Putin needs Pokrovsk to unlock the Donbas—but it’s costing him everything
Russia burns through 68 soldiers for every square kilometer around Pokrovsk. The math is starting to matter.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reached peak offensive operations as the Kremlin orders its armed forces to capture the rest of the Donbas region. With casualties climbing dramatically as Moscow attempts to capture their primary objectives in the four occupied regions, Kyiv is fortifying Pokrovsk—what’s becoming the largest battle of the war so far.
Russia has massed one of their largest troop gatherings since the beginning of the full-scale war, hoping to make a decisive push to break through Ukrainian lines in Pokrovsk and open the remaining stronghold cities to further offensives.
After a year of continuous offensive activity, Russian forces still don’t have a foothold in the city. Ukraine’s Armed Forces continue holding a concrete defense.
The Russian push toward Pokrovsk is seeing casualties and equipment losses that dwarf all other battles of the war so far.
With Vladimir Putin putting all chips on the table for this offensive, it’s becoming this war’s Stalingrad.
Why Russia bled out at Avdiivka
In February 2024, Russian forces captured the strategic city of Avdiivka, which sat on key terrain overlooking Donetsk City center.
The capture came at a heavy price—the Russian military suffered casualties ranging from 25,000 to 40,000, making the battle deadlier than Bakhmut. Regular forces, rather than Wagner mercenaries, took the brunt of the fighting.
Despite inflicting heavy attrition on the Russian military, Kyiv hadn’t fortified the defensive lines behind Avdiivka sufficiently. The Ukrainian high command—whether due to negligence, miscommunication, or poor leadership—left gaps that would prove costly.
The lack of defenses, which should have been installed in the first months of the invasion, became exposed as Russia steadily advanced, capturing the strategic city of Ocheretyne. This gave Russian forces a growing salient that ultimately put them within range of Pokrovsk.
During summer 2024, Ukraine pulled off a shock offensive into Russia proper with the Kursk offensive. One goal was drawing Russian forces away from frontlines under pressure, like Pokrovsk.
But the Russian Ministry of Defense regrouped units from Kherson and continued pressure on the Pokrovsk front.
The Kursk offensive took away potential reserves to reinforce the frontlines as Kyiv faced manpower shortages, and the offensive turned in Moscow’s favor.
From summer 2024 to winter, Russia captured the outlying villages of Krasnohorivka, Kurakhove, Novohrodivka, Selydove, and Ukraisnk—putting their forces only several kilometers from the city.

Where Russian armor goes to die
For most of late winter to early spring 2025, the frontline situation was a stalemate as Ukrainian reserves came in, partially due to the Kursk offensive failing, and Ukrainian forces from the operation being allocated in the sector. Ukraine is also mass-producing various types of drones that help alleviate the artillery shortage by targeting Russian armor.
At the same time in 2025, Russia conducted various offensives in Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupiansk, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast, which hampered major reinforcements entering the Pokrovsk sector, allowing Ukraine to build up fortifications and consolidate its defenses continuously.

The Czech shell initiative also gathered artillery for the Ukrainian frontlines, giving Ukrainian forces more defense allocations to hold the lines against daily Russian assaults.
Despite being only a few kilometers from the outer city, waves of FPV drone attacks have littered the roads into Pokrovsk with Russian armor and corpses that are nearly unretrievable, turning the frontlines into a no-man’s land. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces are suffering 68 casualties per square kilometer gained in the Pokrovsk direction.
The equipment losses during this offensive are staggering.
Independent open-source analysts have tracked and geolocated 602 destroyed tanks, with another 100 abandoned, along with 1,300 destroyed armored fighting vehicles as of September 2025.
To put this in perspective: according to the Oryx blog, Russia has lost 4,000 tanks total, making Pokrovsk the deadliest offensive for Russian forces to date.
When glide bombs meet drone swarms
Russia holds an advantage in the air with dozens of airstrikes from its deadly glide bombs that can take out fortifications, despite taking extremely heavy casualties. On the ground, Russia has a 4-to-1 or 5-to-1 manpower advantage.
