FlyDubai Under Scrutiny After Cockpit Attack

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The Russian government has submitted a draft federal budget for 2027–2029 to the State Duma, Meduza reported on 30 September, citing TASS. In all three years, Russia's expenditures will exceed its revenues, the outlet noted.
Russia's finances have been eroding since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To keep paying for the war, the Kremlin has drained its reserves, borrowed more, and pushed tax burdens onto residents and businesses, while the wider economy stalls.
The government listed social obligations, including aid to those who fought in its war against Ukraine and their families, along with defense needs among the budget's priorities, while its press release left out the planned cuts to social spending and the rise in military spending, Meduza noted, citing The Bell.
Russia's federal budget for 2027 sets spending at 48.8 trillion rubles ($585 billion) and revenue at 43.3 trillion ($519 billion), the Russian government stated, leaving a deficit of 5.5 trillion rubles ($66 billion). It claimed the draft is "balanced" and that healthcare spending will rise compared with 2026.
Deficits of 5.1 trillion rubles ($61 billion) in 2028 and 5.3 trillion ($64 billion) in 2029 are also planned, about 2% of GDP a year, Meduza noted.
This year's deficit is now set to reach a record 7.345 trillion rubles ($88 billion), nearly double the previous forecast of 3.785 trillion ($45 billion), The Moscow Times reported on 1 October. To help close the gap, Moscow plans an array of tax hikes for 2027–2029 to fund military spending. Already by May, its four-month deficit had run 50% above what it had planned for the whole year.

Even as the deficit widens, Russia plans its highest defense spending since the full-scale invasion began: 17.1 trillion rubles ($202.58 billion) in 2027, 27% more than the 13.5 trillion originally planned.
Only 2.3 trillion rubles ($28 billion) of that sum is itemized in public documents, and 34.9% of all 2027 spending will be classified, the highest share in at least 12 years, exiled outlet Vyorstka reported. The Duma is expected to hold the first of three readings on 29 October, the date proposed by Budget Committee chairman Andrei Makarov, Interfax reported.


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Ukraine has cracked the riddle of strange metal "whiskers" that appeared on Russian jet-powered drones striking Kyiv, and they don't appear to be some clever new sensor. They are a simple mechanical detonator, a metal tube, and a rod that, on impact, closes a circuit to set off the warhead, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, presidential adviser, says, ending online guessing about the strange devices.
Photos of Russian drones with long metal prongs jutting from the nose had set off speculation about what they were for. The answer, Flash explains, is low-tech: when the prong hits something, the contact closes, and the charge goes off, with no sensors or electronics.
That simplicity sits against a more worrying trend: Russia is steadily upgrading what its drones carry, from the mix of warheads on the jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 to a new charge designed to sever power pylons.
A contact closes the circuit
"It's all mechanically simple, no sensors or complex detectors," Flash says, commenting on the "whiskers".
It is the kind of crude, cheap fuze that suits a weapon meant to be built and spent in the thousands, where cost matters more than finesse.
Russia upgrades the warheads
Russia's jet drones, now built at roughly 3,000 a month, have become the dominant threat in its nightly campaign. The day when Flash published his "whiskers" post, Russia hit Kyiv with another round of drone strikes, hitting a school, a café, and warehouse buildings across the capital. The children inside the school were in its shelter. Fires broke out across two districts, and one person in the city was wounded.
On 28 September, Russia struck Kyiv's Academy of Sciences, which has a century-old history.
On the same day, Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesperson, said Ukraine must "pay a price" for its actions in recent months and calls Russia's intensified strikes "part of this price."


Less than 50% of the F-16 fighter jets delivered to Ukraine may be operational, Defense Express reports, citing a Wall Street Journal (WSJ) editorial published on 29 September. On the same day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Belgium would deliver three F-16 fighter jets this year.
F-16s are used extensively to intercept Russian cruise missiles and drones. As the number of Russian attacks has increased, these aircraft have become particularly important for Ukraine. However, the jets Ukraine receives are old, and keeping them flying takes regular maintenance, extra work, and hard-to-find parts.
Routine inspections are taking as long as 40 weeks in Belgium, retired US Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery told the WSJ.
A likely reason for the problem is the lengthy maintenance process handled by Belgian company Sabena Aerospace Engineering, according to the WSJ, whose questions the company declined to answer. This process, according to Defense Express's estimates, takes 6–20 times longer than maintenance in the United States, which usually takes between 2 and 6 weeks. Ukraine uses the services of the Belgian company, meaning its F-16s are not being serviced quickly enough.

Delivering three additional fighter jets will not significantly help the Ukrainian military until the issue with aircraft maintenance times is resolved, Defense Express notes. The lengthy turnaround may be caused by a large maintenance backlog at the company, limited capacity, or logistical constraints, and older jets may need extra work and scarcer parts.
The delivery is part of an earlier commitment. Belgium plans to provide seven fighter jets this year: three for operational use and four for spare parts, Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken said in June.
"I'll propose to the government to send all our F-16s to Ukraine in the coming years. It depends on having the F-35s in place because, of course, we have DCA [dual-capable aircraft] capacity. We have our role in the nuclear doctrine of NATO," Francken said.
Belgium has pledged its entire F-16 fleet of 53 aircraft as F-35s replace them, according to Defense Express.
F-16s operated by Ukrainian pilots have shot down more than 3,150 aerial targets. These include 666 cruise missiles and around 2,500 drones of various types. The aircraft have also carried out more than 650 strikes against Russian ground targets, Lieutenant General Anatolii Kryvonozhko, Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, said during a meeting between a Ukrainian Air Force delegation and representatives of Lockheed Martin on 29 September.
At the meeting, Conor McGuire, Lockheed Martin's head of F-16 capability development, highly praised the combat use and operation of F-16s by Ukrainian pilots and the entire ground aviation personnel. He also expressed his intention to help Ukrainians enhance the capabilities of the existing platform, the statement said.


Student journalists, their advisors, and legal advocates say colleagues and administrators are attempting to undermine student reporting on Jeffrey Epstein, Gaza, and other issues that public institutions would rather not have their reputations connected to.
Public records obtained by 404 Media show administrators taking meetings with parents and alumni when they take issue with student reporting and asking advisors to compromise their professional ethics. They also show escalating tensions between student newsroom staff and administrators, prompting more legal aid requests to advocacy groups.
This comes as student journalists at The Cornell Daily Sun earned recognition for breaking the “Cornell Seven” story regarding the lawsuit filed in New York’s trial court last month by a Jane Doe accusing current and former Cornell University students of drugging and sexual abuse. The student journalists told The Cut this week that a vague university and campus police statement from nearly two years ago prompted more questions than answers. Such is the basis for most accountability journalism on college campuses.
The cases we reviewed involved the phase of the reporting process that comes later, where a factual dispute the newsroom has defended or a complaint where the person doesn’t bother to explain what is allegedly wrong with the students’ reporting.
In Colorado, a high school social studies teacher emailed the student publication’s advisor at the time, accusing a student’s opinion piece called “Why is Gaza Important?”of being “published with factually inaccurate and racist information,” but then said in the same email, “I’m not going to start listing the inaccuracies along with the omissions.”
In California, a high school principal told a student journalism advisor to redact the name of an individual threatening to sue the district for defamation after student journalists published an Instagram carousel to their school’s newspaper account about the number of times their county turned up in the Epstein files. In this case, which has already been widely reported on, the administrator told the journalism advisor to redact the name of the woman who was threatening suit without determining whether the reporter made a factual mistake (the students did not).
“I can’t remove the name without your help,” the principal told the advisor via email, after the advisor said the students would first seek legal guidance from the Student Press Law Center before taking any actions.

