Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev confirmed that a missile struck an unnamed industrial enterprise overnight on 15 August 2026. Andrii Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, said the Progress Rocket Space Center was burning. He provided no damage details.

Progress would be a significant target because it builds Soyuz-2 rockets used to launch Rassvet, Russia’s planned alternative to Starlink. Its Soyuz-2.1b rockets carried Russia’s first serial-production Rassvet satellites into orbit this year. However, neither the governor’s statement nor available imagery establishes that Progress itself was hit.

Exilenova+ published early footage from Samara and reported that a Flamingo cruise missile had struck the city.

A mature Rassvet network could reduce Russia’s dependence on unauthorized Starlink terminals. For now, neither damage to Progress nor the reported use of a Flamingo missile has been independently confirmed.

Open-source analysts at Falcon Insight Map geolocated the smoke near Aviakor’s Building No. 106. Militarnyi said Aviakor and Progress sit a few hundred meters apart, and available images could not establish which enterprise was hit. The industrial area lies roughly 900 kilometers from Ukraine.

Kyiv pushes strikes deeper into Russia

Ukraine has increasingly attacked factories far behind the front to disrupt the supply chains sustaining Russian weapons production.

Speaking separately to Euromaidan Press, defense scholar Marc DeVore urged Ukraine to disrupt Russian missile production and launches. Retired US Lieutenant General Ben Hodges noted that Ukraine’s interceptor shortage means it is better to “kill the archer” than try to stop every arrow. 

In June 2026, Ukrainian cruise missiles hit a Voronezh semiconductor plant supplying components for the Pantsir-S1, Iskander-K, and Kh-101.

A reported Flamingo strike in July also damaged the Avitek defense plant in Kirov, more than 1,200 kilometers from Ukraine.

The deeper strikes come as Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) says Russian factories are producing 110% to 120% of their monthly missile quotas. 

How the Samara plant supports Russia’s Starlink alternative

The Progress factory in Samara makes the Soyuz-2.1b rockets used to launch Rassvet satellites developed by Russia’s Bureau 1440. A second batch of 16 entered orbit in July, bringing the serial constellation to 32.

Rassvet’s coverage remains intermittent. However, Moscow plans to deploy 292 satellites by the end of 2027 and 924 by 2035. A Ukrainian defense adviser estimated that continuous service would require 200–250 satellites.

On 14 August, Ukraine's Military Intelligence (HUR) published data on 26 vessels via its War&Sanctions portal, noting that 18 ships face no sanctions from any of Ukraine's partner countries.

The agency said the ships carry Russian oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), or agricultural products from occupied Ukraine. Euromaidan Press could not independently verify HUR’s vessel records.

Russia relies on maritime trade both to fund its war through energy exports and to sell crops taken from occupied Ukraine. Kyiv began building a dedicated system against Russia’s shadow grain fleet in April, modeled on its oil-fleet campaign. A US bill introduced this week would also target vessels, owners, insurers, and ports involved in sanctions evasion. HUR’s new list shows how many ships remain outside those restrictions.

Russia’s grain shadow fleet

HUR divided the 26 vessels into three groups:

• oil tankers serving Lukoil, Rosneft, Surgutneftegas, Novatek, Tatneft, and Gazprom;
• dry-cargo ships using the occupied ports of Berdiansk, Sevastopol, Kerch, and Feodosia;
• LNG carriers moving gas from the sanctioned SAAM FSU floating storage unit, which holds LNG from the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project.

HUR highlighted three of the 18 vessels that are not facing partner sanctions. The bulk carrier LAMAR S repeatedly loaded wheat at the Avlita terminal in occupied Sevastopol in 2026 for delivery abroad, including to Syria, the agency said.

NAYA FALCON carried baking soda and granulated wheat bran from occupied Sevastopol to Egypt and Cyprus, HUR said. The agency linked the oil tanker GREGAL to UAE-based Cymare Navigation FZC, which it described as affiliated with Sovcomflot, Russia’s state-controlled shipping company.

Russia steals grain while striking Ukraine’s exports

Crops taken from occupied land are sold abroad as Russian produce, while Russia's attacks leave Ukraine’s legitimate harvest with fewer routes to market.

Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service said Russia sold more than 2 million tons of grain from occupied Ukraine as Russian produce in 2025. The agency said ship-to-ship transfers at Kavkaz helped conceal its origin.

Meanwhile, Russian attacks have squeezed Ukraine’s legitimate grain trade. Strikes on civilian ships brought the Black Sea corridor to a near standstill during the July harvest peak. Ten people died when Russian missiles hit the grain-laden Golden Leo on 19 July.

HUR called on Ukraine and its partners to synchronize sanctions and detain vessels that violate restrictions. It said the measures could curb Russia’s maritime logistics and war funding.

A former fighter from the Akhmat forces, armed formations loyal to Chechnya’s Kremlin-backed ruler Ramzan Kadyrov, said he wants to fight for Ukraine after nearly a year in captivity.

Identified only as Magomed, he gave his account to Dmytro Karpenko, a Ukrainian journalist and blogger known for interviewing Russian prisoners of war, in a video published on 9 August 2026. Militarnyi, a Ukrainian military news outlet, reported on the interview on 13 August.

Magomed’s reported crossing reflects a divide that has placed Chechen fighters on both sides of Russia’s war. Since 2014, Kadyrov-loyal formations have fought for Moscow, while anti-Kremlin Chechens seeking independence from Russia have supported Kyiv.

Magomed’s account traces one fighter’s claimed passage from the first camp toward the second after Russians allegedly killed his brother. His account has not been independently verified.

The Chechen fighter said he had served near Svitlodarsk, Bakhmut, and Horlivka, including evacuating soldiers’ bodies.

Magomed also claimed two Chechens had crossed before him, prompting Russian commanders to check fighters’ phones and tighten surveillance.

According to Magomed, he later followed a Ukrainian drone toward Ukrainian positions with other Chechens. Ukrainian troops dropped medicine, water, and a radio to guide them. A Russian FPV drone attacked during the crossing and killed one Chechen, he alleged.

Ukrainian forces received the survivors and handed Magomed to the police brigade "Liut". His captivity began on 29 August 2025. Magomed also alleged that Russians killed his brother and called the death an epileptic seizure. Magomed said that drove him to fight Russia.

Militarnyi reported that Magomed had joined the International Legion, which is run by Ukraine's military intelligence. However, Karpenko’s video description says he wants to join the legion. Neither source explained the discrepancy.

What is Akhmat?

Akhmat, the unit Magomed belonged to, provides Russia with frontline troops and rear-area security. UK intelligence estimated in 2024 that around 9,000 personnel served in pro-Russian Chechen units in Ukraine.

Kadyrov’s reach has also expanded during the war. A later investigation found that his armed network had grown to 20 units across Russia’s military and security structures.

The Akhmat group's influence may extend beyond military operations. In January 2026, ATESH, a Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar partisan group, said Moscow planned to hand occupied Mariupol to Akhmat as a reward for Chechen leaders’ loyalty. The resistance organization claimed that arriving Chechen forces sought control of the city’s resources and industry.

Chechens also fight for Ukraine

On the other side, Chechens seeking an independent Ichkeria (the indigenous Chechen name for Chechnya) have fought for Ukraine since 2014.

In April 2026, Ukrainian intelligence said Shamanbat, a Ukrainian special unit that includes Free Ichkeria fighters, helped conduct drone and artillery strikes on Akhmat positions. The agency claimed the operation killed dozens of Akhmat personnel and wounded about 80.

Russia dismissed the idea of a Black Sea ceasefire on 14 August, Reuters reported, a day after the agency disclosed that Ukraine had proposed a mutual halt to attacks on civilian targets there.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said Moscow saw no grounds for measures that would give Kyiv a temporary reprieve.

Russia’s dismissal comes after its strikes drove shipowners from Odesa as Ukraine’s wheat harvest peaked. More than 90% of Ukraine’s farm exports leave through three deepwater Odesa ports. Reuters reported that Ukraine’s 12 August operation at Novorossiysk targeted a naval base and warships, although nearby grain terminals also suspended operations.

Russian forces, by contrast, have repeatedly struck foreign-flagged ships and Ukrainian port infrastructure. The disruption is stranding Ukrainian crops and raising concerns over global food supplies.

Zakharova accused Ukraine of deliberately destabilizing civilian shipping but did not mention Russia’s attacks, Reuters said. She was responding to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who said Ankara had proposed a Black Sea moratorium to both sides.

Zakharova also said Moscow had received no formal proposal from Türkiye and ruled out reviving the 2022–23 Black Sea grain deal, calling it one-sided.

Ukraine’s harvest has nowhere to go

Reuters said Ukraine’s grain exports had fallen 76% year on year so far in August. Ukraine’s Agriculture Ministry projects agricultural exports could nearly halve, from 64.4 million to 29.6 million tonnes. It expects silos to fill by October as grain backs up.

World Grain, citing the US Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service, reported that corn exports could fall 39% and wheat exports 26%. The US agency expects unsold corn stocks to rise more than tenfold.

The ministry has asked the EU for €220 million to subsidize farm loans and help producers finance autumn sowing. Reuters separately reported, citing unnamed sources in both countries, that Kyiv and Chisinau were discussing a rail route to Romania’s Constanța port. Kyiv estimates it could carry only 10% of Ukrainian grain exports.

Explore further

Ukraine and Moldova discuss rail corridor for grain amid Russian Black Sea attacks

Russia turns ports into targets

After Russia refused to extend the UN- and Türkiye-brokered grain deal in 2023, Ukraine opened its own maritime corridor. It remained operational until this summer’s escalation.

