Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has now received the Trump-backed Ukraine peace plan from the US side, but its full contents have not yet been made public officially. The initiative, discussed in recent weeks between a Trump-linked team and senior Russian figures, is reportedly designed to ask Ukraine to surrender additional territory in the east and accept tight limits on its armed forces and long-range weapons in return for a US-brokered security arrangement for Ukraine and Europe, according to a leaked outline obtained by AP.

First reported by Axios, the 28-point document was crafted by Trump associate Steve Witkoff and Kremlin-linked financier Kirill Dmitriev after talks in Miami, building on principles floated at Trump’s August summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska. According to Western accounts of the draft, it would see Kyiv recognise Russian control over more of Donbas, accept Russian as an official language, grant formal status to the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, and bar permanent Western troop deployments while scaling back US military aid.

Taken together, the emerging contours point to a framework that leans heavily on Ukrainian concessions while promising to recalibrate, rather than strengthen, Western military backing—a combination that has alarmed officials in Kyiv and raised questions in European capitals over whether Washington is edging toward a “land-for-peace” formula long rejected by Ukraine’s leadership.

Zelenskyy backs US leadership, rejects “reward” for aggression

On 19 November, during a visit to Ankara, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine is ready to work with the United States and its partners on any format that can bring a real end to Russia’s war. In a post on Facebook reflecting his talks in Türkiye, he wrote that only President Donald Trump and the United States “have sufficient strength for the war to finally come to an end” and that Ukraine is “ready to work in any other meaningful formats that could yield results”, provided American leadership remains “effective, strong” and focused on a lasting peace.

On 20 November, Zelenskyy’s office said he had officially received from the United States a draft peace plan that, in Washington’s view, could “reinvigorate diplomacy”. In a statement on the President’s Office Telegram channel, it is said that he had outlined principles important for Ukrainians, reiterated that "Ukraine has sought peace since the first moments of Russia’s invasion and supports all meaningful proposals"— including President Trump’s initiatives this year to stop the bloodshed.

“We are ready to work constructively with the American side and with our partners in Europe and across the world so that the result is peace,” the statement said. “In the coming days, the President of Ukraine expects to discuss with President Trump the available diplomatic options and the key points needed for peace.”

Blueprint or “information operation”?

At home, senior officials have been more direct in their criticism of the blueprint. First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsya, in a post on X, called the plan a Soviet-style “information‑psychological operation aimed at sowing panic and splitting society rather than a serious peace proposal.”

Ukrainian media and experts have reacted no less bluntly to the leaked US–Russia proposal. Ukrainian outlet Radio Svoboda writes that the 28-point “Witkoff plan” “largely corresponds to the Kremlin’s demands”—demanding territorial concessions, a rollback of NATO ambitions, cuts to the army and Western military assistance—and cites analysts who deem the proposals “harmful” and warn they would leave Ukraine more vulnerable to renewed Russian aggression.

Europeans demand a seat at the table

News that the plan was prepared largely without Kyiv or major European capitals has provoked a sharp response in Brussels and across key EU member states. European foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 20 November warned that any arrangement negotiated over Ukraine’s head would lack legitimacy and durability, according to reports in outlets such as Euronews.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said Europeans support “a long-lasting and just peace” and “welcome any efforts to achieve that,” but stressed that “for any plan to work, you need Ukrainians and Europeans on board.” “Putin could end this war immediately if he’d just stop bombing civilians and killing people, but we haven’t seen any concessions on the Russian side,” she added, and, asked if there had been any European engagement in writing the reported plan, replied: “Not that I know of.”

Dutch Foreign Minister David van Weel likewise underlined that Europe had not been consulted. “No, we have not been involved in the plan,” he said, adding that “what’s important for us is that whatever peace plan is on the table, Ukraine is behind it.” “Without the buy-in of Ukraine, you won’t get the support of the Europeans.”

France’s Europe minister Jean-Noël Barrot said “discussions should start with a ceasefire on the contact line that allows for negotiations on the question of territories and on the question of security guarantees.” “The only obstacle to such ordered discussions, so far, is Vladimir Putin,” he added.

Washington walks a fine line

Washington has now moved from back‑channel drafting to formally putting the proposal in Kyiv’s hands. According to the Financial Times (subscription), a US delegation delivered the 28‑point plan to Zelenskyy in Kyiv this week, with US Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll tasked with walking Ukrainian officials through the document and then sounding out Moscow on next steps. US officials quoted in American media describe the plan as a “comprehensive framework” and say both sides will have to make “realistic” and “necessary” concessions, signalling Washington’s readiness to push Kyiv toward compromises it has previously ruled out.

For the Trump administration, Zelenskyy’s decision is shaped not only by the frontline situation but also by a deepening corruption scandal at home. Investigations into alleged $100m kickback schemes in the state nuclear sector have already forced the resignation of two ministers and implicated a former close associate of the president, prompting what The Guardian calls the worst corruption crisis of his tenure. Analytical centers such as OSW and other Ukrainian outlets note that the affair has shaken public trust in the president’s inner circle and fuelled calls from opponents for a broader reset of his team.

Moscow: No “novations” to announce

Russian state media, including RIA Novosti and TASS, have seized on Western reporting about the plan, highlighting proposed cuts to Ukraine’s army and recognition of Russian control in occupied regions as proof that Moscow’s maximalist demands are finally being heard.

Officially, however, the Kremlin is keeping its distance. Spokesman Dmitry Peskov has told Russian outlets that there are “no novelties” in the dialogue with Washington beyond what was already discussed at the Alaska summit and that Moscow has “nothing to add” on any alleged 28-point proposal. The Foreign Ministry has likewise said it has received no formal documentation from the US and insists any credible process must address Russia’s broader “security concerns” in Europe, including NATO expansion.

What comes next

A US military and diplomatic delegation is in Kyiv this week to brief Zelenskyy and his team on the proposed framework, even as Russian missile and drone attacks continue to kill civilians and devastate infrastructure in Ukrainian cities.

For now, the Trump-backed blueprint has reignited expectations of new peace talks against the backdrop of a postponed meeting between Trump and Putin in Bucharest and fresh energy sanctions against two major Russian companies—developments that may increase pressure on Moscow to engage in negotiations, or at least to appear to do so, as it has on many occasions in the past.

Kyiv will put its first mini combined heat and power (CHP) plants with built-in protection against Russian shelling into operation by the end of 2025, deputy head of the Kyiv City State Administration Petro Panteleiev said, as the capital enters its fourth winter under large-scale attack on Ukraine’s energy grid.

The new gas-engine units are designed to keep critical heating and power infrastructure alive during blackouts, giving Kyiv a backup source of electricity when giant Soviet-era plants are hit or disconnected from the national grid.

This shift towards smaller, hardened power plants signals how Ukraine’s capital is trying to survive Russia’s long energy war: by breaking up vulnerable mega-facilities into a web of protected nodes that can keep hospitals, water pumps, and district heating running even when the main grid is burning.

What Kyiv is building and why it matters

In his interview with Hromadske, Panteleiev said the city is installing seven gas-piston cogeneration units, six of which are planned to go online by the end of the year.

These mini-CHP plants will:

• Generate over 20 megawatts each—enough to power roughly a third of a city district
• Feed electricity first to large boiler houses so central heating can keep working when the grid fails
• Distribute remaining power to nearby residential buildings and critical infrastructure
• Operate inside purpose-built concrete shelters to withstand near-misses and shrapnel from missile and drone strikes

Panteleiev stressed that these facilities are not just oversized generators: they are full-fledged small power stations designed from the start with fortifications. He noted that each site is being engineered individually, with local grid ties and protection built in from day one, and described the concept as one of the first attempts worldwide to pair distributed CHP with systematic physical shielding against high-intensity missile attacks.

Why giant Soviet-era plants cannot be fully protected

While Kyiv has completed the first level of protection around major energy facilities—gabion walls, earthworks, and other basic structures—the deputy mayor was blunt about the limits of concrete.

Talking about the capital’s two large CHP plants, he said it is “unrealistic to hide a CHP plant in concrete,” pointing out that each facility covers around 100 hectares—the size of an entire residential neighborhood. Even if the city encased some critical elements, nearby components would remain exposed; a successful hit on them could still disable the plant.

The city has poured more than 2.7 billion hryvnias (around $64 million) into second-level protection measures and distributed cogeneration projects, financed from the municipal budget and its own utility company, rather than the state budget. The broader mini-CHP program, including equipment, installation, and shelters, is expected to cost about 10.5 billion hryvnias (around $250 million), with some hardware supplied through international aid programs such as UNDP.

Surviving blackouts: priorities, not miracles

Kyiv’s new mini-CHP network is being built for a specific tactical reality: Russia has destroyed more than half of Ukraine’s pre-war generating capacity and repeatedly forces the country into rolling blackouts with mass drone and missile strikes on power plants and gas infrastructure.

Panteleiev said the city has an emergency “resilience program” for full blackouts, focusing first on:

• Hospitals and maternity wards
• Geriatric and social care centers
• Key water and heating facilities

Kyiv has prepared roughly 300 generators of various capacities and 55 mobile boiler units, a number expected to rise to 70 by year-end, to plug the worst gaps when grid power disappears. But he warned that there is no scenario in which backup systems keep the entire city fully powered: Kyiv normally consumes around 1.3 GW of electricity, and creating a parallel, fully underground energy system would require building something like 15 buried power plants—“from the realm of science fiction in wartime,” he argued.

Instead, the goal is to make sure that even during long outages, citizens can still access heat, water, and basic services while repair crews race to reconnect the main grid. Recent analysis of Ukraine’s energy crisis has shown that where transformers were placed inside robust concrete shelters, most survived repeated Russian strikes—a lesson now being applied to Kyiv’s smaller plants and substations.

A test bed for Ukraine’s wider energy defense

Kyiv’s experiment with mini-CHP plants comes as national authorities roll out a program to fortify 100 critical energy and infrastructure sites across Ukraine by the end of 2025, combining physical barriers, rapid-repair teams, and new operating procedures to keep power flowing under fire.

If Kyiv’s sheltered gas-engine (mini-CHP) plants can reliably keep district heating and water systems running through Russia’s next waves of strikes, they may become a model for other cities seeking to decentralize away from a handful of massive, easily targetable Soviet-era sites.

Ukraine’s state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia has signed a strategic contract with French manufacturer Alstom to supply 55 modern electric freight locomotives worth roughly €470–473 million, in a deal financed largely by international development banks and signed in Paris on 17 November 2025 in the presence of Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Emmanuel Macron.

The agreement on French-built locomotives for Ukraine aims to stop the rail system from hitting a “traction wall” within just a few years, replacing a war-battered locomotive fleet that averages 46 years in age while keeping export corridors open and accelerating the shift from Soviet-era infrastructure toward a more integrated European network.

What the new locomotives will do

According to Alstom and Ukrainian Railways, the order covers 55 Traxx Hauler dual-voltage electric freight locomotives designed for Ukraine’s 3kV DC and 25kV AC power systems.

Key facts about the contract

• Quantity: 55 Traxx Hauler freight locomotives
• Total value: about €473 million, with Ukraine citing a 37% cost reduction thanks to grant funding
• Financing mix: roughly €173 million in grants from the World Bank’s URTF fund and a €300 million long-term loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
• Production site: Alstom’s plant in Belfort, France
• Delivery timeline: first locomotive in Q1 2027, full batch delivered between 2027 and 2029
• Capability: power output of 7.2–9.4 MW, maximum speed of 120 km/h, Bo-Bo configuration with each axle powered individually, and Ukrainian-made safety and radio systems onboard

Henri Poupart-Lafarge, Alstom’s chief executive, called the contract “a significant milestone in our commitment to supporting the modernisation of rail transport in Ukraine,” stressing that the locomotives are tailored to the country’s infrastructure while boosting energy efficiency and reliability.

On the Ukrainian side, the new fleet is expected to replace roughly 80 of the oldest locomotives and cut operating costs by more than 30%, giving Ukrzaliznytsia more traction power with fewer vehicles and lower energy and maintenance bills.

Why Ukraine’s railways need new traction now

In its announcement on the official Ukrzaliznytsia website, the company describes a stark starting point: the average age of its locomotive fleet is 46 years, with overall wear exceeding 96%. Without rapid renewal, managers warn that in 2–3 years the traction deficit would become so severe that the railway could no longer move the volumes needed to sustain Ukraine’s export-driven economy, costing up to 10% of freight revenue every year.

That risk comes on top of passenger-side shortages. A recent in-depth look at Ukraine’s rail sector describes how wartime losses have left Ukrzaliznytsia with about 500 fewer passenger cars than in 2022, after at least 150 cars were written off in a single year, cutting daily capacity by thousands of seats even as demand stays high. Chronic ticket shortages are compounded by frozen, state-controlled fares and long-standing governance problems that make it hard to finance new rolling stock from operations alone.

At the same time, the railway has had to carry more with less. Company data show that in 2023 Ukrzaliznytsia transported around 25 million long-distance passengers, including about 2 million to EU countries, and boosted freight volumes by roughly a third compared to the first year of the full-scale invasion. The new electric locomotives are meant to lock in that performance before the aging fleet and wartime damage start forcing hard cuts.

Financing and industrial diplomacy behind the deal

Ukrzaliznytsia says the locomotives were procured through a World Bank international tender that drew interest from more than ten rolling-stock manufacturers from Europe and Asia, with Alstom Transport S.A. submitting the winning compliant bid. Independent technical and procurement consultants assessed the offers and concluded that the price per axle and kilowatt of traction power for the dual-system locomotives was competitive for this segment, especially once grant money is factored in.

The financing is structured to ease pressure on a company already struggling with war-time debt and collapsing freight volumes. Reuters has reported that Ukrzaliznytsia’s freight traffic has dropped by nearly half since 2022, with management warning of a possible 30-billion-hryvnia bailout need in 2026 unless tariffs rise and new revenue streams appear. In this context, a package where more than a third of the cost is non-repayable grant funding is politically and fiscally attractive.

