Ukraine’s prosecution service has dismissed eight people named in connection with an anti-corruption probe into the alleged protection of scam call centers, acting Prosecutor General Anton Kovalskyi reported. His office is also running internal checks on several officials linked to the case. A separate probe covers the trip abroad of his predecessor, who left Ukraine in September.

Ukraine’s main prosecution service is auditing itself while the country’s anti-corruption agencies investigate an alleged scheme run from inside it. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) allege that a PGO official set up a criminal organization in mid-2025. They say it drew in serving prosecution employees and unofficial associates, took bribes for leaving scam call centers alone, and laundered the proceeds. The investigation is called Operation Carthage.

A probe from the outside, an audit from the inside

Ukraine’s main prosecution service is auditing itself while the country’s anti-corruption agencies investigate an alleged scheme run from inside it. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) allege that an official of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) set up a criminal organization in mid-2025. They say it drew in serving prosecution employees and unofficial associates. The group allegedly took bribes for leaving scam call centers alone and then laundered the proceeds. The case is known as Operation Carthage, Espreso reported.

Dismissals and polygraph tests

Seven of the eight dismissed people worked at the PGO, Kovalskyi said. Separately, four people were removed from administrative posts, including the heads of the IT department and the cybercrime directorate. Kovalskyi said 24 prosecutors took polygraph tests. The results went to a commission running an internal investigation. He wrote that trust in the prosecution service would be restored not through announcements of change but through consistent, balanced decisions and concrete results.

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The internal probe concerning former Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko covers his trip abroad. Investigators are checking whether he followed established procedure and how the business trip was organized. Kravchenko left Ukraine in an official car on the night of 13–14 September, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing law enforcement sources. He explained his departure as an official trip to Lithuania.

On 14 September, Kravchenko announced he had signed a notice of suspicion against NABU director Semen Kryvonos. That evening, his own office said Kryvonos had never been properly served and that the register entries were cancelled.

On 15 September, lawmakers backed Kravchenko’s resignation 317–0. Two days later, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy assigned Kovalskyi the duties of prosecutor general by decree. Before that, Kovalskyi headed the Khmelnytskyi Oblast Prosecutor’s Office.

Two Carthage figures under internal review

The PGO completed an internal investigation into Aidyn Khudiiev, a former deputy department head, Kovalskyi said. Its findings will go to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, and the PGO abolished his post. SAPO prosecutor Mykola Karas told a court hearing that detectives seized $50,000 at Khudiiev’s workplace during the Carthage searches.

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The PGO is also investigating Serhii Kropyva, former deputy head of its international cooperation department. NABU detained him on 4 September, the first day of the operation. The internal probe looks at whether he used his powers for private interests and interfered in other prosecutors’ work. The PGO’s General Inspectorate has filed a disciplinary complaint against him with the same commission, and his post was also abolished.

Russian forces struck the eastern Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk on the morning of 8 October, hitting two route buses carrying residents and killing dozens of civilians. The Donetsk Oblast prosecutor's office opened a war-crimes investigation.

Russia has turned everyday movement in frontline Donetsk Oblast into a lethal risk, striking city buses, ambulances, and cars in places its army has not been able to capture.

A route bus run turned deadly

The attack came at around 10:00, catching two route buses in the impact zone. The prosecutor's office said the attackers likely used a UMPB D-30SN. HUR, Ukraine's military intelligence, describes it as a guided glide bomb that can fly up to 100 km when released from an altitude of 12–15 km and carries a warhead equal to a FAB-250 aerial bomb.

The toll rose through the day, from 12 dead in the first reports to 30 killed and 20 wounded by 14:55, Donetsk Oblast head Vadym Filashkin said. Across Donetsk Oblast, Russian attacks killed 33 people that day, including the 30 in Kramatorsk and three in nearby Bilenke, the State Emergency Service said. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the strike would not go unanswered.

Buses pulled off the roads

Filashkin ordered the Kramatorsk and Sloviansk city military administrations to suspend public transport, citing the sharp deterioration in security. Buses had become an attractive target for Russian forces, he said, and the authorities could not risk the lives of passengers and drivers. He also urged everyone still in Donetsk Oblast to leave for safer parts of Ukraine. Kramatorsk is a frequent target of Russian attacks. Russia had not commented on the strike as of publication.

The city has been under daily fire. On 5 October, Russian FPV drones hit ambulances and an apartment block in Kramatorsk, killing a woman and wounding four, the prosecutor's office reported. Over the previous day, Russian forces shelled Donetsk Oblast settlements 31 times and 256 people left the front line, Filashkin said.

A drone attack overnight on 8 October caused a fire that hit part of Yandex's data center in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast, about 580 km from Ukraine, and the site is fully stopped, the Russian tech company told Russian media. The data center sits on the grounds of Sasta, a sanctioned machine-tool plant, Russian outlet Astra said, citing Wikimapia data. Astra's OSINT analyst found from eyewitness footage that the fire hit the plant.

Since late September, Russia has been striking data centers in Kyiv that keep Ukraine's internet and online services running. Now a drone attack has stopped one of the data centers that Russia's largest tech company relies on.

Yandex counts the damage

Yandex warned that some services may be unavailable, while its core services kept running and no one was hurt. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed two drones were downed, a roof caught fire at an enterprise in the Sasovo district, and windows were blown out in several homes.

The power failure took down a wide range of Yandex Cloud infrastructure, including computing capacity, networks, data storage, databases, Kubernetes, cloud services, AI, and security and monitoring systems, Ukrainian outlet ZN.ua reported, citing Exilenova+.

Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ reported that the plant was hit, without naming an attacker. The channel said Sasta, which claims a place on Russia's register of defense-industry companies, makes computer-controlled machine tools, including five-axis machining centers, and previously supplied the Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV) and Roscosmos. The plant's value to the arms industry lies in machines that cut precision parts, not in finished weapons, the channel said.

Citing Exilenova+, Militarnyi reported that Ukraine's Defense Forces hit the plant. It also linked Sasta to Iskander missile supply chains. No source has said whether the plant or the data center was the target, and no Ukrainian official has claimed the Sasovo strike. Sasta has been under US sanctions since November 2023, UK sanctions since February 2024, and Ukrainian sanctions since April 2025, a sanctions database shows.

Salavat: Kyiv reports a hit

Ukrainian forces hit the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat complex in Bashkortostan, about 1,380 km from the front line, causing a fire, Ukraine's General Staff said. It said the complex processes up to 10 million metric tons of hydrocarbons a year and serves Russia's armed forces. Its key unit, the ELOU-AVT-6 primary oil refining unit launched in 2012, can process 6 million metric tons a year, Militarnyi reported. Astra's analyst placed the fire a few kilometers outside Salavat, possibly near the refinery.

Salavat Mayor Marat Zagidullin claimed that debris from several drones fell in the industrial zone that morning and started a fire.

"The enterprise continues to work," he said.

Astra noted earlier hits on the complex on 24 September 2025, on 14 July 2026, when refining fully stopped, and on 13 August 2026.

Russia's strikes on Ukraine's data centers

Russia has repeatedly hit data centers in Kyiv since 23 September. Strikes hit the COSMONOVA data center twice, the second time knocking it out, and the Parkovyi data center stopped working completely on 1 October after a series of strikes. In early October, Russia destroyed the dline.ua data center in Kyiv.

A Russian missile strike on an apartment building in Pryluky, a town in northern Ukraine's Chernihiv Oblast, killed 22 people on 7 October, regional police reported on the morning of 8 October. Five of the dead were children: three one-year-old boys, an eight-year-old boy, and a 13-year-old girl, police said.

Russian strikes on Pryluky, Kremenchuk, Oleksandriia, and Kyiv killed 28 people on 7 October, Interior Minister Ivan Vyhivskyi said. For the town, it was the second deadly missile strike since May. Behind the toll are families like this one: three generations hit by a single strike.

A family visit that ended under rubble

Three-year-old Zlatoslava is now in the Chernihiv Oblast children's hospital, Pryluky district police chief Vladyslav Stoianov told. Her mother, Kateryna, is hospitalized too. The two had come on the evening of 6 October to visit Kateryna's sister, police officer Yuliia Malysh. The girl's father stayed home in Lynovytsia, a village 15 km away.

Yuliia was wounded and is in hospital, Stoianov said. Her husband, Oleh Malysh, was killed. Until recently, Oleh had fought at the front in the Chernihiv Oblast police rifle battalion. The sisters' mother, Liudmyla, had also come over that evening, and she died too. All the family details come from Stoianov, who was describing a colleague's family.

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22 killed in Russian missile strike on Pryluky, including five children

Footage of an emergency worker carrying a little girl from the ruins reached almost all media, Vyhivskyi wrote in the same post. Suspilne first reported that the filmed rescuer had carried Zlatoslava. It then corrected itself: he had carried a different child, five-year-old Zoriana. Vyhivskyi also gives the girl's age as five, and he named the rescuer as State Emergency Service section commander Pavlo Levchenko. With colleagues, Levchenko freed the girl and her mother after the blast threw them out of the building.

Russia is concentrating missiles on a smaller, more specific set of targets, and its jet-powered attack drones are part of the reason, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed. Its combined attack overnight on 7 October killed 22 people in Pryluky, the State Emergency Service (SES) said as of the morning of 8 October. Russian milbloggers noted the shift the same day.

Russia often uses concentrated drone and missile strikes to overwhelm localized Ukrainian air defenses and destroy urban centers, ISW noted. Pryluky, where the strike killed children, was one of the areas a Russian channel says drew a significant share of the Kh-101s that night. With winter close, ISW expects the same pattern against Ukraine's energy grid, with jet drones partly letting Russia keep its missiles for priority targets without firing many more.