Russian forces repeatedly struck foreign-flagged vessels in July. On 19 July, Russian missiles hit the Guinea-Bissau-flagged, Turkish-owned Golden Leo as it left Odesa carrying corn. The attack killed 10 people, Ukraine’s Navy and Sea Ports Authority said. Ag Bull Trading reported that the attacks brought the corridor to its first full stop since it opened in August 2023.

Russia’s dismissal leaves Ukraine’s corridor officially open while Russian attacks continue to drive shipowners away.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said authorities had detained a Russian citizen recruited by Moscow to kill a man in Warsaw. The target holds US and Ukrainian passports, the Associated Press (AP) reported on 13 August. Tusk said Polish security services stopped the alleged attack “at the last minute.” 

Since 2022, AP has mapped about 200 acts of sabotage, arson, and disruption across Europe that officials have linked to Russia. European governments say the campaign aims to intimidate Ukraine’s supporters and disrupt military aid, while Ukrainian authorities report similar recruitment tactics inside Ukraine.

The suspect was detained on 7 August and remanded for three months, Warsaw police said. Tomasz Siemoniak, the minister overseeing Poland’s intelligence services, said the operation involved US services.

PM Tusk called it the first Russian-ordered attempt of its kind against a US citizen in another NATO country. He said the target was “inconvenient to the Putin regime,” without explaining why.

In their bulletin, Reuters reported that Russia’s Warsaw embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Moscow denies conducting a sabotage campaign in Europe.

Russia has already gone after a German arms CEO and critics of the Kremlin

European authorities had already reported plots against arms-industry figures supplying Ukraine. CNN reported in 2024 that US and German services foiled a plot against Rheinmetall chief Armin Papperger. 

Former Bellingcat investigator Christo Grozev said an intelligence insider told him he was on Russia’s kill list. He also warned Putin critic Garry Kasparov that a Russian agent trained in assassination had infiltrated exile groups to approach him.

Russia has also been accused of targeting Kremlin opponents abroad. In June, Kremlin critic Robert Kuzovkov was shot dead in Poland. Tusk said the killing resembled a political assassination, but Warsaw has not attributed it to Russia.

Russia uses disposable agents, not career spies

The alleged recruitment in Warsaw resembles tactics reported elsewhere in Europe. German investigators identified a former Ukrainian bricklayer and an untrained Romanian woman as the suspected operatives surveilling Stefan Thumann, head of Bavarian drone maker Donaustahl. German intelligence later classified the case as a suspected planned assassination.

Ukrainian authorities have reported similar recruitment at home. The SBU said an FSB-directed foreign pair killed Colonel Ivan Voronych in Kyiv in July 2025. Both suspects later died in a shootout with law enforcement.

Ukrainian police say Russian recruitment can escalate from surveillance and simple deliveries to arson, terrorism, and murder. Since the start of 2026, police and the SBU have registered 31 terrorist attacks and prevented another 14.

Ukraine and international partners agreed to work urgently on a mechanism for up to €4 billion ($4.6 billion) in farm loans, Ukrinform reported on 13 August. The plan would use a proposed €220 million ($253 million) EU grant, the Agriculture Ministry said.

Ukraine rebuilt its maritime trade after pushing Russia’s fleet away from its coast. By 2025, its Black Sea route carried about 92% of the country’s grain and oilseed exports. Russia is now striking the Odesa ports sustaining that recovery. The ministry says the attacks have closed three deep-water ports. Ukraine planned to export 64.4 million tons of agricultural products in 2026/27, but now says shipments may reach only 29.6 million tons. The proposed loan mechanism is meant to cover that cash shortfall before next year’s sowing.

EU and Norwegian diplomats joined the meeting with representatives of the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

The participants agreed to develop the plan through the Ukraine Facility and EU guarantee institutions. They aim to do so in the coming weeks, before fall storage use peaks. The grant has not yet been approved.

Odesa attacks send Kyiv toward Baltic ports

The loan plan comes as Russia’s attacks force Ukraine to seek new export routes.

Russia initially blockaded Ukraine’s ports after launching its full-scale invasion. Ukraine later restored a sea corridor after forcing much of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet away. Moscow then shifted pressure to missiles and drones, hitting Ukrainian ports 90 times in 2025 and intensifying attacks this summer.

A Russian strike killed 10 people aboard the grain-carrying Golden Leo on 19 July. Three days later, no ship passed through the corridor.

Kyiv is now considering the Polish Baltic ports of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Świnoujście. Yet the ministry estimates that all alternative routes may eventually carry only 2.9 million tons a month. Ukraine’s monthly target was 5.4 million tons.

Farm loans target next year’s sowing

The €220 million would not go directly to growers. It would subsidize interest and partly cover banks’ lending risks, including by expanding Ukraine’s “5-7-9%” affordable-loan program.

The ministry wants the support to generate €4 billion in farm loans at annual rates no higher than 10%. It calculates that every euro of grant money could mobilize more than €18 in lending.

Ukraine has also temporarily adjusted minimum export price coefficients to offset higher logistics costs, meeting participants noted. Without grain sales, farmers struggle to pay wages and land rents or buy fuel and fertilizer. By November, Ukraine's storage shortfall could reach 11 million tons of crops, with more than €10.8 billion ($12.4 billion) tied up in unsold stocks.

On 13 August, the Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar partisan movement ATESH said its agents had disabled a communications tower near Pylna in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The group said the damage disrupted links between two Russian motor rifle regiments near the border.

Pylna lies on the Russian border and was among the villages seized when Moscow opened the northern Kharkiv front in May 2024. The claimed tower attack is part of a wider Ukrainian resistance effort behind Russian lines. Moscow's forces still depend on infrastructure in occupied territory to communicate, move supplies, and hold the line. Ukraine’s underground fighters exploit that dependence from within, targeting communications, transport, and fuel supplies to create problems for Russian units at the front.

ATESH said the tower carried data between Russian command posts and coordinated units in the area. The movement said its loss disrupted command channels and delayed border-zone mobile groups. It did not say how agents disabled the tower or how long the interruption would last.

The partisans stated that the communications between Russia’s 345th and 380th motor rifle regiments were hit hardest. The regiments operate in neighboring sectors and rely on stable links for joint action and rapid responses, according to the group. ATESH claimed their offensive tempo and ability to support each other had fallen.

Neither the claimed ATESH sabotage nor its reported effects have been independently verified.

ATESH attacks on Russian supply lines

The tower claim follows ATESH’s 10 August account of sabotaging an electric locomotive near Voronezh. The group said it carried military supplies toward the Kupiansk front in Kharkiv Oblast. In June, ATESH also said agents damaged power and rail equipment near Russia’s Novomoskovsk Azot plant, whose output feeds explosives production.

ATESH has also reported intelligence work inside Russian forces. In July, the group said an agent reported a Ukrainian strike on five military fuel trucks in occupied Luhansk. Together, the claims describe a campaign against transport, fuel, and communications behind the front.

Ukrainian resistance works behind the front

The claimed tower operation is one part of the Ukrainian resistance behind Russian lines. Underground networks also gather intelligence and sustain civil defiance. 

A Euromaidan Press investigation documented groups planting explosives, tracking Russian positions, distributing leaflets, and painting Ukrainian symbols despite the threat of imprisonment and torture.

ATESH says its network includes Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, anti-war Russians, and sources inside Russia’s military and occupation administrations. Its claims are often impossible to verify independently. Taken together, they portray a campaign to make Russia’s rear less secure while other groups preserve Ukrainian identity under occupation.

Russia may expand hybrid attacks against Poland and the Baltic states, including infrastructure sabotage or false-flag attacks, Bloomberg reported on 12 August, citing an unnamed European intelligence official. 

The warnings come amid concern that Moscow wants to intimidate Ukraine’s supporters. The CIA warning follows Russian threats, incursions, alleged sabotage plots, and disinformation against Poland and the Baltic states. Most Western military aid reaches Ukraine through Poland, while the Baltic states rank among Kyiv’s strongest supporters. Sabotage of transport, energy, or communications can slow aid delivery and test NATO while hiding Russia’s role.

Separately, a European government official told Bloomberg that the CIA had warned countries in the region of a possible future Russian attack. The CIA declined to comment.

The same official said Russia might instead be creating the impression of an impending attack to sow fear as part of an information operation. The official saw no signs that Moscow was preparing a conventional attack or invasion.

Moscow tests NATO’s eastern flank

Poland and Lithuania had already raised similar concerns. In July, Poland said it had credible intelligence that Russia was planning new provocations. Lithuania later warned that Moscow might rebuild captured Ukrainian drones for false-flag strikes on critical infrastructure.

In September 2025, between 19 and 23 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, shutting down airports and damaging buildings. Poland closed four airports as NATO aircraft responded.

Meanwhile, five people are on trial in Lithuania over attacks allegedly organized for Russian military intelligence in 2024, Bloomberg reported. Lithuania has reinforced infrastructure sites and deployed troops since June.

These warnings and incidents place the CIA alert within a wider pattern of pressure on NATO’s eastern flank and Ukraine’s supporters. 

How Russia strikes without starting a war

Bloomberg cited several recent unexplained drone incidents in Germany alongside the CIA warning. Citing Die Zeit, Euromaidan Press reported that an explosive-laden drone struck the wing of a parked Ukrainian An-124 at Leipzig-Halle airport and failed to detonate. A US Defense Department official in Europe told CNN that Washington assessed the drone belonged to Russian intelligence. 

Bloomberg also reported that a cargo plane hit an unidentified object and that drones appeared over a military base the following day. It did not connect either incident to Russia.

More broadly, Russian hybrid operations have grown sharply since the full-scale invasion. CSIS found that attacks in Europe tripled from 2023 to 2024, after quadrupling the previous year. Separately, the US Helsinki Commission mapped nearly 150 operations in NATO territory attributed to or suspected of Russia between February 2022 and November 2024.

Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges told Euromaidan Press in February that attacks on ports, railways, and cables can probe routes needed for NATO reinforcements. Their deniability raises the political cost of responding.

By hiding its role, Moscow can disrupt support for Ukraine and test NATO without openly starting a war. 

A 12-year-old with a high fever died without medical care in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast, Hola Prystan official in exile Svitlana Linnyk told Ukrinform on 13 August 2026.

No medicine or medical worker was available locally, and the child’s mother could not reach an ambulance pickup point, she said.

The child's reported death comes amid a wider humanitarian crisis in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast. UN and OSCE monitors found drone attacks, mines, and movement restrictions obstructing medical aid and evacuations around Oleshky and Hola Prystan, two occupied communities across the Dnipro from Kherson city. About 6,000 civilians, including 200 children, remained in and around the two communities as of May. Similar medical shortages span occupied Ukraine, while access to free medicines has been tied to having a Russian passport.

The Hola Prystan community where the child died has no operating hospital or rural medical post, Linnyk said. Only two pharmacies remain: one in the city of Hola Prystan and another in the nearby village of Nova Zburivka. Both are selling their remaining supplies.

The nearest hospital is in Skadovsk, an occupied Black Sea port about 60 kilometers by road from Hola Prystan. Nova Zburivka’s ambulance has not operated since 2025. 

Russian occupation authorities have distributed no humanitarian aid for at least eight months to villages surrounding Hola Prystan, or for over a year in the city itself, Linnyk said. 

Linnyk said a Moscow Patriarchate priest occasionally brought supplies but gave them only to Russian passport holders. This reflects a broader pattern of tying basic services in occupied Ukraine to accepting Russian citizenship.

Ukrainian children face a medical system stripped bare 

The medical dangers surrounding the 12-year-old’s death are not confined to Hola Prystan.

In April 2025, Ukraine’s National Resistance Center reported that occupation officials were administering vaccines to children under six in Luhansk Oblast. It described the vaccines as uncertified and of unknown origin.

That November, the Center said a Russian inspection found Crimea’s main children’s hospital lacked breathing bags and cardiac monitors. It said infant mortality on the occupied peninsula had risen 9% over the previous year.

Aid comes with a Russian passport

Hola Prystan is not the only occupied community where access to care has depended on Russian citizenship.

In 2023, Russian-installed officials in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast threatened to deny medical care to residents without Russian passports. A 2025 Kremlin policy later tied free medicines for chronic illnesses to Russian citizenship.

Ukraine’s Health Ministry reported in July 2024 that Russian forces had destroyed 214 medical facilities. It said the full toll remained unknown because authorities had limited access to occupied territories. 

Russia has ceased producing its Geran-3 jet-powered attack drone, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR) told the Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi. The agency estimates Russian industry now makes about 3,000 newer Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones per month.

Russia is shifting toward faster jet drones as Ukraine’s low-cost interceptors have become more effective against slower Shaheds. The Geran-4 and Geran-5 leave defenders less time to react, requiring faster interceptors or short-range air defenses. At the reported production rate, these newer Geran models, previously used in limited numbers, could become a regular feature of Russian attacks.

HUR said Russia has established serial assembly of the two newer models at the Alabuga complex in Tatarstan, with other Russian companies supplying components. The agency also said Russia’s Defense Ministry wants to expand Alabuga’s capacity. Construction began in May. Satellite imagery showed large-scale work by early July 2026, although the purpose of the new buildings remains unknown.

From Geran-3 to newer jet drones

Russia first used Geran-3 drones in large numbers during a combined nighttime attack on Ukraine on 30 July 2025. At least eight flew alongside propeller-driven Shaheds and decoys. The model retained the Geran-2 airframe but replaced its piston engine with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet. HUR gave it a speed of 300–370 kilometers per hour and a range of up to 1,000 kilometers.

In May, then-Defense Ministry adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said Ukrainian defenses stopped 95% of incoming Shaheds during the most recent documented strike and predicted Moscow would produce more jet-powered Geran variants.

The newer Geran-4 has a more robust airframe than the Geran-3 and is designed for high-speed flight and maneuvers. It can reach 500 kilometers per hour.

The larger Geran-5 carries a roughly 90-kilogram warhead and has a stated range of up to 1,000 kilometers. HUR has said Russia may equip it with R-73 air-to-air missiles, potentially threatening aircraft sent to intercept it.

The Chinese engines that Russia itself can't build

The Geran line combines Iranian designs, Russian assembly, and imported technology. HUR described the Geran-3 as a localized version of Iran’s Shahed-238. It found 45 foreign components inside, including parts from the United States, China, Switzerland, Germany, Britain, and Japan.

Russia depends on China for the turbojet engines in newer Geran models. HUR deputy chief Vadym Skibitskyi told RBC-Ukraine that Russia remains fully dependent on Chinese turbojet engines for the Geran-4 and Geran-5. Each costs about $35,000–$40,000, he said.

A Chinese XK-F358 mesh radio recovered from a Geran-5 also helps Russian drones resist jamming. Its manufacturer remains outside the US, EU, UK, and Ukrainian sanctions, according to a review by Euromaidan Press.

A Ukrainian court sentenced the former chief engineer of Lyman’s locomotive depot to 15 years in prison with property confiscation for helping Russia target the frontline city, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) said on 11 August. Investigators report he sent a Russian handler the locations of Ukrainian positions intended for guided-bomb and artillery strikes.

Lyman blocks Russia’s northern route toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which are part of Ukraine's fortress belt in the Donbas. As attacks on supply lines intensify, information about Ukrainian positions can help Russia direct bombs and artillery. The case fits a broader pattern of Russian intelligence recruiting people inside Ukraine to locate targets. Russian services have used money and blackmail, including threats against recruits’ families, to secure their cooperation.

According to the SBU, the former engineer traveled around Lyman and its outskirts to record Ukrainian military bases. He marked possible targets on Google Maps, then sent screenshots to a handler in Russia through a messaging app.

The collaborator operated from basement

The agency said an acquaintance whom it described as a “DNR deputy” in occupied Donetsk Oblast connected him with Russian intelligence. The SBU said the man moved into an apartment building’s basement to shelter himself while directing Russian strikes on the community.

SBU officers detained him in Sloviansk in May 2026. The agency said a seized smartphone contained evidence of his reconnaissance and contacts with the Russian side.

The SBU did not identify the man, the court, or any specific strike enabled by his information.

How Russia turns locals into spotters 

The Lyman case involved an acquaintance of the former engineer, but Russian services also use money, blackmail, and online platforms to find recruits. The SBU says minors may initially receive simple assignments, such as taking photographs or painting graffiti, before being directed toward more serious sabotage.

Other recruits have allegedly answered Telegram offers of “easy money.” These include a Zaporizhzhia man later convicted of building bombs and a Dnipro suspect accused of activating more than 1,000 Starlink terminals for Russian forces.

Ukraine has prosecuted similar cases before. In November 2024, a court sentenced another Russian agent to 15 years for guiding missile and drone strikes in Zhytomyr Oblast.

More recent cases remain at the allegation stage. The SBU has accused a Kharkiv Oblast man of installing hidden cameras near military sites and a Poltava student of mapping energy facilities while filming air-defense units.

Latvia has discovered its first known border tunnel used to enter the country illegally from Belarus, the country’s State Border Guard said on 11 August. Officers intercepted 15 people who had crossed through the underground passage and returned them to Belarus.

Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland accuse Belarus and Russia of directing migrants toward their borders to retaliate for EU sanctions and strain countries supporting Ukraine. Minsk and Moscow deny orchestrating the crossings. Tunnels found in Lithuania and Latvia show organizers adapting to fortified borders, requiring Baltic governments to deploy more personnel and surveillance technology.

The tunnel was about 10 meters from Latvia's fence

Border guards found the group on 10 August in Skrudaliena parish, in Latvia’s southeastern Augšdaugava municipality, and briefed the public on the discovery the following day. The operation involved the State Police, a Lithuanian border-service dog handler, and a rapid-response unit, the Latvian Border Guard said.

While reconstructing the group’s route, officers found the passage near the Silene border post, about 10 meters from Latvia’s fence. The agency said it had received intelligence that a tunnel might be under construction, but had previously found no sign of a breach there.

Riga answered on 11 August 2026 by launching Operation Vilkatis, or “Werewolf,” scheduled to run through the end of August. The government says the operation will improve intelligence-sharing among border guards, police, the military, and security services. It will also expand aerial surveillance and target networks that transport and shelter migrants after they cross.

Explore further

The Belarusian tunnel to the EU was almost done. Then Lithuania drilled a hole in exactly the wrong place—for the diggers

Latvia faced 87% of all crossing attempts along the EU-Belarus border by mid-July 2026

Belarus has weaponized migration since 2021, when EU governments accused Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime of bringing people from the Middle East and Africa to the bloc’s frontier in retaliation for sanctions. Belarus denied orchestrating the crisis.

Latvia reported more direct evidence in January 2026. Documents and phones taken from detained migrants linked Belarusian military and border personnel to organized crossings, according to Latvia’s armed forces and Border Guard.

By 13 July, Latvia had recorded 7,791 attempts over 111 consecutive days, 87% of all attempts along the EU-Belarus border by then. Lithuania later found an unfinished tunnel dug from Belarus. Latvia’s tunnel, unlike the unfinished Lithuanian passage, had already been used.

In an 11 August 2026 address, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated Russia is preparing a new mass mobilization drive after its parliamentary elections this fall, citing an assessment by Ukrainian military intelligence.

Moscow plans to mobilize several hundred thousand people by the end of 2026 and roughly the same number by the end of 2027, he said. The mobilization would come on top of continuing contract recruitment. 

