Ukraine has begun serial production of its new Octopus interceptor drone designed to take down Russia’s Shahed-type attack UAVs, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Denys Shmyhal announced on Friday. The technology has been handed to three manufacturers, with another eleven preparing production lines.

Shaheds are Iranian kamikaze drones regularly used by Russia to strike Ukrainian cities, industry, and energy facilities. They are often launched in large groups to strain air defenses and cause maximum damage. Ukraine has pushed to expand its own interception capabilities as these drones continue to hit civilian areas and critical infrastructure across the country.

Ukrainian-developed Octopus system confirmed in combat conditions

Shmyhal said Octopus is a Ukrainian-developed system created by the Armed Forces and confirmed in combat. It can operate at night, under electronic jamming, and at low altitude - conditions that often make Shahed attacks difficult to counter with standard air defense assets.

He said the launch of mass production will accelerate the deployment of interceptors “so they can begin protecting Ukraine’s skies as soon as possible.” 

He added that the Defense Ministry is continuing to cooperate with domestic drone manufacturers to move new designs quickly from innovation to regular frontline use.

Taiwanese companies continue to supply precision industrial machines for factories that fuel Russia’s war machine, in defiance of sanctions, according to an investigation by Ukrainian watchdog organization StateWatch. 

Precision tools process high-strength alloys used in the production of artillery barrels, missile bodies and drones. Russia imports at least 70% of its Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines from companies in Europe and Asia. Most countries involved have banned selling Russia equipment that can be used to make war materiel. 

Moscow gets around these bans, largely by working with middlemen in countries like China and Türkiye. However, “even Taiwan, a strategic partner of the US, has been implicated in these supply chains,” StateWatch wrote in its 13 November report. 

Since 2022, millions of dollars worth of dual-use machinery has made its way into Russia through Taiwan’s involvement. These include brands like Fedek, Sunmill, and Golden Machinery.

The recipients include companies linked to Russia's military-industrial complex, including Zenik, Kami-Group, Intervesp, Metalmash, and Stanki Tekhnologii Instrument. 

At least 70% of Russia's CNC machine tools are imported, largely from the US, EU, and Japan. Over 80% of all CNCs end up in Russia's military production facilities. 

Over $10 million worth of industrial equipment 

LNS Group is a global company that manufactures bar feeders and CNC lathes. According to Russian customs data, LNS machines worth nearly $5 million have entered Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. 

These exports were mainly facilitated by Taiwanese company TWT Global Enterprise limited. Kami-Group, which sells machine tools, is the largest Russian recipient, according to the report. 

Russian company Zenit published a YouTube video in December 2024, showing LNS’s Fedek-branded equipment at its factory.  

A flashlight manufacturer, Zenit also makes red-dot and thermal sights, laser target designators, and tactical firearm accessories for Russia's troops and intelligence agencies, on top of donating products to Russian troops in Ukraine.

Fedek machines have also been spotted at the G.I. Petrovsky Plant in Nizhny Novgorod, which makes equipment for the Russian Navy, engineering troops, and manufactures avionics.

Zenit's video also shows Sunmill machines. The manufacturer, Jeenxi Technology Co, of Taiwan, “supplied high-precision equipment directly to Russia’s military sector” also to the tune of $5 million, as of December 2024, according to StateWatch.

Russian state contractors Intervesp and Intervesp-M, both of which are internationally sanctioned, were reportedly among the recipients. 

Taiwanese Golden Machinery Co, which manufactures beverage bottling equipment, supplied $800,000 worth of industrial machines  to Russia, according to customs data.

The main recipient was Stanki Tekhnologii, which trades in metalworking equipment and its website shows it regularly signing contracts with Russian defense enterprises.

Stanki Tekhnologii got $430,000 worth of equipment directly from the manufacturer and the rest via a Turkish intermediary.

South Korean firms also implicated 

South Korean brands have also been spotted in Russia, according to a recent report by the Economic Security Council of Ukraine, a Kyiv think tank. 

Between 2024 and 2025, more than $3.7 million worth of Korean-made cutting tools and CNC machines got into Russia through complex transshipment networks involving China, Türkiye, India, Uzbekistan, Lithuania and Thailand.

Products from at least three South Korean precision toolmakers were exhibited at the annual Metalloobraboka expo in Moscow in May.

“The key issue is not simply covert shipments,” Olena Yurchenko, director for analysis and investigations at ESCU, wrote in a statement to Korea JoongAng Daily and Euromaidan Press. 

“What we find alarming is that products made by South Korean brands, which are de facto banned from Russia [since 2022], are now being openly advertised and promoted in Moscow."

Moscow casts a wide net

These figures are a drop in the bucket compared to the $18 billion worth of machine tools reportedly supplied to Russia from Europe and China.

This includes 57 CNC machines worth over $26.5 million from European subsidiaries, along with components and consumables valued at more than $9.5 million.

In October, Germany raided Spinner, a high-precision machine tool manufacturer suspected of knowingly supplying equipment to Russia's military industry. Three individuals have already been charged with violating sanctions.

Ukraine unleashes the minigun on Shahed drones

Ukraine has started equipping its Mi-8 helicopters with American-made M134 Minigun systems to counter Russian Shahed kamikaze drones, according to footage published by the Instagram account aero.tim and reported by Militarnyi.

Russia launches swarms of Shahed kamikaze drones at Ukrainian cities every night, overwhelming air defenses with sheer numbers. These Iranian-designed attack drones are difficult targets for expensive surface-to-air missiles. Helicopter-mounted machine guns give Ukraine another option for intercepting drones without burning through costly missile stockpiles.

The video shows a Mi-8 door gunner firing several bursts at an incoming drone, which then veers off course and crashes. The modification gives the Soviet-designed helicopters a major boost in firepower against low-flying targets that have become a constant threat across Ukraine.

Why Ukraine is putting American miniguns on Soviet helicopters

According to Ukrainian defense portal Militarnyi, the M134 Minigun is a six-barrel, electrically driven machine gun chambered in 7.62×51 mm NATO. It can fire between 2,000 and 6,000 rounds per minute - about eight times faster than the standard PKT machine guns typically mounted on Mi-8s.

Often seen on US helicopters such as the Black Hawk and Huey, the Minigun can be mounted in fixed or swivel configurations, allowing gunners to cover a wide firing arc. Beyond defending against drones, the weapon is also effective for close air support and suppressing enemy firing positions.

In their never-ending effort to protect armored vehicles from the tiny first-person-view drones that are everywhere all the time all along the 1,100-km front line of Russia's wider war on Ukraine, Russian forces have introduced a number of bizarre innovations.

The resulting "cope cages" and "turtle," "porcupine" and "hedgehog" tanks are ungainly and, frankly, ugly. But they work. In fact, they work so well that Ukrainian forces usually copy each modification for their own armored vehicles.

The latest Russian anti-drone innovation is no exception.

Adding thousands of metal "hairs" to the existing anti-drone cope cages on a growing number of hedgehog tanks, the Russians have inspired the Ukrainians to do the same.

Now "both Russian and Ukrainian forces are modifying their tanks into so-called hedgehogs," the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team observed.

"This is the progress we're making," one Ukrainian mechanic narrated in a recent video appealing to supporters for donations of industrial-grade aluminum cabling. Mechanics unravel the cabling into individual metal threads and weld a bundle with around 100 of the threads onto a tank's cope cage.

A single hedgehog might boast 900 bundles for a total of 90,000 metal hairs. Each hair can detonate an incoming FPV before it strikes a tank's hull.

The cost of protection

There are downsides to do-it-yourself anti-drone armor, of course. All that extra weight can quickly ruin a vehicle's gearbox.

And the heavier turtles, porcupines and hedgehogs are prone to getting mired while trying to cross rivers and streams. But a loss of mobility is a small price to pay for extra protection.

To be fair, Ukrainian forces have managed to eventually knock out even the most heavily up-armored Russian tank. But they have to use more and more of their precious FPV drones to do it.

One heavily up-armored Russian turtle tank, which sported an add-on metal shell or shed, deflected around 25 Ukrainian mines and first-person-view drones before the 26th munition—a drone—finally disabled it during an assault toward the city of Siversk in eastern Ukraine late last month.

From cope cages to hedgehogs

Turtle tanks aren't even the latest and toughest up-armored Russian vehicles. Cope cages were in use before Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022. Turtle tanks first appeared in the second year of the wider war. Porcupine tanks with a few thick metal spines showed up early this year. The first hedgehogs crawled onto the battlefield in the fall.