The contract also doubles as a long-term industrial partnership. Under the terms described by Ukrzaliznytsia, the locomotives themselves will be built in France due to time and financing constraints, but both sides have agreed to explore integrating Ukrainian suppliers over the full service life of the fleet.

That includes potential local production of safety systems, communications equipment, brake pads, wheelsets, cabling and cooling systems, with a large matchmaking meeting between Alstom, Ukrzaliznytsia and domestic manufacturers planned for early 2026.

A modern service center for the new locomotives is also set to be created on the basis of an existing Ukrzaliznytsia facility in Ukraine, anchoring high-tech maintenance work and skilled jobs inside the country rather than outsourcing them to EU depots.

Railways under fire but still moving a country at war

The deal lands as Russia intensifies strikes on Ukraine’s rail network. According to Oleksii Kuleba, a deputy prime minister with responsibility for infrastructure, there have been more than 800 railway-related attacks on the network since the beginning of 2025, damaging over 3,000 facilities and causing about $1 billion in losses. Precision drone and missile strikes now deliberately aim for locomotives and traction infrastructure, trying to cripple the system that moves troops, Western weapons, grain and civilians.

Yet the railway keeps running. In recent weeks, Ukrzaliznytsia has described how, after blackouts and missile strikes in regions like Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, damaged trains and infrastructure were patched up quickly, reserve diesel locomotives were deployed, and long-distance trains rerouted over bypass lines to ensure that passengers still reached their destinations—often with only hour-scale delays.

The company is also redesigning schedules and depot patterns to reduce how long trains and crews spend in the highest-risk areas, explicitly trying to stay one step ahead of Russia’s targeting patterns. The new electric locomotives are expected to slot into this doctrine: higher power and better reliability should let Ukrzaliznytsia haul longer and heavier freight trains in fewer slots, making each safe corridor or window of intact infrastructure go further.

The locomotive order is not happening in isolation. Ukraine has already opened its first European-gauge railway between Uzhhorod and Chop, co-financed by EU instruments and designed to connect directly with neighboring EU states. Together, these projects signal a shift from merely repairing Soviet-gauge legacy infrastructure to gradually building an EU-integrated rail system even while the war continues.

What comes next

If everything stays on schedule, the first Traxx Hauler locomotive should arrive in Ukraine in early 2027, undergo certification and testing on Ukrainian tracks, and then enter regular freight service later that year. The full fleet would be in operation by 2029, overlapping with ongoing reconstruction of war-damaged infrastructure.

By that time, Ukrzaliznytsia is likely still to face many of the structural questions highlighted earlier—from governance and debt to tariff policy—which will shape how effectively it can use the new assets. In a railway system that has become a lifeline for Ukraine’s defense, economy and “iron diplomacy” with foreign leaders, securing modern locomotives may be one of the preconditions for longer-term success, while taking into account its wartime resilience.

A leak-based investigation by Radio Svoboda's Skhemy team reveals how a Kremlin-controlled "human rights" foundation has financed a network of lawyers, legal-aid centers, and websites in Ukraine. Presented as routine support for "compatriots abroad," it functions as Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine: undermining mobilization, spreading anti-Ukrainian narratives, and feeding Moscow's propaganda apparatus.

While international attention focuses on military aid and sanctions, this investigation exposes infrastructure Russia built inside Ukraine to undermine mobilization, normalize draft evasion, and produce propaganda materials—all disguised as legal assistance.

A "rights fund" built by the Russian state

At the center is the "Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad," known as Pravfond. An investigation by The Guardian based on leaked documents shows it was founded by Russia's Foreign Ministry and state agency Rossotrudnichestvo, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov chairing its supervisory board.

Danish public broadcaster DR received a data trove of tens of thousands of emails containing documents about this fund from a source and recently shared some of them with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and other newsrooms, including the investigative team “Skhemy” of Radio Svoboda.

Skhemy found Russia's Foreign Ministry earmarked around 180 million rubles (approximately $2.2 million) for Pravfond in 2025, with a slightly larger sum planned for 2026.

Pravfond's "Ukrainian direction" included:

• a Center for Legal Consultations in Kyiv, where lawyers received visitors and compiled reports for the Russian side on alleged “war crimes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces” and “violations of the rights of Russian-speaking citizens”;
• “legal support” websites whose most popular topics are emigration procedures, leaving Ukraine, and ways to delay or avoid military mobilization;
• analytic notes prepared by Ukrainian lawyers and sent to Russian government institutions, including the Foreign Ministry and State Duma.

In 2022 alone, the Kyiv center provided 318 free consultations, operating five days weekly while preparing analytical materials on "rights violations" for Russian officials.

The Kremlin built legal infrastructure inside Ukraine that could influence citizens' behavior while producing "evidence" for Russia's information and diplomatic campaigns.

Pravfond curators in Ukraine

Leaked reports show Ukrainian citizen Yevhen Baklanov overseeing Pravfond's Ukrainian operations from Moscow. Skhemy's investigation reveals his involvement in pro-Russian civic structures before the full-scale invasion.

Baklanov fled to Russia and has been wanted by Ukrainian law enforcement since 2022 on treason charges. Internal Pravfond documents and his Russian bank statements show he received three tranches totaling almost 5 million rubles (approximately $61,680) this year alone, plus 7.5 million rubles (approximately $92,520) the previous year.

Apart from Baklanov, the investigation identifies three other Russian curators of various "Pravfond" initiatives in Ukraine.

• Vyacheslav Yelagin is named as the head of Pravfond in Moscow and oversees overall operations.
• Maksim Zelensky is responsible for projects in Ukraine's south and east, managing local contacts and information platforms.
• Dmytro Mitskis, a journalist and editor of pro-Russian media, is involved in the organization's information support activities.

Lawyers in grey zone

Of those named, only Svitlana Novytska faces criminal prosecution in Ukraine for state treason, accused of collaborating with Russian intelligence and receiving Pravfond payments. The investigation cites an estimated $140,000 legal services budget ($5,000 monthly from 2020-2022) for defending alleged FSB agent Tetyana Kuzmych in Kherson. Novytska denies receiving these funds, and confirmed account deposits remain unverified.

Ukrainian lawyer Vitaliy Sobkovych was listed to receive 720,000 rubles (approximately $8,880) for analytic work and consultations. He told journalists he knows Baklanov but denied cooperation or involvement.

Volodymyr Menkivskyi, appearing in 2016 financial spreadsheets showing Pravfond payments, called suggestions he took Russian money "funny" despite Ukrainian tax documents confirming transfers from a Baklanov-linked NGO financed by Pravfond.

When contacted by journalists, named individuals followed similar patterns in their responses: some acknowledge past cooperation before 2022 but claim they severed ties; others say they attended events unaware of Pravfond funding; some flatly deny involvement despite documentary evidence.

When Skhemy contacted Ukraine's Security Service for comment on the lawyers mentioned in the leaks, the agency said it is 'taking measures in response.

Draft-dodging tips and "crimes of the Kyiv regime"

Pravfond projects built information pipelines targeting ordinary Ukrainians under the guise of legal support. The Kyiv center and related initiatives:

• provided hundreds of free legal consultations, with a strong focus on mobilization, border-crossing rules, and criminal liability
• maintained online Q&A where people could ask about deferment from service, leaving Ukraine, or getting removed from police databases
• operated legal-advice websites whose articles, such as “There are five official reasons not to appear at the draft office,” clearly target Ukrainian men worried about conscription

The pravcenter.org portal, overseen by Russian national Maksim Zelensky and republishing Ukrainian lawyers' materials, received nearly 2 million rubles (approximately $24,680) in requested funding, including 500,000 rubles (approximately $6,170) each for an editor and online consultant.

In internal reports, Russian curators present this activity as "denazification" of Ukraine, framing Ukrainian laws as systematically violating Russian-speakers' rights. Legal advice becomes messaging about "persecuted compatriots" and "crimes of the Kyiv regime"—narratives justifying Moscow's occupation policies and diplomatic posture.

Sanctions gaps: when national defenses don't line up

The EU has sanctioned Pravfond and its leadership since 2023 for destructive anti-Ukrainian activities, citing its role financing propaganda and legal support for Kremlin-aligned actors.

Ukraine imposed national sanctions earlier in 2021, but some measures were time-limited and were not renewed last year, even as new leaks showed continued targeting of Ukrainian society. When journalists of Skhemy asked who was responsible, several ministries referred them to an interagency sanctions group that declined public comment.

At the same time, the EU created a dedicated sanctions framework for hybrid threats, allowing it to target individuals and entities involved in disinformation, cyberattacks, and sabotage on behalf of Russia.

The Pravfond case exposes misalignment risks: when Ukraine's sanctions architecture lags or loosens, hostile actors gain maneuvering room even as Brussels tightens restrictions.

One cog in a much bigger hybrid machine

The Pravfond leak fits a recognizable pattern. Investigations trace Kremlin-linked networks of fake news outlets and AI-generated content, with an AI-powered Russian propaganda wave churning out fabricated stories for Western audiences.

Russian hybrid threats now combine disinformation operations, cyberattacks, economic pressure, covert financing, and—increasingly—legal and NGO fronts like Pravfond.

This leak provides granularity: hybrid war doesn't just move through troll farms or hacking units but also through legal practices, consultation hotlines, and NGO projects promising to "defend your rights."

Russia's war against Ukraine is fought with artillery and missiles but also with invoices, legal briefs, and memoranda on NGO letterhead. The Pravfond story reminds us that every niche—even a small office offering free consultations—can become another cog in Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine when no one watches where money comes from.

In a long on-camera conversation on the MDMEETS – Essential Talks with Mathias Döpfner show, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán laid out a “peace” vision for Russia’s war against Ukraine that would freeze Russian gains, slash Western support for Kyiv, and sideline the EU from any settlement. Speaking about his meeting with Donald Trump, Orbán insisted the former US president is the only leader who can end the war and portrayed himself as a lone mediator between Moscow and the West.

Orbán’s comments on Essential Talks show how a sitting EU and NATO leader is amplifying Kremlin-friendly narratives from inside the bloc, undermining support for Ukraine while demanding that Brussels remake itself around his agenda. For Ukraine’s partners, this is not just Hungarian domestic politics — it is a strategic vulnerability inside Europe’s own camp.

Trump as “man of peace,” Ukraine as expendable bargaining chip

Asked directly about Ukraine, Orbán gushes over Trump. In his words, "Donald Trump is the man of peace."

He claims that if Trump had been in office when Russia launched its full-scale invasion, “the war is over” within a day, or it would never have started at all. In Orbán’s telling, Trump’s pro-business instincts make war irrational, so peace is simply a matter of letting a few “real leaders” cut a deal between Moscow and Washington.

Ukraine barely appears in this story as a sovereign actor. Instead, Orbán suggests:

• the West should stop “escalating” and avoid showing military strength on the battlefield,
• negotiations should be led by Trump and other “big guys,” with Kyiv reduced to an object of talks,
• Russia’s nuclear arsenal makes any effort to help Ukraine win too dangerous, so the priority is to “stop” the war quickly, not justly.

This framing mirrors the Kremlin’s long-running line: that only Washington really matters, Ukraine cannot win, and the price of “peace” is accepting Russia’s gains.

Orbán's ”peace for Ukraine” plan that bakes in Russian occupation

When pressed about territory, Orbán refuses to say whether he would accept Russia keeping Crimea and the Donbas — but then immediately predicts that Russia will take more. On Donetsk, he shrugs that, “if miracle will not happen they will” — a reference to Russian forces occupying the region.

From there, his “peace” architecture looks like this:

• freeze the front line and “stabilize the eastern border of Ukraine,”
• negotiate what weapons Russia may keep on that line — and what NATO countries may deploy on the western side,
• create a demilitarized zone,
• then decide who will finance and rebuild Ukraine and whether Russia returns to global energy trade.

It is striking what is missing:

• No demand that Russia withdraw from occupied Ukrainian territory.
• No acknowledgement of Ukrainian security guarantees on their own terms.
• No mention of justice for war crimes or the right of Ukrainians to choose their future.

Instead, Orbán says openly that he doesn’t care whether this outcome is “losing or winning for Putin” as long as it produces a new European “security system” that works for “us” — meaning Europeans like him.

“This war kills European Union”: turning EU aid into the villain

Orbán’s sharpest anger is not directed at Russia, but at Brussels and Kyiv. He argues that continuing to support Ukraine is destroying the EU’s economy and finances:

He complains that the EU has already spent around €185 billion, that the European economy is losing competitiveness, and that “this war kills European Union” — economically and financially.

To justify cutting Ukraine off, he leans on two Kremlin-friendly tropes:

• “Ukraine can’t win.” Orbán flatly states that Europe is “financing a country” with no chance of victory, so further aid is irrational.
• “Ukraine is corrupt.” He cites recent scandals and even repeats his earlier smear that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is part of a “war corruption mafia,” using this as an argument to stop support rather than to demand reforms.

This is not an abstract philosophical debate. In Brussels, Orbán has already blocked or threatened to block multiple EU aid packages and sanctions rounds, aimed at stopping Russian war, forcing other member states to work around him to keep backing Kyiv.

His interview positions are fully consistent with his behavior at home, where he recently launched a nationwide petition branding EU defense initiatives as “war plans” and urging Hungarians to reject further military aid for Ukraine — directly attacking the tools Kyiv needs to survive.

Outlier in Brussels: portraying the EU as a failing “empire”

Orbán repeatedly describes the EU not as a community he helped build, but as a hostile power trying to “blackmail” and “suffocate” Hungary economically. He even claims that the main reason he needs a financial “shield” from Trump is against Brussels, not Moscow.

In the interview, he:

• calls the current integration model a failure, saying “Europe as it is failed under this integration process,”
• argues that EU “disintegration is going on” and that the Union is effectively dying,
• denounces EU institutions as “occupied” by left-liberal forces pushing an “imperialistic” project that crushes national sovereignty.