Soon after the op-ed was published, the student newspaper’s advisor was reassigned to another role within the district. The advisor from the California school district stepped down from her role during the last school year; she now consults schools and nonprofits on best practices for their student media programs. Mike Hiestand, who is a lawyer with the Student Press Law Center, has spent decades advising student newsrooms. He says it’s common for administrators to target advisors, adding that it’s one of the more effective censorship methods available to them.
“School officials, they see employees as kind of an easy target over whom they have some authority, and they know that in many places, that relationship between the students and their advisor is a tight one,” Hiestand told 404 Media. “Unfortunately, some school officials take advantage of that bond and definitely go after advisors.”
In 2025, the Student Press Law Center (SPLC) claimed that the nonprofit had responded to nearly 1,000 hotline inquiries from student newsrooms in 46 states and Washington D.C. The most common inquiries involved censorship, libel and copyright. Overall, SPLC says calls are down, but hotline inquiries about censorship specifically are up 17 percent from the year prior.
“One of the biggest things we’ve certainly found with censors over the years is they want to be called everything but a censor,” he added. “What they’re doing is everything but censorship.”
This tracks with what 404 Media is observing through public records requests into school, library and university censorship. The same state laws that have been used to restrict how topics like race, gender, and systemic inequality can be accessed and taught have also put student journalists covering those beats in a bind.
Records from Pensacola State College obtained by 404 Media show that last spring, an administrator tried to block funding for a journalism professor to print students’ class assignments for their portfolios because at least one of the stories involved reporting on the LGBTQ+ community. The campus later relented and agreed to release funding for students’ portfolios. In an email to the advisor, an administrator involved in the situation wrote that “the proper role of administration is to facilitate rather than impede the completion of legitimate classroom projects.”
“When you have a principal coming in who doesn’t have a lick of journalism experience claiming that they’re there to guide young journalists, that’s where I have problems,” Hiestand said. “Every principal and every superintendent in the country seems to think that they are qualified editors.”
Similar verbiage has appeared in other public records requests involving student journalists, like in the case of a Maryland school district memo about principals reading and approving every story before publication. In the memo, the chief of schools wrote that “[a]s responsible adults and educational leaders, we have the duty to guide the work of our students as they are developing their skills in a school setting during a school-directed activity.” But internal correspondence obtained by 404 Media suggests that the memo was “really to be sure an administrator could initial any printed posters, review school apparel, and scan over the yearbook to be sure that there is no violation” of the student handbook.
Marie McMullan, program manager and counsel for the Student Press Legal Hotline with the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, says so far, 2026 has been a very consequential year for students leading their school publications.
“Student journalists are a very bright group,” McMullan told 404 Media. “They are great at sounding the alarm and bringing advocates out of the really blatant examples. But I always just worry about making sure that student journalists know their rights so that they can assert them in cases where there are subtler forms of censorship.”
At Southern Illinois University Edwardsville (SIUE), student reporters with The Alestle, the university’s student newspaper, claim that the institution’s marketing and communications department had become more insistent on attending interviews conducted by student reporters in recent months. The department took issue with editor-in-chief Dylan Hembrough’s framing of the dispute, calling several of the claims “inaccurate.” In an interview with 404 Media, Hembrough said the paper investigated and determined there was nothing inaccurate about the story. When Hembrough did not retract the story, the executive director of marketing and communications at SIUE sent an open letter to the entire campus—a mailing list of more than 14,000 people, including faculty and staff—taking issue with that story, along with other stories throughout the years as well.
“The Alestle appears willing to substitute alarming headlines for verified facts, to rely on posturing rather than careful reporting and to treat corrections as an inconvenience rather than a professional obligation,” the open letter reads. With the letter was a link to a 27-page document of corrections the department expected student leadership to act on.
“I have been on the other side of panicking over things like this,” Hembrough told 404 Media. “Something that has helped me get through that, or at least stave it off, is the idea that the truth is more important than whatever I feel about it. Embarrassment or humiliation should have no bearing on how or even whether a publication makes a correction.”
Then in September, Hembrough learned via email that he was being investigated by the campus police for harassment against the department. When Hembrough’s journalism advisor asked the officer to clarify on what grounds, the officer said the report was based on a line in an email, which read: “Marketing and communications’ insistence on interfering with our newsgathering process is dangerous and detrimental to both press freedom and freedom of speech.” Hembrough shared his email with 404 Media, which reads as an editor defending another student reporter’s right to conduct an interview without the department exercising prior restraint over the publication. In her statement to campus police, she reportedly told the officer that “other members of my office have approached me stating Alestle reporters have been by my office uninvited,” and that she didn’t have a lock on her door.
“Due to the media between Marketing and Communications and the Alestle I am worried a ‘January 6th’ type of crowd may be outside my office,” the complainant told the officer, according to the campus police report. The officer advised her to contact facilities management about getting a lock for her office door and concluded that the facts of the case don’t “meet the statutory threshold for Harassment by Electronic Communications.”
The public records reviewed by 404 Media from SIUE support the claims The Alestle’s journalists make throughout their reporting on the department. SIUE did not respond to 404 Media’s request for comment.

The situation at SIUE serves as an example of a dispute about institutional reputation that’s escalated to involve campus law enforcement, but law enforcement nonetheless. McMullan says this escalation has an undeniable chilling effect on free speech, noting that policies and laws that public institutions use to silence young reporters still need to abide by the First Amendment. But overall, she’s impressed with how students at SIUE and other campuses are meeting the moment, even when the adults in the room aren’t.
“Whether it’s in a court of public opinion or a court of law, students are not accepting censorship,” she said. “They’re pushing back against it.”

