Ukraine's top commander has scrapped more than 30 obsolete General Staff orders, clearing out paperwork built for a different war. The cuts ended decade-old training, shooting, and fitness rules and freed commanders from formal reporting that had lost its point, said Vitalii Sarantsev, communications chief of the 14th Army Corps, who announced the move on Facebook.

The army had been carrying a rulebook written for a lower-intensity war. Many of the canceled orders date back to the Anti-Terrorist Operation and Joint Forces Operation of 2016 to 2020, the years of trench fighting in the Donbas before Russia's full-scale invasion, and they clashed with the standards Ukrainian units developed under fire after 2022.

Canceling them removes those legal conflicts and hands commanders back the time the old reporting consumed. It fits the broader push by Drapatyi, the new commander-in-chief, to strip Soviet-era habits out of the force.

The cuts target decade-old rules

Among the scrapped documents are old training programs, outdated firing courses, and physical-training concepts roughly ten years old, according to Sarantsev, along with dozens of interim amendments that, he said, only cluttered the army's legal framework.

"Long-obsolete instructions that had existed only on paper for years, requiring formal reports, check boxes, and tables, were scrapped," he wrote.

Commanders lose the busywork

The change reaches down to daily command. Field commanders no longer have to file reports or run activities to standards eight to ten years old that no longer fit how the war is fought, Sarantsev said, freeing their time to work with their units rather than on paperwork.

He called the decision "a good, big fall cleanup," saying the army was shedding outdated ballast to work faster and with less bureaucracy.

The purge fits a wider reform

Drapatyi took over as commander-in-chief in July, replacing Oleksandr Syrskyi after six days of protests, with a mandate to carry Ukraine's corps overhaul forward and a reputation for favoring the Western military playbook over Soviet-era practice. On 2 September, he published a set of leadership principles that put service members first, and he has since moved on to the NCO corps as well.

Ukraine’s new top commander is pushing to unwind a Soviet-inherited command model mid-war. He wants combat-tested sergeants to have real authority

Russia plans to test-fire a new type of ballistic missile before the end of 2026, one built to fly farther than the Iskander missiles it now launches at Ukraine, according to Ukraine's military intelligence. Its deputy chief outlined the plan at a Ukraine-NATO meeting on 8 September, ZN reported.

A longer-range missile would erode the relative safety of western Ukraine, where the routes carrying Western aid run beyond the front, and stretch air defenses already struggling against ballistic strikes.

A longer reach into western Ukraine

Russia plans final tests of a new ballistic missile with a range of up to 800 kilometers, or about 500 miles, by year's end, Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), told the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council, citing the agency's own assessments. Russian forces may try to hit targets in western Ukraine during those tests, he said.

The deputy chief noted that Moscow is raising both the output and the range of its ballistic missiles to intensify strikes and push Ukraine into a social and economic crisis. He urged partners to tighten sanctions until Russia loses access to the foreign components in its long-range weapons.

Russia's modernized 9M723-2, also called the Iskander-1000, reaches up to 550 km, HUR says, and the older 9M723-1 covers 390 km. An 800-km weapon would carry strikes well past the front.

The missile Russia already fields

Russia already fields a longer-range Iskander variant. This summer, its forces first fired the modernized 9M723-2—part of the Bora-M system—in a combined missile strike on Kyiv. A bigger engine and a larger launcher gave that missile its extended reach, HUR said. Ballistic missiles are the hardest of Russia's strikes for Ukraine to stop, and Moscow has poured them out in recent months, running its plants above quota and firing them in larger salvos.

Losing more soldiers than it signs up

Russia is waging a war of attrition despite heavy losses and has not given up on destroying Ukrainian statehood, Skibitskyi said. Skibitskyi put Russia's August losses at 43,000 soldiers against 39,000 recruited. Russia has struggled to fill its ranks for months. Russia's General Staff sees intensified mobilization as the only way to reach its main goals—fully occupying the Ukrainian Donbas and seizing the strategic initiative—he explained.

The Kremlin plans to mobilize about 600,000 people across 2026 and 2027, half of them by the end of this year, he said. Russia will also try to close the Black Sea to Ukraine and to drag Belarus into the war and into hybrid operations against NATO, he added, though HUR sees no signs of Russian strike groupings forming there yet.

Each new kilometer of range puts more of Ukraine within reach from deep inside Russia, without moving a launcher closer to the border.

Ukraine's National Guard now uses fiber-optic control for 70% of its drones, its commander said in an interview reported by Ukrinform on 9 September. Russian jamming cannot touch that link.

On a front where both sides jam radio signals around the clock, cable-guided drones have become some of the most effective weapons in the war—and Russia has turned to them too.

From radio signals to a cable

National Guard Commander Oleksandr Pivnenko gave that share on the YouTube channel LB Live. Earlier, the split ran the opposite way—about 20% fiber-optic, 80% radio-controlled.

These drones swap the radio link for a hair-thin cable that unspools as they fly, leaving Russian jammers no signal to block. The change was not smooth. Pivnenko said the National Guard first wrestled with the cable's quality and the way the drones handled. Crews have since learned to fly them for reconnaissance and strikes.

Twice as many drone-hunting crews

The force has also doubled its number of interceptor-drone crews over the past six months, Pivnenko said.

The National Guard plans to keep building those capabilities, Pivnenko added, calling the development of unmanned systems units one of its priorities. Ukraine's Defense Procurement Agency has also opened its first competitive tenders for fiber-optic and deep-strike drones, bought to Defense Ministry specifications rather than by product name. Since the full-scale invasion began, the force's drone crews had struck more than 243,000 enemy targets, Pivnenko said in late July.

A Russian strike drone hit the Kyiv premises of the television channels My-Ukraina and My-Ukraina+ in the middle of the day on 8 September, the channel reported. The main blow landed on the newsroom and the working offices while My-Ukraina was live on the national newscast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged a response from Europe and the world.

During its ongoing all-out war, Russia runs a parallel campaign against the people who document it, jailing reporters as terrorists in the territory it occupies, killing them with drones near the front, and accumulating hundreds of crimes against them that European bodies have counted.

The strike landed on the editorial floor

My-Ukraina was broadcasting the national United News telethon, the joint wartime newscast that Ukrainian channels share, at the moment of the attack. Rescuers and medics worked at the site and treated the injured, the channel said. The strike came in daylight, hours after a mass overnight assault on the capital.

Fire and structural destruction hit the business center in the Solomianskyi district, and rescuers evacuated two people from its upper floors, the State Emergency Service said. It put the number injured at five and called that figure preliminary, with the count of victims still being clarified.

"A new page of Russian degradation"

Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram that Russia had struck at media and at journalists with a Shahed, one of the Iranian-designed attack drones it launches at Ukrainian cities in mass waves.

"Right in the middle of the day. Exactly when the journalists were on air. The building is partly destroyed," he said. 

Emergency workers had already put out the fire, and the number of injured could still grow, he added.

"Shaheds against media is a new page of Russian degradation, and there must certainly be a reaction from Europe and the world," Zelenskyy said. 

Russia had already damaged the channel's office overnight on 20 August during a mass attack on Kyiv. That blast blew out the windows, badly damaged the newsroom, and tore down part of the ceiling in the corridors.

Three killed in the capital over the day

Kyiv Mayor Vitalii Klitschko said the number of people killed by Russian strikes in Kyiv since the start of 8 September had reached three. The city military administration put the number of injured across the capital at 19.

Explosions ran for almost five hours overnight and damaged more than 50 sites in Kyiv, the Interior Ministry reported. Russia fired ballistic, cruise, and anti-ship missiles along with jet-powered drones in that attack.

Russia agreed not to bomb Ukraine’s capital during Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s visit there. The respite was short-lived.

© Francisco Seco/Associated Press

Ukraine's new top commander wants the army's combat-tested sergeants to have real careers, real authority, and clear paths to promotion — not just a role training recruits. Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi has met the senior sergeants of the force's branches, corps, and command bodies and set concrete steps to reform the sergeant corps, saying most had come straight from combat zones, Texty reported.

The push targets an old weakness. Ukraine inherited its rank system from the Soviet army in 1991 — a centralized model in which officers decided almost everything and sergeants were little more than senior soldiers, with no authority or career ladder of their own. A 2020 reform law began to change that by aligning the system with NATO standards, making the sergeant an independent figure.