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Russian improvised armor destroying tanks it’s meant to protect

First spotting each new species, defenders' laughter quickly turned to begrudging respect. “Everyone laughs at the design of their sheds, but in fact they work like Hell,” one Ukrainian blogger wrote about the Russian turtles. The DIY vehicles can eat “a lot of FPVs,” the blogger pointed out.

The more FPVs a given vehicle can absorb before succumbing, the likelier the vehicle is to survive an assault across the drone-patrolled no-man's-land, potentially leading accompanying infantry-laden vehicles to the relative safety of some new underground position.

It's in this manner that the Russians gain ground: securing a new lodgement with a few infantry and then gradually expanding it with reinforcements. Not every vehicle and soldier needs to survive the drone barrage; it only takes a few to begin the slow accumulation that will eventually overwhelm outnumbered Ukrainian defenders.

Why Ukraine copies Russian armor

From mockery to respect to mimicry, Ukrainian forces have followed the Russians' lead—first deploying cope cages, then turtles.

One Ukrainian turtle belonging to the 24th Mechanized Brigade, holding positions outside the ruins of Chasiv Yar in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, rolled through Russian artillery and drone bombardment to evacuate wounded Ukrainian troops back in the spring.

"Our armor again withstood multiple FPV hits and was able to take the fighters to a safe place," the brigade reported.

The Ukrainian hedgehogs should be even more effective. And now at least one Ukrainian mechanic, the one in the recent video, is pleading for more donations of industrial cable. "We need them," he intoned. Every three tons of cable makes a new hedgehog that can ward off Russian drones.

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End of Ukraine’s “wunderwaffe” drones? Russian turtle tanks eat FPVs as 14 vehicles break through

Slovakia’s prosecutor has determined that the government’s 2023 decision to send MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine did not constitute a criminal offense, according to Politico. The investigation was launched following a complaint by the current pro-Russian government of Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Prosecutor halts MiG-29 case, finds no legal wrongdoing

On 10 November, the Bratislava prosecutor’s office confirmed that the country’s transfer of MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine was not a criminal act, Politico reported. The office said the criminal prosecution was halted on 30 October “because it was sufficiently established that the act in question does not constitute a criminal offense and there is no reason to refer the case further,” a spokesperson told Politico.

The office concluded that the donation of the aircraft and two anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine had not caused harm to Slovakia as defined by the country’s Criminal Code.

“Nor was it proven that members of the government acted with the intent to obtain an unlawful benefit for themselves or others, or that they exercised their authority in a manner contrary to the law or exceeded their powers,” the spokesperson added.

Slovakia delivered its entire fleet of Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets and two anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine in spring 2023, becoming the first country to send warplanes to Kyiv after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

The current defense ministry, under Fico’s government, filed a criminal complaint in June against former Prime Minister Eduard Heger and former Defense Minister Jaroslav Naď. The complaint accused them of sabotage, abuse of power, and breach of duty in the management of public property in connection with the decision to transfer the jets.

Both officials rejected the allegations at the time.

Following the announcement, Jaroslav Naď published a statement on Facebook.

“It has been confirmed what I have repeatedly said: that the government of Eduard Heger, with me as Minister of Defense, acted not only morally correctly but also in the national interest of the Slovak Republic,” Naď wrote.

Russian crews complain that hefty, improvised armor shells break the transmission on their tanks after just a few kilometers. 

According to interview excerpts posted by Russian tank historian Andrei Tarasenko, mounting this “tsar mangal” style turtle armor on the tank’s chassis quickly overloads the gearboxes. 

One Russian tank “didn't even make it 10 kilometers before one of the side gearboxes failed,” an interviewee told Russian outlet Vault8. This tank was equipped with a makeshift shell made out of cables.  

If the armor shell is instead mounted on the turret, the weight burns out the driver, making the turret impossible to rotate, especially by hand. 

Ukrainian tank operators from the 13th Khartia Brigade confirmed the Russians’ woes to Euromaidan Press.

Passing along his colleagues’ words, Khartia spokesman Volodymyr Dehtiaryov said that improvised armor that weighs several tons does take Russian tanks out of order quickly.

However, he added that the Russians don’t seem to mind losing tanks in this way, as long as they are able to get close enough to inflict enough damage to Ukrainian positions. 

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According to Tarasenko’s post, the Russians are also complaining about shortages of reactive armor, especially the modern Relikt system. Russian crews are trying to make up for the shortage with improvised solutions. 

“On the turret cheeks, there’s a homemade version from garage workshops — sheet metal shaped like factory plating with an explosive insert from the UR-77 mine-clearing line charge. It works about 50/50 at a 45 degree angle,” the Russian crewman is quoted as saying. 

Tanks struggle to evolve in the age of drone warfare

Tanks often lead Russian mechanized assaults, absorbing drone attacks with their bolted-on armor, clearing mines with their front-mounted rollers, and firing their cannons to suppress Ukrainian troops.

This add-on armor comes in a variety of shapes, sizes and weight profiles, evolving over the course of the full-scale invasion from simple cages, to solid steel sheds, to an arrangement of bristling cables, resembling the quills of a porcupine.

There is evidence to suggest that improvised armor is effective at letting the tanks survive more hits from certain types of drones, like FPVs. Some Russian assaults hinge on whether the defenders can run out of drones before the Russians run out of vehicles to overwhelm their positions.

However, the Russians cannot keep sacrificing tanks forever. The Kremlin may be desperate enough for usable armor to pull old T-64s out of storage and try to make them work. Alternatively, the Russians could continue to rely on infantry offensives in the short term, to buy more time for their mechanized forces to recover.

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Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 7 November that Ukraine plans to localize production of Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets starting in 2033, according to a government briefing.

The announcement follows an agreement between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson. On 6 November, the defense ministries of both countries worked out the details of the deal, which includes negotiations for the supply of 150 Gripen E/F class aircraft.

"Yesterday, a memorandum was also signed between one of the Ukrainian companies and Saab regarding the future localization of Gripens in Ukraine," Shmyhal said. "We expect that from 2033, the Gripen will be significantly localized in Ukraine, its production – from large-unit assembly to localization of individual parts."

Shmyhal added that discussions are ongoing about transferring Gripen C/D class aircraft to Ukraine as soon as possible, with negotiations focusing on 2026 as a potential delivery date.

Ukraine and Sweden have agreed to establish two working groups. The first, a technical group, will handle preparations for receiving the fighters and their deployment in Ukraine. The second, a financial group, will work on contract details.

On 22 October, Ukraine and Sweden signed a letter of intent regarding the purchase of at least 100 Gripen aircraft for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The first fighters could arrive in Ukraine as early as 2026, with payment proposed through frozen Russian assets.

Saab AB executive Micael Johansson told the Financial Times on October 27 that the company is considering establishing a facility in Ukraine to assemble Gripen fighters.

On 6 November, Sweden's Ministry of Defense reported that new Gripens for Ukraine could be partially financed through military assistance.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced today that Ukraine will begin mass production of a new drone model to replace Chinese-made DJI Mavic UAVs, Interfax-Ukraine reports.

"Next, Mavic. A very important issue.... We were looking for alternatives – alternatives have been found. There will be mass production of this alternative. Relevant financed contracts are now being prepared," Zelenskyy said during a briefing on 7 November.

DJI Mavic series drones, originally developed for civilian and commercial use, have become among the most widespread and critically important unmanned aircraft on the Ukrainian front. The drones are valued for their compact size, relative affordability, and high-quality imaging capabilities, particularly the Mavic 3 and Mavic 3 Thermal models.

In the Ukrainian army, these drones primarily perform tactical reconnaissance functions at distances up to 15 km, adjust artillery fire, and after modification are used to drop small munitions on enemy positions, serving as the "eyes" of infantry and artillery units.

Zelenskyy also emphasized that evacuation drones must be included in the e-Points bonus system. "The main task is to preserve people's lives, this is a priority," the president said.

During the briefing, Zelenskyy discussed a report from Commander of Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, who presented a program aimed at strengthening air defense over Kherson. According to the president, the program is ready and has received support. He instructed officials to develop similar programs for border cities and the most vulnerable communities.

Recently, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine plans to reach production of 500-800 interceptor drones per day in November.