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The Kremlin is signaling that it will hold the Russian assets of European companies hostage to pressure Europe into rethinking its sanctions, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) wrote on 30 September. Moscow has already put well-known European retailers and food makers under Russian "temporary management." A senior Russian official has now hinted that European banks could be next.
As Russia continues its invasion of Ukraine, it has long turned hostages and threats into weapons. Its record includes nuclear threats against Europe from its Oreshnik missile launch sites and a fresh warning over Kaliningrad. It has played games with Europe's largest nuclear plant that it occupied in 2022, applied gas and water pressure on its neighbors, and Kyiv accuses it of blackmailing the families of Ukrainian prisoners of war. Europe's companies are now one more lever in that kit.
Russia is taking "asymmetric measures" to make Europe rethink its sanctions, a senior Russian government source with direct knowledge of the seizures claimed, Reuters reported. "Let them think about what measures they are taking and what sanctions they are introducing," the source said.
Asked whether the Russian units of Italy's UniCredit and Austria's Raiffeisen could be placed under temporary management, the source answered: "Let them be scared."
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed the decisions were driven by "the increasing level of involvement of these unfriendly countries in direct battlefield hostilities" against Russia. He suggested the moves were "reversible," but added: "For now, we do not see any grounds for a reversal."
Putin's decree of 17 September placed 16 companies under the "temporary management" of a firm called L.E.V. Management, with no end date. They include the Russian units of France's Auchan and Lemana PRO, formerly Leroy Merlin, and of Switzerland's Nestlé. A second decree, on 28 September, handed the Russian assets of German wholesaler Metro AG to UK Torg Rus.
Both decrees amend Putin's April 2023 decree No. 302, which lets Moscow take over the property of firms tied to countries it labels "unfriendly." Because the "temporary" management has no expiry date, ISW considers it effectively nationalization. Independent outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe identified L.E.V. Management's director as retired Russian Major General Andrei Krayushkin.
The Kremlin likely wants to use the seizures to take European companies as corporate hostages, ISW assessed. It also likely expects a temporary fiscal boost from the revenues of the seized businesses.
The strategy assumes that European firms will judge the benefits of staying in Russia to outweigh the risk of losing their assets, the think tank said. Whether a company is seized depends entirely on Moscow's relations with the country where it is headquartered, ISW added.
Since the start of the full-scale war, Russia has introduced temporary administration at 135 foreign-linked firms, mostly from EU countries, according to TASS data cited by Reuters. Earlier targets included French food group Danone and Danish brewer Carlsberg.
The method was tested on Ukraine first. Russia's proxies in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts stole most Ukrainian assets there in 2014 and 2015. In March 2017, after Ukrainian activists blocked rail trade with the occupied areas, they placed the remaining Ukrainian-registered firms under "temporary administrations," a label close to the one Moscow uses today. The published Donetsk list alone ran to 43 assets, from coal mines and ironworks to the Donbas Arena stadium. Much of the coal and steel business later ended up with firms tied to Serhii Kurchenko, a fugitive oligarch from Yanukovych's era.


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Ukraine is about to tell Washington exactly which Russian targets it wants punished under America's new sanctions law, the Associated Press reported. A senior Ukrainian diplomat said Kyiv will hand the Trump administration and Congress a wish list of companies, ships, and people this week—and at the top are the firms supplying parts for Russia's answer to Starlink.
The law requires Washington to act but lets the president waive the sanctions if he certifies that doing so serves US national interests, and the first choice falls due in weeks. For Ukraine, a measure that names no targets changes nothing on the ground—which is why the fight now is over whose names make the list before the clock runs out.
Denys Sienik, chargé d'affaires at Ukraine's embassy in Washington, said the priority is a group of Russian firms making components for Rassvet, Moscow's homegrown satellite network, which Russia hopes to complete by the end of the year—though its own officials have put the start of service in 2027. Bureau 1440, the firm building Rassvet, is not itself on US sanctions lists, but its parent company, ICS Holding, is under US blocking sanctions, according to Militarnyi. The suppliers feeding the network parts are not sanctioned, and those are the ones Kyiv wants added to the list.
Russia sped up the project after Ukraine and SpaceX cut off the Starlink terminals its troops had used without authorization at the front. If Russia completes the constellation, Sienik said, it could strike Ukraine at will with real-time information—a danger he warned would bite hardest this winter. "If these entities are not sanctioned, it will actually make this program possible for Russia and that will be a game-changer," he told reporters, Reuters reported. Kyiv wants access to Starlink inside Russia, too, so it can strike targets there.
Euromaidan Press has reported how such a network would change the battlefield: the satellites transmit in high-frequency bands that are hard to jam, and a relay overhead would feed drones and missiles fresh coordinates mid-flight, letting them fly low under air defenses that struggle to see them.
Ukraine is pushing for tougher action against Russia's shadow fleet, too—the aging tankers that sell its oil around Western restrictions—and is asking the administration and American industry to publicly condemn Russian attacks on US companies' operations inside Ukraine, Sienik said.
The requests arrive as the administration faces an 18 October deadline to decide which Russian entities, if any, to sanction under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, which US President Donald Trump signed into law on 18 September. The law directs the White House to impose tariffs on Russia's biggest oil buyers and to block its banks, officials, and tankers—but lets the president waive those measures, which is why Kyiv is lobbying for the toughest list it can get.


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Russia has a new warhead for its drones, and it is built to cut down power lines. For the first time, a jet drone has carried a shaped "cumulative-cutting" charge designed to sever high-voltage pylons and iron bridges, Serhii Beskrestnov, presidential adviser, known as Flash, said, as Russia opened its heaviest assault on Ukraine's power grid since last winter.
On 30 September, Russia launched its massed fall-winter campaign on Ukraine's energy infrastructure since the last heating season, hitting power sites across 11 regions overnight with missiles and drones, Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi said.
The new warhead fits the aim: Flash says it is meant to bring down the high-voltage lines that carry the country's electricity. And Ukraine enters the winter exposed, with its energy resilience plans less than half complete.
A new charge targets the pylons
The device, which Flash calls a cumulative-cutting special load, is designed specifically to bring down high-voltage pylons and iron bridge structures.
"It consists of a main charge weighing 40 kilograms and four strike modules," he says.
In his reading, Russia intends to go after the major transmission lines that move power across the country, the backbone of the grid, rather than the substations it has struck before.
The campaign builds toward November
On 29 September, two senior Ukrainian officials told The Economist that Russia launched a three-part campaign of attacks on Kyiv, combining massive bombardments, sabotage, and the creation of political chaos. These efforts aimed at destabilizing the Ukrainian capital would peak by November, they said.
According to a representative of the Security Service of Ukraine, Russia has "thousands" of drones in its arsenal and is simultaneously expanding its stockpile of ballistic missiles. The plan is to "deploy the entire arsenal over the next two months," given that Ukraine lacks an effective weapon against jet-powered drones.


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The Russian army deliberately struck a school in Sumy with a 250-kilogram aerial bomb while students—children in grades 1–4—were there, Serhii Kryvosheienko, head of the Sumy City Military Administration, reported on 29 September. The strike was one of a series of mass attacks on Ukrainian territory over the past 24 hours.
Across Ukraine, children now begin the school year in bomb shelters, because Russian missiles, drones, and glide bombs keep hitting schools, hospitals, and homes far from the front. The first eight months of 2026 brought more civilian casualties than all of last year, the UN says, and places where children gather are part of that toll.
Kryvosheienko said the Russians aimed the bomb at the school on purpose.
"With no pity or compassion whatsoever, they strike at children? There is nothing human in the enemy! He is not fighting on the battlefield—he is destroying a nation," Kryvosheienko said.
About 40 students were in the school's shelter at the time, a school employee told Suspilne correspondents. Preliminary reports indicate the children were not injured, Suspilne said.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the strike on the school.
"Four KABs struck the city center, right at the school building, where classes were underway. Thank you to the teachers and the school administration: the children and teachers were in the shelter, a total of 100 people were evacuated in time," he wrote.
Over the past 24 hours, Russian forces carried out more than 60 strikes on 25 population centers in 13 territorial communities of Sumy Oblast, the Sumy Regional Military Administration reported. Two people were killed and 15 others were injured, including two children, according to the administration's figures for each community. Over the course of the day, the oblast was under an air-raid alert for 22 hours and two minutes.
In particular, a 74-year-old man and a 70-year-old woman were killed in the Sumy community as a result of strikes by guided aerial bombs (KABs), the report said. Four people were injured and three people sustained trauma as a result of the Russian attack, including a one-year-old girl. A six-year-old girl was also injured, while a 49-year-old man sustained injuries in a UAV attack.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russians attacked Mykolaiv Oblast with Shahed/Gerbera-type attack UAVs, killing a 56-year-old man, the Mykolaiv Regional State Administration reported. The attack destroyed one detached house, damaged two others and four outbuildings, and caused fires, according to the report.
Russian forces attacked Kharkiv and 10 population centers in Kharkiv Oblast, according to Oleh Syniehubov, head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration. Two people were hurt, both with acute stress reactions.
In Kharkiv, an 8-year-old girl suffered an acute stress reaction, as did an 85-year-old woman in the village of Ohurtsivka, Syniehubov reported.
The Russians used various types of weapons against Kharkiv Oblast: one guided aerial bomb (KAB), one multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS), five Molniya-type UAVs, seven FPV drones, and eight UAVs whose type is still being determined, according to the report.
In Kharkiv, Russian shelling damaged the windows of an apartment building, two cars, a private house, and the roof of a shopping center. A car was also damaged in the village of Myronivka, and three cars in the village of Mali Fesky.

