A US-based recruit was promised up to $1,500 to surveil a prominent Russian dissident before being offered $40,000 to “eliminate” or “disappear” the target, the US Justice Department (DOJ) said on 15 September.
The charges connect that alleged plot to what prosecutors describe as a wider Russian assassination network operating since at least 2024 against dissidents, defectors, and countries perceived as supporting Ukraine.
A federal grand jury in Manhattan indicted five alleged membe
A US-based recruit was promised up to $1,500 to surveil a prominent Russian dissident before being offered $40,000 to “eliminate” or “disappear” the target, the US Justice Department (DOJ) said on 15 September.
The charges connect that alleged plot to what prosecutors describe as a wider Russian assassination network operating since at least 2024 against dissidents, defectors, and countries perceived as supporting Ukraine.
A federal grand jury in Manhattan indicted five alleged members of what prosecutors call the “RIS Network”:
Yuri Khrameev, 63: A Russian national and former colonel in the Russian intelligence services who allegedly recruited people to kill Russian dissidents.
Kirill Khrameev, 27: Yuri Khrameev’s son and an officer in the FSB, Russia’s principal security service and a successor to the Soviet KGB.
Oemis Romagoza Durruthy, 35: A Cuban national living in Russia who allegedly coordinated attacks and arranged travel for operatives.
Yaidel Delgado Suarez, 35: A Cuban national accused of recruiting people in the US for surveillance and murder.
Angel Eduardo Castro, 22: A Venezuelan national accused of helping Suarez recruit US residents to spy on and kill a Russian dissident.
Suarez sent the US resident two locations associated with the dissident, according to the indictment. After the resident delivered photographs and videos, prosecutors say, Suarez and Castro made the $40,000 offer. When the resident declined to carry out the killing, they allegedly asked whether he knew “someone [who] can do the work.”
In 2025, the indictment alleges, Kirill Khrameev recruited a US citizen to photograph a target in Lithuania for a promised $200. Yuri Khrameev then offered approximately $25,000 to kill the man. When the recruit refused, Khrameev allegedly proposed a “simpler job”: burning a warehouse or attacking an electrical substation. He said the purpose was to target countries helping Ukraine, according to prosecutors.
Prosecutors also allege that Durruthy coordinated travel and logistics for attacks in Prague, Czechia, in June 2024 and in Lithuania that September. The Justice Department did not specify what either attack involved.
All five defendants are charged with conspiracy to finance terrorism, carrying up to 20 years in prison. Yuri Khrameev, Suarez, and Castro also face a murder-for-hire conspiracy charge carrying up to 10 years.
All five remain at large. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Moscow saw no need to comment without “credible evidence,” Reuters reported. An indictment is an allegation, and the defendants are presumed innocent.
From military espionage to alleged murder plots
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, its covert campaign against Ukraine’s Western allies has combined intelligence gathering with escalating sabotage. CSIS found that suspected Russian attacks in Europe nearly tripled from 2023 to 2024, often using locally recruited agents against infrastructure and industries supporting Ukraine.
In August 2025, US prosecutors charged active-duty soldier Taylor Adam Lee with trying to transmit Abrams tank information and deliver hardware to someone he believed represented the Russian government, allegedly in exchange for Russian citizenship. That case involved an American insider allegedly offering military secrets, not a proven Russian recruitment operation.
After the Russian convoy docked in Tobruk, a column including armored personnel carriers, mine-resistant vehicles, and at least three Tornado-U armored trucks was seen heading west from the port in imagery published by the open-source intelligence project Russia Maritime Watch, as reported by Militarnyi.
The armor delivery comes as Russian forces have lost more than 10,000 armored and protected vehicles in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, Britain’s defense chief said.
After the Russian convoy docked in Tobruk, a column including armored personnel carriers, mine-resistant vehicles, and at least three Tornado-U armored trucks was seen heading west from the port in imagery published by the open-source intelligence project Russia Maritime Watch, as reported by Militarnyi.
The armor delivery comes as Russian forces have lost more than 10,000 armored and protected vehicles in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, Britain’s defense chief said. Africa Defense Forum reported that Moscow is funding work at six Libyan air bases, some of which support the movement of weapons and personnel toward Sudan and the Sahel. Russia’s Africa Corps already supports military governments in the Sahel, including Mali’s, while a Russian-operated base in Libya has supplied Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.
The cargo ships Anastasiia and Yuriy Arshenevskiy carried the shipment, while the Aleksandr Shabalin, a Russian Navy landing ship capable of transporting vehicles and troops, provided an armed escort, according to Militarnyi.
All three vessels crossed the Mediterranean without broadcasting Automatic Identification System data, the signal normally used to reveal a ship’s position.
Russia’s new foothold in Tobruk? New imagery appears to show APCs/MRAPs, logistics vehicles and other military equipment being unloaded in Tobruk following the arrival of ANASTASIIA and YURIY ARSHENEVSKIY, escorted by the Ropucha-class ALEKSANDR SHABALIN. The shipment adds to… https://t.co/clXt2U2t5Q
This was at least the second Russian military shipment to reach Tobruk under naval escort this year. Both cargo ships are under sanctions and have previously carried military cargo. Satellite imagery showed equipment being loaded onto them in August at Baltiysk, a naval base in Russia’s Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, Militarnyi reported.
In January 2026, the sanctioned Mys Zhelaniyadelivered military cargo to Tobruk under escort by a large Russian anti-submarine warship.
Tobruk lies in eastern Libya, which is controlled by forces loyal to commander Khalifa Haftar. The six bases under development host Russian personnel, air defenses, combat aircraft, and drones.
Maaten al-Sarra, one of the six bases, lies near Libya’s borders with Chad and Sudan and supports Russian operations extending toward Sudan and the Sahel, the belt of countries immediately south of the Sahara.
Russian and Libyan authorities have not said who will receive the latest cargo, so there is no confirmation that the vehicles are intended for the Africa Corps, the Russian Defense Ministry-run force that took over much of Wagner’s former role in Africa.
Africa Defense Forum reported that Moscow pivoted toward Libya after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, having previously used Syria as a transit hub. Moving the vehicles under naval escort as Russian forces absorb continuing battlefield losses in Ukraine underscores the importance Moscow appears to place on keeping its African corridor supplied.
How Russia expands its reach across Africa
Libya is one node in Russia’s wider African system. Through the Africa Corps, Moscow supports autocracy-minded military governments and armed groups throughout the continent in exchange for political influence and access to natural resources. Human rights groups and local residents have accused Russian personnel and their partners of killings and other abuses against civilians, including in Mali.
Ukraine’s military intelligence says Kremlin-backed Russian Houses seek to cultivate young Africans with pro-Moscow views. Moscow also invests in education programs and cultural events across the continent to spread a positive image of Russia, its politics, and its culture.
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry said in August that nearly 500 Africans recruited into Russia’s military had died. Ukrainian drone specialists are also helping forces fighting Russian troops in Mali and operating in Sudan and Libya, CNN reported.
A large-scale police operation is underway after a drone of unknown origin crashed 1 kilometer from a Bundeswehr base, German media outlet Bild reported on 15 September.
Drones have repeatedly flown over German military bases, and German prosecutors are already treating one August find near Ukraine-bound cargo as attempted sabotage. Germany's military counterintelligence has tied repeated sabotage on German soil to Russia, with high probability. Neither the owner nor the origin of this
A large-scale police operation is underway after a drone of unknown origin crashed 1 kilometer from a Bundeswehr base, German media outlet Bild reported on 15 September.
Drones have repeatedly flown over German military bases, and German prosecutors are already treating one August find near Ukraine-bound cargo as attempted sabotage. Germany's military counterintelligence has tied repeated sabotage on German soil to Russia, with high probability. Neither the owner nor the origin of this drone is known. Russia has denied involvement in earlier incidents, some of which Germany has officially attributed to it.
Discovery near airbase triggers large-scale search
Parts of the drone were found east of Lake Steinhude, the media outlet said. The crash site is one kilometer from the Bundeswehr's Wunstorf air base in Lower Saxony, the German military confirmed to the outlet. The drone crashed in an open, uninhabited area, the state criminal police office said. After the debris was discovered, authorities launched a large-scale search operation in the area to find additional parts of the UAV, according to Bild.
Investigators do not yet know who owns the drone
The search continues, and the state criminal police office says there are so far no indications of a danger to the public. Investigators learned about the discovery on Monday and want to analyze any other drone parts they find to determine its origin, the media outlet reported. Only then could more be said about the circumstances of the crash, it added.
Explore further
Germany will close Russia’s Bonn consulate after attributing Leipzig Airport drone attack to Moscow
Drones have been spotted over Bundeswehr bases many times
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the number of reports of drone sightings has "increased significantly" and become "more consistent," a spokesperson for the Bundeswehr Operations Command told RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland (RND) in August.
"Overall, several hundred suspected drone overflights have been reported in the area of the German Armed Forces in recent years," the command spokesperson told RND.
What came before this crash
Germany is the busiest front in Russia's covert campaign in Europe. A Semtex-laden drone turned up beside a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle airport in August, and investigators this month named a Russian intelligence operative and a Belarusian petty criminal. Berlin blamed Moscow and ordered Russia's Bonn consulate closed.
Two Bulgarians were arrested over a September arson at a Munich building site between two defense-tech headquarters, a day after two attempts to sabotage the power grid that Germany has not attributed. Germany suspects a planned assassination of a Bavarian drone maker's boss, watched by agents hired for single jobs.
Explore further
The throwaway agents Moscow sent after a Bavarian drone boss arming Ukraine—and how Germany stopped them
Not every strand leads to Moscow. German military counterintelligence this week attributed part of the drone activity over Bundeswehr sites to Chinese intelligence.
Elsewhere the tempo holds: Polish prosecutors have opened more than a hundred espionage cases in 20 months, and in the Netherlands a former commander of US Army forces in Europe said Russian saboteurs attacked the rail network and tried to kill him, which Dutch Railways said they knew nothing about.
Bien que ces deux concepts appartiennent à des mondes totalement différents (les neurosciences cognitives humaines et l'informatique), ils partagent une métaphore commune : la superposition de couches de traitement pour extraire du sens.
— Permalien
Bien que ces deux concepts appartiennent à des mondes totalement différents (les neurosciences cognitives humaines et l'informatique), ils partagent une métaphore commune : la superposition de couches de traitement pour extraire du sens.
— Permalien
Bibliothèque René-Richard, Baie-Saint-Paul (Québec), inaugurée en 1998. Photo : Marie D. Martel, octobre 2025.
Ce texte est le deuxième d’une série consacrée aux transformations de la lecture. Après avoir discuté de l’hypothèse d’une société « postlittéraire », à partir de l’article de Rose Horowitch, The End of Reading Is Here, je m’intéresse ici à l’autre versant de la question : qu’est-ce qui fait qu’une société demeure une société de lecteurs et de lectrices?
Chaque 12 août, depuis mai
Bibliothèque René-Richard, Baie-Saint-Paul (Québec), inaugurée en 1998. Photo : Marie D. Martel, octobre 2025.
Ce texte est le deuxième d’une série consacrée aux transformations de la lecture. Après avoir discuté de l’hypothèse d’une société « postlittéraire », à partir de l’article de Rose Horowitch, The End of Reading Is Here, je m’intéresse ici à l’autre versant de la question : qu’est-ce qui fait qu’une société demeure une société de lecteurs et de lectrices?
Chaque 12 août, depuis maintenant plus d’une décennie, l’initiative J’achète un livre québécois! invite les Québécoises et les Québécois à entrer dans une librairie et à repartir avec un livre d’ici. Si on en a les moyens, le geste est simple : choisir un livre, l’acheter, peut-être le lire, le donner ou en parler. Et pourtant, cette journée dit quelque chose d’important sur la lecture : une culture du livre ne se maintient pas toute seule. Elle se construit, se transmet et s’entretient.
Cette réflexion s’est aussi nourrie des conversations que j’ai eues autour du 12 août, d’abord avec Alexandre Sirois dans La Presse, puis à ICI Côte-Nord, avec Catherine Paquette et mon collègue Mathieu Dauphinais, de la Bibliothèque de Sept-Îles. Plutôt que de rester prisonniers et prisonnières de la question spectaculaire de « la fin de la lecture », je voudrais donc déplacer le regard vers ce qui permet à la lecture de continuer à occuper une place dans nos vies : si nous voulons demeurer une société de lecteurs et de lectrices, quelles conditions devons-nous collectivement préserver?
Car on ne devient pas lecteur ou lectrice par la seule force de sa volonté. On le devient parce que des livres se trouvent à portée de main. Parce que quelqu’un nous en a lu lorsque nous étions enfants. Parce que nous avons parfois grandi dans une famille où les livres étaient présents, où lire allait de soi, où certaines habitudes, dispositions et familiarités avec la culture nous ont été transmises. La lecture est aussi affaire d’héritage culturel, au sens où l’entendaient Pierre Bourdieu et Jean-Claude Passeron — et cet héritage est inégalement distribué.
Mais ce qui n’est pas hérité peut aussi se construire ailleurs. Parce qu’une personne enseignante nous a fait découvrir un livre qui nous parlait. Parce qu’une bibliothécaire a su nous conseiller. Parce qu’une librairie existe dans notre quartier ou qu’une bibliothèque scolaire ou publique nous permet d’emprunter gratuitement. Parce que nous avons vu d’autres personnes lire, entendu parler de livres, reçu des recommandations, participé à une heure du conte ou à un club de lecture.
C’est là que les institutions et les communautés prennent toute leur importance : elles peuvent élargir, prolonger, parfois même compenser ce qui n’a pas été transmis dans la famille. Au contact de ces personnes, de ces lieux et de ces expériences se construisent progressivement les capacités, les habitudes, l’attention, le désir et la motivation nécessaires pour entrer dans un texte et y demeurer. Autrement dit, la lecture est une pratique sociale avant d’être seulement une compétence individuelle.
L’infrastructure de la lecture
On parle beaucoup de l’accès aux livres. Avec raison. Mais avoir des livres disponibles ne suffit pas à faire des lecteurs et des lectrices. Entre la présence d’un livre sur une tablette et son appropriation par une personne existe tout un monde de médiations : familles, écoles, bibliothèques, librairies, maisons d’édition, médias, organismes communautaires, auteurs et autrices, enseignants et enseignantes, bibliothécaires, événements littéraires, politiques culturelles et éducatives. C’est cette infrastructure de la lecture qui m’intéresse.
Le mot infrastructure peut sembler étrange lorsqu’il est question de lecture. Nous l’associons plus spontanément aux routes, aux réseaux électriques ou aux télécommunications. Mais les pratiques culturelles reposent elles aussi sur des infrastructures, certaines matérielles, d’autres sociales et institutionnelles. Elles sont souvent peu visibles, comme nous l’a enseigné Susan Leigh Star, précisément parce que, lorsqu’elles fonctionnent bien, nous finissons par les tenir pour acquises.
Une société de lecteurs et de lectrices repose ainsi sur une véritable écologie de la lecture : des livres, certes, mais également des lieux où les rencontrer, des personnes qui les font circuler, des institutions qui en garantissent l’accès, des communautés dans lesquelles on peut en parler et, chose peut-être de plus en plus précieuse, du temps et de l’attention pour les lire.
Cette manière d’envisager la lecture rejoint aussi les travaux que nous avons menés autour de la littératie communautaire. Celle-ci invite précisément à ne pas considérer la littératie comme une compétence qui se développerait uniquement dans l’individu ou dans l’école, mais à regarder l’ensemble des milieux, des relations, des acteurs et actrices qui contribuent à la rendre possible. Les pratiques de littératie sont situées : elles prennent forme dans des communautés, des institutions et des contextes sociaux particuliers, traversés par la diversité et par des conditions d’accès inégales.
Cette perspective permet alors et surtout de déplacer le regard de la responsabilité individuelle vers une responsabilité partagée. Familles, écoles, bibliothèques, organismes communautaires, librairies, institutions culturelles et politiques publiques ne jouent évidemment pas le même rôle, mais leurs actions sont interdépendantes et peuvent se renforcer mutuellement. Soutenir la lecture revient alors moins à demander aux individus de lire davantage qu’à construire intentionnellement et collectivement les conditions dans lesquelles lire devient possible, significatif et désirable.
Les bibliothèques : créer les conditions de la rencontre
Mais un autre chiffre retient particulièrement mon attention : les activités proposées par les bibliothèques ont attiré 1,5 million de participations, soit 33 % de plus qu’en 2022. La reprise de la participation aux activités a donc été plus rapide que celle des entrées physiques — même si, dans les deux cas, les niveaux demeuraient encore inférieurs à ceux d’avant la pandémie.
Il ne faudrait pas faire dire à ces chiffres davantage qu’ils ne permettent d’établir. Ils ne prouvent pas que les Québécois et les Québécoises fréquentent désormais les bibliothèques davantage pour leurs activités que pour leurs collections. Ils nous rappellent cependant quelque chose que l’on ne peut plus ignorer : une bibliothèque ne se contente pas de mettre des livres à disposition.
L’accès et la médiation sont deux choses différentes, mais complémentaires. Nous avons beaucoup travaillé, à juste titre, à démocratiser l’accès aux livres et à l’information. Le défi de notre temps pourrait être aussi de préserver — et peut-être de renforcer — les conditions sociales de leur appropriation.
Les effets se font sentir au-delà des murs de l’école. Lors du récent Congrès mondial d’IBBY à Ottawa, j’ai entendu des maisons d’édition jeunesse québécoises témoigner directement des répercussions de ces mesures sur leurs ventes. J’y étais moi-même pour présenter une étude sur les contestations et la censure des livres jeunesse en matière de sexualité ainsi que de diversité sexuelle et de genre au Canada, ce qui rappelle une autre manière dont cette infrastructure peut être compromise : non seulement lorsque les ressources diminuent, mais lorsque certains livres sont retirés, déplacés, restreints ou rendus plus difficiles d’accès.
On pourrait encore allonger la liste. Un bilan critique récent fait ainsi état d’une « érosion silencieuse » de la mission de BAnQ. Il faudrait aussi parler du financement longtemps jugé insuffisant dans le milieu des CRSBP (Réseaux BIBLIO), malgré les bonifications récentes, alors que ceux-ci jouent un rôle déterminant dans l’accès aux bibliothèques sur une grande partie du territoire québécois. Ces institutions ont ceci de particulier qu’elles relèvent, à des degrés divers, d’une responsabilité nationale plutôt que strictement municipale — comme les bibliothèques scolaires — et qu’elles semblent pourtant demeurer dans l’angle mort des politiques publiques. À filer la métaphore de l’infrastructure, les nids-de-poule ne manquent pas sur la route historique de la littératie au Québec.
Ces phénomènes sont évidemment différents, mais ils invitent à regarder l’ensemble du réseau du livre et de la lecture, plutôt qu’une simple chaîne linéaire. Lorsqu’un de ses nœuds s’affaiblit, ce sont les possibilités de rencontre entre une diversité d’œuvres et leurs publics, jeunes ou moins jeunes, qui se réduisent. Le paradoxe est alors frappant. D’un côté, nous nous inquiétons du recul de la lecture chez les jeunes et cherchons des moyens de leur donner le goût des livres. De l’autre, nous fragilisons parfois les conditions mêmes qui leur permettent de les rencontrer.