Drapatyi, who became commander-in-chief in July 2026 with a mandate to carry that overhaul forward and a reputation for favoring decentralized command, is now pressing it directly.

Sergeants outgrow the training role

The sergeant's job long ago stopped being only about preparing troops, Drapatyi said. Sergeants now settle new arrivals into combat areas, handle supply and equipment, ready personnel for tasks, and command them directly in battle.

"A sergeant was a soldier yesterday. Today, he is a commander who is closest to the soldier and sees the real state of the unit on the ground best of all," Drapatyi said.

Drapatyi assigns the reform tasks

The meeting worked through the structure of the corps, the split of responsibility between sergeants and officers, training, appointments, and pay. For each, Drapatyi continued, he set specific tasks, defined next steps, and named the people responsible.

"We cannot build a modern, combat-capable sergeant corps on old approaches," Drapatyi said.

He believes that a sergeant's combat experience should turn into authority, professional development, responsibility, and a real say in how troops are trained and led.

The Trump administration had let the peace process enter such a freeze that a trip to Kyiv was just an initial step. Any new talks will happen alongside escalating fighting.

© Francisco Seco/Associated Press

The documents amount to an autopsy of the weapons-contracting process.

© David Guttenfelder/The New York Times

Secret military audits reveal a military procurement system riddled with mismanagement. In 2024 alone, Ukraine lost $1.2 billion to fraud and waste.

© Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Ukraine's private defense industry says no single part of the government is actually responsible for it. The Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry, an alliance of more than 400 companies, has called on the authorities to create a state body with clear powers over defense-industry policy.

The gap sits under a fast-growing sector: Ukraine's top defense-market segments more than doubled to $6.8 billion in 2025, and the private arms market has grown roughly tenfold since 2022. By industry estimates, the sector now employs on the order of 300,000 people. The council argues that a sector of that scale has no government home with the authority to steer it.

Responsibility with no owner

The council traces the problem to July 2025, when the government merged the Ministry of Strategic Industries into the Ministry of Defense, a move meant to unify defense management. More than a year on, the council says the relevant functions remain split among the Defense Ministry, the ministries of economy, finance, and digital transformation, the National Security and Defense Council, and various state agencies.

Each institution handles one slice, the council says, but none holds enough authority or bears comprehensive responsibility for developing the defense industry. That, it argues, makes it harder to solve producers' problems, coordinate policy, attract investment, scale production, and enter foreign markets.

What the council wants

The council stresses that it is not demanding the restoration of the Strategic Industries Ministry. Instead, it wants a capable body with clear powers, adequate resources, and defined political responsibility — a single point of contact between the state and Ukrainian producers.

Such an institution should:

• Develop a medium-term defense-industrial policy aligned with the needs of the Defense Forces and budget planning;
• Coordinate the development of production capabilities, technologies, testing infrastructure, investment, and joint production;
• Serve as the state’s single point of contact with Ukrainian defense manufacturers;
• Ensure the systematic promotion of Ukrainian defense products abroad and protect the interests of Ukrainian companies in international partnerships;
• Involve manufacturers and relevant industry associations in developing decisions that affect the sector.

The council, chaired by presidential adviser Oleksandr Kamyshyn, groups more than 360 private producers, 28 drone-pilot schools, and 20 defense venture funds.

"We represent the industry's common position and help producers work with the state, the military, and international partners," it says of its role.

The defense-industrial complex is critical to Ukraine's ability to defend itself, the council says, and its scale now demands a matching system of state management.

Donald Trump’s business ally and son-in-law now heading from Moscow to Kyiv to meet Zelenskyy

Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are heading to Kyiv for the first time in their roles as Donald Trump’s peace envoys to Ukraine, after talks on Saturday in Moscow.

The White House said Witkoff and Kushner had “discussed substantive plans for next steps” towards ending the war between Ukraine and Russia during their meeting on Saturday in Moscow with Vladimir Putin.

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© Photograph: Gavriil Grigorov/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN/EPA

© Photograph: Gavriil Grigorov/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN/EPA

© Photograph: Gavriil Grigorov/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN/EPA

A deadly campaign of Russian and Ukrainian airstrikes has escalated since the last U.S.-brokered negotiations stalled in February.

© Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

President Vladimir V. Putin ordered a pause in strikes on Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, ahead of the meeting with President Trump’s envoys: his son-in-law Jared Kushner and the businessman Steve Witkoff.

© @Kadmitriev/X, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

As the fear of a possible mobilization becomes a fixture of daily life across Russia, many men are deciding whether to flee, hide or sit tight.

© Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Ukrainian Defense Forces units have been ordered to temporarily observe a ceasefire along the line of contact from 00:00 on 5 September through 23:59 on 8 September, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing sources in several military brigades and a senior security official.

The order comes as US President Donald Trump’s special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are expected to visit Moscow and Kyiv this weekend for talks aimed at ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.

According to Ukrainska Pravda’s sources, Ukrainian units operating across the front have received instructions to observe the temporary “silence regime” during the four-day period.

An air raid alert was issued in Kyiv at 00:00 on 5 September just as the temporary ceasefire was due to take effect, with Russian drones reported over Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts.

Pause coincides with US envoys’ visits

Witkoff and Kushner are expected to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 5 September before traveling to Kyiv for talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 6 September.

Their visit comes after months of stalled negotiations. US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine froze in February following the outbreak of war between the US, Israel and Iran, while subsequent contacts between US, Russian and Ukrainian officials have failed to produce a breakthrough.

Zelenskyy said on 4 September that Ukraine would ensure conditions for the US envoys’ safe travel and called for Russia to reciprocate by refraining from strikes during the period needed for the meetings and related logistics.

The reported Ukrainian order would extend the pause beyond the envoys’ visits, covering 5–8 September.

Russia has continued its intensive drone campaign against Ukrainian cities even as diplomatic contacts have resumed. Kyiv remains skeptical of Moscow’s willingness to accept a genuine ceasefire, with Ukrainian officials warning that Russia may use negotiations to buy time while continuing its military campaign.

Budapest praised the Verkhovna Rada—Ukraine’s parliament—after it voted 261–0 to classify mass arrests, deportations, and persecution by the Soviet military administration in Zakarpattia (also known as Transcarpathia) from 1944 to 1946 as crimes of the communist regime.

The vote makes the Verkhovna Rada the first state body in the world to recognize the repression of Zakarpattia’s Hungarian community as a crime, according to European Pravda. It creates an opening for historical reconciliation after years of minority-rights disputes, strained relations, and blocking Ukraine’s EU accession. However, Budapest continues to press Kyiv for further concessions.

After Soviet forces took control of Zakarpattia—Ukraine’s westernmost region, bordering Hungary and home to the country’s largest ethnic Hungarian community—the NKVD, Stalin’s secret police, and SMERSH, Soviet military counterintelligence, detained civilian men aged 18 to 50 under the pretext of mobilization.

The men were deported without trial to labor camps and the Soviet Gulag prison-camp system. Hungary’s Foreign Ministry said tens of thousands of Hungarian- and German-speaking men were deported, and many thousands died under the inhumane conditions of forced labor.

The campaign became known in Hungarian as malenkij robot. Derived from a Russian phrase meaning “a little work,” Soviet troops used this deceptive phrase when taking people away.

Hungarian Foreign Minister Anita Orbán—no relation to former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—called the declaration “a fitting tribute” to thousands targeted by Soviet terror because of their Hungarian identity. She said Hungary was ready to help uncover the truth about the past and honor the victims.

Hungary welcomes the Ukrainian parliament’s declaration condemning Soviet authorities' coercive measures against the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia between 1944 and 1946. The declaration is a fitting tribute to the thousands of victims of deportation and forced labor…

— Anita Orban (@_OrbanAnita) September 3, 2026

The resolution calls for memorials, archival publications, research, and the inclusion of the repression in educational programs. It also draws a parallel with Russia’s present-day occupation practices, saying Moscow is committing similar large-scale repression against civilians in occupied Ukraine.

Marton Hajdu, chair of the Hungarian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, nevertheless said reconciliation must be accompanied by Kyiv’s full implementation of its June agreement with Budapest on minority rights.