The Russians also injured six residents of Donetsk Oblast: three people in Bilbasivka, one person in Sloviansk, one person in Shabelkivka, and one person in Druzhkivka, Donetsk Regional State Administration head Vadym Filashkin reported on his social media.
Over the past day, 18 population centers in Kherson Oblast came under Russian airstrikes, drone attacks, and artillery shelling, leaving five people injured, says Oleksandr Prokudin, head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration. He adds that Russian forces targeted critical and social infrastructure as well as residential areas, damaging two detached houses in particular.
Over the past 24 hours, the Russians carried out 686 strikes on 51 population centers in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, but no civilians were injured, co-chair of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Defense Council Ivan Fedorov reported, adding that:

Seven facilities in Zhytomyr Oblast were damaged during the evening and overnight hours leading into 30 September, says Vitalii Bunechko, head of the Zhytomyr Regional Military Administration. Food and processing industry enterprises as well as energy facilities came under Russian attack. Four cars also burned as a result of the attack, Bunechko added.
The Russian army attacked three districts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with UAVs, Dnipropetrovsk Regional Military Administration head Oleksandr Hanzha wrote on social media. The attacks damaged infrastructure, and a fire broke out in one of the communities, he said, adding that there were no casualties.
Air defense forces neutralized three Russian UAVs over Cherkasy Oblast, with no casualties, Ihor Taburets, head of the Cherkasy Regional Military Administration, reported. However, the fall of an enemy target caused a fire at an infrastructure facility, which was quickly extinguished, he added.
Foreign minister’s warning comes as oil prices climb sharply this month and El Nino breaks records
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A former Wagner fighter captured by Ukraine has described alleged training sessions in Mali where Russian mercenaries used African prisoners as live subjects, deliberately inflicting severe injuries so recruits could practice battlefield medicine and killing.
The fighter told Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Karpenko that Wagner instructors brought captured Africans to training sessions and turned them into human practice targets.
“We gathered for medical training, and they brought in a captured terrorist. They tied a block of TNT to his leg. They set it off, everyone moved away, and of course his leg was blown off,” he said.
The recruits then practiced stopping the resulting bleeding. According to the fighter, the prisoner was later shot in the artery near his armpit so they could practice the same procedure on his arm.
The prisoner died after the training.
In another session, he said, instructors had a prisoner's leg chopped off with an ax so recruits could practice applying a tourniquet under realistic conditions.
“They cut off his leg. Then they put on the tourniquet – everything as if it were an extreme situation, so everything would be realistic,” he said.
The alleged exercises also included training in how to kill.
The fighter said another prisoner was drugged before recruits were taught how to kill someone with a knife.
“They showed us how to kill with a knife to the heart. They chose two people who were willing and said: ‘Here, strike the heart,’” he said.
The fighter said all three prisoners died during the exercises.

The testimony comes from a Russian mercenary who joined Wagner in 2023 and was sent to Mali that September via Syria. He said around 120–130 recruits traveled with him and that Wagner paid them $3,000 a month.
Wagner was a Russian paramilitary formation that operated as a deniable arm of the Kremlin in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. After Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in 2023, the group's independent role was largely dismantled, with many of its fighters and operations brought under Russian state control. Its African operations were increasingly taken over by Russia's state-run Africa Corps.
The mercenary remained in Mali until April 2024. After returning to Russia, he signed a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry in August 2025 and was assigned to the 14th Separate Special Forces Brigade, which is subordinate to Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU.
He was subsequently captured by Ukrainian forces.
The account has not been independently verified, but it adds to years of allegations of serious abuses by Wagner and other Russian personnel in Africa.
Wagner fighters have long faced allegations of abuses in Africa, including killings and violence against civilians. In Mali, the group became a key part of Russia’s military presence after the country’s military junta turned to Moscow for support, with Wagner fighters operating alongside Malian forces. Ukrainian intelligence has also documented and targeted Wagner’s activities in Africa.
The pattern of alleged abuses has continued under Russia’s Africa Corps, the Kremlin-controlled force that replaced Wagner in Mali. Human Rights Watch reported in August 2026 that Africa Corps fighters summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, beat dozens of others, and burned and looted homes in central Mali. In June, the group also carried out airstrikes that killed eight civilians, including three children.


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Small groups of Russian infantry could slip into regional capital Zaporizhzhia this winter, a frontline commander warned in a mid-September interview with Dnipro TV, in a debate later compiled by Radio Svoboda. His forecast drew quick pushback from a military analyst, who called it far more categorical than the situation warrants. At the center of the dispute lies the drained Kakhovka Reservoir, whose dry bed Russia now uses for cover.
Dense drone surveillance has made large mechanized assaults costly, pushing Russian commanders toward small groups that probe for gaps. That shift turns unwatched terrain — here, the drained reservoir bed—into the seams they test.
Dmytro Filatov, callsign Perun, commands the 1st Separate Assault Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo. The danger will come not as a massed assault but as infiltration, he said. He expects solitary infantry groups to reach and enter Zaporizhzhia over the winter. He pointed to the Stepnohirsk axis and the dense buildings along the Dnipro shore. Fog and rain raise pressure across the whole front, and Russian troops have long fought well in winter, he said.
Zaporizhzhia is a regional capital and industrial center in southeastern Ukraine, with more than 700,000 residents before the full-scale invasion. The city sits about 25 km from the nearest active front, around Stepnohirsk to the south—unusually close for a regional capital of its size. Russian missiles, drones, and glide bombs hit the city daily. It has held since 2022, and Russia has not taken a Ukrainian regional capital since the war's first months.

