The Russian air force is lobbing as many as 5,000 glide bombs at Ukrainian positions every month, including some bombs weighing 3,000 kg. Just one of those aerial monsters is powerful enough to flatten a high-rise building.

The glide bombs blast holes in Ukrainian defenses, disrupt military logistics, and terrorize everyday Ukrainians living near the front line, leveling entire apartment buildings in one go.

In the battle for Pokrovsk, Russian forces drop up to 450 glide bombs per week on a single sector, destroying fortified strongpoints that Ukrainian forces spent months building—and allowing Russian infiltration. One FAB-3000 bomb can completely obliterate a fortified position, turning Ukrainian defensive networks into rubble and forcing troops into open fields where they become easier targets.

There are measures Ukrainian forces can take to blunt the relentless bombardment—but none are cheap. And some could take months if not years to have any meaningful effect.

Recent footage from the front line in Myrnohrad, in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, dramatically illustrates the power of Russia's glide bombs, which range as far as 65 km on pop-out wings and satellite guidance. Russian industry developed the glide bomb kits in early 2023 in response to heavy Russian air force losses during close bombing sorties.

Glide bombs are a truly terrifying weapon. A Ukrainian soldier fighting in Konstantinivka told me about a FAB-3000 (as in, it weighs 3,000kg) hitting a nine-story apartment building next to his position. Leveled it to the ground in one go. https://t.co/SvTqljWqnv

— Neil Hauer (@NeilPHauer) November 13, 2025

The recent footage depicts a 1,500-kg or 3,000-kg glide bomb striking a multi-story building—and demolishing it.

"Glide bombs are a truly terrifying weapon," Canadian journalist Neil Hauer explained. He recalled a story about 3,000-kg glide bombs striking an apartment building in Kostiantynivka, in eastern Ukraine. "Leveled it to the ground in one go," Hauer wrote.

The inexpensive glide bombs, each costing just a few tens of thousands of dollars, dramatically reduce Russian warplanes' exposure to the most dangerous Ukrainian air defenses. Instead of attacking from directly overhead, planes could attack from 40 km (with the first generation of glide bombs) or from 65 km (with a newer generation that debuted this year).

Why glide bombs work—and how Russia protects its bombers

It's no coincidence that, as Russia's hundreds of Sukhoi Su-30 and Su-34 fighter-bombers switched to glide bombing since 2023, the rate of loss for both types has declined. Since Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian air force has written off around 15 Su-30s and around 40 Su-34s.

More than 250 of the jets remain in service—and Sukhoi continues to deliver replacement airframes at a rate of a couple of dozen a year.

Ukrainian forces aren't defenseless. They can:

• jam the glide bombs with electronic warfare systems;
• shoot down the glide-bombing Sukhois with their best long-range air defenses;
• and suppress the rate at which Russian industry completes replacement jets.

But jamming requires constant adaptation as the Russians add more and more satellite navigation receivers to successive generations of glide bombs. Long-range air defenses are in short supply as the Ukrainian air force prioritizes the defense of major cities and power plants against the most damaging Russian cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

Russian jets accumulate dangerous flight hours

Disrupting the Russian aerospace industry is a long-term solution to the glide-bomb threat.

Flying nearly daily glide-bombing sorties, the Russian Su-30s and Su-34s have "built up significant fatigue hours" on their metal airframes, analysts Nikolay Staykov and Jack Watling wrote in a new study for the Royal United Services Institute in London. Warplanes are built tough, but they can become unreliable and unsafe after a few thousand flight hours.

More and more Russian jets are reaching that dangerous threshold. The recent crash of an Su-30 may underscore that risk.

Strangling Sukhoi—sanctions and drone strikes

Ukraine and its allies can accelerate the decline of the Russian fighter fleet and slow the pace of glide bombings—by strangling Sukhoi and its suppliers with sanctions, and directly attacking the most critical production facilities with long-range attack drones.

The aerospace industry in Russia is uniquely vulnerable.

"Because of the number of precision subcomponents necessary to assemble fighter aircraft, even minor delays and disruption to production have a significant knock-on impact in suppressing the acceleration of aircraft production," Staykov and Watling wrote.

If Ukraine's allies can close gaps in sanctions on Russia's aerospace industry to cover all tiers of suppliers and, equally importantly, properly enforce the sanctions, it could "reduce the threat" from the Kremlin's glide bombers by reducing the number of flyable planes.

It wouldn't happen quickly, of course. It could take years before fatigue grounds a significant portion of the Su-30 and Su-34 fleet. Drone strikes on the factories could speed up the degradation by driving the production rate of new jets closer to zero.

But an intensive effort to drone Russian aerospace plants might have the unintended consequence of taking the pressure off the oil industry—and boosting Russia's wider economy.

At present, Kyiv aims most of its long-range drones at Russia's oil industry. The oil campaign has disabled 20% of Russia's oil refining, forced a VAT hike, and driven Moscow's National Wealth Fund toward exhaustion by 2026—"the most efficient thing Ukraine can do" to hurt Russia's war machine, as one economist says.

But every drone aimed at an oil refinery is a drone not aimed at aircraft factories building the bombers that drop 5,000 glide bombs monthly. Pivoting to strikes on airplane factories focus might reduce bombardment in two or three years, if it works. Every month of delay means 5,000 more bombs.

Ukraine pushes to expand its own interception capabilities

Ukraine has begun serial production of its new Octopus interceptor drone designed to take down Russia’s Shahed-type attack UAVs, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Denys Shmyhal announced on Friday. The technology has been handed to three manufacturers, with another eleven preparing production lines.

Shaheds are Iranian kamikaze drones regularly used by Russia to strike Ukrainian cities, industry, and energy facilities. They are often launched in large groups to strain air defenses and cause maximum damage. Ukraine has pushed to expand its own interception capabilities as these drones continue to hit civilian areas and critical infrastructure across the country.

Octopus system is confirmed in combat conditions

Shmyhal said Octopus is a Ukrainian-developed system created by the Armed Forces and confirmed in combat. It can operate at night, under electronic jamming, and at low altitude - conditions that often make Shahed attacks difficult to counter with standard air defense assets.

He said the launch of mass production will accelerate the deployment of interceptors “so they can begin protecting Ukraine’s skies as soon as possible.” 

He added that the Defense Ministry is continuing to cooperate with domestic drone manufacturers to move new designs quickly from innovation to regular frontline use.

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Taiwanese companies continue to supply precision industrial machines for factories that fuel Russia’s war machine, in defiance of sanctions, according to an investigation by Ukrainian watchdog organization StateWatch. 

Precision tools process high-strength alloys used in the production of artillery barrels, missile bodies and drones. Russia imports at least 70% of its Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines from companies in Europe and Asia. Most countries involved have banned selling Russia equipment that can be used to make war materiel. 

Moscow gets around these bans, largely by working with middlemen in countries like China and Türkiye. However, “even Taiwan, a strategic partner of the US, has been implicated in these supply chains,” StateWatch wrote in its 13 November report. 

Since 2022, millions of dollars worth of dual-use machinery has made its way into Russia through Taiwan’s involvement. These include brands like Fedek, Sunmill, and Golden Machinery.

The recipients include companies linked to Russia's military-industrial complex, including Zenik, Kami-Group, Intervesp, Metalmash, and Stanki Tekhnologii Instrument. 

At least 70% of Russia's CNC machine tools are imported, largely from the US, EU, and Japan. Over 80% of all CNCs end up in Russia's military production facilities. 

Over $10 million worth of industrial equipment 

LNS Group is a global company that manufactures bar feeders and CNC lathes. According to Russian customs data, LNS machines worth nearly $5 million have entered Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. 

These exports were mainly facilitated by Taiwanese company TWT Global Enterprise limited. Kami-Group, which sells machine tools, is the largest Russian recipient, according to the report. 

Russian company Zenit published a YouTube video in December 2024, showing LNS’s Fedek-branded equipment at its factory.  

A flashlight manufacturer, Zenit also makes red-dot and thermal sights, laser target designators, and tactical firearm accessories for Russia's troops and intelligence agencies, on top of donating products to Russian troops in Ukraine.

Fedek machines have also been spotted at the G.I. Petrovsky Plant in Nizhny Novgorod, which makes equipment for the Russian Navy, engineering troops, and manufactures avionics.

Zenit's video also shows Sunmill machines. The manufacturer, Jeenxi Technology Co, of Taiwan, “supplied high-precision equipment directly to Russia’s military sector” also to the tune of $5 million, as of December 2024, according to StateWatch.

Russian state contractors Intervesp and Intervesp-M, both of which are internationally sanctioned, were reportedly among the recipients. 

Taiwanese Golden Machinery Co, which manufactures beverage bottling equipment, supplied $800,000 worth of industrial machines  to Russia, according to customs data.

The main recipient was Stanki Tekhnologii, which trades in metalworking equipment and its website shows it regularly signing contracts with Russian defense enterprises.

Stanki Tekhnologii got $430,000 worth of equipment directly from the manufacturer and the rest via a Turkish intermediary.

South Korean firms also implicated 

South Korean brands have also been spotted in Russia, according to a recent report by the Economic Security Council of Ukraine, a Kyiv think tank. 

Between 2024 and 2025, more than $3.7 million worth of Korean-made cutting tools and CNC machines got into Russia through complex transshipment networks involving China, Türkiye, India, Uzbekistan, Lithuania and Thailand.

Products from at least three South Korean precision toolmakers were exhibited at the annual Metalloobraboka expo in Moscow in May.

“The key issue is not simply covert shipments,” Olena Yurchenko, director for analysis and investigations at ESCU, wrote in a statement to Korea JoongAng Daily and Euromaidan Press. 