A cautious thaw in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations

The exchange adds to tentative signs of improving relations since Péter Magyar ended Viktor Orbán’s 16 years in power in April. Magyar’s government summoned Russia’s ambassador after Moscow struck Zakarpattia and later closed a money-laundering case involving $82 million belonging to Ukraine’s state-owned Oschadbank, reversing another Orbán-era dispute.

Budapest and Kyiv also reached a June agreement covering Hungarian-language education and the use of Hungarian in public services. Yet Magyar’s government has continued to slow parts of Ukraine’s EU accession process amid domestic pressure to defend Zakarpattia’s Hungarian community. The recognition of Soviet crimes, therefore, provides new common ground without settling the wider disagreements between the neighbors.

Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) have launched an operation targeting an alleged criminal organization headed by an official of the Prosecutor General’s Office and involved in protecting a network of fraudulent call centers and laundering assets.

Fraudulent call centers have become a major organized-crime problem in Ukraine, with authorities investigating hundreds of suspected operations and working with international partners to pursue these networks.

NABU announced the operation on 4 September, saying further details would be released later.

Deputy department head reportedly detained

Ukrainska Pravda, citing sources, reported that NABU and SAPO had detained Serhii Kropyva, deputy head of the Prosecutor General’s Office’s Department of International Legal Cooperation.

Ukrainska Pravda also reported that investigators were carrying out searches at the Prosecutor General’s Office. The outlet published footage showing NABU employees entering the building, including climbing over its fence with ladders.

The allegations against Kropyva have not been detailed publicly by NABU, and his detention has not been officially confirmed by the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Prosecutor General’s Office pledges cooperation

The Prosecutor General’s Office said the circumstances surrounding the possible involvement of one of its employees in illegal activity connected to fraudulent call centers must be established by investigators.

The office said it would provide anti-corruption authorities with all information and assistance required by law and that the case should receive an objective legal assessment.

The employee under investigation will be suspended from official duties for the duration of the pre-trial investigation, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

Ukraine has been targeting fraudulent call centers

The Prosecutor General’s Office said authorities have carried out more than 1,050 searches over the past 12 months and shut down around 340 fraudulent call centers comprising more than 5,000 operator positions.

Ukrainian prosecutors have also participated in 37 international joint investigation teams coordinated by Eurojust and supported by Europol, the office said.

Authorities are currently investigating 147 criminal proceedings related to the activity. More than 183 people have been notified of suspicion, while indictments against 93 people have been sent to court, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

The established losses suffered by victims amount to tens of millions of hryvnias, it said.

Kropyva’s previous positions

According to Ukrainska Pravda, Kropyva previously worked in Ukraine’s Cyber Police, where he headed its Kyiv department and later served as first deputy head.

The outlet reported that former Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova appointed Kropyva to head a newly created department in 2022 without a competitive selection process. The department was responsible for economic crimes and state cybersecurity, according to Ukrainska Pravda.

Before joining the Prosecutor General’s Office, Kropyva reportedly served as deputy head of the Odesa Regional State Administration under Oleh Kiper.

The investigation is ongoing, and the allegations have not yet been adjudicated by a court.

Spain will send Ukraine more Patriot interceptor missiles, Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares confirmed, according to Le Monde.

Patriot interceptors are among the few weapons Ukraine has that can stop Russian ballistic missiles. The specialized rounds are scarce worldwide, and manufacturer Raytheon cannot build them fast enough to meet demand. Each costs $3 million to $4 million.

Spain confirms the flow will grow

Albares spoke at an informal meeting of European Union foreign ministers in Ireland on 2 September. He reaffirmed Madrid's support as Kyiv pressed for more interceptors. "We have been doing this for a long time, and we will continue to do so," he said. He confirmed that Madrid is preparing a new batch. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said the bloc is also working with non-member states to lift Ukraine's air defenses.

Madrid and Kyiv meet in Wicklow

The confirmation followed talks with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha. They met on the sidelines of the same EU gathering, in Wicklow. Sybiha said he pressed Ukraine's urgent need to strengthen its air and ballistic missile defenses. He also thanked Spain for its solidarity. Albares reaffirmed Spain's role as a founding member of the Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition, which ten countries launched in Paris on 13 July. The group aims to build a shared anti-ballistic capability, and its declaration calls the coalition purely defensive. Spanish military instructors are training Ukrainian technicians to maintain the systems.

What Spain has promised so far

Spain is not just giving—it is also buying. In December 2025, Madrid signed a $1.7 billion contract with US arms maker Raytheon for four new Patriot systems. It was Spain's largest Patriot order yet. The deal covers radars, launchers, command-and-control stations, and training. Spanish firm Sener builds the control system for the GEM-T interceptor those launchers fire. Spain is one of only a handful of European countries that operate Patriots.

What Spain has already sent

Spain has supplied Ukraine with Patriot missiles before. In March, Madrid pledged five older PAC-2 interceptors from an air-defense artillery regiment at Marines, near Valencia. Madrid has pledged €1 billion ($1.16 billion) in military aid for 2026. Ukraine has spent months urging partners to release interceptors from their stockpiles.

The Cabinet of Ministers has dismissed Serhii Sukhomlyn as head of the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine and appointed Ivan Fedorov to lead the agency.

Kyrylo Budanov, a decorated soldier and former military spy chief, advocates a negotiated settlement. Talks are expected to resume this month.

© Jędrzej Nowicki for The New York Times

Germany will close Russia’s General Consulate in Bonn, terminate the agreement concerning the Russian House in Berlin, and tighten entry controls for Russian citizens. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul announced this at a joint press conference with Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt on 1 September, after German authorities formally attributed the attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia.

German investigators have identified two suspects allegedly linked to the operation: a Russian-born man with a Latvian passport and a Belarusian man with a Russian passport. This information was reported by Süddeutsche Zeitung. Investigators believe both have links to Russian state structures, according to the report.

Both men have already left Germany, complicating efforts to bring them to justice, Tagesschau reports. One of Berlin’s responses was the closure of Russia’s Consulate General in Bonn — the last Russian consulate general remaining in Germany.

Germany tightens its Russia policy

Russia’s General Consulate in Bonn will close on 18 September, according to Wadephul. Germany will also seek additional EU sanctions against people linked to Russian hybrid attacks, increase pressure on Russia’s “shadow fleet,” and strengthen entry controls for Russian nationals.

He stated that since the beginning of "the unlawful war of aggression" against Ukraine, Germany's goal has been to bring the war to an end, restore the peace order in Europe, and return to a constructive relationship.

"However, this requires a minimum level of willingness on the Russian side. We must acknowledge that Russia shows no willingness to reach an accommodation,” Wadephul said.

Moscow rejected the accusations. Russian President Vladimir Putin called Germany’s response a “grave mistake,” TASS reports.

The investigation leads to two suspects

According to German investigators, the Belarusian suspect left DNA traces on one of the drones, inside a container containing explosives, and on an antenna found near the airport. The Russian-born suspect, who holds a Latvian passport, is believed to have coordinated and directed the operation, entered Germany through Berlin, and then traveled toward Saxony.

The Russian-born suspect left Germany two days before the attack, while the Belarusian suspect also left the country.

What happened at Leipzig Airport

The diplomatic response stems from a sabotage attempt on 4 August, when a bomb-laden drone struck a Ukrainian An-124 cargo aircraft but failed to detonate. The drone, carrying explosives, remained unnoticed for about four hours before being discovered, while later analysis indicated it had been aimed at the aircraft near its fuel tanks.

La vidéo d’un cycliste ukrainien ciblé par un drone posté vendredi par l’armée russe puis dépubliée a suscité un vif émoi en ligne. Ce n’est pourtant pas la première fois que les opérateurs de drones…
— Permalien

Poland will recover hundreds of millions of euros from a shared European Union fund for weapons it handed to Ukraine, the defense outlet Militarnyi reported. The money had been frozen for two years and only started moving after a change of government in Hungary lifted a veto.

Europe's ability to keep weapons moving to Ukraine rests on members trusting they will be paid back for what they give away. When that cost-sharing seizes up, national governments face the full bill alone, and the case for the next donation gets harder. A single member's veto can jam that machinery for years.