Russia blew up the Kakhovka dam in June 2023 and drained the reservoir behind it. Reeds now stand several meters high across the dry basin, giving foot soldiers cover to move unseen. Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces reported in November 2025 that Russian groups use it to press into the Ukrainian flank.
Russian troops increasingly use the bed to infiltrate and haul supplies, said Kostiantyn Mashovets of the Information Resistance group. One of their assault groups pushed as far as Malokaterynivka before Ukrainian forces blocked it, he wrote. Ukrainian troops hold northern Plavni, including the railway station and part of the E-105 highway, Mashovets added. The Institute for the Study of War pointed to the same route in its 26 September assessment, citing Ukrainian military observers.
Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military-political expert and Information Resistance coordinator, rates the threat far lower. He wrote that the warning "sounded far more categorical than it should have." Stepnohirsk, about 25 km south of Zaporizhzhia, is the closest active fighting to the city. Russia has tried for years to take the town but now controls only its 3rd microdistrict and southern Plavni.
Infiltration becomes possible only if Russia takes the whole foothold and reaches the north bank of the Konka river. That will not happen by the end of 2026, and no ground push on the city looks possible, he said. The main danger stays daily Russian strikes on the city, not a ground advance, he added.


Estonia says Russia ordered the August arson attack on Milrem Robotics’ Tallinn premises, an Estonian defense company supplying Ukraine with military ground robots.
Russian sabotage operations have been expanding across Europe in recent months, targeting companies, infrastructure and supply chains connected to Ukraine’s defense effort. European authorities have linked or investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson and other sabotage attempts in several countries, as Moscow seeks to disrupt support for Ukraine and intimidate its European backers.
Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said on 29 September that information gathered by Estonia’s Internal Security Service showed the fire at Milrem’s Tallinn premises on the night of 14–15 August was a Russian intelligence-directed sabotage operation. Estonia summoned Russia’s chargé d’affaires over the attack.
Estonian authorities had already detained three suspects in connection with the arson, with the suspects apprehended in Latvia. Tsahkna said the perpetrators had been taken into custody and no longer posed a threat to Estonia.
Russia’s attempts to divide, intimidate and sow confusion will fail.
— Margus Tsahkna (@Tsahkna) September 29, 2026
Every act of sabotage only strengthens Allied resolve, increases pressure on Russia and reinforces support for Ukraine.
We will continue to expose, deter and respond. No stone will be left unturned. https://t.co/JfdSbAUGi1
When the investigation was first announced in August, Estonian authorities had not publicly established a Russian connection or disclosed evidence linking Moscow to the fire.
Milrem Robotics makes THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles, which have been used by Ukrainian forces since 2022 for tasks including transporting ammunition, food and other supplies, evacuating wounded troops, and mine clearance.
The company said in August that the fire had not disrupted its production or deliveries to Ukraine. More than 200 of its robotic systems are expected to be operating in Ukraine by the end of 2026, including more than 150 vehicles funded by the Netherlands.
The attack is part of a growing series of suspected sabotage operations targeting companies and facilities connected to Ukraine’s defense effort. In August, Slovak authorities foiled an attempted arson attack on a Ukrainian drone factory, while European investigations have also examined suspected Russian involvement in attacks on defense-related facilities in Czechia, Lithuania and Bulgaria.
Tsahkna said Russia’s campaign is intended to intimidate European countries, divide allies and weaken their support for Ukraine.
“Russia’s sabotage campaign will not achieve its objectives,” the Estonian Foreign Ministry said, adding that Estonia and its allies would continue increasing pressure on Russia and supporting Ukraine.
Tsahkna said Estonia would respond to the attack by increasing both its support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia.


A Russian drone struck near the Yahodyn border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border, the Ukrainian Border Service and the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on 28 September. Geolocated footage of the attack shows the jet-powered Geran-5 striking near the facility. Following the incident, Poland is reviewing its air security measures.
Russia systematically strikes Ukraine’s border crossings to complicate logistics. Russian strikes near the Ukrainian-Polish border have increased over the past month. Yahodyn is one of the largest border crossings with Poland, on a route leading, among other destinations, to Warsaw, and has repeatedly been used by senior foreign officials visiting Ukraine.
The blast wave damaged the checkpoint building at the terminal entrance, Ivan Romaniuk, head of the Volyn Regional Military Administration, reported on 28 September. It was a jet-powered drone, but there was “preliminarily no direct hit” on the border crossing, BBC Ukraine reported, citing its own sources in the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
On the afternoon of 28 September, Poland reported the involvement of Polish military aviation because of Russian drone attacks against Ukraine. That day, it was also reported that the airports in Rzeszów and Lublin suspended operations.
Jacek Horyszewski, a spokesperson for the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command, said on TVN24 that a Russian drone had struck near the Yahodyn border crossing in Volyn Oblast on the border with Poland.
Romaniuk confirmed the attack in the village of Starovoitove, Kovel district, Volyn Oblast, where the Yahodyn international border crossing is located.
“There have been no reports of injuries or fatalities,” he said.
Videos that appeared online show the drone falling in a forest near people and border infrastructure.
— Breaking News (@breakingUAnews) September 28, 2026
Момент удару «Герані-5» поблизу КПП «Ягодин», – місцеві канали.
BBC з посиланням на ДПСУ пише, що реактивний дрон вдарив неподалік кордону з Польщею: «Влучання у пункт пропуску «Ягодин» попередньо, не було». pic.twitter.com/VNq7QMy2Ly
The Russians carry out such attacks on Ukraine’s western regions using repeaters on Belarusian territory that amplify signals for Shahed- and Gerbera-type drones, BBC Ukraine reported, citing State Border Guard Service data.
Detonation of a Russian Geran-5 drone at the YAGODIN BORDER CORSSING, Ukraine. The explosion occurred ~1km from Polish territory.
— acceladealer (@acceladealer) September 28, 2026
POV: 51.193867, 23.821266@FaytuksNetwork @GeoConfirmed
geolocated by @Grimm_Intel pic.twitter.com/IeVClA06WF
The same day, Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk said Poland will change its engagement rules "in the coming days." Currently, helicopter and fighter jet pilots can use weapons only after visually identifying a target: the aircraft must approach the object and determine what it is. After the rules are changed, however, a pilot or operational commander will be able to make a decision to engage based solely on radar data.

“It is notable that Polish authorities have taken this step as NATO states attempt to find an adequate response to Russian drones nearing or entering their airspace from Ukraine, often leaving NATO air defense insufficient time to identify and target such threats before they have entered allied airspace,” the Institute for the Study of War noted in its 28 September report.
On 10 September, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Poland had prevented a threat to one of its border crossings with Ukraine overnight and expected its border crossings to be attacked as Moscow targets trade routes in an attempt to economically weaken Kyiv. He made the statement after drones struck a border crossing between Ukraine and Moldova on the previous day, killing two people.
On 13 September, Russian forces struck the locomotive of a passenger train two kilometers from the Polish border and hit a gas station near the Yahodyn international border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border.
— @UA_Peacemaker (@UaPeacemaker) September 13, 2026
На Волині внаслідок атаки РФ пошкоджено АЗС біля ПП «Ягодин» на кордоні з Польщею - речниця Волинської митниці Валентина Черниш.
Також на кордоні із Польщею рашисти атакували залізничну інфраструктуру - відео. pic.twitter.com/3XLc3B4FFw
The drone attack forced passengers on a train from Ukraine to leave the carriages for safety. Those evacuated included Boris Johnson, security advisers to European governments, German Bundestag lawmakers, diplomats, and academics.
After the Russian attacks, Poland deployed military units on the border with Ukraine and strengthened infrastructure near the border crossings, Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz said on 15 September.
On 17 September, Russian forces struck near the Yahodyn border crossing with a jet-powered drone.