Ukraine and Sweden have agreed to begin localizing the production of Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets on Ukrainian territory, with plans to establish significant domestic manufacturing by 2033, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 7 November, as reported by Ukrainian national broadcaster Suspilne.

This marks a major step in Ukraine’s long-term strategy to rebuild and modernize its defense industry through Western technology partnerships. By producing advanced fighter jets domestically, Kyiv secures greater self-sufficiency in arms manufacturing, strengthens its air force against continued Russian attacks, and integrates more deeply into Europe’s defense ecosystem.

According to Shmyhal, the two countries finalized the details with Sweden’s Ministry of Defence on 6 November, including provisions for the supply of up to 150 Gripen E-class fighters. A memorandum of intent was signed between a Ukrainian defense enterprise and Saab, the Swedish aerospace manufacturer, to set up future production inside Ukraine.

“From 2033, Gripen production will be significantly localized in Ukraine, from large-unit assembly to the manufacturing of individual components,” Shmyhal said.

First jets arrive next year, domestic production follows

Ukraine expects to receive its first Gripen fighter jets from Sweden as early as next year, with initial batches likely to include older C and D models, before the full-scale production of the advanced Gripen E variant begins later in the decade.

Ukrainian defense portal Militarnyi notes that the localization project would be Ukraine’s first large-scale fighter-aircraft production effort, encompassing everything from assembly to parts manufacturing. Saab is also reportedly exploring options for a parallel production line in Canada due to growing international demand.

Deal builds on Ukraine's largest-ever combat aviation agreement

The agreement follows the 22 October 2025 letter of intent signed by Zelenskyy and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson for the purchase of 100 to 150 Gripen E fighters - Ukraine’s largest-ever combat aviation deal. 

Kristersson described it as a long-term partnership to build a “serious air force” capable of defending Ukrainian skies against Russian attacks.

The Gripen E is a 4++-generation multirole fighter capable of speeds up to Mach 2, equipped with advanced radar, AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, and precision strike capability.

As Washington flip-flops on granting Tomahawk cruise missiles to Kyiv, there is a more practical, politically expedient solution, which doesn’t involve an American veto of every target that Ukraine may want to hit. 

That solution is twofold: fund Ukraine’s defense companies to make their own missiles and long-range drones, and supply Kyiv with cheaper, less advanced munitions in greater numbers, observers and insiders said. 

This will still let Ukraine scale up its deep-strike campaign, meant to grind down the Russian offensive rather than face its full might on the front lines, saving both lives and money. 

“Right now, we need less missiles to meaningfully reduce the Russians’ capabilities, compared to 2022, because now we have drones,” said Serhii Kuzan, chair of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center. 

"But let's imagine that you also add missiles... this is a few dozen-fold enhancement to our long-range capabilities."

American Tomahawks and German Tauruses, which would be very helpful for deep strikes, remain blocked by politics for the time being. However, the Ukrainians have already made up for their dearth of missiles by innovating a menagerie of effective homegrown solutions. They just need support to make more. 

Ukraine’s drones have proven effective at hitting softer targets like refineries, but also factories. One Kyiv-based developer told Euromaidan Press that drones can now penetrate a meter of concrete and deal heavy damage with warheads lighter than 100 kilograms.

Ukraine also produces its own missiles, like the Neptune and, more recently, the Flamingo. It also gets cruise missiles from less reticent allies — the Storm Shadows and SCALPs provided by the UK and France, respectively. All of the above have been used in successful strikes against Russia.

“The situation is not binary, and Ukraine could undoubtedly make effective use of 50 or so Tomahawks. However, since the US is highly unlikely to donate these missiles, European governments might be better advised to channel the estimated $125–200 million they would cost… directly into Ukraine’s missile industry,” wrote missile expert Fabian Hoffmann of Oslo University. 

“Given that expanding Ukraine’s domestic missile production remains a major strategic priority, this may represent the more beneficial option.”

Deep strikes into Russia need to be scaled up

If necessity is the mother of invention, she has been an especially fruitful mother in Ukraine, birthing a wide variety of tech for both the front line and strategic attacks deep inside Russian territory. 

When Western allies refused to grant long-range weapons out of fear of escalation, Ukraine was forced to develop a plethora of effective attack drones of different shapes and sizes, from their Shahed analogues like the Batyar, to bombers resembling civilian aircraft, like the UJ-22 or the Horynych, to high-altitude balloons and more. 

Using these unmanned technologies, Ukraine has been striking Russia’s hydrocarbon infrastructure for years, but this campaign really kicked into high gear in 2025, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claiming that attacks are happening practically every day. 

In spite of the economic damage, Russia has so far kept up the frontline pressure, demonstrating that it can still afford to throw money and bodies at the problem, something that Ukraine, short on both funds and manpower, cannot do. 

Still, Kyiv hopes that by disabling enough strategic targets with more attacks, Russia’s military sustainability will falter. 

Observers and insiders who spoke to Euromaidan Press said that deep strikes will not win the war or reconquer lost territories, but they can still weaken Russia’s war effort and halt its advance, with the right choices of targets and sufficient means to hit them. 

• Drones work better against softer targets like refineries, but these are easier to replace
• Industrial machinery is harder to replace but harder to damage and is farther away from the front, so missiles work better against it
• Missiles are also useful for killing commanders in bunkers — if enough are killed, this can paralyze a regional offensive, thanks to Russia's top-down command style
• Tomahawks would be very useful to hit hardened targets, but chances of Ukraine getting them seem remote, with the White House constantly changing its mind
• Up to 50 missiles were under discussion; Ukraine would need hundreds of Tomahawks to take out entire factory complexes — plus, Washington could tell Kyiv what targets it's allowed to shoot
• For the same cost, the US and European allies could provide cheaper missiles and funding to buff up Ukraine's deep strike capabilities

Blasting Russia's refineries and industrial base

Designing a deep strike campaign around drones means choosing softer targets, said Marc DeVore, a defense policy scholar, who advised the UK’s Foreign Office on Russia’s full-scale invasion. 

“I think that Ukraine has done a great job in terms of identifying some of those target sets,” he told Euromaidan Press. 

Well-placed drone strikes can take refineries offline but to keep them that way, the attacks have to be regular and repeated, with most drone-sized payloads. 

“Repairs and restoring a refinery to operation is not necessarily rocket science and there's a sufficient number of producers of the necessary equipment that the Russians will be able to source,” DeVore said. 

Replacement piping, pumps, and other components can be easily acquired from China or built at home. Now, drones can do lasting damage to cracking units, which break down crude oil, and may be harder for Russia to source.

Missiles are able to do a lot more devastating damage to these targets, which would keep them offline longer. But missiles can be even more valuable if used to strike harder to reach targets, such as factories that make weapons or the stuff that goes into them.

Such plants are better-protected and also contain hefty industrial machinery like CNC machines or rotary forges that make parts for military vehicles. A recent investigation by InformNapalm showed that Russia must resort to evading sanctions to get its hands on more of these machines. 

These machines are hard to damage with small payloads, but also much harder to replace if they are destroyed by a larger blast.

“Russia doesn't produce its own rotary forges, and China also is a laggard. So the rotary forge industry is largely dominated by one Austrian company, (GFM), and Russia depends on it for rotary forges,” DeVore said.  

“So if one could either destroy those forges or inflict sufficient damage, it would be very difficult for Russia to replace them,” assuming the company doesn’t sell its tech to a random middleman that pops up overnight. 

Range is also a factor. Tomahawks can go up to 1,500 kilometers. A significant proportion of Russia’s heaviest military production assets are located far from the front lines, requiring any weapons to cross major distances to reach them.

The majority of long-range attack drones and cruise missiles that Ukraine uses now typically have ranges in the hundreds of kilometers, without breaching the 1,000 kilometer mark. Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missile has a claimed range of up to 3,000 kilometers, but this has yet to be verified independently. 

Killing Russian command staff to halt the advance

Missiles are typically more effective at penetrating command and control centers, which are typically shielded by thick concrete. An attack like that can kill important command staff, which can be very disruptive to the Russian military, with its top-down command structure.

It was a Ukrainian Storm Shadow strike in 2023 that blasted the Black Sea Fleet headquarters and command center in Crimea, reportedly killing dozens of officers. 

Missile strikes were also instrumental in hitting the command posts of Russia’s 155th Naval Infantry, “paralyzing that entire direction” for a while, according to Kuzan. “The same story played out in Kursk in the spring.”

