Brussels will set out legal measures this week to halt Russian fossil fuel imports into the EU, but has delayed plans to address nuclear technology dependency, the Financial Times reported on 16 June.

EU countries have paid more than €200 bn ($231 bn) to Russia for fuel since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. While coal and oil imports have been sanctioned, nuclear fuel presents a complex challenge despite accounting for only €700mn ($810 mn) of €22bn ($25 bn) paid to Russia in 2024, according to Bruegel.

“Technically speaking the uranium supply chain is very complex,” said Ben McWilliams at Bruegel. “Therefore a gradual phaseout would be needed.”

The EU operates 101 nuclear reactors, 19 using Soviet designs. The bloc relies on Russia for 20-25 per cent of its uranium and often purchases Russian spare parts.

The European Commission wants the nuclear sector free of Russian imports by the 2030s, but a document published Friday warned €241 bn ($278 bn) of investment is needed to build domestic supply chains.

Russia’s dominance creates challenges. “[Russian state nuclear company] Rosatom is one of the biggest companies in all sectors of nuclear markets,” said Dmitry Gorchakov at Bellona.

Hungary and Slovakia strongly oppose phaseout plans. Their ministers said the 2030s timeline would lead to “higher and more volatile prices” and threaten energy security.

Russia dominates 55 % of global uranium enrichment. European companies Orano and Urenco hold 40 % alongside Russian and Chinese firms.

Boris Schucht, Urenco’s chief executive, said the company had started refurbishing centrifuges “which was originally not intended” to meet demand. He warned about circumvention: “We can already see Russia selling volumes to China and China selling volumes that would not otherwise have been available.”

Hungary’s Paks plant represents the biggest challenge. The country doubled down on Russian technology in 2014, building two new Rosatom-designed blocks. The plants should supply three-quarters of Hungary’s electricity needs.

Despite EU pressure, Hungary has not switched away from Russian nuclear fuel and parts. The commission will use trade measures requiring weighted majority approval rather than unanimous sanctions that Hungary and Slovakia could veto.

Frédéric Lelièvre at Framatome said Europe must accelerate domestic industry: “We need to have these facilities and with the IP in Europe to make sure we can deploy the programmes we want to deploy and not rely on anybody else.”

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A policy document presented in Brussels on 26 May calls for the European Union to assume leadership of the international sanctions coalition and strengthen economic pressure on Russia.

Western countries imposed extensive sanctions on Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, aiming to cripple Russia’s economy, restrict access to finance and technology, and pressure Moscow to change its political behavior.

The “White Paper: The Future of European Leadership in the Economic Deterrence of Aggression” analyzes the achievements and vulnerabilities of EU sanctions policy while proposing practical tools to enhance the bloc’s economic security.

The document, prepared by the National Sanctions Coalition, outlines specific instruments for both responding to Russian aggression and countering future threats. Key recommendations include creating a unified EU sanctions body, implementing an analogue to the US entity list, strengthening control over high-risk goods exports, introducing extraterritorial (secondary) sanctions for circumvention assistance, and maintaining sanctions against Russia’s defense sector and critical infrastructure even after hostilities end.

“The sanctions instruments proposed in the White Paper are aimed at ending the Russian war in Ukraine as quickly as possible — by reducing Russia’s income and limiting its military-industrial potential,” said Denis Gutyk, executive director of the Council of Economic Security of Ukraine and co-author of the document.

According to the white paper, Russia has earned approximately €887 billion ($1,014.4 bn) from energy exports since February 2022, significantly exceeding the €211 billion ($241.4 bn) spent on its war effort during the same period. The document notes that from February 2022 to early 2025, the European Union spent more than €207 billion ($236.8 bn) on imports of Russian fossil fuels despite existing sanctions.

Tomáš Šindelář, Deputy Head of the Sanctions Unit at the European External Action Service (EEAS), supported the nitiative outlined in the White Paper. Using the example of countering Russia’s shadow fleet, he explained how EU sanctions instruments have already evolved.