Missile waves on a few areas, Russian channels claim

Russia launched 48 Kh-101, Iskander-K, and Kalibr cruise missiles overnight on 7 October, Ukraine's Air Force reported. It also fired ballistic missiles, Zircon and Oniks anti-ship missiles, and 130 strike and decoy drones, 46 of them jet-powered Shahed-type models.

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22 killed in Russian missile strike on Pryluky, including five children

Russian milbloggers claimed the same day that Moscow had grouped a large part of its missile salvo into repeated waves on a few areas, while other weapons kept stretching Ukraine's air defenses elsewhere. The pro-war Russian Telegram channel Dva Mayora described the change as a switch from striking with splayed fingers to a series of hits with missile "fists." Defenders must then absorb a sharply rising load around one chosen site as one wave follows another, the channel claimed.

Citing Ukrainian monitoring channels, it claimed that roughly 30 or more Kh-101 cruise missiles flew toward Pryluky, Kremenchuk, Svitlovodsk, and Oleksandriia in Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kirovohrad oblasts. It put the Kremenchuk group at up to 15 missiles, Kh-101s and Kalibrs among them, aimed at the area of Kremenchuk and its hydroelectric plant.

Jet drones take some of the load off Russia's missiles

ISW said the jet-powered versions penetrate Ukrainian air defenses deeper and more reliably than propeller models. In ISW's assessment, that partly lets Russia concentrate cruise and ballistic missiles on priority targets without significantly raising missile use. Russia builds about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet drones a month, Ukraine's military intelligence agency (HUR) told Militarnyi in August.

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ISW expects Russia to apply the pattern in a likely brutal winter campaign against energy infrastructure. Russia likely intends to make city life untenable and force Ukraine to capitulate to its demands, ISW assessed. Such tactics have not worked before and are unlikely to work now, analysts added.

They called cheap countermeasures to jet drones and small cruise missiles vital, alongside Western air defense aid such as US-made Patriots, which can stop ballistic missiles. Ukraine has already paired a Soviet-era Kub launcher with American RIM-7 interceptors to catch jet drones.

A Ukrainian Sargan-3000 sea drone shot down a Russian Shahed flying on a mesh radio network, Ukraine's Navy reported on 7 October. Ukrainian sea drones have downed Russian aircraft before, but with missiles. This one used a machine gun.

Russia has been hitting Odesa with air attacks that come in waves with short gaps between them. Guarding the sky over water is harder than over land. Since fall 2025, Russia has also used mesh radio networks to reroute Shaheds mid-flight and dodge Ukrainian air defenses. That leaves Ukraine needing more ways to meet these drones out at sea, before they reach its ports and coast.

A Shahed steered by radio

A mesh-network drone passes its control signals along a chain of radio relays, drone to drone and on to ground antennas. That lets a Russian operator steer it in flight.

In May, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, then a Defense Ministry adviser, said only about 5% of Shaheds had got through in a recent Russian strike, and predicted that Russia would answer with jet-powered versions and strikes near the border. By July, Ukraine was testing jamming against mesh-controlled jet Shaheds, he said.

The Sargan-3000 fired its Protector remote weapon station, Militarnyi reported. The station is a remotely operated 12.7-mm (50-caliber) machine gun with electro-optical sights. The outlet added that the Sargan-3000 is designed for combat missions far from Ukraine's coast.

Built for the open sea

Ukraine's Navy took the Sargan-3000 into service in April 2026, according to Militarnyi. The drone boat has a combat radius of up to 1,600 km. It moves at 40–55 knots and carries up to 450 kg of payload.

In September, a Sargan-3000 sank a Russian uncrewed boat with machine-gun fire. Militarnyi called it the first battle between uncrewed sea platforms in history. Analyst H.I. Sutton wrote that the boat carried a Protector made by Norway's Kongsberg. That is the same weapon station named in the October shootdown. Sutton added that Russian attack sea drones work closely with Shaheds, which can relay the boats' mesh radio signals.

Ukraine plans 135 basic mobile shelters for civilians at 28 of its border crossings, the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development said on 7 October.

Since the start of September, Russian drones have repeatedly struck crossings on Ukraine's borders with Moldova and Romania. Since mid-September, strikes have also reached the Polish border near the Yahodyn crossing in Volyn Oblast. On 13 September, a Russian drone strike set a gas station near the crossing on fire. On 28 September, the blast wave from another strike damaged the checkpoint building. On 25 September, First Deputy Minister for Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport Serhii Derkach said Ukraine is exploring with its neighbors whether some checkpoints could move onto their territory. No agreement has been reported. On 2 October, Moldovan Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin said Moldova had set up shelters next to its crossings with Ukraine and started relocating staff from joint checkpoints.

135 shelters for travelers and border staff

The shelters will stand at the crossings and on the roads leading to them. Regional recovery services in Vinnytsia, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, and Volyn oblasts are running the purchases. The agency said the shelters will make the border safer for people crossing it and for checkpoint staff.

In Chernivtsi Oblast, one of the 10 tenders the agency lists on Prozorro, Ukraine's public procurement system, covers eight shelters for 50 people each and three for 20 each, Ukrinform reported. They will stand on the approach road to the Porubne–Siret international crossing on the Romanian border. The work is expected to cost UAH 38.5 million (about $855,000), excluding VAT.

Russian strikes on crossings

On 5 October, at about 09:38, a projectile fell near the Palanca–Maiaky–Udobne crossing on the Moldovan border. It ricocheted off the ground into a shuttle bus parked by the barrier and also damaged a control booth. One Moldovan border officer suffered light injuries, and the crossing was suspended, Moldova's Border Police said, linking the incident to Russia's attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Moldovan authorities did not specify the projectile's type or origin.

Overnight on 9 September, Russian drones struck the Starokozache crossing with Moldova, killing two people and injuring three. On 1 September, Russian Shahed drones hit the Orlivka ferry crossing on the Danube, opposite Romania's Isaccea, and temporarily shut it down. Another Russian strike on 6 September halted the crossing again.

Russia has shown a drone interceptor built on the Alazan, a civilian anti-hail rocket, Militarnyi reported. The sample went on display at a weapons exhibition that Russian dictator Vladimir Putin toured at the Chebarkul training range in the Urals on 2 October.

Ukraine now sends drones at Russia by the hundreds, by Moscow's own count. Russia's Defense Ministry claimed its air defenses intercepted nearly 900 overnight into 6 October. Russia's missile-based air defense was built to repel aircraft raids and a few cruise missiles, not swarms of low-flying drones.

In May, Ukrainian intelligence said Russia was adding four regiments, 24 battalions, and 162 batteries to counter Ukrainian strike drones. The converted Alazan, which Militarnyi calls an anti-drone system, is one more piece of that search. Meanwhile, the commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, said his forces struck 300 Russian air-defense assets between January and 19 September.

From hail reagent to shrapnel

Based on the size of the sample on display, the interceptor builds on the Alazan-2M or Alazan-6 series, Militarnyi assessed. The outlet put the stated cost at up to $12,000 per unit but did not say who named the figure. In civilian service, the rocket flies about 10 km, climbs up to 8 km, and carries about 0.5 kg of reagent. For air defense, the developers plan to replace that reagent with a fragmentation warhead.

Militarnyi's analysis of the published photos describes the front end as a steering assembly: four cruciform deflector fins, probably paired with a seeker or a fuze. At the rear sit folding stabilizers and the open nozzle of a solid-fuel motor, held in a metal cradle.

One sample among 300 exhibits

The Kremlin's account of the visit lists more than 300 weapons on display, including interceptor drones, but does not mention the rocket. Propaganda channel Russia 1 aired the interceptor in its report from the visit, and the Kremlin pool of state news agency RIA posted photos.

German radar maker Hensoldt has signed a memorandum with Ukraine's Defense Ministry for more large-scale radar deliveries, the company said on 5 October. Ukrainian defense outlet Defense Express reads it as a step toward fitting Hensoldt's TRML-4D, already in Ukrainian service, into FREYJA, a planned shield against ballistic missiles.

Ballistic missiles remain the hardest threat in Russia's air war. After Russia's overnight barrage on 7 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine is still searching daily for Patriot missiles. The only other system Ukraine can use against them is the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, which fires Aster 30 interceptors made in small numbers. That gap is why Fire Point is reworking its FP-7 missile into a Patriot-like interceptor. Such an interceptor still needs radars to find its target first.

A memorandum signed during Merz's visit

Hensoldt CEO Oliver Dörre signed the document on the sidelines of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's visit to Ukraine. Beyond deliveries, it covers further development of radar capabilities. The partners will also study options to deploy and jointly operate TRL-4D LR long-range radars. Hensoldt said this expands cooperation already agreed on in ballistic missile defense.

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The TRL-4D LR is the land-based version of a long-range radar Hensoldt also builds for the German Navy, German outlet Sicherheit & Verteidigung reported. The outlet cited Germany's defense procurement office as giving the naval version a range of more than 400 km (250 miles) against air targets. That, it concluded, puts the range well beyond the TRML-4D's.

"The Ukrainian air defence forces urgently need our high-performance radars to help protect infrastructure such as bridges," Dörre said.

Defense Express, describing the same memorandum, tied both the mass deliveries and the joint-operation plan to the TRML-4D. Hensoldt's release names no model for the deliveries and links joint operation to the TRL-4D LR.

Eyes for FREYJA

Hensoldt and Fire Point signed a memorandum on FREYJA at the Eurosatory arms show in Paris in June, with the TRML-4D to play a key role, Hensoldt announced. Fire Point is set to act as prime contractor and hold design authority. Hensoldt is to produce, test, and deliver the radars.

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Defense Express expects any study of deployment options to focus on how well the radar detects ballistic missiles and relays that data. Hensoldt has its own unit in Ukraine to work closely with operators, the outlet noted. Earlier, the company began setting up a local hub so Ukraine can service and repair the TRML-4D itself.

