Most Ukrainians favor ending combat operations through negotiated settlement while demanding concrete security assurances from Western allies, according to new polling data from the Rating Sociological Group.

The survey, conducted 21-23 August, found 59% of respondents support “cessation of hostilities and search for compromise,” while 20% back continuing the war until Donbas and Crimea are returned and 13% favor fighting until 23 February 2022 borders are restored.

Security guarantees emerge as the central precondition for any ceasefire agreement. When asked whether Ukraine should agree to stop fighting, 75% said “Yes, but only if Ukraine receives security guarantees from the USA and European countries,” according to the polling firm. Just 19% said Ukraine “should not agree under any conditions,” while 3% supported an unconditional ceasefire.

Ukrainians identified three priority security mechanisms: continued military financing and weapons supplies from partners (52%), allied commitments to enter combat if Russia attacks again (48%), and international air and sea patrols (44%).

The preference for multilateral negotiations over bilateral talks with Moscow was pronounced. The Rating group found 62% view “search for compromise with involvement of other countries” as realistic, compared to 20% who favor “direct negotiations with Russia.” Only 11% support rejecting talks entirely and “fighting until liberation of all territories.”

When asked about current priorities, 58% chose securing Western commitments for future army financing and adequate weapons supplies, while 31% prioritized territorial recovery.

Respondents most commonly said Ukraine fights Russia for “children’s future” (60%) and “freedom” (44%).

The telephone survey interviewed 1,600 adults across all oblasts except occupied Crimea and Donbas territories and areas without Ukrainian mobile coverage. The margin of error is 2.5% with 95% confidence level.

In an editorial published on 27 August, Rzeczpospolita stated that in the fourth year of Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine, Polish President Karol Nawrocki has taken a position that aligns with the aggressor. The commentary by Zuzanna Dąbrowska focused on Nawrocki’s recent veto of a bill that would have expanded support for Ukrainian citizens, framing the decision as politically motivated rather than policy-based.

Domestic strategy behind the Ukraine aid veto

According to Rzeczpospolita, the Polish president’s veto marks the beginning of a process to unify Poland’s right-wing political forces in preparation for the 2027 parliamentary elections. Nawrocki needs to build a right-wing coalition between the Law and Justice (PiS) party and the Confederation, the article argues.

The editorial highlights Nawrocki’s signing of the Toruń Declaration promoted by pro-Russian politician Sławomir Mentzen as part of this broader strategy. It notes that unless the ruling coalition presents a strong presidential challenger, the right-wing bloc may achieve its goal of securing a constitutional majority.

A consistent anti-Ukraine stance

The piece argues that Nawrocki has maintained a clear and consistent anti-Ukrainian position since entering political life. While such positions are not unique among world leaders, the context of war renders them significant. According to Dąbrowska, in wartime there is a binary choice between supporting the victim of aggression or the aggressor. The op-ed concludes that for the president’s circle, this distinction appears secondary to internal political priorities.

Public attitudes and political response

Rzeczpospolita connects the shift in political decisions to changing public sentiment. The commentary states that societal attitudes are now shaping political behavior, and that political messaging in turn reinforces those attitudes. The result, it says, is a feedback loop that has already led to incidents of violence, public conflict, and discrimination against children.

Russian influence on Polish discourse

The op-ed also links the rise of anti-Ukrainian sentiment to earlier Russian disinformation campaigns. It notes that efforts originating in the Kremlin since 2022—using false stories, social media content, and memes—were initially dismissed as implausible. However, the article states that these narratives have become more influential and are now shaping public discourse. The seed planted by Moscow in 2022, the editorial says, is now producing results.