Moscow has relied on contract soldiers and foreign troops to avoid the political cost of another compulsory draft. But Russia has struggled to recruit soldiers as quickly as it loses them. A mass call-up could replace losses and maintain offensive operations, although Ukrainian officials say it may initially do little more than offset battlefield losses.

Zelenskyy said internal Russian documents support the intelligence assessment. The documents have not been published. 

According to Zelenskyy, Putin plans to wait until after Russia’s parliamentary elections, then use the result to claim the Russians support continuing the war. He described the vote as an “imitation,” claiming every party allowed to compete opposes peace. Russia’s Supreme Court barred Yabloko, the country’s only officially registered party opposing the war, from contesting the election, Reuters reported.

Russia avoided a second draft since 2022. Now recruitment can't keep up

The Kremlin has largely avoided another compulsory call-up since its September 2022 mobilization triggered mass protests and an exodus of Russians. Instead, Moscow has used financial incentives and recruited prisoners and foreigners to replenish its forces in Ukraine.

In March 2026, then-Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Russia aimed to recruit 409,000 troops during 2026 and form at least 11 divisions. Ukrainian intelligence then warned in July that Moscow could mobilize 500,000 people that fall. 

195,000 new contracts signed—but losses keep outpacing recruitment

Russia has struggled to meet those targets while covering battlefield losses. Ukraine said Moscow had failed to replace its losses for five consecutive months by April. By mid-July, Russia had signed 195,000 military contracts against a target of 204,500, while Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service estimated its 2026 personnel losses at 196,700.

In his 11 August 2026 address, Zelenskyy claimed Russia is losing at least 30,000 personnel monthly, 60% of them killed, and that its force in Ukraine is gradually shrinking. The figures could not be independently verified.

Zelenskyy also said Putin expects the recruits and North Korean troops to prolong the war and expand Russian offensive capacity. The president stated that he had ordered Ukraine’s intelligence agencies and special services to make Moscow’s plans harder to carry out, but gave no details.

Russia is deploying Rassvet satellites, its answer to Starlink, faster than originally planned, Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence (GUR), told RBC-Ukraine.

Moscow aims to expand the network to 292 satellites by the end of 2027 and 924 by 2035, he said. Existing satellites can already provide intermittent connections as they pass over Ukraine.

Rassvet could give Moscow an independent alternative to Starlink, which Ukrainian forces rely on for battlefield communications and drone operations. Russian forces also used unauthorized Starlink terminals until Ukraine and SpaceX blocked access. Rassvet’s coverage remains intermittent but could eventually support strike drones, prompting Kyiv to consider countermeasures.

Why Russia wants its own Starlink

Ukrainian forces rely heavily on Starlink for frontline communications, drone operations, and command and control. 

Russian forces also relied heavily on unverified terminals until Ukraine and SpaceX blocked them on 5 February. The shutdown disrupted Russian communications and assaults across multiple parts of the front. On 10 August 2026, the SBU said it had dismantled two schemes that registered terminals in Ukraine for transfer to Russian forces.

Rassvet could reduce Russia’s dependence on SpaceX and illicit supply networks. Ukrainian experts have warned that a mature network could also relay data to Russian strike drones.

32 satellites up, 260 to go by 2027

Bureau 1440, the Russian satellite developer behind Rassvet, began testing the network with three satellites in 2023. Three larger prototypes followed in 2024 to test upgraded equipment, including satellite-based 5G technology and laser links between spacecraft. 

Russia launched its first batch of 16 serial Rassvet satellites on 23 March 2026 after manufacturing problems delayed the mission. A second group of 16 followed in July, Militarnyi reported.

In May 2026, Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a defense technology adviser to the President of Ukraine, said each Rassvet satellite then in orbit passed over Ukraine roughly once daily, providing six to 10 minutes of connectivity. He estimated that continuous coverage would require 200–250 satellites. 

Ukraine’s Agriculture Ministry has cut its forecast for agricultural exports in 2026–2027 by 54% as Russian attacks disrupt shipping through Odesa’s ports, Bloomberg reported.

The ministry now expects 29.6 million tons of agricultural exports, down from 64.4 million. Its wheat export forecast fell by 53%, from 17.6 million tons to 8.3 million tons.

Ukraine grows far more grain than it consumes, exporting 65%–70% of its agricultural output. Bloomberg said the sector generated more than half of Ukraine’s export revenue last year. But Russia’s summer attacks have stalled the sea corridor as the harvest arrives, driving some wheat prices below production costs. Land and river routes cannot match the Black Sea shipping capacity, while sales through neighboring EU states remain politically contested. That leaves farmers with less money for the next sowing and further reduces Ukraine’s export income.

Ukraine has about 59 million tons of grain storage. That storage could be full by early November, leaving the country 11 million tons short of space by the end of fall 2026. 

Wheat sells below cost as the silos fill up

Ukraine’s export bottleneck is already hitting its farmers. Port prices fell by another 12-15% in one week, while some farmers sold wheat below production cost. When ships stop, traders either stop buying or pass the higher cost of alternative routes on to producers. That leaves farmers with less cash for fall sowing.

To ease the pressure, the government has approved subsidized loans for agricultural producers. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Kyiv would expand storage. Ukraine's Agriculture Ministry has also asked the European Commission for €220 million to help cover interest for small and medium-sized farms.

Ukraine and Moldova are discussing a rail route to Romania’s Constanța port. According to the report, grain was already being redirected through Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary, but these routes cannot replace Odesa’s capacity.

Now the ports and the ships are Russia's targets

The export bottleneck is only part of the problem. Russia’s bombardment also threatens the ports, civilian ships, and crews needed to keep the corridor operating. 

The port of Odesa normally handles about 90% of Ukraine’s grain shipments. Russia intensified attacks on terminals and civilian ships in July 2026 as the harvest reached the coast.

On 19 July, three Russian missiles struck the foreign-flagged Golden Leo as it left Odesa carrying corn, killing 10 people, including a Ukrainian sea pilot. Three days later, no vessel passed through the corridor.

Alternative routes offer little relief, as record-low Danube levels were restricting river traffic. Poland continues to bar Ukrainian grain from its domestic market. Those constraints leave more of the harvest inside Ukraine and farmers with less money to plant the next crop.

Russia will introduce two editions of a new regional history textbook series in occupied Ukrainian schools on 1 September 2026. The books present the occupied Ukrainian regions as historically Russian, MOST, a Kherson-based outlet, reported on 10 August.

The new textbooks bring Russia's campaign to erase Ukrainian identity into occupied classrooms, where authorities remove Ukrainian from curricula and replace lessons with Russian ideology, military drills, and firing-range visits. Moscow's Russification campaign extends beyond schools to efforts to change the demographics of occupied Ukrainian territory and re-educate forcibly transferred Ukrainian children.

The new textbook series, entitled "History of Our Region: Donbas and Novorossiya," comprises one edition for grade 5 and another for grades 6–7. The course attached to the books will be compulsory throughout Russia's so-called "new regions," according to the Ukrainian human rights center ZMINA.

"Novorossiya" is an imperial term Moscow uses to claim southern and eastern Ukraine. 

Russia's Education Ministry calls the course "objective" and part of a "unified history of Russia," Meduza reports. Minister Sergei Kravtsov claimed it contains "objective information, rather than the lies that appeared in Ukrainian textbooks."

Replacing the curriculum, then the population

The "Novorossiya" textbook forms part of a broader Kremlin campaign to Russify occupied Ukraine's education, culture, and demographics. 

Since occupying Melitopol, Russian authorities have systematically replaced Ukrainian curricula and textbooks. Older Russian textbooks, issued after Moscow's full-scale war, already depicted occupied Melitopol as part of Russia. 

A 2025 Kremlin strategy requires occupied regions to enter Russia's educational, cultural, and information space. The policy also sets a nationwide target for “All-Russian civic identity” to reach at least 95% by 2036.

35,000 Ukrainian children still missing

Meanwhile, experts estimate that about 35,000 Ukrainian children remain missing and are likely held in Russia or Russian-occupied territory. Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 210 facilities used to hold children from Ukraine. The lab found that at least 130 facilities subjected Ukrainian children to pro-Russian cultural, patriotic, or military programs. 

One case shows where such indoctrination can lead. Once listed as missing under occupation, Ukrainian boy Oleksandr Mustiatse later appeared online in a Russian uniform bearing the “Z” invasion symbol, Save Ukraine reported.

South Korea is keeping lethal aid to Ukraine off the table while continuing humanitarian and reconstruction support, Yonhap reported on 10 August. The outlet cited a senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official.

South Korea’s response maintains its established policy of providing humanitarian and nonlethal support to Ukraine, but not direct weapons. Seoul previously helped move artillery shells to Ukraine through the United States. While South Korea arms NATO members with K2 tanks and K9 howitzers to free up older kit for the Ukrainian front, it still draws the line at any direct transfer to Kyiv. Seoul rejects Ukraine’s purchase requests as North Korea sends Russia ammunition and troops in exchange for money and military technology.

South Korean law bars direct exports of lethal weapons to countries in active conflict, a rule rooted in constitutional principles and Seoul's wariness of antagonizing Moscow and Beijing while managing the threat from the North.

Ukraine is seeking South Korean interceptor missiles for its air defenses. The official neither addressed the request specifically nor formally rejected it:

“South Korea’s supply of defense materials to any country has always been carried out in accordance with domestic law,” the official said. Seoul will continue to support Ukraine’s recovery through assistance in energy, infrastructure, healthcare, and education. 

The official also declined to confirm whether Seoul and Kyiv were discussing military support. However, he said Moscow-Pyongyang military cooperation “is directly related to our security and violates the United Nations resolutions” and should stop immediately.

Seoul’s indirect aid stopped short of direct arms transfers

In 2023, Seoul transferred hundreds of thousands of 155 mm shells to the United States under a confidential arrangement. Washington then arranged for them to reach Ukraine, The Wall Street Journal reported.