Already on duty

Ukraine's military uses the TRML-4D both standalone and as the built-in radar of the IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defense system, Defense Express noted. Hensoldt lists an instrumented range of 250 km (155 miles) at altitudes up to 30 km (19 miles). Defense Express, citing the manufacturer, gives track ranges of more than 120 km (75 miles) for fighter jets and more than 60 km (37 miles) for supersonic missiles.

More radars give earlier warning of ballistic strikes, but they cannot stop them. Until the FP-7.X makes its first ballistic intercept, planned for mid-2027, that job stays with Patriot and SAMP/T missiles. Partners delivered three times fewer air defense missiles in the first half of 2026 than a year earlier, Zelenskyy said on 5 August.

Ukrainian drugmakers could lose the certificates that let them sell in Uzbekistan, their most important export market, Ukrainian business outlet Ekonomichna Pravda reported on 7 October. Uzbekistan is ending remote factory inspections next year, and industry sources say its inspectors are wary of traveling to a country at war.

Russia's war keeps reshaping Central Asia's trade with both warring countries: Ukrainian refinery strikes pushed Russian fuel shortages into the region, and Kazakhstan gained leverage over a Russian retail giant.

A market worth a third of export earnings

Uzbekistan brings in about 30% of the Ukrainian drug industry's foreign-currency earnings, and one in 10 medicine packs sold there is Ukrainian, Ekonomichna Pravda wrote. By the outlet's count, at least three of Ukraine's five biggest drugmakers by revenue rank it as their top foreign market.

The currency from Uzbekistan lets manufacturers keep prices low in Ukraine and absorb losses from Russian strikes, three industry sources told Ekonomichna Pravda. Losing the market would force producers to raise domestic prices or pull low-margin medicines, which "will hit the Ukrainian patient," said Hennadii Vovk, former deputy head of Ukraine's State Service on Medicines and Drug Control.

Exports reached $114 million in January–June 2026, more than in all of 2021, said Yevheniia Piddubna, government relations head at Farmak, Ukraine's largest drugmaker. She said Uzbekistan takes 35% of Farmak's exports.

Data from the YouControl business registry, cited by the outlet, complicates that picture. In 2022, 30–35% of Farmak's products went to Uzbekistan. In 2025, Uzbekistan was not among its direct buyers. Farmak explained that wartime currency rules cap payment terms at 180 days, while foreign buyers often demand longer. So part of its trade runs through the group's Polish company.

Remote checks end, and inspectors hesitate to travel

Uzbekistan grants three-year certificates of good manufacturing practice (GMP) after inspecting the factory. Since the pandemic, it has allowed remote checks. That suited Ukraine, where Uzbek experts avoided traveling because of Russia's invasion, industry sources told the outlet. Remote inspections end on 1 January 2027.

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Most Ukrainian certificates expire within a year. Farmak's runs out in November 2026, and the company may not manage to renew it in time. Three producers renewed under the old rules until 2029: Darnytsia, the Borshchahivskyi Chemical and Pharmaceutical Plant, and Farmex Group. According to Piddubna, Uzbekistan's regulator has drafted rules for remote inspections in force-majeure cases, but nothing has been put into practice. Industry sources said the Uzbek Presidential Administration must sign off.

Producers have asked the Office of the President, the Foreign Ministry, and the Health Ministry to raise the issue with Uzbekistan's government, but no Ukrainian experts have been sent there yet, the outlet reported. Russia, whose share of the Uzbek drug market is almost the same as Ukraine's, is ready to take Ukraine's place, its sources said.

Russia's jet-powered attack drones could eventually reach 800–900 km/h, and intercepting them will demand new piloting skills—so Ukraine has asked the makers of its interceptor drones to build simulators to train the crews, a senior Air Force officer told a parliamentary commission on 6 October, Suspilne reported.

Russia keeps modifying its jet Shaheds faster than Ukraine can field the drones meant to catch them, and Kyiv is now preparing crews for speeds its interceptors have never faced—a sign the air war is shifting from a contest of volume to one of raw speed.

The speed Russia hasn't reached yet

Colonel Yurii Cherevashenko, deputy commander of Ukraine's Air Force, told the commission that Russia's jet drones fly at around 600 km/h today but could eventually reach 800–900 km/h—speeds he said have not been recorded so far. That range sits near the cruising speed of a commercial airliner.

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Intercepting such targets will take specific piloting skills, Cherevashenko said. When an interceptor and its target move at roughly the same speed, he noted, the pilot barely perceives the difference in their speeds. To train for that, Ukrainian interceptor-drone makers have been tasked with building simulators where crews can practice against high-speed targets.

Where Ukraine stands now

Ukraine already downs 85% to 90% of Russia's slower, propeller-driven drones, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said, but the jet models remain a tougher problem—Ukrainian interceptors scored their reportedly first kill of a jet-powered Shahed in November 2025. In a 28 September evening address, Zelenskyy put the jet-drone interception rate at about 57%, lower than required. Days later, he said Ukraine is testing five interceptor-drone models and could be producing about 400 of one of them by the end of October. Asked when jet-drone interceptors would arrive at the scale needed, Cherevashenko answered: "Not before the end of November."

Defense officials from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan spoke with North Korean representatives at Russia's Center-2026 strategic exercises, Afghanistan's Defense Ministry reported. So far, neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has confirmed any meeting, and Kabul disclosed no details of the talks or any agreement.

Since invading Ukraine, Russia has gathered a circle of sanctioned governments it both leans on for its war and props up in return—a trade that runs in opposite directions depending on the partner. Each new tie leaves one more isolated state with a stake in the war grinding on.

Observers among dozens

The exercises ran from 28 September to 3 October in Russia's Chelyabinsk Oblast. The Taliban attended as observers for the first time since it retook power in 2021, Militarnyi reported, one of dozens of foreign delegations present.

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Mawlawi Nasibullah Madani, commander of the Abdullah bin Masoud Joint Combat Training Command, led the Taliban delegation. The ministry said its officers held discussions with North Korea's military attaché and with officials from China, India, Vietnam, and other countries on bilateral ties and military cooperation. The delegation also toured an exhibition featuring heavy weapons, drones, long-range missiles, and robotic systems.

Moscow's expanding military network

On 27 May 2026, Russia and the Taliban signed a military-technical cooperation agreement. Russia's special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, claimed the deal is a practical framework focused on repairing Soviet- and Russian-made equipment the Taliban already holds. Russia remains the only country to formally recognize the Taliban government, a step it took in July 2025.

North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russia in June 2024 that includes a mutual defense clause. Pyongyang has since sent an estimated 14,000 troops to Russia's Kursk Oblast. In April, Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War put North Korea's losses at 7,058, including 2,251 killed.

National Guard commander Major General Oleksandr Pivnenko signed a follow-on contract with Quantum Frontline Industries managing director Matthias Lehna and Frontline Robotics chief technology officer and co-founder Pavlo Kosolapkin to build two Ukrainian drones in Germany, Quantum Systems said on 5 October. The deal covers the Linza strike drone and the Zoom reconnaissance drone, exceeds the volume of the 2026 agreement, and schedules delivery for 2027.

The order scales up a line that is already running. Quantum Frontline Industries' first production year remains on track for completion in 2026, it has already delivered its first drones to Ukraine's Defense Forces, and it is now preparing to increase production capacity fivefold for next year, Quantum Systems said.

German plants, Ukrainian designs

Quantum Frontline Industries is a German-Ukrainian joint venture of Frontline Robotics and Quantum Systems. Both the Linza and the Zoom come from Frontline Robotics, and the systems are manufactured in Germany for Ukraine.

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Linza 3.0 carries up to 4 kg of payload out to 15 km and stays aloft up to 60 minutes, and it is already in service with more than 60 Ukrainian units, Frontline Robotics has said. Zoom 3.0 detects targets, fixes their coordinates, and corrects fire under active Russian jamming, the company told Militarnyi. It loiters for up to an hour and works at a tactical radius of up to 20 km. AI-driven navigation and autonomous operation over the target keep its data flowing even when standard radio links break down.

From ramp-up to serial production

Quantum Frontline Industries said the contract moves it from initial production ramp-up toward sustained, high-volume manufacturing. Kosolapkin told Militarnyi the firm keeps refining Linza and Zoom on feedback from Ukrainian troops, whose needs drive how the systems evolve, and that producing in Germany gives it extra capacity to scale Ukraine-proven designs and deliver them in larger volumes.

Ukraine is working on a satellite system of its own, something similar to SpaceX's Starlink, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 4 October, Interfax-Ukraine reported. He argued Kyiv should be free to turn Starlink on Russian military targets, warning that China and other states will share comparable satellite technology with Moscow within months. Ukraine's battlefield communications still ride on a network owned by Elon Musk, who has clashed with Kyiv and once limited its wartime use.

Low-orbit satellite internet has turned into a frontline utility that a single company or government can switch on or off, and both armies are now racing to own that link instead of renting it. Control of the network decides whose drones can see the battlefield and fly through the jamming to strike it—leverage Kyiv has gone without while its connection rode on hardware it does not run.

Working on a Starlink of its own

Zelenskyy said there was groundwork in place and that Ukraine was working on a system similar to Starlink. He called it fair for Ukraine to aim Starlink at military sites inside Russia. The timing is the reason, he said: some states will share the technology with Russia late this year or early next, and the Chinese are among them. Moscow is already fielding its own Starlink-style constellation, Rassvet, though for now it reaches Ukraine only in brief passes.

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Ukraine's troops and drones lean heavily on Starlink, a network Kyiv neither owns nor controls. Musk has used that control against Kyiv before: in 2022 SpaceX refused a Ukrainian request to extend Starlink over occupied Crimea for a drone strike on Russia's warships, and it has since restricted the network's use for drone operations.

Sanctions, and satellites of its own

Zelenskyy has asked US President Donald Trump several times to sanction the Russian and Chinese companies building Russia's Rassvet network, most recently at the UN General Assembly in New York, he said in a recent Financial Times interview.