Lorsque nous constatons que certains jeunes lisent moins, la question ne peut donc pas être uniquement : Pourquoi ne lisent-ils pas davantage? Elle doit également être, encore une fois : quelles conditions leur donnons-nous pour devenir lecteurs et lectrices?
Le 12 août : rendre visible une écologie du livre et de la lecture
C’est ce qui donne au 12 août une portée qui dépasse l’achat individuel d’un livre. J’achète un livre québécois! met en lumière, pendant une journée, tout un réseau : des auteurs et autrices écrivent, des maisons d’édition publient, des librairies font circuler les œuvres, des bibliothèques et des écoles les rendent accessibles, des médiateurs et médiatrices les font découvrir, des lecteurs et lectrices les lisent, les recommandent et les transmettent.
Acheter un livre québécois ne « sauvera » évidemment ni la lecture ni « la civilisation » — ce n’est d’ailleurs pas l’ambition de l’initiative. Mais l’événement accomplit quelque chose de moins sensationnel mais peut-être de plus intéressant : il rend le livre visible et socialement désirable.
Car les pratiques culturelles ne se développent pas sur le seul mode de l’injonction : il faut lire davantage. Elles se nourrissent de désir, de curiosité, de rencontres et d’une communauté qui leur accorde de la valeur. À sa manière, le 12 août contribue à entretenir une culture dans laquelle les livres et la lecture comptent.
Et les jeunes?
La question devient particulièrement pressante lorsqu’on observe le recul de certaines pratiques de lecture chez les jeunes. Il est tentant d’en chercher la cause du côté des écrans, de TikTok, des téléphones ou du manque d’attention. L’intelligence artificielle ajoute toutefois une dimension nouvelle. La technologie peut désormais non seulement concurrencer la lecture, mais accomplir une partie de son travail à notre place.
Les outils d’intelligence artificielle générative peuvent résumer un livre, expliquer un texte difficile, répondre à des questions sur son contenu et même produire une analyse qui donne toutes les apparences de la compréhension. Ils peuvent certes soutenir l’apprentissage, mais ils rendent aussi possible quelque chose d’assez radical : obtenir certains des produits de la lecture sans avoir accompli soi-même le travail de lecture.
C’est pourquoi la lecture profonde (Deep Reading) me paraît devenir, paradoxalement, plus importante à l’ère de l’IA — cette forme de lecture attentive, réflexive et exigeante à laquelle se sont notamment intéressées Maryanne Wolf et Naomi Baron, et sur laquelle je reviendrai dans un prochain billet. Ce qui est en jeu n’est pas tant la survie du livre comme objet que l’expérience de la lecture elle-même : entrer dans un texte complexe, y consacrer du temps et de l’attention, l’interpréter, le confronter à d’autres idées et construire son propre jugement.
L’enjeu pour les bibliothèques comme pour les différentes instances des réseaux de littératie, sera donc moins d’empêcher l’usage de ces outils que de faire en sorte qu’ils soutiennent l’apprentissage et la pensée plutôt qu’ils ne nous dispensent de penser.
Entretenir une culture de la lecture
C’est peut-être là que le diagnostic d’une société « postlittéraire » devient utile, à condition de ne pas en faire une prophétie. La lecture n’est peut-être pas en train de disparaître. Elle devient une pratique qu’il faut activement soutenir. Non pas en idéalisant un âge d’or où tout le monde aurait lu de longs romans — il n’a probablement jamais existé — ni en opposant systématiquement le livre aux écrans. Mais en nous demandant quelles expériences de lecture nous jugeons suffisamment précieuses pour vouloir les transmettre et les préserver.
Cela suppose bien sûr des livres, des lieux et des personnes qui les font circuler. Mais aussi quelque chose de plus difficile à protéger : du temps et des espaces pour lire, réfléchir et discuter sans être constamment sollicités ailleurs. Acheter un livre québécois le 12 août est un geste culturel. Faire en sorte que nous ayons encore le désir, le temps et la capacité de le lire est un projet social.
Ce billet reprend le mot d’ouverture prononcé dans le cadre du marathon d’écriture « Wikipédia – 25 ans, fière et engagée », organisé à l’Université du Québec à Montréal le 26 mars, à l’occasion du Printemps de la recherche et de la création en collaboration avec Wikimédia Canada et l’Institut de recherches et d’études féministes. Cet événement, porté aussi par le collectif Les sans pagEs – Montréal, dans lequel je suis impliquée, visait à soutenir la création et l’amélioration d’articles cons
Ce billet reprend le mot d’ouverture prononcé dans le cadre du marathon d’écriture « Wikipédia – 25 ans, fière et engagée », organisé à l’Université du Québec à Montréal le 26 mars, à l’occasion du Printemps de la recherche et de la création en collaboration avec Wikimédia Canada et l’Institut de recherches et d’études féministes. Cet événement, porté aussi par le collectif Les sans pagEs – Montréal, dans lequel je suis impliquée, visait à soutenir la création et l’amélioration d’articles consacrés à des femmes chercheuses, militantes, ainsi qu’à des personnes issues de communautés encore trop peu visibles en ligne.
-> À noter que le support de présentation utilisé lors de cette intervention est disponible à la fin du billet.
Je suis très heureuse d’être avec vous aujourd’hui pour ouvrir ce marathon d’écriture Wikipédia. Je me présente brièvement : je suis Marie D. Martel, professeure à l’EBSI, à l’Université de Montréal, et impliquée dans le groupe Les sans pagEs Montréal, un collectif engagé dans l’amélioration de la représentation des personnes s’identifiant comme femmes et marginalisées sur Wikipédia. Merci pour cette invitation, merci à Simon Côté-Lapointe, bibliothécaire à l’UQAM, pour la qualité de son engagement et de l’organisation.
Fondée en 2001, Wikipédia célèbre ses 25 ans cette année. En un quart de siècle, elle est devenue une infrastructure majeure du savoir, avec plus de 60 millions d’articles, dont plus de 2,5 millions en français, dans plus de 300 langues, et des centaines de millions de consultations chaque mois. Mais il faut insister sur un point fondamental : Wikipédia ne fait pas que diffuser le savoir, elle contribue aussi à définir ce qui est visible, reconnu et documenté. Une personne sans page Wikipédia est beaucoup moins visible, moins citée, moins reconnue ; à l’inverse, le simple fait d’y être présent contribue à sa reconnaissance dans l’espace public.
Lorsque l’on regarde les données, le constat est clair. Environ 19 % des biographies dans les projets Wikimédia concernent les personnes identifiées comme femmes, et à peine plus de 20 % sur Wikipédia en français. Les autres identités de genre restent presque invisibles, autour de 0,15 %. Du côté de Wikidata, la base de données qui structure ces contenus, on observe également des écarts : environ 24% de femmes pour le Canada, contre 33 % à l’échelle globale. Ce sont des chiffres qui ne traduisent pas seulement un manque : ils révèlent un déséquilibre structurel dans la manière dont le savoir est produit et rendu visible.
Ce déséquilibre s’explique en grande partie par la composition de la communauté contributrice. Les enquêtes de la Wikimedia Foundation montrent que celle-ci reste encore largement masculine, historiquement entre 80 et 90 % de personnes identifiées comme hommes y contribuent. Cela a des effets directs : moins d’articles sur les personnes identifiées comme femmes, certains sujets moins développés, et plus largement, il y a une reproduction des hiérarchies existantes dans les sources.
Quand on dit qu’il y a une « reproduction des hiérarchies existantes dans les sources », on veut dire que Wikipédia dépend fortement de sources déjà reconnues — comme les articles dans les médias, les articles et les ouvrages académiques ou les institutions. Or, ces sources ne sont pas neutres. Historiquement, elles ont davantage documenté : les hommes, les figures institutionnelles, les trajectoires dominantes Et beaucoup moins : les femmes, les personnes autochtones, les actrices communautaires ou certaines figures locales.
Or, Wikipédia s’appuie sur ces sources pour l’écritute des articles… et donc, ce faisant, elle reproduit les mêmes déséquilibres. Autrement dit, Wikipédia ne fait pas que refléter le monde, elle contribue aussi à perpétuer et structurer certaines inégalités dans la production et la circulation du savoir.
Dans le cas du Québec, la situation se complexifie encore. Les contributeurs de Wikipédia en français sont majoritairement européens, et notamment français. La présence canadienne y est relativement faible : on l’estime autour de 7 %, avec environ 300 personnes contributives actives canadiennes contre près de 4000 françaises. Mais on ne dispose pas de données précises permettant d’identifier la part de la contribution québécoise, ni celle des contributrices.
Cette absence de données est en soi révélatrice : elle rend difficile la mesure des inégalités tout en contribuant à invisibiliser des dynamiques territoriales, sociales et culturelles bien réelles.
À cela s’ajoute une reconnaissance moindre de certaines sources québécoises dans les protocoles d’évaluation, notamment lorsque le statut de médias comme Le Devoir ou La Presse comme sources nationales est questionné. Alors, les effets sont cumulatifs : invisibilisation des personnes identifiées comme femmes, invisibilisation des figures québécoises, et sous-documentation de nombreuses trajectoires locales. Nous sommes donc face, à tout le moins, à un double biais, à la fois de genre et géographique.
C’est dans ce contexte que s’inscrit le projet Les sans pagEs qui vise à combler le fossé des genres sur Wikipédia, notamment à travers des éditathons comme celui d’aujourd’hui, et aussi par la formation et l’accompagnement à l’écriture. Mais il ne s’agit pas seulement de produire des articles : il s’agit aussi de créer des communautés, de rendre la contribution plus accessible et de valoriser d’autres trajectoires et d’autres savoirs.
Il existe plusieurs autres initiatives : Art + féminisme, WikiGap, le projet Women in Red, le marathon d’aujourd’hui. Ce sont des initiatives très fortes, mais elles ont leurs limites : elles reposent largement sur le bénévolat, elles restent ponctuelles et elles ne transforment pas automatiquement les structures qui produisent les inégalités.
C’est ici qu’intervient la notion de féminisme des données. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’ajouter des femmes dans les données, mais de transformer les conditions mêmes de production du savoir. Les travaux de Catherine D’Ignazio et Lauren Klein montrent que les données ne sont jamais neutres : elles sont produites dans des contextes sociaux et reflètent des rapports de pouvoir. Cela implique de se demander qui décide des critères, quelles sources sont reconnues, qu’est-ce qui rend visible — ou invisibilise — certains savoirs. L’enjeu n’est donc pas seulement de combler un manque, mais de transformer le système qui le produit.
Aujourd’hui, en participant à ce marathon, vous pouvez faire encore bien plus qu’écrire des articles. On peut aussi s’exercer à développer une conscience critique et envisager d’autres niveaux d’action dans une perspective de féminisme des données.
À un second niveau, nous chercherons, en outre, à analyser les biais et à rendre plus visibles les inégalités. Comment ? En mesurant les écarts, en identifiant les absences, en repérant les déséquilibres dans les contenus ou les catégories. Il s’agit également de montrer comment les systèmes de classification participent eux-mêmes à l’invisibilisation de certaines figures, afin de mieux comprendre ces mécanismes. C’est dans cette perspective que Simon Villeneuve et moi avons travaillé à quantifier le fossé des genres dans les ressources biographiques, en particulier canadiennes, en incluant notamment les projets Wikimédia.
Cette étape est cruciale, car elle permet de situer précisément les problèmes, d’en objectiver les manifestations afin de mieux les déjouer et d’orienter des pistes d’amélioration. Toutefois, elle ne suffit pas entièrement.
À un autre niveau, il devient nécessaire de chercher à transformer le système lui-même. Cela implique d’agir sur les sources, de questionner les critères de notoriété, d’accompagner activement de nouvelles contributrices, de mobiliser différents acteurs du réseau documentaire dans une forme convergence par rapport à ces enjeux, en plus d’améliorer la structuration des données afin de rendre certains contenus plus visibles. À titre d’exemple, j’ai créé il y a quelques années la catégorie « bibliothécaire québécoise », précisément pour mettre en évidence un angle mort dans la structuration des savoirs. Ce type d’intervention, à la fois modeste et stratégique, participe d’un travail plus large de reconfiguration des infrastructures informationnelles.
Et dans le contexte québécois, par exemple, cela peut vouloir dire constater le manque de biographies de personnes s’identifiant comme femmes ou issues des diversités sexuelles et de genre, mais aussi agir concrètement sur les sources : documenter ces figures dans des publications reconnues (articles scientifiques, presse nationale et régionale), soutenir la production de contenus éditoriaux (catalogues d’exposition, ouvrages collectifs), mobiliser des archives existantes souvent peu visibles, améliorer leur repérabilité (indexation, métadonnées, numérisation) et leur admissibilité selon les standards de Wikipédia. Cela implique également de traduire ou adapter certaines sources pour les rendre davantage mobilisables, de diversifier les corpus de référence en intégrant des savoirs situés ou communautaires, et de renforcer les liens entre institutions (bibliothèques, centres d’archives, milieux culturels) afin de consolider l’écosystème documentaire. Autrement dit, il s’agit d’intervenir à la fois sur la production, la reconnaissance, la structuration et la circulation des sources afin de rendre ces figures plus admissibles et visibles dans l’encyclopédie.
C’est ce que l’on entend lorsque l’on affirme qu’il ne s’agit pas seulement de combler des absences, mais de comprendre — et d’agir sur — les mécanismes qui les produisent. Le chemin est plus exigeant, mais il permet d’avoir un impact plus profond et ouvre la voie à une véritable forme de justice sociale.
Yvonne Oddon, bibliothécaire et résistante
L’exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté : Chansons de résistantes dans les prisons nazies » offre une relecture forte et poignante de l’engagement de la bibliothécaire et résistante Yvonne Oddon. Autour de 19 chansons documentées par cette dernière à son retour des prisons et camps nazis, cette exposition musicale et documentaire révèle comment les arts populaires et la création poétique ont pu devenir des armes de survie, d’espoir et de résistance. E
L’exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté : Chansons de résistantes dans les prisons nazies » offre une relecture forte et poignante de l’engagement de la bibliothécaire et résistante Yvonne Oddon. Autour de 19 chansons documentées par cette dernière à son retour des prisons et camps nazis, cette exposition musicale et documentaire révèle comment les arts populaires et la création poétique ont pu devenir des armes de survie, d’espoir et de résistance. En donnant à entendre ces voix de femmes emprisonnées et déportées, l’exposition témoigne aussi d’une part oubliée d’une histoire culturelle et mémorielle.
Sur l’air de la liberté : quand chanter devient résister
L’exposition présente également des reconstitutions vocales a cappella ou accompagnées au piano que l’on a pu entendre lors d’un récital mémorable présenté lors du vernissage à la Maison de la culture Côte-des-Neiges (Montréal, Québec). Offerte en formats physique et numérique depuis le 28 mars 2025 jusqu’au 2 mai, on peut la voir et l’entendre au Centre d’études allemandes et européennes de l’Université de Montréal (Pavillon 3744 rue Jean Brillant, 5e étage) ; elle est hébergée sur un site web dédié, enrichi de contenus analytiques et historiques.
La version itinérante est appelée à circuler dans plusieurs institutions au Québec et en France, prolongeant ainsi l’impact pédagogique et mémoriel du projet. Ce projet s’inscrit dans une démarche de recherche-création et qui a donné lieu à diverses publications scientifiques qui approfondissent le sujet des dynamiques de résistance à l’œuvre dans ces chants de détention.
Page d’accueil de l’exposition numérique « Chansons de résistance dans les prisons nazies »
Yvonne Oddon, pionnière oubliée de la bibliothéconomie
Yvonne Oddon, la plus américaine des bibliothécaires françaises, occupe une place importante dans le livre « Bâtisseuses de la lecture publique », publié en 2024 aux Presses de l’ENSSIB, sous la direction d’Isabelle Antonutti. Cet ouvrage remarquable réhabilite la mémoire de soixante pionnières de la lecture publique en France. En s’appuyant sur des archives souvent fragmentaires, cet ouvrage met en lumière le rôle fondamental joué par les femmes dans la structuration de la profession, dans un univers historiquement façonné au masculin et où les figures des bibliothécaires sont longtemps restées invisibilisées. Préfacé par Arlette Farge, cette recherche fait émerger une véritable histoire sociale des travailleuses de bibliothèque, en exposant leurs réalisations, leurs luttes pour la reconnaissance, et leur apport dans l’évolution de la lecture publique. Un article et plusieurs entrées dans cet ouvrage sont consacrés à Yvonne Oddon.
Née en 1902, Yvonne Oddon suit une formation à l’American Library School à Paris, puis part en stage à l’université du Michigan, aux États-Unis, où elle s’étonne de constater la place centrale accordée aux bibliothèques dans la vie universitaire. De retour en France, elle contribue activement au développement des bibliothèques dans les régions dévastées, notamment par la mise en place du tout premier bibliobus à Soissons en 1933. En 1929, elle est recrutée comme bibliothécaire du musée d’ethnographie du Trocadéro, devenu musée de l’Homme en 1937, où elle introduit des standards innovants inspirés des pratiques américaines : libre accès, classement méthodique, réseaux d’échange de périodiques, et une photothèque documentaire.
Résistante dès 1940, elle cofonde le réseau du Musée de l’Homme avec Boris Vildé et Anatole Lewitsky. Elle affirme, dans une archive sonore qui contient un extrait d’entretien diffusé sur France Culture en 1963, que son engagement est né d’une réaction instinctive face aux «fausses nouvelles», alors qu’elle effectuait, à titre de bibliothécaire, un travail de dépouillement de la presse. Il s’agissait donc, dès le départ, d’une posture résolument antipropagandiste, en réponse à la machine de désinformation nazie. Peu à peu, elle s’est engagée dans une résistance tous azimuts : fabrication de tracts, création du journal clandestin Résistance, contacts avec l’Angleterre pour « transmettre des renseignements nécessaires à la France libre », « transports de volontaires et d’évadés », « organisation de groupes de combat avec dépôts d’armes », etc. Suite à une dénonciation, elle arrêtée en 1941. Elle échappe à la peine de mort, mais elle est déportée et incarcérée dans plusieurs prisons et camps nazis, dont Ravensbrück et Mauthausen. C’est au cours de sa détention qu’elle compose avec ses compagnes de captivité ces chansons de résistance, rassemblées à son retour. Ce matériel constitue aujourd’hui un témoignage bouleversant de la vie culturelle au quotidien dans un contexte de violence extrême.
Après la guerre, elle reprend ses fonctions de bibliothécaire; elle participe activement à la création de l’ICOM (Internationa Council of Museums), collabore avec l’UNESCO, et réédite avec Charles-Henri Bach leGuide du bibliothécaire, devenu une référence. Elle poursuit des missions internationales en Afrique et en Haïti, où elle forme des professionnel.les de la documentation. Yvonne Oddon s’est éteinte en 1982, mais où on se souvient d’elle à la bibliothèque du Musée de l’Homme qui porte son nom.