South Korean exports have also helped NATO members replace weapons sent to Kyiv. Poland bought South Korean K2 tanks and K9 howitzers while transferring older tanks and Polish-built Krab artillery systems to Ukraine.

Yet Seoul rejected Ukraine’s request to buy air-defense systems, radars, and artillery propellant in November 2024. In February 2026, it still limited support to humanitarian and nonlethal aid while considering NATO’s request to help purchase US weapons for Ukraine.

North Korean deployments bring the war closer to Seoul

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said a decision had been made to deploy 30,000–50,000 more North Koreans to Russia. He warned that they would gain modern combat experience and Russian technology that could later threaten Asian countries. Kyiv wants South Korean air defenses and has offered cooperation on drones.

The South Korean official cited by Yonhap declined to confirm either the reported deployment or Zelenskyy’s statement that Ukrainian and South Korean diplomats were discussing possible cooperation.

North Korea is already believed to have sent approximately 20,000 combat troops and military engineers to Russia’s Kursk region, according to Yonhap. Pyongyang has earned as much as $22 billion from arming Russia, helping it finance conventional and nuclear forces.

The Japanese outlet Kyodo News reported in November 2025 that North Korea had transferred about 6.5 million rocket and artillery munitions in exchange for Russian air-defense, space, and nuclear technologies.  Moscow and Pyongyang’s 2024 mutual defense pact formalized the expanding military relationship.

Seoul says no again to Ukraine’s weapons request as Pyongyang gets ready to send Russia more troops

The Sverdlovsk Regional Court sentenced Ivan Stolbov, a 34-year-old Russian citizen who lived in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine, to 13 years in a high-security penal colony.

The court sentenced Stolbov over 11 alleged donations of about 100 hryvnias (about $2.23) each to an unidentified Ukrainian organization, Mediazona reported on 10 August 2026. Born in Sarapul, Russia, Stolbov worked as a procurement manager before his arrest.

Since 2022, Russian courts have imprisoned Russians and Ukrainians under treason, terrorism, and other national-security laws over donations to Ukrainian causes. Penalties depend on the charge: high treason, used against Stolbov, has a 12-year minimum. The Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KHPG) reports that Russian officials threaten up to eight years in prison for donations to organizations Moscow labels extremist, regardless of the amount (this includes Ukrainian organizations).

Authorities detained him at Yekaterinburg's Koltsovo International Airport in July 2025. Stolbov had traveled to Yekaterinburg to visit relatives.

The verdict said he was not registered in Russia. Court records reviewed by Mediazona showed that Stolbov then received three consecutive administrative arrests, two imposed as he left the detention center, before prosecutors filed the treason charge. 

KHPG has reported cases in which Russian authorities used surveillance to detect such transfers.

KHPG has documented defendants ranging from teenagers and pensioners to travelers and residents of occupied Ukraine.

Small transfers, decade-long sentences 

Stolbov’s case is one of several in which Russian courts have imposed decade-long terms over alleged donations to Ukraine.

Two women from Russian-occupied Enerhodar received 14 years each after allegedly transferring $120 and $57 to Ukrainian forces.

In May, a Russian court sentenced Ukrainian citizen Polina Kuzmina to 12 years and Russian citizen Vladimir Grabovetsky to 14 years. Prosecutors accused them of making 78 transfers to fund Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

KHPG documented a 14-year sentence for a Melitopol mother of two over alleged donations to Ukraine’s military and the Freedom of Russia Legion. KHPG also reported that Viktor Nikitenko, 58, received 12 years for alleged transfers and Ukrainian war bonds.

Stolbov’s 13-year term sits just above the minimum for high treason under Russian law. Article 275 provides for 12 to 20 years or life imprisonment.

A plan presented to the UK's new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, would extend Britain's nuclear umbrella to Ukraine and other non-NATO European states. In exchange, Britain would regain access to the EU single market for goods, The Telegraph reported on 9 August.

The proposal comes as European governments question whether they can rely on US protection and struggle to turn moral support for Ukraine into troops and weapons. Russia's invasions, despite the assurances Kyiv received from the US and the UK when it surrendered its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest memorandum, have also revived calls for nuclear-backed guarantees.

Former Conservative MP Nick Boles drafted the plan. He proposes a "European Confederation" that combines single-market access with NATO-style mutual defense commitments. 

For Ukraine, it would provide protection modeled on NATO Articles 4 and 5 while Kyiv pursued full EU membership.

Ukraine would maintain a large army as Europe's bulwark against Russia and share defense technology with other members of the Confederation. Britain would raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, while both countries would gain full access to the EU's single market for goods.

Boles said Europe needed a new security model because neither US President Donald Trump nor a future US president could be guaranteed to "defend Europe as if it were Kansas." 

Boles's plan is not Burnham government policy. Nevertheless, it has circulated among officials, including National Security Adviser Jonathan Powell, as London considers deeper cooperation with the EU.

Britain's support bumps against Europe's political limits

Prime Minister Burnham entered Downing Street as a firm supporter of Ukraine. He assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that British support remained unchanged and pledged to preserve aid levels.

Britain also co-leads with France the Coalition of the Willing, which plans to deploy forces in Ukraine after a ceasefire to deter another Russian attack.

The Coalition has brought together representatives of 40 countries. Still, members remain divided over how far to support Ukraine.

Britain and France have formally declared their intention to deploy forces after a potential ceasefire in Ukraine. Yet Poland offered logistical support but ruled out troop deployment, while Bulgaria has withdrawn from the Coalition. Europe has promised deterrence, but key deep-strike missiles may not arrive until 2029.

Boles's plan would pair Britain's nuclear deterrent with Ukraine's conventional military strength. Unlike the Coalition’s voluntary plans, Boles's proposed European Confederation would place its defense guarantees in a treaty. NATO would initially be responsible for carrying them out.

From surrendered weapons to a nuclear shield

Ukraine inherited the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal after the Soviet collapse, including about 1,900 strategic warheads. 

Kyiv relinquished them under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum after receiving security assurances from Russia, Britain, and the US. Despite these promises, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and launched its full-scale war in 2022.

Russia's invasions have revived calls among Ukrainian lawmakers for nuclear-backed security guarantees. Politician Roman Kostenko has called for guarantees that could include British and French nuclear retaliation in the event of another Russian attack. 

Under Boles's proposal, Ukraine would not regain its own warheads. It would instead come under Britain's nuclear shield.

An unnamed Republican official in Washington said fears of Ukrainian competition may be obstructing a Patriot license, The Atlantic reported on 9 August. RTX’s Raytheon and Lockheed Martin may worry Ukraine would improve Patriot interceptors and make them faster and cheaper than US production lines, he said.

The official said the manufacturers would frame their concerns around intellectual-property theft and technology transfer. Their deeper concern, he claimed, is that Ukraine could eventually outcompete them. Neither company has publicly confirmed that motive.

Meanwhile, Russia’s missile threat is growing. July was Ukraine’s deadliest month for civilians since 2022, while Moscow can reportedly launch 77 ballistic and cruise missiles at once and aims to raise that capacity to 200. Ukrainian intelligence separately said Russian plants reached 110–120% of their July missile-production targets and are unlikely to pause their attacks.

Why the Patriot license remains unfinished

US President Donald Trump promised the license at NATO’s 8 July summit. Yet Lockheed Martin and RTX had not been informed, and by 23 July, both described the process as only beginning.

On 8 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Trump had agreed to grant Ukraine Patriot production licenses, but paperwork was delaying their issuance.

Current interceptor supplies are also failing to keep pace with Russian attacks. After a 5 August strike killed 17 people, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had received three times fewer anti-ballistic missiles since the beginning of 2026. He suggested the reduction might partly be intended to make Kyiv more compliant.

At their 28 July White House meeting, Zelenskyy asked Trump for 300 Patriot interceptors before winter, Axios reported. Trump declined, citing depleted US stocks and demand for interceptors in the Middle East.

Why Ukraine might look like a competitor—and why it is also part of the solution

Ukraine’s expanding defense industry is testing Western allies’ willingness to strengthen a potential competitor.

 In January, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that French arms manufacturers faced “fierce competition” from Ukrainian and other European rivals. By July, Le Monde reported that many European allies remained torn between helping Ukraine and creating a new continental competitor.

Yet Kyiv has also proven willing to cooperate with its partners on mutual defense. Ukrainian military specialists have already helped the US counter Iranian-designed Shahed drones and protect American bases in the Middle East. After Washington requested assistance in March, Kyiv sent interceptor drones and military specialists to Jordan the following day.

Kyiv has also spearheaded the ten-country FREYJA initiative, combining Ukrainian launchers and interceptors with European radars and sensors to counter Russian ballistic missiles. Zelenskyy said the system could eventually protect countries across Europe.

Industrial cooperation extends to the Pentagon’s Drone Dominance Program. Kyiv approved its first export of finished combat drones after F-Drones’ F10 placed sixth among 25 competitors. The company won a prototype order for 2,000 drones and plans to open a factory in Ohio.

Russia fired 198 ballistic and hypersonic missiles at Ukraine in July, its highest monthly total of 2026, alongside 153 cruise missiles, as its factories ran their main missile lines at 110 to 120% of plan, the deputy head of Ukraine's Defense Ministry intelligence directorate (HUR), Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, told RBC-Ukraine in an interview published on 10 August.

The volume reflects a production run, not a drawdown of reserves. Moscow has spent recent months building and firing more of exactly the weapons most likely to penetrate Ukrainian defenses, as Kyiv runs short of the Patriot interceptors that are its only reliable counter to ballistic missiles. On 5 August, Ukraine failed to intercept any of 28 Russian missiles, including 24 ballistic ones.