Successful attacks over the course of a month can disable command and control of an entire assault grouping, he said. But this requires a sufficient number of missiles.

The limits and opportunity costs of expensive missiles

With a few dozen good missiles, Ukrainians can force Russians to divert their air defense assets to protect more strategic sites, possibly weakening air coverage along the front. Or the Russians can be forced to spend resources to disperse production and harden facilities, especially if they don’t know how many missiles Ukraine has. 

However, “if your goal is inflicting decisive damage on the Russian economy, yes, you would need hundreds,” DeVore said. 

Hoffmann would agree, writing that destroying production plants with conventional missiles requires large salvos. Each Tomahawk can obliterate everything within a radius of 13 meters, but the Alabuga plant that makes Russia’s weapons stretches across 160,000 square meters. 

It’d take at least 150 Tomahawks to destroy 50% of the facility, assuming all of them reach their targets. This is a lot more than the amount Washington had reportedly considered.

“This is not to suggest that this type of counter-industry targeting is inherently unfeasible. It is not,” Hoffmann wrote. “Still, such operations are more demanding than commentators generally suggest, and arguably require more heavy missiles than Ukraine has access to in the short-term.”

With fewer missiles, Ukraine can focus on disrupting supply chains like electronics, explosives, propellants, and so on, which it has been doing with some success, using drones and Storm Shadows. 

“The other problem… is that for the Tomahawk to be used, it requires an entire targeting infrastructure that's dependent on the Americans,” DeVore said.

“Even if the Americans were willing to provide this system, they would have a de facto veto on every use case which I'm not sure is the situation you want to be in when the occupant of the White House seems to change his mind a lot.” 

The more expedient alternative: help Ukraine develop missiles and drones

With that in mind, if Washington is unwilling to supply Ukraine with its most advanced, exquisite missiles, the US and other NATO allies can still improve Kyiv’s ability to degrade Russia’s oil industry and military production capabilities. 

“Whether or not Tomahawks arrive in Ukraine, this will not decide the war. What matters far more is that European governments continue to invest substantial funds directly into Ukraine’s missile sector,” Hoffmann wrote. 

Zelenskyy said that while Ukraine uses foreign missiles like Storm Shadows, 95% of deep strikes are conducted using Ukrainian weapons. 

For example, some Ukrainian attack drones are more powerful than people give them credit for, despite having a limited payload size on paper, said Viktor, a Ukrainian technician who works in a lab developing Shahed-like delta-wing UAVs to attack Russia. His full name was omitted from the article for security purposes. 

He claimed the cost of the basic hardware is just $5,000, although incorporating jamming-resistant antennas raises the price several times. According to Viktor, some Ukrainian companies have learned to squeeze a lot more damage out of a relatively small payload, just tens of kilograms in mass.

"Some ammo is made by ordinary guys... they don't know the chemistry or physics that they should know," he said.

"But I know a few companies that paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for special simulation programs for how they need to make the ammo to penetrate a meter of concrete, with a small amount [of explosive charge] and cause huge damage inside."

He added that Ukrainians already have the ability to use digital image matching to hit stationary targets on the ground. This is similar to what the Tomahawk uses for its terminal guidance. 

In fact, there is a “whole list” of much simpler weapons that allies can deliver to Ukraine by the thousands, relatively inexpensively, Kuzan said. For example, air-launched munitions with cheap guidance, like turbo-powered versions of the glide bombs Russia keeps dropping — these “ersatz-missiles,” as he called them, can strike from 300 to 450 kilometers away. 

While Russian air defenses are able to shoot cheaper weapons down with relative ease, Ukrainians have proven adept at punching corridors through these defenses with decoys, anti-radiation weapons, and other tech, enabling them to deliver sufficient firepower against stationary targets. 

"You can carry out strikes against sites where weapons, equipment, fuel, and everything else the army consumes, are being stockpiled. That's the mission," Kuzan said. "The more such sites are hit, the slower the advance. So, in fact, it's precisely these strikes that can halt the invasion."

In the skilled hands of Ukrainian soldiers, an old body armor becomes a combat marvel. The Pansarbandvagn 301 is a Swedish armored personnel carrier developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite its venerable age, this vehicle continues to perform combat missions. Now, as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, specifically within the 39th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade.

The Swedish PBV-301 in the 39th brigade turns logistics into survival on the front

The brigade reports that the PBV is used for logistical support in the unit’s area of responsibility.

“This armored vehicle supplies ammunition and food, transports and retrieves fighters from positions, and evacuates the wounded,” the soldiers say.

The brigade notes that the vehicle is “not bad, and in skilled hands it is even capable of small miracles.”

From ammunition runs to casualty evacuation

According to the troops, the main effectiveness of the PBV-301 depends on the training of the mechanic-driver. For this reason, practical training sessions are regularly held under the guidance of experienced instructors.

“Such exercises allow drivers to practice driving on difficult sections of terrain and to become accustomed to the physical and psychological stresses,” the instructor says.

Training under fire: how instructors temper PBV mechanic-drivers so they can run routes that don’t work the first time

He emphasized that completing combat missions requires considerable endurance and strength of spirit from the driver.

“There are routes you can do on the first try, and there are ones you have to ‘run’ several times. We train, provide guidance, and offer assistance. Because there is no better motivation than a well-prepared crew,” he explains.

A legislative proposal that would allow Ukraine to join the European Defence Fund will be put to a vote in the European Parliament before the end of 2025, according to the head of the Parliament's Security and Defence Committee.

"Our committee is working expeditiously, and I am pleased that we plan to vote on the EU Defence Omnibus Package before the end of this year, to be ready for the next stage of the EU's defence agenda," said Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann of Germany during a committee session in Brussels on 6 November, according to European Pravda.

EU Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, who attended the committee meeting, noted that on the evening of 5 October, a defence mini-Omnibus was preliminarily agreed upon, which "will enable Ukraine to become an associate member of the European Defence Fund."

The draft EU legislation, proposed by the European Commission in April 2025, was informally agreed upon on Wednesday evening by European Parliament members and Denmark's EU Council presidency. The proposal increases funding for defence-related investments by amending existing EU programs: the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), Horizon Europe, the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Digital Europe Programme (DEP), and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — with the aim of directing EU funds toward defence needs under the ReArm Europe plan.

"MEPs insisted that the legislation should allow for broader support to Ukraine's defence industry and guarantee its participation in the European Defence Fund," the European Parliament press service told Europeiska Pravda.

Denmark's EU presidency confirmed that Ukraine's inclusion in the European Defence Fund will create "new opportunities for Ukrainian entities to join collaborative research and development projects in defence within the EU in the future."

The EDF budget for 2021-2027 is approximately €7.3 billion ($ 8.4 bn), of which €2.7 bn ($3.1 bn) is allocated to joint defence research and €5.3 bn ($6.1 bn) to joint defence capability development projects, complementing national contributions.

The legislative act incorporating Ukraine's accession to the EDF will be coordinated at the European Parliament committee level in the coming weeks and will be brought to a plenary vote by the end of the year. Following this, it must be approved by the EU Council.

On 16 October , the European Commission presented a defence roadmap — a comprehensive plan to strengthen European defence capabilities, which includes countering drones and other threats from air, sea, and space. Ukraine was identified as a key component of the EU's defence readiness.

Every time North Korea deepens its support for Russia's war in Ukraine, South Korea promises to "reconsider" arming Kyiv directly. The announcements come with stern language about crossing red lines. Then nothing happens.

But focusing on what Seoul isn't doing misses what it has accomplished: pioneering an indirect support model that's proven both scalable and sustainable.

Through systematic defense exports to Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states, South Korea has enabled equipment transfers to Ukraine while navigating legal constraints and diplomatic sensitivities. This approach offers a blueprint other nations facing similar restrictions could replicate.

South Korea’s defense industry

South Korea has rapidly become one of the world’s major arms exporters. Military hardware like K2 Black Panther main battle tanks, K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, and the Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) have become bestsellers.

The $13.7 billion deal that Poland signed with South Korea in 2022 marked the country’s arrival as a global defense supplier, not just a regional one. For Kyiv, such a trajectory carries important implications.

While many Western defense industries struggle with slow production cycles and byzantine bureaucratic processes, South Korea’s defense industries are government-funded, export-oriented, and vertically integrated. South Korean factories can deliver major weapons items within months, not years. In the war of attrition that Ukraine faces, this production speed matters as much as technical specifications.