Russia plans to sharply increase military spending in 2027 while expanding the authorized size of its armed forces, according to budget documents seen by Reuters and a report by Novaya Gazeta Europe.
The developments point to Moscow preparing to expand its war effort into next year, even as its battlefield gains remain limited and its campaign increasingly relies on missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. It is also doing so as the Russian government faces a widening budget deficit and falling projected oil and gas revenues.
Russia plans to spend 17.1 trillion rubles ($202.6 billion) on defense in 2027, according to government documents reviewed by Reuters. That is about 27% more than the 13.5 trillion rubles originally budgeted for defense in 2027 and would be the highest level of military spending since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The documents project total defense spending of 50 trillion rubles over the next three years. The actual amount Russia will spend on defense in 2026 is classified, Reuters reported, while some military-related spending can be recorded under other parts of the state budget.
The planned increase comes alongside worsening fiscal pressures. Russia has raised its forecast for the 2026 budget deficit to 3.2% of GDP, from an earlier estimate of 1.6%, according to Reuters. Overall government spending is expected to rise 13.2% this year to 48.6 trillion rubles, or 20.9% of GDP.
The government also expects to increase net borrowing by 26% in 2026 to 5 trillion rubles and withdraw 459 billion rubles from its National Wealth Fund, Reuters reported. Its forecast for 2026 oil and gas revenues has been cut to 7.6 trillion rubles from 8.9 trillion.
Russia is reportedly planning new tax increases for 2027 to help cover the growing deficit. A new windfall tax on metals and mining companies is expected to bring in about 200 billion rubles a year, according to the documents. State debt is projected to rise to 21.7% of GDP in 2027, above the 20% level Russian authorities have previously considered safe.
The draft budget is expected to be submitted to Russia's parliament by October 1.
At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin has again increased the authorized size of the country's armed forces.
Putin signed a decree raising the official staffing level of the Russian Armed Forces to 2.44 million people, including 1.55 million military personnel, Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on September 28. The increase is 15,500 personnel compared with the previous decree issued in August.
It is the fourth increase in the authorized size of the Russian military in 2026 and the seventh since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to Novaya Gazeta Europe. Before the invasion, the authorized force stood at 1.90 million people, including 1.01 million military personnel.
The increases in military staffing and spending come as Russia continues to pursue its maximalist war aims despite limited battlefield progress. The Institute for the Study of War assessed on September 27 that Russia's frontline has remained largely static in recent months and that the Kremlin is increasingly relying on long-range missile and drone strikes as part of its effort to force Ukraine to capitulate during the winter of 2026–27.
ISW assessed that Putin may be trying to make Ukraine's infrastructure and air defense capacity buckle under sustained Russian strikes rather than relying solely on further territorial gains. The institute also said the Kremlin may delay a large-scale mobilization while it assesses whether its expanded long-range strike campaign can achieve its objectives.
The planned increase in military spending and the repeated expansion of the armed forces show that Moscow is preparing to sustain and expand its war effort into 2027, even as its forces make limited territorial gains in Ukraine.


© Arif Kartono/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images


© Kenzo Tribouillard/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images


Lithuania is getting its US troops back although the overall American presence in Europe will shrink, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said. He tied the wider drawdown to Washington's demand that Europe take more responsibility for its own defense. Lithuania's case, he suggested, is the exception.
While waging all-out war on Ukraine, Russia keeps probing Europe with drones and sabotage that stop just short of open attack. Its small Baltic neighbors are already preparing their people for a possible invasion, and American soldiers on their soil have long been the clearest sign that attacking them means fighting the US. With Washington weighing a pullback and telling Europe to fend for itself, each US unit that stays on Russia's doorstep carries more weight than its size.
Nausėda spoke in an interview with LNK television on 28 September.
"There will be fewer US troops in Europe. This is partly related to what US President Donald Trump says, to the signals the US administration is sending us that Europe must take on more responsibility itself," he said.
Europe must do more for itself, and it is already doing so, Nausėda added. The US presence in Lithuania matters not only for its military power but also for deterrence, he argued.
"The presence of these troops is precisely what reduces the likelihood of military conflict or military aggression," he told LNK, ELTA reported.
Nausėda called the decision a kind of encouragement for Lithuania. "As the overall number of US troops in Europe decreases, in Lithuania that number will at least remain, will not decrease, and perhaps will even be slightly larger," he said. "In any case, the heavy battalion will be here."
The battalion will keep its Abrams tanks, but an engineer battalion will replace the artillery battalion, Nausėda said on LRT's Savaitė program. The rotation will again last nine months. The Americans will number roughly as before, over 1,000, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said.
Estonia has also secured the return of US troops, at least temporarily, LRT noted.
More than 1,000 US troops began leaving Lithuania when their rotation ended in early June, and no replacement arrived, LRT said. It was the country's first gap in the US presence since 2020. American heavy battalions have rotated through Lithuania since 2019.
The Pentagon is weighing a withdrawal of about 25,000 US troops from Europe, and possibly as many as 40,000, NBC News reported, adding that no final decision had been made. About 80,000 US troops are now stationed on the continent. Germany, Italy, and Spain would likely be among the countries most affected.


For decades, Europe operated on a series of assumptions: that borders were essentially settled; that economic interdependence would constrain major-power conflict; that international law would increasingly regulate state behavior; that military force was becoming less relevant; and that, ultimately, the United States would guarantee European security.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shattered those norms, as Moscow attempts to change borders by force and reshape the European security order. NATO now describes Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allied security, while also identifying sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and other hybrid actions as part of the threat.
The foreign policy of the Trump administration is further undermining past postulations. It threatens to annex Canada, speaks of occupying Greenland by force, and ignores Spain's sovereignty. It disrespects European military contributions, then demands European support for operations of its own choosing, legal justification optional. It negotiates European security over Europe's head while resetting relations with the power that threatens the continent, calls European countries "decaying" and their leaders "weak," and has launched a trade war against its former allies while pursuing business with its former strategic opponent.
Discussing solutions without first agreeing on the problem is meaningless. Yet that is what Europe has done since the war started in 2014.