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Denys Shtilerman, co-founder and chief designer at Ukrainian defense company Fire Point, told the Financial Times in May that the firm had launched two satellites this year and planned dozens more in 2027, aiming to reduce reliance on the US government and Western tech companies. To strike deep inside Russia and gather intelligence, he has said, Ukraine needs its own constellation covering all of Russia.

Ukraine has developed a new missile to knock down Russia's fast, jet-powered Shahed drones, the ones its air defenses catch far less often than older models, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 4 October, Suspilne reported. The weapon, called Nika, has not yet been tested. He announced it during a visit to Kyiv by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Russia's plants turn out an estimated 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month, Ukraine's military intelligence estimates, and the jets fly fast enough to outrun the cheap interceptors built for slower, propeller-driven Shaheds. Ukraine plans about 400 units of just one of five interceptor models it is testing by the end of October, as it scrambles to close the gap before winter.

A new missile heads into testing

Both the Ukrainian and German sides have reacted positively to the missile, Zelenskyy said, though he stayed cautious on the result: for now, he said, it only "could be positive." In the same remarks, he announced a successful test of a separate system, the German-Ukrainian interceptor Spys.

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Ukraine shoots down 85-92% of propeller-driven Shaheds, Zelenskyy said. Against the jet-powered variants, interception falls to roughly 50-60%, he noted at the press conference with Merz. F-16 fighter jets help close the gap, he said.

From interceptor drones to a new missile

Over the past month, Ukraine tested a new generation of drone interceptors built for the jet-Shahed threat. On 15 September, one struck a Shahed in trials, though Zelenskyy said developers still needed to refine its control system. On 19 September, he said the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) had created its own interceptor drone and used it to down a jet Shahed in combat. Nika adds a purpose-built missile to that mix.

Ukraine's parliament registered a bill on minority-language schooling on 1 October to lift Hungary's block on the country's European Union membership talks, Ukrinform reported. Kyiv acts first with the legislation. Budapest reciprocates by letting the EU push the stalled accession process forward. Hungary's government welcomed the text within a day.

Ukraine's route into the European Union turns on unanimous votes, so one member state's leverage can stall the entire queue—and Kyiv is trying to pry the clusters open one bargain at a time before the window for this year's progress closes.

A tightly timed swap

European Pravda, citing unnamed sources, reported that the two capitals agreed to move in parallel after a public standoff, with neither side willing to go first on trust alone. Ukraine registers and passes the bill. In return, Hungary is to let the Council of the EU presidency send Kyiv, on 6 October, the requests needed to open two negotiating clusters—stages of the membership process. The Rada plans an extraordinary session on 12 October to adopt it, and European Pravda says the votes are there. A Council of the EU decision is due on 13 October, ahead of a European Council summit two days later. Deputy Prime Minister Vsevolod Chentsov said rebuilding trust will take concrete steps from both governments.

What the bill changes

Lawmakers filed Bill No. 16119, which creates a national minority school status: a school qualifies when over half its pupils—50% plus one—study in a national-minority language that is also an official EU language. By Education Ministry estimates, that fits about 149 schools, roughly 1.2% of Ukraine's general secondary institutions. Ukrainian stays the language of instruction, and the bill does not return Russian to classrooms.

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Pupils at qualifying schools could use the minority language with teachers and classmates, not only in lessons, and parents could petition to add subjects taught in Ukrainian. The text also covers Ukraine's indigenous peoples, such as Crimean Tatars, and drops a Ukrainian-language certificate requirement for the heads of 29 private schools for as long as they stay in their posts. Education committee head Serhii Babak said the solution protects Ukrainian while meeting an EU accession commitment.

What changed in Budapest

Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar posted on Facebook that the bill strengthens legal guarantees for Hungarian-language education and the school network, and wrote that he expects those rights honored in practice. European Pravda framed the outcome as a win Magyar's own voters can read as delivering what the previous government never secured. Foreign Minister Anita Orbán said the new government had achieved more in a few months for the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia than Viktor Orbán's cabinet managed in ten years. Under Magyar, Hungary agreed in June to open the first accession cluster but kept slowing the rest. Only in recent weeks, European Pravda wrote, did Budapest abandon Orbán-style unconditional blocking. This bill is meant to free the next two.

Ukraine has turned ground robots into a frontline workhorse, and the state is now trying to buy them at scale through its first competitive, ministry-spec tender. Viktor Pavlov, an officer of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade's UGV battalion, laid out the risks of that model to Army Inform, the Defense Ministry's outlet, in an interview. Once a robot clears the military's technical requirements, price becomes the main criterion, Pavlov says. The order is split into lots, and no maker can take more than half a class. He warns the model may not tell a cheap, makeshift machine from one that actually survives at the front.

Robots now handle the war's deadliest chores—driving supplies through kill zones and reaching the wounded where people can't—and Ukraine has already contracted more than 22,000 for 2026. How the military buys them now shapes whether the push yields machines troops trust or a stockpile of cheap ones they don't.

From disposable drones to the next mass weapon

Aerial drones became disposable, mass-produced weapons years ago. Ground robots—the tracked and wheeled machines that haul supplies, pull out the wounded, and attack Russian positions—are only now reaching serial state supply. In August, the Defense Procurement Agency (DOT), the body that buys Ukraine's arms, opened its first competitive tenders for logistics and strike robots built to specs set by the Defense Ministry. Pavlov, founder of Ukraine's UGV School, calls it an experimental format that can work where market prices are inflated. Splitting the order into lots also gives smaller engineering teams a real chance, he said, because many large producers are already busy with state contracts.

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Why the lowest bid may beat the best robot

A tender rewards the cheapest product that formally meets the requirements, not the best one, Pavlov said. A thermal camera, for example, can be listed as desirable rather than mandatory, so a maker chasing the lowest price will most likely leave it off. On any given feature the machines diverge—suspension, cameras, comms channels, a winch—one has it, another doesn't, yet both can land in the same class.

The machines themselves are very different. One carries 250 kilograms, another up to 349, but both fall into the "200-plus" category. Unlike FPV drones, which share standard sizes and parts, ground robots have no common frame—Ukraine fields many local variants. Pavlov compared the choice to picking an iPhone over a cheaper Android: on paper the features match, but soldiers know which machine they can run and repair.

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He also fears the model punishes innovation. A company can spend 18 months and a 20-person team building a robot, then watch a rival copy it, skip the research costs, and undercut it. A design troops already know how to run and repair—like the Ratel—is a known quantity. An untested bargain can break down mid-mission with no spare parts.

A mixed system, not tenders alone

Price competition should be one tool, not the only one, Pavlov argued. New robots should first reach units through pilot buys, letting soldiers test them and say what works. Proven systems can then be contracted in bulk, with tenders saved for classes where the offers are truly comparable. Ukraine's robots are too varied, he said, and what units need can't always be squeezed onto a spec sheet.

UFORCE, a Ukrainian defense company, says it fielded 11 crewless boats and eight drones at NATO's largest unmanned-systems exercise in Portugal, Militarnyi reported. The firm's crews acted as both mock enemy and allied forces alongside Ukraine's Navy during the 31 August–25 September drills. The turnout more than doubled the company's presence at last year's exercise, when it brought five vessels.

Ukraine began the all-out war without large warships, yet uncrewed boats drove Russia's Black Sea Fleet out of its main base on the Black Sea—a result that now pulls far larger navies to the same ranges to test the weapon for themselves.

Ukraine brings its sea-drone playbook to Portugal's NATO exercise

UFORCE joined REPMUS 26, the Portuguese Navy's annual exercise, co-organized with NATO, where member states try out robots and drones built for combat at sea. This year the company widened its presence sharply, UFORCE said on LinkedIn. Across the scenarios, its crews ran strikes, reconnaissance, and defense.

At the center sat the MV7, an uncrewed boat UFORCE showed in every setup it offers. Across its configurations, the MV7 carried interceptors, FPV drones, other kinetic weapons, and electronic-warfare gear. Crews launched flying drones straight off the decks while the boats sat on the water, all run by a single control program.

The company brought three systems to REPMUS for the first time: the Nemesis SeaStrike drone, which launches from the MV7, the MV11 boat, and a supply vessel called L11. UFORCE teams worked beside Ukraine's Navy throughout. Portuguese President António José Seguro inspected the MV7 on the pier, the company said.

Not Ukraine's first visit

Ukraine was at REPMUS last year, too. At REPMUS 2025, a Ukrainian-led "enemy" team beat NATO's side across all five drill scenarios and, in one, landed enough mock strikes on a NATO frigate to have sunk it in a real battle. Ukraine also brought the upgraded Magura v7.2 to that year's drills.

Ukraine is stitching together a layered answer to Russia's faster, jet-powered Shahed drones, leaning on electronic jamming, fighter jets, and a new class of homegrown interceptors, RBC-Ukraine reported. Each tool has limits, and the new interceptors still bring down only the occasional jet drone. The bottleneck now is money and factory output, not ideas.

Russia is pouring faster jet-powered drones into the air war as winter nears, a campaign Western analysts say is meant to wear Ukraine's defenses down—and holding those skies now turns on which side can keep out-producing the other's cheap weapons.

Fighter jets help, but they run on imported rounds

Electronic jamming can work against some of the drones, and Ukraine is also sending combat aircraft up after them. But aviation has a catch: the jets need air-to-air missiles and cannon rounds, and for the F-16 and Mirage those are imported and not always in stock. Flying over Kyiv adds danger to the civilians below and to the pilots, so Ukraine would rather catch the drones out on the approaches.