This production efficiency forms the foundation of the indirect support model, enabling South Korea to reinforce Ukraine’s warfighting capability without violating its own policy.

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Why indirect support, not direct transfers

South Korean law limits direct lethal weapons exports to countries involved in active conflicts. . This restriction reflects both constitutional principles and South Korea's complex security environment—particularly concerns about antagonizing China and Russia while managing the North Korean threat.

But legal constraints didn’t mean inaction. Instead of opting for a direct arms transfer, South Korea has found indirect ways to reinforce Ukraine’s defense through its neighbors — an approach that maintains diplomatic equilibrium while sustaining the flow of weapons supply.

How the mechanism works

Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries serve dual roles: frontline NATO member states and crucial logistics hubs for Ukraine’s war effort. By expanding arms deliveries to these countries, South Korea has reinforced the strategic depth of Ukraine’s neighbors.

Poland began transferring Soviet-era T-72 tanks to Ukraine in 2022, with over 200 donated by some accounts in the early phase of the war. In August 2022, Warsaw signed an executive contract to acquire 180 South Korean K2 Black Panther tanks, with the first deliveries arriving in December 2022.

This rapid procurement of modern replacements appears to have enabled Poland to donate large portions of its older T-72 inventory during 2022-2023. The same pattern applied to artillery: South Korean K9 howitzer deliveries freed Warsaw to transfer Krab self-propelled howitzers—platforms based on the K9 design—to Kyiv.

Polish officials could justify depleting their Soviet-era tank inventory because South Korean replacements were guaranteed and arriving quickly. Without the K2 contract, Poland's transfers would have stopped after initial batches to preserve domestic defensive capacity.

Meanwhile, Romania has signed contracts for K9 howitzers, and the Baltic countries are pursuing similar acquisitions. If South Korea accelerates such defense exports, it could bolster NATO’s eastern flank and indirectly reduce Ukraine’s security burden. Furthermore, such procurement would contribute to interoperability enhancement within NATO since most of South Korea’s weapons systems have been designed in accordance with Western communications and logistics standards.

Eventually, South Korea has risen as a silent guarantor of the resilience of Ukraine’s neighboring countries and is helping to ensure that the pipeline of equipment and deterrence remains continuously open.

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Filling up the security vacuum, faster than the West

Ukraine’s allies often face delays in heavy equipment manufacturing and procurement—tanks, artillery, and air defense systems frequently require multi-year timelines. South Korea operates on a different schedule.

Once Poland signed the contract, South Korean factories immediately adjusted their production, and the first installment of K2s and K9s was delivered within a year. This speed helps fill credibility gaps when Western industries face production bottlenecks or political gridlocks. While Washington and Brussels debate supplemental packages, South Korean factories build and ship.

Limitations and trade-offs

The indirect model has constraints. It takes longer than direct transfers—equipment flows through an additional link in the supply chain. It doesn't address Ukraine's most urgent needs like air defense systems, which require direct channels. And there's a legitimate question about scale: how much equipment can actually flow through backfilling versus new production?

Yet these limitations may be preferable to the alternative. South Korean public opinion polls show 82% opposition to direct weapons transfers to Ukraine. Attempts at direct support would likely face legal challenges, strain relations with China and Russia, and potentially deliver only token amounts. The indirect mechanism, while slower, enables larger-scale transfers that can be sustained over years rather than months.

In wars of attrition, sustainability often matters more than speed. Poland's $13.7 billion commitment suggests the ceiling for indirect support exceeds what direct transfers would likely achieve given domestic and diplomatic constraints.

Policy recommendations

For Seoul: Formalize what's now ad hoc. Establish a trilateral cooperation office staffed by Defence Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) officials, NATO’s procurement specialists, and representatives from Poland and Romania. This office would track equipment flows in real time—when Poland transfers tanks to Ukraine, Seoul would receive immediate notification to accelerate replacement deliveries. Additionally, establisha dedicated logistics and maintenance hub in Central Europe to sustain long-term operational readiness for South Korean weapons systems operating in NATO countries.

For Washington: Integrate South Korea’s production cycle into NATO supply-chain. Include South Korean defense firms in NATO’s industrial expansion initiatives or joint production projects. This diversifies suppliers and strengthens transatlantic defense capacity.

For Kyiv: Establish industrial cooperation offices both in Kyiv and Seoul to track backfill mechanisms. Pursue co-production projects in areas like drones and armored vehicles to deepen bilateral defense cooperation and reinforce Ukraine’s industrial capability in the long run.

For other constrained allies: Study the South Korean model to design politically feasible support strategies that sustain global deterrence without violating domestic political red lines.

Conclusion

Seoul's indirect support model represents more than a workaround for legal constraints. It demonstrates that constrained allies can provide meaningful, sustained support through systematic backfilling arrangements. If Japan, the OAE, and other capable nations replicate this approach, Ukraine's support network could expand significantly without requiring direct transfers that many countries cannot politically or legally provide.

The debate shouldn't be whether South Korea should abandon indirect support for direct transfers. It should be which other countries will adopt Seoul's blueprint.

Ju Hyung Kim

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim serves as President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, where he advises the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of National Defense, and other key defense organizations. He holds a doctorate in international relations from Japan's National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS).

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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Russia’s next-gen strategic bomber program may struggle to get off the ground if the West can prevent Moscow from evading sanctions, according to an investigation by InformNapalm, a Ukrainian intelligence community.

InformNapalm on 4 November reported that it acquired a trove of internal documents from Russia's aerospace component manufacturer OKBM, which the EU sanctioned in October. Purported copies of some documents were published with the investigation. 

The papers show that development of the Poslannik strategic bomber and parts for the Sukhoi-57 fighter are running into delays. This is partly due to Moscow’s shortage of precise machining tools made by foreign companies that have left the Russian market. The documents linked by InformNapalm directly name this as a reason. 

“At this stage, the Russian Federation is not able to produce parts for its promising aviation complexes on its own… they need to purchase foreign automated production equipment, high-precision CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machines,” InformNapalm wrote.  

“This is why sanctions work and they are important, because they significantly hamper Russian military capabilities. But it is no less important to track schemes and ways to circumvent sanctions through third countries and impose secondary sanctions.”

According to the investigation, OKBM used Taiwan-made Hartford HCMC-1100AG and Johnford SL-50 machines, as well as a Serbian Grindex BSD-700U CNC grinder, bought through subsidies from Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade.

InformNapalm pointed to these acquisitions as examples of the Russian state’s attempts to evade sanctions. 

The founder of InformNapalm, who goes by Roman Burko, told Euromaidan Press that the intelligence gathering operation directly contributed to OKBM being included in the latest sanctions package. The organization went public with the data to cause additional damage to the Russian manufacturers.

"Russian contracts explicitly state that information leaks lead to investigations, bureaucracy, and contract terminations," Burko said.

Russia’s aircraft modernization program

The Tupolev PAK DA, also known as the Poslannik (Russian for "Envoy"), is a subsonic stealth bomber meant to replace the venerable Tu-95, which dates back to the 1950s.

Russian media and other online sources report that the PAK DA is meant to have a range of 12,000 kilometers, an operational ceiling of 20 kilometers, and carry a conventional or nuclear payload of up to 30 tons. Moscow reportedly began financing development in the late 2000s and since then, the program has run into multiple delays. 

Russian media previously reported that the bomber was supposed to be ready for serial production in 2027. According to InformNapalm’s investigation, OKBM is supposed to deliver components for actuating the Poslannik's weapon bays by August 31, 2027. 

The documents released by InformNapalm state that the program is marked secret and OKBM may lose its contract if it fails to maintain that secrecy. 

The investigation also found that OKBM is involved in making gearboxes for the weapon bays of the Sukhoi-57, a Russian multi-role stealth fighter with the NATO reporting name Felon. 

The Su-57 has fought in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As of 2023, Russia had only 22 Su-57s in service, although it intends to increase production. Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation plans to deliver 76 fighters by 2027. 

On top of modernizing its air force, Russia has entertained plans to export the Su-57 as a competitor to the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

India initially participated in the development of the Su-57 but pulled out of the program in 2018, citing lack of satisfaction with performance and other concerns. In October, Russian Ambassador Denis Alipov made an offer to India to launch “local production” of Su-57s. 