“What we find alarming is that products made by South Korean brands, which are de facto banned from Russia [since 2022], are now being openly advertised and promoted in Moscow."

Moscow casts a wide net

These figures are a drop in the bucket compared to the $18 billion worth of machine tools reportedly supplied to Russia from Europe and China.

This includes 57 CNC machines worth over $26.5 million from European subsidiaries, along with components and consumables valued at more than $9.5 million.

In October, Germany raided Spinner, a high-precision machine tool manufacturer suspected of knowingly supplying equipment to Russia's military industry. Three individuals have already been charged with violating sanctions.

Ukraine unleashes the minigun on Shahed drones

Ukraine has started equipping its Mi-8 helicopters with American-made M134 Minigun systems to counter Russian Shahed kamikaze drones, according to footage published by the Instagram account aero.tim and reported by Militarnyi.

Russia launches swarms of Shahed kamikaze drones at Ukrainian cities every night, overwhelming air defenses with sheer numbers. These Iranian-designed attack drones are difficult targets for expensive surface-to-air missiles. Helicopter-mounted machine guns give Ukraine another option for intercepting drones without burning through costly missile stockpiles.

The video shows a Mi-8 door gunner firing several bursts at an incoming drone, which then veers off course and crashes. The modification gives the Soviet-designed helicopters a major boost in firepower against low-flying targets that have become a constant threat across Ukraine.

Why Ukraine is putting American miniguns on Soviet helicopters

According to Ukrainian defense portal Militarnyi, the M134 Minigun is a six-barrel, electrically driven machine gun chambered in 7.62×51 mm NATO. It can fire between 2,000 and 6,000 rounds per minute - about eight times faster than the standard PKT machine guns typically mounted on Mi-8s.

Often seen on US helicopters such as the Black Hawk and Huey, the Minigun can be mounted in fixed or swivel configurations, allowing gunners to cover a wide firing arc. Beyond defending against drones, the weapon is also effective for close air support and suppressing enemy firing positions.

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In their never-ending effort to protect armored vehicles from the tiny first-person-view drones that are everywhere all the time all along the 1,100-km front line of Russia's wider war on Ukraine, Russian forces have introduced a number of bizarre innovations.

The resulting "cope cages" and "turtle," "porcupine" and "hedgehog" tanks are ungainly and, frankly, ugly. But they work. In fact, they work so well that Ukrainian forces usually copy each modification for their own armored vehicles.

The latest Russian anti-drone innovation is no exception.

Adding thousands of metal "hairs" to the existing anti-drone cope cages on a growing number of hedgehog tanks, the Russians have inspired the Ukrainians to do the same.

Now "both Russian and Ukrainian forces are modifying their tanks into so-called hedgehogs," the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team observed.

"This is the progress we're making," one Ukrainian mechanic narrated in a recent video appealing to supporters for donations of industrial-grade aluminum cabling. Mechanics unravel the cabling into individual metal threads and weld a bundle with around 100 of the threads onto a tank's cope cage.

A single hedgehog might boast 900 bundles for a total of 90,000 metal hairs. Each hair can detonate an incoming FPV before it strikes a tank's hull.

A Ukrainian tank is also receiving what a Ukrainian soldier refers to as a “haircut” of unraveled steel cable attached to steel mesh.
This stand-off system has proven effective on Russian “hedgehog” tanks of considerably increasing resistance to FPV attacks.
1/ https://t.co/HYTa3XlRhV pic.twitter.com/t7xaZXXOjq

— Roy (@GrandpaRoy2) November 10, 2025

The cost of protection

There are downsides to do-it-yourself anti-drone armor, of course. All that extra weight can quickly ruin a vehicle's gearbox.

And the heavier turtles, porcupines and hedgehogs are prone to getting mired while trying to cross rivers and streams. But a loss of mobility is a small price to pay for extra protection.

To be fair, Ukrainian forces have managed to eventually knock out even the most heavily up-armored Russian tank. But they have to use more and more of their precious FPV drones to do it.

One heavily up-armored Russian turtle tank, which sported an add-on metal shell or shed, deflected around 25 Ukrainian mines and first-person-view drones before the 26th munition—a drone—finally disabled it during an assault toward the city of Siversk in eastern Ukraine late last month.

From cope cages to hedgehogs

Turtle tanks aren't even the latest and toughest up-armored Russian vehicles. Cope cages were in use before Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022. Turtle tanks first appeared in the second year of the wider war. Porcupine tanks with a few thick metal spines showed up early this year. The first hedgehogs crawled onto the battlefield in the fall.

First spotting each new species, defenders' laughter quickly turned to begrudging respect. “Everyone laughs at the design of their sheds, but in fact they work like Hell,” one Ukrainian blogger wrote about the Russian turtles. The DIY vehicles can eat “a lot of FPVs,” the blogger pointed out.

The more FPVs a given vehicle can absorb before succumbing, the likelier the vehicle is to survive an assault across the drone-patrolled no-man's-land, potentially leading accompanying infantry-laden vehicles to the relative safety of some new underground position.

It's in this manner that the Russians gain ground: securing a new lodgement with a few infantry and then gradually expanding it with reinforcements. Not every vehicle and soldier needs to survive the drone barrage; it only takes a few to begin the slow accumulation that will eventually overwhelm outnumbered Ukrainian defenders.

Why Ukraine copies Russian armor

From mockery to respect to mimicry, Ukrainian forces have followed the Russians' lead—first deploying cope cages, then turtles.

One Ukrainian turtle belonging to the 24th Mechanized Brigade, holding positions outside the ruins of Chasiv Yar in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, rolled through Russian artillery and drone bombardment to evacuate wounded Ukrainian troops back in the spring.

"Our armor again withstood multiple FPV hits and was able to take the fighters to a safe place," the brigade reported.

The Ukrainian hedgehogs should be even more effective. And now at least one Ukrainian mechanic, the one in the recent video, is pleading for more donations of industrial cable. "We need them," he intoned. Every three tons of cable makes a new hedgehog that can ward off Russian drones.

Slovakia’s prosecutor has determined that the government’s 2023 decision to send MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine did not constitute a criminal offense, according to Politico. The investigation was launched following a complaint by the current pro-Russian government of Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Prosecutor halts MiG-29 case, finds no legal wrongdoing

On 10 November, the Bratislava prosecutor’s office confirmed that the country’s transfer of MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine was not a criminal act, Politico reported. The office said the criminal prosecution was halted on 30 October “because it was sufficiently established that the act in question does not constitute a criminal offense and there is no reason to refer the case further,” a spokesperson told Politico.

The office concluded that the donation of the aircraft and two anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine had not caused harm to Slovakia as defined by the country’s Criminal Code.

“Nor was it proven that members of the government acted with the intent to obtain an unlawful benefit for themselves or others, or that they exercised their authority in a manner contrary to the law or exceeded their powers,” the spokesperson added.

Slovakia delivered its entire fleet of Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets and two anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine in spring 2023, becoming the first country to send warplanes to Kyiv after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

The current defense ministry, under Fico’s government, filed a criminal complaint in June against former Prime Minister Eduard Heger and former Defense Minister Jaroslav Naď. The complaint accused them of sabotage, abuse of power, and breach of duty in the management of public property in connection with the decision to transfer the jets.

Both officials rejected the allegations at the time.

Following the announcement, Jaroslav Naď published a statement on Facebook.

“It has been confirmed what I have repeatedly said: that the government of Eduard Heger, with me as Minister of Defense, acted not only morally correctly but also in the national interest of the Slovak Republic,” Naď wrote.

Russian crews complain that hefty, improvised armor shells break the transmission on their tanks after just a few kilometers. 

According to interview excerpts posted by Russian tank historian Andrei Tarasenko, mounting this “tsar mangal” style turtle armor on the tank’s chassis quickly overloads the gearboxes. 

One Russian tank “didn't even make it 10 kilometers before one of the side gearboxes failed,” an interviewee told Russian outlet Vault8. This tank was equipped with a makeshift shell made out of cables.  

If the armor shell is instead mounted on the turret, the weight burns out the driver, making the turret impossible to rotate, especially by hand. 

Ukrainian tank operators from the 13th Khartia Brigade confirmed the Russians’ woes to Euromaidan Press.

Passing along his colleagues’ words, Khartia spokesman Volodymyr Dehtiaryov said that improvised armor that weighs several tons does take Russian tanks out of order quickly.

However, he added that the Russians don’t seem to mind losing tanks in this way, as long as they are able to get close enough to inflict enough damage to Ukrainian positions. 

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According to Tarasenko’s post, the Russians are also complaining about shortages of reactive armor, especially the modern Relikt system. Russian crews are trying to make up for the shortage with improvised solutions. 

“On the turret cheeks, there’s a homemade version from garage workshops — sheet metal shaped like factory plating with an explosive insert from the UR-77 mine-clearing line charge. It works about 50/50 at a 45 degree angle,” the Russian crewman is quoted as saying. 

Tanks struggle to evolve in the age of drone warfare

Tanks often lead Russian mechanized assaults, absorbing drone attacks with their bolted-on armor, clearing mines with their front-mounted rollers, and firing their cannons to suppress Ukrainian troops.

This add-on armor comes in a variety of shapes, sizes and weight profiles, evolving over the course of the full-scale invasion from simple cages, to solid steel sheds, to an arrangement of bristling cables, resembling the quills of a porcupine.

There is evidence to suggest that improvised armor is effective at letting the tanks survive more hits from certain types of drones, like FPVs. Some Russian assaults hinge on whether the defenders can run out of drones before the Russians run out of vehicles to overwhelm their positions.