The money starts flowing again

Poland will receive up to $500 million in 2027 from the European Peace Facility (EPF), an EU fund that reimburses member states for military aid to Ukraine. Deputy Defense Minister Paweł Zalewski told the Polish news agency PAP that the ceiling combines the $465 million now secured with a possible $12–35 million more, depending on which of the two payout options the European Commission picks. Warsaw had already collected $960 million earlier, bringing its total EU reimbursement to roughly $1.4 billion.

The reimbursements had stalled in 2024, when Hungary blocked a $7.7 billion tranche. Budapest dropped the veto in June 2026 after a new government took over, unfreezing the funds. The bloc is now steering part of the money toward joint arms purchases and its training mission for Ukraine, rather than just reimbursement.

Where Poland stands among donors

By Militarnyi's tally of Kiel Institute figures, total Polish aid has reached $6.8 billion, with $5.2 billion of that military. That ranks Poland 11th among donors by raw volume. When weighed against each country's economy, it ranks 9th, equal to 1.021% of Polish GDP, with the military share at 0.775%.

What Warsaw handed over

Poland has supplied ammunition and other weapons since early 2022, before the full-scale invasion, and has since handed over more than 350 tanks—14 Leopard 2A4, about 60 PT-91 Twardy, and roughly 280 Soviet-era T-72 variants. Warsaw also sent Krab self-propelled howitzers, Piorun shoulder-fired air-defense missiles, and Grad rocket launchers. Alongside Slovakia, it was among the first NATO states to send Ukraine fighter jets, delivering 14 MiG-29 jets and 10 Mi-24 attack helicopters between 2022 and 2024.

President Volodymyr Zelensky described the shootout on the streets of the Ukrainian capital as an “absolutely shameful event” and ordered an investigation.

© Roman Pilipey/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

President Volodymyr Zelensky described the shootout on the streets of the Ukrainian capital as an “absolutely shameful event” and ordered an investigation.

© Roman Pilipey/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The European Union is discussing export support with Ukraine and its neighboring countries, including through so-called solidarity lanes, Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen told Bloomberg on 2 September.

Strikes in the Black Sea have curtailed exports from both Ukraine and Russia, while low water limits how much grain vessels can carry on the Danube, Ukraine’s main fallback when sea traffic slows. Wheat and corn prices are at multiyear highs, and the Bloomberg Agriculture Spot Index jumped by more than 13% in August, its sharpest monthly rise in over a decade. Hansen said the EU’s role as a major food exporter means drought-driven production losses could cause shortages elsewhere.

Created after Russia's full-scale invasion, the solidarity lanes carry Ukrainian exports by road, rail, and river through neighboring countries when Black Sea shipping is disrupted.

The European Commission is separately weighing relief for drought-hit EU farmers. Hansen urged governments to use flexibilities in the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU's farm-subsidy system, including exemptions for circumstances beyond farmers' control, emergency fertilizer aid, and earlier payments, but proposed no new measures in a letter seen by Bloomberg. EU agriculture ministers are due to discuss the drought in Ireland next week and in Brussels later in September.

Russian attacks squeeze Ukraine’s export routes

Low water is only one obstacle to Ukraine’s southern export routes. Russia has repeatedly attacked ports and transport links along the Danube and on Odesa Oblast’s Black Sea coast. Some Ukrainian farmers have sold wheat below production cost as port prices fell, leaving less money for the next sowing.

Romania detected more than 100 drones during seven attacks on Danube ports in mid-August, interim Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruță said. Russia struck Izmail, Ukraine's largest Danube port, three times in August. The 29 August attack killed one person and destroyed five grain trucks, Odesa regional authorities said.

Ukraine and Moldova have pursued a rail corridor through Moldova to Constanța, Romania’s main Black Sea port, as an alternative. Moldova later halved transit tariffs through 31 December. Ukrainian officials estimate the corridor could handle around 10% of Ukraine's grain exports, Reuters reported.

Ukraine formally notified the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on 2 September that Russian airspace is unsafe for civilian flights because of increased military activity, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said. The letter behind the notification asks the organization to urge its member states to stop civil flights over Russia altogether, ZN reported.

ICAO, the UN aviation agency, cannot close Russian airspace or order carriers to reroute. European and US airlines already avoid Russia's airspace, while carriers from China, Türkiye, and the Gulf states have kept flying through it. Those remaining airlines must assess the safety of flying amid drone and air defense operations. Drone alerts during reported Ukrainian attacks have repeatedly shut Russian airports and delayed hundreds of flights.

The notification follows a 1 September warning by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who told airlines, insurers, and other aviation stakeholders that Russian skies were becoming unsafe as Ukrainian drones reached deeper into the country.

Zelenskyy said Ukraine's Foreign Ministry would pass information about the risks to international organizations. The letter to ICAO came from another office—Mykola Kalashnyk, Ukraine's minister for recovery, infrastructure, and transport, whose portfolio covers aviation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Zelenskyy's statement amounted to "a bid for state terrorism" and that Moscow would find a way to respond if civilian "tragedies" followed.

Sybiha urged airlines to avoid Russian airspace and said the notice was meant to prevent unintended incidents, arguing that Moscow was failing to disclose the dangers its war had created. He invoked Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the provision that recognizes states’ right to defend themselves against an armed attack. The foreign minister further stated that the war was “returning home to Russia.”

In its separate statement, ICAO warned of rising threats to civil aviation worldwide. It did not mention Russia, endorse Ukraine’s assessment, or say Kyiv’s notification had prompted it.

The UN aviation body identified long-range weapons, drones, navigation-signal interference, and advanced air-defense systems as growing dangers to civilian aircraft. It reiterated that international aviation law prohibits the use of weapons against them.

ICAO urged member states to assess airspace under their control, share threat intelligence quickly, and improve military-civilian coordination.

Russian airports were already facing repeated closures

Russian airspace has not been legally or completely closed. The disruption has instead taken the form of temporary restrictions at individual airports.

From 5–7 May 2026, restrictions during reported Ukrainian attacks delayed more than 450 flights at Moscow airports, while limits at Vnukovo remained in place for nearly 18 hours.

On 6 July 2025, Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport canceled 171 flights, while airports in five other cities suspended operations. During an earlier wave on 22 May 2025, Domodedovo halted flights four times in one day and Sheremetyevo three times, while Vnukovo and Zhukovsky also restricted operations.

Airports in Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, and Tambov were temporarily closed during a 27 May attack in which Moscow claimed 99 drones were intercepted. Two days later, another alert delayed 20 arrivals and 14 departures at Vnukovo, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels claimed.

As the Trump administration refuses to end its war in Iran, it is steering into the storm, not out of it

Russia hasn’t yet killed large numbers of Europeans outside Ukraine, but it’s getting closer. The night of 4-5 August, an airport bus driver discovered an armed drone lying near the tarmac of the Leipzig-Halle airport, which is a central hub of Europe’s logistical support to Ukraine’s war effort. A cargo jet, meanwhile, may have struck a second drone shortly after takeoff, forcing an abrupt landing, and investigators found a third drone laden with military explosives nearby.

In 2024, incendiary devices hidden in parcels ignited in DHL cargo at the same airport. Had these detonated in the air, a major air catastrophe and large-scale civilian casualties would have ensued, probably resulting in a broader war.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc/Getty Images

Each side is using missiles and drones to try to pound the other into giving up, breeding ceaseless human suffering. But there is no sign that either country’s determination will weaken.

© Oleksandr Ratushniak/Reuters

These Russian drones are more destructive, faster and harder to shoot down than the propeller-driven models that Moscow has used throughout the war.

© Gleb Garanich/Reuters

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and National Police shut down a Kyiv-based network of several dozen people who allegedly used fake cryptocurrency investment platforms and malicious code to steal digital assets from citizens of EU countries, the SBU said on 1 September.

Investigators identified the alleged organizer as a 25-year-old Kyiv IT specialist, according to the SBU. The case reaches beyond Ukraine because the agency says the alleged victims were EU citizens. The agency said the network’s monthly turnover from funds obtained illegally could reach $1 million during its most lucrative periods.