Russia evades sanctions to keep up manufacturing

At least 70% of all Russian CNC machine tools are imported, largely from the US, EU, and Japan. Over 80% of all CNCs end up in Russia's military production facilities. 

While Russian military manufacturing has suffered as access to this equipment dried up following the full-scale invasion, Moscow has been able to get its hands on foreign equipment either through intermediaries or foreign companies violating sanctions. 

Ukraine's Economic Security Council reported that Russia has procured $18 billion worth of machine tools from both Europe and China. This includes 57 CNC machines worth over $26.5 million from European subsidiaries, along with components and consumables valued at more than $9.5 million.

In October, Germany raided Spinner, a high-precision machine tool manufacturer suspected of knowingly supplying equipment to Russia's military industry. Three individuals have already been charged with violating sanctions.

More leaks on the way

According to InformNapalm, the documents it released on 4 November are only a fraction of the total it has managed to acquire and go over, in partnership with the cyber analytics center Fenix. Ukrainian intelligence was also reportedly involved in the operation.

InformNapalm wrote that it plans to continue publishing leaks about OKBM into the future, with the hopes that publicity will help strengthen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia's military industry.

Russian drones now build a web of relays and defy electronic warfare. Russia is rapidly deploying and refining remote control of long-range drones over mesh networks. In October 2025, the occupiers already used this approach to hunt Ukrainian trains, says Serhii Beskrestnov, also known as Flash, as per Defense Express.

From Chinese mesh modems to relay drones that keep functioning under fire

Flash explains that Russia turned to Chinese manufacturers to turn the idea into reality. It specially ordered mesh modems, nominally labelled as Wi-Fi gear, operating in the 1300–1500 MHz band, and uses technology that differs from conventional Wi-Fi.

Each unit costs approximately $7,000 and can deliver an output of 10–20 W per channel, allowing for links of 100 km or more.

These modems provide a digital, encrypted connection that is relatively resistant to electronic interference by using cross-frequency distribution techniques. Each modem also acts as a relay: airborne modems on drones form a chain network in which data packets automatically reroute if a node disappears.

As a result, even if many platforms are shut down, the network remains operational. The drones that survive keep the links and forward data. 

“Each modem is not just a transmission point but also a relay for others. In the air, modems on drones create communications channels between themselves. Each of them tries to link to the next, and if one drops out, the information is routed around through another channel,” Beskrestnov explains.

From Gerbera to Shahed: scaling the tech for attacks on moving targets

Russia has been refining this technology for about a year. Flash noted that even if 80% of the drones are destroyed, the remainder can still relay information. Initially, Moscow tested the system on small foam drones, such as the “Gerbera", used for rear-area reconnaissance and relaying signals back toward Russian territory.

Seeing the concept’s effectiveness, the Russians began installing mesh modems on Shahed drones, enabling online control from Russian soil.

Technically, the network can provide throughput up to ~50 MB/s, and in degraded conditions, around 2 MB/s, which is enough to stream optimized high-definition video and allow FPV control with acceptable latency.

Although Shaheds are not highly maneuverable, their capabilities are sufficient to attack predictable moving targets, such as trains whose speed and route are known. An operator controlling a drone online can approach from the rear and strike a locomotive or tanker.

“These Shaheds can not only hit GPS coordinates like a substation but can also strike its most vulnerable point... We prioritize detecting these modems by their signal and jamming them with electronic warfare,” Flash says.

Modems that only switch on near the target, and ground relays on balconies

A Shahed with a mesh modem may only power the modem at a specific coordinate near the target — i.e., these modems don’t need to broadcast continuously and may activate just before strike.

Beyond airborne nodes, the Russians can set up ground relays: the modems are compact and can be installed on balconies or rooftops with internet access. Such ground nodes don’t need high antennas to communicate with nearby UAVs.

Can the system be countered?

Flash stresses that, despite the system’s complexity, it can be defeated by electronic warfare. However, the effectiveness of countermeasures depends on how widely and well Russia implements mesh technology: if Moscow deploys it not just on Shaheds but on other long-range platforms, it will gain a robust, fast, and wide two-way data channel.

Any mitigation depends on the volume, quality, and scale of Russia's deployment.

"It’s crucial not to miss the moment when Russia multiplies use of this tech across many platforms, not only Shaheds. Because that would create a resilient, fast, broad two-way data channel,” the Defense Express experts say.

The ratio of Russia’s use of ballistic missiles with 480 kg warheads to cruise missiles has increased in 2025 compared to previous years. Additionally, the Russians are refining their deployment methods for Iskander-M systems, which are capable of destroying residential buildings, making it more difficult for Patriot systems to intercept them, according to RBC-Ukraine.

The missile subtly changes course while the battery tries to keep up automatically

This challenge is compounded by the fact that the Iskander-M missile can make minor course adjustments as it approaches its target.

As Yurii Ihnat, Head of Communications for the Air Force Command, has noted that the Patriot system intercepts ballistic missiles automatically, which makes it harder to determine the precise moment to engage a maneuvering missile.

Ballistic missiles make sharp trajectory changes

Russian occupiers have also begun using Iskander-M more frequently and from multiple directions, often combining them with other tools, such as drones and cruise missiles.

“This, in turn, makes them even harder to intercept. A Patriot battery during an attack can only 'look' in one direction. It cannot engage targets 360 degrees around it,” the military official added.

Despite these challenges, Patriot systems continue to operate effectively, achieving confirmed interceptions of both Iskanders and Kinzhal missiles.

They failed to steal history. Ukrainian air defenders shot down the Russian army’s newest reconnaissance drone, "Kniaz Veshchiy Oleg", named after the ruler of Kyivan Rus, who, as legends said, could foresee the future, according to the 63rd Separate Mechanized Brigade. 

“At the same time, in the swamps where Moscow would later rise, frogs croaked. Naming your drone after a proto-Ukrainian warrior and politician is just another attempt to steal our history,” the 63rd Brigade added.

Despite its grandiose name, the Russian drone failed to predict its own destruction.

“For the first time in the history of this war, Ukraine has recorded the downing of Russia’s newest reconnaissance drone with the peculiar name "Kniaz Veshchiy Oleg", the statement concluded.

Earlier, the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, also known as HUR, destroyed the base of Russian invaders belonging to the most elite and secretive drone Rubikon center in Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast. 

The Rubikon unit specializes in the use of unmanned systems, including combat drones, during Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine. It is considered one of the most effective and combat-ready structures of the Russian army.

A Ukrainian soldier severely wounded in a Russian-occupied town spent more than a month waiting for rescue, according to Ukraine's First Separate Medical Battalion. After six failed attempts and the loss of six ground drones, the seventh mission — carried out using a damaged land-based robotic system — finally brought him home alive. The battalion shared footage showing highlights of the operation, but did not specify the front sector or even the oblast where the mission took place.

33 days behind enemy lines: Seventh rescue attempt ends in success

According to the battalion, the soldier sustained a serious injury 33 days before the operation, with only a tourniquet keeping him alive. During that time, six rescue attempts failed. All used NRK—"ground robotic systems"—and all were either destroyed or rendered inoperable. Four of the six destroyed machines belonged to adjacent units.

Despite the repeated setbacks, the seventh attempt succeeded. The evacuation covered a total of 64 km, including 37 km driven with a damaged wheel. The NRK reportedly sustained a hit from an anti-personnel mine on the way to the wounded soldier but kept moving.

On the return route, a Russian drone dropped explosives on the machine. Thanks to the armored capsule it was carrying, the soldier inside was unharmed.

The entire operation lasted 5 hours and 58 minutes, with the ground drone averaging a speed of 13 km/h and reaching a top speed of 29 km/h.

The battalion confirmed the soldier was successfully evacuated and received necessary medical care. He is currently undergoing further treatment and is not in danger.

"If he didn’t surrender — we had no right to"

In a closing message, First Separate Medical Battalion noted,

“If the soldier didn’t surrender — we had no right to.”

The situation in Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, is absolutely critical. Russian occupiers continue to amass forces. The DeepState monitoring project reports that the invaders have already established control over parts of the city, setting up positions and logistics hubs to support further infiltration. 

A logistical trap for Ukrainian forces and lost possibilies

At the same time, Ukrainian soldiers continue to carry out clearing operations and neutralize Russian troops using all available capabilities, with drone pilots playing a key role in securing Pokrovsk. 