Launches climbed through the summer

Ballistic launches rose steadily before July's peak: 61 in April, 107 in May, and 134 in June, Skibitskyi said. Attack intervals shortened from roughly one strike every 10 days to weekly, then tighter. "Everything depends on the quantity of weapons produced," he said.

Russia is meeting its monthly plans for the main missile types at 110 to 120% and, by 3 August, had already fulfilled its full-year plan for the Zircon hypersonic and modernized Onyx missiles, building 33 Zircons and 60 Onyx in seven months. That output, Skibitskyi said, makes a lasting pause in strikes unlikely.

Plans overfulfilled, reserves untouched

Output for individual systems ran well above target. The July plan for the Kh-101 cruise missile was met at 140%, the Kalibr at 111%, and the Kh-35 at 200%, according to HUR figures. In absolute terms, Russia planned 72 Kh-101s and built 87. It planned 26 Kalibrs and built 29.

Its stockpile of 9M723 ballistic missiles for the Iskander-M stood at about 130 as of 5 August, against a monthly plan of 60, though July output reached 65, Skibitskyi said. For the RM-48U, a Mach 6 surface-to-surface missile launched from the S-400, the August plan is about 40 units on estimated reserves of 400.

"They are not really going into reserves. Right now almost everything for use comes off the assembly line," Skibitskyi said.

Newly built Kalibrs now largely go to equip Russia's new warships and submarines, he added, and Ukraine intercepts nearly all the Kalibrs fired when it has the surface-to-air missiles to do so.

Kinzhal and Kh-32 output halted since April

Part of the ballistic surge came from stopping other programs. Russia suspended production of the hypersonic Kinzhal and the Kh-32 cruise missile in April, redirecting their propellant and components to missiles it considers more effective, Skibitskyi said. The Kh-32, a modernized Kh-22, had failed repeated attempts to improve its accuracy and was returned to development.

The Kinzhal has a similar problem.

"We can hardly recall a case when this missile hit the target precisely," Skibitskyi said. "For an effective missile the deviation from the target should not exceed 5 to 7 meters, and theirs is 30 meters and more."

A shift to jet-powered drones

Russia's August plan for strike drones, across the Geran, Gerbera, and Harpia families, is 11,000 units, Skibitskyi said. Production dipped in July as plants retooled toward the turbojet Geran-4 and Geran-5, which already made up half of one recent attack and require faster interceptors to stop.

The engines remain a bottleneck. Russia depends on China for the turbojets, pays about $35,000 to $40,000 apiece, and is trying to build its own, Skibitskyi said.

Targets: defense plants, logistics, and Black Sea shipping

Russia concentrates its strikes on Ukraine's defense-industrial complex, centered on Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, and Kharkiv, and on logistics, including railways, ports, and shipping, Skibitskyi said. He described a methodical campaign against civilian vessels in the Black Sea: "This is an unprecedented situation, when civilian vessels are not simply struck but methodically finished off and destroyed, to deny us the ability to conduct trade."

Energy sites tied to ports and logistics are also targeted, he said, along with other infrastructure meant to sow panic and destabilize the country.

North Korea, Iran, and a Starlink analog

North Korea has transferred 40 more KN-23 and KN-24 missiles after an initial batch of about 100, Skibitskyi said. One recent North Korean missile strayed roughly 15 kilometers from its target and killed a family. Iranian cooperation has narrowed since 2022 and 2023, as Russia now builds its own strike and FPV drones.

Moscow is also fielding Rassvet, a Russian analog of Starlink, faster than planned. Sixteen satellites reached orbit in March 2026, with a planned constellation of 292 by 2027 and 924 by 2035. For now, it works only in fragments, as each satellite passes over Ukrainian territory.

A pause looks unlikely

Russia may cut the number of missiles sent at a single target but is unlikely to stop, Skibitskyi said. The tempo will depend above all on how much it can produce. "They will be able to reduce the number of missiles flying at one target, but they are unlikely to make a pause," he said.

Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk was buried in Moscow on 5 August 2026, four days after he reportedly died in a bombing at an Italian restaurant. Security was heavy at the funeral. The ceremony at Troyekurovskoye Cemetery reportedly took place behind roadblocks, metal detectors, and buses carrying Russian National Guard troops.

If he died in the blast, Plokhotnyuk would be at least the fourth senior Russian general killed near Moscow since December 2024. The earlier targets held senior roles in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow has blamed Kyiv for others without presenting public proof. Unlike the three earlier generals, however, independent reporting has not established that Plokhotnyuk himself was the intended target. Responsibility for several of the killings remains disputed or unconfirmed.

The Russian news site Mediazona verified through state registries that Plokhotnyuk died on 1 August 2026, the day of the Moscow bombing. His business partner later confirmed the death after speaking with the general’s father.

Russian officials have not confirmed that Plokhotnyuk died in the blast.

Plokhotnyuk previously commanded Russian troops in Transnistria, a Russian-backed breakaway strip of Moldova. In 2022, he was serving as chief of staff of Russia's 49th Combined Arms Army. Its units attacked southern Ukraine through Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

A bomb was brought to the restaurant disguised as a gift

The device that killed Plokhotnyuk exploded at the entrance to Moscow’s Balzi Rossi restaurant on the evening of 1 August. Five people died, and at least 19 suffered injuries.

A woman tried to carry the device inside as a gift but was stopped by a security guard, according to accounts compiled by Sistema, RFE/RL’s Russian investigative unit. The bomb then reportedly detonated remotely.

The woman and the guard both died. Investigators have not said whether she knew that the package contained explosives.

Sistema found several signs that the closed restaurant was hosting a belated 55th-birthday celebration for Colonel General Aleksandr Chaiko, appointed head of Russia’s Aerospace Forces in May 2026.

Footage taken before the blast reportedly showed a backdrop reading “Alexander 55.” State registries confirmed that Chaiko’s son-in-law, Daniil Peredriy, died that day. Chaiko’s daughter, Maria, and another relative reportedly suffered injuries.

The presence of several Chaiko relatives indicates that the event was held for him. However, independent reporting has not established whether he was inside when the bomb exploded. Ukraine has not claimed responsibility.

The EU sanctioned Chaiko in March 2026. It identified him as the senior Russian commander on the ground when Russian forces entered Bucha in February 2022. Hundreds of civilians were killed during Russia’s occupation of the Kyiv suburb.

Far from the front, Russia’s generals keep coming under attack

Before Plokhotnyuk’s reported death, bombings had killed at least three senior Russian generals in Moscow and its surrounding region since December 2024.

A bomb hidden in an electric scooter killed chemical warfare commander Igor Kirillov outside his apartment. An SBU source told Reuters that Ukraine organized the operation.

A car bomb later killed General Staff officer Yaroslav Moskalyk near Moscow. Zelenskyy subsequently mentioned an intelligence briefing on the “elimination” of Russian commanders without naming Moskalyk. Kyiv never formally claimed the bombing.

Another vehicle blast killed military planner Fanil Sarvarov in December 2025. Russian investigators considered possible Ukrainian involvement, while Kyiv remained silent.

No public evidence has established who organized the Balzi Rossi bombing.

Ukraine expects the joint European FREYJA interceptor program to deliver "concrete results" by the turn of 2026–2027, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 6 August. The program "is already actively underway," he added. 

Under the program, Ukraine would manufacture the interceptor and launcher, while European partners would provide radars, sensors, and other critical components.

Zelenskyy said FREYJA is intended to intercept ballistic missiles and would benefit countries across Europe. He said its successful development would place Ukraine among the few countries with an anti-ballistic system of their own.

The FREYJA project seeks to address Ukraine's growing shortage of interceptors capable of stopping Russian ballistic missiles. FREYJA will not solve the immediate shortage, but it could reduce Europe's long-term reliance on scarce US-made Patriot interceptors. Recent Russian attacks have shown the consequences of that shortage.

How the FREYJA interceptor would help Ukraine

Ten countries are involved in FREYJA, and Zelenskyy said more partners had agreed to join the effort. Leading European defense companies will contribute the radars, sensors, and other technology the system requires, he said.

This joint venture connects Ukraine's wartime missile production with technologies held by established European manufacturers. Earlier Euromaidan Press reporting described the project as pairing a Ukrainian Fire Point interceptor with European radar, guidance, and sensor technology.

Euromaidan Press noted that each FREYJA round cost about $700,000, compared with roughly $4 million for a PAC-3 interceptor. However, FREYJA is not a one-for-one Patriot equivalent and has not yet demonstrated a ballistic-missile interception. The lower price could matter if Ukraine can manufacture it at scale.

Zelenskyy's timetable concerns "concrete results," not a fully operational or mass-produced system.

Ukraine needs FREYJA amid growing interceptor shortage

The need for FREYJA was on display during Russia's overnight attack on 5 August. Moscow launched 24 ballistic and four anti-ship missiles, and Ukraine reported intercepting none of them. Air defenders neutralized 98 of 115 drones, but missiles and drones still struck 26 locations. 17 people were killed.

July 2026 had already shown the same deterioration. Ukraine only downed two of 36 ballistic missiles in two major attacks, roughly one in eighteen, as Patriot stocks ran low.

Washington offers no quick relief. Trump's July promise of a Patriot production license remains in its early stages, according to the system's manufacturers. Asked about more Patriot interceptors on 6 August, Trump replied that the United States also needed missiles.

The mismatch leaves Ukraine pursuing two tracks: pressing partners for scarce Patriots now while building FREYJA for a less dependent European defense later.

Russia destroyed a Bosch warehouse in Ukraine overnight into 5 August, the German manufacturer said. The strike wiped out its stock of household goods and industrial technology. No Bosch employee or worker for its logistics partner was injured.