However, the Russians cannot keep sacrificing tanks forever. The Kremlin may be desperate enough for usable armor to pull old T-64s out of storage and try to make them work. Alternatively, the Russians could continue to rely on infantry offensives in the short term, to buy more time for their mechanized forces to recover.

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Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 7 November that Ukraine plans to localize production of Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets starting in 2033, according to a government briefing.

The announcement follows an agreement between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson. On 6 November, the defense ministries of both countries worked out the details of the deal, which includes negotiations for the supply of 150 Gripen E/F class aircraft.

"Yesterday, a memorandum was also signed between one of the Ukrainian companies and Saab regarding the future localization of Gripens in Ukraine," Shmyhal said. "We expect that from 2033, the Gripen will be significantly localized in Ukraine, its production – from large-unit assembly to localization of individual parts."

Shmyhal added that discussions are ongoing about transferring Gripen C/D class aircraft to Ukraine as soon as possible, with negotiations focusing on 2026 as a potential delivery date.

Ukraine and Sweden have agreed to establish two working groups. The first, a technical group, will handle preparations for receiving the fighters and their deployment in Ukraine. The second, a financial group, will work on contract details.

On 22 October, Ukraine and Sweden signed a letter of intent regarding the purchase of at least 100 Gripen aircraft for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The first fighters could arrive in Ukraine as early as 2026, with payment proposed through frozen Russian assets.

Saab AB executive Micael Johansson told the Financial Times on October 27 that the company is considering establishing a facility in Ukraine to assemble Gripen fighters.

On 6 November, Sweden's Ministry of Defense reported that new Gripens for Ukraine could be partially financed through military assistance.

EU tightens visa rules for Russians, citing espionage and weaponized migration

EU tightens visa rules for Russians, citing espionage and weaponized migration

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced today that Ukraine will begin mass production of a new drone model to replace Chinese-made DJI Mavic UAVs, Interfax-Ukraine reports.

"Next, Mavic. A very important issue.... We were looking for alternatives – alternatives have been found. There will be mass production of this alternative. Relevant financed contracts are now being prepared," Zelenskyy said during a briefing on 7 November.

DJI Mavic series drones, originally developed for civilian and commercial use, have become among the most widespread and critically important unmanned aircraft on the Ukrainian front. The drones are valued for their compact size, relative affordability, and high-quality imaging capabilities, particularly the Mavic 3 and Mavic 3 Thermal models.

In the Ukrainian army, these drones primarily perform tactical reconnaissance functions at distances up to 15 km, adjust artillery fire, and after modification are used to drop small munitions on enemy positions, serving as the "eyes" of infantry and artillery units.

Zelenskyy also emphasized that evacuation drones must be included in the e-Points bonus system. "The main task is to preserve people's lives, this is a priority," the president said.

During the briefing, Zelenskyy discussed a report from Commander of Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, who presented a program aimed at strengthening air defense over Kherson. According to the president, the program is ready and has received support. He instructed officials to develop similar programs for border cities and the most vulnerable communities.

Recently, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine plans to reach production of 500-800 interceptor drones per day in November.

Ukraine and Sweden have agreed to begin localizing the production of Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets on Ukrainian territory, with plans to establish significant domestic manufacturing by 2033, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on 7 November, as reported by Ukrainian national broadcaster Suspilne.

This marks a major step in Ukraine’s long-term strategy to rebuild and modernize its defense industry through Western technology partnerships. By producing advanced fighter jets domestically, Kyiv secures greater self-sufficiency in arms manufacturing, strengthens its air force against continued Russian attacks, and integrates more deeply into Europe’s defense ecosystem.

According to Shmyhal, the two countries finalized the details with Sweden’s Ministry of Defence on 6 November, including provisions for the supply of up to 150 Gripen E-class fighters. A memorandum of intent was signed between a Ukrainian defense enterprise and Saab, the Swedish aerospace manufacturer, to set up future production inside Ukraine.

“From 2033, Gripen production will be significantly localized in Ukraine, from large-unit assembly to the manufacturing of individual components,” Shmyhal said.

First jets arrive next year, domestic production follows

Ukraine expects to receive its first Gripen fighter jets from Sweden as early as next year, with initial batches likely to include older C and D models, before the full-scale production of the advanced Gripen E variant begins later in the decade.

Ukrainian defense portal Militarnyi notes that the localization project would be Ukraine’s first large-scale fighter-aircraft production effort, encompassing everything from assembly to parts manufacturing. Saab is also reportedly exploring options for a parallel production line in Canada due to growing international demand.

Deal builds on Ukraine's largest-ever combat aviation agreement

The agreement follows the 22 October 2025 letter of intent signed by Zelenskyy and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson for the purchase of 100 to 150 Gripen E fighters - Ukraine’s largest-ever combat aviation deal. 

Kristersson described it as a long-term partnership to build a “serious air force” capable of defending Ukrainian skies against Russian attacks.

The Gripen E is a 4++-generation multirole fighter capable of speeds up to Mach 2, equipped with advanced radar, AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, and precision strike capability.

As Washington flip-flops on granting Tomahawk cruise missiles to Kyiv, there is a more practical, politically expedient solution, which doesn’t involve an American veto of every target that Ukraine may want to hit. 

That solution is twofold: fund Ukraine’s defense companies to make their own missiles and long-range drones, and supply Kyiv with cheaper, less advanced munitions in greater numbers, observers and insiders said. 

This will still let Ukraine scale up its deep-strike campaign, meant to grind down the Russian offensive rather than face its full might on the front lines, saving both lives and money. 

“Right now, we need less missiles to meaningfully reduce the Russians’ capabilities, compared to 2022, because now we have drones,” said Serhii Kuzan, chair of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center. 

"But let's imagine that you also add missiles... this is a few dozen-fold enhancement to our long-range capabilities."

American Tomahawks and German Tauruses, which would be very helpful for deep strikes, remain blocked by politics for the time being. However, the Ukrainians have already made up for their dearth of missiles by innovating a menagerie of effective homegrown solutions. They just need support to make more. 

Ukraine’s drones have proven effective at hitting softer targets like refineries, but also factories. One Kyiv-based developer told Euromaidan Press that drones can now penetrate a meter of concrete and deal heavy damage with warheads lighter than 100 kilograms.

Ukraine also produces its own missiles, like the Neptune and, more recently, the Flamingo. It also gets cruise missiles from less reticent allies — the Storm Shadows and SCALPs provided by the UK and France, respectively. All of the above have been used in successful strikes against Russia.

“The situation is not binary, and Ukraine could undoubtedly make effective use of 50 or so Tomahawks. However, since the US is highly unlikely to donate these missiles, European governments might be better advised to channel the estimated $125–200 million they would cost… directly into Ukraine’s missile industry,” wrote missile expert Fabian Hoffmann of Oslo University. 

“Given that expanding Ukraine’s domestic missile production remains a major strategic priority, this may represent the more beneficial option.”

Deep strikes into Russia need to be scaled up

If necessity is the mother of invention, she has been an especially fruitful mother in Ukraine, birthing a wide variety of tech for both the front line and strategic attacks deep inside Russian territory. 

When Western allies refused to grant long-range weapons out of fear of escalation, Ukraine was forced to develop a plethora of effective attack drones of different shapes and sizes, from their Shahed analogues like the Batyar, to bombers resembling civilian aircraft, like the UJ-22 or the Horynych, to high-altitude balloons and more. 

Using these unmanned technologies, Ukraine has been striking Russia’s hydrocarbon infrastructure for years, but this campaign really kicked into high gear in 2025, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claiming that attacks are happening practically every day. 

In spite of the economic damage, Russia has so far kept up the frontline pressure, demonstrating that it can still afford to throw money and bodies at the problem, something that Ukraine, short on both funds and manpower, cannot do. 

Still, Kyiv hopes that by disabling enough strategic targets with more attacks, Russia’s military sustainability will falter. 

Observers and insiders who spoke to Euromaidan Press said that deep strikes will not win the war or reconquer lost territories, but they can still weaken Russia’s war effort and halt its advance, with the right choices of targets and sufficient means to hit them. 

• Drones work better against softer targets like refineries, but these are easier to replace
• Industrial machinery is harder to replace but harder to damage and is farther away from the front, so missiles work better against it
• Missiles are also useful for killing commanders in bunkers — if enough are killed, this can paralyze a regional offensive, thanks to Russia's top-down command style
• Tomahawks would be very useful to hit hardened targets, but chances of Ukraine getting them seem remote, with the White House constantly changing its mind
• Up to 50 missiles were under discussion; Ukraine would need hundreds of Tomahawks to take out entire factory complexes — plus, Washington could tell Kyiv what targets it's allowed to shoot
• For the same cost, the US and European allies could provide cheaper missiles and funding to buff up Ukraine's deep strike capabilities

Blasting Russia's refineries and industrial base

Designing a deep strike campaign around drones means choosing softer targets, said Marc DeVore, a defense policy scholar, who advised the UK’s Foreign Office on Russia’s full-scale invasion. 

“I think that Ukraine has done a great job in terms of identifying some of those target sets,” he told Euromaidan Press. 

Well-placed drone strikes can take refineries offline but to keep them that way, the attacks have to be regular and repeated, with most drone-sized payloads. 

“Repairs and restoring a refinery to operation is not necessarily rocket science and there's a sufficient number of producers of the necessary equipment that the Russians will be able to source,” DeVore said. 

Replacement piping, pumps, and other components can be easily acquired from China or built at home. Now, drones can do lasting damage to cracking units, which break down crude oil, and may be harder for Russia to source.

