence remained at nearly 87% that same year. Combined, the two countries imported 8.7 million tonnes of Russian crude oil in 2024, which is 2% more than in 2021.
Since the beginning of the invasion, these imports have sent the Kremlin approximately €5.4 billion in tax revenue. As the report emphasizes, that amount could theoretically fund the production of 1,800 Iskander-M missiles—missiles used to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian areas.
Despite disruptions in the Druzhba pipeline in 2024 and multiple opportunities to diversify through the Adria pipeline, both Hungary and Slovakia continued to rely on Russian supply chains. Slovakia began marginal non-Russian crude imports in the latter half of 2024, while Hungary saw its non-Russian crude intake fall to nearly zero.
Merz: Hungary and Slovakia could lose EU funds over pro-Russia stance
The report highlights the central role of Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, which owns the only refineries in both Hungary and Slovakia. MOL’s strategic decisions on crude origin determine national energy sourcing. Although the Hungarian state does not directly own MOL, it controls over 30% of the company through government-aligned foundations, effectively shaping its energy policy.
MOL secured multiple contracts for non-Russian oil via the Adria pipeline—2.2 million tonnes in 2023 and 2.1 million tonnes in 2025—but actual delivery in 2023 was less than half that amount. Meanwhile, MOL continues to process discounted Russian crude, profiting from price gaps that are not passed on to consumers. In fact, gasoline and diesel prices in Hungary remained 5% above the EU average in 2024.
Szijjártó says Kyiv must accept Budapest blocking Ukraine’s EU accession, Zelenskyy says most Hungarians support Ukraine
This arrangement has allowed MOL’s operating income to rise significantly: to $26.4 billion in 2022 and around $25.3 billion in both 2023 and 2024. The company’s profits helped stabilize Hungary’s strained budget through a windfall tax—initially 25%, later raised to 95%. By 2024, the tax yielded only $15 million, compared to $521 million in 2022, as discounts narrowed and fiscal benefits declined.
Between 2022 and May 2024, Hungary and MOL earned an estimated €1.7 billion in “extra profit” from this setup, according to a Hungarian nonprofit G7 investigation cited in the report.
The report details how both Hungary and Slovakia used EU exemptions to re-export petroleum products made from Russian crude to Czechia. Originally set to expire in December 2023, this export exemption was extended twice—first to December 2024, then to June 2025—despite Czechia’s objection.
Russia creates “axis of autocrats” in European states, Spiegel says
In 2024, Slovakia exported 710,000 tonnes of petroleum products to Czechia, worth €520 million, while Hungary added another 39,000 tonnes worth €40 million. Slovnaft, MOL’s Slovak subsidiary, is identified as the primary beneficiary.
Hungary has positioned itself as a regional hub for Russian gas, increasing imports via TurkStream and re-exporting to Slovakia. Hungary’s 15-year contract with Gazprom, signed in 2021, was expanded in 2024 with an additional 2 billion cubic meters per year.
Slovakian cities erupt in anti-Fico protests again
Slovakia, whose contract with Gazprom runs until 2034, has likewise expanded imports from Hungary, effectively bypassing Ukraine as a transit country. The report notes that this arrangement severely weakens the EU’s diversification efforts and severely weakens “the EU’s collective energy security strategy and reinforce long-term risks of political leverage by the Kremlin.”
Central to the report is the exposure of intermediary networks, particularly Normeston Trading SA—a company tied to Soviet-era oil traders and Russian oil majors. Normeston, once based in Belize and later in Cyprus and Switzerland, acted as a shadow intermediary for Russian crude shipments to Hungary and Slovakia.
The company has long-standing ties to MOL executives and Russian oil firms, including Lukoil and Bashneft. The report alleges that Normeston facilitated massive markups on Russian oil imports by acting as a middleman, effectively skimming profits outside the scope of EU oversight.
Hungarian OTP Bank sees 40% profit surge in Russia
Although Slovakia signed a fuel supply deal with US-based Westinghouse, and Hungary with France’s Framatome, both continue to receive large volumes from Rosatom. The Paks II nuclear project in Hungary, led by Rosatom and financed 80% through a Russian loan, is flagged as a long-term strategic risk that locks Hungary into Russian influence for decades.
The report points out that the key contract details for Paks II are classified, and oversight is minimal. It describes the entire project as lacking transparency, with regulatory bypasses and rising costs now estimated at €15 billion—about 12% of Hungary’s GDP.
“Russian gas costs sovereignty, US LNG only money”: Zelenskyy responds to Fico’s “enemy” claims
Tests confirm both MOL refineries can process non-Russian crude. In 2019, during a Druzhba contamination crisis, Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil temporarily dropped to 48% as it switched to Adria-supplied crude.
Similarly, alternatives to Russian gas exist through expanded LNG infrastructure in Greece, Croatia, and Poland, and new interconnectors with Austria, Romania, and Poland. The report insists that technical constraints do not justify continued Russian dependency.
Budapest halts talks with Kyiv amid Hungarian spy scandal
The report urges the EU to:
It concludes that continued exemptions and reliance on Russian energy sources serve no technical or economic rationale and must be ended to protect European energy security, reduce Kremlin revenues, and restore EU sanctions integrity.
Hungary's European Affairs Minister Janos Boka said on May 27 that it is difficult to lead constructive negotiations with Ukraine on its EU accession, as Kyiv is allegedly conducting "information and intelligence" operations on Hungary's territory.