The occupiers are attempting to secure the area between Pokrovsk and Hryshyne, while Ukrainian special units continue clearing operations to maintain control of this critical logistical corridor. 

“However, this does not solve the main problem — blocking the Russians on the southern outskirts to prevent further infiltration into the city. Given that they are already establishing positions and taking control of the area, this possibility is effectively lost," the experts say. 

An occupation, even without strong fortifications

The situation also threatens Myrnohrad, Pokrovsk's twin city, with being cut off entirely from the outside world. 

"Its capture would be especially damaging because the occupiers could take it without even properly fortifying their positions," the DeepState experts add.

Russians are leveling Pokrovsk within the city and along the flanks of the defensive line

Meanwhile, Spokesperson for the 7th Rapid Response Corps of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Serhii Okishev says that active operations are ongoing in the northeastern part of Pokrovsk to clear Russian occupation forces, according to Ukrinform.

Okishev notes that Russian forces are using artillery, drones, and guided aerial bombs. The fighting is concentrated both within the city and along the flanks of the defensive line.

Putin sets deadline for Pokrovsk conquest, throws 17,000 more soldiers thrown into burning city

Russian troops are attempting to advance through the urban areas and establish positions on the outskirts. 

Fighting continues in the Pokrovsk area between Ukrainian special forces and Russian occupation troops. The operation aims to protect a strategically important logistical area and neutralize Russian attempts to expand their fire control over critical supply routes.

A new study of demining efforts in Ukraine has revealed a significant breakthrough: AI boosts Ukraine demining surveys, with artificial intelligence-analyzed drone imagery increasing productivity by over 800%, according to findings announced today, 4 November 2025.

The 18-month field study in Ukraine was conducted by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) using technology from AI security company Safe Pro Group. The results were presented at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 2025 GICHD Innovation Conference.

This technological leap is significant because it could drastically shorten the timeline and lower the cost of clearing Ukraine's vast contaminated lands, which are estimated to be the size of half of Germany and could take a century to make safe by traditional methods.

A dramatic increase in efficiency

The research findings, detailed in a report by Business Wire, focused on improving "non-technical surveys" (NTS). This is the crucial first step where teams identify suspected hazardous areas, allowing specialized and slower clearance teams to be deployed more effectively.

Compared to traditional survey methods, the study found teams using the AI technology achieved:

• An 800+% increase in productivity.
• 550% more potentially hazardous items, such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), identified per hectare.
• A 300% faster survey speed per hour per team.
• A labor cost reduction of approximately 50% per hectare.

How the AI technology works

The system, called SpotlightAI by Safe Pro, uses artificial intelligence and computer vision to analyze aerial imagery captured by commercially available drones. The AI is trained to detect small, hard-to-find explosive threats that may be missed by the human eye. This data is then converted into detailed 2D and 3D maps that guide humanitarian demining teams on the ground.

Dan Erdberg, Chairman and CEO of Safe Pro Group, stated that the data confirms the "dramatic impact SpotlightAI can have helping the nearly 60 countries contaminated with UXO return their land to productivity."

Kyaw Lin Htut, a Senior Advisor for Innovation at NPA, which co-authored and presented the study, added that the "preliminary findings of our study suggest an outsized impact in increased person-hour efficiency" for survey teams operating in Ukraine.

The scale of Ukraine's challenge

This new technology addresses one of the most severe contamination crises in modern history. Russian forces have contaminated an estimated 174.000 square kilometers, roughly 30% of Ukraine's territory, with mines and unexploded ordnance, as Euromaidan Press has reported.

Experts cited by the publication have warned that clearance efforts are severely hindered by the chaotic and undocumented mining practices of Russian forces. In some heavily affected regions, complete demining could take up to 100 years. The World Bank has previously estimated the total cost to fully demine Ukraine at $34.6 billion.

While the physical task of clearing mines remains a slow and dangerous process, this breakthrough in AI-driven survey technology offers a significant strategic advantage. By rapidly and cost-effectively identifying hazardous areas, it allows Ukraine's clearance teams to focus their efforts where they are needed most, dramatically accelerating the first critical step in returning contaminated land to safe use.

The threat Ukraine feared is becoming real. Russia is developing bombs that could strike far beyond the front lines. According to the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, Russian forces have increased the range of their aerial bombs from 140 km to 200 km by using guided modular planning bombs (KMPB) equipped with turbojet engines, Telegraf has reported. 

Russian bombs reach beyond air-defense envelopes and threaten rear areas

The Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, also known as HUR, noted earlier munitions with shorter reach were used by the enemy primarily to strike targets in the frontline and border regions of Ukraine.

"The new bomb will be no exception, and its up to 200 km range will allow Russian aircraft to remain outside the engagement envelopes of Ukraine’s air-defense systems," said HUR.

In practical terms, today’s threats can now affect infrastructure and facilities that were previously considered relatively protected.

Chinese, American, and Swiss components helped to build deadly weapon

HUR also pointed to the origins of components for these munitions. According to the intelligence service, they are largely built using Chinese parts, while the high-explosive aviation bombs of the Kometa type are fitted with universal modules.

They also employ electronic components of Western manufacture, including products from companies in Switzerland and the US. 

The combination of accessible imported parts and adapted technologies provides the adversary with new capabilities for large-scale strikes.

Ukraine must adapt to changes in Russia's range and tactics

The emergence of bombs with a range of up to 200 km requires defense systems to revise their tactics and coverage zones, and to strengthen reconnaissance for early detection of launchers and attacking aircraft.

The battlefield conditions are changing, increasing the need for integrated air defense measures and the adaptation of air defense strategy. 

The United Kingdom is significantly expanding its air defence support for Ukraine, providing thousands of new interceptor drones and hundreds of missiles to help Kyiv defend its cities and energy infrastructure. UK Defence Secretary John Healey highlighted new support, including a joint program for a new "Octopus" interceptor drone, during Defence Questions in Parliament. This assistance comes as Ukraine braces for intensified Russian aerial attacks during the winter.

This new package is strategically significant as it provides Ukraine with a high-volume, cost-effective counter to Russian drone swarms, aiming to protect critical infrastructure and preserve more advanced missile interceptors for complex threats.

A new generation of interceptor drones

The centerpiece of the new support is a "first-of-its-kind joint program" for the "Octopus" interceptor drone, as reported by the UK Defence Journal. Thousands of these drones, which will be produced in the UK, are scheduled to be supplied to Ukraine on a monthly basis.

During his announcement, Defence Secretary John Healey said the support is a direct response to Russia’s intensified strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure, stating, “Putin's aerial bombardment of Ukraine is cynical, illegal and targeted at civilians.”

Expanding the missile shield

Beyond the new drone program, the UK has accelerated the delivery of other critical air defence hardware. Healey confirmed that more than 200,000 rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition and "hundreds of air-to-air missiles" have been delivered to Kyiv this autumn.

This builds on a steady flow of support throughout the year. A UK government factsheet published in September detailed provisions of additional counter-drone and air defence equipment. This includes a new system named "Gravehawk," jointly funded by the UK and Denmark, which has already been tested in Ukraine with more units to follow.

Earlier, in June, the UK committed 350 ASRAAM missiles, as reported by Euromaidan Press. Originally designed for air-to-air use, British engineers rapidly adapted the missiles to be ground-launched from the UK-developed RAVEN mobile air defence system. By June 2025, Ukraine had already operationally deployed eight Raven systems, with five more confirmed for future delivery. This £70 million package was notably financed using interest generated from frozen Russian financial assets.

A long-term strategic commitment

This latest aid is part of a sustained British commitment to Ukraine's defense. Total military financing from the UK now stands at £13.06 billion since February 2022, according to a House of Commons Library research briefing. The briefing notes that military financing for 2025 alone will be £4.5 billion.

This financial support is built upon a broader, long-term security framework. The UK was the first nation to finalize a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine on 12 January 2024, which was followed by an agreement for a 100-year partnership in January 2025, as noted in the parliamentary briefing.

Strategic implications for winter

The combination of new systems provides Ukraine with a layered air defence network. The high-volume, lower-cost "Octopus" drones, along with systems like "Gravehawk" and "Raven," are designed to intercept mass attacks by Russian Shahed-type drones.

This strategy is crucial for protecting the national energy grid ahead of winter. By using these systems to counter drones, Ukraine can preserve its more advanced and expensive missile systems, such as the US-provided Patriots, to defend against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.