Missiles are able to do a lot more devastating damage to these targets, which would keep them offline longer. But missiles can be even more valuable if used to strike harder to reach targets, such as factories that make weapons or the stuff that goes into them.

Such plants are better-protected and also contain hefty industrial machinery like CNC machines or rotary forges that make parts for military vehicles. A recent investigation by InformNapalm showed that Russia must resort to evading sanctions to get its hands on more of these machines. 

These machines are hard to damage with small payloads, but also much harder to replace if they are destroyed by a larger blast.

“Russia doesn't produce its own rotary forges, and China also is a laggard. So the rotary forge industry is largely dominated by one Austrian company, (GFM), and Russia depends on it for rotary forges,” DeVore said.  

“So if one could either destroy those forges or inflict sufficient damage, it would be very difficult for Russia to replace them,” assuming the company doesn’t sell its tech to a random middleman that pops up overnight. 

Range is also a factor. Tomahawks can go up to 1,500 kilometers. A significant proportion of Russia’s heaviest military production assets are located far from the front lines, requiring any weapons to cross major distances to reach them.

The majority of long-range attack drones and cruise missiles that Ukraine uses now typically have ranges in the hundreds of kilometers, without breaching the 1,000 kilometer mark. Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missile has a claimed range of up to 3,000 kilometers, but this has yet to be verified independently. 

Killing Russian command staff to halt the advance

Missiles are typically more effective at penetrating command and control centers, which are typically shielded by thick concrete. An attack like that can kill important command staff, which can be very disruptive to the Russian military, with its top-down command structure.

It was a Ukrainian Storm Shadow strike in 2023 that blasted the Black Sea Fleet headquarters and command center in Crimea, reportedly killing dozens of officers. 

Missile strikes were also instrumental in hitting the command posts of Russia’s 155th Naval Infantry, “paralyzing that entire direction” for a while, according to Kuzan. “The same story played out in Kursk in the spring.”

Successful attacks over the course of a month can disable command and control of an entire assault grouping, he said. But this requires a sufficient number of missiles.

The limits and opportunity costs of expensive missiles

With a few dozen good missiles, Ukrainians can force Russians to divert their air defense assets to protect more strategic sites, possibly weakening air coverage along the front. Or the Russians can be forced to spend resources to disperse production and harden facilities, especially if they don’t know how many missiles Ukraine has. 

However, “if your goal is inflicting decisive damage on the Russian economy, yes, you would need hundreds,” DeVore said. 

Hoffmann would agree, writing that destroying production plants with conventional missiles requires large salvos. Each Tomahawk can obliterate everything within a radius of 13 meters, but the Alabuga plant that makes Russia’s weapons stretches across 160,000 square meters. 

It’d take at least 150 Tomahawks to destroy 50% of the facility, assuming all of them reach their targets. This is a lot more than the amount Washington had reportedly considered.

“This is not to suggest that this type of counter-industry targeting is inherently unfeasible. It is not,” Hoffmann wrote. “Still, such operations are more demanding than commentators generally suggest, and arguably require more heavy missiles than Ukraine has access to in the short-term.”

With fewer missiles, Ukraine can focus on disrupting supply chains like electronics, explosives, propellants, and so on, which it has been doing with some success, using drones and Storm Shadows. 

“The other problem… is that for the Tomahawk to be used, it requires an entire targeting infrastructure that's dependent on the Americans,” DeVore said.

“Even if the Americans were willing to provide this system, they would have a de facto veto on every use case which I'm not sure is the situation you want to be in when the occupant of the White House seems to change his mind a lot.” 

The more expedient alternative: help Ukraine develop missiles and drones

With that in mind, if Washington is unwilling to supply Ukraine with its most advanced, exquisite missiles, the US and other NATO allies can still improve Kyiv’s ability to degrade Russia’s oil industry and military production capabilities. 

“Whether or not Tomahawks arrive in Ukraine, this will not decide the war. What matters far more is that European governments continue to invest substantial funds directly into Ukraine’s missile sector,” Hoffmann wrote. 

Zelenskyy said that while Ukraine uses foreign missiles like Storm Shadows, 95% of deep strikes are conducted using Ukrainian weapons. 

For example, some Ukrainian attack drones are more powerful than people give them credit for, despite having a limited payload size on paper, said Viktor, a Ukrainian technician who works in a lab developing Shahed-like delta-wing UAVs to attack Russia. His full name was omitted from the article for security purposes. 

He claimed the cost of the basic hardware is just $5,000, although incorporating jamming-resistant antennas raises the price several times. According to Viktor, some Ukrainian companies have learned to squeeze a lot more damage out of a relatively small payload, just tens of kilograms in mass.

"Some ammo is made by ordinary guys... they don't know the chemistry or physics that they should know," he said.

"But I know a few companies that paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for special simulation programs for how they need to make the ammo to penetrate a meter of concrete, with a small amount [of explosive charge] and cause huge damage inside."

He added that Ukrainians already have the ability to use digital image matching to hit stationary targets on the ground. This is similar to what the Tomahawk uses for its terminal guidance. 

In fact, there is a “whole list” of much simpler weapons that allies can deliver to Ukraine by the thousands, relatively inexpensively, Kuzan said. For example, air-launched munitions with cheap guidance, like turbo-powered versions of the glide bombs Russia keeps dropping — these “ersatz-missiles,” as he called them, can strike from 300 to 450 kilometers away. 

While Russian air defenses are able to shoot cheaper weapons down with relative ease, Ukrainians have proven adept at punching corridors through these defenses with decoys, anti-radiation weapons, and other tech, enabling them to deliver sufficient firepower against stationary targets. 

"You can carry out strikes against sites where weapons, equipment, fuel, and everything else the army consumes, are being stockpiled. That's the mission," Kuzan said. "The more such sites are hit, the slower the advance. So, in fact, it's precisely these strikes that can halt the invasion."

In the skilled hands of Ukrainian soldiers, an old body armor becomes a combat marvel. The Pansarbandvagn 301 is a Swedish armored personnel carrier developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite its venerable age, this vehicle continues to perform combat missions. Now, as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, specifically within the 39th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade.

The Pansarbandvagn 301 is not the only old weapon Ukraine has. In September 2025, a Kyiv air defense volunteer operator stopped Russia's Kh-69 cruise missile with a "Maksim" machine gun used by the Russian Empire and Soviet troops during World War II. 

The Swedish PBV-301 in the 39th brigade turns logistics into survival on the front

The brigade reports that the PBV is used for logistical support in the unit’s area of responsibility.

“This armored vehicle supplies ammunition and food, transports and retrieves fighters from positions, and evacuates the wounded,” the soldiers say.

The brigade notes that the vehicle is “not bad, and in skilled hands it is even capable of small miracles.”

From ammunition runs to casualty evacuation

According to the troops, the main effectiveness of the PBV-301 depends on the training of the mechanic-driver. For this reason, practical training sessions are regularly held under the guidance of experienced instructors.

“Such exercises allow drivers to practice driving on difficult sections of terrain and to become accustomed to the physical and psychological stresses,” the instructor says.

Training under fire: how instructors temper PBV mechanic-drivers so they can run routes that don’t work the first time

He emphasized that completing combat missions requires considerable endurance and strength of spirit from the driver.

“There are routes you can do on the first try, and there are ones you have to ‘run’ several times. We train, provide guidance, and offer assistance. Because there is no better motivation than a well-prepared crew,” he explains.

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A legislative proposal that would allow Ukraine to join the European Defence Fund will be put to a vote in the European Parliament before the end of 2025, according to the head of the Parliament's Security and Defence Committee.

"Our committee is working expeditiously, and I am pleased that we plan to vote on the EU Defence Omnibus Package before the end of this year, to be ready for the next stage of the EU's defence agenda," said Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann of Germany during a committee session in Brussels on 6 November, according to European Pravda.

EU Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, who attended the committee meeting, noted that on the evening of 5 October, a defence mini-Omnibus was preliminarily agreed upon, which "will enable Ukraine to become an associate member of the European Defence Fund."

The draft EU legislation, proposed by the European Commission in April 2025, was informally agreed upon on Wednesday evening by European Parliament members and Denmark's EU Council presidency. The proposal increases funding for defence-related investments by amending existing EU programs: the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), Horizon Europe, the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Digital Europe Programme (DEP), and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — with the aim of directing EU funds toward defence needs under the ReArm Europe plan.

"MEPs insisted that the legislation should allow for broader support to Ukraine's defence industry and guarantee its participation in the European Defence Fund," the European Parliament press service told Europeiska Pravda.

Denmark's EU presidency confirmed that Ukraine's inclusion in the European Defence Fund will create "new opportunities for Ukrainian entities to join collaborative research and development projects in defence within the EU in the future."

The EDF budget for 2021-2027 is approximately €7.3 billion ($ 8.4 bn), of which €2.7 bn ($3.1 bn) is allocated to joint defence research and €5.3 bn ($6.1 bn) to joint defence capability development projects, complementing national contributions.

The legislative act incorporating Ukraine's accession to the EDF will be coordinated at the European Parliament committee level in the coming weeks and will be brought to a plenary vote by the end of the year. Following this, it must be approved by the EU Council.

On 16 October , the European Commission presented a defence roadmap — a comprehensive plan to strengthen European defence capabilities, which includes countering drones and other threats from air, sea, and space. Ukraine was identified as a key component of the EU's defence readiness.

Every time North Korea deepens its support for Russia's war in Ukraine, South Korea promises to "reconsider" arming Kyiv directly. The announcements come with stern language about crossing red lines. Then nothing happens.