The SBU said investigators had documented alleged crimes by every member of the group. However, its statement did not specify how long the network had operated, how many EU citizens were affected, which countries they lived in, or the total amount allegedly stolen.

The agency did not name any foreign law enforcement partners involved.

How the crypto ring operated

The alleged organizer of the crypto ring recruited other tech workers in the capital, the SBU said. Posing as cryptocurrency-platform representatives, they offered targets seemingly profitable ways to invest in digital assets.

The network found victims by posting about supposedly lucrative crypto projects in popular Telegram channels, then showed them fabricated trading results and fake profits to make the operation look legitimate, investigators said.

Engaged targets were sent a link to a counterfeit site that mimicked a real crypto service and were persuaded to connect their wallets and approve a transaction, the SBU said. The site carried malicious code called a “drainer” that, the agency said, let the operators withdraw the victims’ assets to addresses they controlled—emptying the wallets.

During 23 searches of the suspects’ offices and homes, officers seized phones, computers, money believed to be criminal proceeds, and 16 high-end cars, including Porsche, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz models, the SBU said.

Authorities were still deciding whether to serve notices of suspicion, while the investigation continued under the Prosecutor General’s Office, the SBU said. Those involved could face up to 12 years in prison with confiscation of property.

Ukraine’s role in combating cross-border cybercrime

Ukraine has previously joined with foreign agencies to pursue cross-border cyber threats. In April, the SBU said it worked with the FBI, EU law enforcement, and Polish counterintelligence to disrupt Russian military-intelligence spying through hacked routers. The operation blocked more than 100 servers and removed hundreds of routers in Ukraine from Russian control.

Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Novatek-Ust-Luga production complex in Russia’s Leningrad Oblast on 1 September, saying the target was hit and a fire followed. The scale of the damage remains under assessment.

Russian authorities initially acknowledged damage and a fire but did not identify the facility. Ukraine’s military intelligence later named the Novatek complex as the target, and the General Staff has now confirmed the strike and said the facility supports Russia’s armed forces. It did not explain how, nor say whether, production was disrupted.

Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, was first to identify the target, saying on 1 September that its operators had struck the complex alongside Ukraine’s Defense Forces in a joint deep-strike operation. Key elements of the site’s oil-processing installation and other equipment were hit, and a large fire broke out, the agency said. The General Staff confirmed the strike the following day.

Video of the overnight attack on the port of Ust-Luga in Russia’s Leningrad region. pic.twitter.com/dXG5XTkhab

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) September 1, 2026

The Novatek complex at Ust-Luga separates stable gas condensate—a liquid produced during natural gas extraction—into fuel and petroleum components and handles their shipment through the Baltic port. Its design capacity exceeds six million tons a year, the General Staff said. The plant produces light and heavy naphtha, kerosene, a diesel fraction, and a marine-fuel component.

Ukraine has repeatedly targeted the Ust-Luga port

Before Ukraine named the target, Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledged infrastructure damage and a fire at Ust-Luga on 1 September, but did not identify the specific facility. HUR subsequently named the Novatek complex as the target and reported damage to key equipment.

The operation continued Ukraine’s campaign against Ust-Luga’s energy and port infrastructure. Ukrainian agencies confirmed the first strike on Novatek’s complex overnight on 24–25 March. Drones returned on 31 March, setting fuel-storage tanks ablaze, damaging a pier and pumping equipment, and temporarily halting port operations, followed by another reported attack on 7 April. Ukrainian drones last hit the port on 14 August, marking the sixth such attack there in 2026.

Whether or not US president fits the definition of a Russian asset, his actions align closely with the Kremlin’s interests

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Could Donald Trump be a Russian asset? The headline on a review in the Guardian of my new book Betrayal has provoked heated international debate. Written by the historian Lawrence Freedman, the piece generated thousands of comments from across Europe and beyond on social media. Many people responded with a single word: “Duh!”

Trump’s relationship with Vladimir Putin is the biggest mystery in international politics. In 2017 I wrote a book called Collusion, which set out Moscow’s operation to support and cultivate Trump, going back decades. The US president, of course, denies links with Russia. But in his second term, his behaviour towards Putin has been as weird and perplexing as during his first.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Thilo Schmülgen/Reuters

© Photograph: Thilo Schmülgen/Reuters

© Photograph: Thilo Schmülgen/Reuters

On 1 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin said during a conversation with journalists that Russian troops had 12 km left to reach Sumy. Censor.NET estimated from DeepState’s map that Russian forces were approximately 17 km from Sumy’s administrative boundary.

Russian military commanders have systematically exaggerated their gains on the battlefield. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) describes such claims as part of a Kremlin information campaign aimed at creating the impression of major Russian gains. In this case, the Russian president cited exaggerated gains that, compared with his previous claims, appear to be a setback.

What Putin said

“The ‘North’ group of forces continues to create a security belt along the Russian-Ukrainian border in the border areas of the Sumy region... There are 12 km left to Sumy, to the Sumy ring road,” Putin said during the press conference.

Censor.NET reported that Russian forces were about 17 km from Sumy without specifying the reference point, while Putin did not say which section of the city’s ring road his 12 km figure referred to.

Putin previously gave a different distance

On 28 June, during an interview with Russian propagandist Pavel Zarubin, Putin said that Russian troops had “about 10.5 km” left to reach Sumy. At the time, he also explained the offensive as the creation of a “security zone” along Russia’s border.

Putin’s claimed distance to Sumy therefore increased by approximately 1.5 km in just over two months, contradicting the Kremlin’s portrayal of a continuing advance.

Other exaggerations

In July 2026, Putin claimed that Russian forces had “completely captured” Kostiantynivka. Ukraine’s General Staff rejected the claim, saying Ukrainian forces continued defensive operations in the city. ISW also said some videos of Russian flags being raised in Kostiantynivka were likely AI-altered.

On 2 December 2025, Putin claimed that Russian forces had captured Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. ISW found no evidence confirming the city’s complete capture and assessed that its fall would not enable Moscow to achieve a significant breakthrough.

Russian propagandists used the Matryoshka disinformation network to circulate a digitally altered front page of the Polish regional weekly Przegląd Regionalny warning of a “hungry fall and winter” in Ukraine, the country’s Center for Countering Disinformation reported.

The fake turns genuine anxiety over Russian attacks on warehouses and food logistics into an unsupported prediction of mass starvation. The Center said Matryoshka routinely disguises fabricated material as reporting by established Western outlets, lending Russian narratives borrowed credibility while creating the impression that foreign media consider Ukraine’s situation hopeless.

The fabricated Przegląd Regionalny front page claimed Russian strikes would push 63% of Ukrainians to the brink of famine over a “hungry autumn and winter.” No such article ran—the real front page of that issue looked entirely different, and the circulated image was built using graphics-editing software, the Center said.

The image spread through Matryoshka, a network that dresses invented content in the mastheads of recognized Western outlets. In this case, the campaign was meant to frighten Ukrainians and weaken public confidence, according to the Center.

Although it impersonated a Polish outlet, the Center described Ukrainians—not Polish readers—as the campaign’s target: the Polish masthead supplied an apparently independent foreign voice for a Russian narrative.

The fake works because the disruption it points to is real. Russian attacks on warehouses and food logistics had destroyed up to 90% of Ukraine’s modern food storage capacity, and suppliers were moving stocks and changing delivery routes and storage methods in response, Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotskyi said on 28 August 2026, according to Interfax-Ukraine.

Supermarket chain ATB has temporarily capped purchases of certain essential goods at 6 units of any single product per customer, citing both Russian strikes and resellers buying in bulk.

What the fake predicts, though, is not what officials expect. Presidential defense-technology adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov urged Ukrainians not to panic and said a systemic food shortage was not expected, ZN.UA reported.

How Russia spreads disinformation in Poland

Russia has repeatedly exploited Poland’s information space to turn political, economic, and security anxieties against Ukraine. Polish Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said Russian intelligence had offered Poles €3,000–€4,000 ($3,500–$4,600) to spread disinformation before the 2025 presidential election.

After Russian drones entered Poland that September, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the Kremlin was using real fears and emotions to fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiment. False claims about Ukrainians living off Polish taxpayers have also fed hostility as bilateral relations frayed.