New interceptors are landing hits—just not enough

The newest piece is a wave of Ukrainian interceptor drones built to chase the jet versions, which fly three times faster than the propeller Shaheds. Ukrainian crews have been downing the jet Gerans in a recent run: on 19 September, presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, confirmed one Geran-5 shot down, and in late September, operators of the National Guard's Separate Artillery Brigade brought down a Geran-4 with the Bullet interceptor made by General Cherry, the first Geran-4 that drone has downed, Ukraine's National Association of Defense Industries said. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said several prototypes have proven themselves in combat.

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Across all methods, Ukraine now intercepts about 57% of the jet drones Russia launches, Zelenskyy said on 28 September—a rate that has climbed but still trails the 90%-plus it manages against slower Shaheds. Kills by the new interceptors specifically remain isolated. In August, Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said jet drones can make up as much as two-thirds of the drones in some raids—though not every time. One promising route is reworking Ukraine's own long-range strike drones into interceptors. Kyiv is in talks with partners over the money; on 28 September, Ukraine's Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara asked the EU to help finance the interceptors so enough reach the front quickly.

Hitting the launch sites and jamming the controls

Ukrainian forces strike the Russian airfields the jet drones launch from, RBC-Ukraine's sources said, though the raids have not forced Russia to abandon the attacks. On 20 August, military intelligence hit drone storage and launch sites at Primorsko-Akhtarsk, one of the launch bases RBC names, and at occupied Donetsk airfield. Ukraine also keeps going after the Belarusian relay towers Russia strings into a mesh network to steer the drones in, RBC's sources said.

Russia hit Kyiv with another round of drone strikes from the evening of 30 September into the morning of 1 October, striking a school, a café, and warehouse buildings across the capital, the city's mayor and emergency services said. The children inside the school were in its shelter and came through unharmed. Fires broke out across two districts, and one person in the city was wounded.

Children across Ukraine now start the school year in bomb shelters, as Russian drones, missiles, and glide bombs keep hitting schools, homes, and hospitals far from the front—part of a civilian toll the UN says has already outrun all of last year's.

A school full of children, all in the shelter

A Russian drone hit a school in Kyiv's Solomianskyi district on the morning of 1 October and started a fire, Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said, adding that the children were in the shelter. More than 100 students and about 60 staff were sheltering inside, and none were hurt, police said. The jet-powered drone damaged the building's facade at third-floor level, RBC-Ukraine reported.

A café and warehouses among the sites hit

On the evening of 30 September, a Russian strike started a fire at a café on the ground floor of a residential building in Solomianskyi, while warehouse buildings burned in the northern Obolonskyi district. One person was injured in the warehouse fire and handed to medics, RBC-Ukraine reported.

42 sites damaged across Kyiv Oblast

Across Kyiv Oblast, Russian attacks over the previous 24 hours damaged 42 sites and injured six people, regional authorities reported.

Kyiv is now under Russian air attack daily. On 28 September, Russian drones hit the city center in daylight, including the National Academy of Sciences, and earlier waves struck filling stations and other everyday sites across the capital.

Ukraine is about to tell Washington exactly which Russian targets it wants punished under America's new sanctions law, the Associated Press reported. A senior Ukrainian diplomat said Kyiv will hand the Trump administration and Congress a wish list of companies, ships, and people this week—and at the top are the firms supplying parts for Russia's answer to Starlink.

The law requires Washington to act but lets the president waive the sanctions if he certifies that doing so serves US national interests, and the first choice falls due in weeks. For Ukraine, a measure that names no targets changes nothing on the ground—which is why the fight now is over whose names make the list before the clock runs out.

A list topped by Russia's Starlink clone

Denys Sienik, chargé d'affaires at Ukraine's embassy in Washington, said the priority is a group of Russian firms making components for Rassvet, Moscow's homegrown satellite network, which Russia hopes to complete by the end of the year—though its own officials have put the start of service in 2027. Bureau 1440, the firm building Rassvet, is not itself on US sanctions lists, but its parent company, ICS Holding, is under US blocking sanctions, according to Militarnyi. The suppliers feeding the network parts are not sanctioned, and those are the ones Kyiv wants added to the list.

Russia sped up the project after Ukraine and SpaceX cut off the Starlink terminals its troops had used without authorization at the front. If Russia completes the constellation, Sienik said, it could strike Ukraine at will with real-time information—a danger he warned would bite hardest this winter. "If these entities are not sanctioned, it will actually make this program possible for Russia and that will be a game-changer," he told reporters, Reuters reported. Kyiv wants access to Starlink inside Russia, too, so it can strike targets there.

Euromaidan Press has reported how such a network would change the battlefield: the satellites transmit in high-frequency bands that are hard to jam, and a relay overhead would feed drones and missiles fresh coordinates mid-flight, letting them fly low under air defenses that struggle to see them.

Oil tankers and attacks on US firms

Ukraine is pushing for tougher action against Russia's shadow fleet, too—the aging tankers that sell its oil around Western restrictions—and is asking the administration and American industry to publicly condemn Russian attacks on US companies' operations inside Ukraine, Sienik said.

The deadline Washington is now facing

The requests arrive as the administration faces an 18 October deadline to decide which Russian entities, if any, to sanction under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, which US President Donald Trump signed into law on 18 September. The law directs the White House to impose tariffs on Russia's biggest oil buyers and to block its banks, officials, and tankers—but lets the president waive those measures, which is why Kyiv is lobbying for the toughest list it can get.

Russia is wiring its long-range attack drones together by a mesh network in flight and buying pricier, higher-resolution cameras for them, Ukraine's Air Force reported on 29 September. Its spokesperson said one drone could serve as a scout, strike drone, and relay for the rest, which is why they often fly one behind another over long distances. Chains of them keep crossing near the Belarus border, UkrInform reports.

For Ukraine, the danger in each such upgrade is arithmetic: the more Russia networks cheap, once-disposable drones and pushes its control links away from the front, the harder they become to jam or shoot down, and the more of them reach the cities they are aimed at.

Sharper, pricier eyes

Ihnat said on a national broadcast that Russia is sourcing higher-quality materials and raising the resolution of its drone cameras. The cameras it buys are increasingly expensive and higher-quality, he said, which lets its operators study the ground in fine detail and use each drone for a specific purpose.

On a mesh network, he said, the drones talk to each other and hand the control signal back toward the operator, so no single link has to carry it alone.

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Chains along the Belarus border

Asked about relays operating out of Belarus and about Russia's guidance of jet-powered Shaheds, the exploding drones it fires in swarms, Ihnat said Moscow had already claimed its satellite network was ready. He confirmed mesh networks are in use and said their use was quite dangerous. Ukraine has no information yet on whether Russia is using towers, he said.

It often sees drones crossing long distances in chains along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, so nothing can be ruled out, but intelligence would have to confirm whether such relays exist. Asked whether Russia is preparing a fresh ballistic strike, he said intelligence would warn when extra vigilance is needed.

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Ukraine's countermeasures

Ihnat has also said Russia launched more attack drones in September than in August, counting 3,177 jet-powered drones so far this month against 2,850 in August. To knock them down, Ukraine leans mainly on tactical aviation, including F-16 fighters, and on ground-based air defense when missiles are available, he said, with shoulder-fired man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) working well against jet drones inside their range. He said Ukraine needs more missiles for both Patriot systems and ground-based launchers, plus faster domestic solutions it can scale up.

Fourteen more Ukrainian children have crossed from Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast back onto Ukrainian-held ground, the oblast's military administration said on 29 September. They join a years-long effort to recover children from land Russia seized in 2022, with thousands more still deported or unaccounted for.

Ukrainian authorities say Russia has deported nearly 20,000 children since its 2022 full-scale invasion, and Zelenskyy insists the true figure is far higher. Those taken to Russia are placed in institutions or Russian families and pushed through Russian "re-education" aimed at erasing their Ukrainian identity.

These 14 add to roughly 2,000 children Ukraine has brought back since 2022—a recovery effort still dwarfed by the numbers Russia holds and keeps adding to.

Who made it out

The 14 are four boys and 10 girls, aged 6 to 17, said Oleksandr Prokudin, who heads the administration. Rescuers also brought back one young adult who had been deprived of parental care.

Each case shows what pushed the children toward the return. One 16-year-old boy was being forced onto Russia's military registration rolls under occupation, part of a pipeline that moves teenagers from a Russian passport toward conscription at 18. A 17-year-old girl had sought a Ukrainian education despite the risks and Russian control, Prokudin said. A 10-year-old girl, he added, had longed to come home and did all she could to reach safety.

The running tally

The children left through Bring Kids Back UA, the repatriation program President Volodymyr Zelenskyy launched in 2023, working with the Ukrainian charity Save Ukraine. That brings to 204 the number of children returned from occupied Kherson Oblast since the start of 2026, regional authorities said.

The wider deportation campaign

In 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and his children's rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, over the illegal deportation of children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.

Russia is preparing to make daily life in Kyiv harder before winter, aiming at the ordinary places civilians use rather than at military sites, The Economist reported. Ukrainian officials say the push blends bombing, sabotage, and disinformation, and expect it to peak in November.

Every winter of its full-scale invasion, Russia has tried to freeze Ukrainians into surrender, and each year the strikes reach deeper into ordinary life. The civilian casualties recorded in 2026 have already passed the whole of last year, the UN says.

From the power grid to the grocery store

Russia has already turned its drones on Kyiv's supermarkets, food warehouses, and data centers this year. On 28 September, a Russian jet drone struck the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv. The strike killed two people, the Academy said. Survivors climbed from the windows of the burning building. A senior Ukrainian official told The Economist the Kremlin now wants shoppers too afraid to enter a store. Russia is also keeping its winter routine, hitting electricity, water, and sewage systems.

Cheaper jet drones that stream live to their pilots

Most of the damage now comes from Russia's cheap jet drones, The Economist said. Pilots guide them onto targets and watch a live video feed. They are hard to stop, and Russia's ballistic missiles are deadlier still as Ukraine's supply of Patriot interceptors dwindles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Kyiv had agreed a new Patriot interceptor package, but it remains short of interceptors of its own. A security official told The Economist that Russia has thousands of drones stockpiled and plans to use its entire ballistic missile stock within two months.