L’exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté », devrait, à plus d’un titre, faire partie du circuit des bibliothèques et des centres d’archives, car elle appartient à l’histoire professionnelle de ces travailleuses de la mémoire et du savoir.
Nous avons besoin cette énergie de résistance que portait Yvonne Oddon, alors que nous nous abandonnons peut-être en ce moment à une forme de résignation feutrée, souvent maquillée en pragmatisme, qui banalise les reculs en matière de liberté, de justice et de mémoire collective. Le courage d’Oddon, sa créativité, et sa vision d’une bibliothèque comme lieu vivant, solidaire et émancipateur, résonnent avec une acuité particulière dans le monde actuel. Entre démarches individuelles et actions collectives, émerge aussi une injonction à maintenir vivant et bien audible l’ espoir pour des futurs alternatifs — un appel que le parcours de Oddon vient puissamment relayer en écho.
Don’t Look Away : dans l’air du temps, un écho
Ainsi, la plus américaine des bibliothécaires françaises serait sans doute en accord avec R. David Lankes, qui, face à la vague de censure et de persécutions visant les bibliothécaires aux États-Unis, répondait avec force : « Don’t look away. »Ne détournez pas le regard. C’est exactement ce qu’Yvonne Oddon a refusé de faire et qu’il faut entendre : résister, agir et documenter.
Dans ce texte percutant, publié le 26 mars dernier et que j’ai traduit ici, Lankes s’inquiète de la dérive autoritaire actuelle aux États-Unis, où les bibliothèques et institutions culturelles, loin d’être simplement fermées, sont en voie de devenir des instruments de propagande. Il évoque les attaques contre les agences fédérales, les bibliothèques universitaires, les chercheurs et les archivistes, ainsi que la montée inquiétante de la censure, des listes de mots interdits, et des persécutions de bibliothécaires accusés d’être trop « libéraux ». Face à l’inquiétude grandissante de la communauté internationale, il appelle à ne pas détourner le regard.
Plutôt que de se contenter de déclarations officielles ou de pressions diplomatiques, l’auteur exhorte les bibliothécaires à documenter activement cette nouvelle forme de « McCarthysme anti-woke » : archiver les documents censurés, recueillir les témoignages, créer des canaux de soutien, favoriser les discussions critiques et protéger la mémoire du moment. Il insiste aussi sur la nécessité d’agir à l’échelle locale, là où les bibliothèques restent profondément ancrées dans la confiance des communautés. En cultivant des espaces de dialogue, de solidarité et de résistance, les bibliothécaires peuvent, ici comme ailleurs, défendre la démocratie. Mais pour cela : don’t look away.
Rendre visibles les invisibles, les oubliées
Dessin en cours (avant le fusain et l’encrage au stylo noir)
Yvonne Oddon faisait également partie de ces nombreuses femmes notables sans image sur Wikipédia. Pour remédier à cette absence visuelle, je me suis permis de dessiner un portrait inspiré d’un remix composite d’images disponibles (vidéo, photo… c’est toujours un défi particulier), afin de rendre hommage à sa mémoire et de contribuer à la visibilité de son engagement. Ce geste s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’initiative portée par Les sans pagEs qui lancent un appel aux illustrateurs et illustratrices pour créer des portraits de femmes dont les biographies sur Wikipédia n’ont pas d’image. Ce projet vise à réduire le biais de genre sur la plateforme en enrichissant les articles consacrés aux femmes, aux féminismes et d’autres sujets sous-représentés.
Je note, par ailleurs, que dans l’article consacré au journal Résistance sur Wikipédia, Yvonne Oddon n’est pas mentionnée parmi les créateurs de cette publication. J’en ai fait un sujet de discussion. Mais, selon le Musée de l’Homme, ce serait bien le cas; elle serait d’ailleurs à l’origine du nom du journal. C’est aussi ce qui est affirmée sur le site du Musée de la résistance en ligne.
Sources principales
Antonutti, Isabelle (dir.) (2024). Bâtisseuses de la lecture publique. Presses de l’ENSSIB. Chapitre consacré à Yvonne Oddon, dans une étude collective sur les pionnières de la lecture publique en France. https://books.openedition.org/pressesenssib/13279
Wikipédia – Yvonne Oddon (voir aussi la section bibliographie) Article biographique détaillé retraçant sa carrière bibliothéconomique et son engagement dans la Résistance. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yvonne_Oddon
Exposition « Sur l’air de la liberté : chansons de résistantes dans les prisons nazies » (2025). Projet dirigé par Marie-Hélène Benoit-Otis avec la collaboration de Cécile Quesney. Reconstitution musicale de 19 chansons documentés par Yvonne Oddon.https://chansonsresistantes.crcmp.org/
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Pour les personnes qui attendaient de me lire sans devoir déchiffrer mon écriture à la main, les transcriptions (merci l’IA, faites avec Claude, pas contrôlées – donc signalez-moi si vous voyez des bizarreries) ont été ajouté aux photos de mes pages de cahier.
Des mots sur un carnet à Paris [en]
01.07.2026
Billet manuscrit, Paris toujours, un 4 juillet [en]
04.07.2026
Making the Bees Walk in Line [en]
11.07.2026
Who Vibecoded This Upgrade? [en]
16.0
Pour les personnes qui attendaient de me lire sans devoir déchiffrer mon écriture à la main, les transcriptions (merci l’IA, faites avec Claude, pas contrôlées – donc signalez-moi si vous voyez des bizarreries) ont été ajouté aux photos de mes pages de cahier.
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Je me demande si l’invasion de nos écrans par l’IA va redonner une place à l’écriture manuscrite.
Transcription IA non vérifiée (22.07.2026):
Paris, le 4.7.2026, 8h45
Ce cahier est immense. Je l’ai acheté pour écrire. J’ai un doute en écrivant la date, pourtant je ne devrais pas, c’est le 4, l’anniversaire de Delphine, mais je vérifie quand même. Ce n’est pas ça que j’avais prévu d’écrire. Mais je repense à elle, je repense à il y a un an. Je mange à midi avec une
Je me demande si l’invasion de nos écrans par l’IA va redonner une place à l’écriture manuscrite.
Transcription IA non vérifiée (22.07.2026):
Paris, le 4.7.2026, 8h45
Ce cahier est immense. Je l’ai acheté pour écrire. J’ai un doute en écrivant la date, pourtant je ne devrais pas, c’est le 4, l’anniversaire de Delphine, mais je vérifie quand même. Ce n’est pas ça que j’avais prévu d’écrire. Mais je repense à elle, je repense à il y a un an. Je mange à midi avec une de ses amies, que je n’aurais sans doute jamais connue si Delphine était encore là aujourd’hui pour fêter ses 42 ans. J’ai cherché sur Facebook, “Delphine anniversaire”, parce que j’ai un doute alors que je sais — c’est bien le 4, son anniversaire, c’est juste ? Je sais mais je vérifie quand même. Pas parce que c’est Delphine, parce que ma mémoire et ma vie sont faites de ces milliers de petites vérifications, chaque jour, tout le temps, avant l’accident aussi. Elles sont efficaces, mes vérifications, même moi je ne les remarquais généralement pas. Elles évitent oublis et erreurs.
J’écris moins bien que l’autre soir. Parce que c’est le matin ? Les lignes du cahier ? La fatigue ? J’ai dormi huit heures et j’émerge avec peine. Les mots sur une page sont plus visiblement ancrés dans un instant précis du temps que ceux sur un écran, plus facilement retravaillés, malaxés et transformés. Le temps de la production n’est pas différent de celui de l’impression.
Je pense à Delphine, il y a un an et un jour, seule dans sa voiture. La tristesse m’envahit en tombant sur un des nombreux avis de recherche qu’on avait lancés sur Facebook. Je me souviens la peur au ventre, les appels à la police, les échanges avec ceux et celles qui l’aimaient, chaque nouvelle personne amenant malgré elle plus de fermeté à la certitude que personne n’avait de nouvelles, que personne ne savait rien, que le pire était à craindre. L’angoisse, l’urgence, l’impuissance, se soutenir comme on pouvait, les maux de tête qui ne me quittaient plus, l’attente, l’espoir sous perfusion mais le cœur qui a déjà sombré…
L’incompréhension — alors, depuis, maintenant. Chacun tente de construire du sens comme il peut, ou supporte son absence, plus ou moins bien.
L’intensité extraordinaire, au sens premier, entre le 5 et le 12 juillet, entre la prise de conscience de sa disparition et son enterrement, le cauchemar de réaliser qu’elle avait laissé des instructions de suppression de son compte Facebook après son décès lorsque j’ai demandé sa mémorialisation, peine redoublée que ma santé ne me permette pas de garder le lien avec ceux et celles qui partageaient cette peine du départ abrupt de Delphine. Encore maintenant, j’aurais voulu, mais je ne peux pas, et ça me pèse, de ne pas être en mesure d’honorer sa vie et sa mémoire comme je le voudrais.
Ce n’est pas nouveau, mais c’est criant depuis mon accident : ma vie n’a pas la place pour tout ce que je voudrais. Voilà donc de quoi je voulais parler à ce cahier tout à l’heure quand j’ai commencé à écrire, avant qu’une date m’envoie sur un chemin de traverse.
“Les arbres ne poussent pas jusqu’au ciel”, métaphore évoquée dans la discussion d’un cas servant de support à ma formation sur l’épuisement professionnel. Évidemment qu’au-delà de ce que cette formation m’a apportée en tant qu’intervenante systémicienne, j’en ai aussi tiré plein d’idées enrichissantes sur le plan personnel. Entre une hyperactivité marquée qui m’a déjà amenée plus d’une fois à l’épuisement ou à ses portes, et une fatigabilité accrue durant cette trop longue période post-accident, ce n’est pas surprenant.
Ce n’est pas parce que quelque chose marche bien et a du succès qu’en faire toujours plus sera toujours mieux. Il y a des effets de seuil. L’entrepreneur qui développe encore et encore son projet finira un jour par ne plus réussir à suivre, même si jusqu’ici ça a toujours bien marché pour lui, de développer toujours encore de nouvelles idées. Et moi alors ?
Moi aussi, j’ai des idées, je lance des choses, je fais. Je n’aime pas l’idée que les arbres ne poussent pas jusqu’au ciel. Je pense qu’en optimisant on peut toujours plus que ce qu’on croit. J’adore Tetris. Quand la voiture semble pleine et qu’il faut encore y glisser un sac, j’y parviens. Idem avec la cave, la valise, le frigo, et l’agenda. Mais l’agenda est trompeur, car il ne dessine que le temps, pas “l’énergie”. Je sais depuis longtemps la nécessité de freiner, sans en être persuadée dans ma chair. Je vois ma fatigue comme un échec d’optimisation, pas l’atteinte d’un seuil.
L’accident a changé ça, et continue de le changer. Je ne vais pas retracer toutes les étapes ici, mais l’accident a l’avantage de balayer l’excuse du défaut d’optimisation.
Le problème avec les idées et les envies, pour moi, c’est que ça coûte en énergie de ne rien en faire. Mais j’ai mis le doigt sur une chose qui les amène : l’input. Tout ce qui rentre chez moi a tendance à générer une réponse multibranches. L’IA m’a mise sur la piste. J’ai pas mal bidouillé avec l’IA ces derniers mois (et aussi avant). Et ce qui m’a frappée, c’était la tendance qu’avait mon assistant IA, quand il mettait à jour un fichier (l’état d’avancement d’un projet, une idée à développer, une liste de modifications faites…) à toujours ajouter un peu plus de texte que la fois d’avant. Il a clairement tendance à être verbeux — si c’est moi qui le dis ! J’ai mis énormément d’énergie à essayer de corriger ce travers. J’ai donné plus d’instructions. Mais rien ne parvenait à réduire l’usine à gaz. C’est une défaillance de fond : un biais vers un peu plus de production, dans le doute. Mieux vaut en faire un peu plus, produire plus de mots. Et ce qui amène à cette production de mots, c’est mon input, mes prompts, ce que je fais entrer dans le système. Si je ne donne rien à manger à mon assistant IA, les fichiers cessent de se multiplier et de s’allonger.
Hier, sur LinkedIn, je vois passer des conseils pour prompter Fable, le dernier et plus puissant modèle de Claude : il faut lui en donner moins. Moins de détails, moins d’instruction. Si on construit nos instructions comme pour les anciens modèles, il sous-performe.
L’IA m’intéresse en tant qu’outil, bien sûr, mais aussi en tant que support de réflexion (possiblement modèle et métaphore) pour appréhender ce qu’on appelle le langage, l’intelligence, le sens, et même la vie. La façon dont nous observons et réagissons, en tant qu’humains, à une production “mécanique”, est fascinante et riche de considérations philosophiques.
L’IA nous amène dans un monde où produire du contenu est devenu plus facile qu’avant — tellement facile que la production n’est plus le facteur limitant, et que notre monde, qui n’est pas prévu pour y faire face, s’y noie.
Moi, ça ne me coûte rien de produire des idées. Mon cerveau est comme l’IA qui crache des mots dès qu’on appuie sur un bouton. En plus de ça, malgré (grâce à ?) mon TDAH, j’ai assez de facilité à en faire quelque chose de tangible, de ces idées. Je suis orientée vers l’action, le faire. Je pense à un truc, je suis prête à démarrer avec.
Tout ça m’a été très bénéfique au cours de ma vie, et l’est encore, dans plein de circonstances. Je me dis qu’il faudrait peut-être une prise en charge logo pour mes symptômes linguistiques, quelques semaines plus tard j’ai trouvé quelqu’un. J’ai eu une carrière entrepreneuriale et je fonctionne encore comme ça. Ma capacité à avoir des idées, à vouloir des choses, et à les réaliser : tout ça m’a amené beaucoup de succès et est très valorisé. Mais c’est aussi ce qui me fait souffrir car il y a non seulement une limite au nombre d’heures dans une journée et au nombre d’années dans une vie, mais aussi à la capacité de notre corps et de notre cerveau à travailler et à fournir des efforts. La route vers l’épuisement et la surcharge est toute tracée. Et dans un contexte comme le mien maintenant, où “l’énergie” est objectivement limitée, où je veux réellement me ménager pour récupérer, c’est extrêmement frustrant, au point d’être douloureux, d’être assaillie en permanence d’idées et d’envies “réalisables” mais impossibles. Alors oui : prendre du recul, accepter la frustration, tout ça c’est très bien. Mais ne pourrait-on pas freiner cette production spontanée et effrénée d’envies et d’idées ? Oui : en étant plus sélectif avec ce qui rentre, et fait leur terreau et leur engrais.
Savez-vous sur quelle plateforme la durée de vie du contenu est la plus longue? Nous allons répondre à toutes vos questions dans cet article!
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Savez-vous sur quelle plateforme la durée de vie du contenu est la plus longue? Nous allons répondre à toutes vos questions dans cet article!
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C’est danah boyd qui l’explique. « Lorsque les professionnels utilisaient le terme « médias sociaux » pour décrire les outils internet apparus ...
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C’est danah boyd qui l’explique. « Lorsque les professionnels utilisaient le terme « médias sociaux » pour décrire les outils internet apparus ...
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On May 3, an unusual procession moved through Washington DC. Several hundred people walked beneath the monuments of the American capital carrying portraits of Red Army soldiers. Children waved Soviet flags. A live orchestra played wartime songs at the World War II memorial. The Russian embassy had filed the permit; the DC Metropolitan Police provided an escort. Russian state media celebrated the event as proof that, with the return of Donald Trump, historical truth too had returned to America.
On May 3, an unusual procession moved through Washington DC. Several hundred people walked beneath the monuments of the American capital carrying portraits of Red Army soldiers. Children waved Soviet flags. A live orchestra played wartime songs at the World War II memorial. The Russian embassy had filed the permit; the DC Metropolitan Police provided an escort. Russian state media celebrated the event as proof that, with the return of Donald Trump, historical truth too had returned to America.
One organizer told Russian state television: “We love, respect Russia, honor the memory of our heroes.”
Similar marches took place in Paris, Amsterdam and Busan. In Berlin, authorities announced that Soviet flags, Russian symbols and military songs would once again be banned near Soviet war memorials during May 8 and 9 commemorations.
But in Moscow, Victory Day itself appeared haunted by fear.
For decades, May 9 has been Russia’s most sacred annual political ritual, binding victory, patriotism and state power into a single language. But this year, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov was reduced to announcing that the Immortal Regiment march in Moscow would continue only “in electronic format.”
The run up to this year’s Victory Day became the most anxious Moscow has experienced in recent memory. The Kremlin canceled the traditional procession in the Russian capital, moving it online. Military equipment was removed from the parade. Mobile internet access across Moscow was intermittently shut down in the days leading up to May 9. Spectator numbers in St. Petersburg were reportedly slashed from thousands to just a few hundred. The Victory Parade in Kaliningrad was canceled entirely. Russian media outlets published extraordinary reports about Vladimir Putin retreating deeper into protected bunkers amid fears of Ukrainian drone strikes and assassination attempts.
Russia’s Foreign Ministry even warned foreign governments to evacuate diplomats from Kyiv before May 9, threatening massive retaliation if Ukraine targeted the celebrations with drones.
And then came another extraordinary twist. Volodymyr Zelensky publicly “allowed” the parade to proceed. In a deliberately tongue-in-cheek decree issued after negotiations around a temporary ceasefire, the Ukrainian president formally excluded Red Square from Ukraine’s operational strike plans for the duration of the celebrations, even listing the exact geographic coordinates of the square itself.
Watching it all unfold, I kept wondering whether empires collapse more easily than the systems of feeling they create. The Soviet Union fell apart more than 30 years ago, but the architecture built around victory, sacrifice and historical grievance survived it, stretching across borders, diasporas and rival political projects. What began as Soviet myth-making about liberation has evolved into a transnational political language through which governments, activists, diasporas and rival ideological movements compete over legitimacy, victimhood and belonging.
Over the years, at Coda, in our Rewriting History current, we have tracked how the remembrance of World War II became central to Putin’s machinery of legitimacy and repression. Soon after he came to power, Russian public culture became saturated with stories of the Great Patriotic War. Watching Russian state television often felt as if the war had ended yesterday. New films, schoolbooks, drama series, speeches, parades and television specials turned victory into the emotional foundation of Putin’s Russia. Scholars of Russian memory politics have described how, under Putin, collective memory of the war became a tool for claiming legitimacy, discrediting opposition and presenting the Russian state as the eternal defender against fascism.
It resonated because it tapped into genuine emotion passed on for generations. It was never just propaganda. It rested on something real: the scale of Soviet loss and the private grief carried by millions of families.
The Immortal Regiment began in 2012 in the Siberian city of Tomsk as a local act of remembrance. Ordinary people walked through the streets carrying photographs of relatives who died in the war. By 2015, Putin was leading the Moscow procession himself, while state-backed organizations coordinated chapters in dozens of countries.But in Putin’s Russia, where victory had already become the central organizing myth of the state, the boundary between private mourning and political mythology dissolved.