Analyzing the security environment, before recommending solutions, I have identified eight fixed points that I regard as constants.
Russia has offered the West four tales, all unpleasant, one designed to look like an "easy way out." The first calls on Ukraine to give up Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, the lie Trump's plan is built on. But Putin's demands transcend Donbas, as his 2024 speech and Russia's operations show. The second, "Novorossiya," adds Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Odesa to the first lie.
The third, "one people, one nation," claims all of Ukraine. In the words of former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski: "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire." The fourth, "the Russian World," is the only one formalized in Russian strategic documents, encompassing the "former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation."
Ukraine's defeat is crucial to Russia's broader strategy. Integrated with Belarus, a subjugated Ukraine would give Russia the population, economy and technology to be seen as a near peer to the US and China, project power across the post-Soviet space, and ease its own demographic decline, while handing Moscow the country's defense industry, farmland and mineral, gas and oil deposits, and moving Russian military power nearly 900 km closer to London, Berlin and Paris.
It would create an aggressive, imperialist power on Europe's border, emboldened to force NATO's withdrawal to its 1997 borders and to deny the US the ability to deploy forces and nuclear weapons to Europe. The West, not Ukraine, has been defined as Russia's enemy.
Russia has been conducting an ever-escalating hybrid war against NATO's European member states since 2014. The EU Parliament acknowledged as much in September 2021. Its aggressions include sabotage against critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, disinformation, GPS jamming affecting civilian aviation, repeated airspace violations by strike drones, and attacks on Europe's defense-industrial base.
Russia's acts of violence against Western targets are becoming increasingly brazen. In August, Western intelligence sources reported a new wave of attacks on weapons factories in Europe under cover of "plausible deniability," The Telegraph reported. A CIA report shared with European governments warns Russia may attack Spain, France or Italy with Gerbera drones launched from ships, El Mundo reported, citing Lithuanian sources.
It is the same hybrid war Ukraine faced until 24 February 2022, one expected to turn open by 2029. Article 5 could, and probably should, have been triggered years ago. Having failed to respond, NATO has lost credibility, raising the risk of war.

In May 2022, I began using the term tsunami of ripple effects to describe the cost of not intervening in a war that threatens the security of the Alliance. It is the reverberations that raise the cost of living, undermine food and energy security, and spread famine, recession and inflation, raising the risk of unrest, extremism, and, ultimately, the fall of governments. Europe is living through the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War.
The international security architecture is being dismantled, our institutions discredited, and NATO no longer deters Russia. Building on public frustration, the tsunami of ripple effects gave us Trump and the rise of right-wing parties across Europe.
If Russia were deterred, it would not have launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO's strategic concept commits it to ending, by political and military means, conflicts that threaten Alliance security, including in Ukraine. Nor would Russia be conducting an ever-escalating hybrid war against NATO's European states, or preparing for a military conflict with the Alliance, as US and European intelligence services warn. Lack of deterrence raises the risk of Russian strategic miscalculation and war, especially since NATO was the only military power able to deny Russia its Great Power aspiration and its demand for a sphere of influence over the post-Soviet space.
NATO used to display readiness and capabilities. Today it has become a religion. Europe begs it is still almighty while Russia is a disbeliever.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put it plainly at Davos on 20 January 2026: "We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition." We "cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination," he said, calling for countries to organize in the face of great-power rivalry through different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests. As he told the World Economic Forum: "We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we wish to be."

Ukraine is fighting for its right to exist. Russia is fighting for its Great Power status, strategic parity with the USA and China. If it is defeated in Ukraine, it will forever remain a pariah state, potentially imploding. For a negotiation to succeed, it must solve the cause of the war: Russia's Great Power ambitions, which cannot be negotiated away, only denied through military power.
Even with the tools to evict the Russian Armed Forces, Ukraine cannot expect Russia to accept defeat by a nation that, in its distorted narrative, "does not exist." Russia would only accept withdrawal from Ukraine if the alternative were to fight a far superior military power and thereby risk losing the means that secure the survival of the regime and the state.
Several European intelligence services warn of war by 2029;
International law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity remain fundamental principles. But without the capability and political will to defend them, principles become aspirations, not constraints on states prepared to use force. Acknowledging the world as it is means acknowledging that power still matters. It means accepting that deterrence requires more than statements of concern: ammunition, air and missile defense, long-range strike and counter-drone systems, secure communications, logistics, cyber resilience, and the industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict.
Values mean nothing unless one is prepared to defend them.
This is where Carney's second formulation matters: countries must rely not only on "the strength of our values, but also the value of our strength." Values mean nothing unless one is prepared to defend them, as Canada is doing, raising defense spending and strengthening domestic industry. Europe needs to draw the same conclusion: strategic autonomy, not abandoning NATO, but ensuring Europe can defend itself and its interests even when an ally's priorities change.
The European Council already calls Russia's war an existential challenge and demands defense readiness be strengthened by 2030. But acknowledging reality means going further than setting targets.
It means recognizing that Ukraine is not merely the recipient of European security assistance. Ukraine is an integral part of Europe's security architecture. Its battlefield experience, defense industry, intelligence, and ability to absorb and defeat Russian attacks are crucial to European security.
Because individual member states refuse Ukraine as a member, NATO has made itself a liability, and some of the same countries are erecting hindrances to its EU membership too, letting national interest block common security.

The choice is not between idealism and realism. It is between pretending that the old assumptions still hold and building the capabilities required by the reality that has replaced them.
Acknowledging the world as it is means seeing the threats clearly; defending the world as it should be means acting on that knowledge, and the bridge between the two is strength.
Strength is not found in numbers, but in unity: agreeing on the enemy and a real will and capability to fight.
Accept those eight fixed points, and Europe's room for maneuver is gone, along with its present strategy. Europe cannot afford another 12 years of futile diplomacy while Russia exploits our naivety to prepare for war in the next two to three years, diplomacy that has undermined Europe's need to rearm and establish credible deterrence.
European governments have long acknowledged that their armed forces no longer provide credible defense, yet their security policy still assumes NATO guarantees collective security.
Acknowledge reality, and the illusion shatters.
Europe urgently needs a new strategy, one that looks beyond NATO and the EU's inherent weaknesses toward a military alliance credible enough to reshape the strategic environment. This is why I have long argued for a Coalition of Like-Minded European countries (CALM). It offers a path from recognition to action, from acknowledging NATO's failure to building something that works.
Strength is not found in numbers, but in unity: agreeing on the enemy, his aims and strategy, and committing to countermeasures that demonstrate real will and capability to fight.
Unlike NATO or the EU, CALM does not have to wait for Europe's rearmament to reach 2035. It builds on existing NATO interoperability.
The force already exists: Ukraine's battle-hardened army, National Guard, Special Operations Forces, air defense, and Unmanned System Forces, combined with European fifth-generation aircraft and state-of-the-art navies, are credible, combat-proven, and in place.
Russia already struggles to fight Ukraine alone; it would face a different reality entirely if Ukraine formally joined a coalition of European military powers. That is why the declaration matters now, not after the capability is fully built: with the interoperability already proven, it changes Russia's strategic assessment immediately, not in 2035.
This is not only about physical capabilities. It is about changing Russia's perception of its strategic environment. It starts with a declaration; preparing for military intervention comes next. But it begins with the declaration.
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
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© Cristian Leyva/Alamy

The vehicles carried out autonomous underwater formation navigation with no human intervention for 34 minutes over 500m

© Northwestern Polytechnical University


© Lucas Foglia for The New York Times


Russia is likely attempting to force Ukraine to capitulate by spring 2027 through a large-scale campaign of long-range strikes, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in its 27 September report. Russian President Vladimir Putin's new theory of victory relies heavily on the mass use of jet-powered drones and ballistic missiles against Ukraine, the institute assesses.
Russia keeps shifting to faster jet-powered drones that Ukraine's defenses struggle to stop, forcing it to spend scarce missiles on them. Russia's use of jet-powered drones rose eightfold from June to August, with Moscow launching around 7,700 such drones since their initial deployment, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said on 23 September. But Putin likely does not expect the campaign to last indefinitely, and he may hold off on a new mobilization until he sees whether the strikes work, ISW assesses.
Putin's modified theory of victory largely depends on Russia's ability to mass-launch cheap jet-powered Gerans that get through Ukrainian defenses often enough, the institute notes.
Even a Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger claimed on 27 September that the Russian strategy, which relies heavily on long-range strikes, is costly and cannot continue indefinitely, not least because Ukraine is hitting Russia harder too, according to the analysis.
At the same time, Putin stated on 25 September that Ukraine "must feel" Russia's "retaliatory" strikes. ISW assesses that this suggests he intends to intensify Russia's strike campaign in winter, as he has in previous winters.