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Sabotage, chaos, and a city that won't switch off

Ukraine's counter-intelligence services say they foil seven or eight Russian plots a week, and officials believe some sleeper cells remain. The campaign's third element, disinformation, targets war fatigue and corruption scandals. Russia runs the same plan every year, hoping its bot farms will push Ukrainians onto the streets to demand surrender, said Andrii Kovalenko, who heads the Center for Countering Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council.

"It's nonsense," he told The Economist, adding that someone is feeding the idea to Putin so they can steal more money.

Kyiv is also far harder to shut down than Moscow assumes, Kovalenko said. The city's internet is too decentralized for a handful of strikes to knock out, The Economist noted. Energy expert Olha Babii said the test is how fast crews restore power, not whether it can be destroyed. The capital is emptying, its population down from about 3.7 million to 3.3 million by The Economist's count.

A Ukrainian defense company has shown a new way to knock FPV drones out of the sky, unveiling a net-firing interceptor at the IT Arena tech conference in Lviv, dev.ua reported. The system, called Mangal and developed by Phantom Defense, is still a prototype—the company says the first production units could reach the market in a few months.

Ukraine's counter-drone work has turned into a crowded contest, with firms racing to field jammers, interceptor drones, and net-throwers that can blunt Russia's growing use of cheap FPVs.

What Mangal does

Phantom Defense designed the modular launcher to defend positions, vehicles, and other targets against enemy drones. It fires a special net weighted with sinkers. The net opens the moment it fires, tangling the drone and dragging it down. One module holds six charges. Two cameras give the crew a clearer view, and the system can detect targets on its own, which speeds up how fast an operator spots a threat. Crews can fix Mangal in place to guard checkpoints, trenches, or infrastructure, or bolt it onto a vehicle.

Why a net

FPV drones—aircraft a pilot flies straight into a target—have become a routine danger along the front. A small, fast drone is hard to hit with a single round. A net spreads as it travels, so it is more forgiving to aim. Neither Phantom Defense nor the outlets covering the launch have said how far Mangal's net can reach.

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Other net-based counters

Other developers are turning to nets too. The WINFLY Spider is an interceptor drone that snares a target in a net and returns to its launch point intact, at about $27 a shot. That lets one aircraft make repeated intercepts instead of being spent on a single kill. Scan Horizon comes from Postup Solutions, a firm registered in Wrocław, Poland, and pairs a net launcher from Ukrainian company Ptashka Drones. Its net reaches about 30 meters. Contra Drone, meanwhile, has shown interceptor missiles that can reportedly carry net warheads alongside other options.

The company that actually assembles Russia's homegrown answer to Starlink has been left off every Western sanctions list, a US research group and a Ukrainian anti-corruption watchdog separately told Euromaidan Press this month.

Both landed on the same gap—the manufacturer, Bureau 1440, and its leaders remain untouched by the West, even though Kyiv has already placed the firm on Ukraine's own sanctions list. They differ on how much a Western designation would achieve, not on where the opening is.

The company no Western government has sanctioned

Rassvet is Russia's low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation, built by the private firm Bureau 1440 to give Moscow's troops communications independent of SpaceX. Bureau 1440 launched its first 16 satellites in March 2026, building the network after SpaceX cut off the Russian units' unauthorized Starlink access. C4ADS, a US-based research organization, confirmed to Euromaidan Press that Bureau 1440 and its leadership sit outside every Western sanctions regime, and called designating the manufacturer the single most visible and effective step available.

Viktoriia Vyshnivska, a senior analyst at the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), a Ukrainian watchdog, was more measured. "We shouldn't expect a magical effect," she said, but sanctions would make the Western boards and components Bureau 1440 depends on harder and costlier to source. Many of those goods are already banned under EU export controls, she noted—yet the manufacturer itself remains off the lists.

The EU named the network but not the firm

The EU has already moved once. Its 21st sanctions package, adopted on 23 July, targeted the Rassvet network but stopped short of the manufacturer, leaving Bureau 1440 and its chief executive off the lists. On 28 August, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Kyiv had sent a formal note to the UN's telecom agency requesting that Ukraine be excluded from Rassvet's coverage. Days later, he urged EU ministers to sanction the project. Ukraine gave partners a list of nine entities tied to it, Militarnyi reported, citing sources.

For years Ukraine could find, jam, or knock out the communication links Russian forces leaned on. Rassvet may be the first it cannot. Vyshnivska put the useful window to slow it at about a year. Russia, by Ukrainian calculations, needs five to eight years to see it through.

Euromaidan Press examined how Russia built Rassvet, and how far it still has to go.

Small groups of Russian infantry could slip into regional capital Zaporizhzhia this winter, a frontline commander warned in a mid-September interview with Dnipro TV, in a debate later compiled by Radio Svoboda. His forecast drew quick pushback from a military analyst, who called it far more categorical than the situation warrants. At the center of the dispute lies the drained Kakhovka Reservoir, whose dry bed Russia now uses for cover.

Dense drone surveillance has made large mechanized assaults costly, pushing Russian commanders toward small groups that probe for gaps. That shift turns unwatched terrain — here, the drained reservoir bed—into the seams they test.

Solitary groups, not massed forces

Dmytro Filatov, callsign Perun, commands the 1st Separate Assault Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo. The danger will come not as a massed assault but as infiltration, he said. He expects solitary infantry groups to reach and enter Zaporizhzhia over the winter. He pointed to the Stepnohirsk axis and the dense buildings along the Dnipro shore. Fog and rain raise pressure across the whole front, and Russian troops have long fought well in winter, he said.

A city on the front's edge

Zaporizhzhia is a regional capital and industrial center in southeastern Ukraine, with more than 700,000 residents before the full-scale invasion. The city sits about 25 km from the nearest active front, around Stepnohirsk to the south—unusually close for a regional capital of its size. Russian missiles, drones, and glide bombs hit the city daily. It has held since 2022, and Russia has not taken a Ukrainian regional capital since the war's first months.

The dead reservoir as cover

Russia blew up the Kakhovka dam in June 2023 and drained the reservoir behind it. Reeds now stand several meters high across the dry basin, giving foot soldiers cover to move unseen. Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces reported in November 2025 that Russian groups use it to press into the Ukrainian flank.

Russian troops increasingly use the bed to infiltrate and haul supplies, said Kostiantyn Mashovets of the Information Resistance group. One of their assault groups pushed as far as Malokaterynivka before Ukrainian forces blocked it, he wrote. Ukrainian troops hold northern Plavni, including the railway station and part of the E-105 highway, Mashovets added. The Institute for the Study of War pointed to the same route in its 26 September assessment, citing Ukrainian military observers.

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An analyst is not convinced

Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military-political expert and Information Resistance coordinator, rates the threat far lower. He wrote that the warning "sounded far more categorical than it should have." Stepnohirsk, about 25 km south of Zaporizhzhia, is the closest active fighting to the city. Russia has tried for years to take the town but now controls only its 3rd microdistrict and southern Plavni.

Infiltration becomes possible only if Russia takes the whole foothold and reaches the north bank of the Konka river. That will not happen by the end of 2026, and no ground push on the city looks possible, he said. The main danger stays daily Russian strikes on the city, not a ground advance, he added.

Ukrainian defense-tech firm BlueBird Tech has begun renting out its Hrets electronic-warfare jammers by the day, in what it calls Ukraine's first such service, the company said on 29 September 2026. Electronic-warfare gear—the devices that scramble the radio links attack drones rely on—is normally bought outright, renting lets a user take a system for a single mission or test it before committing.

The pull is a war where cheap first-person-view (FPV) drones have made portable jamming a routine need, one many users face only for a stint.

How renting works

After paperwork and a deposit equal to the device's full price, the system is handed over, and that handover counts as day one. Each day's rent is then drawn from the deposit, return the system working and undamaged and the renter gets back what is left. Keep it long enough that the fees add up to the full price, and the jammer passes to the renter automatically. Renting is open to individuals, companies, charities, and volunteer groups.

Three models, and what each one jams

The Hrets XL is a modular FPV jammer built from two to 10 working modules, priced case by case. The vehicle-mounted Hrets 4MC is an anti-drop system that jams DJI Mavic-type quadcopters—the drones Russian forces use to drop munitions—for about $56 a day. The lightweight Hrets 4M jams FPV drones at a stated 70 to 400 meters for about $67 a day. One Ukrainian firm has even packed detection, decoding, and jamming of an FPV signal into a single device.

Ukraine's air defenders now have purpose-built interceptors for Russia's jet-powered attack drones—weapons whose speed and altitude make them difficult for conventional defenses to catch, Militarnyi reported. A crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Regiment downed a Geran-5 over Chernihiv Oblast with a newly delivered interceptor, according to the Serhiy Prytula Foundation.

Russia's long-range drone and missile attacks have become central to its effort to wear down Ukraine's air defenses and grid before winter, and the war in the sky now turns on which side scales its answer faster.

The Chernihiv intercept

The crew, callsign Yastrub (Hawk), made its first successful engagement with the new interceptor, hitting the jet drone at 425 km/h and above 3 km, the foundation said, releasing footage of the strike. The Prytula Foundation supplied the interceptors and said it has contracted several manufacturers to counter the jet threat.

"Our task is to scale this up and strengthen units," it said.

Why it kept slipping through

Russia first used the Geran-5 in January 2026. HUR's own specifications put its warhead at 90 kg, cruise speed at 450–600 km/h, and range at 950 km, with a ceiling of 6 km. That mix of jet speed and high altitude kept it clear of machine guns, shoulder-fired missiles, and the cheap interceptors built to swat slower piston-engine Shaheds.