The speed of that transformation still feels important to me. It says something about the way modern political systems absorb private emotion and fold it back into the language of the state.
The Kremlin framed these Victory Day rituals as a defense against what it called Western attempts to “rewrite history” by minimizing the Soviet role in defeating fascism or equating Stalinism with Nazism. Ukraine and many Eastern Europeans came to see the marches instead as vehicles for imperial nostalgia and wartime propaganda.
But the argument, it seems, is no longer only about what happened in the past. It is about who gets to turn memory and grief into political legitimacy in the present.
This year Germany found itself in the extraordinary position of having to ban Soviet flags and military songs near Soviet memorials, effectively regulating the symbolic language of antifascism itself. Historian Timothy Snyder once warned that “if fascists take over the mantle of antifascism, the memory of the Holocaust will itself be altered.” That is precisely the moral and historical dilemma Berlin has now forced into the open. What happens when the symbols of genuine antifascist sacrifice become inseparable from the imagery of an ongoing war? When the flags carried by the soldiers who liberated Auschwitz are also flown at embassy-organized rallies while Russian bombs fall on Kharkiv?
At Coda, we explored some of these tensions years ago, in our documentary “What To Do With Stalin,” which examined the strange afterlife of Stalin’s image across the former Soviet world. While filming in Georgia, we encountered arguments that now feel strikingly familiar: whether remembering Stalin represented patriotism or denial, historical pride or historical amnesia.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NdfTH6rfe7E
Even then, it was obvious these battles were never really about the past.
Putin himself acknowledged as much during this year’s Victory Day speech, describing the war in Ukraine as a “just” continuation of the struggle against fascism and accusing the West of fueling confrontation with Russia “to this day.” Hours later, he suggested the war might finally be over. “I think that the matter is coming to an end,” he told reporters.
Victory Day 2026 may ultimately be remembered not for the military parade itself, but for revealing how unstable that memory system has become. Moscow performed triumph while fearing attack. Berlin restricted Soviet symbols in the name of democratic security. Washington hosted embassy-linked Soviet commemorations beneath American monuments.
I was ten years old when the Soviet Union collapsed. For those of us who grew up inside it, the end of the empire felt at once chaotic and exhilarating. Borders opened, old certainties disappeared and ideology lost its grip almost overnight. I still feel fortunate that, as a child, I witnessed an empire built on terror and repression collapse into history.
In the decades that followed, we watched Russia slowly turn the symbols and emotional reflexes of the Soviet system into instruments of political power once again. Victory Day became one of the most potent of these instruments: a ritual that fused together grief, patriotism, historical trauma and state legitimacy into a single, powerful sentiment.
Russia’s ambassador to Washington, Alexander Darchiev, praised what he described as the Trump administration’s dramatically changed attitude toward Victory Day commemorations. The holiday, he said, now played “an unequivocally positive role” in Russia-US relations. He pointed specifically to the marches held in the center of Washington, DC.
But the more I think about this year’s Victory Day, the less it feels like a story about Russia alone. When the Soviet Union collapsed, many of us assumed its emotional architecture would disappear with it. Instead, parts of it were patiently cultivated and repurposed for a new era by the men in charge of Putin’s Russia.
The emotional logic that once underpinned the Soviet system no longer belongs only to Russia and the shattered geography of its former empire. Grievances, historical trauma and rituals of belonging now shape political life all around the world. Digital networks and algorithmic systems did not create these emotional impulses, but they amplified them at a scale the Soviet state could only dream of. Perhaps that is the true afterlife of an empire: not the survival of its borders or ideology, but of the emotional systems it builds to organize fear, belonging and historical destiny.
Additional research by Masho Lomashvili and Irina Matchavariani
[en]
Même si je ne suis pas en train de vibe-coder à tour de bras, j’ai bien sauté dans le train côté IA. Depuis deux ans environ, je dis que ce que je ressens concernant l’importance et le potentiel de l’IA générative est quelque chose que je n’ai pas senti depuis ma découverte d’internet il y a 20-25 ans.
Et là mes amis, j’ai l’impression de m’être pris un train en pleine figure. Enfin, je le vois arriver depuis un moment, le train, mais là il est sur moi. Mon vieux pote Jens-Christian vie
Même si je ne suis pas en train de vibe-coder à tour de bras, j’ai bien sauté dans le train côté IA. Depuis deux ans environ, je dis que ce que je ressens concernant l’importance et le potentiel de l’IA générative est quelque chose que je n’ai pas senti depuis ma découverte d’internet il y a 20-25 ans.
Et là mes amis, j’ai l’impression de m’être pris un train en pleine figure. Enfin, je le vois arriver depuis un moment, le train, mais là il est sur moi. Mon vieux pote Jens-Christian vient de me montrer, en live (bon, par visio) à quoi ressemblait son assistant IA et l’infrastructure (PAI) qui le rendait possible. Je vais vous expliquer tout ça en français, ne vous en faites pas, mais sachez déjà qu’en gros, le fameux “assistant IA” qui est véritablement capable de nous aider à organiser nos vacances, choisir un menu pour ce soir, nous briefer pour préparer notre journée, garder le fil de nos multiples projets et évidemment, automatiser notre administratif récurrent, sans juste faire semblant qu’il en est capable – eh bien on y est.
OK. Maintenant j’explique pourquoi je suis en train de vous dire que l’ordinateur de Star Trek, c’est déjà aujourd’hui. Enfin avant, un petite digression préalable.
On le sait bien: ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui “une IA”, c’est en fait un “LLM” (Large Language Model). C’est une intelligence artificielle (un type de programme) qui produit des mots. En très simplifié, c’est du texte prédictif dopé. Le LLM, il ne fait qu’une chose, à la base: il regarde le “contexte” (le texte déjà écrit) et fait une prédiction statistique sur le prochain mot. Et le prochain. Et le prochain. L’IA (le LLM) ne “sait” rien. C’est juste une machine à aligner des mots. Mais ce qui est dingue, c’est que cette machine est capable de produire du texte que l’on reconnaît comme “discours”, et qui nous donne le sentiment d’être en train de parler à une vraie personne. C’est le côté “chatbot” ou “interface conversationnelle”. Ça veut dire que pour faire faire des choses à une machine, aujourd’hui, on peut simplement lui expliquer avec nos mots – pas besoin de cliquer sur tel bouton, donner telle commande, utiliser un langage de programmation. On dit quelque chose, et quelque chose se passe.
Si vous avez déjà l’habitude de fréquenter Claude ou ChatGPT, vous savez comme ça va. On chatte avec, et on est tour à tour bluffé (quand ça marche) et désespéré (quand ça marche pas). On se casse vite le nez sur les limites du truc, il nous dit un truc qui est faux, et on se dit qu’il est bien con et que l’IA, ça ne marche pas si bien que ça. On pense aux rêves qu’on avait de pouvoir dire à notre IA “fais ma déclaration d’impôts” ou “planifie mon projet” (pourquoi pas “fais mon job”, pendant qu’on y est), ou plus modestement, “envoie les factures vétérinaires à l’assurance pour qu’ils remboursent”. L’IA nous promet monts et merveilles mais ne livre pas toujours – d’autant plus si on se contente de lui parler dans une conversation qui s’allonge à l’infini, qu’on ne comprend comment travailler avec la fenêtre de contexte, que les skills ça nous dépasse, qu’on ne maîtrise pas les subtilités du prompting et qu’on n’a pas encore fait le pas d’organiser nos interactions en projets ou d’essayer Cowork. On entend bien ceux qui développent des trucs incroyables à l’aide de l’IA, mais bon, on n’est pas tous développeurs, et franchement les résultats médiocres qu’on obtient nous laissent penser que c’est beaucoup de hype, toute cette histoire. On est d’accord?
Et là au milieu, je suis en train de vous dire (je vous promets j’ai pas fumé) qu’en fait oui, l’IA est bien capable de nous offrir cet “assistant digital” dont on rêve. Je crois franchement qu’on y est. Mais c’est pas “en chattant avec Claude”. Et il n’y a pas besoin non plus d’apprendre à programmer pour y arriver.
La clé, c’est cette infrastructure mentionnée en début d’article: PAI. C’est pas une “alternative” à Claude ou ChatGPT ou Gemini. C’est un système qui se construit dessus. Une collection d’instructions pour IA et de scripts (comme des mini-programmes) qui vont tourner sur l’ordinateur.
Comme dit plus haut, une IA ne “sait” rien. On peut lui donner une liste de tâches en début de conversation, en rajouter 3 nouvelles, parler de la pluie et du beau temps, et lui redemander les tâches 10 minutes plus tard, et il y a fort à parier qu’il y aura une erreur dans la liste. Qu’elle reconnaîtra de bonne grâce quand on la lui fera remarquer. Par contre, si au début de la conversation on lui demande de créer un fichier contenant cette liste, et que deux jours plus tard on lui demande nous lire la liste qui est sur le fichier, là, ça marche. Suivant quelle est votre expérience dans l’utilisation de l’IA, vous avez peut-être fait ce constat de vous-même: c’est vachement plus fiable de faire mettre des infos dans des fichiers, de faire écrire des scripts pour extraire de l’information d’un document ou d’un tableau de données. Et d’ailleurs, aujourd’hui, votre “Claude chatbot” le fera spontanément ou vous le proposera, suivant ce que vous lui demandez.
Donc: l’assistant IA de nos rêves, c’est pas “juste” une IA, c’est surtout des tas de scripts et des fichiers contenant des informations. Et bien sûr quand même une IA, pour interagir avec nous (la fameuse “interface conversationnelle”) et faire évoluer le système en fonction de nos besoins.
Vous êtes encore là? Soyons un peu concrets. PAI c’est donc un truc qu’on télécharge sur son ordi et qui une fois lancé, va premièrement installer ce dont il a besoin (y compris Claude Code si on ne l’a pas déjà). Ensuite, quand on le lance, il va nous prendre par la main (via l’interface conversationnelle, donc en discutant déjà avec l’IA) pour le configurer et démarrer avec. Oui, il faut taper un truc dans la ligne de commande, il y a un premier pas ou deux un peu geek, mais après, c’est “juste du blabla” comme on a l’habitude de faire normalement avec une IA.
Ce qui fait que PAI c’est pas “juste une IA”, c’est que c’est un système prévu pour créer ce dont vous avez besoin de votre assistant. On ne vous livre pas une voiture: on met à votre disposition tout ce qu’il faut pour concevoir et produire la voiture qui correspond exactement à vos besoins – les ingénieurs, les designers, les mécanos, l’usine de production, et aussi le chef de projet qui va vous prendre par la main pour vous aider à décrire la voiture dont vous avez besoin. PAI c’est ça.
L’infrastructure comprend un système et une structure pour stocker des infos de contexte vous concernant – pas juste la façon dont vous aimez que l’IA vous parle, mais aussi vos valeurs, vos domaines d’expertise, vos préoccupations et buts dans la vie. Et pas sous forme de laborieux champs texte à remplir. L’IA va vous interviewer, ou dans mon cas, avaler mon blog, et en tirer les informations pertinentes. Ou pas, si on veut pas. L’infrastructure comprend aussi des processus: en particulier, comment développer un système dont vous avez besoin.
Un exemple en guise de démo (on a fait ça en direct avec Jens-Christian et son assistant pendant notre visio): un truc dont je rêve, perso, ce serait un système qui est au courant de ce que j’ai dans mon frigo et mes armoires, de ce que j’aime manger et cuisiner, et qui puisse me dire “ah ben ce soir, tu pourrais te faire ceci ou cela”. Pour de vrai, c’est une grosse charge mentale chez moi ce genre de truc. Donc hop, on soumet cette idée à l’assistant. J’ai deux ou trois idées en plus: si je donne à l’assistant mes tickets de caisse de courses, il pourrait savoir ce que j’ai acheté comme nourriture. Et si je lui montre ce que je mange ou me cuisine, il pourrait en déduire ce que j’ai utilisé. Peut-être de temps en temps il faut lui faire une photo du frigo ou de l’armoire pour vérifier si son inventaire est à jour. Et il pourrait aussi avoir à dispo une collection de recettes que j’ai faites, et d’idées-repas (j’ai commencé à compiler ça, manuellement). On donne donc ces infos à l’assistant, et on observe. Honnêtement, c’est là que je me suis retrouvée sur le cul.
PAI comprend donc un processus, ou une méthode, pour approcher ce genre de demande: clarifier à quoi ressemblerait le système fini, puis, selon une logique similaire au “rétro-planning” (du reverse-engineering, en fait) il produit un concept, les différentes parties du système à créer, évalue de quelle façon les créer (scripts, IA, quels outils sont à disposition, parce que bien sûr il sait quels outils on a sur l’ordi et ce qu’on a l’habitude d’utiliser), à quoi ressemblerait une version minimale fonctionnelle du système (le “MVP”=minimum viable product du jargon dev/business), et (après feu vert bien entendu) produit un prototype. En dix minutes, on avait un prototype interactif à qui je pouvais demander quoi manger ce soir, après avoir rempli une liste bidon de ce qui était dans mon frigo – et surtout, un plan pour développer le reste du système.
Avant aujourd’hui, j’avais prévu d’écrire un article sur ce que j’étais en train de faire avec l’IA en ce moment. Je me suis mise à Cowork, et je suis en train de créer un système qui m’aide à garder le fil de mes multiples projets en cours. Pas juste à savoir où j’en étais et quelle était la prochaine chose à faire quand je reprends un dossier trois semaines après l’avoir laissé en plan, mais aussi à avoir une vue d’ensemble du “portfolio de projets”. Dans mon système, il y a un fichier dans lequel je note les unes derrières les autres toutes les idées qui me passent par la tête, et ensuite il y a un script (et un peu d’IA) qui avale ce fichier et qui dispatche chaque idée ou info dans une sorte de boîte de réception pour le projet en question.
Exemple (parce que c’est mieux les exemples). J’ai trois tonnes de fichiers d’archives pas mal en bordel sur deux disques durs externes. Ça prend beaucoup de place, et je sais qu’il y a du contenu dupliqué, mais pas où et lequel. Je suis donc en train d’utiliser Claude pour m’aider à faire ça de façon méthodique. Donc ça c’est un de mes projets avec Claude. Mettons que pendant qu’on est en train d’avancer dans ce projet, je me retrouve dans le dossier qui contient les sauvegardes des vidéos live que j’ai faites sur Facebook. Il y a celles des chats diabétiques, mais aussi des vidéos sur d’autres sujets et dont je voudrais faire un article dans le blog. Comme je suis en grande conversation avec Claude, je mentionne ça, et peut-être que j’évoque les 3-4 articles que j’ai en tête, pour qu’il en prenne note. Il va noter ça (parce que je lui ai donné des instructions dans ce sens à l’aide d’un skill) dans le fichier “de sortie” du projet, prêt à être importé dans le fichier d’entrée du projet “idées pour le blog”. Ou alors, je suis en train de faire à manger et une idée de génie pour l’aménagement de mon balcon me traverse le cerveau: je la note rapidement dans mon fichier central, sachant que Claude rangera cette info au bon endroit.
Donc créer ce genre de système, avec Cowork, c’est possible, mais je fais beaucoup manuellement. Je micro-manage beaucoup. Je dois être directive, parce que sinon Claude me dit “ouais ouais c’est bon je m’en charge, c’est super simple” et en fait… non.
Avec PAI, il y a déjà des instructions et des “compétences” (skills) dans l’infrastructure exprès pour que créer ce genre de système se fasse bien et simplement. C’est donc une boîte à outils, accessible via le chat, qui nous permet de “forger” le système dont nous avons besoin – créer l’assistant qui va simplifier les tâches à peu de valeur ajoutée de notre quotidien, ou celles qui sont difficiles pour nous, qui va nous permettre d’avoir plus d’énergie à disposition pour les choses qui comptent pour nous.
Je vais gentiment prendre congé de vous pour aujourd’hui, parce que ça devient un article-fleuve (qui plus est pas super bien structuré et clair peut-être) et que mon cerveau n’a plus beaucoup de batterie. On va en reparler quand je sauterai le pas (dès que j’ai un peu de temps à dispo) pour installer PAI chez moi.
Juste deux mots de prudence avant de clore:
Claude Code, Cowork, PAI: des outils puissants mais qui présentent également des risques côté sécurité. Ce n’est pas une bonne idée, aujourd’hui, de laisser votre IA contrôler votre navigateur web, de lui donner libre accès à vos fichiers ou à votre e-mail, surtout si vous ne comprenez pas bien les enjeux sécuritaires
faire tourner quelque chose comme PAI “coûte” en termes d’utilisation d’IA – tout comme ça coûte de faire produire des images par l’IA, des pages de code, de manipuler des fichiers sur un disque dur, de lire des PDFs de 500 pages… sur un plan gratuit, oubliez; même un plan à 20.-, c’est probablement bien chaud
Quelques liens (en vrac parce que je suis trop raide):
A funny thing happened on the day OpenAI announced it was shutting down Sora, its video generation app: Iran went all in on synthetic propaganda and very quickly started winning the global meme war. The timing is a coincidence, no doubt, but it is the kind of coincidence that illuminates.
Watching the explosive virality of the clips offers a powerful lesson in asymmetric media operations. They deploy cultural sophistication, an understanding of online communities and the enormously powerful
A funny thing happened on the day OpenAI announced it was shutting down Sora, its video generation app: Iran went all in on synthetic propaganda and very quickly started winning the global meme war. The timing is a coincidence, no doubt, but it is the kind of coincidence that illuminates.
Watching the explosive virality of the clips offers a powerful lesson in asymmetric media operations. They deploy cultural sophistication, an understanding of online communities and the enormously powerful creation tools made available by American tech companies, tools that give everyone on the internet access to a personal reality distortion field — drones, but for your feed.
On Wednesday, as Donald Trump was trying desperately to talk down the oil markets with hints of a deal, a stream of videos, carefully calibrated for U.S., regional and third country audiences rolled out on X via embassy accounts, Russia Today, and disaffected Maga influencers. The clips, by broad social media consensus, are good. Some lean heavily on the extremely online grammar of the U.S. right. Some remix Hollywood characters and likenesses in exactly the way that OpenAI’s now nixed billion-dollar deal with Disney was supposed to sanction. Others lean more heavily into Islamic iconography, featuring Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu as worshippers of Baal, the foreign demon god who figures in both the Quran and the Hebrew Bible. The Lego movie is an especially rich resource, but so are TikTok formats, and the kind of idealized AI figures beloved of Trump administration meme makers. You can watch a few of them here.
Notably, faked war footage is far from the dominant format. All of these clips foreground and celebrate their own artificiality: some are sentimental, some triumphal, many are full of the gleeful adolescent wit of gamers on discord forums.