But focusing on what Seoul isn't doing misses what it has accomplished: pioneering an indirect support model that's proven both scalable and sustainable.

Through systematic defense exports to Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states, South Korea has enabled equipment transfers to Ukraine while navigating legal constraints and diplomatic sensitivities. This approach offers a blueprint other nations facing similar restrictions could replicate.

South Korea’s defense industry

South Korea has rapidly become one of the world’s major arms exporters. Military hardware like K2 Black Panther main battle tanks, K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, and the Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) have become bestsellers.

The $13.7 billion deal that Poland signed with South Korea in 2022 marked the country’s arrival as a global defense supplier, not just a regional one. For Kyiv, such a trajectory carries important implications.

While many Western defense industries struggle with slow production cycles and byzantine bureaucratic processes, South Korea’s defense industries are government-funded, export-oriented, and vertically integrated. South Korean factories can deliver major weapons items within months, not years. In the war of attrition that Ukraine faces, this production speed matters as much as technical specifications.

This production efficiency forms the foundation of the indirect support model, enabling South Korea to reinforce Ukraine’s warfighting capability without violating its own policy.

Why indirect support, not direct transfers

South Korean law limits direct lethal weapons exports to countries involved in active conflicts. . This restriction reflects both constitutional principles and South Korea's complex security environment—particularly concerns about antagonizing China and Russia while managing the North Korean threat.

But legal constraints didn’t mean inaction. Instead of opting for a direct arms transfer, South Korea has found indirect ways to reinforce Ukraine’s defense through its neighbors — an approach that maintains diplomatic equilibrium while sustaining the flow of weapons supply.

How the mechanism works

Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries serve dual roles: frontline NATO member states and crucial logistics hubs for Ukraine’s war effort. By expanding arms deliveries to these countries, South Korea has reinforced the strategic depth of Ukraine’s neighbors.

Poland began transferring Soviet-era T-72 tanks to Ukraine in 2022, with over 200 donated by some accounts in the early phase of the war. In August 2022, Warsaw signed an executive contract to acquire 180 South Korean K2 Black Panther tanks, with the first deliveries arriving in December 2022.

This rapid procurement of modern replacements appears to have enabled Poland to donate large portions of its older T-72 inventory during 2022-2023. The same pattern applied to artillery: South Korean K9 howitzer deliveries freed Warsaw to transfer Krab self-propelled howitzers—platforms based on the K9 design—to Kyiv.

Polish officials could justify depleting their Soviet-era tank inventory because South Korean replacements were guaranteed and arriving quickly. Without the K2 contract, Poland's transfers would have stopped after initial batches to preserve domestic defensive capacity.

Meanwhile, Romania has signed contracts for K9 howitzers, and the Baltic countries are pursuing similar acquisitions. If South Korea accelerates such defense exports, it could bolster NATO’s eastern flank and indirectly reduce Ukraine’s security burden. Furthermore, such procurement would contribute to interoperability enhancement within NATO since most of South Korea’s weapons systems have been designed in accordance with Western communications and logistics standards.

Eventually, South Korea has risen as a silent guarantor of the resilience of Ukraine’s neighboring countries and is helping to ensure that the pipeline of equipment and deterrence remains continuously open.

Filling up the security vacuum, faster than the West

Ukraine’s allies often face delays in heavy equipment manufacturing and procurement—tanks, artillery, and air defense systems frequently require multi-year timelines. South Korea operates on a different schedule.

Once Poland signed the contract, South Korean factories immediately adjusted their production, and the first installment of K2s and K9s was delivered within a year. This speed helps fill credibility gaps when Western industries face production bottlenecks or political gridlocks. While Washington and Brussels debate supplemental packages, South Korean factories build and ship.

Limitations and trade-offs

The indirect model has constraints. It takes longer than direct transfers—equipment flows through an additional link in the supply chain. It doesn't address Ukraine's most urgent needs like air defense systems, which require direct channels. And there's a legitimate question about scale: how much equipment can actually flow through backfilling versus new production?

Yet these limitations may be preferable to the alternative. South Korean public opinion polls show 82% opposition to direct weapons transfers to Ukraine. Attempts at direct support would likely face legal challenges, strain relations with China and Russia, and potentially deliver only token amounts. The indirect mechanism, while slower, enables larger-scale transfers that can be sustained over years rather than months.

In wars of attrition, sustainability often matters more than speed. Poland's $13.7 billion commitment suggests the ceiling for indirect support exceeds what direct transfers would likely achieve given domestic and diplomatic constraints.

Policy recommendations

For Seoul: Formalize what's now ad hoc. Establish a trilateral cooperation office staffed by Defence Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) officials, NATO’s procurement specialists, and representatives from Poland and Romania. This office would track equipment flows in real time—when Poland transfers tanks to Ukraine, Seoul would receive immediate notification to accelerate replacement deliveries. Additionally, establisha dedicated logistics and maintenance hub in Central Europe to sustain long-term operational readiness for South Korean weapons systems operating in NATO countries.

For Washington: Integrate South Korea’s production cycle into NATO supply-chain. Include South Korean defense firms in NATO’s industrial expansion initiatives or joint production projects. This diversifies suppliers and strengthens transatlantic defense capacity.

For Kyiv: Establish industrial cooperation offices both in Kyiv and Seoul to track backfill mechanisms. Pursue co-production projects in areas like drones and armored vehicles to deepen bilateral defense cooperation and reinforce Ukraine’s industrial capability in the long run.

For other constrained allies: Study the South Korean model to design politically feasible support strategies that sustain global deterrence without violating domestic political red lines.

Conclusion

Seoul's indirect support model represents more than a workaround for legal constraints. It demonstrates that constrained allies can provide meaningful, sustained support through systematic backfilling arrangements. If Japan, the OAE, and other capable nations replicate this approach, Ukraine's support network could expand significantly without requiring direct transfers that many countries cannot politically or legally provide.

The debate shouldn't be whether South Korea should abandon indirect support for direct transfers. It should be which other countries will adopt Seoul's blueprint.

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

Submit an opinion to Euromaidan Press

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Russia’s next-gen strategic bomber program may struggle to get off the ground if the West can prevent Moscow from evading sanctions, according to an investigation by InformNapalm, a Ukrainian intelligence community.

InformNapalm on 4 November reported that it acquired a trove of internal documents from Russia's aerospace component manufacturer OKBM, which the EU sanctioned in October. Purported copies of some documents were published with the investigation. 

The papers show that development of the Poslannik strategic bomber and parts for the Sukhoi-57 fighter are running into delays. This is partly due to Moscow’s shortage of precise machining tools made by foreign companies that have left the Russian market. The documents linked by InformNapalm directly name this as a reason. 

“At this stage, the Russian Federation is not able to produce parts for its promising aviation complexes on its own… they need to purchase foreign automated production equipment, high-precision CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machines,” InformNapalm wrote.  

“This is why sanctions work and they are important, because they significantly hamper Russian military capabilities. But it is no less important to track schemes and ways to circumvent sanctions through third countries and impose secondary sanctions.”

According to the investigation, OKBM used Taiwan-made Hartford HCMC-1100AG and Johnford SL-50 machines, as well as a Serbian Grindex BSD-700U CNC grinder, bought through subsidies from Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade.

InformNapalm pointed to these acquisitions as examples of the Russian state’s attempts to evade sanctions. 

The founder of InformNapalm, who goes by Roman Burko, told Euromaidan Press that the intelligence gathering operation directly contributed to OKBM being included in the latest sanctions package. The organization went public with the data to cause additional damage to the Russian manufacturers.

"Russian contracts explicitly state that information leaks lead to investigations, bureaucracy, and contract terminations," Burko said.

Russia’s aircraft modernization program

The Tupolev PAK DA, also known as the Poslannik (Russian for "Envoy"), is a subsonic stealth bomber meant to replace the venerable Tu-95, which dates back to the 1950s.

Russian media and other online sources report that the PAK DA is meant to have a range of 12,000 kilometers, an operational ceiling of 20 kilometers, and carry a conventional or nuclear payload of up to 30 tons. Moscow reportedly began financing development in the late 2000s and since then, the program has run into multiple delays. 

Russian media previously reported that the bomber was supposed to be ready for serial production in 2027. According to InformNapalm’s investigation, OKBM is supposed to deliver components for actuating the Poslannik's weapon bays by August 31, 2027. 

The documents released by InformNapalm state that the program is marked secret and OKBM may lose its contract if it fails to maintain that secrecy. 

The investigation also found that OKBM is involved in making gearboxes for the weapon bays of the Sukhoi-57, a Russian multi-role stealth fighter with the NATO reporting name Felon. 

The Su-57 has fought in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As of 2023, Russia had only 22 Su-57s in service, although it intends to increase production. Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation plans to deliver 76 fighters by 2027. 

On top of modernizing its air force, Russia has entertained plans to export the Su-57 as a competitor to the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

India initially participated in the development of the Su-57 but pulled out of the program in 2018, citing lack of satisfaction with performance and other concerns. In October, Russian Ambassador Denis Alipov made an offer to India to launch “local production” of Su-57s. 

Russia evades sanctions to keep up manufacturing

At least 70% of all Russian CNC machine tools are imported, largely from the US, EU, and Japan. Over 80% of all CNCs end up in Russia's military production facilities. 

While Russian military manufacturing has suffered as access to this equipment dried up following the full-scale invasion, Moscow has been able to get its hands on foreign equipment either through intermediaries or foreign companies violating sanctions. 

Ukraine's Economic Security Council reported that Russia has procured $18 billion worth of machine tools from both Europe and China. This includes 57 CNC machines worth over $26.5 million from European subsidiaries, along with components and consumables valued at more than $9.5 million.