Related:

UK delivers hundreds of air defense missiles to Ukraine months ahead of schedule

UK to build pilot batch of Octopus interceptor drones under joint project with Ukraine

Ukraine plans to begin mass production of its new Flamingo and Ruta missiles by the end of this year, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on 3 November, as reported by Ukrainian media, saying the country is making “very good” progress in developing its own long-range strike capabilities.

In recent months, Kyiv has accelerated domestic weapons production to strengthen its defenses and reduce dependence on foreign supplies amid ongoing Russian attacks. Ukraine’s push to build homegrown missiles marks a major step toward achieving self-sufficiency in long-range precision warfare, a domain once dominated by imported systems.

Speaking at a press briefing, Zelenskyy said the new weapons are already being used by Ukraine’s Defense Forces, but declined to specify numbers. “We expect mass production by the end of this year,” he said

He added that Ukraine’s Neptune anti-ship missile is already in serial production, with an extended-range cruise missile version - the “long Neptune” - also in service.

The Flamingo is a long-range Ukrainian cruise missile designed for deep-strike missions. Ukrainian officials say it delivers heavy strike power and long reach, giving Kyiv a strategic-capability previously dependent on foreign supplies.

The Ruta is a shorter-range jet-powered cruise missile or high-end loitering drone developed with technology from the Netherlands-based start-up Destinus. It is intended for tactical precision strikes and greater operational flexibility.

Zelenskyy said the deployment of these systems shows that Ukraine is “doing very well” in domestic missile production despite wartime constraints. “Every new missile we build strengthens our independence,” he noted.

The move underscores Ukraine’s determination to expand its domestic defense industry while maintaining pressure on Russian military targets far behind the front lines.

On 3 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed that missile production is progressing well, with mass production of several systems expected to be completed by the end of the year. He also mentioned the deployment of new missile models and the expansion of production capacities, particularly for interceptor drones and maritime unmanned vehicles, UNIAN reports. 

Tools of response and strategic pressure

“We are deploying new missiles, including the ‘Flamingo,’” Zelenskyy said.

He did not specify quantities but has noted that the country expects mass production by year-end. He also emphasized the “Neptune” series, already in production and delivering strong results.

“We have standard and extended versions, both performing very well," he explained. 

According to Zelenskyy, these systems are effective against energy infrastructure strikes, targeting resources that fund the aggressor.

Scaling production: 600–800 interceptor drones Per Day

Ukraine is also accelerating production of interceptor UAVs, aiming to reach 600–800 units per day by the end of November, “if all goes according to plan.”

Zelenskyy acknowledged potential setbacks, such as attacks on factories or damage to workshops, but stressed that “so far we have not lost any type of long-range weapon.”

The industry is working alongside the military, with repair teams and logistics restoring production capacity even after strikes.

Berlin and Copenhagen as first hubs of weapon exports

Zelenskyy announced the creation of two European export hubs: “These are for weapons we can afford to sell. The first two will be Berlin and Copenhagen, decided at the company level, and operational this year.”

Revenue from exports will support domestic production of scarce systems. Ukraine also has a surplus of maritime drones and certain artillery systems available for export, provided that proper safety and regulatory oversight are in place.

The Ukrainian president proposed a fair financial mechanism: partners could fully fund the production of scarce weapons in Ukraine, with the resulting systems to be split equally, a method to rapidly mobilize both partner and Ukrainian industrial capacity.

Ukraine has showcased a new concept for a jet-powered unmanned fighter aircraft at the first-ever Drone Warfare Summit in the Philippines, Defence Blog reports.

The presentation highlights Ukraine’s growing efforts to promote its defense technologies internationally, as Kyiv increasingly positions itself as a key innovator in drone warfare amid its ongoing war with Russia.

During its presentation, the Ukrainian delegation revealed the Fighter Aircraft FA v1, a concept for a compact jet-powered drone designed for high-speed reconnaissance and strike missions. 

According to technical data shown at the event, the FA v1 can reach speeds of over 250 km/h, with an operational range of 30 kilometers and a flight ceiling of 5,000 meters. It also features a detection range of up to 15 kilometers for aerial targets.

Images from the presentation indicate a twin-tail design, similar to small-scale experimental unmanned jets under development in other countries. While Kyiv did not disclose the manufacturer or production plans, officials said the project reflects Ukraine’s wartime experience in deploying and countering drones on the battlefield.

The Ukrainian delegation also shared insights into how unmanned and autonomous systems have reshaped its defense strategy, particularly in electronic warfare and multi-domain operations.

The three-day summit, held from 27 to 29 October at Subic Bay, brought together military officials, defense manufacturers, and experts from across the Indo-Pacific to discuss the rapidly evolving role of unmanned systems in modern warfare.

Russia has the capacity to launch as many as 500 Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones at Ukraine in a single attack, but doing so on a daily basis is not possible, Ukraine's military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said on July 2, according to Suspilne.

In recent weeks, Russia has intensified its drone assaults on Ukrainian cities, often launching hundreds in a single day. The largest aerial attack since the start of the full-scale invasion occurred overnight on June 29, when Moscow launched 477 drones and 60 missiles across Ukraine.

"Launching 450–500 Shaheds every day — it's just not realistic," said Budanov during a ceremony recognizing five Ukrainian intelligence achievements in the national record book, according to public broadcaster Suspilne.

"But unfortunately, they do have the ability to do it periodically. They can realistically launch up to 500 in one strike," Budanov added.

Budanov also said Russia is upgrading the capabilities of the Shahed-type drones by improving their CRPA (Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna) systems, which protect the drones from GPS jamming. He noted that Russian engineers are now producing 16-channel CRPA antennas, which are harder to counter electronically.

"These antennas are currently produced in Russia, but the engineer who developed this CRPA antenna was here in Ukraine," Budanov said.

"Back in the early 2000s, no one here needed it, so the engineer moved to Russia. One (of the two engineers involved in the development) has already died under unclear circumstances. The other is still alive, though probably not for long."

Russia has used thousands of Shahed-type drones throughout its full-scale invasion to strike Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, often in large overnight waves. Ukrainian air defenses have adapted over time but face growing challenges as Moscow improves drone resilience and electronic warfare capabilities.

President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Moscow has launched 28,743 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.

Budanov also said Russia has made unsuccessful attempts to develop its own naval drones. The last known effort came in early June, when experimental models detonated before reaching Ukrainian territorial waters, he said.

"They didn't achieve results. Based on our information, they were heading toward the city of Yuzhne, searching for targets," he said.

Ukraine has been using domestically developed Magura naval drones to target Russian military assets in the Black Sea, keeping much of Russia's fleet pinned in port.

Despite their small size, the unmanned surface vessels have proven effective, including in a May 2 operation when Ukraine's military intelligence used Magura-7 drones armed with air-to-air missiles to shoot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets near Novorossiysk. It was the first recorded instance of fighter jets being downed by naval drones.

Ukraine shows its latest ‘ship-killer’ Magura drone series to the public for the first time

The Magura drones, as well as the Sea Baby drones of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), were pivotal in turning the tide of the war in the Black Sea, destroying or damaging Russian ships and other assets.

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

The Defense Ministry has approved the Ukrainian-made ground-based robotics complex "Murakha" ("Ant") for combat operations, the ministry announced on June 28.

Since 2024, Ukraine has been scaling up robotics development in hopes that mass production of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) will "minimize human involvement on the battlefield."

The Murakha is a tracked robotic platform designed to support front-line units working under challenging conditions, such as under enemy artillery and in heavily mined terrain, the Defense Ministry said.

Its larger size makes it one of Ukraine's leading UGVs in terms of load capacity. The Murakha can reportedly carry over half a ton of weight across dozens of kilometers. It can also cross difficult terrain and shallow water.

According to the Defense Ministry, the Murakha's multiple control channels allow it to function successfully even in areas of the battlefield where Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are operating.

Mobile robots are capable of performing several tasks on the battlefield, including offensive and defensive activities, evacuation of the wounded, logistical support for units, and mining and demining.

In April, the Defense Ministry unveiled the D-21-12R UGV, a ground-based robot equipped with a machine gun.

Ukrainian drones strike missile, drone arsenal in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast

Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) struck on June 28 the 1060th Material-Technical Support Center in the city of Bryansk, Ukraine’s General Staff said. The facilities store a Russian missile and drone arsenal, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing a source in HUR.

The Kyiv IndependentDmytro Basmat