On Ukraine, this translates into Orbán standing almost alone in the European Council — abstaining or vetoing where others back sanctions, aid, and accession talks. Other EU leaders have increasingly treated him as an outlier, finding legal and political workarounds to bypass his vetoes and reaffirm support for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Shared playbook with Trump on Ukraine and Europe

Orbán underlines that his worldview and Trump’s are aligned not just on Ukraine but on Europe more broadly. He praises Trump as an anti-bureaucratic “real leader” and complains that the EU has become a war-mongering bureaucracy.

The overlap looks like this:

• Quick-fix personal diplomacy. Both men promise they can end the war rapidly through personal deals with Putin, with Trump previously boasting he could do it in “24 hours” and Orbán now insisting that only Trump can be “a good instrument to make a peace between the Russians and the Ukrainians.”
• Blaming the West, not Russia. Rather than focusing on Russia’s aggression, they accuse EU support for Ukraine of “prolonging” the war. Orbán says the “American president is in favor of the peace” while “Europeans… would not like to have a peace just now,” caricaturing the EU as addicted to war spending.
• Using Ukraine as leverage. Both have treated Ukraine’s survival as a bargaining chip in wider fights — Trump for sanctions and alliance politics, Orbán for energy and budget concessions inside the EU.

For Ukrainians and their supporters, this is a dangerous combination: a US president promising simplistic deals, and an EU premier eager to help sell them, even at the cost of Ukrainian territory and European credibility.

Why it matters for Ukraine and its allies

Orbán’s interview is not just another contrarian hot take. It shows how far a Kremlin-friendly framing of “peace” has penetrated into EU and NATO decision-making:

• Normalizing Russian gains. Orbán's ”peace for Ukraine” treats Russian occupation as inevitable and Ukrainian victory as impossible, helping shift the Overton window toward rewarding aggression.
• Undermining Western unity. Every time he calls EU support for Kyiv “irrational” or claims the war is “killing” Europe, he hands Moscow another talking point to exploit in European capitals already wrestling with war fatigue.
• Marginalizing Ukraine’s voice. A Trump-Orbán “deal” model sidelines Ukrainians from deciding their own future, turning them into objects of diplomacy between Washington, Moscow, and a handful of “big guys.”

Orbán’s long-standing political friendship with Putin makes it difficult to see him as a neutral mediator; instead, he appears as an outlier inside the EU whose positions routinely tilt toward Kremlin interests and away from Ukraine’s democratic choice to integrate with Europe. The rest of the EU — and Ukraine’s transatlantic allies — will have to keep building mechanisms that support Kyiv despite Budapest, not through it.

Kyiv residents endure 12-16 hour blackouts this winter—but the darkness was avoidable. Ukraine had proven grid protection works: under former Ukrenergo chief Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, 60 concrete shelters defended critical transformers, and nearly all survived repeated Russian strikes. But this success was not replicated across Ukraine's energy sector.

On 10 November 2025, Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau exposed systematic corruption at state nuclear operator Energoatom—1,000 hours of surveillance recordings documenting officials organizing 10-15% kickbacks while zero protective shelters were built at their facilities through autumn 2024.

Simultaneously, Kudrytskyi—who had secured €1.5 billion in Western aid for grid defense—faced fraud charges over a 2018 fence project where the state lost nothing.

The political prosecution triggered a predictable response: Western donors withdrew, international funding collapsed to 5-10% of previous levels, and critical infrastructure went unprotected.

The convergence proved catastrophic. At Ukrenergo's protected sites, transformers survived Russian attacks. At Energoatom's unprotected substations and thermal plants, missiles found easy targets.

Current blackouts stem from this dual institutional failure: corruption preventing infrastructure protection, political vendetta destroying donor confidence. Ukraine built the solution, proved it worked, then officials chose kickbacks over replication—and prosecuted the executive who delivered results.

Why this matters

The combined effect of corruption and political persecution deepened Ukraine's energy crisis by shutting down the main channel of Western financial support. International aid through Ukrenergo dropped to just 5-10% of previous levels after Kudrytskyi's September 2024 dismissal—from €1.5 billion over 18 months to a trickle.

Meanwhile, zero protective shelters were built for transformers at Energoatom, thermal power plants, and regional energy companies until autumn 2024, despite Ukrenergo completing approximately 60 such structures at its own facilities by September.

Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Energy Industry Research Center, told Suspilne that this loss of international backing is directly responsible for the severity of current blackouts—a consequence of institutional breakdown rather than Russian missiles alone.

When protection worked—and when it didn't

The protection systems built at Ukrenergo, Ukraine's national electricity transmission system operator, and Energoatom, Ukraine’s nuclear operator, tell a tale of two radically different management systems.

Under Kudrytskyi's leadership, Ukrenergo partnered with the government's Agency for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure to construct approximately 60 anti-drone shelters for critical transformers by September 2024. These massive concrete structures—up to 25 meters tall—were designed specifically to withstand mass Iranian Shahed drone strikes.

The effectiveness proved remarkable. According to the Verkhovna Rada's temporary investigative commission cited by Kharchenko, out of 74 protected objects built by Ukrenergo and the Agency, only one autotransformer was destroyed by a direct hit from a heavy missile. The rest survived repeated attacks.

Kudrytskyi explained to Espreso that Ukrenergo secured several billion euros in aid—significantly more than Ukraine's entire Energy Ministry obtained. Western partners trusted the company's management and saw results. Between 2020 and 2024, Ukrenergo attracted $1.5 billion in grants and loans, becoming the second-largest recipient of international aid in Ukraine after the state itself.

But outside Ukrenergo's network, the picture was bleak. At the time of Kudrytskyi's dismissal in September 2024, zero protective shelters had been built for transformers at non-Ukrenergo sites—including Energoatom facilities, thermal power plants, and regional energy companies, according to Kudrytskyi in his interview with the BBC.

Kharchenko confirmed that Energoatom didn't even begin tendering for protective construction until late summer or early autumn 2024. The unprotected Energoatom substations and open switchgears became priority targets, he explained, and current blackouts stem directly from this failure to protect key generation facilities.

The delayed protection had a simple reason, Kharchenko suggested: some officials questioned whether such expensive fortifications were necessary at all.

The $100 million corruption scheme

On 10 November 2025, Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau unveiled Operation Midas—a 15-month investigation documenting systematic corruption at Energoatom. Over 1,000 hours of surveillance recordings captured contractors openly discussing "Shlagbaum" (bar gate)—slang for the 10-15% kickbacks demanded from anyone wanting to work with the nuclear operator.

The scheme operated from a Kyiv office tied to Andrii Derkach, a former Ukrainian MP whom the US Treasury sanctioned in 2020 as "an active Russian agent" for election interference, and who now serves as a Russian senator.

Investigators identified businessman Tymur Mindich—President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's former comedy studio partner—as "Carlson," coordinating the money-laundering network.

Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko, who previously served as Energy Minister, appeared in recordings under the codename "Professor."

Mindich crossed Ukraine's border at 02:09 on 10 November—hours before NABU detectives arrived at his residence, raising immediate questions about information leaks. He's now believed to be hiding in Israel or Austria.

When asked about the $100 million NABU alleges was stolen through the Energoatom kickback scheme, Kharchenko was skeptical: "100 million—this is, well, maybe, 10%." The implication: the full corruption scale could reach $1 billion.

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Political prosecution and collapsing Western trust

Between 2020 and 2024, Ukrenergo chief Kudrytskyi secured $1.5 billion for Ukrenergo from Western partners—triple what Ukraine’s entire Energy Ministry obtained. He ensured shelters were built from donor funds: "We didn't spend a single budget kopeck on those shelters that Ukrenergo built," he told Espreso.

He was dismissed in September 2024—and the money flow stopped. Western partners noticed: Two Western board members—Daniel Dobbeni and Peder Andreasen—quit Ukrenergo, calling the firing "politically motivated."

The dismissal triggered a financial crisis. While talking to Suspilne, Kharchenko explained that Ukrenergo failed to restructure its Eurobonds in coordination with Ukraine's sovereign debt restructuring, pushing the company into technical default. International lenders won't provide new credits to an entity in default, and grant-makers grew cautious.

This funding flow, built around trust for Kudrytskyi, collapsed. "When Kudrytskyi was dismissed, the main channel of Western support through Ukrenergo was effectively closed," Kharchenko explained. "We lost international support for Ukrainian energy. We've lost at least 80% of what we could have received."

The aid flow plummeted from €1.5 billion over 18 months to just 5-10% of previous capacity. Naftogaz now maintains Western trust with quality corporate governance, but can only support gas infrastructure—not the devastated electricity sector.

Kudrytskyi now faces fraud charges stemming from a 2018 fence reconstruction project. The case centers on bank guarantees that Ukrenergo properly collected when a contractor failed to complete work—a standard commercial transaction where the state suffered no losses.

The charges materialized 14 months after his dismissal, following his public criticism of infrastructure protection failures by Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko—who was exposed in the Mindich tapes under the code name "Professor" within the criminal organization, according to information from the NABU investigation and reports from lawmakers.

For international donors—whether financial institutions or government aid agencies—trust and reputation of recipients matter fundamentally.

"When these donors see corruption scandals, or political interference in corporate governance, or political cases not backed by facts and made in half a day, this creates additional obstacles," Kudrytskyi told Espreso. "We don't have time to heroically overcome obstacles we create for ourselves."

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Information monopoly and presidential isolation

Kudrytskyi has been accused of failing to ensure energy security, despite having left his position 14 months earlier. The disconnect puzzled observers.

Kharchenko offered an explanation. He sees that people in Zelenskyy's circle are exclusively friendly to Halushchenko—the former Energy Minister now serving as Justice Minister. "Herman Valeriyovych knows how to communicate with people—I assure you, in person he's very pleasant, charismatic, professional, and convincing," Kharchenko said. Most people surrounding the president evidently receive information through one channel.

"I don't see the president, in the energy sphere, inviting people who broadcast any alternative thoughts and assessments, and listening to what's wrong," Kharchenko told Novyi Vidlik.

The monopolized information flow means alternative assessments of infrastructure failures and protection gaps never reach decision-makers. "When you have energy being attacked and negative things happening, and people around you point fingers at each other or say everything's fine, but it's evidently not fine—a manager in such a situation would invite an alternative viewpoint," Kharchenko said. "I don't observe this situation."

Ukraine energy crisis winter forecast: Attack, collapse, recover, repeat

Kharchenko predicted a predictable winter pattern: major Russian attack, followed by three to four days of severe disruption with 12-16-hour blackouts, then a gradual recovery until the next strike.

Three cities face the worst schedules: Kyiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv—massive consumption centers with insufficient internal generation. Kyiv and Odesa each face roughly one gigawatt power deficits. These cities will consistently endure the longest outages.

"I'm not an adherent of winter armageddon," Kudrytskyi told Espreso. "I don't think the energy system will collapse or there will be catastrophic consequences. We'll still survive the next winter. But of course, the question is the duration of outages and the degree of damage Russians can achieve to our facilities."

The strategic solution, both Kudrytskyi and Kharchenko emphasized, is accelerating distributed generation: replacing 15-20 large Soviet-era power plants vulnerable to missile strikes with hundreds of small gas, solar, and battery storage facilities scattered across Ukraine. Such a network would be exponentially harder for Russia to destroy and provide crucial regional resilience.

But distributed generation requires coordination, funding, and institutional trust—precisely what corruption and political persecution have destroyed.

The institutional breakdown

The failure wasn't technical or financial. In summer 2023, authorities identified several hundred critical infrastructure objects requiring protection—not just Ukrenergo substations, but power plants, gas infrastructure, and other essential facilities.

From summer 2023, Ukrenergo and the restoration agency built protection for Ukrenergo substations. But what happened at other facilities?

In his Espreso interview, Kudrytskyi posed the critical questions:

• Why didn't the Energy Ministry coordinate protection for all other objects at the same time Ukrenergo was building shelters?
• Why didn't it determine budget sources for such protection?
• And if there were no budget funds, why didn't it approach donors who were ready to help Ukrainian energy?

The answer emerged in November 2025 surveillance recordings: some officials were too busy organizing kickback schemes to focus on infrastructure protection.

Anti-corruption lawyer Daria Kaleniuk wrote that persecution of government critics through fabricated criminal cases had become a trend. Western board members Daniel Dobbeni and Peder Andreasen quit Ukrenergo in September 2024, calling Kudrytskyi's dismissal "politically motivated."

Now Ukrainians endure 12-16 hour blackouts at the heart of this energy crisis—not because Russia attacks, though it does, but because institutions failed to build protection systems, maintain donor trust, or prioritize infrastructure over personal enrichment.

"Any effective action against corruption is very much needed," Zelenskyy said after the NABU raids. But the damage was done. The coordination failure between protection, prosecution, and politics left Ukraine's grid more vulnerable than Russian missiles alone could have achieved.

Maxim Volovich

Trained in international relations, Maxim Volovich spent two decades as a diplomat and now covers regional and foreign policy issues as a journalist at Euromaidan Press.

Courts have detained five suspects while President Zelenskyy sanctioned two businessmen who fled Ukraine hours before raids in the expanding $100 million Energoatom corruption probe.

The scandal strikes at a particularly vulnerable moment. Ukraine generates over half its electricity from nuclear power after Russia seized the Zaporizhzhia plant, while citizens endure 12-hour blackouts from systematic Russian infrastructure strikes. The alleged theft—equivalent to 27 Patriot missiles or 40,000 interceptor drones—occurred while contractors built defenses for facilities under active bombardment, raising questions whether corruption functioned as simple enrichment or deliberate sabotage benefiting Moscow.

Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) 10 November revelations based on 15 months of surveillance, two cabinet ministers have resigned, the government has dissolved Energoatom's supervisory board, and authorities have announced comprehensive audits of all state enterprises.

Courts detain five suspects as investigation expands

Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court has ordered pre-trial detention for five individuals connected to the scheme, with bail options ranging from UAH12 million ($285.5K) to UAH126 million ($3.0M).