In October, Germany raided Spinner, a high-precision machine tool manufacturer suspected of knowingly supplying equipment to Russia's military industry. Three individuals have already been charged with violating sanctions.

More leaks on the way

According to InformNapalm, the documents it released on 4 November are only a fraction of the total it has managed to acquire and go over, in partnership with the cyber analytics center Fenix. Ukrainian intelligence was also reportedly involved in the operation.

InformNapalm wrote that it plans to continue publishing leaks about OKBM into the future, with the hopes that publicity will help strengthen the impact of Western sanctions on Russia's military industry.

Russian drones now build a web of relays and defy electronic warfare. Russia is rapidly deploying and refining remote control of long-range drones over mesh networks. In October 2025, the occupiers already used this approach to hunt Ukrainian trains, says Serhii Beskrestnov, also known as Flash, as per Defense Express.

From Chinese mesh modems to relay drones that keep functioning under fire

Flash explains that Russia turned to Chinese manufacturers to turn the idea into reality. It specially ordered mesh modems, nominally labelled as Wi-Fi gear, operating in the 1300–1500 MHz band, and uses technology that differs from conventional Wi-Fi.

Each unit costs approximately $7,000 and can deliver an output of 10–20 W per channel, allowing for links of 100 km or more.

These modems provide a digital, encrypted connection that is relatively resistant to electronic interference by using cross-frequency distribution techniques. Each modem also acts as a relay: airborne modems on drones form a chain network in which data packets automatically reroute if a node disappears.

As a result, even if many platforms are shut down, the network remains operational. The drones that survive keep the links and forward data. 

“Each modem is not just a transmission point but also a relay for others. In the air, modems on drones create communications channels between themselves. Each of them tries to link to the next, and if one drops out, the information is routed around through another channel,” Beskrestnov explains.

From Gerbera to Shahed: scaling the tech for attacks on moving targets

Russia has been refining this technology for about a year. Flash noted that even if 80% of the drones are destroyed, the remainder can still relay information. Initially, Moscow tested the system on small foam drones, such as the “Gerbera", used for rear-area reconnaissance and relaying signals back toward Russian territory.

Seeing the concept’s effectiveness, the Russians began installing mesh modems on Shahed drones, enabling online control from Russian soil.

Technically, the network can provide throughput up to ~50 MB/s, and in degraded conditions, around 2 MB/s, which is enough to stream optimized high-definition video and allow FPV control with acceptable latency.

Although Shaheds are not highly maneuverable, their capabilities are sufficient to attack predictable moving targets, such as trains whose speed and route are known. An operator controlling a drone online can approach from the rear and strike a locomotive or tanker.

“These Shaheds can not only hit GPS coordinates like a substation but can also strike its most vulnerable point... We prioritize detecting these modems by their signal and jamming them with electronic warfare,” Flash says.

Modems that only switch on near the target, and ground relays on balconies

A Shahed with a mesh modem may only power the modem at a specific coordinate near the target — i.e., these modems don’t need to broadcast continuously and may activate just before strike.

Beyond airborne nodes, the Russians can set up ground relays: the modems are compact and can be installed on balconies or rooftops with internet access. Such ground nodes don’t need high antennas to communicate with nearby UAVs.

Can the system be countered?

Flash stresses that, despite the system’s complexity, it can be defeated by electronic warfare. However, the effectiveness of countermeasures depends on how widely and well Russia implements mesh technology: if Moscow deploys it not just on Shaheds but on other long-range platforms, it will gain a robust, fast, and wide two-way data channel.

Any mitigation depends on the volume, quality, and scale of Russia's deployment.

"It’s crucial not to miss the moment when Russia multiplies use of this tech across many platforms, not only Shaheds. Because that would create a resilient, fast, broad two-way data channel,” the Defense Express experts say.

The ratio of Russia’s use of ballistic missiles with 480 kg warheads to cruise missiles has increased in 2025 compared to previous years. Additionally, the Russians are refining their deployment methods for Iskander-M systems, which are capable of destroying residential buildings, making it more difficult for Patriot systems to intercept them, according to RBC-Ukraine.

The missile subtly changes course while the battery tries to keep up automatically

This challenge is compounded by the fact that the Iskander-M missile can make minor course adjustments as it approaches its target.

As Yurii Ihnat, Head of Communications for the Air Force Command, has noted that the Patriot system intercepts ballistic missiles automatically, which makes it harder to determine the precise moment to engage a maneuvering missile.

Ballistic missiles make sharp trajectory changes

Russian occupiers have also begun using Iskander-M more frequently and from multiple directions, often combining them with other tools, such as drones and cruise missiles.

“This, in turn, makes them even harder to intercept. A Patriot battery during an attack can only 'look' in one direction. It cannot engage targets 360 degrees around it,” the military official added.

Despite these challenges, Patriot systems continue to operate effectively, achieving confirmed interceptions of both Iskanders and Kinzhal missiles.

They failed to steal history. Ukrainian air defenders shot down the Russian army’s newest reconnaissance drone, "Kniaz Veshchiy Oleg", named after the ruler of Kyivan Rus, who, as legends said, could foresee the future, according to the 63rd Separate Mechanized Brigade. 

“At the same time, in the swamps where Moscow would later rise, frogs croaked. Naming your drone after a proto-Ukrainian warrior and politician is just another attempt to steal our history,” the 63rd Brigade added.

Despite its grandiose name, the Russian drone failed to predict its own destruction.

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1986004092578058409

“For the first time in the history of this war, Ukraine has recorded the downing of Russia’s newest reconnaissance drone with the peculiar name "Kniaz Veshchiy Oleg", the statement concluded.

Earlier, the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, also known as HUR, destroyed the base of Russian invaders belonging to the most elite and secretive drone Rubikon center in Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast. 

The Rubikon unit specializes in the use of unmanned systems, including combat drones, during Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine. It is considered one of the most effective and combat-ready structures of the Russian army.

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A Ukrainian soldier severely wounded in a Russian-occupied town spent more than a month waiting for rescue, according to Ukraine's First Separate Medical Battalion. After six failed attempts and the loss of six ground drones, the seventh mission — carried out using a damaged land-based robotic system — finally brought him home alive. The battalion shared footage showing highlights of the operation, but did not specify the front sector or even the oblast where the mission took place.

33 days behind enemy lines: Seventh rescue attempt ends in success

According to the battalion, the soldier sustained a serious injury 33 days before the operation, with only a tourniquet keeping him alive. During that time, six rescue attempts failed. All used NRK—"ground robotic systems"—and all were either destroyed or rendered inoperable. Four of the six destroyed machines belonged to adjacent units.

Despite the repeated setbacks, the seventh attempt succeeded. The evacuation covered a total of 64 km, including 37 km driven with a damaged wheel. The NRK reportedly sustained a hit from an anti-personnel mine on the way to the wounded soldier but kept moving.

On the return route, a Russian drone dropped explosives on the machine. Thanks to the armored capsule it was carrying, the soldier inside was unharmed.

The entire operation lasted 5 hours and 58 minutes, with the ground drone averaging a speed of 13 km/h and reaching a top speed of 29 km/h.

The battalion confirmed the soldier was successfully evacuated and received necessary medical care. He is currently undergoing further treatment and is not in danger.

"If he didn’t surrender — we had no right to"

In a closing message, First Separate Medical Battalion noted,

“If the soldier didn’t surrender — we had no right to.”

33 days wounded in a Russian-held town. Six ground drones were lost trying to reach him. The seventh one, even with a damaged wheel, survived a landmine and a Russian drone strike to bring the wounded Ukrainian soldier to safety.

Details: https://t.co/HCUEpe6uEK pic.twitter.com/pFS5t042xB

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) November 4, 2025

The situation in Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, is absolutely critical. Russian occupiers continue to amass forces. The DeepState monitoring project reports that the invaders have already established control over parts of the city, setting up positions and logistics hubs to support further infiltration. 

A logistical trap for Ukrainian forces and lost possibilies

At the same time, Ukrainian soldiers continue to carry out clearing operations and neutralize Russian troops using all available capabilities, with drone pilots playing a key role in securing Pokrovsk. 

The occupiers are attempting to secure the area between Pokrovsk and Hryshyne, while Ukrainian special units continue clearing operations to maintain control of this critical logistical corridor. 

“However, this does not solve the main problem — blocking the Russians on the southern outskirts to prevent further infiltration into the city. Given that they are already establishing positions and taking control of the area, this possibility is effectively lost," the experts say. 

An occupation, even without strong fortifications

The situation also threatens Myrnohrad, Pokrovsk's twin city, with being cut off entirely from the outside world. 

"Its capture would be especially damaging because the occupiers could take it without even properly fortifying their positions," the DeepState experts add.

Russians are leveling Pokrovsk within the city and along the flanks of the defensive line

Meanwhile, Spokesperson for the 7th Rapid Response Corps of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Serhii Okishev says that active operations are ongoing in the northeastern part of Pokrovsk to clear Russian occupation forces, according to Ukrinform.

Okishev notes that Russian forces are using artillery, drones, and guided aerial bombs. The fighting is concentrated both within the city and along the flanks of the defensive line.

Putin sets deadline for Pokrovsk conquest, throws 17,000 more soldiers thrown into burning city

Russian troops are attempting to advance through the urban areas and establish positions on the outskirts. 

Fighting continues in the Pokrovsk area between Ukrainian special forces and Russian occupation troops. The operation aims to protect a strategically important logistical area and neutralize Russian attempts to expand their fire control over critical supply routes.