The head of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, personally consecrated Igor Pashentsev as bishop of Skadovsk and Oleshky after occupation authorities appointed him to lead the Skadovsk diocese, the Ukrainian outlet IPC-South reported, citing Russian sources.

The appointment advances the Russian church’s incorporation of occupied Ukrainian parishes into a Moscow-controlled structure created after Russia seized the area. Pashentsev will oversee churches across five occupied Kherson districts through a diocese IPC-South describes as operating illegally on Ukrainian territory.

Ukraine banned the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church from operating in the country in 2024 and established a court process for suspending Ukrainian religious groups that fail to sever Russian control. The measure targets Russian control, not Orthodox Christianity.

IPC-South says Pashentsev graduated from a Soviet military command school of chemical defense and served in the Soviet Defense Ministry’s 12th Main Directorate from 1981 to 1992. The Federation of American Scientists says the directorate stored, maintained, transported, and secured the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, but public records do not identify his duties there.

Ordained in 1993, Pashentsev completed the Moscow Theological Seminary in 1998, later led a Tambov diocesan office for relations with the armed forces and detention facilities, and served in the Barysh diocese. Known in the church as Joseph, he held the rank of archimandrite—a senior Orthodox monk—before his consecration.

During a Dormition liturgy—a major Orthodox feast honoring the Virgin Mary—Kirill gave Pashentsev an episcopal staff symbolizing a bishop’s authority and delivered instructions before his ministry began, Russian church accounts relayed by IPC-South said.

The Russian Orthodox Church created the Skadovsk diocese—a regional church administration—on 27 December 2023 after the occupation made it impossible for the existing Kherson diocese to oversee parishes on the Dnipro’s left bank. The new body incorporated parishes across the occupied Oleshky, Hola Prystan, Kalanchak, Skadovsk, and Chaplynka districts. IPC-South describes it as operating illegally on Ukrainian territory.

Russia weaponizes church control while suppressing other faiths

Pashentsev’s appointment is part of the Moscow Patriarchate’s wider effort to control religious life in occupied Ukraine. Religious communities that reject Kremlin authority face interrogations, threats, closures, and confiscation.

Ukraine’s Security Service has accused church structures of recruiting and training mercenaries for Russia’s military. The Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, says occupation authorities also arbitrarily detain clergy and destroy places of worship while suppressing independent Ukrainian religious identity.

Strikes on ports and vessels by both Russia and Ukraine have left farmers facing ruin and could cause another worldwide food shock.

© Jędrzej Nowicki for The New York Times

The Russian president promised continued retaliation against the Ukrainians and “full solidarity” with Iran.

© Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Wolfgang Kubicki, chair of Germany’s pro-business liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), proposed that Berlin summon Russia’s ambassador and use the prospect of Taurus missiles for Ukraine as leverage against further hybrid attacks during an appearance on German broadcaster ntv.

Kubicki’s proposal does not change German policy. The FDP has no seats in the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, while Chancellor Friedrich Merz has ruled out supplying the missiles. However, it recasts military aid to Ukraine as a potential cost Moscow would face for hybrid attacks inside Germany. Berlin has since formally blamed Russia for the Leipzig/Halle operation that prompted his remarks.

Kubicki said “a reasonable person” would tell the ambassador that Germany had so far withheld Taurus missiles. If the hybrid threat continued, Berlin should do everything possible to ensure Ukraine received the weapons it needed to defend itself against Russia, he added.

Taurus, the weapon Kubicki spoke about, is a German-Swedish cruise missile launched from military aircraft, with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. Ukraine has sought it for years to strike military targets far behind Russian lines.

Germany refused to supply Taurus missiles in 2025 while funding hundreds of Ukrainian-made long-range systems. Merz again ruled out a transfer in March, arguing that Ukrainian weapons were more effective.

Leipzig sharpens Germany’s hybrid-war debate

Germany formally blamed Russia on 1 September for the attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport and said it would close the Russian consulate in Bonn and terminate the agreement under which the Russian House cultural center operates in Berlin, DW reported. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt cited evidence from German and allied intelligence services, as well as investigations across Europe. Russia has denied involvement.

The operation that prompted Kubicki’s warning involved an explosives-laden drone that struck the wing of a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 heavy cargo aircraft on the evening of 4 August but failed to detonate, Die Zeit reported. The airport handles civilian freight and NATO logistics, while Ukraine’s Antonov Airlines uses it as a base.

Investigators later found evidence that three drones were involved and discovered about 50 grams of suspected military explosive near the runways.

Russia is sending jet-powered drones against Ukrainian cities in growing numbers—no longer only the Iranian Shahed-238 it fields as the Geran-3, but the newer, faster Geran-4 and Geran-5. The fear everyone voices is their speed, but speed breaks the cheap layer, not the missiles.

Ukraine's expensive air-defense missiles already routinely shoot down cruise missiles, and to them, a fast drone is just one more target. The strain falls on the cheap layer instead—the interceptor drones Ukraine built to down thousands of Shaheds a month for a few thousand dollars each, a fraction of a missile's price.

Those were designed to catch slow drones, and against jet speed, they struggle. If that layer breaks, the cost of defending Ukraine's skies climbs—and the Defense Ministry has already started paying to keep it from breaking.

The shift is not marginal, and it continues to accelerate. Russia had sent more than 2,500 jet-powered Shaheds against Ukraine by 30 August, against roughly 1,500 in July, informal presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov wrote—the drones, he noted, were launched practically straight from the factory. Russia fired roughly 1,400 jet-powered drones since the start of 2026 to June, and air defenses recorded about 180 in all of 2025, Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba of Ukraine's State Research Institute said.

A record month, and the weapon built to beat it

Ukrainian interceptor drones destroyed more than 33,000 Russian drones of all types in March 2026—roughly double the February total and a record for the cheapest layer of Ukraine's air defense, then-Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said.

Russia sent Shaheds—cheap, propeller-driven, long-range, lumbering in at about 185 kilometers per hour (115 mph)—in mass raids meant to swamp Ukraine's defenses. Ukraine adapted, with mobile fire teams, electronic warfare, and layered engagement, then added interceptor drones that destroy incoming drones for a fraction of a surface-to-air missile's cost.

As Ukraine got better at catching propeller drones, Russia reached for speed—jet-powered versions that fly more than three times faster than the Shaheds Ukraine spent three years learning to intercept.

By August, Ukraine's military intelligence said Russia had stopped building the Geran-3 and shifted to the newer jets, producing roughly 3,000 of them a month.

Conventional air defense already handles this

The worry centers on velocity: a jet drone flies several times faster than a propeller-driven or electric one, reducing the time defenders have to detect, identify, and hit it. But the fear aims at the wrong place, said Oleksii Kolesnyk, director of the Ukrainian firm Reactive Drones.

"A jet-powered UAV is, in many ways, similar to a cruise missile. For conventional air defense, jet-powered drones are simply another aerial target," he told Euromaidan Press.

Ukraine's surface-to-air systems routinely intercept cruise missiles. A fast drone is standard work for them—though Zelenskyy said in late August that the jets are the hardest to intercept, and that combat aircraft now mainly protect against them.

The strain lands on the interceptor drones

An interceptor drone, unlike a ground-launched missile, has to chase its target down and ram it, which worked against slow Shaheds. Against something near cruise-missile speed, the geometry breaks.

The problem exists almost only for interceptor drones, Kolesnyk said—they were never designed for these speeds. At jet velocities, guidance, target tracking, and the final homing onto the target all hit technical ceilings, and faster interceptors alone will not fix it.

"New technical solutions will be needed," he said.

Interceptor drones are why Ukraine can answer mass raids without firing a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars at each incoming drone. Break that math, and the affordability of Ukraine's whole air defense shifts.

The Defense Ministry's answer

Through the defense-tech accelerator Brave1, Ukraine backed 12 technologies under the EU4UA Defence Tech grant program, offering up to €150,000 each for high-speed interceptors capable of reaching 450 kilometers per hour (about 280 mph) or more.

That push has since produced candidates. By late August, Ukraine had four interceptor systems built to run down the jets, all already in field testing, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara said, and the Alexa Spatium had entered service. Ukraine now wants to bring them up to standard and build them in the thousands.

