Russia is concentrating missiles on a smaller, more specific set of targets, and its jet-powered attack drones are part of the reason, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed. Its combined attack overnight on 7 October killed 22 people in Pryluky, the State Emergency Service (SES) said as of the morning of 8 October. Russian milbloggers noted the shift the same day.

Russia often uses concentrated drone and missile strikes to overwhelm localized Ukrainian air defenses and destroy urban centers, ISW noted. Pryluky, where the strike killed children, was one of the areas a Russian channel says drew a significant share of the Kh-101s that night. With winter close, ISW expects the same pattern against Ukraine's energy grid, with jet drones partly letting Russia keep its missiles for priority targets without firing many more.

Missile waves on a few areas, Russian channels claim

Russia launched 48 Kh-101, Iskander-K, and Kalibr cruise missiles overnight on 7 October, Ukraine's Air Force reported. It also fired ballistic missiles, Zircon and Oniks anti-ship missiles, and 130 strike and decoy drones, 46 of them jet-powered Shahed-type models.

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22 killed in Russian missile strike on Pryluky, including five children

Russian milbloggers claimed the same day that Moscow had grouped a large part of its missile salvo into repeated waves on a few areas, while other weapons kept stretching Ukraine's air defenses elsewhere. The pro-war Russian Telegram channel Dva Mayora described the change as a switch from striking with splayed fingers to a series of hits with missile "fists." Defenders must then absorb a sharply rising load around one chosen site as one wave follows another, the channel claimed.

Citing Ukrainian monitoring channels, it claimed that roughly 30 or more Kh-101 cruise missiles flew toward Pryluky, Kremenchuk, Svitlovodsk, and Oleksandriia in Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kirovohrad oblasts. It put the Kremenchuk group at up to 15 missiles, Kh-101s and Kalibrs among them, aimed at the area of Kremenchuk and its hydroelectric plant.

Jet drones take some of the load off Russia's missiles

ISW said the jet-powered versions penetrate Ukrainian air defenses deeper and more reliably than propeller models. In ISW's assessment, that partly lets Russia concentrate cruise and ballistic missiles on priority targets without significantly raising missile use. Russia builds about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet drones a month, Ukraine's military intelligence agency (HUR) told Militarnyi in August.

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ISW expects Russia to apply the pattern in a likely brutal winter campaign against energy infrastructure. Russia likely intends to make city life untenable and force Ukraine to capitulate to its demands, ISW assessed. Such tactics have not worked before and are unlikely to work now, analysts added.

They called cheap countermeasures to jet drones and small cruise missiles vital, alongside Western air defense aid such as US-made Patriots, which can stop ballistic missiles. Ukraine has already paired a Soviet-era Kub launcher with American RIM-7 interceptors to catch jet drones.

Russian forces appear to use AI to plan air attacks and recognize targets amid raids on Ukrainian cities. This may include recent air attacks on Odesa that have come in waves with short gaps, Deputy Air Force Commander for Air Defense Colonel Yurii Cherevashenko says, Ukrinform reports.

Russia has already equipped its jet-powered Geran-4 drones with machine vision, allowing them to recognize and track targets on their own in the final seconds of flight. Recently, a single jet drone hit a locomotive in Odesa Oblast in late September and killed two railway workers.

The scale of Russia's AI use is hard to measure, Cherevashenko continues, but Ukrainian specialists already see its elements in how attacks are organized. The long, wave-by-wave strikes on Odesa would be far harder to plan and coordinate without it, he believes.

"Russian forces use AI to lay out attack routes and to recognize targets," Cherevashenko says, framing it as his own assessment rather than a confirmed fact.

The sea is harder to defend than land

Odesa Oblast is home to the biggest port in Ukraine, "Southern". Protecting it is a challenging task as guarding the airspace over water is tougher than over land, Cherevashenko says. Some air defense assets do not perform as well at sea, and in some cases, crews can intercept a target only as it approaches.

Weather adds to the problem, with storms and fog, while the open sea gives Russia more freedom to choose drone routes and launch points. To protect ports and the coast, Ukraine uses drone motherships, platforms that carry other drones aloft to extend their flight time and keep watch over set areas.