If Putin is counting on Ukraine to break and capitulate this winter, he may be ignoring what the campaign will cost Russia over time, the institute notes. This strategy also counts on Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptors against ballistic missiles, and on the country's power grid and other vital systems giving way under months of strikes.
Until that approach runs out, Putin is unlikely to back down on his demands or agree to real ceasefire talks, ISW assesses.
A Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger claimed on 27 September that Russian forces launched predominantly jet-powered Geran-5 drones at Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kyiv during the night of 26–27 September. According to the blogger, Russia's diverse arsenal of strike weapons and Ukraine's shortage of air defense assets allow Russian forces to maintain the current pace of strikes and expand the range of targets, ISW writes in its analysis.
At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 26 September that Ukraine's interception rate for jet-powered Shahed drones currently stands at 55%. Of more than 2,730 such drones Russia had launched in September by then, Ukrainian forces had downed or suppressed more than 1,500, he added.

Ukraine is testing interceptor drone prototypes in combat conditions, Ukrainian Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov told Novyny.LIVE on 27 September. The mass deployment of interceptors capable of shooting down jet-powered Gerans could begin within several months, he added. Ukrainian companies have already successfully tested several interceptor drones capable of intercepting Russian jet-powered drones in field conditions, the institute notes.
At the same time, it remains unclear whether Ukraine will be able to scale up its interceptor program quickly enough and achieve sufficient success to disrupt the intensification of Russia's campaign during the winter, ISW notes.
Expanding Russia's arsenal of strike weapons is cheaper than carrying out a second mobilization economically, militarily, and socially, a Kremlin-linked Russian milblogger cited by the institute claimed.
Putin may put off large-scale forced mobilization until he sees whether the strikes deliver, ISW assesses, though his officials have been laying the groundwork for it despite Kremlin denials. Still, the need to replace Russia's enormous battlefield losses could push him to order such a mobilization as early as this fall, ISW notes, as Ukrainian and other sources have repeatedly reported he is preparing to do.


© Gleb Garanich/Reuters


A Ukrainian Hornet drone struck a Russian radar system about 120 kilometers behind the front, Taras Myshak, senior communications officer of the 59th Separate Assault Brigade of Unmanned Systems, said on Suspilne on 28 September, ArmyInform reported. The brigade's Signum unmanned systems battalion carried out the strike about a week earlier, he added.
Russia's air defenses depend on radars to see Ukrainian drones and missiles coming. Every radar it loses weakens that watch and gives the next Ukrainian strike a better chance of getting through.
According to Myshak, the target was a "quite expensive" Russian radar system.
A radar system is effectively the "eyes" of the Russian air defense system: it detects aerial targets, determines their coordinates, and transmits information to other elements of the system.
Russian forces in the brigade's zone, roughly along the Donetsk Oblast border, continue to operate in small infantry groups and use infiltration tactics, Myshak says. At the same time, the Russians are trying to cut Ukrainian logistics, he adds, saying that the brigade is effectively holding the Russian army back from infiltrating into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

The Russians' main means in this sector remain drones and infantry, the serviceman says. The number of infantry has decreased somewhat compared with previous periods, but the pressure from the enemy has not stopped, he adds.
"Of course, they will try, they will constantly probe, so to speak, our defense with their infiltrations. And likewise with drones, of various ranges, working on logistics, making it impossible for us to enter positions, to deliver everything necessary to the positions, in order to make our defense impossible," Myshak emphasized.
At the same time, Ukrainian troops are trying not only to defend against these actions but also to deprive the Russians of radars, electronic warfare systems, and other equipment, the serviceman says. "We likewise don't let them relax," he said.
This was likely the same strike that Ukrainian volunteer fundraiser Serhii Sternenko reported on his Telegram channel on 18 September. Operators of the Signum unit of the 59th Brigade, together with the First Separate Unmanned Systems Center, hit a Russian Nebo-M radar about 120 kilometers from the front line, he wrote.
The radar, which Sternenko valued at about $100 million, was damaged over two drone sorties, which also wounded two Russian servicemen, according to his post. During the operation, the Russians tried to jam the drone's video feed with electronic warfare, but the operators flew on using only flight data and their own experience, he added.

In October 2024, Ukraine's military said it had hit a Russian Nebo-M radar station with ATACMS ballistic missiles to blunt Moscow's ability to spot and shoot down aircraft and missiles, Reuters reported. The military estimated each such system at more than $100 million.
Ukraine is systematically increasing its use of medium-range strike drones, which can hit targets up to 200 kilometers deep inside enemy territory, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported in May this year. Russian air defenses and radars are among the main priorities of such operations, as their destruction weakens the system for detecting and intercepting aerial targets, the ministry said. Medium-class drones, including the FP-2, Hornet, and Bulava, play a critical role in such strikes, the ministry noted.
According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian forces struck at least 25 major Russian air defense and radar systems during April, about 12 of which were radar systems, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry also wrote in May this year.


Ukrainian drones struck two fuel depots in Krasnodar Krai overnight on 28 September, setting both on fire, Militarnyi reported. The targets were the NFB-Pavlovskaya depot in Pavlovskaya and the Edelveys-95 depot near Novotitarovskaya, about 25 km from Krasnodar.
A drone alert was declared in the region at 23:43. Residents of Novotitarovskaya then reported drones overhead and at least six explosions near the railway, Russian news Telegram channel Astra reported. Fires broke out at both depots. NASA FIRMS satellite data confirmed both blazes by 04:24, Militarnyi reported, citing imagery published by Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+.
More from Oil Depot in Novotitarovskaya pic.twitter.com/5LigJzW0WL
— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) September 28, 2026
NFB-Pavlovskaya handles cargo operations with petroleum products, including wholesale trade in motor fuel and petroleum storage, Militarnyi reported.
Edelveys-95 is a similar facility. It specializes in wholesale distribution of diesel fuel (Euro-5 standard) and gasoline (AI-92, AI-95, and AI-100), Astra reported. Its capacity is 4,500 cubic meters, and it has its own rail siding for receiving and shipping fuel. The company has been selling petroleum products for 30 years, buying directly from Russia's largest refineries, according to its website.
The overnight strikes came two days after SBU drones struck the Ilsky oil refinery in the same region on 26 September, triggering fires near the ELOU-AVT unit and the tank farm. Ilsky is one of the largest refineries in Russia's Southern Federal District, with a design capacity of roughly 6.6 million tonnes of crude per year, and has been struck more than 18 times since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.
Ukraine's sustained campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure has earlier pushed Russia's fuel shortages into Central Asia and forced Moscow to seek emergency refining deals abroad.