Not a revolution, but an evolution with a long history

Colonel Oleksandr Saienko, a former Ukrainian brigade commander, rejected the idea that any of this is new.

"This is better described as an evolution of unmanned systems rather than a completely new stage of warfare," he said.

Jet drones long predate this war. "The first jet-powered UAVs appeared back in the 1970s," he said, pointing to Soviet reconnaissance drones beginning with the Tu-143 and continuing with the Tu-141 and Tu-243—platforms Ukraine itself later flew in the Donbas war and the full-scale invasion. What has changed is scale, and the problem the drones now solve: arriving before the defender can react.

Saienko's warning points past the engine.

"The decisive advantage will not belong to whoever simply has a jet engine. It will belong to whoever integrates these platforms into an effective reconnaissance-strike system, protects them against electronic warfare, manufactures them at scale, and keeps costs manageable," he said.

His frame is the kill chain—detect, identify, decide, engage—and every gain in speed compresses that cycle. "If a target is flying at 500 to 700 kilometers per hour, even a delay of several dozen seconds may make interception impossible," he said, adding: "Radars must see sooner, command systems must classify automatically, and operators get less time—until automation becomes a requirement."

Why hasn't every drone gone jet-powered

Speed solves one problem and creates several. "They are simply another category of strike UAV," Kolesnyk said.

"One solution does not replace another."

Oleksii Kolesnyk, Reactive Drones.

Compact turbojets are expensive and hard to source for smaller drones. Bigger airframes have to be reinforced to take the loads and vibration, which adds weight and cost. Fuel burn climbs far above that of the electric or piston drones built for endurance, and higher speed leaves less room for navigation errors.

So, jet drones fill a niche rather than taking over the whole strike fleet. "They are most effective at ranges of roughly 200 to 600 kilometers," Kolesnyk said—fast strikes on high-value or time-sensitive targets, where getting there quickly matters more than flying cheaply or far.

Ukraine didn't drop first-person-view (FPV) drones when fiber-optic ones arrived, and jam-resistant drones didn't replace the rest. Each capability added a layer rather than erasing the previous one. Saienko expects the same. "The emergence of jet aviation did not eliminate piston-engine aircraft. The same principle applies," he said. Cheap propeller drones are ideal for mass attacks, while jet platforms handle speed.

The next fight is over reaction time

Jet drones force defenders to decide faster, and that is the harder demand. A slow propeller drone is a wasteful target for an expensive missile. A cruise missile demands an instant answer. A jet drone sits in between—and an operator has to sort which weapon meets which target in seconds, while holding scarce interceptors back for the worst threats. Every misjudgment costs something.

"The challenge is no longer only interception—it is detecting, identifying, and assigning the target quickly enough," Saienko said.

Both experts reach the same conclusion from opposite ends: Kolesnyk through the technical limits of the interceptor drone, Saienko through the entire defensive network. Both land on automation—AI-driven target recognition, distributed sensors, and fast data sharing to shrink the gap between spotting a target and hitting it. The winner won't necessarily fly the fastest aircraft. It will process information faster than its opponent.

Over four days at the end of August, Russia fired about 800 jet drones at Ukraine, Ukraine's president said—a type most of Ukraine's cheap interceptors still cannot catch. And the problem won't stay Ukraine's alone. Drones from the same broad Shahed family have already strayed into NATO airspace and turned up in other wars. The interception race Ukraine is running now is one everyone will eventually run.

In a frontline Ukrainian city, parents don’t see schools built below ground as apocalyptic. Instead, they offer relief from worry about the threat of Russian strikes.

© Jędrzej Nowicki for The New York Times

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy marked the start of the academic year with children at a Kyiv Oblast school rebuilt after Russian forces destroyed it in 2022, before an air attack forced their first lessons into the shelter on 1 September 2026, the Kyiv Oblast Military Administration said.

Knowledge Day, Ukraine’s traditional start of the academic year, fell during the full-scale invasion for the fifth time. Russia’s war now determines whether children can learn alongside their classmates: local security and shelter access govern classroom returns, while about 200,000 pupils near the front will remain fully remote.

Around three million pupils began the 2026–2027 academic year, including roughly 240,000 first-graders, 10% fewer than a year earlier, Member of Parliament Iryna Borzova of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Youth and Sports told Ukrinform. Most will learn in person or through a blended format, but some 200,000 children near the front will study entirely online, she said.

More than 82% of school pupils and preschoolers can access shelters, Education Minister Andrii Butenko said. The government has allocated UAH 6 billion this year to expand access to shelters and other educational safety infrastructure.

Russian forces destroyed the school Zelenskyy visited in March 2022. It reopened only last autumn with a shelter and backup power, according to the Kyiv Oblast Military Administration.

Zelenskyy said Russia had spent the preceding two weeks attacking infrastructure partly to disrupt the start of the academic year.

Ahead of Knowledge Day, Kyiv Oblast Military Administration head Tymur Tkachenko advised schools in high-risk communities not to hold mass opening ceremonies. Each school was to decide whether to proceed based on the security situation in its community.

“First and foremost, there must be safety,” Tkachenko said. If a ceremony went ahead, he recommended holding it directly in a shelter where possible. For events outside shelters, attendance was not to exceed the capacity of the nearest protective facility, and schools were told to avoid large gatherings of pupils, parents, and staff.

How Russia’s invasion has devastated Ukrainian education

Ukraine’s 2026 Knowledge Day began after six consecutive days of Russian attacks on Kyiv and its surrounding region, culminating overnight in a massed missile and drone strike. Eight people were killed, and seven were injured, including three children, while civilian infrastructure was damaged across five Kyiv districts.

Russia’s invasion has turned school safety and reconstruction into central parts of Ukraine's education policy. By September 2024, more than 3,500 educational institutions had been damaged and nearly 400 destroyed, with the World Bank estimating that almost $14 billion would be needed to rebuild them.

Attacks on Ukraine’s energy system have also left classrooms without heat or electricity, forcing prolonged holidays and renewed distance learning.

Ukraine's Armed Forces are forming the 446th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade, which is recruiting servicemembers while formation continues, MilitaryLand reported. The new unit joins a force that hit 32,485 Russian personnel over the summer alone, the Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS) reported on 1 September.

Ukraine is facing a shortage of military personnel, yet the Armed Forces are forming their second separate unmanned systems brigade this year. The force's commander wants unmanned systems covering the entire front at tactical, operational, and strategic depths.

What is known about the 446th Brigade

Military personnel from other units can apply for a transfer through Army+, according to MilitaryLand.

The first of the two was the 445th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade Chata, whose formation became known in July. Both units are recruiting for posts running from operators of ground robots, FPV, bomber, and interceptor drones to psychological-support officers, analysts, and accountants, Militarnyi reported.

The deployment of such units is part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' broader effort to increase the number of unmanned systems in the military. Ukrainian drones accounted for about 96% of Russian casualties in March—33,988 of roughly 35,000 killed or severely wounded—Zelenskyy said in April.

Why Ukraine is turning to drones

The expansion of unmanned systems brigades is part of a broader effort initiated by Robert Brovdi, callsign Madyar, to increase the role of the SBS within Ukraine's Defense Forces, Militarnyi notes.

Brovdi told Reuters in June that he wants to raise the drone forces from about 2.5% of Ukraine's armed forces to 5%, a goal he first stated publicly in September 2025. At that share, the drone units accounted for roughly a third of Russian losses over the previous 12 months, according to figures the force gave Reuters, which said it could not verify them independently.

Then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi described unmanned systems as one of the key factors shaping modern warfare. Current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Mykhailo Drapatyi stated that one of his priorities is the development and scaling of the unmanned component.

Overall, the SBS struck 58,465 targets in August, its own tally for 1–31 August shows.

On 1 September 2026, Latvia banned imports of Russian- and Belarusian-made books, clothing, toys, and other consumer goods, including shipments routed through third countries, Latvian Public Media reported.

The restricted goods were worth approximately €12.5 million ($14.5 million) in 2025, or 6.5% of Latvia’s remaining imports from the two countries. Although modest economically, the measure goes beyond EU-wide sanctions and advances Riga’s effort to deny Moscow and Minsk revenue during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The restrictions cover the following:

• Books, newspapers, and other printed material
• Clothing, textiles, footwear, and headwear
• Toys, games, and sporting equipment.