The statement comes after the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) announced on May 9 that it had dismantled a Hungarian military intelligence network operating in Ukraine's Zakarpattia Oblast, detaining two agents accused of espionage against the Ukrainian state.
The Hungarian government denied the accusation as a smear campaign and instead declared it had exposed two Ukrainian spies operating in Hungary. The controversy has put a further strain on an already fragile bilateral relationship.
Talking to journalists ahead of the EU General Affairs Council in Brussels on May 2, Boka said that constructive negotiations on Ukraine's entry to the EU would be difficult in this context.
Hungary, whose government is widely regarded as the most Russian-friendly in the EU, has been blocking the opening of accession negotiation clusters with Kyiv. After the scandal broke out, Budapest announced it is suspending talks with Ukraine on national minority rights, long presented by Hungary as the main roadblock in accession negotiations.
Budapest has repeatedly accused Kyiv of discriminating against the Hungarian ethnic minority concentrated in southwestern Zakarpattia Oblast, an accusation that the Ukrainian leadership denies. Much of these disputes center around Ukraine's language laws that require at least 70% of education above the fifth grade to be conducted in Ukrainian.
In turn, Kyiv has long accused Budapest of undermining Ukraine's sovereignty through political interference and dual citizenship schemes. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has also consistently obstructed sanctions against Russia and military aid for Ukraine within the EU.
Amid the escalating controversy, Orban has also accused Ukraine of meddling in Hungary's internal affairs and colluding with the Hungarian political opposition.
The agenda of the May 27 meeting in Brussels includes the possibility of stripping Hungary of its voting rights as the EU is looking for ways to override Budapest if it vetoes Ukraine's accession.
This will be the eighth hearing regarding Hungary since the European Parliament triggered Article 7 procedures against the country in 2018. Article 7 of the EU Treaty allows for the suspension of Council voting rights if a member state consistently breaches EU founding principles.
The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek
Cooperation between the United States and the European Union on preventing Russian sanctions evasion has broken down, Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on 27 May. According to a cited leaked internal report from Germany’s Foreign Ministry, the EU’s Special Representative for Sanctions, David O’Sullivan, told a closed-door meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 20 May in Brussels that there is “no joint outreach” with the US anymore. He also noted that G7 cooperation on the matter had “lost momentum.”
The EU, US, and G7 began sanctioning Russia in 2014 after its illegal annexation of Crimea and sharply escalated restrictions following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Sanctions target Russia’s energy, defense, banking, and tech sectors, aiming to cut its war-financing capacity and punish widespread human rights violations and attacks on Ukrainian sovereignty. The sanctions regime may collapse under US President Donald Trump, who seeks to resume trade with Russia and is pushing for Kyiv-Moscow negotiations, allegedly to end the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war.
The leak suggests that European hopes for a united front against Russia’s sanctions circumvention are rapidly eroding. While a new 18th package of EU sanctions is being prepared in response to renewed Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities, the lack of US participation raises doubts about global enforcement capacity.
Süddeutsche Zeitung notes that some experts suggest that US President Donald Trump “would rather resume doing business with Russia today than tomorrow.” Normalization with Russia “will mean an end to the global sanctions regime,” Green MEP Sergey Lagodinsky warned. German MP Johann Wadephul warned that the new EU sanctions “will be financially painful for Russia” but acknowledged doubts about future American involvement, despite stating that “there will be a clear reaction from the West” to Russia’s attacking Ukraine instead of negotiating peace.
China plays a key role in sanctions evasion, the leaked report finds. EU sanctions commissioner David O’Sullivan told the EU Foreign Affairs Council that “around 80%” of such cases are tied to China, which denies involvement. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Chief of Ukraine Oleh Ivashchenko said Chinese firms are supplying essential materials to 20 Russian arms factories.
Despite the breakdown in US-EU coordination, the EU has reportedly achieved some success in blocking war-related exports via third countries. Export channels through Armenia, Serbia, Uzbekistan, and India have seen disruptions. However, Kazakhstan, Türkiye, and the UAE remain problematic transit points, the document notes.
Efforts against Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” — tankers and cargo ships used to bypass sanctions — have seen some progress. According to O’Sullivan, multiple nations have stripped Russian-linked ships of their flags following EU pressure. However, he urged further measures against ports used frequently by these vessels, including those in Türkiye, India, and Malaysia.
The next EU sanctions package is expected to hit Russia’s energy and financial sectors, though Russia’s ally Hungary opposes these measures and has shown “no willingness to compromise,” the document adds.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced a tougher stance against Hungary and Slovakia over their continued obstruction of EU sanctions targeting Russia, German TV channel NTV reported. Actions against them can include withdrawal of EU funds from the countries.
Speaking at the WDR-Europaforum on 26 May, Merz said, referring to the restraining role of both states in the EU sanctions against Russia:
“We will not be able to avoid a conflict with Hungary and Slovakia if this course continues.”
He emphasized that both governments represent only a “small minority” among the 27 EU member states, yet have used their veto powers to block or weaken sanctions.
“We cannot allow the decisions of the entire European Union to depend on a small minority,” Merz stated.
According to the German chancellor, the EU has a range of instruments it can apply to increase pressure on the pro-Russian governments of Slovakia and Hungary. Among them are infringement proceedings for violations of rule-of-law obligations and the possible suspension of EU funding for Budapest and Bratislava.
“But there is always the option of withdrawing European funds from them,” Merz said, referencing legal mechanisms available under EU treaties. While he added that he does not seek conflict, he made it clear: “If it is necessary, then we will deal with them.”
Merz had spoken directly with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán the previous week.
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