Ukraine answers AI with AI

Ukraine is also building its own AI for air defense. Automated turrets using machine vision now help counter Russian drones. According to Army Media, the Air Force says such turrets have scored their first shoot-downs, including of Geran-5 jet drones, with one soldier saying 50 rounds were enough to bring down a Geran.

Ukraine's Defense Ministry is going further. In late September, it unveiled an AI system called SPECTR, built by its A1 Artificial Intelligence Center and already in testing with several combat units, to analyze battlefield data, predict Russian moves, and suggest options to commanders.

Ukraine's battlefield successes appear to be forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory and shift focus toward long-range strikes to compel Ukraine to surrender, rather than advances on the battlefield, the Institute for the Study of War said on 4 October.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia used more than 800 jet-powered drones during the week of 27 September to 4 October. Ukraine currently intercepts only 50–60% of jet-powered drones, leaving it vulnerable to the large number of new drones Russia is deploying.

The late-September start and the campaign's aim

ISW said Russian forces began their winter 2026–27 strike campaign against Ukraine's energy infrastructure in late September and that the campaign is aimed at making civilian life unbearable enough to force Ukraine to capitulate.

Russian forces would step up attacks on military facilities, defense industry sites, and related infrastructure in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine, the Russian Defense Ministry said on 4 October, according to Reuters. The announcement followed Zelenskyy's vow to increase attacks on Russian oil refineries.

The ministry also claimed its recent strikes on Kyiv and other Ukrainian regions were a response to alleged Ukrainian attacks on civilian targets inside Russia. Among the grievances it named were Ukraine's strikes on Leningrad Oblast during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June and alleged strikes on electoral infrastructure in Moscow during the 18–20 September State Duma elections, according to ISW.

ISW called the Russian Defense Ministry's framing of the recent strikes as retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on Russian civilian targets unfounded, saying many of its specific claims are "blatantly false." Russia has provided no evidence that Ukraine targeted electoral infrastructure, and Ukraine's 19–20 September strikes on Moscow targeted oil refineries and warehouses, the think tank said. The Russian strikes "are not an actual response to specific events," it concluded.

The 135 drones, the bridges struck seven times

Overnight on 3–4 October, Russia launched 135 Shahed-type and Gerbera-type drones, while also using decoy drones and Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions. Ukrainian forces downed 123 drones and two loitering munitions, and strikes hit five locations, according to ISW, which cited the Ukrainian Air Force. Russian forces struck Kyiv's Northern and Southern bridges seven times between 1 and 4 October in an effort to disrupt Ukraine's economy and daily civilian life, ISW said.

Ukraine builds new layers of defense against jet drones

More than 12 .50-caliber machine-gun turrets are already working in Kyiv against jet-powered drones, and eight more will be installed in Kyiv Oblast, Zelenskyy said, Suspilne reported. He added that F-16s help a lot against the drones, according to Ukrinform. Ukraine is set to receive 2,000 Bars interceptor drones through joint production with Germany, RBC-Ukraine reported.

Ballistic missiles may be Russia's next wave

Zelenskyy said Ukraine estimates Russia has up to 700 ballistic missiles in reserve and produces 130–140 a month. He made the remarks at a joint media briefing with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Kyiv, Ukrinform reported. Russia is likely stockpiling ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles for intense strikes after its jet-powered drones lose their current advantage, ISW assessed. ISW also cited an ongoing shortage of Patriot interceptors.

OHCHR has verified some 15,280 civilian casualties in Ukraine in the first eight months of 2026, 55% more than in the same period of 2025, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said on 2 October.

Ukraine's former top commander has a warning for anyone betting that new gadgets will win the war, he wrote in a column for Ukrainska Pravda. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the country's Commander-in-Chief until 2024 and now its ambassador to the UK, argues 2026 is a war of technologies and, no less, of the strategies and doctrines that must keep pace with them. Bolting modern tech onto an old Soviet playbook, he says, drove mobilization into a dead end.