The court detained:

Ihor Myroniuk, former adviser to Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko, with bail set at $3 million. Prosecutors identified Myroniuk, codenamed "Rocket" in surveillance recordings, as having taken control of Energoatom's procurement processes alongside the company's security director.

Dmytro Basov, Energoatom's former executive director for physical protection, faces 60 days detention with $951.7K bail.

The court also detained three back office employees allegedly involved in money laundering: Liudmyla Zorina $285.5K Lesia Ustymenko $594.8K, and Ihor Fursenko.

Zelenskyy imposes sanctions on fleeing suspects

On 13 November, Volodymyr Zelenskyy also signed a decree imposing sanctions on two individuals implicated in the NABU case concerning Energoatom. As of the latest reports, these two individuals are:

Timur Mindich: A businessman and close associate of President Zelenskyy, as well as a co-owner of the president's former production company, Kvartal 95. NABU investigators allege he was the main organizer of the corruption scheme.

Oleksandr Tsukerman: A businessman alleged to have led the "back office" used for laundering the illicit funds (reportedly around $100 million).

Reportedly, both are citizens of Israel and fled Ukraine just hours before NABU detectives arrived to search.

The sanctions, in force for three years, include:

• Revocation of state awards of Ukraine
• Asset blocking in Ukraine
• Restrictions on trade operations
• Prevention of capital withdrawal from Ukraine
• Suspension of economic and financial obligations
• Termination or suspension of licenses and permits

Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk clarified the decision "provides for a full standard package, including the blocking of assets on the territory of Ukraine, regardless of the citizenship of the persons to whom they are applied," Interfax noted.

Energoatom supervisory board sacked, ministers announce resignation

The immediate political fallout has been swift, as President Zelenskyy in his address called for the dismissal of two ministers linked to the energy portfolio. Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko, who previously served as Energy Minister, and current Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk both tendered their resignations on 12 November. The Ukrainian Parliament is expected to vote on their dismissal on Tuesday, 18 November.

The Ministry of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture will submit proposals for a new Energoatom Supervisory Board within one week, working in cooperation with G7 partner countries, Ukrinform reported. The previous board was dissolved on 11 November after the Cabinet of Ministers deemed its work unsatisfactory.

"At the direction of Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, in cooperation with G7 partners, will submit proposals to the government within the week for the new composition of the Supervisory Board," the ministry announced. An international advisory firm has been appointed to assist the selection process.

The State Audit Service has launched a comprehensive audit of Energoatom, with procurement review to be completed within 15 working days and a full company audit within 90 days. The findings will be forwarded to law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies.

Prime Minister Svyrydenko on 13 November announced Ukraine will conduct audits of all state-owned companies. "Eradicating corruption is a matter of honor and, most importantly, dignity. We bear responsibility before our defenders," she commented.

Ukraine Energoatom scandal investigation expands to examine Russian links

Some Ukrainian analysts view the scandal through a different lens—as potential evidence of Russian penetration rather than simple enrichment.

Olena Tregub, a prominent anti-corruption advocate, argued that the money-laundering schemes in the energy sector lead back to Andriy Derkach—an officially designated Russian agent and former Ukrainian politician now serving in Russia's parliament. Members of his network were employed inside Energoatom and participated in the alleged corruption scheme.

"This raises an uncomfortable but necessary question: were these officials stealing money simply to enrich themselves and buy luxury properties abroad—or were they intentionally weakening Ukraine?" Tregub wrote. The consequences include increased blackout risks and degraded defense capabilities, which would directly benefit Russia.

The Security Service of Ukraine has opened a separate investigation into Mindich for "assistance to an aggressor state" based on allegations about operations in Russia during the full-scale invasion.

Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK) announced on 10 November it launched a service inspection after being mentioned in NABU's published materials. The agency sent an official request to NABU for relevant information and confirmed readiness for "maximum cooperation with the public, media, law enforcement, and other parties."

"No room for corruption": the view from Brussels and Berlin

The scandal has sent shockwaves to Ukraine's Western partners, who are pumping billions of dollars in financial and military aid into the country. The reaction from European capitals has been one of severe consternation.

Speaking to Reuters on the sidelines of a Group of Seven foreign ministers meeting in Canada, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas stressed the urgency of the situation around the Energoatom scandal. "There is no room for corruption, especially now. I mean, it is literally the people's money that should go to the front lines," Kallas said. "I think what is very important that they really proceed with this very fast and take it very seriously," she added.

The European Commission, which is overseeing Ukraine's complex EU accession process, is reportedly monitoring the government's response closely.

This is particularly true for Germany, which has been a major supporter of Ukraine's energy sector. German government spokesman Stefan Kornelius told DW that Berlin is concerned about reports involving "a sector that receives considerable support from Germany." The government will "very closely monitor developments," he said.

While expressing concern, Kornelius also offered a guarded note of trust: "at the moment we have confidence in the Ukrainian government that it will ensure this be cleared up... and in the anti-corruption authority that it will lay bare this case and it will be brought to a transparent conclusion."

Ukraine announced the return of a group of children and teenagers from Russian-occupied territories through the Bring Kids Back UA initiative, according to Presidential Office head Andriy Yermak.

The returns underscore the ongoing challenge of recovering Ukrainian children from Russia's systematic deportation campaign. Since February 2022, Russia has deported 19,546 Ukrainian children according to the Children of War portal, with only 1,791 returned as of 12 November 2025—a war crime for which the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and children's rights commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova in March 2023.

Children face harassment, forced assimilation under occupation

Among those returned was a 10-year-old girl whose classmates bullied her for her Ukrainian heritage, Yermak stated on Telegram. Her younger brothers at kindergarten were forced to sing Russian songs and collect money for the occupying army.

A 7-year-old girl and her 2-year-old brother lost their mother due to Russian doctors' inaction. Occupation authorities attempted to send the siblings to an orphanage despite having living relatives in Ukraine.

Another young person returned, now 19, had endured torture and execution threats from Russian military personnel because a relative served in Ukraine's Armed Forces. After reaching adulthood, occupation authorities placed him on the military registry.

Recent investigations reveal Russia systematically channels deported Ukrainian children through cadet schools and military training programs. The militarization campaign targets children as young as eight, subjecting them to years of pro-Russian indoctrination before conscripting them into occupation forces.

Russia weaponizes children as political leverage

The returns come as Russia uses deported Ukrainian children as bargaining chips with Washington, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Russian officials frame limited returns as goodwill gestures toward the United States while continuing mass deportations.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently highlighted the Bring Kids Back UA initiative as the primary channel for facilitating children's returns. An international coalition of 41 countries now works to support these efforts.

"We are fulfilling the president's task—to return all Ukrainian children," Yermak said on his Telegram, thanking Save Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine's Joint Center, and international partners.

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Ukraine's Soft Loan Program delivered UAH 5 billion ($119 million) to 80 defense industry enterprises during its first year of operation, the Ministry of Defence announced on 12 November. On top of that, the ministry approved an additional 16 loan applications worth nearly UAH 700 million ($17 million), while 52 applications totaling over UAH 4 billion ($95 million) remain under review.

This financing is significant because it addresses a fundamental challenge for Ukraine's defense transformation: manufacturers need capital to transition from prototype development to mass production to meet immediate frontline demands.

How the Soft Loan Program works

The program offers manufacturers two financing options:

• Working capital loans: Up to UAH 100 million ($2.4 million) for three-year terms.
• Investment project loans: Up to UAH 500 million ($11.9 million) for five-year terms.

Defense enterprises pay 5% interest while the state covers the remaining percentage. Companies can apply through five partner banks that meet security requirements. The Ministry of Defence implements the program alongside the Ministry of Finance, the Business Development Fund, and participating Ukrainian banks.

"Safeguarding the workforce of defense industry enterprises is a matter of national security. Many key production facilities continue to operate under extremely difficult conditions to ensure that the army receives modern weapons and equipment on time. We are enhancing the conditions to ensure their continuous operations," stressed Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine Anna Gvozdiar.

Bridging the gap from prototype to production

Loan recipients use funds for production modernization, equipment acquisition, manufacturing expansion, and serial production development. The structure reflects a broader pattern in Ukrainian defense financing: companies build battlefield-tested prototypes and secure military contracts, but then need capital to scale.

While Ukrainian defense manufacturers can produce $35 billion worth of equipment annually, the loan program addresses the gap between this technical capability and the actual production volume. Companies often demonstrate successful designs but lack the working capital to purchase components, hire workers, and expand facilities to meet demand.

The loan program complements direct government procurement. For instance, Ukraine's Defence Procurement Agency paid UAH 104.2 billion ($2.5 billion) to 76 drone manufacturers during 2024-2025, demonstrating how rapid scaling responds to battlefield requirements. Manufacturers need both contracts and capital—procurement orders create the demand, while these soft loans provide the financing to fulfill those orders at scale.

Ukrainian forces hit the Starobesheve thermal power station in Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast late on 11 November, triggering a large explosion and subsequent fire that disrupted electricity supply across occupied territories from Donetsk to Mariupol.

The strike extends Ukraine's systematic energy warfare campaign into territories Russia has occupied since 2014. Ukrainian forces have conducted retaliatory strikes on Russian power infrastructure since October, after Moscow's winter terror campaign destroyed over half of Ukraine's pre-war generating capacity in early 2025. The Starobesheve attack shifts focus from Russian territory to energy supplies sustaining occupation administrations.

Strategic facility powers Russian occupation infrastructure

The Starobesheve thermal power plant, located in Novyi Svit settlement, has a reported electrical capacity of about 2,300 MW and serves as the primary source of power supply for the occupied territories, Militarnyi reported. Purported videos posted on social media appear to show a large explosion and subsequent fire emanating from the Starobesheve power plant, captured by local residents.

Petro Andriushchenko, head of the Center for the Study of Occupation, noted that the plant was damaged and out of order, which caused massive power outages in the occupied cities—from Donetsk to Mariupol. Residents say electricity in homes is intermittent, with some appliances malfunctioning, according to RBC-Ukraine.

The facility has been under Russian control since 2014. After Ukraine disconnected the occupied parts of Donbas from its national grid in 2017, the Starobesheve and Zuiivska thermal power plants remained the main electricity sources for the Russian-occupied territories, RBC-Ukraine reported.

Ukraine expands deep-strike energy campaign

The Starobesheve strike is part of Ukraine's broader campaign targeting Russian energy infrastructure:

• Days before Starobesheve, Ukrainian forces launched a coordinated assault on fuel and drone infrastructure in Volgograd, Crimea, and Donetsk
• Ukrainian forces conducted more than 160 precision strikes on oil refineries and energy facilities in 2025, reducing Russia's oil production by up to 90% and causing a fuel shortage of over 20%, according to Security Service of Ukraine chief Vasyl Malyuk
• Ukrainian drones and missiles have hit power facilities deep inside Russia for several consecutive nights, demonstrating both reach and precision
• The International Energy Agency estimates Ukrainian strikes cut Russia's refining output by 500,000 barrels per day, keeping processing rates low until at least mid-2026
• President Zelenskyy warned that if Russia resumed its winter terror campaign on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Ukraine would strike back in kind.

Foreign ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) nations convened in Niagara-on-the-Lake, Canada, on 11-12 November 2025, for tense discussions on global security.

The talks are dominated by Russia's escalating war in Ukraine, stalled US-led peace initiatives, and growing trade frictions within the alliance.

The gathering comes as the G7 confronts a dual challenge: maintaining a united front against Russian aggression while navigating sharp internal divisions over US trade policies and defense spending demands.

Divisions over Ukraine and US peace efforts

The summit opened amid clear divisions on how to handle the war in Ukraine. Most G7 members have adopted a tougher line on Russia than US President Donald Trump, who has prioritized his own peace proposals. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated before the meeting that Russia's "continuing war of aggression against Ukraine" challenges global freedom and security, requiring a united G7 front.

According to a report from Euronews, European allies are particularly concerned about uncertainty over US efforts to end the war, as well as a separate US-brokered ceasefire plan in Gaza that is reportedly faltering.

The German foreign minister emphasized that his country is providing an additional €40 million to help Ukraine endure another winter, specifically to counter Russia's "targeted terror attacks on the civilian gas and heat supply." This financial support directly translates into tangible resilience, helping Kyiv maintain civilian morale and infrastructure stability—a strategic goal to prevent Russia from breaking the country's spirit.

Trade tensions and defense spending

The talks were also marked by strained relations over US trade policy. As reported by The Associated Press, President Trump's imposition of tariffs on Canadian imports has created friction with the host nation. This economic pressure is coupled with Trump's demand that NATO partners, including all G7 members except Japan, spend 5% of their GDP on defense.

The AP noted that Canada and Italy are the furthest from this goal, though Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand stated Canada plans to reach the target by 2035. In a social media post, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio framed the US position, stating the focus is on "putting the safety and security of Americans FIRST."

Indo-Pacific and critical minerals

While Ukraine and trade dominated, the ministers also addressed long-term strategic challenges, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Kyodo News reported that Japan's new Foreign Minister, Toshimitsu Motegi, planned to "bring an Indo-Pacific perspective into G7 discussions and advance concrete cooperation."

A central part of this strategy is a G7 initiative to establish alternative supply chains for critical minerals to diversify away from China’s market dominance. This effort is a direct attempt to bolster the G7's economic and defense security by mitigating reliance on geopolitical competitors, a crucial step in the world's current volatile geopolitical situation.

Mykola Sedykh and Stas Balytskyi were eight years old when Russian occupation began in Donetsk Oblast. Now, they wear Russian military uniforms after years in cadet schools—victims of war crimes who may return to Ukraine as occupiers.

Ukraine faces a generation gap Russia engineered through decade-long indoctrination campaigns. Since 2014, Moscow has deported children from Donetsk Oblast orphanages and shelters, subjected them to years of pro-Russian propaganda in cadet schools, and channeled them into military service once they reach conscription age, according to an investigation by Ukrainian online newspaper Texty. The two young men now of legal age—Mykola Sedykh and Stas Balytskyi—exemplify how children removed from Ukrainian institutions become part of Russia's occupation forces, potentially returning to fight against their homeland.