A new study of demining efforts in Ukraine has revealed a significant breakthrough: AI boosts Ukraine demining surveys, with artificial intelligence-analyzed drone imagery increasing productivity by over 800%, according to findings announced today, 4 November 2025.

The 18-month field study in Ukraine was conducted by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) using technology from AI security company Safe Pro Group. The results were presented at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 2025 GICHD Innovation Conference.

This technological leap is significant because it could drastically shorten the timeline and lower the cost of clearing Ukraine's vast contaminated lands, which are estimated to be the size of half of Germany and could take a century to make safe by traditional methods.

A dramatic increase in efficiency

The research findings, detailed in a report by Business Wire, focused on improving "non-technical surveys" (NTS). This is the crucial first step where teams identify suspected hazardous areas, allowing specialized and slower clearance teams to be deployed more effectively.

Compared to traditional survey methods, the study found teams using the AI technology achieved:

• An 800+% increase in productivity.
• 550% more potentially hazardous items, such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), identified per hectare.
• A 300% faster survey speed per hour per team.
• A labor cost reduction of approximately 50% per hectare.

How the AI technology works

The system, called SpotlightAI by Safe Pro, uses artificial intelligence and computer vision to analyze aerial imagery captured by commercially available drones. The AI is trained to detect small, hard-to-find explosive threats that may be missed by the human eye. This data is then converted into detailed 2D and 3D maps that guide humanitarian demining teams on the ground.

Dan Erdberg, Chairman and CEO of Safe Pro Group, stated that the data confirms the "dramatic impact SpotlightAI can have helping the nearly 60 countries contaminated with UXO return their land to productivity."

Kyaw Lin Htut, a Senior Advisor for Innovation at NPA, which co-authored and presented the study, added that the "preliminary findings of our study suggest an outsized impact in increased person-hour efficiency" for survey teams operating in Ukraine.

The scale of Ukraine's challenge

This new technology addresses one of the most severe contamination crises in modern history. Russian forces have contaminated an estimated 174.000 square kilometers, roughly 30% of Ukraine's territory, with mines and unexploded ordnance, as Euromaidan Press has reported.

Experts cited by the publication have warned that clearance efforts are severely hindered by the chaotic and undocumented mining practices of Russian forces. In some heavily affected regions, complete demining could take up to 100 years. The World Bank has previously estimated the total cost to fully demine Ukraine at $34.6 billion.

While the physical task of clearing mines remains a slow and dangerous process, this breakthrough in AI-driven survey technology offers a significant strategic advantage. By rapidly and cost-effectively identifying hazardous areas, it allows Ukraine's clearance teams to focus their efforts where they are needed most, dramatically accelerating the first critical step in returning contaminated land to safe use.

The threat Ukraine feared is becoming real. Russia is developing bombs that could strike far beyond the front lines. According to the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, Russian forces have increased the range of their aerial bombs from 140 km to 200 km by using guided modular planning bombs (KMPB) equipped with turbojet engines, Telegraf has reported. 

Russian bombs reach beyond air-defense envelopes and threaten rear areas

The Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, also known as HUR, noted earlier munitions with shorter reach were used by the enemy primarily to strike targets in the frontline and border regions of Ukraine.

"The new bomb will be no exception, and its up to 200 km range will allow Russian aircraft to remain outside the engagement envelopes of Ukraine’s air-defense systems," said HUR.

In practical terms, today’s threats can now affect infrastructure and facilities that were previously considered relatively protected.

Chinese, American, and Swiss components helped to build deadly weapon

HUR also pointed to the origins of components for these munitions. According to the intelligence service, they are largely built using Chinese parts, while the high-explosive aviation bombs of the Kometa type are fitted with universal modules.

They also employ electronic components of Western manufacture, including products from companies in Switzerland and the US. 

The combination of accessible imported parts and adapted technologies provides the adversary with new capabilities for large-scale strikes.

Ukraine must adapt to changes in Russia's range and tactics

The emergence of bombs with a range of up to 200 km requires defense systems to revise their tactics and coverage zones, and to strengthen reconnaissance for early detection of launchers and attacking aircraft.

The battlefield conditions are changing, increasing the need for integrated air defense measures and the adaptation of air defense strategy. 

The United Kingdom is significantly expanding its air defence support for Ukraine, providing thousands of new interceptor drones and hundreds of missiles to help Kyiv defend its cities and energy infrastructure. UK Defence Secretary John Healey highlighted new support, including a joint program for a new "Octopus" interceptor drone, during Defence Questions in Parliament. This assistance comes as Ukraine braces for intensified Russian aerial attacks during the winter.

This new package is strategically significant as it provides Ukraine with a high-volume, cost-effective counter to Russian drone swarms, aiming to protect critical infrastructure and preserve more advanced missile interceptors for complex threats.

A new generation of interceptor drones

The centerpiece of the new support is a "first-of-its-kind joint program" for the "Octopus" interceptor drone, as reported by the UK Defence Journal. Thousands of these drones, which will be produced in the UK, are scheduled to be supplied to Ukraine on a monthly basis.

During his announcement, Defence Secretary John Healey said the support is a direct response to Russia’s intensified strikes on civilian and energy infrastructure, stating, “Putin's aerial bombardment of Ukraine is cynical, illegal and targeted at civilians.”

Expanding the missile shield

Beyond the new drone program, the UK has accelerated the delivery of other critical air defence hardware. Healey confirmed that more than 200,000 rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition and "hundreds of air-to-air missiles" have been delivered to Kyiv this autumn.

This builds on a steady flow of support throughout the year. A UK government factsheet published in September detailed provisions of additional counter-drone and air defence equipment. This includes a new system named "Gravehawk," jointly funded by the UK and Denmark, which has already been tested in Ukraine with more units to follow.

Earlier, in June, the UK committed 350 ASRAAM missiles, as reported by Euromaidan Press. Originally designed for air-to-air use, British engineers rapidly adapted the missiles to be ground-launched from the UK-developed RAVEN mobile air defence system. By June 2025, Ukraine had already operationally deployed eight Raven systems, with five more confirmed for future delivery. This £70 million package was notably financed using interest generated from frozen Russian financial assets.

A long-term strategic commitment

This latest aid is part of a sustained British commitment to Ukraine's defense. Total military financing from the UK now stands at £13.06 billion since February 2022, according to a House of Commons Library research briefing. The briefing notes that military financing for 2025 alone will be £4.5 billion.

This financial support is built upon a broader, long-term security framework. The UK was the first nation to finalize a ten-year security cooperation agreement with Ukraine on 12 January 2024, which was followed by an agreement for a 100-year partnership in January 2025, as noted in the parliamentary briefing.

Strategic implications for winter

The combination of new systems provides Ukraine with a layered air defence network. The high-volume, lower-cost "Octopus" drones, along with systems like "Gravehawk" and "Raven," are designed to intercept mass attacks by Russian Shahed-type drones.

This strategy is crucial for protecting the national energy grid ahead of winter. By using these systems to counter drones, Ukraine can preserve its more advanced and expensive missile systems, such as the US-provided Patriots, to defend against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.

Related:

UK delivers hundreds of air defense missiles to Ukraine months ahead of schedule

UK to build pilot batch of Octopus interceptor drones under joint project with Ukraine

Ukraine plans to begin mass production of its new Flamingo and Ruta missiles by the end of this year, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on 3 November, as reported by Ukrainian media, saying the country is making “very good” progress in developing its own long-range strike capabilities.

In recent months, Kyiv has accelerated domestic weapons production to strengthen its defenses and reduce dependence on foreign supplies amid ongoing Russian attacks. Ukraine’s push to build homegrown missiles marks a major step toward achieving self-sufficiency in long-range precision warfare, a domain once dominated by imported systems.

Speaking at a press briefing, Zelenskyy said the new weapons are already being used by Ukraine’s Defense Forces, but declined to specify numbers. “We expect mass production by the end of this year,” he said

He added that Ukraine’s Neptune anti-ship missile is already in serial production, with an extended-range cruise missile version - the “long Neptune” - also in service.

The Flamingo is a long-range Ukrainian cruise missile designed for deep-strike missions. Ukrainian officials say it delivers heavy strike power and long reach, giving Kyiv a strategic-capability previously dependent on foreign supplies.

The Ruta is a shorter-range jet-powered cruise missile or high-end loitering drone developed with technology from the Netherlands-based start-up Destinus. It is intended for tactical precision strikes and greater operational flexibility.

Zelenskyy said the deployment of these systems shows that Ukraine is “doing very well” in domestic missile production despite wartime constraints. “Every new missile we build strengthens our independence,” he noted.

The move underscores Ukraine’s determination to expand its domestic defense industry while maintaining pressure on Russian military targets far behind the front lines.

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On 3 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed that missile production is progressing well, with mass production of several systems expected to be completed by the end of the year. He also mentioned the deployment of new missile models and the expansion of production capacities, particularly for interceptor drones and maritime unmanned vehicles, UNIAN reports. 

Tools of response and strategic pressure

“We are deploying new missiles, including the ‘Flamingo,’” Zelenskyy said.

He did not specify quantities but has noted that the country expects mass production by year-end. He also emphasized the “Neptune” series, already in production and delivering strong results.

“We have standard and extended versions, both performing very well," he explained. 

According to Zelenskyy, these systems are effective against energy infrastructure strikes, targeting resources that fund the aggressor.

Scaling production: 600–800 interceptor drones Per Day

Ukraine is also accelerating production of interceptor UAVs, aiming to reach 600–800 units per day by the end of November, “if all goes according to plan.”

Zelenskyy acknowledged potential setbacks, such as attacks on factories or damage to workshops, but stressed that “so far we have not lost any type of long-range weapon.”