The strike was part of Russia's intensified attacks on the warehouses and distribution centers that supply Ukraine. Destroying these facilities eliminates stored goods and disrupts the delivery of food, parcels, equipment, and other essential products. Recent attacks have hit both Ukrainian companies and international brands operating in the country.

Bosch said the warehouse premises belonged to its logistics partner. The company's preliminary assessment found that all Bosch products stored there had been destroyed. It did not disclose the location.

Bosch and its logistics partner are now assessing the damage. They are also seeking ways to maintain operations and meet commitments to customers and business partners.

Russia launches anti-ship missiles on stocks

The Bosch loss came during the same overnight barrage that devastated warehouses and production sites across Kyiv and the surrounding region. Russian strikes destroyed facilities used by Rozetka, Nova Poshta, and Epicentr. The three companies distribute parcels, household goods, and construction supplies across Ukraine.

That attack killed 17 people and wounded 44. Ukraine intercepted none of the 24 ballistic missiles or four anti-ship missiles Russia launched, according to Ukrainian officials.

Ukraine is looking for ways to protect its businesses

The same night, a strike burned down the central Ukraine warehouse of German automotive-products maker Liqui Moly. All employees escaped injury, and the company said it would continue operating.

Two nights earlier, a Russian drone attack outside Dnipro set food warehouses ablaze. On 1 August, another Russian drone hit a Rozetka warehouse where 270 people were working, killing one employee.

The campaign comes as Russia launches more missiles than Ukraine can reliably stop. Moscow fired 376 missiles in July, including 126 ballistic weapons, Euromaidan Press previously reported.

Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov said Russia had intensified attacks on warehouses and production sites. He warned businesses to disperse their stocks. Russia can sustain about 100 ballistic-missile launches a month and locate commercial targets using cheap local informants, he said.

Radical anti-Ukrainian rhetoric became less prominent across Polish social media in July, according to an analysis published on 3 August by Gremi Personal, a recruitment firm for Ukrainian workers.

Gremi Personal researchers monitored public Polish-language posts and comments across Facebook, X, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, and Wykop, a Polish social news and discussion platform. They recorded less direct ethnic abuse, collective blame, calls to restrict Ukrainians' rights, and justification of violence than in the previous period.

Polish social media posts condemning xenophobia and attacks on Ukrainians also became more visible.

Still, the result marks a shift in online discourse, not proof that attitudes across Polish society have improved. Gremi said its monitoring was not a representative opinion poll. Negative discussion around Ukrainian migration, welfare, and Polish-Ukrainian historical memory also remained widespread.

Poland's social media may be cooling faster than its streets, but nearly a million Ukrainians still held temporary protection there as of mid-April 2026 amid rising hate crimes and renewed disputes over Ukraine's honoring of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, blamed by Poland for wartime massacres. Russia exploits the rift with disinformation.

How Polish-Ukrainian relations have worsened

Historical memory has become a sharper political fault line in Polish-Ukrainian relations since President Volodymyr Zelenskyy issued Decree 440/2026 on 26 May. The order gave a Ukrainian special forces unit the honorary title "Heroes of the UPA."

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army is remembered in Ukraine for fighting Soviet rule. Poland holds it responsible for the massacres of Polish civilians during World War II.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki stripped Zelenskyy of Poland's highest honor in June in response to the "Heroes of the UPA" decree. In July, he also sought a legal ban on the UPA's red-and-black flag.

The row followed years of Poland's far right turning Ukrainian refugees and historical grievances into wedge issues, rallying voters against Polish aid to Ukraine.

Hate-crime reports keep climbing

Reports of suspected hate crimes against Ukrainians in Poland have risen since the beginning of 2026. Ukrainians filed 180 reports of suspected hate crimes with Polish police in the first half of 2026, Rzeczpospolita reported. The newspaper cited national police data. The total was more than 30% above the same period in 2025.

These were allegations, not crimes confirmed by investigators or courts. Yet recent attacks show the danger behind the numbers.

In May, 16-year-old Ukrainian refugee Artem suffered a fractured skull in an attack on a Warsaw bridge. Police detained five teenage suspects, while Warsaw's mayor blamed increasingly hostile right-wing rhetoric.

On 26 July, three men allegedly beat a young Ukrainian couple in Wrocław after asking whether the woman was Ukrainian. Investigators are treating the assault as a hate crime driven by the victims' nationality.

Days earlier in Poznań, three men beat a 60-year-old Pole after he defended a Ukrainian teenager from abuse on a tram.

About 16,000 foreign volunteers from at least 72 countries serve in Ukraine's Defense Forces, Military Ombudsman Olha Reshetylova said. Reshetylova said nearly 40% are citizens of Latin American countries.

The figures show the scale of foreign volunteers' participation in Ukraine's military as Russia's invasion strains Ukraine's manpower. Reshetylova's office monitors their rights and uses complaints to identify recurring problems.

Reshetylova announced the figures during a 4 August meeting of the heads of Ukraine's foreign diplomatic missions.

"Ukraine values [foreign service members'] contribution and understands their responsibility to uphold their rights," she said.

Since 27 January 2026, her office has received more than 300 requests from foreign service members, their relatives, and authorized representatives—requests concerning pay, benefits, supplies, combatant status, medical care, and early contract termination. The office has proposed legal changes in response.

Reshetylova did not explain how the figure of 16,000 was calculated. In February 2026, a Ukrainian Ground Forces official said that more than 10,000 foreigners had served or were serving in Ground Forces units.

That cumulative figure covered a narrower part of Ukraine's Defense Forces and is not directly comparable with Reshetylova's estimate.

Foreign recruits bring combat experience and specialist skills

The International Legion, the main destination of most foreign volunteers, draws members from more than 50 countries. Its members include veterans of the war against ISIS, career soldiers, medics, and newcomers motivated by duty, adventure, experience, or personal loss. 

On the front line, Colombian veterans have played a significant role in aiding Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, bringing military and police experience gained fighting drug cartels and rebels in Colombia.

Some foreign service members also contribute specialist skills beyond infantry combat. British bomb-disposal expert Christopher "Swampy" Garrett cleared mines and trained more than 2,000 Ukrainian troops, police officers, and international volunteers.

Garrett was killed on 6 May 2025 while dismantling a Russian explosive device in Izium. 

Contracts, captivity, and the human cost

Beyond the battlefield, foreign service members can face contract disputes in Ukraine, prosecution at home, or imprisonment by Russia.

Finnish volunteer Leo Åland struggled to end his six-month contract. He was killed in combat after serving in Ukraine's military for just over four months.

In December 2025, a Swiss court convicted Avi M. of serving in Ukraine's military. Swiss law prohibits citizens from joining foreign armed forces.

Russia has prosecuted captured foreign members of Ukraine's military as mercenaries rather than treating them as prisoners of war. A Russian court sentenced British fighter James Scott Rees Anderson to 19 years following his capture in Kursk Oblast.

Ukraine now holds prisoners of war (POWs) from 51 countries who fought for Russia, Dmytro Lubinets, the Ukrainian parliament’s human rights commissioner, said on 4 August. 

The figure illustrates the global reach of Moscow’s efforts to replenish its forces with foreign recruits. Russia has targeted people abroad with promises of well-paid jobs, university places, and military salaries. Some enlist knowingly. Others report being deceived or pressured into service.

Speaking at a meeting of heads of Ukraine’s foreign diplomatic missions, Lubinets said joining Russia’s war carries “real legal consequences.” He did not disclose the prisoners’ nationalities or their total number.

The human cost extends beyond those captured. A July 2026 BBC Russian Service/Mediazona investigation documented at least 3,589 foreign nationals who had died fighting for Russia. The total comprised 1,285 people from more than 40 countries and 2,304 North Korean troops. 

Russia throws its recruitment net across the globe

Moscow has increasingly looked abroad for soldiers as its invasion consumes manpower. Recruiters focus heavily on Africa, Asia, and Latin America, offering civilian work, education, high salaries, or military service. 

A human rights investigation covered by Euromaidan Press found that Russia had recruited at least 27,000 people from more than 130 countries since February 2022. Researchers said recruits often received Russian-language contracts they could not understand, while some faced threats or rapid deployment to combat. 

Explore further

China asks Ukraine to treat Chinese POWs well, but doesn’t say if it wants them back

In Africa, recruitment operates within a broader Russian soft power influence network. Russian Houses offer language courses and routes into Russian universities. Ukraine’s military intelligence describes Russian Houses as a pipeline through which some young Africans reach Russia as students or workers and later enter Moscow’s army. 

Beyond Africa, Russia preys upon the disadvantaged with promises of work. An Associated Press investigation found that Bangladeshi men promised cleaning jobs in Russia were instead sent into combat.

Foreign recruits abandoned after capture

For those captured, neither Russia nor their home governments offer a clear route home. Ukraine’s POW Coordination Headquarters said Moscow had excluded foreign recruits from prisoner exchanges, although some embassies had visited their citizens. 

A Kenyan Foreign Ministry official stated the government was following reports of several trafficked Kenyans held as POWs in Ukraine. Yet Ukrainian POW official Petro Yatsenko said most African governments showed little interest in bringing their citizens home. 

China likewise asked Ukraine to treat two captured Chinese fighters humanely, but did not say whether it sought their return. Ukrainian officials said Russia had inquired only about captured North Korean soldiers, showing little interest in other foreign fighters in captivity. 

Russia is conducting six illegal archaeological expeditions across occupied Crimea, Suspilne reported. The illegal digs target crypts, a necropolis, and ancient settlements.

Suspilne, citing RIA Novosti Krym, reported that Vadym Maiko, head of Russia’s Institute of Archaeology of Crimea, said the expeditions include the Opushky burial ground, where teams are examining at least three crypts. They also include the late-antique Kyz-Aul necropolis near Yakovenkove, as well as work near the Artezian hillfort and the Belinske settlement. Suspilne did not identify the other two expeditions. 