Weaponizing childhood vulnerability

Eight-year-old Mykola Sedykh spent four years in a Khartyzsk shelter between 2015 and 2019, where Russian paramilitaries from the "Pyatnashka" brigade regularly visited, bringing gifts and displaying weapons, Texty found. For children without parental protection, these armed men became heroes rather than invaders. The International Committee of the Red Cross recently clarified that propaganda aimed at encouraging children from occupied territories to voluntarily join enemy military service constitutes a war crime, even when presented as voluntary recruitment.

Stas Balytskyi's trajectory followed similar patterns. After losing both parents during the war, Russian propaganda outlets exploited his image for "Save Donbas Children" campaigns targeting European audiences, using orphaned children to justify Moscow's 2014 invasion while simultaneously preparing those same children for future combat roles.

The cadet conveyor belt

Both boys ended up at Donetsk Boarding School No. 1, which deported 225 children to Russia on 18 February 2022, six days before the full-scale invasion. Director Olha Volkova, decorated with medals by occupation authorities, oversaw militarization programs including Yunarmia youth army participation before.

The institution has since transformed into a militarized cadet school named after Russian cosmonaut Georgiy Beregovoy, enrolling approximately 180 Ukrainian children starting from first grade, with a Russian citizen and war participant serving as military director.

Sedykh and Balytskyi were separated into different Cossack cadet schools—Sedykh to Kropotkin in Krasnodar Krai, Balytskyi to Ruza in Moscow Oblast, Texty reported. These facilities function as military boarding schools with weapons training, parade drills, and mandatory meetings with war veterans. Sedykh's school honors Russian General Gennadiy Troshev, who advocated public executions of Chechen resistance fighters during the 1990s conflicts.

Completing the transformation

Recent photos show both young men in Russian military uniforms. Balytskyi now attends Moscow Higher Military Command School training motorized rifle commanders and military police, while Sedykh appears to have joined a Kuban Cossack military formation, likely one of the BARS units currently fighting in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Donetsk oblasts.

Russia's Kuban Cossack forces deployed more than 9,200 personnel in Ukraine as of 2025. Ukrainian citizen Mykola Sedykh may soon return to Donbas—but as Nikolay (the Russian version of his name), an occupation soldier potentially fighting against his own country.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova in March 2023 for illegal child deportation. Ukraine searches for nearly 20,000 deported children, though Russia's children's rights commissioner claimed receiving over 700,000 Ukrainian minors.

Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) released audio evidence from Operation Midas capturing suspects plotting 10–15% kickbacks on Ukraine's nuclear operator protection contracts.

Businessman Tymur Mindich, allegedly one of the key suspects, remains fugitive as parliament prepares dismissal votes for high-ranking officials and the opposition European Solidarity party, led by former president Petro Poroshenko, pushes to disband the entire Cabinet of Ministers.

The 15-month investigation exposed a $100 million kickback scheme on contracts for nuclear facility protection—infrastructure Russia has systematically targeted throughout the war. With parliament now considering dismissal of top energy officials and Ukraine seeking Western funds for energy infrastructure, the case demonstrates whether anti-corruption institutions can deliver the accountability Western partners require.

NABU tapes reveal protection racket at nuclear operator

NABU published recordings capturing suspects discussing systematic extortion from Energoatom contractors. The suspects used codenames throughout the 15-month investigation.

According to MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak, the recordings feature individuals identified by the following nicknames, Novynarnia reported:

• "Carlson" – Tymur Mindich, businessman and co-owner of Kvartal 95 studio, associate of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
• "Professor" – Herman Halushchenko, Justice Minister and former Energy Minister
• "Tenor" – Dmytro Basov, executive director for physical protection and security at Energoatom
• "Rocket" – Ihor Myroniuk, former advisor to Halushchenko during his tenure as Energy Minister

While NABU has not officially confirmed all identities, Hromadske reported that law enforcement confirmed Myroniuk as a former energy minister advisor and Basov as Energoatom's executive director for physical protection.

The recordings reveal how contractors faced what investigators call the "Shlagbaum" (boom barrier) system: pay the percentage or watch payments freeze and supplier status vanish. One company allegedly received a 435 million UAH ($10.5 million) contract in 2025 after agreeing to the higher 15% rate, NV confirmed.

The tapes also capture suspects' awareness of investigative risks. In a June 2025 exchange, "Carlson" expressed concern: "I don't want to end up being served with suspicion," Ukrainska Pravda noted. A month later, "Tenor" discussed building protective structures with "Rocket," mentioning colossal figures and asking whether to continue. "Rocket" replied: "I'd wait. But, f***, honestly, it's a shame to waste the money," Hromadske transcribed.

Money laundering through Derkach family office

NABU investigators uncovered a dedicated money-laundering office in central Kyiv belonging to the family of Andriy Derkach, a former Ukrainian MP now serving as a Russian senator, that processed approximately $100 million.

The scheme operated like a bank—with its own "cash discipline," accounting, currency operations, and geography stretching from Kyiv to Atlanta, Georgia, and Moscow, Ekonomichna Pravda noted. "Through this office, strict accounting of received funds was carried out, a "black ledger" was maintained, and money laundering was organized through a network of non-resident companies," the bureau stated.

In intercepted conversations, "Rocket" and "Tenor" discussed transferring tens of thousands of dollars while inventing new transfer routes. The operational part of the "laundry" was headed by someone nicknamed "Sugarman"—presumably one of the Tsukerman brothers, Mykhailo or Oleksandr, Ekonomichna Pravda noted.

Investigators discovered the scheme used cryptocurrency for money laundering and collected cash at at least 30 different locations across Kyiv to avoid financial monitoring detection, Suspilne reported. A significant part of the transactions, including cash disbursements, took place outside Ukraine.

During searches, NABU officers found an item labeled "Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation" at the office of one scheme co-organizer, which the bureau called an "interesting artifact," NV highlighted.

Opposition escalates pressure with dismissal motions

Draft resolutions have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada to dismiss Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko and Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk, Ukrinform documented. The documents are listed under registration numbers 14200 and 14201 on the parliament's website. The initiatives were submitted by MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak.

Neither resolution has been added to the parliamentary agenda. Both motions are registered but not scheduled for consideration, and no date has been confirmed for votes on either the ministerial dismissals or a broader Cabinet resignation procedure.

Hrynchuk responded to the dismissal motion during a briefing: "I will not react to this because I do not understand the claims," UNN quoted. She emphasized continuing her duties: "I am doing my job."

Halushchenko has not publicly addressed the searches or dismissal motion. The Justice Ministry did not issue statements responding to the allegations.

European Solidarity party escalated the political response by initiating a procedure to dismiss the entire Cabinet of Ministers. "We are beginning the procedure for the resignation of the government—unprofessional and corrupt. Our goal is state governance, the unity of society, and the trust of partners. We call on all colleagues in parliament who are aware of the threats to the state to sign the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers for the sake of forming a government of national salvation," the party stated on 10 November, Interfax Ukraine reported.

The party statement emphasized the wartime context: "When millions of Ukrainians were left without electricity during shelling, when the best were dying every day at the front, another 'battery' was working in the rear—the one that charged the pockets of the chosen ones. One hundred million dollars that could have gone to protect the energy infrastructure turned up in Energoatom's schemes," Interfax Ukraine quoted.

Zelenskyy's broad condemnation avoids names

President Zelenskyy addressed the investigation in his evening address on 10 November, hours after the raids. "Any effective action against corruption is very much needed. The inevitability of punishment is essential," he stated, Ukrainska Pravda reported. "Energoatom currently provides Ukraine with the largest share of power generation. Integrity within the company is a priority."

The president neither mentioned Mindich nor addressed the searches at Halushchenko's residence. "The energy sector and every branch, everyone who has constructed corrupt schemes, must face a clear procedural response. There must be convictions," Zelenskyy continued. "And government officials must work together with NABU and law enforcement bodies—and do it in a way that delivers real results."

The statement marks a careful position for Zelenskyy, whose administration faced July protests after attempting to subordinate NABU to the Prosecutor General. Parliament reversed that law after mass demonstrations, restoring the bureau's independence.

Mindich's flight hours before searches

Mindich crossed Ukraine's border at 02:09 on 10 November—hours before NABU detectives arrived at his residence, LIGA.net confirmed citing law enforcement sources. Zhelezniak stated Mindich "will be hiding in Israel and Austria." The timing raised immediate questions about information leaks, prompting SAPO head Oleksandr Klymenko to create a commission investigating the possible data breach, UNN reported.

Separately, the Security Service of Ukraine opened criminal proceedings on 6 November under Article 111-2 (aiding an aggressor state) based on allegations that Mindich maintained business operations in Russia during the full-scale invasion, specifically diamond extraction and sales, Interfax Ukraine detailed. The FBI is investigating Mindich for possible money laundering connected to the Odesa Port Plant, NV noted.

Operational implications for wartime energy security

The alleged corruption occurred while Russia conducted systematic strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Energoatom, which generates over half of Ukraine's electricity after the occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, manages procurement for nuclear safety and protective construction.

Diverting funds from nuclear safety projects creates vulnerabilities that could compromise defense readiness. The investigation reveals a pattern where contracts meant to protect critical infrastructure instead enriched middlemen operating outside official authority—turning wartime security needs into profit opportunities.

With Ukraine requesting additional Western financial support for energy infrastructure protection, according to the European Commission website, the investigation tests whether Kyiv can demonstrate effective governance over reconstruction investments. The scheme's exposure comes as the EU has already warned that failures in anti-corruption enforcement could jeopardize €50 billion in assistance, Euromaidan Press reported.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on 9 November that Ukraine and EU partners are preparing the 20th sanctions package against Russia, expected within a month, as Moscow's oil revenues collapsed 27% year-on-year in October amid existing restrictions and falling crude prices.

The timing connects Ukraine's push for expanded sanctions with mounting evidence that economic pressure is beginning to crack Russia's war financing. Russia collected 888.6 billion rubles ($9.7 billion) in oil and gas taxes in October, down from the same month last year, according to Russia's Finance Ministry.

Ukraine's three-pronged sanctions proposal

Zelenskyy outlined specific targets for the 20th package in his evening address:

• Energy sector entities: Russian legal entities and individuals still profiting from energy resources despite existing restrictions
• Child abduction networks: Updated listings of Russians involved in forcibly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia
• Military supply chains: Companies and countries enabling Russia's weapons production through component exports

"Every Russian missile and every Russian drone contains specific components from other countries, specific countries – without them, there would simply be no Russian weapons," Zelenskyy said, directing Ukraine's Foreign Ministry to intensify work on cutting these supply lines.

Russian war chest shows cracks

The revenue collapse suggests sanctions are gaining traction. Russia's oil and gas revenues totaled 7.5 trillion rubles over the first 10 months of 2025, down 2 trillion from 9.54 trillion a year earlier. The decline accelerated from 14% in the first five months to 21% by October.

Multiple factors drove the drop: Russia's Urals crude averaged just $53.99 per barrel in October, below the government's $70 initial forecast and even its revised $56 target. Meanwhile, late October saw the US sanction Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia's two largest oil companies accounting for half of Russian crude exports—about 2.2 million barrels daily.

Around 70% of Russia's seaborne oil exports now face US restrictions. Analyst Vladimir Chernov of Freedom Finance Global estimates a 5-10% drop in Rosneft and Lukoil exports combined with wider discounts could cost Russia's state budget up to 120 billion rubles ($1.3 billion) monthly.

Moscow's budget scramble

Russia's Finance Ministry expects a 22% shortfall in hydrocarbon revenues for 2025, projecting just 8.6 trillion rubles against an initial 10.94 trillion target. The ministry sees no significant recovery through 2028, with oil and gas revenues projected at 8.9 trillion in 2026, 9 trillion in 2027, and 9.7 trillion in 2028—still 20%, 19%, and 13% below 2024 levels respectively.

To plug widening fiscal gaps expected to reach 5.7 trillion rubles this year and exceed 10 trillion over the next three years, Moscow plans sharp tax increases. Value-added tax rises to 22% starting next year, small business taxes jump significantly, and the Finance Ministry aims to raise 12 trillion rubles through new borrowing.

Ukraine tightens domestic enforcement

Ukraine also introduced new sanctions Saturday targeting Russian government officials, occupation administrators, propagandists, collaborators, and military-industrial complex workers. "Russia continues its war, and in response, there must be our strong pressure with partners – pressure that is truly tangible for Russia, that brings them losses and that is felt politically," Zelenskyy said.

The president emphasized that all Russian attempts to disrupt processes with the United States and Europe would receive sanctions responses, declaring: "Everything gets its own reaction, its own sanctions."

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Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) revealed on 10 November 2025 an intricate corruption scheme at Energoatom: unvetted operatives wielding control over the country's state nuclear company through systematic bribery. Over 1,000 hours of surveillance recordings and 70 nationwide raids documented how these external actors, without formal positions, made critical decisions affecting the strategic enterprise.

The investigation, dubbed Operation Midas, targeted businessman Timur Mindich, co-owner of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's former comedy studio Kvartal 95, along with Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko, who previously served as energy minister, and several Energoatom executives, according to Ukrainian outlet NV.

MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak said Mindich left Ukraine hours before NABU officers arrived and "will be hiding in Israel and Austria," Interfax Ukraine reported.

How the scheme operated: kickbacks and shadow control

The evidence is stark: video and audio recordings show Energoatom contractors openly discussing bribe percentages—10 to 15 percent of contract values, investigators found. They call it "Shlagbaum," or boom barrier, slang for an obstacle designed to extract payments.

The scheme was ruthlessly systematic: prosecutors say bribes were demanded in exchange for avoiding blocked payments or loss of supplier status."In fact, management of the strategic enterprise with annual revenue of over $4.7 billion was carried out not by official employees, but by outsiders who had no formal authority, yet took on the role of 'watchers,'" NABU specialists said.