Researchers have long been warning that generative tools will undercut the authority of visual evidence, compounding and accelerating the damage created by slower, cruder forms of fakery: photoshop, selective editing, even gaming clips passed off as combat footage. Of course, we are already there, and have been for a while. Russia has been the paramount master of this game, in Ukraine and in its ongoing influence operations around the world. But others have learned quickly. Last year, when India and Pakistan were engaged in a brief aerial battle, social media bullshit overwhelmed and compromised traditional coverage. More recently, Israel’s obliteration of Gaza was accompanied by a sustained and comprehensive blizzard of visually compelling misinformation, propaganda, and official lies.
That continues. On March 28, Israel killed three journalists in a targeted strike in Southern Lebanon, claiming without evidence that one of them, Ali Shoaib, was a member of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces. They later distributed a photograph of him in military fatigues to reinforce the point, but explained to Fox news that in fact, they’d had to photoshop the uniform in because no such picture existed.
Meanwhile, in the Trump administration’s domestic war on immigrants and political opponents, we’ve seen a complete resetting of norms around the tone of official communication and any expectation that it is rooted in fact. Nowhere was that more evident than in the altered footage posted by the White House of the arrest of the prominent Minneapolis activist Nekima Levy Armstrong in January. In the video, shared by the official White House handle, a handcuffed Levy Armstrong is sobbing, her skin visibly darkened. In fact, she had faced arrest calmly.
Questioned by reporters about this blatant falsification, deputy White House communications director Kaelan Dorr responded: "Enforcement of the law will continue. The memes will continue.” Collapsing the distinction between a meme and the factual record with the aid of AI is the final step in this administration's insistence that its preferred narrative simply is reality.
The problem for the White House and its allies is that their choices in tech policy, official communication, and press freedom level the playing field for information war in ways that Tehran’s media strategists understand and they, for all their immersion in online worlds, do not.
Iranian propagandists know that the currency of visual information online has already been completely debased. They’ve dealt with it plenty, and no doubt practiced it themselves in regional battles for narrative dominance. Their insight is that as cheap and easy as it is to create and distribute fakes, returns on the effort of mobilizing what disinformation researchers call “coordinated inauthentic action” are diminishing. They still do it, but it isn’t where the action is.
Sam Altman, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg have, in a very practical sense, wrought this moment in concert with Peter Thiel, Alex Karp, JD Vance and Donald Trump. At their urging, the U.S. has surrendered unrivaled dominance in scarce, expensive information and cultural assets in exchange for a political economy of media that widely distributes cheap, abundant ones.
Tech leaders and conservative politicians have worked consistently for a decade to deprecate the trustworthiness of American journalism and constrain its liberties. They have smeared its practitioners as “enemies of the people”; they have captured the commanding heights of the broadcast and culture industries through crony deals, and they have launched an assault on both press freedom and standards, two assets that once made American news outlets the envy of the world. Needless to say, the economic collapse of traditional media companies fostered by Google’s and Meta’s advertising duopoly only served to deepen the damage. Jeff Bezos’s Washington Post shuttered its Middle East bureaus just days before the war began.
Meanwhile, lying from agency podiums and the Oval Office, makes Karoline Leavitt barely distinguishable from Baghdad Bob, Iraq’s minister of information in 2003 whose surreal, truth-dodging press conferences during the U.S.-led invasion made him a global laughingstock. And the DOGEing of both the nominally independent Voice of America, as well as the state department’s Global Engagement Center leaves the administration with neither broadcast nor digital counter-propaganda assets.
When no one can be trusted with the actual truth, we are left with the AI equivalent of 19th-century editorial cartoons, produced at industrial scale and distributed globally. America has little advantage in that war, particularly when it is at a moral, political and legal nadir.
If anything, Iran, which combines repression with an enormously rich literary culture, film scene and advertising market brings serious capabilities to the fight.
Of course, the ebbing of information power was already under way during the first Trump administration, and during Joe Biden’s term in ways that are indissociable from broader democratic decline. The “trust and safety” architecture adopted by big platform companies was designed — implicitly if not always visibly — to conserve information authority, and ensure that it functioned in broadly pro-democratic ways.
After the disastrous failures of the Rohingya genocide — which rights groups and UN investigators blamed Facebook for facilitating — and the fears surrounding the manipulation of the U.S. electoral environment in 2016, there was a clear threat to the commercial and political health of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Tech companies, governments, researchers and human rights experts devised rules and norms for content moderation grounded in existing standards, tools for detecting coordinated inauthentic behavior, and a framework for crisis response.
The community of practitioners and institutions that sprung up to combat the flesh-eating virus attacking the body politic were working with bandaids in the battlefield hospital even before Covid, a coordinated attack from the right, and the second Trump victory hit them, but they succeeded in imposing some limits. That project now lies in ruins.
The Stanford Information Laboratory has been shut down. Trust and Safety teams at Meta and X have been disbanded. The national security arm of the project, centered around the State Department is gone, and private funding for countering misinformation has largely dried up.
Where are the hyperscalers, the AI titans, whose tools are being so effectively deployed, in all of this?
The trust and safety people who do work at OpenAI are dutifully putting out reports every few months. They are detailing how they foiled efforts to use ChatGPT for a Chinese influence campaign aimed at Sanae Takaichi, the Japanese prime minister, and exposing a Russian content mill feeding African newspapers. “Pro-tip for governments,” wrote Head of National Security policy Sasha Baker on LinkedIn of the February report. “Please don’t use our products to spread lies online.”
Governments, in the world of Sam Altman’s “democratic AI” do not include that of the United States. OpenAI has not mentioned a single U.S. ally — let alone the administration itself — in these reports.
OpenAI has hired multiple ex-Clinton, Obama and Biden officials, and in their work a weird, attenuated piece of the old national security approach to information integrity lives on, alongside the project of selling products to the Pentagon. The company’s leaders clearly treat these issues as a complement to messaging around Western AI, or a picayune adjunct to the bigger questions of AI risk, which are handled way up in the organizational stratosphere, as they are at Anthropic.
Perhaps the larger lesson is that you can’t really shut down Sora, or put AI-generated video back in its box. If you choose to prosecute an illegal war of choice after surrendering the hard-won high ground of a robust, democratic information environment, high tech weaponry will not offset the deficit. On the contrary, you will have compounded the risk of both tactical failure and strategic geopolitical defeat. When that happens, and in some ways it already has, those who made this war, and their enablers in Silicon Valley, will have only themselves to blame.
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Pour les personnes dont le cerveau reste coincé sur la chaîne catastrophe Crans-Montana (TDAH ou pas): il faut décrocher. Dans cette vidéo j’explique pourquoi et ce qui peut vous aider à y réussir, concrètement. Sorry elle est un peu longue…
Je reproduis ci-dessous ce que j’ai publié sur Facebook:
Il faut absolument (j’insiste) décrocher. Il y a un risque réel de se traumatiser via l’exposition aux contenus autour de cette histoire.
Donc: priorité absolue, faire autre chose.
Il faut absolument (j’insiste) décrocher. Il y a un risque réel de se traumatiser via l’exposition aux contenus autour de cette histoire.
Donc: priorité absolue, faire autre chose. Regarder des films ou des séries. Faire un puzzle ou du nettoyage. Trouver quelqu’un qui va nous traîner dehors pour prendre l’air.
Considérez cette consigne comme une nécessité médicale, vraiment.
Prenez soins de vous et ne vous exposez pas de manière non nécessaire à des images traumatisantes. Protégez-vous, et protégez les enfants et adolescent·es sous votre responsabilité.
Les algorithmes liés aux #Reels (Insta, Facebook, Tiktok) sont susceptibles de vous inonder très rapidement de scènes tragiques et de témoignages terribles et poignants. Les algorithmes sont terriblement efficaces et il y a un risque réel de se laisser prendre dans une spirale de visionnage de contenu potentiellement traumatique #doomscrolling.
Ces vidéos, via des phénomènes d’empathie et d’engagement émotionnel, risquent de provoquer chez vous de la détresse, de l’anxiété, ou même des symptômes qui peuvent s’apparenter à ce qu’on observe suite à l’exposition à des événements traumatisants. Ces risques ont été documentés dans des études scientifiques.
Suivant la situation, on peut aussi essayer d’appeler le 143 (la main tendue) mais le mieux est vraiment, si on n’est pas directement impacté de mettre le paquet (pardon) pour se prendre par la peau des fesses afin de mettre son cerveau sur autre chose. « Mécaniquement », même si on n’a pas envie, même si on est bouleversé, même si on veut comprendre, même si on ne sait pas quoi faire de ses émotions.
Un tuyau: « arrêter » n’est pas une bonne instruction, en fait, il faut vraiment remplacer l’activité non souhaitable par une activité plus souhaitable et incompatible, comme en comportement animal.
Quelle est votre « activité plus souhaitable », même sans être motivé•e? C’est ça la chose à faire, peu importe ce que c’est, juste là. Une série, un puzzle ou une promenade c’est très bien. Et on lâche le tel et l’ordi car sur les réseaux, impossible d’y échapper pour le moment.
Ukraine has synchronized its sanctions against Russia with the last three packages of economic penalties imposed by the European Union, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 8. "Three more packages of EU sanctions are fully effective in Ukraine," Zelensky said in his evening address. Earlier on July 8, the president announced a new round of sanctions, including restrictions on five Chinese-registered companies accused of supplying components found in Russian Shahed-type drones used to a
Ukraine has synchronized its sanctions against Russia with the last three packages of economic penalties imposed by the European Union, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 8.
"Three more packages of EU sanctions are fully effective in Ukraine," Zelensky said in his evening address.
Earlier on July 8, the president announced a new round of sanctions, including restrictions on five Chinese-registered companies accused of supplying components found in Russian Shahed-type drones used to attack Ukraine.
Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Zelensky's sanctions commissioner, told reporters on July 8 that the latest decrees bring Ukrainian penalties in line with the EU's 15th, 16th, and 17th packages of sanctions against Russia.
The 15th package targets individuals from Russia, Belarus, and China, among other countries, according to Vlasiuk. It includes the Russian pilot Alexander Azarenkov, who was involved in the deadly attack on the Okhmatdyt children's hospital in Kyiv. Zelensky signed the sanctions decree on the one-year anniversary of the strike.
The 16th package includes individuals from Russia, China, Turkey, and other nations. It also targets the Voin Center, Russia's military-patriotic education organization operating in occupied Ukrainian territories, and Pivdennyi Flot LLC, which transports Russian oil via its "shadow fleet," Vlasiuk said.
The 17th package designates firms from Russia, China, Turkey, and other countries, including the gold-mining company Petropavlovsk and the Chinese company Skywalker Technology Co. Ltd, produce drone parts for Russia.
The EU is expected to approve its 18th package of sanctions against Russia later this week, after facing opposition from pro-Kremlin bloc members Slovakia and Hungary.
Ukraine has taken measures to coordinate sanctions with international partners in order to amplify pressure on Moscow. Zelensky on June 27 signed a decree to synchronize Ukraine's sanctions against Russia with those imposed by the EU and Group of Seven (G7).
The International Criminal Court (ICC) said on July 8 that it had issued arrest warrants for two senior Taliban leaders, accusing them of crimes against humanity and gender-based persecution following the group's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. The move follows Russia's recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government on July 3. Russia, which had previously designated the Taliban as a banned terrorist group, became the first country in the world to recognize it. In a statement,
The International Criminal Court (ICC) said on July 8 that it had issued arrest warrants for two senior Taliban leaders, accusing them of crimes against humanity and gender-based persecution following the group's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.
The move follows Russia's recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government on July 3. Russia, which had previously designated the Taliban as a banned terrorist group, became the first country in the world to recognize it.
In a statement, the ICC named Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Afghanistan's top judge Abdul Hakim Haqqani as suspects in a campaign of systematic oppression targeting women, girls, and others who do not conform to the group's rigid gender ideology.
The court said the alleged crimes took place across Afghanistan from the Taliban's return to power on August 15, 2021, and continued at least until Jan. 20, 2025. The suspects are believed to have played key roles in the enforcement of Taliban policies that led to "murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance."
The persecution was not limited to women and girls, according to the ICC. The court said that men perceived as allies of women or opponents of Taliban ideology were also targeted.
The ICC emphasized that the Taliban implemented a state-led policy of repression that violated fundamental human rights and freedoms across the country.
Most of the international community has refused to formally recognize the Taliban regime due to its human rights abuses and failure to meet international standards.
Meanwhile, since Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the Kremlin has deepened relationships with authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, Iran, and now the Taliban. Russia has expanded trade with Afghanistan and allowed Taliban officials to participate in Russian forums.
In December 2024, the Russian State Duma passed a law allowing certain groups, including the Taliban, to be removed from the country's list of banned terrorist organizations. The move paved the way for official recognition.
Putin has referred to the Taliban as "allies," and Lavrov has called them "sane people," despite the group's ongoing enforcement of strict Islamic law, including gender apartheid, public executions, and bans on women's education.
U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 8 he was "not happy" with Russian President Vladimir Putin. "We get a lot of bullsh*t thrown at us by Putin," he said at a cabinet meeting. "He's very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless."Trump has vacillated for months between criticizing Putin and praising the Kremlin. So far, he has failed to increase military aid to Ukraine or sanction Russia despite Moscow's refusal to accept a ceasefire.During his election campaign, Trump repeated
U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 8 he was "not happy" with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"We get a lot of bullsh*t thrown at us by Putin," he said at a cabinet meeting. "He's very nice all the time, but it turns out to be meaningless."
Trump has vacillated for months between criticizing Putin and praising the Kremlin. So far, he has failed to increase military aid to Ukraine or sanction Russia despite Moscow's refusal to accept a ceasefire.
During his election campaign, Trump repeatedly pledged to end the war in Ukraine within "24 hours." However, his efforts to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia have seen no progress.
Trump also addressed U.S. legislation on sanctions, saying the Senate's Russia sanctions bill was "totally optional" for him to implement or terminate.
"I'm looking at it very strongly," Trump said.
The bill would impose 500% tariffs on imports from countries purchasing Russian oil, gas, uranium, and other products. It was introduced in April but has seen no progress since then.
Earlier, Trump signaled growing openness to tougher measures against Moscow, ABC News reported on June 29.
According to Senator Lindsey Graham, Trump privately told him it was "time to move" the Russia sanctions bill.
"I’m confident the president is ready for us to act," Graham said.
The Senate is expected to vote on the bill after Congress returns from a break in July.
"(Putin is) killing a lot of people — his soldiers and their soldiers mostly. And it's now up to 7,000 a week," Trump said on July 8, referring to Russia's battlefield losses.
In recent weeks, Trump has been critical of the Russian president. Following a phone call with Putin on July 3, Trump said he was "very disappointed," signaling growing frustration with the Kremlin.
When asked by a journalist on July 8 whether he would take action, Trump responded: "Wouldn't be telling you... We want to have a little surprise."
Trump also commented on the the current pause in weapons deliveries to Ukraine. He pointed to the previous transfer of advanced systems, including Javelin anti-tank missiles and Patriot air defense systems, calling them "the best equipment in the world."
His remarks come after the United States halted military aid shipments to Ukraine on July 2 amid an internal Pentagon review of stockpile capacity. The freeze coincided with a surge in Russian aerial attacks, leaving Ukraine increasingly vulnerable amid a shortage of U.S.-supplied air defense systems.
The U.S. halted weapons shipments to Ukraine amid a capability review, the White House and Pentagon previously confirmed, with Trump later denying the pause.
On July 7, the Pentagon said it would renew shipments, saying the additional defensive weapons were intended to help Ukraine protect itself while the U.S. works toward "a lasting peace."
Russia's crude oil shipments have dropped to their lowest level since February, as refinery processing outpaces production growth and trims available export volumes, Bloomberg reported on July 8.Russia has used its revenues from energy exports to finance the war in Ukraine.Seaborne crude flows averaged 3.12 million barrels a day over the four weeks to July 6, a 3% decline from the previous period ending June 29, according to tanker-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg. That's the lowest level rec
Russia's crude oil shipments have dropped to their lowest level since February, as refinery processing outpaces production growth and trims available export volumes, Bloomberg reported on July 8.
Russia has used its revenues from energy exports to finance the war in Ukraine.
Seaborne crude flows averaged 3.12 million barrels a day over the four weeks to July 6, a 3% decline from the previous period ending June 29, according to tanker-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg. That's the lowest level recorded since the four-week period ending Feb. 23.
The gross value of Moscow's oil exports rose by about $100 million, or 8%, to $1.36 billion for the week ending July 6, Bloomberg said. That increase was due to higher volume, although average export prices declined for a second consecutive week.
Most of Russia's oil continues to head to Asia. Shipments to the region averaged 2.73 million barrels per day, slightly lower than the previous month. Flows to Turkey fell to 370,000 barrels a day, and shipments to Syria held steady at 25,000 barrels a day.
The European Union is seeking to tighten sanctions on Russia. Ambassadors have yet to approve the EU's 18th sanctions package due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia. The bloc failed to adopt the new package on June 27.
The new package includes restrictions targeting Russia's energy and banking sectors, as well as transactions linked to the Nord Stream gas pipeline.
Three men were found guilty on July 8 in connection with an arson attack on Ukraine-linked businesses in London, which British authorities say was orchestrated by Russia's Wagner mercenary group, Reuters reported.The alleged ringleader, Dylan Earl, 21, had already pleaded guilty to aggravated arson over the 2024 blaze targeting companies that were supplying Elon Musk's Starlink satellite equipment to Ukraine, according to Reuters. The systems are considered vital to Ukraine's communications and
Three men were found guilty on July 8 in connection with an arson attack on Ukraine-linked businesses in London, which British authorities say was orchestrated by Russia's Wagner mercenary group, Reuters reported.
The alleged ringleader, Dylan Earl, 21, had already pleaded guilty to aggravated arson over the 2024 blaze targeting companies that were supplying Elon Musk's Starlink satellite equipment to Ukraine, according to Reuters.
The systems are considered vital to Ukraine's communications and defense against Russia's ongoing invasion.
Earl also became the first person convicted under the U.K.'s National Security Act after admitting to a separate plot to attack a wine shop and restaurant in London’s upscale Mayfair district and to kidnap its owner, a prominent critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Two others, Jake Reeves, 23, and Earl’s associate, also pleaded guilty to aggravated arson, with Reeves admitting to a charge under the National Security Act for receiving a material benefit from a foreign intelligence agency.
A jury at London's Old Bailey court convicted three additional men, Nii Kojo Mensah, 23, Jakeem Rose, 23, and Ugnius Asmena, 20, of aggravated arson. They had denied the charges. A fourth man, Paul English, 61, was acquitted.
Two other defendants, Ashton Evans, 20, and Dmitrijus Paulauskas, 23, were charged with failing to disclose knowledge of terrorist activity. Evans was convicted on one count and cleared of another. Paulauskas was acquitted of both charges and reportedly broke down in tears as the verdict was read.
Commander Dominic Murphy of the London Metropolitan Police reportedly said he was confident the Wagner Group and the Russian state were behind the attacks.
The U.K. has designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization.