Latvia’s Cabinet approved the final product list on 25 August following a Foreign Ministry proposal, completing restrictions parliament authorized on 23 July.

The ban applies regardless of whether the products arrive directly or through another country. Russian- and Belarusian-made goods may still transit Latvia on their way to other EU markets, Meduza reported.

Food and beverages are not covered. The restrictions are scheduled to remain in force until 1 July 2027 and will be reviewed annually.

The Foreign Ministry said the measure is also intended to limit the entry of Russian propaganda material. The targeted products accounted for only 0.05% of Latvia’s total imports in 2025, according to Euronews.

How Latvia has been cutting off trade with Russia and Belarus

Latvia’s combined imports from Russia and Belarus have already fallen by 91%, from €2.13 billion ($2.47 billion) in 2022 to €193 million ($224 million) in 2025, according to Latvian Public Media. Much of that decline followed the country’s departure from Russian energy supplies and the Baltic states’ disconnection from the Russian and Belarusian electricity grids.

The latest prohibition blocks consumer goods that Brussels has not collectively banned.

Latvian Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs previously pledged to eliminate the country’s remaining commercial links with Russia and Belarus, although pharmaceutical exporters were expected to remain exempt.

In August, Latvia also resumed publishing a monthly register of businesses trading with either country, naming 171 companies. Inclusion on the list does not itself indicate a sanctions violation.

Russia's Zircon runs on two solid-propellant motors, a booster and a sustainer, Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) said in a breakdown of the missile's structure and components. That leaves no room for the scramjet Moscow advertised, Defense Express wrote.

Russia presented Zircon as a hypersonic missile capable of penetrating modern air defenses. HUR says it instead uses solid-propellant motors, which Defense Express reads as demolishing Moscow's claims about a superweapon. The intelligence agency also listed an Altera programmable chip and a TriQuint amplifier among the missile's components, the same finding investigators keep making in Russian weapons.

HUR published an interactive 3D model of Zircon through its War&Sanctions database, the latest in a series on Russian ballistic weapons. The agency said the recorded maximum speed to date does not exceed Mach 6.8—about seven times the speed of sound—and that the missile does not hold it through the whole flight. Russia claims Mach 9 at some stages of flight. Zircon carries a roughly 120-kilogram warhead.

Defense Express reported that a 2010 contract with solid-fuel specialist NPO Iskra indicates that this propulsion system was planned from the earliest stages of Zircon's development.

Built for ships, moved onto a coastal launcher

Zircon is a Russian anti-ship missile developed for surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia later adapted it for Bastion-M coastal launchers amid difficulties operating its Black Sea Fleet, HUR said.

Ukrainian forensic experts first confirmed Russia had fired a Zircon at Kyiv in February 2024. Defense Express reported that Ukraine intercepted two more over the capital the following month. Russia has continued using Zircon against land targets: in February 2026, it launched four at Ukraine’s power grid, of which Ukrainian air defenses downed two.

What solid-fuel propulsion changes

Solid fuel does not make Zircon slow: Mach 6.8 is still hypersonic. A scramjet draws oxygen from the atmosphere to sustain hypersonic flight; Zircon instead flies on self-contained rocket motors. HUR calls it a ballistic missile rather than the hypersonic cruise missile Russia advertised, and notes its onboard computer is the type fitted to all Russian ballistic missiles. Defense Express says the trajectory may be aeroballistic and the motor possibly dual-pulse, given the range Russia wanted from a missile that had to fit a ship's launch silo.

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in 2019 that the missile could reach Mach 9 and travel 1,000 kilometers, up from earlier official figures of Mach 6 to 8 and 400 to 500 kilometers. A year earlier, the former head of its manufacturer said it flew on a jet engine, Defense Express said.

In February 2024, Kyiv's forensic institute concluded from the debris that the engine was air-breathing rather than solid-fuel, and Defense Express went further the following month, reporting from its own sources that Russia had built a working scramjet. The outlet has since appended a correction to that article, noting that HUR found a solid-fuel 3L2211 motor from NPO Iskra where the scramjet was supposed to be.

The US chips inside Zircon

HUR identified two components from US manufacturers inside Zircon: a programmable gate array from Altera, now part of Intel, and a TGA2704 amplifier from TriQuint Semiconductor, now Qorvo. It also mapped 70 companies involved in its production, along with their personnel and foreign manufacturing equipment.

The finding fits a wider pattern. Investigators have found Western electronics in Russia's UMPK glide-bomb kits and traced at least 28 foreign parts from 15 companies in the Kh-101 that struck Kyiv's Okhmatdyt children's hospital.

A 2026 examination found 62 US-made parts in an Iskander missile, while a Russian Geran drone combined a Soviet missile with Western electronics and a Chinese modem.

Alumina processed at a refinery in County Limerick may be feeding Russia’s war in Ukraine, an investigation suggested. There is little agreement on what to do about it.

© Paulo Nunes dos Santos for The New York Times

The appointment of Mykhailo Fedorov, a Ukrainian former defense minister, showed how other militaries are racing to adapt to battlefield changes accelerated by the war in Ukraine.

© Jędrzej Nowicki for The New York Times

In Lithuania, a photograph of a company executive with a black mourning ribbon was placed next to funeral wreaths, and similar objects turned up near a Czech defense company, Delfi reported on 30 August. Law enforcement officials are investigating whether the two incidents are connected.

Russia is trying to obstruct the defense assistance that NATO countries provide to Ukraine. To this end, Russia uses various forms of intimidation: exerting political pressure, carrying out cyberattacks, and recruiting people to conduct sabotage against foreign defense companies. Russia is suspected of using a new form of psychological pressure against the executives of companies that supply aid to Ukraine: through the use of elements symbolically associated with death.

Wreaths outside a Vilnius drone maker, and a suspect in custody

In Vilnius, funeral wreaths were left near the offices of RSI Europe, a company that manufactures unmanned systems and supplies Ukraine with FPV drones and remote detonation systems. Next to the wreaths, unknown individuals placed a photograph of company head Tomas Milašauskas, tied with a black mourning ribbon. Milašauskas is alive and well.

"We are not afraid. This is ordinary intimidation, a provocation, the usual methods of Russians' work. Our reaction is absolutely normal—we continue to work, we do not react and do not get distracted, because their goal is to distract our attention and direct it where it should not go," Milašauskas told LNK Žinios, as relayed by Delfi.

Milašauskas said that this was the first time RSI Europe had faced such a provocation. But the company had previously faced attempts to interfere with its operations, including cyberattacks.

A similar incident occurred in Czechia at almost the same time. Funeral wreaths also appeared near the offices of Czech defense group CSG, which makes ammunition and military equipment. A photograph of CSG executive director David Chour was placed nearby, Delfi reported.

Lithuanian police have already detained one suspect and launched a pre-trial investigation. National Crisis Management Centre head Vilmantas Vitkauskas said he believed the monitoring and the measures taken after earlier talks with defense firms made the detention possible. The detainee is a Ukrainian citizen, LNK's sources said. Preliminary information suggests that he may have been hired to deliver the wreaths, while the person who ordered them may have been a Belarusian citizen.

“This is probably only the beginning”

Lithuanian officials are treating the use of mourning symbols against defense companies as a possible provocation linked to Russian intelligence, after warning the sector to expect such attempts. Remigijus Motuzas, chairman of the Lithuanian parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, said:

"I think that such cases may become more frequent—and they have already become more frequent. This is probably only the beginning," he said.

He said the warnings are serious enough to require particular vigilance, although security at infrastructure facilities in the country has already been strengthened.

The Lithuanian authorities are also paying particular attention to the fact that photographs and videos of the wreaths quickly spread on social media and Telegram channels following the incidents. Posts accompanying the material promoted claims that NATO is allegedly fighting Russia with Ukraine’s hands, while European companies assisting Kyiv are supposedly making money from the war. Lithuanian officials consider this information component characteristic of information operations by Russian intelligence services.

The nearly constant air raids, a shift from years of largely overnight attacks, have left residents exhausted and on edge.

The depot, which was in a civilian area near Kyiv, “definitely shouldn’t have been there,” President Volodymyr Zelensky said.