The recordings capture conversations about halting critical infrastructure protection projects—not for engineering reasons, but over monetary disputes about kickback rates.

Who investigators targeted in nationwide raids

The operation zeroed in on a network of officials and businessmen, including:

• Timur Mindich: Businessman and Kvartal 95 co-owner whose interests reportedly span defense (drone manufacturer Fire Point) and energy sectors. Media reports claim the FBI is investigating him for money laundering in cooperation with NABU.
• Herman Halushchenko: Current Justice Minister who served as Energy Minister during the period under investigation. Zheleznyak submitted a formal request for his dismissal.
• Ihor Myroniuk: Former advisor to Halushchenko whom sources describe as an "overseer" who met with contractors in back-office negotiations. NABU conducted searches at his residence.
• Zukerman brothers (Mykhailo and Oleksandr): Financiers who allegedly handled Mindich's business operations. Zhelezniak reported both fled Ukraine, though NABU officers intercepted one brother during a summer escape attempt.

Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk also faces dismissal calls over alleged connections to the scheme.

Political fallout and parallel investigations

The scandal has triggered immediate fallout. Parliament member Zheleznyak branded it "systemic corruption" demanding action, and dismissal requests for Galushchenko and Hrynchuk face Parliamentary vote.

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) is separately investigating Mindich for "assistance to an aggressor state" based on allegations about diamond extraction and sales operations in Russia during the full-scale invasion, Interfax Ukraine reported. SBU's Main Investigation Department confirmed on 6 November 2025 that it opened criminal proceedings under Article 111-2 of Ukraine's Criminal Code.

Wartime vulnerability: what this means for Ukraine's energy security

The alleged corruption occurred while Ukraine's energy infrastructure faced systematic Russian missile and drone attacks. As a state enterprise managing nuclear power operations with annual revenues exceeding $4.7 billion, Energoatom's procurement and staffing processes offered lucrative opportunities for corrupt actors.

"Corruption in the energy sector, money laundering, illegal enrichment," Oleksandr Abakumov, head of NABU's detective unit, outlined as the main directions of the large-scale investigation, NV reported.

Diverting funds meant for nuclear safety and infrastructure projects creates vulnerabilities that could compromise defense readiness and undermine public trust in government accountability during wartime.

What happens next

NABU has not publicly identified all participants in the alleged criminal organization. Prosecutors say audio and video evidence will support further prosecutions as the investigation expands.

The case is seen as a critical test for Ukraine's anti-corruption infrastructure. Western governments have previously defended NABU's independence, viewing such enforcement as essential to Ukraine's European integration path and its ability to maintain international support.

The investigation also raises serious governance questions for Energoatom. Before the full-scale invasion, the company generated approximately half of Ukraine's electricity. With the six-reactor Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant under Russian occupation since March 2022, the integrity of the company's remaining operations is paramount.

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Hungary became the first NATO ally to secure exemption from US sanctions on Russian energy when President Donald Trump granted Prime Minister Viktor Orban a one-year waiver during their 7 November White House meeting, a White House official confirmed to Reuters.

The exemption allows Hungary to continue purchasing Russian oil and gas in exchange for over $1.4 billion in Hungarian commitments to US nuclear, defense, and energy purchases. The move marks a significant breach in Western sanctions against Russia, as Orban—who has vowed to veto Ukraine's EU accession and opposes its NATO membership—openly aligned with Trump in characterizing the war as unwinnable and positioning both leaders as the sole "pro-peace" voices in the West.

This development threatens Ukraine's strategic position because it weakens the coordinated sanctions regime designed to constrain Russian energy revenues that fund Moscow's war effort, while emboldening an EU and NATO member to maintain financial flows to Russia and block Ukrainian integration into Western security structures.

What happened at the White House

Trump welcomed Orban for a bilateral meeting and lunch that yielded immediate economic and diplomatic results.

Politico reported that Hungary signed a memorandum of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation valued at $20 billion, including construction of 10 small modular reactors in Budapest using US nuclear technology. Hungary also committed to purchasing $114 million in nuclear fuel from US-based Westinghouse, $600 million in liquified natural gas, and $700 million in defense materials.

The centerpiece of Orban's visit was securing relief from US sanctions targeting Russian energy. According to Reuters, a White House official confirmed Hungary received a one-year exemption from sanctions on Russian oil and gas. Trump justified the decision by citing Hungary's landlocked geography, stating "it's very difficult for him to get the oil and gas from other areas" and noting that Hungary lacks seaports for alternative energy imports.

The exemption contradicts Trump's previous pressure on European nations to cut Russian energy purchases to economically isolate Moscow.

BBC analysis noted that Hungary and Slovakia together have paid Russia $13 billion for oil between Russia's February 2022 invasion and the end of 2024, providing critical hard currency to Moscow despite Western sanctions efforts.

Why this matters for Ukraine's security

The sanctions exemption directly undermines Ukraine's defensive capabilities by preserving Russian energy revenues that finance military operations. Russian oil and gas sales remain Moscow's primary source of hard currency for weapons procurement, troop salaries, and military industrial production—the economic foundation sustaining Russia's invasion.

More strategically, the exemption creates the first formal crack in the unified Western sanctions architecture. If a NATO and EU member can obtain preferential treatment on Russian energy, other nations may seek similar exemptions, accelerating the collapse of coordinated economic pressure that has been one of the West's primary non-military tools against Russian aggression.

The exemption also rewards Orban's obstructionism toward Ukraine within European institutions. Politico reported that Orban has declared he would veto Ukraine's accession to the European Union and opposes Ukrainian NATO membership—positions that directly contradict the policies of most NATO allies and EU members who view Ukrainian integration as essential to long-term European security.

Orban's opposition to Ukrainian victory and Western support

During the White House meeting, Orban openly expressed skepticism about Ukraine's ability to prevail militarily against Russia. When Trump asked whether Orban believed Ukraine could win the war, Orban responded evasively: "Miracle[s] can happen," according to Politico. This framing aligns with Trump's characterization of the war as unwinnable through military means and contradicts the position of NATO leadership and most European governments that sustained military aid is essential to Ukrainian defense.

Orban described the US and Hungary as the only "pro-peace" governments addressing the Russia-Ukraine war, and characterized other European nations as "misunderstanding" the conflict by believing Ukraine can prevail on the battlefield, according to the Politico report. This rhetorical positioning isolates Ukraine diplomatically by suggesting that support for Ukrainian military resistance represents a misguided approach rather than legitimate defense of sovereignty.

Trump also revived plans to host a peace summit in Budapest with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Ukraine. Last month, Orban was reportedly offered the opportunity to host such a summit, though that plan "quickly disintegrated," Politico reported. During the 7 November meeting, Trump stated: "If we have it, I'd like to do it in Budapest"—suggesting Hungary could serve as the venue for negotiations that would likely marginalize Ukrainian input and European perspectives on territorial integrity and security guarantees.

The trade package and Hungary's pivot

The economic package Hungary committed to represents a significant financial outlay designed to demonstrate reciprocity with the Trump administration. The BBC reported that the nuclear agreement includes construction of 10 small modular reactors valued between $10 billion and $20 billion, which Hungary needs to power expanding Chinese battery manufacturing plants around the country. These smaller nuclear facilities face fewer construction delays and licensing complications than traditional large-scale plants.

Hungary also agreed to purchase $114 million in nuclear fuel from US-based Westinghouse for its Paks 1 nuclear power station, which was built by the Soviet Union in the 1980s and currently supplies approximately 40% of Hungary's electricity needs, according to the BBC. The US agreement to lift nuclear sanctions on Hungary may help restart the long-delayed Paks 2 expansion project, which has been financed and designed by Russia's Rosatom but faces persistent technical and licensing obstacles.

Orban framed the visit as the beginning of "phase two" in Hungary's improving relationship with the Trump administration, referencing what he characterized as "politically motivated sanctions" from the Biden administration against his top aide, Antal Rogan, who was sanctioned for corruption allegations, Politico reported.

Implications for Western unity and Ukrainian support

The meeting creates several concerning scenarios for Ukraine and the broader Western alliance. If Trump's precedent encourages other nations—particularly those with less stable democratic institutions or closer ties to Russia—to request similar exemptions, the coordinated sanctions regime could fragment rapidly. The divergence between Hungary's position and that of other NATO and EU members will deepen existing tensions within both institutions, undermining the unified deterrence posture that underpins Ukrainian security.

The exemption complicates Congressional support for Ukraine. Congress controls military aid to Kyiv and now faces questions about backing a country while its NATO ally undermines sanctions on Russia's main revenue source. Trump's willingness to host peace talks in Budapest, paired with Orban's skepticism about Ukrainian victory, signals negotiations could pressure Ukraine into territorial concessions and forced neutrality.

The BBC noted that critics argue energy dependence on Russia is merely being replaced by energy dependence on the US, while the Orban government contends it is achieving greater diversity of supply. However, the one-year timeframe for the exemption—expiring just after Hungary's April 2026 election—suggests the waiver is designed primarily to boost Orban's domestic political position rather than address structural energy security concerns.

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A Ukrainian court sentenced a Russian soldier to life in prison on 6 November for executing a surrendered Ukrainian prisoner of war—the first such ruling in Ukraine's history. The verdict exposes a pattern documented throughout 2025: Russia systematically tortures, kills, and conceals Ukrainian POWs from monitors, while international bodies report Ukraine provides Russian captives with medical care and unrestricted UN access.

Dmitry Kurashov, 27, shot 41-year-old veteran Vitalii Hodniuk at point-blank range in January 2024 after Hodniuk ran out of ammunition and laid down his arms, according to Ukraine's Security Service (SBU). Ukrainian forces captured Kurashov later that same day. He had been recruited from a Russian prison to serve in a "Storm-V" assault unit, Suspilne reported.

Why this verdict matters now

The Zaporizhzhia court conviction arrives as three major international investigations—by the OSCE, Amnesty International, and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission—published findings throughout 2025 documenting systematic Russian violations of international humanitarian law.

The reports describe a deliberate policy architecture: torture as routine practice, enforced disappearances to prevent accountability, manipulation of international monitors, and denial that captured Ukrainians qualify as prisoners of war at all.

The contrast with Ukraine's treatment of Russian prisoners could hardly be sharper. While Russia conceals captives and blocks monitor access, Ukraine maintains established internment facilities with full UN oversight.

Immediate torture and killings upon capture

Kurashov's execution of Vitalii Hodniuk is far from an isolated case. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported another case: 33-year-old Ukrainian National Guard soldier Vladyslav Nahornyi, captured near Pokrovsk in August 2025. Russian forces took him and seven other Ukrainian soldiers to a basement, hands tied behind their backs.

From his hospital bed, unable to speak after Russian forces slit his throat, Nahornyi described in written notes what happened next. The reconnaissance soldiers captured first had their eyes gouged out, lips cut off, ears and noses removed, male organs mutilated. Then Russians cut all their throats and threw them into a pit. Nahornyi was the only survivor. Using a broken glass bottle, he cut his bindings, bandaged his throat, and crawled for five days to Ukrainian positions.

His survival suggests many more Ukrainian soldiers may have been killed or tortured to death immediately after capture. Not officially recognized as prisoners of war, they never stood a chance at survival. The case exemplifies the summary violence toward Ukrainians that has become standard practice by Russian forces.

Systematic torture in Russian detention facilities

Amnesty International's March 2025 report "A Deafening Silence" documented torture methods used systematically across Russian detention facilities. Researchers interviewed dozens of former Ukrainian POWs and civilian prisoners who described remarkably consistent patterns: immediate torture upon capture, electric shocks, beatings severe enough to cause death, denial of medical care, and prolonged isolation designed to break prisoners psychologically.

Russian authorities use torture not primarily for interrogation but as punishment and intimidation. Many prisoners described being tortured even after providing all requested information. The goal appears to be inflicting maximum suffering rather than extracting intelligence.

Enforced disappearance emerged as another systematic practice. Russia refuses to acknowledge holding many Ukrainian prisoners, making it impossible for families to locate them or for international monitors to verify their treatment. Some prisoners remain "disappeared" for months before Russia acknowledges their captivity—if it ever does.

How Russia manipulates the Red Cross

An OSCE expert mission presented findings on 25 September revealing how Russian authorities stage-manage International Committee of the Red Cross visits. Moscow allows access only to select prisoners in relatively good condition while concealing others entirely, creating a false impression of compliance with Geneva Convention requirements for neutral monitoring.

The OSCE mission documented that Russian forces refuse to recognize captured Ukrainian military personnel as POWs at all, instead designating them as "persons detained for countering the special military operation." The same designation is used for detained Ukrainian civilians. Hence Russia treats them in criminal courts as "terrorists."

This classification, though completely fictitious and nonsensical, strips them of Geneva Convention protections and provides Russia with a legal pretext for abuse that would otherwise be clearly prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The report found that Russia routinely subjects Ukrainian military personnel to torture and summary executions, and maintains a system designed to prevent accountability. These policies may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law.

Ukraine grants "unfettered access" to Russian POWs

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission operates with "unfettered access" to Russian POWs held in established Ukrainian internment facilities. International monitors can visit any facility, interview any prisoner, and verify conditions without restriction—the standard required under the Geneva Conventions but systematically violated by Russia.

A March 2025 investigation by ZMINA.info examined why Amnesty International's major report on POW treatment focused exclusively on Russian violations. The answer was straightforward: Amnesty International Ukraine's separate study found Russian POWs in good physical condition receiving appropriate medical treatment. There was no pattern of systematic abuse to document.

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European defense possesses the economic and technological capacity to match Russian military power within five years, but severe shortfalls in ground forces and ammunition mean the continent remains dangerously unprepared for major war, according to a French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) analysis released on 4 November.

The assessment reveals a stark reality: Ukrainian resistance currently serves as Europe's primary deterrent against broader Russian aggression while the continent races to build military capabilities it should already possess.