Earl had exchanged hundreds of encrypted messages with a supposed Wagner handler using the alias "Privet Bot" on Telegram. According to reporting by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), the account was previously advertised by Grey Zone, a Wagner-affiliated channel.
Prosecutors said Earl expressed interest in fighting for Wagner and was encouraged to recruit contacts from British soccer hooligan networks, Irish republican groups, and organized crime circles, Reuters reported. He and Evans also admitted to unrelated charges of dealing cocaine.
The Russian Embassy in London has denied any involvement in the warehouse attack and accused the British government of blaming Russia for domestic issues.
The Kremlin has consistently rejected accusations of sabotage and espionage, despite growing evidence and convictions tied to Russian-linked operations across Europe.
U.S. President Donald Trump has promised to send 10 Patriot interceptors to Ukraine - a smaller number than had been paused previously while en route to the country, Axios reported on July 8, citing its sources. Trump has also suggested that Germany sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine, according to three sources cited by Axios. They said the U.S. and European allies would split the cost of the purchase.The discussion comes as Ukraine is calling upon its allies, particularly the United S
U.S. President Donald Trump has promised to send 10 Patriot interceptors to Ukraine - a smaller number than had been paused previously while en route to the country, Axios reported on July 8, citing its sources.
Trump has also suggested that Germany sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine, according to three sources cited by Axios. They said the U.S. and European allies would split the cost of the purchase.
The discussion comes as Ukraine is calling upon its allies, particularly the United States, to support Ukrainian air defense by supplying "life-saving" Patriot systems and relevant missiles.
The Pentagon said on July 2 that some military assistance to Ukraine had been halted as the U.S. Defense Department conducts a review of foreign aid deliveries.
On July 7, the Pentagon said it would renew shipments, saying the additional defensive weapons were intended to help Ukraine protect itself while the U.S. works toward "a lasting peace."
Merz called Trump to request the release of the paused interceptors, according to Axios. During the call, Trump proposed that Germany sell one of its own Patriot batteries to Ukraine.
While no agreement has been reached, officials on both sides say negotiations are ongoing. German officials maintain that Berlin has already sent a higher share of its available Patriot systems to Ukraine than any other NATO country, including the U.S.
Russia has escalated its aerial campaign against Ukraine in recent weeks, launching large-scale missile and drone attacks that have killed and injured hundreds of civilians across multiple cities.
The suspension of U.S. arms deliveries, which include Patriots and precision-guided munitions, drew criticism from Kyiv. During a July 4 phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump said he was not responsible for halting the aid, according to the Wall Street Journal.
He reportedly told Zelensky that a review of U.S. munitions stockpiles was initiated after last month's U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, but denied ordering a full pause in shipments.
NBC News reported that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth halted the shipments unilaterally on July 2, despite internal Pentagon assessments that the move would not jeopardize U.S. military readiness.
Special Envoy Keith Kellogg and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov are set to meet in Rome later this week to discuss resuming the stalled military aid, Politico reported on July 7.
President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an order on July 8 imposing sanctions on five Chinese-registered companies accused of supplying components found in Russian Shahed-type drones used to attack Ukraine.The decree follows a statement by Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), which said it recovered Chinese-made parts from downed drones during a July 4 air assault on Kyiv.Sanctions were imposed on Central Asia Silk Road International Trade, Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing, Shenzhen Royo Technology,
President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an order on July 8 imposing sanctions on five Chinese-registered companies accused of supplying components found in Russian Shahed-type drones used to attack Ukraine.
The decree follows a statement by Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), which said it recovered Chinese-made parts from downed drones during a July 4 air assault on Kyiv.
Sanctions were imposed on Central Asia Silk Road International Trade, Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing, Shenzhen Royo Technology, Shenzhen Jinduobang Technology, and Ningbo BLIN Machinery.
The list was published on the Presidential Office's website alongside the official decision by Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council.
Russia's domestically produced drones based on Iran's Shahed-136 is a loitering munition extensively used by Russia to target Ukrainian cities, and is assembled with components sourced from around the world. Kyiv has warned that some of these parts continue to flow through countries that have not joined Western sanctions.
China has emerged as one of Moscow's key wartime partners, helping Russia circumvent sanctions and becoming the largest supplier of dual-use goods aiding its defense sector.
Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president's commissioner for sanctions, told journalists on July 7 that Russia's growing ability to sustain weapons production is being driven by a flow of Chinese components and materials.
Zelensky has repeatedly accused China of backing Russia and providing technological and logistical support for its war effort. On May 29, he said Beijing had blocked the sale of drones to Ukraine while continuing to supply them to Russia.
Ukraine has already sanctioned several Chinese companies tied to Russia's war effort.
As Russian-Chinese relations deepen, Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to visit China in September, where he is scheduled to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 7 permitting foreigners to serve in the Russian army during periods of mobilization, expanding military recruitment efforts.Putin's partial mobilization decree from Sept. 21, 2022, remains in force and has never been formally rescinded. Ending it would require a separate presidential decree specifying a termination date.Previously, it was allowed only during states of emergency or under martial law. Despite its full-scale invasion of Ukrai
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 7 permitting foreigners to serve in the Russian army during periods of mobilization, expanding military recruitment efforts.
Putin's partial mobilization decree from Sept. 21, 2022, remains in force and has never been formally rescinded. Ending it would require a separate presidential decree specifying a termination date.
Previously, it was allowed only during states of emergency or under martial law. Despite its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has avoided formally declaring martial law.
According to the document, the Kremlin is also permitting qualified specialists who have reached the age limit to sign contracts with Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal Security Service (FSB), or other state security agencies.
The changes aim to strengthen recruitment as Moscow tries to keep up the pace of troop replenishment without causing another wave of unpopular conscription. The Kremlin has heavily relied on financial incentives and aggressive campaigns to attract new volunteers.
Moscow currently recruits 30,000 to 40,000 individuals into its army each month, sources familiar with U.S. and EU intelligence told the Wall Street Journal.
On March 31, Putin authorized the spring conscription of 160,000 men — the country's largest call-up in 14 years. Though Russian officials claim conscripts are not sent to the front, human rights groups and relatives have reported that many are pressured into signing contracts.
In May, Russia's Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin said 20,000 naturalized migrants were sent to fight in Ukraine after failing to register for military service.
In the summer of 2024, Russian lawmakers passed a law allowing the revocation of citizenship for naturalized individuals who do not comply with military registration requirements.
Less than a month after his release from Russian captivity, 57-year-old soldier Valery Zelensky died of injuries sustained under torture, Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne reported on July 6.Zelensky had spent 39 months in Russian captivity. He was released as part of the landmark 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner deal on May 25. Just 22 days later, on June 16, his heart stopped. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, his unit delivered weapons to Ukrainian forces in Mariupol, his daughter, Valeria Z
Less than a month after his release from Russian captivity, 57-year-old soldier Valery Zelensky died of injuries sustained under torture, Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne reported on July 6.
Zelensky had spent 39 months in Russian captivity. He was released as part of the landmark 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner deal on May 25. Just 22 days later, on June 16, his heart stopped.
At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, his unit delivered weapons to Ukrainian forces in Mariupol, his daughter, Valeria Zelenka, said.
"When the offensive began, they were told that volunteers were needed to go on the assault. Out of 40 (people), eight said, 'We're going.' My father was one of them," she added.
The family did not immediately find out that he had been taken prisoner for some time, and he was considered missing in action. During his years in captivity, Zelensky's family received only one letter. He had long appeared on prisoner exchange lists but did not return until this year.
"The torture was not just cruel, it was inhuman. But he endured it," his daughter told Suspilne.
"He told me, 'Daughter, I endured it because of Kyokushin (a style of karate). I have discipline, I'm tough. My body and muscles protected me.'"
Valeria said her father had been overjoyed to come home and meet his grandson for the first time. He also expressed a desire to learn Ukrainian after years of speaking Russian.
Doctors initially treated him for suspected pancreatic issues, but his condition quickly deteriorated. During surgery, they discovered his organs were severely damaged. He died in intensive care days later.
"My father told me, 'Three people died among us from torture. And when I was in a very bad state, I asked God: Please let me see the eyes of my beloved,'" his daughter said.
A medical report listed extensive injuries. He had a non-functioning shoulder and arm and showed signs of multiple organ failures.
"The first feeling is inexhaustible pain that your loved one is no longer here. He was simply tortured," Valeria said. "And there is relief that he no longer feels that torture."
Zelensky's return was part of a wider prisoner exchange agreed during a first round of direct talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Istanbul.
The case is the latest in a number of Ukrainian soldiers' deaths after their return from Russian captivity, highlighting the effects of "widespread and systematic" torture of prisoners of war (POWs) in Russian prisons, reported by the U.N.
Serhii Dobrovolskyi, a Ukrainian soldier who had been in Russian captivity since 2023, died just a month after his release at the end of May as part of a 1000-for-1000 prisoner swap, an official from the soldier's home region announced on June 21.
In 2023, a high-ranking officer from the "Azov" brigade, Oleh Mudrak, died at 35 years old, months after his release from Russian captivity.
As a POW, he survived the Olenivka camp explosion and endured a dramatic weight loss in just 100 days, as seen in the photos published by Stanislav Aseyev, a Ukrainian writer and activist.
Dmytro Shapovalov, a 32-year-old defender of Ukraine who was exchanged in 2023 after over a year in Russian prisons, died on June 9, according to Suspilne.
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian captivity often face torture, abuse, and inhumane treatment, according to Ukrainian officials and human rights groups.
Many former POWs have reported beatings, starvation, and psychological pressure.
The exact number of Ukrainians currently held by Russia remains unknown. Kyiv continues to call for a full all-for-all exchange. Moscow has repeatedly rejected the offer.
In anticipation of a potential war with Russia, the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands has begun reserving space for NATO ships carrying military cargo and is mapping out logistics routes for weapons transfers, the Financial Times reported on July 8.The decision comes as NATO allies increasingly warn of the risk of a large-scale war with Russia within five years. Rotterdam has previously handled weapons shipments, but this marks the first time that it will designate a special berth for militar
In anticipation of a potential war with Russia, the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands has begun reserving space for NATO ships carrying military cargo and is mapping out logistics routes for weapons transfers, the Financial Times reported on July 8.
The decision comes as NATO allies increasingly warn of the risk of a large-scale war with Russia within five years. Rotterdam has previously handled weapons shipments, but this marks the first time that it will designate a special berth for military use.
Part of the container terminal will be repurposed to ensure the safe transfer of ammunition and other equipment between vessels. Military supply logistics will be coordinated with the port of Antwerp in neighboring Belgium.
"We see each other less and less as competitors," Boudewijn Siemons, Chief Executive of the Port of Rotterdam Authority, said, referring to the port of Antwerp.
"If large volumes of military goods would have to be shipped, we'd look to Antwerp or other ports to take over some capacity and the other way around."
Siemons added that not all terminals are equipped to handle military-grade cargo, making the logistical coordination crucial, particularly for shipments from the U.S., U.K., and Canada.
In May, the Dutch Defense Ministry confirmed that space would be allocated for military supplies at NATO's request. The move is part of broader efforts by European allies to reduce dependence on the U.S. for defense logistics.
Russia's military spending has surged amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow's 2024 defense budget rose by 42% in real terms, reaching $462 billion, surpassing the combined total of all European countries.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on July 5 that a Chinese military move against Taiwan could prompt Beijing to encourage Russia to open a second front against NATO states.
Rutte has repeatedly warned that Russia could rebuild its military capabilities fast enough to pose a direct threat to NATO territory, urging allied governments to act swiftly and decisively.
After failing to approve 18th package of sanctions against Russia due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia, EU countries are expected to finalize an agreement this week, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna said on July 7.Since EU sanctions require unanimous approval, a single veto could prevent implementation. In late June, EU ambassadors did not approve the sanctions package because of objections from Budapest and Bratislava. "According to my information, European countries wil
After failing to approve 18th package of sanctions against Russia due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia, EU countries are expected to finalize an agreement this week, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna said on July 7.
Since EU sanctions require unanimous approval, a single veto could prevent implementation. In late June, EU ambassadors did not approve the sanctions package because of objections from Budapest and Bratislava.
"According to my information, European countries will still reach an agreement this week on the 18th package of sanctions, together with Slovakia and Hungary," she told Ukrainian broadcaster ICTV.
The delay followed earlier signs of resistance from both governments, despite the package being introduced shortly after the previous round of sanctions took effect on May 20.
"It is noteworthy that during the previous period, when the decision on the 17th package was being made, Hungary did not vote for this decision until the last day," Stefanishyna said.
"There was even almost a day when these sanctions were not put into effect."
Unlike Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has consistently opposed sanctions and military aid for Ukraine, Slovakia has not previously attempted to block new EU measures.
Bratislava requested a delay in adopting the latest package until the bloc clarifies the financial implications of RePowerEU — an initiative to end reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2030.
"Without radical political leadership in the European Union, it will be very difficult," Stefanishyna said, warning of future veto threats by individual member states.
The 18th package includes new restrictions targeting Russia's energy and banking sectors, as well as transactions linked to the Nord Stream pipeline project.
These measures are part of a broader European effort to tighten pressure on Moscow as it continues to reject calls for an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.
While the EU pushes forward with additional restrictions, the United States has not imposed new sanctions on Russia since President Donald Trump took office in January.
At least nine civilians were killed and 81 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past 24 hours, regional authorities reported on July 8.Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 54 drones overnight, including Iranian-designed Shahed-type attack drones, and fired four S-300/400 guided missiles. Air defenses intercepted 34 drones, while another eight were likely used as radar-jamming decoys. Drones struck five locations across the country.The overnight assault was repelled using
At least nine civilians were killed and 81 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past 24 hours, regional authorities reported on July 8.
Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 54 drones overnight, including Iranian-designed Shahed-type attack drones, and fired four S-300/400 guided missiles.
Air defenses intercepted 34 drones, while another eight were likely used as radar-jamming decoys. Drones struck five locations across the country.
The overnight assault was repelled using aircraft, electronic warfare, mobile fire groups, and missile defense systems, the military said.
In Kharkiv Oblast, one person was killed and 40 others were injured, including three children, as the city of Kharkiv and seven other settlements came under attack, Governor Oleh Syniehubov reported.
Russian strikes on Zaporizhzhia Oblast injured 20 people and damaged at least 64 houses and apartment buildings, Governor Ivan Fedorov said.
In Donetsk Oblast, three civilians were killed — two in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and one in Novotroitske — and 10 more were injured, according to Governor Vadym Filashkin.
In Sumy Oblast, four people were killed and four more injured in Russian strikes, the local administration reported.
One person was killed and four others were injured in Kherson Oblast, where Russian forces hit residential areas and public infrastructure, damaging two apartment buildings and 17 houses, according to Governor Oleksandr Prokudin.
Three people were injured in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Russian troops attacked with first-person-view (FPV) drones, Governor Serhii Lysak said.
The wave of attacks follows Russia's ongoing refusal to accept a ceasefire and comes amid rising use of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure.
Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) identified Russian Armed Forces Major Denis Sheynov as allegedly involved in the July 2024 missile strike on Kyiv's Okhmatdyt children's hospital, HUR reported on July 8.The strike, which killed two adults and injured at least 34 people, directly hit the country's largest pediatric medical center, where 627 children were receiving treatment at the time. According to HUR, Sheynov is the head of the special engineering service of the 121st Heavy Bomber Aviatio
Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) identified Russian Armed Forces Major Denis Sheynov as allegedly involved in the July 2024 missile strike on Kyiv's Okhmatdyt children's hospital, HUR reported on July 8.
The strike, which killed two adults and injured at least 34 people, directly hit the country's largest pediatric medical center, where 627 children were receiving treatment at the time.
According to HUR, Sheynov is the head of the special engineering service of the 121st Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, part of Russia's 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, tasked with executing the strike.
Sheynov, born in Saratov on Jan. 30, 1978, was reportedly responsible for the technical preparation of the X-101 air-launched cruise missiles used in the attack.
He graduated from the Saratov Higher Military Command Engineering School Missile Forces, and previously served in Syria in 2018. Sheynov has been awarded several medals by the Russian government, including for participation in the Syrian war.
Ukrainian authorities previously charged Russian Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash in absentia for ordering the strike, which was widely condemned internationally.
Kobylash gave the order at around 9:15 a.m., while the hospital was struck at 10:45 a.m.
Striletska Bay near Sevastopol, once a key base for Russian warships in occupied Crimea, is now nearly empty and used primarily for mooring tugboats and small patrol craft, the Atesh partisan group reported on July 8.According to the group, Russia now uses the bay mainly for maintenance work and rare anti-sabotage defense drills, having pulled most major vessels from the area. "Recently, the bay has been practically empty... The degradation of the occupation fleet in Sevastopol is becoming incre
Striletska Bay near Sevastopol, once a key base for Russian warships in occupied Crimea, is now nearly empty and used primarily for mooring tugboats and small patrol craft, the Atesh partisan group reported on July 8.
According to the group, Russia now uses the bay mainly for maintenance work and rare anti-sabotage defense drills, having pulled most major vessels from the area.
"Recently, the bay has been practically empty... The degradation of the occupation fleet in Sevastopol is becoming increasingly obvious. Striletska Bay, which previously housed a large number of combat vessels, is now idle." Atesh said.
The remaining combat units are periodically rotated and redeployed in an apparent effort to avoid detection by Ukrainian reconnaissance.
"Every object is under control — no ship will go unnoticed," Atesh said, adding that all ship movements are being tracked and shared with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Sevastopol has served as the base for Russia's Black Sea Fleet since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Repeated Ukrainian attacks using naval drones, missiles, and long-range drones have forced the Kremlin to reduce its naval presence in occupied Crimea.
Ukraine has destroyed several Russian vessels, including the Caesar Kunikov landing ship, the Sergei Kotov patrol ship, the Ivanovets missile corvette, and multiple high-speed landing crafts.
The shrinking Russian presence in Sevastopol comes as Ukraine steps up drone attacks against other Black Sea Fleet locations. On July 6, drones struck the fleet's facilities in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, a key port east of Crimea across the Kerch Strait.
Russia has lost 1,028,610 troops in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported on July 8.The number includes 1,070 casualties that Russian forces suffered over the past day.According to the report, Russia has also lost 10,995 tanks, 22,967 armored fighting vehicles, 54,456 vehicles and fuel tanks, 30,034 artillery systems, 1,434 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,192 air defense systems, 421 airplanes, 340 helicopt
Russia has lost 1,028,610 troops in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported on July 8.
The number includes 1,070 casualties that Russian forces suffered over the past day.
According to the report, Russia has also lost 10,995 tanks, 22,967 armored fighting vehicles, 54,456 vehicles and fuel tanks, 30,034 artillery systems, 1,434 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,192 air defense systems, 421 airplanes, 340 helicopters, 44,230 drones, 28 ships and boats, and one submarine.