Ukrainian units also face difficulties with recruitment, unit rotations, and morale due to poor leadership—weaknesses the Russians have exploited. One of Ukraine’s biggest challenges in the war today is fixing issues related to recruitment, negligence of commanders, and improving morale.
Kyiv was able to reorganize its defense and conduct localized counterattacks from late February to early March 2025, as the settlement of Kotlyne was liberated, which pushed back a potential Russian salient. Russia conducted its major summer offensive a month later, putting pressure on the strategic H-32 highway.
With tank and armor losses littering the highways, Russia adopted tactics of sending unsupported infantry assaults, known as sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
The Kremlin sends these groups toward weak points in Ukrainian positions, some of which suffer from slow unit rotations or a lack of infantry due to manpower issues.
If the groups exploit those positions, Russia gradually sends more forces to reinforce that point—which they did during the summer, as there were fears of infiltration into Pokrovsk city in July.
How Azov crushed Russia’s breakthrough
Near Dobropillia, Russia sent several hundred reconnaissance groups, which managed to break through Ukrainian lines in mid-August, causing enough panic for Kyiv to send major reinforcements.
One reason Russia pushed its groups rapidly into the city was the timing of the Alaska Summit between President Trump and Putin—Moscow wanted a psychological victory to convince Washington that there was a “breakthrough.”
The 1st Azov Corps, one of the most battle-hardened units, was redeployed to Dobropillia, ended the breach, and stabilized the frontlines alongside the 1st Assault Battalion, Rubizh Brigade, and 93rd Mechanized Brigade. Localized counterattacks pushed the Russians back with various reports of either complete or operational encirclement in three different pockets outside Dobropillia.
Ukraine successfully counterattacked and exposed the groups to encirclement because Russian forces overextended their front lines, pushing forward without consolidating their positions. As the war drags on and Russia suffers catastrophic losses with minimal gains, their general staff and the Kremlin grow desperate to capture Pokrovsk before the end of the fighting season.
Why this city decides everything
The Pokrovsk offensive is becoming the pinnacle of warfare during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As both countries have exhausted their militaries, the fate of the city during the next few months could determine how the war concludes.
But here’s what’s at stake globally: occupying Pokrovsk could give Russia strategic topography to press onto the rest of the Donetsk fortress cities. Ukrainian forces continue buying valuable time to prepare defenses for the rest of the oblast.
What makes Donetsk crucial to Ukrainian defense is strategic terrain and over a decade of fortifications, with Pokrovsk being no exception.
Ukraine’s goals in the sector should be continuing attrition against the Russian military alongside other sectors of the frontlines, and continuing to build fortifications while addressing manpower gaps.
The longer Pokrovsk stays in Ukrainian hands, the less time Russia has to achieve one of its primary war goals of capturing the rest of Donbas, as the wartime economy shows signs of exhaustion.
Outside of Pokrovsk, Russian forces will still need to capture Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, and the fortress cities of Lyman, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk.
This effort will require more manpower than Russia can currently muster, and without a rapid capture of Pokrovsk, those war aims become even more difficult for the Kremlin to achieve.
A major reason Putin is demanding that Trump force Ukraine to cede the rest of the Donbas is due to the decimation of his military’s force projection capabilities, which can no longer take key objectives without catastrophic manpower and equipment losses.
According to the British Ministry of Defense, it would take Russia another two million men and perhaps four years even to capture the rest of Donbas—time Putin can’t afford. Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Budanov, stated Russia looks to end the full-scale war sometime in 2026 before the economy cracks, and to do that, Pokrovsk will need to be captured to open up the rest of the fortified cities of Donetsk.
Right now, the longer Ukraine holds Pokrovsk, inflicts catastrophic losses, and buys time for greater fortifications to be completed in the fortress cities, the better it is for Kyiv. Without capturing Pokrovsk, particularly by the end of winter 2026, Russia—with its economy already reeling from Ukrainian strikes on refineries—could finally be forced to negotiate fairly.
If Russia doesn’t want to negotiate and presses beyond its current economic and military capabilities after exhausting its forces, Moscow could face a homegrown collapse akin to the Soviet-Afghan War, and the Battle of Pokrovsk could be the catalyst for it.