"European countries have the necessary potential—that is, the economic means, military capabilities and technological expertise—to face Russia by 2030, provided they demonstrate the political will to do so," writes IFRI director Thomas Gomart in the report's executive summary.

That five-year timeline assumes Ukraine continues absorbing the bulk of Russian military power, giving Europe breathing room it has yet to use effectively.

Ukraine buys time for European defense to catch up

The IFRI study identifies Ukrainian resistance as one of two pillars preventing Russian military assault on Euro-Atlantic territory. The other is NATO unity, which depends on uncertain US commitment.

If either pillar erodes, the report warns, "the risk of an open armed confrontation between Russia and Europe, whatever the scale, would increase considerably."

This makes Ukraine's fight existential not just for Kyiv, but for a European continent that has failed to convert three years of elevated defense spending into the military mass needed to deter Moscow on its own.

Russia maintains what the analysis calls "a decisive advantage in terms of mass, firepower, mobilization capacity and tolerance for attrition." Ukrainian forces have countered this through innovation, Western weapons, and strategic depth—advantages European armies would struggle to replicate if forced to confront Russia directly before 2030.

Europe dominates air and sea but can't match Russia on land

The report quantifies Europe's military inadequacy in stark terms:

• Ground forces: Twenty of 30 European NATO/EU nations field fewer than 15,000 soldiers
• Ammunition: Critical shortfalls in stockpiles that would impede sustained combat operations
• Missiles: Production capabilities described as a "dire picture"
• Industrial surge: Higher defense budgets have not translated into tangible manufacturing capacity

The assessment notes Europe holds clear advantages in air and naval domains, plus qualitative edges in soldier training and command structures. But the analysis emphasizes that "the land domain remains Europe's weak point"—precisely where Ukraine has been fighting Russia to a standstill for nearly four years.

Europe's air superiority comes with a critical dependency: sustaining it requires "massive support from the United States," raising questions about readiness if US commitment wavers.

Economic strength without military output

The disconnect between Europe's economic capacity and military readiness defines the report's central tension.

European nations have enacted transformative industrial policies—the Critical Raw Material Act, Net Zero Industries Act, and Clean Industrial Act—while reducing fossil fuel import costs by 50% since 2022, saving over €250 billion annually. The continent possesses economic advantages Russia cannot match.

Yet these resources have not produced the ammunition stockpiles, artillery pieces, or troop numbers required to replace what Ukraine currently provides: a barrier against Russian territorial expansion.

The analysis concludes Europe's response to "sustained Russian hybrid warfare" has been "largely defensive and overly cautious," suggesting conventional military readiness alone cannot counter Moscow's full threat spectrum.

Russia's permanent warfare model

The IFRI assessment describes Russian strategy as "permanent, cross-domain and coercive," using subversive actions to "prepare the ground for an open military campaign, designed to be brief, intense and decisive."

This approach aims to "influence the West's risk assessment and paralyze its decision-making by instilling the fear of escalation"—a tactic that has repeatedly delayed Western weapons deliveries to Ukraine and slowed European rearmament.

Russia's updated nuclear doctrine reinforces this escalation calculus, lowering the threshold for nuclear use to include conventional wars against non-nuclear countries backed by nuclear-armed allies. While US, French, and British deterrence currently shields Europe, the report cautions that any loss of credibility in extended deterrence would leave Europe facing "a strategic imbalance with Russia."

Ukraine has effectively demonstrated how to counter Russian hybrid warfare through military resistance combined with maintaining societal resilience. The IFRI analysis states Ukraine is "showing the way to the rest of Europe" in opposing Russian aggression.

The 2030 calculation

Europe's path to matching Russian military power by 2030 depends on political decisions made now—and on Ukraine maintaining its defensive lines in the interim.

The analysis serves as both warning and roadmap: Europe possesses the resources and technology to build necessary military capabilities within five years. What remains uncertain is whether European political will can match Ukrainian military determination before the security architecture deteriorates further.

As the report makes clear, the continent faces a critical race against time, with Ukraine currently fighting the war that Europe may need to fight if it fails to prepare adequately.

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The European Union is preparing to sharply tighten its visa regime for Russian citizens by effectively ending the issuance of multiple-entry Schengen visas in most cases, Politico reported three European officials as saying. This escalation in penalizing Moscow for its war in Ukraine is expected to be formally adopted and implemented later this week.

This move signals a significant escalation, shifting the bloc's policy from making visas more expensive to actively restricting travel, limiting most Russians to single-entry permits only. This policy serves as a form of geopolitical leverage, balancing security risks with a goal of ramping up pressure on the Kremlin by targeting the Russian populace. For applicants, it may turn the process into a hard-to-win lottery.

New rules end most multi-entry access

The new visa regime, reported by Politico, will restrict Russian citizens to single-entry visas. Exceptions will be limited, primarily reserved for humanitarian cases or for individuals who also hold EU citizenship.

This decision follows a surge in Russian travel, with European Commission data showing over 500,000 Schengen visas were issued to Russians in 2024. While this figure is higher than in 2023, it remains a fraction of the more than 4 million visas granted in 2019 before the full-scale war on Ukraine.

A fragmented policy and national division

The European Union previously suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia in September 2022, which made the application process longer and more expensive. However, visa issuance remains a “national competence,” meaning the European Commission cannot enforce a complete ban.

This has led to a fragmented policy, as detailed by another Politico report. “Frontline” states like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland have imposed near-total entry bans. In contrast, other member states, including Hungary, France, Spain, and Italy, have continued to issue tourist visas at relatively high rates, a source of friction within the bloc.

Diplomat movement targeted in 19th sanctions package

The new visa rules for tourists run parallel to separate, long-standing proposals to curb the movement of Russian diplomats already stationed in the EU. This push, championed by countries like Czechia, aims to counter security risks, as reported by Euractiv.

These concerns were formally addressed in the bloc's 19th sanctions package. The Council of the EU announced on 23 October 2025 that the new measures include "strengthening control over the movement of Russian diplomats across the EU" to counter “hostile intelligence activities.”

Moscow condemns move, expands own travel bans

Russia's Foreign Ministry condemned the 19th sanctions package, which includes the new visa and diplomat restrictions, as illegitimate. In a statement on 24 October 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Brussels was persisting "on a course that is becoming ever more self-destructive for the European Union itself."

Zakharova also criticized the ban on EU operators providing tourism services in Russia, claiming the main goal is to prevent EU citizens from seeing the country firsthand.

In response to the package, Moscow announced on 31 October 2025 that it had "significantly expanded" its own entry ban list. According to a report from Xinhua, the measure targets representatives from European institutions, EU member states, and commercial organizations involved in providing military assistance to Ukraine.

New EU geopolitical visa strategy

These moves to restrict tourist travel and curb diplomat movement are part of a broader shift in Brussels to treat visa access as a geopolitical tool. The European Commission is developing a new, pan-European strategy that, while non-binding, will leverage its visa policies to advance the EU’s strategic interests amid an “increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.”

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Russia is aggressively recruiting hundreds of mercenaries from economically distressed Arab and Muslim-majority nations, including Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and beyond, to fight in Ukraine, using social media platforms like TikTok to promise massive salaries and expedited Russian citizenship. However, many of these recruits, lured by offers far exceeding what they could earn at home, report being deceived about their roles and thrust onto the most dangerous front lines with little training, according to multiple media investigations and family accounts.

Russia's strategy targets global economic desperation to fill frontline gaps, sourcing fighters who, if killed, will not spark domestic political backlash or require the official compensation given to Russian soldiers.

From TikTok to the trenches

The path from the Middle East to the Ukrainian front often begins with a social media post. For 24-year-old Mohammed Imad from Iraq, his final post on TikTok in May showed him in military fatigues with smoke rising in the background, captioned "Pray for me," as reported by The Arab Weekly. His family has not heard from him since, joining a growing number of Iraqi families searching for sons who were lured to Russia by promises of wealth.

Recruiters, operating on TikTok and Telegram, target young men in countries with high unemployment, like Iraq where one in three youths is jobless. These online influencers promote a package that seems irresistible: a monthly salary of $2,800—more than four times an Iraqi soldier's pay—and signing bonuses as high as $20,000, according to the Weekly's investigation.

A mix of money and faith

The primary incentives are economic, but recruiters also leverage propaganda. One online post declared, "Give me an Iraqi soldier and a Russian weapon, and we will liberate the world from Western colonialism," the Weekly found.

For those who enlist, the promise of expedited Russian citizenship for themselves and their families is a powerful draw, as reported by Netherlands-based analytical outlet Platform RAAM. Recruiters typically assure new volunteers they will have non-combat support roles, like cooking or driving, but in reality, almost all end up on the front lines, the outlet found.

This state-backed system, which includes officials from Russia's Foreign Ministry, processes volunteers on business visas and has them sign military contracts upon arrival.

A new, strategic element of this recruitment appears to be the integration of these Muslim fighters under Chechen command. Abbas al-Munaser, a 27-year-old Iraqi who joined the Russian army in 2024, confirmed in a post that he was fighting under a "Muslim Chechen commander," according to The Arab Weekly.

This approach suggests a Russian strategy of using a shared religious identity to manage and motivate its new foreign legion, leveraging the reputation of forces led by Ramzan Kadyrov, the Head of the Chechen Republic, whose predominantly Muslim units are already active in the war.

“There is death here”

Despite the slick recruiting, the reality on the ground is grim. Al-Munaser, who posts about his experiences, warned other Iraqis: "There is death here." He described what he had seen in Ukraine as "a war of advanced technology, a war of drones," unlike the wars they had known in Iraq.

The deception is a common theme. Many recruits are promised non-combat roles like drivers or kitchen staff, but upon arrival, they are given minimal training and sent to the front, an investigation by The Insider found. Some are deployed in "meat grinder" assaults—waves of soldiers sent to attack positions without armored support.

When these foreign fighters are killed, their families often face a bureaucratic nightmare, receiving no official word. This disposable nature of foreign troops is a key strategic benefit for Moscow. "If a foreigner dies, there are no social payouts and no responsibility; there are no relatives inside Russia who are unhappy with the war; and of course, fewer dead Russians,” said Andriy Yusov, a representative of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), as reported by TVP World.

Related:

• Russia, Iran recruiting Middle Eastern mercenaries for war in Ukraine - media
• Russia abandons foreign fighters in Ukrainian captivity - lured in by promises of riches

A new study of demining efforts in Ukraine has revealed a significant breakthrough: AI boosts Ukraine demining surveys, with artificial intelligence-analyzed drone imagery increasing productivity by over 800%, according to findings announced today, 4 November 2025.

The 18-month field study in Ukraine was conducted by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) using technology from AI security company Safe Pro Group. The results were presented at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 2025 GICHD Innovation Conference.

This technological leap is significant because it could drastically shorten the timeline and lower the cost of clearing Ukraine's vast contaminated lands, which are estimated to be the size of half of Germany and could take a century to make safe by traditional methods.

A dramatic increase in efficiency

The research findings, detailed in a report by Business Wire, focused on improving "non-technical surveys" (NTS). This is the crucial first step where teams identify suspected hazardous areas, allowing specialized and slower clearance teams to be deployed more effectively.

Compared to traditional survey methods, the study found teams using the AI technology achieved:

• An 800+% increase in productivity.
• 550% more potentially hazardous items, such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), identified per hectare.
• A 300% faster survey speed per hour per team.
• A labor cost reduction of approximately 50% per hectare.

How the AI technology works

The system, called SpotlightAI by Safe Pro, uses artificial intelligence and computer vision to analyze aerial imagery captured by commercially available drones. The AI is trained to detect small, hard-to-find explosive threats that may be missed by the human eye. This data is then converted into detailed 2D and 3D maps that guide humanitarian demining teams on the ground.

Dan Erdberg, Chairman and CEO of Safe Pro Group, stated that the data confirms the "dramatic impact SpotlightAI can have helping the nearly 60 countries contaminated with UXO return their land to productivity."

Kyaw Lin Htut, a Senior Advisor for Innovation at NPA, which co-authored and presented the study, added that the "preliminary findings of our study suggest an outsized impact in increased person-hour efficiency" for survey teams operating in Ukraine.

The scale of Ukraine's challenge

This new technology addresses one of the most severe contamination crises in modern history. Russian forces have contaminated an estimated 174.000 square kilometers, roughly 30% of Ukraine's territory, with mines and unexploded ordnance, as Euromaidan Press has reported.

Experts cited by the publication have warned that clearance efforts are severely hindered by the chaotic and undocumented mining practices of Russian forces. In some heavily affected regions, complete demining could take up to 100 years. The World Bank has previously estimated the total cost to fully demine Ukraine at $34.6 billion.

While the physical task of clearing mines remains a slow and dangerous process, this breakthrough in AI-driven survey technology offers a significant strategic advantage. By rapidly and cost-effectively identifying hazardous areas, it allows Ukraine's clearance teams to focus their efforts where they are needed most, dramatically accelerating the first critical step in returning contaminated land to safe use.

The United Kingdom is significantly expanding its air defence support for Ukraine, providing thousands of new interceptor drones and hundreds of missiles to help Kyiv defend its cities and energy infrastructure. UK Defence Secretary John Healey highlighted new support, including a joint program for a new "Octopus" interceptor drone, during Defence Questions in Parliament. This assistance comes as Ukraine braces for intensified Russian aerial attacks during the winter.

This new package is strategically significant as it provides Ukraine with a high-volume, cost-effective counter to Russian drone swarms, aiming to protect critical infrastructure and preserve more advanced missile interceptors for complex threats.

A new generation of interceptor drones

The centerpiece of the new support is a "first-of-its-kind joint program" for the "Octopus" interceptor drone, as reported by the UK Defence Journal. Thousands of these drones, which will be produced in the UK, are scheduled to be supplied to Ukraine on a monthly basis.