The expeditions add to what Ukrainian officials describe as a wider campaign of cultural theft. Since 2014, Russia has removed artifacts, dug without Kyiv’s permission, and reshaped Ukrainian sites to support its claim to the peninsula. 

Russia’s habit of stealing Ukrainian history 

Russia has expanded in recent years its archaeological excavations in the occupied Ukrainian territories. 

On 1 April 2026, Ukraine’s military intelligence released a report identifying seven Russian archaeologists and historians linked to excavations and occupation institutions. Its update also listed 20 objects taken from occupied sites, including Kyz-Aul and the Hospitalnyi burial mound. 

Ukraine’s National Resistance Center also says Russian security personnel let artifact looters remove finds from Chersonesus in return for kickbacks. Meanwhile, Russian construction and excavation there exposed 500,000 artifacts. 

In July 2026, UNESCO placed the site on its danger list, citing damage from construction and large-scale digs. 

Accountability has begun, but rarely reaches court

The EU’s 17th sanctions package targeted Russia's cultural heritage looting in Crimea. It listed Chersonesus occupation director Elena Morozova and the museum she leads.

Ukraine has also pursued individual archaeologists. Yet identifying the people behind illegal digs is not the same as bringing them before a court.

A Polish court approved the extradition of Hermitage archaeologist Alexander Butyagin to Ukraine after Kyiv accused him of causing $4.8 million in damage at Myrmekion. Warsaw later handed him to Belarus in an April prisoner exchange, and he returned to Russia.  The case never reached Ukrainian courts. 

The 1954 Hague Convention protects archaeological sites and requires parties to prevent theft, pillage, or misappropriation. But Butyagin’s release exposed the central enforcement problem: Ukraine can document a suspect, secure an arrest, and still lose custody before trial. 

Russia's overnight missile-and-drone barrage on Kyiv and its surrounding region on 5 August destroyed the warehouses and production sites of several of Ukraine's largest retail and logistics companies, killed 17 people and wounded 44 more, and laid bare the country's dwindling ability to intercept ballistic missiles, according to Ukrainian officials.

Russia's main target on 5 August: Ukraine's warehouses

Russia has spent this year pushing its air war toward the ballistic missiles that Ukrainian defenses struggle most to stop, launching more of them than Ukraine can shoot down while its Patriot interceptor stocks run dry, and pairing them with drone waves that keep reaching homes, transit and the warehouses that feed the country.

Three Russian ballistic missiles destroyed the largest distribution center operated by Rozetka, Ukraine’s biggest online retailer, near Kyiv overnight on 5 August. Rozetka co-founder Iryna Chechotkina said the warehouse had processed more than 100,000 online orders each day and was beyond repair.

By dawn, the attack had torn through the civilian logistics network moving parcels, groceries, household goods and construction materials across the capital and its suburbs. At least 17 people were killed and 44 injured in the broader barrage, according to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

In its 5 August 2026 strikes, Russia destroyed a sorting center owned by Nova Poshta, Ukraine’s largest private parcel carrier, as well as major facilities operated by Epicentr, the country’s largest home-improvement retailer. Sites belonging to Novus and Fozzy Group, two major Ukrainian grocery retailers, were also damaged.

Nova Poshta said cluster munitions—bombs that scatter smaller explosives across a wide area—destroyed its Kyiv sorting center. Three people were killed and eight injured. Two of those killed were drivers for a partner carrier, while the third worked for a contractor.

Epicentr lost two major warehouse complexes and much of its ceramic-tile production. One employee was killed, and three were hospitalized at the company’s complex in Kalynivka. Its logistics center on Kyiv’s Viskozna Street burned completely, while another Russian missile destroyed the factory's kilns.

During a separate overnight attack on 3-4 August, a Russian drone destroyed a Biosphere warehouse storing household and personal-care products in Dnipro, although all employees reached shelter and no one was injured.

The Kyiv attack extended beyond commercial facilities. Russia's attack killed eight people waiting for a delayed train at Kvitneva station, a commuter stop near Brovary, east of Kyiv. Missiles also hit homes and offices, damaged an ambulance and caused an ammonia leak at a non-residential site.

An earlier Euromaidan Press report detailed the destruction across Kyiv and the surrounding region.

Why Ukraine intercepted none of the missiles

Russia launched 24 ballistic missiles and four Zircon and Oniks anti-ship missiles, high-speed weapons designed primarily to strike naval targets but also used against Ukrainian cities.

Ukraine intercepted none of the 28, the Ukrainian Air Force said. Air defenses shot down or electronically disabled 98 of the 115 accompanying drones.

Missiles and 17 drones struck 26 locations, while debris fell at another six.

Zelenskyy said ballistic-missile interceptors could have saved those killed. Ukraine’s stocks of Patriot missiles, its only reliable defense against Russian ballistic weapons, are critically depleted. 

A global interceptor shortage means manufacturers cannot produce advanced air-defense missiles fast enough to meet demand.

Russia exploited the same gap on 1 August 2026, when it fired 27 ballistic missiles at Kyiv and Ukraine intercepted only one.

Moscow may point to recent Ukrainian strikes on Wildberries logistics centers to frame its attacks as retaliation. Ukrainian officials say the Russian retailer transports military goods, including drone components and navigation equipment. The Kremlin denies that Wildberries carries military cargo.

Ukraine’s acting Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha rejected any comparison between the attacks. "Russian attacks cannot be justified by anything, including any actions by Ukraine," he said.

Russian LNG accounted for all of Belgium’s liquefied natural gas imports in July, Bloomberg reported. The Iran war disrupted Middle Eastern supplies and kept European gas prices high.

The shift exposes a contradiction in EU energy policy. Countries should be reducing Russian purchases before a full ban on Russian gas, part of the EU's plan to end its energy dependence on Moscow amid the war against Ukraine, takes effect in January 2027. Yet disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has reopened demand for Moscow’s fuel.

Belgium bought about 0.4 million tons of Russian LNG in July, Bloomberg data show. Its total LNG intake fell by more than 40% from a year earlier, while high prices discouraged winter stockpiling. Russia became the sole supplier in a shrinking market.

Belgium still received pipeline gas from Norway and the UK, meaning Russia supplied all its LNG, not all its gas. It was the first month since early 2021 that all of Belgium’s LNG came from Russia, Bloomberg reported.

Europe’s Russian LNG reliance grows

France, Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands spent €34.3 billion ($39.6 billion) on Russian LNG between 2022 and 2025, a Greenpeace analysis found. Their combined bilateral aid to Ukraine during that period totaled €21.2 billion ($24.4 billion). 

Europe’s Russian LNG dependence predates Belgium’s July reversal. The EU paid Russia €7.2 billion for LNG in 2025. By early 2026, Europe was receiving 97% of exports from Russia’s Yamal LNG plant.

Europe received 16% more Russian LNG in the first half of 2026 than a year earlier, paying €5.96 billion, Bloomberg reported. France, Belgium, and Spain were the biggest buyers, according to figures Bloomberg cited from the German nonprofit Urgewald.

The 2027 ban gives long-term buyers legal protection to end their contracts early. Yet the gas keeps flowing through European ports and on European-operated ships. In July, Greece held up new sanctions to protect Dynagas, whose vessels transport Russian gas sourced from the Arctic. 

Iran war boosts Russia and raises Ukraine’s costs

The same energy shock strengthens Russia while squeezing Ukraine. The Iran war increased Moscow’s energy income while raising the cost of Ukraine’s imported fuel. It also diverted political attention from Russia’s invasion. 

The scale became visible within the first two weeks of the Iran war. Russia earned €7.7 billion from fossil-fuel exports during the first half of March. Daily earnings reached €513 million as Brent crude climbed above $119 per barrel. 

Higher prices later threatened to raise the EU price cap on Russian oil from $44.1 to at least $65 per barrel. Brussels considered freezing it to prevent the Iran-driven price spike from weakening sanctions on Moscow.

A mass shooting in occupied Crimea left one Russian serviceman and three civilians dead on 4 August 2026, according to Moscow-installed authorities. Another soldier and three other people were reportedly wounded.

Russia keeps many troops stationed in Ukraine’s occupied Crimea, using it as a rear logistics hub for its war against Ukraine. That dependence has made the peninsula a prime Ukrainian target as Kyiv seeks to sever supply lines supporting Russian forces across the south.

The Russian soldier first opened fire on fellow servicemen, killing one and wounding another, Moscow-installed Sevastopol governor Mikhail Razvozhayev said on Telegram. 

The gunman then allegedly attacked residents of Khmelnytske, a village southeast of Sevastopol. Razvozhayev said the civilians killed were two men, aged 71 and 59, as well as a 64-year-old woman.

Russian occupation authorities said they detained the attacker. They have not publicly identified him, named his military unit, or disclosed a possible motive.

Independent Russian outlet Agentstvo reported that the suspect may be 21-year-old Maxim Alistratov from Saratov Oblast, citing a screenshot from a local chat group. The Moscow Times, which relayed the report, said it could not independently verify the identification. Occupation authorities have not confirmed it.

Euromaidan Press could not independently verify Razvozhayev's account or the reported identity of the attacker.

Violence involving Russian troops in Crimea

Russian military court records have also documented sexual offenses by servicemen in occupied Crimea and Sevastopol, including against civilian residents.

In 2023, Siberia.Realities, an RFE/RL project, reviewed records from 100 Russian military courts. A follow-up report by Crimea.Realities, another RFE/RL initiative, found that the peninsula accounted for 18 such cases in 2022. That was 16% of all sexual-offense cases involving servicemen before Russian military courts that year, and more than in any region of Russia itself.

The outlet noted that court records from other occupied Ukrainian territories were not publicly available.