The EU will introduce the "toughest sanctions... imposed (on Russia) in the last three years" in coordination with U.S. senators, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said in a television interview on July 7."(Russian President Vladimir) Putin is no longer advancing on the front and is now limited to shelling residential areas with drones and missiles. This is leading to numerous casualties among the civilian population. This must stop," Barrot said.U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham said on June 2
The EU will introduce the "toughest sanctions... imposed (on Russia) in the last three years" in coordination with U.S. senators, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said in a television interview on July 7.
"(Russian President Vladimir) Putin is no longer advancing on the front and is now limited to shelling residential areas with drones and missiles. This is leading to numerous casualties among the civilian population. This must stop," Barrot said.
U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham said on June 29 that U.S. President Donald Trump was ready for the Senate to vote on a bill to impose new sanctions on Russia. The Republican senator has repeatedly called for implementing additional sanctions against Moscow.
Barrot noted the EU is planning to impose the strongest sanctions against Russia that the bloc has introduced since 2022.
"This (war) cannot continue; it must stop. To achieve this, in coordination with American senators, Europe is preparing to introduce, based on French proposals, the toughest sanctions we have imposed in the last three years," he said.
"They will directly deplete the resources that allow Vladimir Putin to continue his war," Barrot added.
In the U.S., senators have been working on a sanctions bill, with Graham saying voting on a bill is expected to begin following the end of the July congressional break.
Graham, earlier on July 7, said he expects "the Senate will move the bipartisan Russian sanctions bill that will allow tariffs and sanctions to be placed on countries who prop up Putin’s war machine and do not help Ukraine."
The bill led by Graham has been in the works for several months as the White House has failed attempts to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia.
"Ukraine has said yes to ceasefires and to any and all meeting requests while Putin continues to defy peace efforts. It is now time to put more tools in President Trump’s toolbox in order to end the war," he said.
Russia has relied on its partners, including Belarus, China, and Iran, for trade and to bypass Western sanctions meant to inhibit Moscow's ability to continue its war against Ukraine.
The United States will send "more weapons" to Ukraine amid intensified Russian strikes, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters on July 7, adding that he is disappointed in Russian President Vladimir Putin."We're gonna send some more weapons we have to them, they have to be able to defend themselves, they're getting hit very hard now," Trump said alongside a U.S. and Israeli delegation at the White House.The U.S. halted weapons shipments to Ukraine amid a capability review, the White House an
The United States will send "more weapons" to Ukraine amid intensified Russian strikes, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters on July 7, adding that he is disappointed in Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"We're gonna send some more weapons we have to them, they have to be able to defend themselves, they're getting hit very hard now," Trump said alongside a U.S. and Israeli delegation at the White House.
The U.S. halted weapons shipments to Ukraine amid a capability review, the White House and Pentagon previously confirmed, with Trump later denying the pause.
Trump previously said he was disappointed in Putin for not making progress to end Russia's war against Ukraine, following a phone call between the two leaders on July 3.
On July 7, Trump again said he was unhappy with Putin for failing to cooperate with U.S. efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
"It's a horrible thing, and I'm not happy with President Putin at all," Trump said. "I'm disappointed frankly that President Putin hasn't stopped."
He noted that the additional assistance the U.S. will supply to Ukraine will mainly consist of defense weapons amid increased Russian attacks.
"They're getting hit very hard. We're gonna have to send more weapons, your defensive weapons primarily, but they're getting hit very, very hard. So many people are dying in that mess," Trump said.
Later on July 7 the Pentagon released a statement confirming more weapons would be sent to Ukraine.
"At President Trump's direction, the Department of Defense is sending additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure the Ukrainians can defend themselves while we work to secure a lasting peace and ensure the killing stops," it read.
"Our framework for POTUS to evaluate military shipments across the globe remains in effect and is integral to our America First defense priorities."
President Volodymyr Zelensky has previously said he and Trump discussed supplying Ukraine with additional Patriot missile systems following a phone call between the two on July 4.
Zelensky described his recent phone call with Trump as "the best conversation in all this time" in an evening address on July 5.
"Patriot (missiles) are key to protection from ballistic (missiles). We discussed several other important issues that our teams will work out in detail at meetings in the near future," he said.
Trump described his July 3 conversation with Putin as disappointing, saying that the call "didn't make any progress" in stopping Russia's war against Ukraine.
"I'm very disappointed with the conversation I had today with President Putin," Trump told journalists. "Because I don't think he's there. And I'm very disappointed. I don't think he's looking to stop this fighting."
Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell confirmed on July 2 that some military assistance to Ukraine has been halted as the U.S. Defense Department conducts a review of foreign aid deliveries.
"This capability review... is being conducted to ensure U.S. military aid aligns with our defense priorities... We see this as a common-sense, pragmatic step towards having a framework to evaluate what munitions are sent and where," Parnell said.
Despite the Pentagon announcement, Trump did not acknowledge a halt in U.S. weapons shipments to Ukraine.
"Why did you pause weapons shipments to Ukraine?" a reporter asked Trump as the U.S. president prepared to board Air Force One on July 3.
A former deputy chief of the Russian army's General Staff, Colonel General Khalil Arslanov, was sentenced to 17 years in prison on July 7 over a scheme involving the theft of over 1 billion roubles ($12.7 million) from Defense Ministry contracts, Russia's state-owned TASS news agency reported.A closed-door military court found Arslanov and others guilty of embezzling millions from state contracts with Voentelecom, a company providing telecommunications services to the Russian military. Arslanov
A former deputy chief of the Russian army's General Staff, Colonel General Khalil Arslanov, was sentenced to 17 years in prison on July 7 over a scheme involving the theft of over 1 billion roubles ($12.7 million) from Defense Ministry contracts, Russia's state-owned TASS news agency reported.
A closed-door military court found Arslanov and others guilty of embezzling millions from state contracts with Voentelecom, a company providing telecommunications services to the Russian military.
Arslanov was also convicted of extorting a 12 million rouble ($152,400) bribe from the head of a military communications company. Two co-defendants, Colonel Pavel Kutakhov and military pensioner Igor Yakovlev, received seven and six years in prison, respectively.
Arslanov, a former head of the Russian military's communications unit, served as deputy chief of the army's General Staff from 2013 until his removal in 2020 and was named a colonel general in 2017.
This high-profile conviction is the latest in a series of corruption scandals that have implicated top echelons of the Russian military establishment over the past year. Russia has significantly stepped up prosecutions of senior defense officials.
Just last week, on July 1, former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov was sentenced to 13 years in a penal colony after being found guilty of corruption. It was the harshest verdict in a series of high-level military corruption cases until Arslanov's sentencing on July 7.
Authorities initially detained Ivanov in April 2024 on bribery allegations, later adding embezzlement charges in October. His trial, like Arslanov's, was held behind closed doors reportedly due to national security concerns.
Ivanov's co-defendant, Anton Filatov, a former logistics company executive, received a 12.5-year sentence.According to state media, the embezzled amount totaled 4.1 billion roubles ($48.8 million), primarily funneled through bank transfers to two foreign accounts. Ivanov pleaded not guilty.
The court stripped him of all state honors and ordered the confiscation of property, vehicles, and cash valued at 2.5 billion roubles, including a luxury apartment in central Moscow, a three-storey English-style mansion, and a high-end car collection featuring brands like Bentley and Aston Martin.
Russia's crude oil production in June fell below its agreed-upon OPEC+ target, according to individuals familiar with the data interviwed by Bloomberg. Russian producers reportedly pumped 9.022 million barrels per day last month, a figure 28,000 barrels per day below the required level, including compensation cuts. This marks the largest gap between Russia's output and its monthly quota this year, based on Bloomberg's calculations.Historically, Russia, which co-leads the OPEC+ alliance with Saud
Russia's crude oil production in June fell below its agreed-upon OPEC+ target, according to individuals familiar with the data interviwed by Bloomberg.
Russian producers reportedly pumped 9.022 million barrels per day last month, a figure 28,000 barrels per day below the required level, including compensation cuts. This marks the largest gap between Russia's output and its monthly quota this year, based on Bloomberg's calculations.
Historically, Russia, which co-leads the OPEC+ alliance with Saudi Arabia, has faced criticism for poor compliance with production quotas. However, the nation has shown improved adherence for most of 2025, often pumping below its required levels, according to analysis of Russian data. This increased focus on production discipline follows earlier critiques from Riyadh.
Under the terms of the OPEC+ agreement, Russia's daily production quota for June had increased by 78,000 barrels to 9.161 million barrels. However, Moscow had also committed to a 111,000 barrel-a-day compensation cut for the month, bringing its actual output target to 9.050 million barrels per day.
On July 5, eight OPEC+ nations collectively agreed to raise production by 548,000 barrels per day in August, aiming to capitalize on strong summer consumption. Analysts suggest these additional barrels may be quickly absorbed but could contribute to a crude surplus later in the year.
Independent verification of Russia's oil output data has become challenging since Moscow classified official figures after Western sanctions targeting the nation's energy industry following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, market watchers now largely rely on indicators such as seaborne exports and domestic refinery runs to track trends in Russia's oil production.
The United Kingdom has imposed new sanctions on Russian individuals and an organization involved in the use and transfer of chemical weapons in Ukraine, the British government announced on July 7.According to the updated sanctions list published on the U.K. government's official website, the new measures target Russia's Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry, as well as Lieutenant General Alexei Rtishchev, head of Russia's Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops, and his
The United Kingdom has imposed new sanctions on Russian individuals and an organization involved in the use and transfer of chemical weapons in Ukraine, the British government announced on July 7.
According to the updated sanctions list published on the U.K. government's official website, the new measures target Russia's Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry, as well as Lieutenant General Alexei Rtishchev, head of Russia's Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops, and his deputy, Andrei Marchenko.
The U.K. government said that both of them "have been responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting prohibited activity related to chemical weapons."
The Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry was sanctioned for providing Russia's military with handheld chemical grenades, which have been used against Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The new British sanctions come amid growing international concern over Russia's escalating use of banned chemical agents in its war against Ukraine.
On July 4, the Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) reported that Russian troops are increasingly deploying chemical weapons— including chloropicrin, a highly toxic World War I-era agent, in the field.
The agents are reportedly dropped by drones to flush Ukrainian soldiers from trenches, leaving them exposed to further drone or artillery strikes. While Russia previously used tear gas, the confirmed use of chloropicrin, a substance banned under international law, is "absolutely unacceptable," Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans said.
Ukrainian authorities say Russia has conducted more than 9,000 chemical attacks since the full-scale invasion began in 2022. At least three Ukrainian soldiers have reportedly died from direct exposure.
Russia’s growing ability to sustain weapons production despite Western sanctions is being driven by a flow of Chinese components and materials, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president’s commissioner for sanctions, told journalists on July 7.Vlasiuk’s statement comes as Russia escalates its drone and missile strikes on Ukraine, while the U.S. continues to hold back on imposing tougher sanctions against Moscow and foreign-made components are still being found in Russian weapons used in the atta
Russia’s growing ability to sustain weapons production despite Western sanctions is being driven by a flow of Chinese components and materials, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president’s commissioner for sanctions, told journalists on July 7.
Vlasiuk’s statement comes as Russia escalates its drone and missile strikes on Ukraine, while the U.S. continues to hold back on imposing tougher sanctions against Moscow and foreign-made components are still being found in Russian weapons used in the attacks.
Ukraine has previously documented that Chinese companies have contributed electronics and materials used in the production of these drones.
Just days earlier, after a large-scale Russian attack on July 4, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha shared on social media a photo of a component from a Shahed-136/Geran-2 combat drone discovered in Kyiv. According to Sybiha, the part was manufactured in China and delivered recently.
"The trend of China’s (role) is increasing," Vlasiuk told journalists.
He said that the presence of Chinese-made components and materials in Russian weapons is on the rise, adding that Beijing is expanding its technological capabilities and can now replicate some American technologies.
What an irony. Following tonight's massive Russian air attack on Ukraine, we discovered in Kyiv a component of a Russian-Iranian "Shahed-136"/"Geran-2" combat drone, which was made in China and supplied just recently.
When asked by Kyiv about the Chinese parts found in Russian weapons, Beijing responded by claiming that such support is "non-lethal," the president's commissioner for sanctions said.
Beijing remains one of Russia's key wartime partners, helping Moscow evade Western sanctions and emerging as the leading supplier of dual-use goods used by the Russian defense industry.
In April, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that China, alongside Iran and North Korea, is supplying weapons to Russia.
His remarks followed reports that Ukrainian soldiers had captured Chinese nationals fighting together with Russia's army in Donetsk Oblast. Later, Zelenskyrevealed that at least "several hundred" Chinese nationals are fighting on Russia's side in Ukraine.
Ukraine has already sanctioned several Chinese companies tied to Russia’s war effort.
The South China Morning Post reported that China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told the EU's top diplomat Kaja Kallas on July 3 that the country cannot afford for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine amid fears Washington would shift focus towards Beijing.
Editor's note: This story was updated with the latest information from the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office.Russian drones struck Ukrainian conscription offices in the cities of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia early on July 7, injuring at least three people in Kharkiv, while also damaging military infrastructure, Ukraine's Ground Forces said. At least one soldier was wounded in Zaporizhzhia. The attack comes as Russia increases its efforts to disrupt mobilization in Ukraine. "As a result of the attac
Editor's note: This story was updated with the latest information from the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office.
Russian drones struck Ukrainian conscription offices in the cities of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia early on July 7, injuring at least three people in Kharkiv, while also damaging military infrastructure, Ukraine's Ground Forces said. At least one soldier was wounded in Zaporizhzhia.
The attack comes as Russia increases its efforts to disrupt mobilization in Ukraine.
"As a result of the attack, (Russian) drones hit the building of the Kharkiv conscription office and the surrounding area, as well as near the Zaporizhzhia conscription office," the Ground Forces said.
Two other districts of Kharkiv came under attack that same day, in which one woman was killed and over 80 people, including eight children, were reported injured or suffered shock in Kharkiv, according to the local prosecutor's office.
The strikes are the latest in what Ukrainian military officials describe as a deliberate Russian campaign to target enlistment infrastructure and undermine mobilization efforts.
On July 3, a deadly Russian strike on the central city of Poltava killed two people and injured 47 others. The attack caused a fire at the city's military conscription office and heavily damaged nearby civilian buildings, including civilian houses.
Speaking on national television after the Poltava attack, Ukraine's Ground Forces spokesperson Vitalii Sarantsev said Russia was intentionally striking enlistment centers to disrupt Ukraine's ability to replenish its Armed Forces.
"We will continue to strengthen our army, train our troops, and involve more people in defense to deliver a strong response to the enemy," Sarantsev said.
Major shutdowns at Russia's key airports on July 5–6 caused by Ukrainian drone attacks could cost Russian airlines around 20 billion rubles ($254 million), the pro-Kremlin outlet Kommersant reported on July 7, citing airline representatives and industry experts. Since the start of mass disruptions on July 5, a total of 485 flights were canceled, 88 were diverted to alternate airports, and another 1,900 were delayed across major hubs, according to Russia's aviation agency Rosaviatsiya.The drone a
Major shutdowns at Russia's key airports on July 5–6 caused by Ukrainian drone attacks could cost Russian airlines around 20 billion rubles ($254 million), the pro-Kremlin outlet Kommersant reported on July 7, citing airline representatives and industry experts.
Since the start of mass disruptions on July 5, a total of 485 flights were canceled, 88 were diverted to alternate airports, and another 1,900 were delayed across major hubs, according to Russia's aviation agency Rosaviatsiya.
The drone attacks prompted operational shutdowns that triggered widespread logistical and economic consequences. Over 94,000 passengers were housed in hotels, 43,000 refunds were processed, and hundreds of thousands of vouchers for food and drinks were issued.
The estimated financial toll includes direct airline losses from canceled Boeing 737-800 flights, which can run between 15 million and 23 million rubles ($190,000–$292,000) each depending on the route, as well as costs for delays, diversions, and passenger care.
Experts say the true cost could be far higher. Dmitry Datsykov of EXPO.UAV estimated tens of billions of rubles in additional indirect losses, including missed connections, taxi and hotel losses, and supply chain disruptions.
Ukraine has not publicly claimed responsibility for the disruptions but has acknowledged that its drone strategy aims to undermine Russian logistics and force the war's consequences closer to the Russian public.
The economic fallout comes amid growing scrutiny of Russia's transport sector. On July 7, President Vladimir Putin dismissed Transport Minister Roman Starovoit following the aviation chaos and a high-profile ammonia leak at the Ust-Luga port.
The Kremlin has increasingly struggled to protect critical infrastructure from Kyiv's deep-strike drone campaign, which in recent months has expanded to include refineries, radar plants, and now Russia's busiest airports.
Editor's note: This is a developing story and is being updated.Russia's former Transport Minister Roman Starovoit shot himself dead in Odintsovo following his dismissal by President Vladimir Putin on July 7, the pro-government newspaper Izvestia reported, citing unnamed sources.Starovoit's ouster came after nearly 500 flights were grounded at major Russian airports on July 5–6 due to security threats from Ukrainian drone attacks.The following day, an explosion aboard the Eco Wizard tanker at the
Editor's note: This is a developing story and is being updated.
Russia's former Transport Minister Roman Starovoit shot himself dead in Odintsovo following his dismissal by President Vladimir Putin on July 7, the pro-government newspaper Izvestia reported, citing unnamed sources.
Starovoit's ouster came after nearly 500 flights were grounded at major Russian airports on July 5–6 due to security threats from Ukrainian drone attacks.
The following day, an explosion aboard the Eco Wizard tanker at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast triggered an ammonia leak, adding to the crisis engulfing Russia's transportation sector.
Starovoit, sanctioned by Ukraine and Western countries for his role in the war against Ukraine, had served as governor of Russia's Kursk Oblast before being appointed transport minister in May 2024.
According to Russian media, Starovoit's body was found near Moscow. Preliminary findings suggest that the suicide may be linked to a possible criminal case.
Media outlets report that the former minister shot himself using an honorary firearm he had received from the Interior Ministry in 2023.
According to media reports, former Kursk Oblast official Aleksei Smirnov, who had previously served as Starovoit's deputy, had provided testimony implicating Starovoit. Smirnov himself was arrested earlier on suspicion of embezzling 1 billion rubles (over $12 million) during the construction of defensive structures in the border region.
An investigation into the large-scale theft of state funds in Kursk Oblast is currently underway, with several of Starovoit's former deputies remaining under suspicion, including Smirnov, who briefly served as acting governor.
State-controlled RIA Novosti, citing Russia's Investigative Committee, reported that Starovoit's body was discovered inside his private vehicle with a gunshot wound. Investigative teams from Russia's Main Investigative Directorate are reportedly working at the scene to determine the exact circumstances. The primary theory under consideration is suicide.
The timing of the death remains unclear. Andrei Kartapolov, head of the State Duma Defense Committee, confirmed the death to RTVI, stating only that it occurred "quite some time ago," without elaborating further.