Ukraine's military intelligence estimates Russian plants now turn out around 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month, according to HUR. A monitoring Telegram channel, Polkovnyk HSh, reports a newer variant that steers by ground imagery instead of satellites, which would blunt jamming—though HUR has not confirmed it and lists no such system among the drone's components. Separately, Russia moved the jet engine inside the fuselage, a change aimed at more speed and range.

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Where the fight stands

Ukraine intercepts about 55% of Russia's jet drones, against more than 90% of the older models, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 26 September. Since the start of September, Russia had launched more than 2,730 jet drones, and Ukraine had downed or suppressed more than 1,500, he added. Zelenskyy also said Russia plans to spend $12 billion in 2027 on jet drones and loitering munitions alone. Ukraine already has several interceptor prototypes in combat use, and the 1020th crew's kill is one of several jet Geran intercepts Ukrainian units and drone makers have logged this month.

Russia's low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation Rassvet went from a few minutes of connectivity over Ukraine to two stable windows lasting more than an hour each in just five months. The system was built by the Russian private company Bureau 1440 as Moscow's answer to Starlink.

As of now, it is nowhere near matching SpaceX's 10,000-satellite network—but the gap between what Russia has now and what it needs is closing, and the tools that could slow it down mostly sit unused. When Ukraine and SpaceX bricked Russian-obtained Starlink terminals earlier this year, Russian assaults froze across the front—proof that cutting satellite command-and-control links matters more than disrupting guidance. Russia is now building its own links. The most consequential tool that could slow that down is Western sanctions against Bureau 1440 itself.

Four years of Western sanctions have failed to cut Russia off from the foreign components its missile and drone factories rely on: parts manufactured after sanctions were imposed still reach Russian assembly lines within months. Rassvet is a new version of the same problem. The system is still being built and relies on imported components whose exact origin is disputed—some experts point to American and European parts reaching Russia through sanctions-evasion networks, others say the core hardware is built from off-the-shelf Chinese components. Its manufacturer remains unsanctioned by any Western government, while some of the infrastructure needed to expand production has already been struck by Ukraine.

Six minutes in March, two hours by August

In March 2026, Bureau 1440 launched its first operational batch of 16 Rassvet satellites from Plesetsk Cosmodrome. Each pass over Ukraine created a window of six to 10 minutes, Serhii Beskrestnov, callsign Flash, a Ukrainian presidential adviser on defense technology, estimated at the time.

By late August, the picture had changed. Tracking data from N2YO showed four passes a day and two stable communication windows lasting more than an hour each. Satellite communications expert Volodymyr Stepanets said that 12 of the 16 satellites from the first batch had reached their operational altitude of 550 km, three were still ascending, and one had burned up—likely due to a manufacturing defect. A second batch of 16 went into orbit in July, though those satellites struggled to reach their target altitude and some may reenter the atmosphere.

The second batch may be climbing faster than the first did at the same stage. Still, Russia is far from the 200–250 satellites Beskrestnov considers necessary for stable, round-the-clock coverage, and the altitude of roughly 550 km is still short of the roughly 800 km the constellation is designed to reach.

What Rassvet would change on the battlefield

Russia is unlikely to have any civilian use in mind for these communication windows. The satellites transmit in the Ka and Ku bands—high-frequency signals that are difficult to jam and difficult to detect.

Right now, Ukraine's electronic warfare can push Russian drones offline: a Shahed flying low through a jammed zone loses its link and drifts off course. A satellite relay overhead would change that. The drone holds its course, receives updated coordinates mid-flight, stays below radar, and strikes. The constellation could do this for long-range strike and naval drones alike—letting them operate through electronic warfare at very low altitudes, where Ukraine's air defenses struggle to see them.

Bureau 1440 has also developed user terminals small enough to fit on Geran-type attack drones and cruise missiles. Gerans have struck Ukrainian territory, including Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, almost continuously over the past month. A terminal on a Geran would turn a one-way munition into a weapon that can be redirected after launch. Unlike the Starlink terminals Ukraine relies on, which are geographically restricted, Russian terminals are expected to face no such limits—the same terminal that connects a Geran over Kyiv Oblast would work over Berlin or Paris.

The sanctions lever—and the gap in it

Rassvet's parent company, IKS Holding, is one of Russia's largest hardware and software developers. The US sanctioned the holding, its then-owner Anton Cherepennikov, and the subsidiaries Kryptonit and KNS Group on 24 February 2023. Cherepennikov died under unexplained circumstances, but the company keeps operating.

Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) says the holding serves as a personnel reserve for the Federal Security Service (FSB). The first deputy CEO of IKS Holding is Boris Korolyov, son of FSB First Deputy Director Sergei Korolyov, according to the SZRU. He took the post at 27 in 2023, after Cherepennikov's death.

More importantly, though, is the company that actually builds the satellites—Bureau 1440—and its leadership. Ukraine has placed the company on its own sanctions list, but Kyiv's unilateral designations carry limited trade enforcement power, because these people and this company are absent from Western lists. At Euromaidan Press's request, the US-based research organization C4ADS confirmed that Bureau 1440 and its leadership sit outside every Western sanctions regime, and called designating the manufacturer the single most visible and effective step available.

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From the Ukrainian side, Viktoriia Vyshnivska, a senior analyst at the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), told Euromaidan Press that sanctions on Bureau 1440 are not a magic button—but they are not pointless, either. Because Bureau 1440 uses Western equipment, designating the company would directly affect trade in those boards and components, she said. Any Western manufacturer that kept doing business with the company would also risk investigation and legal consequences.

Given the reach of Russia's sanctions-evasion networks and its close ties with China in joint production and technology sharing.

"We shouldn't expect a magical effect," Vyshnivska said.

But sanctions would make direct trade impossible and raise the cost and difficulty of sourcing Western components.

Even if the useful window is short, making supplies more expensive and harder to find is the point.

Many of the goods Bureau 1440 uses are already banned from sale to Russia under EU export controls, Vyshnivska noted. Yet Bureau 1440 itself is still absent from the sanctions lists. Her recommendation: Bureau 1440, its current owners, its parent company, the key related entities and individuals, and its main suppliers should all be designated.

Diplomacy: Ukraine goes to the ITU

Beyond that, Ukraine is trying to act on its own on several fronts.

The first is diplomacy. On 28 August, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Ukraine had sent a formal note to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN agency that coordinates radio frequencies, demanding that Ukrainian territory be excluded from Rassvet's service areas across all frequency bands. The system's use over Ukraine "has nothing to do with civilian purposes," he wrote on X.

Days later, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Ireland, Sybiha handed partners a list of nine legal entities linked to the project and urged them to impose sanctions.

The EU had already moved once: its 21st sanctions package, adopted on 23 July, targeted the Rassvet network. But the main gap is not closed, and that round stopped short of the manufacturer, leaving Bureau 1440 and its chief executive off the lists.

Hitting the supply chain with weapons

Another lever is direct strikes. In mid-August, Ukrainian-made Flamingo cruise missiles struck an industrial zone in Samara that houses the Progress Rocket Space Center—the only plant in Russia that serially assembles the Soyuz-2.1b rockets used to launch Rassvet into orbit. Satellite imagery published by the Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+ showed a collapsed roof section 85 meters long and 35 meters wide over Building 106A, the hall where crews wire the rockets' control systems and cabling. The channel reported two missile hits on that hall.

If the hall was destroyed, production could stop entirely, and switching to other Russian launch vehicles would take significantly longer and add complexity. Drones also attempted to strike Plesetsk Cosmodrome, from which both 2026 batches were launched.

Both targets—the factory that builds the rockets and the site that launches them—are needed if Russia is to expand Rassvet production.

The timeline: 5.5 to eight years, if nothing changes

Russia plans to expand the constellation to 292 satellites by the end of 2027, Deputy Chief of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence (HUR) Vadym Skibitskyi said. Moscow's longer-term goal is 924 satellites by 2035.

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With 32 satellites already launched in two batches, 260 more are needed. At 16 satellites per launch, that requires roughly 17 launches. At a four-month interval between launches, deploying them would take roughly 5.5 years even if every launch succeeded and every satellite reached its target orbit. That most likely won't fully work out: one satellite from the first batch is already lost, two from the second batch may be lost as well, and none of them has yet reached the required altitude.

Russia also depends on the scarce Soyuz-2.1b rocket. The rocket has averaged only six to eight launches per year since 2022—most committed to GLONASS navigation satellites, ISS resupply, and military payloads—limiting Russia to a theoretical maximum of roughly two Rassvet-dedicated launches per year, or 128 Rassvet satellites over four years at that rate.

There is still time to shut this project down or slow it. Vyshnivska put the useful window to slow Rassvet at about a year. Russia, by Ukrainian calculations, needs five to eight years to see it through.

Ukraine is building an artificial intelligence system to analyze battlefield data, help commanders plan operations, and forecast Russia's possible moves, its Defense Ministry said. The system keeps the data it runs on behind a protected perimeter.

The logic behind the project: Ukraine can already read the battlefield from drone footage and sensor feeds, but converting that picture into orders is the harder, still-human half where wars are decided.

What SPECTR is built to do

SPECTR comes from A1, the AI center inside Ukraine's Defense Ministry. Its head, Danylo Tsvok, said Ukraine holds a unique store of data on how this war is fought, and SPECTR is designed to help turn that into a real edge on the ground.

The system is built to analyze incoming information, spot patterns, draft recommendations for planning operations, and automate the routine work in headquarters. Troops would work with frontline information faster.

"Essentially, we are building an operating system for warfighting. It will help the military choose effective courses of action and predict the enemy’s possible moves," Tsvok said.

SPECTR will run inside systems the Defense Forces already use, and on local devices set aside for sensitive data.

The center behind an AI-driven army

The ministry set up A1 in March 2026 with backing from the UK government, aiming to turn AI into Ukraine's battlefield advantage and build an "AI-driven army." That effort runs along three tracks: faster, data-based decisions, AI built into weapons and less bureaucracy in the ranks. The center is working on three flagship projects. Some of its solutions are already being tested by units.