During his announcement, Defence Secretary John Healey said the support is a direct response to Russia’s intensified strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure, stating, “Putin's aerial bombardment of Ukraine is cynical, illegal and targeted at civilians.”

Expanding the missile shield

Beyond the new drone program, the UK has accelerated the delivery of other critical air defence hardware. Healey confirmed that more than 200,000 rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition and "hundreds of air-to-air missiles" have been delivered to Kyiv this autumn.

This builds on a steady flow of support throughout the year. A UK government factsheet published in September detailed provisions of additional counter-drone and air defence equipment. This includes a new system named "Gravehawk," jointly funded by the UK and Denmark, which has already been tested in Ukraine with more units to follow.

Earlier, in June, the UK committed 350 ASRAAM missiles, as reported by Euromaidan Press. Originally designed for air-to-air use, British engineers rapidly adapted the missiles to be ground-launched from the UK-developed RAVEN mobile air defence system. By June 2025, Ukraine had already operationally deployed eight Raven systems, with five more confirmed for future delivery. This £70 million package was notably financed using interest generated from frozen Russian financial assets.

A long-term strategic commitment

This latest aid is part of a sustained British commitment to Ukraine's defense. Total military financing from the UK now stands at £13.06 billion since February 2022, according to a House of Commons Library research briefing. The briefing notes that military financing for 2025 alone will be £4.5 billion.

This financial support is built upon a broader, long-term security framework. The UK was the first nation to finalize a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine on 12 January 2024, which was followed by an agreement for a 100-year partnership in January 2025, as noted in the parliamentary briefing.

Strategic implications for winter

The combination of new systems provides Ukraine with a layered air defence network. The high-volume, lower-cost "Octopus" drones, along with systems like "Gravehawk" and "Raven," are designed to intercept mass attacks by Russian Shahed-type drones.

This strategy is crucial for protecting the national energy grid ahead of winter. By using these systems to counter drones, Ukraine can preserve its more advanced and expensive missile systems, such as the US-provided Patriots, to defend against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.

Related:

UK delivers hundreds of air defense missiles to Ukraine months ahead of schedule

UK to build pilot batch of Octopus interceptor drones under joint project with Ukraine

Russian military aircraft have returned to Syria’s Hmeimim airbase between 24–29 October, ending a months-long suspension that began in March 2025 after President Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in December 2024. The renewed activity follows Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s 15 October visit to Moscow, where he pledged to uphold existing agreements on key Russian military installations in Syria.

The move underscores Moscow’s urgency to preserve its strategic infrastructure amid shifting alliances in the Middle East. Reactivating Hmeimim enables Russia to sustain logistical operations stretching from Africa to the Mediterranean, directly countering predictions that Moscow would lose its Syrian strongholds after Assad’s fall.

A strategic pivot or an effort to save face?

A source close to the Kremlin told Bloomberg that Russia has fully resumed operations at Hmeimim airbase, corroborated by open-source flight tracking data. A Russian Air Force Ilyushin Il-62M transport aircraft flew from Libya to Latakia on 26 October before continuing to Moscow. Meanwhile, Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan heavy cargo planes — capable of hauling tanks and air defense systems — landed at Hmeimim three times between 24–29 October.

Military flights to Hmeimim airbase in Syria have resumed after a nearly six-month pause, as Moscow and Damascus seek to restore ties following the ousting of Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad.he ousting of Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad.

"The renewal of flights indicates an effort by Russia and Syria to rebuild their bilateral relations after a period of instability for the Syrian leadership," Bloomberg reported.

Putin seeks guarantees as Syria’s new leadership redefines terms

During al-Sharaa’s 15 October Kremlin meeting — his first since taking power — the Syrian president vowed to “respect all agreements concluded throughout the great history” of bilateral relations. His pledge came despite leading Hayat Tahrir al-Sham forces, which had toppled the Assad government that Russia once fought to preserve.

Putin, striking a pragmatic tone, said Moscow was ready to renew cooperation on “interesting and useful beginnings” and praised Syria’s recent parliamentary elections.

Talks reportedly focused on Russian involvement in Syrian oil and infrastructure projects. However, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani announced that agreements made with the previous regime are suspended and "not accepted," a statement seen as directly targeting the status of Russia's Assad-era deals.

Diplomatic engagement is accelerating. A Syrian Foreign Ministry delegation visited Moscow on 27 October to reopen the country’s embassy, Bloomberg reported. Separately, Syrian Defense Minister Major General Murhaf Abu Qusra led a three-day official visit to the Russian Federation with senior military officials to discuss renewed defense cooperation, SANA reported.

Russia’s strategic foothold amid wartime strains

Reestablishing operations in Syria is vital for Russia’s ability to project power across multiple regions. The Hmeimim and Tartus bases have long served as logistical lifelines for Russian troops and affiliated units — including the Wagner Group and Africa Corps — active in the Middle East and Africa.

Losing either base would have been a significant strategic setback for Moscow, Bloomberg noted, as the Kremlin remains entangled in a confrontation it created with the United States and Europe over the war in Ukraine. US President Donald Trump has reportedly courted Syria’s new administration, meeting al-Sharaa twice this year, while Washington and the EU have begun easing sanctions on Damascus.

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has forced it to withdraw much of its expeditionary force from Syria. Maintaining a reduced presence now marks a symbolic win. Still, Bloomberg noted, Russia’s footprint in Syria is expected to be smaller than it was under Assad.

Syria positions itself for reconstruction investments

Syria has attracted $28 billion in investments during the first six months after amending investment laws, President al-Sharaa announced at the Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh. The president emphasized reconstruction should rely on investment rather than foreign aid.

Moscow portrays itself as a benevolent partner keen to answer the call for help.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said Russian companies are eager to participate in rebuilding Syria’s oil fields, transport networks, and energy systems. “Our companies are interested in using Russian equipment inside Syria, and this topic was discussed extensively during the meeting between Presidents Putin and Al-Sharaa,” Novak told reporters, highlighting Moscow’s long-standing experience in Syria’s energy sector.

Read also:

• Ukrainian troops crush elite Russian Spetsnaz "Senezh", involved in operations in Syria: commander killed, six eliminated
• Syria cancels Russian port lease, forcing military withdrawal from Tartus

Two US senators announced plans to summon Russia's ambassador to Washington for a hearing on the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children. The bipartisan initiative from Senators Lindsey Graham and Brian Schatz on 29 October aims to demand accountability for what Ukrainian authorities state are 19,546 documented child deportations since the 2022 invasion.

This congressional hearing represents a new push, moving the accountability effort beyond international courts. By seeking to publicly confront the Russian ambassador, the senators aim to apply direct diplomatic pressure, as legal enforcement of ICC warrants remains impractical.

A bipartisan push for accountability

Two US senators announced plans to invite Russia's ambassador to Washington, Alexander Darchiev, to answer for the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children. Senators Lindsey Graham (Republican, South Carolina) and Brian Schatz (Democrat, Hawaii) told The Hill on Wednesday that they planned to formally invite the ambassador to testify before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations.

The initiative follows growing concerns over the scale of the deportations and the preservation of evidence.

"This is a real atrocity, and the American government should help to establish the record and try to remedy what has been done," Schatz told TheHill.

The Ukrainian embassy in Washington has reportedly begun preparations for the hearing. Schatz acknowledged that senators likely cannot compel a foreign diplomat to testify, noting they would issue an invitation rather than a subpoena.

Kremlin's blatant denial

The Russian Embassy in Washington rejected the senators' initiative, calling it "just another provocation," in a statement reported by TASS. Russian diplomats claimed the hearing was intended "to cover up war crimes committed by neo-Nazi regime in Kiev against civilians, including children in Donbas."

The embassy accused Ukraine and its allies of waging a "campaign of lies and fakes of ‘tens of thousands’ of abducted minors," claiming that "the actual list presented by Ukraine does not exceed 339."

While stating that Russia is open to "cooperation in good faith" to reunite families, the embassy concluded that "Any Russian participation in such a highly biased hearing is therefore out of question."

The scale of the abductions

According to data from the Ukrainian government portal Children of War, 19,546 children have been documented as deported as of 30 October 2025. The portal also reports that 661 children have been killed and 2,205 wounded during the war, while 1,744 children have been successfully returned.

Key data from a September 2025 report by Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab includes:

• Total Facilities: Children from Ukraine have been taken to at least 210 facilities inside Russia and the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine since the full-scale invasion in 2022.
• Re-education Programs: Re-education activities aligned with pro-Russia narratives have occurred in at least 130 sites (61.9%) identified in the study where Ukrainian children have been taken.
• Military Training: Children from Ukraine underwent military training in at least 39 locations (18.6%) identified by the Humanitarian Research Lab.
• Facility Expansion: At least 49 of the 210 locations (23.3%) identified were expanded or had new permanent roofed structures added since the full-scale invasion.
• Government Management: Russia's government directly manages at least 106 of the 210 locations where Ukrainian children have been taken, including 55% of facilities where re-education occurred and 58% where militarization took place.

Concerns mounted that the collection of this vital data would be disrupted after the Trump administration terminated funding for the Yale tracking program in March 2025, which could result in the destruction of war crimes evidence. “This data is absolutely crucial to Ukraine’s efforts to return their children home,” wrote a group of US lawmakers.

International bodies cite genocide pattern

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova on charges of unlawful deportation of children.

Russia denounced the warrants but does not deny relocating Ukrainian children. Grigory Karasin, head of the international committee in Russia's Federation Council, claimed in July 2023 that 700,000 children had "found refuge" in Russia, "fleeing the bombing and shelling from the conflict areas in Ukraine."

In an official resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated that documented evidence of child deportations "matches" the crime of genocide as defined by Article 2(e) of the Genocide Convention, which includes the "the forcible transfer of children from one group to another group."

Despite these measures, returns remain limited. Recent successes include eight children who escaped occupation in mid-October. First Lady Melania Trump has also reportedly advocated for the children's return, exchanging letters with Putin.

Related:

Eight children returned from occupation: sisters bullied for Ukrainian language, boy hid from Russians

Swedish MP becomes OSCE special envoy for abducted Ukrainian children. Russia erases their identity and turns into future soldiers

The drone hovered overhead with its camera running. It followed a man as he ran from his house toward shelter. Tracked his movements. Waited. Then struck.

"We are hit every day," the man later told investigators. "Drones fly at any time—morning, evening, day or night, constantly."

That feeling—of being perpetually watched, perpetually hunted—turned out to be Russia's strategy.

The pattern emerges

Across three oblasts in southern Ukraine throughout 2025, the attacks followed the same method. Drones with cameras. Civilians were tracked as they fled. Strikes timed for maximum terror. Then something that made investigators certain this wasn't random combat: the drones came back.

The same targets hit again. And again.

Ambulances with clear protective markings—vehicles that international law specifically shields from attack—struck multiple times. Fire brigades hit while responding to earlier strikes. Humanitarian distribution points where civilians gathered for aid. Power infrastructure serving hospitals and homes.

The attacks spanned Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts along the right bank of the Dnipro River—a 300-kilometer stretch of Ukrainian-held territory. The question for investigators was: Was this chaos or coordination?

247 videos, 226 witnesses

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine spent months collecting evidence. They gathered roughly 500 videos from the affected regions, verified 247 of them, and interviewed 226 survivors and witnesses.

The evidence showed coordination, centralized command, and systematic methodology designed not to win tactical victories but to empty entire regions of their populations.

On 27 October 2025, the Commission presented its findings to the UN General Assembly's Third Committee with a stark conclusion: this isn't warfare. It's two distinct crimes against humanity.

This wasn't chaos, it was policy

War crimes and crimes against humanity aren't the same thing. War crimes can be isolated—a commander's decision, a unit's actions, a moment's brutality. Crimes against humanity require something more: a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. Evidence of policy, not chaos.

The Commission found the policy.

The drone strikes weren't tactical errors or collateral damage from combat. They were designed to spread terror and force civilians from their land—what international law calls "murder and forcible transfer of population." The Commission also documented a second crime: deportations and transfers of civilians from Russian-occupied areas, some subjected to torture.

The distinction matters for one reason: accountability.

The cases being built

International humanitarian law has rules even for war. The Fourth Geneva Convention—recently given updated guidance by the International Committee of the Red Cross—protects ambulances, civilians, and essential infrastructure. It requires good faith interpretation to preserve the law's humanitarian purpose.

Russia's documented pattern—deliberately targeting marked emergency vehicles, using repeat strikes to prevent rescue operations, systematically hunting civilians with drone cameras—represents the opposite of good faith. It's a policy designed to empty the law of meaning while maximizing civilian harm.

The Commission isn't writing history. It's building legal cases. Every verified video, every witness interview, every documented pattern creates evidence that prosecutors can use. The classification as crimes against humanity means Russian commanders can't claim isolated decisions or tactical necessity.

The documentation shows system. And systems have planners.

Loud silence from Moscow

Russia does not recognize the Commission. It has not granted investigators access to occupied territories. It continues to deny intentionally targeting civilians despite extensive verified evidence showing coordinated attacks across 300 kilometers.

The Commission, established by the UN Human Rights Council on 4 March 2022, has had its mandate extended repeatedly—most recently in April 2025. It must submit a comprehensive report by February-April 2026.

The Commission has previously confirmed that torture and enforced disappearances by Russian authorities also constitute crimes against humanity, building a comprehensive record across multiple categories of international law.

The precedent

The stakes reach beyond Ukraine. Russia's defense arguments have been consistent: civilian casualties are unintentional collateral damage in legitimate military operations. We don't target civilians.

The UN report systematically dismantles this defense. The cameras on the drones weren't for targeting military positions. They were for tracking civilians. The repeated strikes on ambulances weren't targeting enemy fighters. They were preventing rescue operations. The 300-kilometer pattern wasn't the fog of war. It was a coordinated policy.

This changes calculations for international courts. Individual commanders can't claim they followed isolated combat orders when the documented evidence shows centralized planning. The UN has now created an authoritative, verified record that future prosecutors can use and that other militaries considering similar campaigns must account for.