Long-range Ukrainian drones struck the Ilsky oil refinery in Russia's Krasnodar Krai on July 7, hitting one of the facility's technological workshops, a source in Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) told the Kyiv Independent. Located roughly 500 kilometers (311 miles) from Ukrainian-controlled territory, the refinery is among the largest in southern Russia, producing over 6 million tons of fuel annually. It is involved in the reception, storage, and processing of hydrocarbons and distributes r
Long-range Ukrainian drones struck the Ilsky oil refinery in Russia's Krasnodar Krai on July 7, hitting one of the facility's technological workshops, a source in Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) told the Kyiv Independent.
Located roughly 500 kilometers (311 miles) from Ukrainian-controlled territory, the refinery is among the largest in southern Russia, producing over 6 million tons of fuel annually.
It is involved in the reception, storage, and processing of hydrocarbons and distributes refined products via road and rail. The refinery is part of Russia's military-industrial complex and plays a direct role in supporting Moscow's war effort, the source said.
The Russian regional operational headquarters claimed that "drone debris" fell on the oil refinery.
The strike marks a renewed wave of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, following a months-long pause since March. On July 1, Ukrainian drones struck the Saratovorgsintez oil refinery in Russia's Saratov Oblast.
Kyiv has targeted dozens of refineries, oil depots, and military-industrial sites since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. Winter drone attacks forced at least four Russian refineries to temporarily shut down.
This is the second known strike on the Ilsky refinery. Ukrainian drones, operated by the Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SSO), previously targeted the facility on Feb. 17, causing a fire.
Krasnodar Krai, a strategic region along Russia's Black Sea coast, has increasingly come under Ukrainian drone attacks as Kyiv extends the range of its strikes deep into Russian territory.
Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) on July 7 published what it claimed was a Russian army order to increase its military presence at a base in Armenia, two days after HUR's warning of such a move was denied by Yerevan.HUR first made the claim on July 5, saying Russia was increasing its forces at the Gyumri base to exert greater influence in the South Caucasus and "destabilize the global security situation."Armenia's Foreign Ministry denied the claim on the same day.In a post on social media o
Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) on July 7 published what it claimed was a Russian army order to increase its military presence at a base in Armenia, two days after HUR's warning of such a move was denied by Yerevan.
HUR first made the claim on July 5, saying Russia was increasing its forces at the Gyumri base to exert greater influence in the South Caucasus and "destabilize the global security situation."
Armenia's Foreign Ministry denied the claim on the same day.
In a post on social media on July 7, HUR published a document which it said was a "order from the commander of the troops of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces on the 'replenishment' of the Russian military base in Armenia."
"The telegram lists a list of measures for the urgent “replenishment” of the units of the Russian unit by selecting personnel from among the servicemen of the 8th, 18th, 49th and 58th combined arms armies of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces," HUR said.
The news comes amid a major deterioration in Russian-Azerbaijani relations after a deadly June 27 operation in Russia's Yekaterinburg, where Russian security forces killed two Azerbaijani nationals and injured several others in a raid linked to a 2001 murder case.
Armenia has had a historically close relationship with Russia but the relations between Yerevan and Moscow have recently deteriorated.
Russia's leverage over both Baku and Yerevan has diminished dramatically since Azerbaijani troops captured Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-controlled region in Azerbaijan, in 2023.
Russian peacekeepers later withdraw from the region, and now Baku and Yerevan are negotiating a permanent peace deal.
Armenia, which has lambasted Moscow for failing to help it during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is drifting closer to the West.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has suspended the country's membership in a Russian-led military alliance and announced plans to join the European Union. Recently there has also been a crackdown on the pro-Russian opposition in Armenia.
Editor's note: This story was updated with a statement made by Ukraine's General Staff. Ukraine's military confirmed on July 7 that it targeted a chemical plant in Russia's Moscow Oblast used for producing ammunition and explosives, the General Staff said.The plant, located 88 kilometers (55 miles) northeast of Moscow, produces industrial and military-grade chemicals, including explosives, ammunition components, and aircraft protection systems. Established in 1915, the plant is one of the city's
Editor's note: This story was updated with a statement made by Ukraine's General Staff.
Ukraine's military confirmed on July 7 that it targeted a chemical plant in Russia's Moscow Oblast used for producing ammunition and explosives, the General Staff said.
The plant, located 88 kilometers (55 miles) northeast of Moscow, produces industrial and military-grade chemicals, including explosives, ammunition components, and aircraft protection systems.
Established in 1915, the plant is one of the city's largest employers and plays a key role in Russia's defense-industrial complex. Its location in Krasnozavodsk places it roughly 530 kilometers (329 miles) from the Ukrainian border.
It is affiliated with the Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec and supplies the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Federal Security Service (FSB), and other law enforcement agencies.
Residents of Moscow region report attack on chemical plant
Krasnozavodsk residents report an attack on the Krasnozavodsk chemical plant in local chat groups.
Moscow Oblast authorities have not officially confirmed the attack. Russia's Defense Ministry claimed that air defenses intercepted or destroyed 91 Ukrainian drones across multiple regions, including eight over Moscow Oblast.
In a statement released later on July 7, Ukraine's General Staff confirmed that units from its Unmanned Systems Forces, in coordination with other elements of the Defense Forces, carried out a precision strike against the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant.
The facility was specifically targeted to disrupt Russia's ability to produce explosive materials and ammunition, including thermobaric warheads used in Shahed-type drones.
"A series of explosions was recorded in the area of Krasnozavodsk, and firefighting equipment was seen moving through neighboring settlements," the statement read. The results of the strike are still being assessed, it added.
The Kyiv Independent could not independently verify the reports.
The reported strike comes as part of Ukraine's broader campaign to disrupt Russian logistics, weapons production, and supply lines far behind the front line.
In recent months, Ukrainian drones have hit multiple industrial and military sites across Russia, including oil depots, airfields, and electronics facilities.
At least 12 civilians were killed and 69 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past 24 hours, regional authorities reported on July 7.Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 101 drones overnight, including Iranian-designed Shahed-type attack drones, as well as four S-300/400 guided missiles. Air defenses intercepted 75 drones, while another 17 likely served as radar-jamming decoys.The drone and missile assault was countered using aviation, electronic warfare, mobile fire tea
At least 12 civilians were killed and 69 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past 24 hours, regional authorities reported on July 7.
Ukraine's Air Force said Russia launched 101 drones overnight, including Iranian-designed Shahed-type attack drones, as well as four S-300/400 guided missiles. Air defenses intercepted 75 drones, while another 17 likely served as radar-jamming decoys.
The drone and missile assault was countered using aviation, electronic warfare, mobile fire teams, and air defense systems, the military said.
The heaviest casualties occurred in Donetsk Oblast, where seven civilians were killed — four in Kostiantynivka, two in Druzhkivka, and one in Novohryhorivka — and 15 others were injured, Governor Vadym Filashkin reported.
In Kharkiv Oblast, 27 people were injured, including three children, according to Governor Oleh Syniehubov. At least three victims remain hospitalized in moderate condition, and the number may rise.
Russian forces also attacked critical and residential infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, killing two civilians and injuring nine, Governor Oleksandr Prokudin said.
Two more civilians were killed in Sumy Oblast in a drone strike, local authorities said. Another person was injured. In Odesa Oblast, one civilian was killed and infrastructure was damaged in an attack on the regional capital, Governor Oleh Kiper reported.
In Zaporizhzhia, at least 12 people were injured in separate attacks throughout the day, including 10 during a drone strike on the city center, Governor Ivan Fedorov said.
Five civilians were injured in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — two women and three men — in the latest wave of attacks, according to Governor Serhii Lysak.
The mass strikes come amid Russia's continued rejection of ceasefire proposals and its growing use of aerial assaults to pressure Ukrainian defenses.
Kyiv has repeated its urgent appeals to Western partners to ramp up deliveries of air defense systems to protect civilian areas from drone and missile attacks.
Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Transport Minister Roman Starovoit on July 7, following a series of high-profile disruptions to Russia's aviation and shipping sectors.The official decree was published on Russia's legal information portal. No reason was given, but Starovoit's departure comes after nearly 300 flights were grounded at major Russian airports on July 5–6 due to security threats from Ukrainian drone attacks.Adding to the turmoil, an explosion aboard the Eco Wizard tanker at
Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Transport Minister Roman Starovoit on July 7, following a series of high-profile disruptions to Russia's aviation and shipping sectors.
The official decree was published on Russia's legal information portal. No reason was given, but Starovoit's departure comes after nearly 300 flights were grounded at major Russian airports on July 5–6 due to security threats from Ukrainian drone attacks.
Adding to the turmoil, an explosion aboard the Eco Wizard tanker at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast caused an ammonia leak on July 6, prompting an emergency response.
Starovoit, sanctioned by Ukraine and Western countries for his role in the war against Ukraine, had served as governor of Russia's Kursk Oblast before being appointed transport minister in May 2024.
According to the Russian state-controlled newspaper Vedomosti, Deputy Transport Minister Andrei Nikitin, a former Novgorod Oblast governor, is a leading candidate to replace Starovoit.
On July 6, the Russian Federal Aviation Agency confirmed that 287 flights were delayed or canceled at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, St. Petersburg's Pulkovo Airport, and Nizhny Novgorod's Strigino Airport due to safety concerns from drone activity.
Kyiv's drone campaign, which has increasingly disrupted civilian air travel in Russia, is part of Ukraine's broader strategy to undermine Russia's logistics far beyond the front line.
Russian authorities said the ammonia leak at Ust-Luga was "minor," but the pro-Kremlin Telegram channel, Baza, reported that an unexplained explosion preceded the incident.
The Eco Wizard tanker is believed to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet" — a network of vessels used to bypass international sanctions on Russian oil and chemical exports. Five tankers have been damaged by explosions at Russian ports since the start of 2025.
The Kremlin has not made a formal statement on the minister's dismissal.
U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 6 that his administration is "helping a lot" when it comes to Ukraine, defending his approach to the ongoing war."I am helping Ukraine. I'm helping it a lot," Trump told reporters when asked in Washington why the U.S. does not support Ukraine as strongly as it supports Israel.The comment follows a growing outcry in Kyiv over the U.S. Defense Department's decision to pause deliveries of key weapons, including Patriot air defense missiles and precision-guid
U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 6 that his administration is "helping a lot" when it comes to Ukraine, defending his approach to the ongoing war.
"I am helping Ukraine. I'm helping it a lot," Trump told reporters when asked in Washington why the U.S. does not support Ukraine as strongly as it supports Israel.
The comment follows a growing outcry in Kyiv over the U.S. Defense Department's decision to pause deliveries of key weapons, including Patriot air defense missiles and precision-guided munitions.
Ukrainian officials have warned that the delay leaves the country more vulnerable to intensified Russian missile and drone attacks, which have killed and injured hundreds of civilians in recent weeks.
While Trump has repeatedly said he wants to end the war and support Ukraine, his administration has not imposed new sanctions on Russia since he took office in January and has yet to approve additional military assistance packages.
Instead, the Trump administration has prioritized military action in the Middle East. The U.S. launched air strikes on three nuclear sites in Iran on June 21, a move critics say stands in contrast to Washington's cautious posture toward Moscow.
Speaking on Air Force One on July 5, Trump expressed frustration over his July 3 phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"It just seems like he wants to go all the way and just keep killing people," Trump said.
Trump also spoke with President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 4 in what the U.S. president later described as a "very strategic" call. Trump said the two discussed Ukraine's urgent need for air defenses.
"They're going to need something because they're being hit pretty hard," Trump said, adding that supplying Patriot systems was a possibility.
Despite those comments, there have been no new authorizations for weapons deliveries, and Trump's administration has continued to avoid direct economic pressure on Moscow.
Two rounds of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine held in Istanbul in May and June led only to prisoner exchanges, with no breakthrough on ending hostilities. Moscow has maintained maximalist conditions while rejecting calls for an unconditional ceasefire.
U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 6 that his administration will impose an additional 10% tariff on countries aligning themselves with what he described as the BRICS group's "anti-American policy.""There will be no exceptions to this policy," Trump wrote on the social network Truth Social.The announcement coincided with the BRICS summit in Brazil, where member states, including Russia, China, and India, adopted a declaration condemning strikes on Iran and Israel's operations in Gaza. The
U.S. President Donald Trump said on July 6 that his administration will impose an additional 10% tariff on countries aligning themselves with what he described as the BRICS group's "anti-American policy."
"There will be no exceptions to this policy," Trump wrote on the social network Truth Social.
The announcement coincided with the BRICS summit in Brazil, where member states, including Russia, China, and India, adopted a declaration condemning strikes on Iran and Israel's operations in Gaza.
The document did not explicitly name the U.S. but criticized actions perceived as destabilizing. On June 21, the country carried out strikes on three major Iranian nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
Trump's latest trade threat escalates tensions with the BRICS group, which has increasingly sought to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar and shift toward a multipolar world order.
Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, described the summit as the start of a new "Global South" era, highlighting the group's aim to reshape the global order.
Though Russian President Vladimir Putin said in October 2024 that there are no immediate plans to create a BRICS currency, he highlighted the group's goal of financial sovereignty.
In January, Trump warned of 100% tariffs on BRICS members if they attempt to adopt a new or existing currency to replace the U.S. dollar in international trade.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attended the BRICS summit in person, while Putin participated via video due to an outstanding International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant. Brazil, the summit's host, is an ICC member and obligated to arrest Putin if he enters the country.
The declaration also condemned incidents on Russian railway infrastructure and called for a negotiated settlement in the war against Ukraine. However, it avoided urging Russia to halt its full-scale invasion.
BRICS expanded in 2024, admitting Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates as new members. In October 2024, Putin hosted a BRICS forum in Kazan, attended by 36 world leaders.
Russia has lost 1,027,540 troops in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported on July 7.The number includes 1,100 casualties that Russian forces suffered over the past day.According to the report, Russia has also lost 10,995 tanks, 22,963 armored fighting vehicles, 54,370 vehicles and fuel tanks, 29,993 artillery systems, 1,432 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,192 air defense systems, 421 airplanes, 340 helicopt
Russia has lost 1,027,540 troops in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported on July 7.
The number includes 1,100 casualties that Russian forces suffered over the past day.
According to the report, Russia has also lost 10,995 tanks, 22,963 armored fighting vehicles, 54,370 vehicles and fuel tanks, 29,993 artillery systems, 1,432 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,192 air defense systems, 421 airplanes, 340 helicopters, 44,058 drones, 28 ships and boats, and one submarine.
BRICS summit participants condemned recent attacks on Russia’s railway infrastructure, according to a joint declaration on July 6 from Rio de Janeiro."We condemn in the strongest possible terms the attacks on bridges and railway infrastructure deliberately targeting civilians in the Bryansk, Kursk and Voronezh regions of the Russian Federation on May 31, and June 1 and 5 2025, which resulted in the deaths of several civilians, including children," the document says.Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh o
BRICS summit participants condemned recent attacks on Russia’s railway infrastructure, according to a joint declaration on July 6 from Rio de Janeiro.
"We condemn in the strongest possible terms the attacks on bridges and railway infrastructure deliberately targeting civilians in the Bryansk, Kursk and Voronezh regions of the Russian Federation on May 31, and June 1 and 5 2025, which resulted in the deaths of several civilians, including children," the document says.
Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh oblasts are all located near Ukraine’s northeastern border and have played a central role in Russia’s war effort, serving as key logistical hubs and launch sites for missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities–often targeting civilian infrastructure and causing casualties.
In their declaration, BRICS leaders also called for a negotiated peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
“We recall our national positions concerning the conflict in Ukraine as expressed in the appropriate forum, including the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly,” the document said. “We expect that current efforts will lead to a sustainable peace settlement.”
The statement comes a few days after a phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 3, in which Putin said "Russia will continue to pursue its goals" in the war against Ukraine, Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov said.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attended the summit in person, while Russian President Vladimir Putin participated via video link.
Brazil is a member of the ICC and a signatory to the Rome Statute, meaning it is obliged to arrest Putin if he enters the country.
The ICC issued a warrant for the Russian leader's arrest in March 2023 over the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The BRICS declaration also condemned recent U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities as violations of international law and criticized the presence of foreign forces in Syria and Gaza, calling for Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory.
BRICS, originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has expanded in recent years to include Iran, Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, and Indonesia.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated Moscow's offer to mediate disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, during a meeting with his Iranian counterpart at the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Reuters reported on July 6.Lavrov met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi to discuss the situation, condemning recent Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran, including attacks on nuclear sites under IAEA safeguards. Moscow reaffirmed its support for Iran’s right to nuclear energy, and also o
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated Moscow's offer to mediate disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, during a meeting with his Iranian counterpart at the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Reuters reported on July 6.
Lavrov met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi to discuss the situation, condemning recent Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran, including attacks on nuclear sites under IAEA safeguards.
Moscow reaffirmed its support for Iran’s right to nuclear energy, and also offered to store Iranian uranium as part of a potential solution.
Although Iran officially denies intentions to pursue nuclear weapons, tensions with the U.S. and Israel remain high following the Iran-Israel conflict in June, which has currently settled into an uncertain ceasefire.
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry said on June 22 that Iran’s nuclear program must be dismantled to prevent it from threatening the Middle East or the wider world, following U.S. air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
“Iran is complicit in the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The Iranian regime is providing military assistance to Russia, including the supply of UAVs and technologies that Russia consistently uses to kill people and destroy critical infrastructure,” the statement read.
Russia and Iran have deepened ties since the start of the full-scale invasion. Notably, Iran has provided Russia with thousands of Shahed drones used in attacks against Ukrainian cities, as well as short-range ballistic missiles.
Moldova's Victory bloc, a pro-Russian political alliance, plans to participating in the country's September parliamentary elections, the bloc's founder Ilan Shor announced on July 6. Shor, an exiled pro-Kremlin oligarch, established the Victory bloc in August 2024. The bloc includes his own Shor party, which is banned in Moldova. Victory will submit documents in the coming days registering the bloc for participation in the September vote, Shor said. "Our main goal in these elections is to overth
Moldova's Victory bloc, a pro-Russian political alliance, plans to participating in the country's September parliamentary elections, the bloc's founder Ilan Shor announced on July 6.
Shor, an exiled pro-Kremlin oligarch, established the Victory bloc in August 2024. The bloc includes his own Shor party, which is banned in Moldova.
Victory will submit documents in the coming days registering the bloc for participation in the September vote, Shor said.
"Our main goal in these elections is to overthrow the fascist regime and hold early democratic elections within the next six months," Shor said.
The candidate list will be headed by Evghenia Gutul, the head of Moldova's Gagauzia region, who is currently on trial for illegally funding the banned Shor party. Gutul maintains ties to Moscow and is currently under U.S. sanctions.
The upcoming September elections carry high stakes for Moldova, one of the pooerest countries in Europe. Moldovan President Maia Sandu said on July 4 that Chisinau's European path rests on the outcome of the vote.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pledged on July 4 that the European Union will help Moldova defend itself against hybrid threats by "agents of autocracy" as elections approach.
Moldova was granted EU candidate status in 2022. Sandu's ruling Party of Action and Solidarity aims to maintain its parliamentary majority and move the country closer to full membership by 2030.