A year ago, Zaluzhnyi warned that Ukraine would need thousands of counter-drone systems and mass drone production to cope with the growing role of UAVs in war. A year later, those capabilities still aren't there at the scale he called for, mobilization has hit the dead end he now describes, and the four measures he proposed have not kept pace with how quickly drones are spreading.

Drones are already cheap, widespread, and shaping the war, and the front has gone static, Zaluzhnyi writes, while Russian strikes keep reaching railways and fuel stations far behind it.

This is no longer a drone war

The drones filling headlines no longer exist on their own, Zaluzhnyi writes. They have evolved into more familiar weapon types, cheaper and more effective—anyone still treating drones as a stand-alone class is about three years behind. Fixating on individual gadgets, he argues, misses the real contest: strategy and doctrine.

He reaches back to World War I for the danger he sees, running the line from Verdun and the Somme to Robotyne and Bakhmut. Before that war, soldiers in one army marched in bright red trousers that were supposed to help against repeating rifles, machine guns, and long-range artillery, and later against tanks and aircraft.

Today's faith in old security guarantees, he warns, is that same proud symbol worn onto a modern battlefield.

"The red trousers taught them nothing," he writes of those still moving tanks and artillery toward the fight by yesterday's logic.

New weapons, old strategy

The war has surrendered itself to marketers and wheeler-dealers, Zaluzhnyi writes—people who, without understanding or strategy, stoke it for quick profit while flaunting the pace of technological progress. Trying to retake land with Soviet methods and new weapons drove mobilization into a dead end, and fewer and fewer people were willing to take the one chance it offered.

"Damn marketing that kills," he adds.

The way out, he argues, is to treat technology as a new weapon, build tactics around it, and only then reshape the force.

That is what he calls doctrine, built through resource and technological alliances into a strategy for victory. Ukraine and Russia, he writes, have become real-time testing grounds.

What he warned a year ago

In September 2025, Zaluzhnyi named the four fights Ukraine had to win to survive mass drone warfare: counter-drone systems at scale, state-level drone production, integrated battlefield networks, and channeling tech talent into defense industries.

The counter-drone systems he put first are still short of the scale he warned Ukraine would need. Mobilization, he writes, has hit a dead end, and marketers—not the doctrine he calls for—are setting the pace.

Russia is building large new production halls at the Tatarstan site where it assembles the Shahed/Geran-type attack drones it fires at Ukrainian cities, the Ukrainian geospatial and satellite intelligence analyst Dnipro Osint reported, publishing satellite images of the work. At least five long buildings stand finished in the southern part of the Alabuga special economic zone, with internal roads and access ways laid around them and further construction under way. What the new halls are for is not known yet.

What the images show

Several of the large workshops in the zone's southern section are already complete, and several more sites are in active construction, the analyst said. Laid roadways, and the outlines of additional buildings appear beside the finished rows, and he published the coordinates of the site along with the images.

The plant behind the nightly waves

The zone lies near the city of Yelabuga, more than 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, and has been one of Russia's principal military plants since 2023. It assembles the Shahed-type strike drones Russia calls Gerans, along with the Gerbera decoys flown alongside them, built at a tenth of a Shahed's cost to make Ukrainian air defense spend interceptors on empty airframes.

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Output has climbed with the attacks. Russia builds about 3,000 of the jet-powered version a month, by Ukrainian military intelligence's count, and has accumulated a reserve of more than 6,000 Gerans for large-scale attacks. The zone itself expanded by 340 hectares in a year, media reported in May.

Chinese firms supply the engines, navigation systems, and avionics, with Iran's role reduced to consultations and occasional deliveries, while Moscow claims the drones are fully localized. The workforce includes teenage students from the site's own Alabuga Polytech college and women recruited as labor migrants from African and Central Asian countries, some of whom were later sent to the occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant.

Struck repeatedly, expanding anyway

Ukrainian long-range drones have hit the zone's workshops more than once, including a confirmed strike on Shahed storage there. None of them disabled the facility, since Ukrainian long-range drones carry too little explosive to wreck industrial buildings. Russia has also fortified the site, installing more than 20 towers with heavy machine guns on its territory and perimeter.