“Initially, we focused exclusively on ships, but recent analysis showed that there is an entire ecosystem of operators around the shadow fleet — insurance companies, fleet managers, service providers,” Šindelář said. “And if these entities are also seriously affected by sanctions, this allows disrupting the operation of the entire mechanism while maintaining pressure on the fleet itself.”

The 17th sanctions package became the first where Europe applied such an approach, according to Šindelář. Europe more than doubled the number of vessels under sanctions and for the first time included in the restrictions not only the vessels themselves, but also related operators — not only in Russia, but also in third countries.

The white paper identifies several challenges facing EU sanctions policy, including limited extraterritorial application of restrictive measures, consensus requirements that slow decision-making, and heterogeneous enforcement approaches across member states. The document said that while the US has imposed 494 secondary sanctions targeting entities across 57 countries since the invasion began, the EU’s sanctions regime cannot yet be regarded as fully extraterritorial.

According to the document, approximately 70% of Russia’s oil exports are now transported via a “shadow fleet” of over 1,000 vessels, of which only 153 are currently subject to EU sanctions. The paper warns that more than 72% of these vessels are over 15 years old, increasing risks of mechanical failures, collisions, and oil spills that could cost coastal states up to €1.6 billion ($1.8 bn) in damages and cleanup efforts.

Russia uses a “shadow fleet” of vessels to evade sanctions by frequently changing ship names and flags, turning off AIS tracking, using complex ownership structures, and conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers at sea to obscure the origin of cargo.

The white paper also addresses the issue of frozen Russian assets. Approximately €210 billion ($239 bn) in Russian Central Bank assets have been frozen within the EU, with more than half held at Euroclear Bank. Despite substantial volumes of frozen assets, the document identifies legal challenges to confiscation, including the principle of sovereign immunity under international law.

Among specific recommendations, the document calls for adopting EU Council decisions to confiscate Russian sovereign assets and transfer them to support Ukraine.

Earlier, the Baltic states, Northern European countries, and Finland have openly called for the immediate confiscation of frozen Russian assets, with Finland’s finance minister Riikka Purra urging the EU to proceed with seizure.

France has also proposed seizing assets if Russia breaches a future ceasefire in Ukraine, while key EU officials like Valdis Dombrovskis and Maria Luís Albuquerque support the idea, though major states like Germany and France remain cautious about full confiscation.

The EU’s move to reinstate tariff quotas on Ukrainian agricultural exports from 6 June 2025 has drawn sharp criticism from Ukraine’s Agriculture Minister Vitalii Koval, who warned the decision could cost the country between €2.8 billion and €3.5 billion in 2025 alone and undermine efforts to plug the country into the bloc’s single market, Euroactiv reports.

The reintroduction of pre-2022 trade restrictions comes after EU member states, particularly those with large farming sectors, pushed for the change. The move cancels the full trade liberalization granted to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

Minister warns of “moral losses” and economic harm

Speaking at the Agriculture and Fisheries Council (AGRIFISH) in Brussels on Monday, Koval described the EU’s decision not only as an economic setback but a blow to public morale in Ukraine.

“What about the moral losses? This is not calculated in billions, but millions of Ukrainian citizens supporting integration into the EU,” he said.

Koval noted that agriculture has become Ukraine’s key economic pillar following the devastation of its other major sectors, including chemicals and steel. With farming now contributing 17% of Ukraine’s GDP, he emphasized the weight of the EU’s decision on the country’s overall recovery.

Poland welcomes decision

Poland’s Agriculture Minister Czesław Siekierski celebrated the rollback of liberalized trade with Ukraine, calling it a political win ahead of national elections scheduled for Sunday. Speaking on the sidelines of the AGRIFISH meeting, Siekierski said the move would help address the concerns of Polish farmers, who have been protesting over Ukrainian imports in recent years.

Future trade framework in the works

Koval said Ukraine’s goal remains to develop a long-term trade framework with the EU by the end of July. He framed the Monday visit to Brussels as an effort to counter negative narratives about Ukrainian exports, saying his job was to confront “myths” about disruptions caused by Ukraine’s products.