Russian drones and missiles struck Kyiv data centers over 23–24 September, knocking out internet and hosting providers. The Digital Transformation Ministry said about 100,000 subscribers lost service, NV Business reported.

Russia has widened its air campaign from power plants and warehouses to railways, fuel stations, and now digital infrastructure as it tries to grind down the country's ability to function before another war winter.

"You'd have to destroy 70-80% of Kyiv's buildings"

MiroHost founder and Internet Invest Group head Oleksandr Olshanskyi told NV Business the attack destroyed his own data center.

"Most critically important data and systems have been moved abroad or to the cloud," Olshanskyi said. "If an online store stops working, that's unpleasant but not a tragedy."

He called rumors about a full internet blackout or sharp service price hikes baseless.

"Destroying all internet in a simple way is impossible—you'd have to use nuclear or chemical weapons or destroy 70-80% of buildings in Kyiv," he said.

What Russia hit

The strikes damaged a Kyiv data center housing UTELS switching equipment on 23 September. Overnight into 24 September, Russia destroyed equipment of hosting provider CityHost.UA and the data center housing MiroHost. About 95% of MiroHost's clients operate outside Ukraine and were unaffected, he said. Russia also struck the Pavutyna network's data center. Crazy Network said a missile struck Kyiv's central traffic exchange hub, cutting service for its subscribers in Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Khmelnytskyi Oblast.

Providers KIEVNET, Domonet, FAUST, and Etherlink also reported disruptions. Ukraine's telecom regulator NKEK said on 24 September that providers were completing emergency restoration, and Domonet estimated service would return by 21:00 that evening.

The 23 September strikes killed two people and injured more than 40, and hit a college building in Kyiv while students were on campus, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote that evening. Russia targeted major Ukrainian data centers "seeking to disrupt the flow of information," he said. "This is critical civilian infrastructure that ensures people can access life-saving information. It is not a military target."

"More sanctions pressure, more missile interceptors are the only way to stop this terror," Sybiha wrote. "These attacks must not become the new normal."

Panic, not military gain

Olshanskyi said Russia uses these strikes to spread fear, not achieve lasting results.

"The enemy's goal is to cause damage, inflame panic, and heighten nervousness," he said.

His data center's destruction "will not affect the situation at the front in any way," he said.

A Russian academic and an ultranationalist media owner have drawn up a menu of ways to knock out Starlink, the satellite network keeping Ukraine's drones and troops online, the Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported. The ideas run from jamming to a nuclear blast in space, and come as Poland investigates a suspicious fire at a Starlink ground station serving Ukraine.

Satellite internet is the nervous system of the drone war. Since a terminal cutoff early this year gutted Russian frontline coordination, Moscow's search for a workaround has widened from the spectrum to orbit—and from the battlefield toward the infrastructure that keeps the network alive.

The scenarios

Sergei Glazyev of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Konstantin Malofeyev, founder of the Russian outlet Tsargrad, laid out the proposals. Glazyev's list runs from cutting communication cables on land and undersea to crippling data centers and downing reconnaissance and command aircraft, whatever their nationality. Without American and British spotters, planners, and analysts, he claims, Ukraine's army would go blind. Glazyev's core argument is that Starlink satellites are not geostationary—nothing hangs over Ukraine, so the entire constellation must be struck at once.

For electronic warfare, they push wider use of the Volna Kupol Garant, a roughly $1.5 million system that beams a signal to briefly deafen a passing Starlink satellite over what its developers claim is up to 20 km². Kinetic options follow—the A-235 Nudol and S-500 Prometheus interceptors—though they call spending one costly missile on one cheap satellite "insane extravagance." A third idea scatters metal pellets to spark what the authors call the Kessler effect—a debris cascade that would destroy everything at that altitude.

The bluntest proposal detonates a nuclear device in space, its pulse frying electronics on low-orbit satellites. The authors admit this would also wreck Russia's own Rassvet network, which orbits at a similar altitude. "We can no longer hit Musk's creation for free," they write, "but it's still the optimal option. The legal consequences are unimportant."

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A station burns in Poland

On 23 September, fire destroyed the distribution panel of a ground Starlink station in Wola Krobowska that feeds Poland and Ukraine. Poland's Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said sabotage could not be ruled out and that the pattern matched Russian services' modus operandi. A bottle of flammable liquid was found beside the burned distribution panel, according to sources cited by RMF24. Exatel, which the minister named as the station's operator, said it only subleases the land and transmits data there, and neither operates nor owns the infrastructure.

France delivered additional MICA air-to-air missiles and 30mm cannon ammunition for Ukraine's Mirage 2000 fighter jets, Militarnyi reported, citing France's Armed Forces Ministry.

Delivering an aircraft is one step, keeping it armed is another. France's weapons resupply reflects a shift from one-off hardware transfers to sustained combat support as Russia's aerial campaign against Ukrainian cities grinds on.

What MICA does

The MICA, developed by MBDA, comes in two versions: radar-guided (MICA RF) and infrared (MICA IR). It weighs about 112 kg, flies at Mach 4.9—nearly five times the speed of sound—and can engage targets 60 to 80 km away.

Ukraine's Mirages have also carried older Magic 2 missiles limited to roughly 20 km. MICAs were reportedly included with the original donation, but the supply may have been limited, which would explain why the Magic 2s stayed in use. MICA triples to quadruples that engagement window, letting pilots intercept cruise missiles far earlier in their flight path. The fresh delivery keeps Ukraine's small fleet supplied with the missiles that make these longer-range interceptions possible.

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Cheap shells for cheap drones

The 30mm ammunition feeds the Mirage's two built-in DEFA 554 cannons, which fire at a selectable rate of 1,200 or 1,800 rounds per minute. A pilot who uses the gun on a Shahed drone saves a MICA for a target that actually needs one.

Ukraine's F-16 operations follow a similar logic: pilots use their 20mm Vulcan cannons alongside AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles, though Zelenskyy called the missile option expensive—used when nothing else can reach a jet drone, because "a human life is more important."

A Ukrainian Mirage 2000 shot down a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile during its very first combat mission, on 7 March 2025. France has delivered about a dozen modified Mirage 2000-5F jets since February 2025, and the fleet is still growing.

Ukraine's Third Army Corps says it became the first military unit in the world to use ground robots for mine clearance inside a live offensive, sending the machines ahead of its infantry into the deadliest sectors to keep soldiers out of the line of fire, Censor.NET reported. The corps built the capability from nothing during its Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive in Donetsk Oblast.

Keeping soldiers alive has become the organizing principle of how Ukraine fights, and handing the jobs most likely to kill them to ground robots is how an army that refuses to treat its people as expendable defends the line.

Robots cleared 30 km of routes in two nights

On the Shandryholove axis, the robots cleared 30 kilometers of routes in two nights—work that two companies of sappers would have needed a full week to finish. The corps reported no losses among its sappers there. Announcing the operation's second phase, corps commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi said protecting personnel drives how his troops plan and fight:

"People often ask, but what about our losses? My answer: we minimize them by every possible means. In assault operations, drones and ground robots always move ahead of the infantry," he said.

Robots clear most of the mines and mine Russian routes in return

The corps says it built the system from scratch and scaled it from a single squad up to the entire corps, arguing that manual clearing would be impossible across open terrain swept by fire. Ground robots now lift roughly 60% of the anti-personnel mines in its area of responsibility. They also work in reverse, remotely mining Russian advance routes—one crew can lay up to 200 meters a day, cutting off enemy reserves. The same machines carry frontline logistics, evacuating the wounded and hauling in provisions and equipment.

Operation Vivaldi continues in Donetsk Oblast, where the corps recently air-dropped robots behind Russian lines. Its advance has disrupted Russia's plan to encircle the fortified belt of Donetsk cities. In the second phase, the Third Army Corps liberated Shandryholove and Derylove and took full control of Drobysheve. Across the operation's first two phases, it has retaken 125 square kilometers.

Russian strikes have killed or wounded more Ukrainian civilians in the first eight months of 2026 than in all of last year, a senior United Nations official told the Security Council, Censor.net reported. The official warned that the toll keeps climbing as missiles and drones increasingly reach cities far from the front line. She also cautioned that mounting attacks on Ukraine's battered energy grid could push millions into a dark, cold winter.

In the war's fifth year, Russia's long-range strikes on Ukrainian cities have shifted the danger from the front to the streets where people live, and the rising civilian toll now tracks how far those weapons reach.

Casualties outpace all of 2025

Rosemary DiCarlo, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, gave the toll as the Council met on Ukraine, Ukrinform reported.

"In just the first eight months, more civilians were killed or injured in Ukraine than in all of 2025," she said.

The heavy toll already recorded in September shows the trend continuing, she added, as strikes hit populated areas away from the front.

The UN human rights office has confirmed at least 17,257 civilians killed since February 2022, including 835 children. Another 53,693 people have been wounded, among them 3,247 children, and DiCarlo said the real numbers are likely far higher. Kyiv and other cities have faced near-daily attacks in recent weeks, she said, with strikes hitting railways, shopping centers, gas stations, warehouses, and food and logistics firms.

A warning over the coming winter

DiCarlo said the mounting strikes on Ukraine's already-damaged energy infrastructure are especially worrying with another war winter near.

"The cumulative impact of these strikes could plunge millions of people into darkness and cold in the coming months," she said.

She urged an immediate moratorium on strikes on populated areas and urgent action to protect the power grid. Targeting civilians and civilian sites is prohibited under international law, she noted.

The warning follows the deadliest stretch of the war for civilians, when UN monitors counted 437 people killed in July, the worst monthly toll since May 2022. Russia has also renewed strikes on gas production and power plants ahead of the heating season.