The industry is working alongside the military, with repair teams and logistics restoring production capacity even after strikes.

Berlin and Copenhagen as first hubs of weapon exports

Zelenskyy announced the creation of two European export hubs: “These are for weapons we can afford to sell. The first two will be Berlin and Copenhagen, decided at the company level, and operational this year.”

Revenue from exports will support domestic production of scarce systems. Ukraine also has a surplus of maritime drones and certain artillery systems available for export, provided that proper safety and regulatory oversight are in place.

The Ukrainian president proposed a fair financial mechanism: partners could fully fund the production of scarce weapons in Ukraine, with the resulting systems to be split equally, a method to rapidly mobilize both partner and Ukrainian industrial capacity.

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In June 2019, I stood in the corner of a hotel ballroom in Athens and watched as some of the most prominent publishers and senior editors from across the European continent were made to sit blindfolded on chairs arranged in circles.

It was past midnight. The bar had been open for hours. In this dimly lit space, Google executives moved between the circles, their voices cutting through the nervous laughter.

"Werewolves, wake up," one of them commanded. "Choose your victim." The blindfolded editors, people who ran newsrooms, who held governments accountable, who prided themselves on their clear-eyed analyses of current affairs, tilted their heads toward the voices of their hosts, trying to decode who among them was predator and who was prey.

This was the climax of NewsGeist, Google's annual gathering for publishers and editors. The game was Werewolf, sometimes called Mafia, a contest of deception and power where "villagers" must identify the killers among them as they are being eliminated one by one. Google executives, led by Richard Gingras, the company's Global Vice President for News, acted as game masters. They decided who could speak, who had to stay silent, who lived, and who died. The editors participated enthusiastically. Some had flown in on Google's dime. Many had received grants from the Google News Initiative, the company's billion-dollar program to support journalism innovation. All of them depended on Google's algorithms to surface their journalism to readers.

I played one round, but felt so uncomfortable I decided to watch from the edge of the room, struck by how the whole scene looked like performance art: a dramatization of the actual relationship playing out in the real world beyond this ballroom. Publishers were going broke trying to survive in an ecosystem Google had architected. Google decided what lived and what died in its search rankings, in ad auctions, in the fundamental infrastructure of digital publishing. The parallels seemed too obvious to miss. But in Athens, everyone was laughing, playing along, bonding over cocktails and clever game theory.

Six years later, in October 2025, I finally got to ask Richard Gingras if it had occurred to him that Google executives commanding blindfolded editors in a game of power and deception might be a metaphor for the actual relationship between Google and journalism.

He looked genuinely surprised.

"No, it didn't," he said. "Oh gosh. Oh my gosh. No!"

The question no one asked 

When the International Press Institute asked me if I wanted to interview Gingras on stage at their annual congress in Vienna, my first instinct was to say no. I knew it would likely be a futile exercise: a single interview against his substantial public platform. Although now retired from Google, Richard Gingras remains a towering figure in journalism circles, a 73-year-old who had spent five decades at the intersection of media and technology, including nearly fifteen years as Google's senior voice on journalism matters. Throughout that time, he'd been a fixture at every major industry conference, built personal friendships with leading editors across the world, and positioned himself as journalism's thoughtful critic and advocate.

But I said yes because despite being perhaps the most influential voice in shaping the relationship between the world's most powerful information company and the journalism industry, Gingras had never been asked to account for what he had built. And as journalism now lurches into a new era of AI dependency, making the same mistakes with companies like Microsoft that it made with Google, I wanted to know: Could one of the architects of the first wave of platform capture reflect honestly on what he'd created? And could that self-reflection help us to avoid repeating the pattern?

The lesson from a Central Asian autocracy 

The morning of the interview, I woke with a knot in my stomach that sent me straight back to another interview, nearly twenty years earlier. I was 26, newly appointed as the BBC's Central Asia correspondent, and I'd secured an exclusive with Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan's president who hadn't spoken to any foreign media in fifteen years. A friend had arranged it on one condition: I couldn't ask about the corruption charges against Nazarbayev in the United States. On the morning of the interview, my friend called to remind me his career would be on the line if I broke that promise. I felt physically ill walking into that room, not afraid of Nazarbayev, but sick at the thought of betraying someone who'd helped me and who would pay the price for my question.

I asked anyway. Nazarbayev was furious. My friend didn't speak to me for months. But I learned something that has shaped every difficult interview since: Power protects itself not through crude censorship, but through relationships, by making you feel that asking the question would be a betrayal of someone who trusted you, who opened doors for you, and who would now suffer consequences.

Comparing a Central Asian dictator to a former Silicon Valley executive may seem absurd. Richard Gingras is no authoritarian. He doesn't imprison dissidents or threaten reporters. He hosts conferences, funds initiatives, and builds relationships. But the mechanism is identical. In Vienna, the discomfort I felt wasn't about betraying a friend who had helped me, it was about breaking an unspoken professional consensus. Gingras had made himself indispensable to journalism, not through threats but through generosity, access, and genuine engagement. Asking hard questions of someone who has positioned himself as journalism's ally, who many of my colleagues consider a friend, who has funded their projects and attended their events—that feels like betrayal not because he'll retaliate, but because the entire system is built on not asking the question.

Architecture of Capture

Journalism that protects relationships isn't journalism at all. Yet that's precisely what journalism did with major platforms, especially Google. For fifteen years. Gingras was at the center of a carefully constructed ecosystem of dependency. Publishers couldn't survive without Google's traffic. Google didn't need publishers — but keeping them dependent, grateful, attending conferences, accepting grants, led to them obliging their benefactors by being effectively blind to what was happening to their industry, what was being done to it.

Journalism was seen as politically important by Google leadership way out of proportion to its revenue-generating potential, because of its influence on public perception and potential regulation. The same was true at Meta. News executives inside these tech companies had big titles, meaningful infrastructure, and significant access to top leadership, but that access came with an implicit understanding about what questions wouldn't be asked. Publishers didn’t want to be left behind but, unknowingly, they were sealing their fate.

This power dynamic extends far beyond one company's relationship with one industry. At Coda Story, where we've spent years investigating how authoritarian regimes capture institutions and reshape information systems, we recognize the pattern. The same architecture of dependency that Google built with journalism is now embedded across every sector where technology companies control infrastructure. These companies are largely opaque and unregulated, yet they control the essential infrastructure of modern life. App developers depend on platform stores. Startups depend on cloud providers. Musicians depend on Spotify for discovery and revenue. Artists depend on Instagram for visibility. Schools depend on Google Classroom and Chromebooks. Media organizations now depend on AI companies whose models train on their content and are increasingly embedded in workflows, suggesting headlines, making edits, writing summaries. The negotiations happening today mirror what happened with Google and journalism fifteen years ago.

Understanding how journalism was captured matters especially because journalism was meant to be the institution that held power accountable. When journalism itself becomes dependent on the platforms it should scrutinize, unable to ask hard questions without risking its survival, the entire accountability infrastructure collapses. Tech platforms control the infrastructure upon which democratic institutions operate, and those institutions have learned not to examine that control too closely. What happened with Google and journalism is now the template. This is why reflecting on what Gingras built matters: not to relitigate the past, but because the pattern is repeating itself. If someone as thoughtful and engaged as Gingras can't examine what happened during his tenure, what hope do we have for accountability as these dependencies deepen?

The test 

In preparing for our conversation, I read everything Gingras had published recently. He is incredibly eloquent, and I found myself agreeing with much of what he wrote: his observations about echo chambers, about oversimplification, about journalism's failures. In much of his writing, he invokes his father-in-law Dalton Trumbo — the screenwriter who chose prison over compliance with McCarthyism — as evidence of his own intimate understanding of authoritarianism. He writes eloquently about polarization and journalism's narrow focus on accountability reporting.

Intellectually, I find much of Gingras's critique of journalism provocative and not entirely without merit. But it also felt self-serving. Take his recent piece about what he calls "the Woodward-Bernstein effect," in which he argues that journalism's post-Watergate focus on accountability reporting has become "problematic," that it's turned journalists into "the town scold" and "arrogant know-it-alls." Our team at Coda has spent years covering technology companies, and Google was consistently the most opaque, the most difficult to get answers from—genuinely harder to hold accountable than the fossil fuel companies I'd covered in the past. For fifteen years, Gingras was the friendly face of that opacity. And yet, he writes thousands of words diagnosing journalism's problems while writing almost nothing about Google's role in creating them.

I wanted to know: Could he apply the same analytical rigor to Google that he applies to journalism?

Here are the highlights and then the full transcript of the conversation that unfolded.

Key moments from the interview

• On power asymmetry: When asked if Google had power over journalism, Gingras initially deflects, then eventually says "You want me to say yes? Yes. I don't understand the point."
• On the Trump inauguration: Gingras says "the White House was very clever in staging that situation" to create the photo of tech executives at Trump's inauguration,” and insists "that's the last photo Sundar ever wanted taken. We don't support this administration.”
• On the Navalny app: When confronted about Google removing Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny's voting app at Putin's demand — after invoking his father-in-law Dalton Trumbo who chose prison over compliance — Gingras says he "wasn't involved in that specific decision."
• On Google's impact: Gingras repeatedly denies that Google disrupted journalism's revenue model or harmed the industry.
• On accountability: When pressed about why he writes extensively criticizing journalism but not Google, Gingras says the questions raised are about decisions he "wasn't involved with."
• On dependency: When told publishers' relationship to Google is like "controlling the oxygen," Gingras responds: "What do you mean control the oxygen? Why don't you just explain it to me instead of talking in metaphors?"
• The audience intervention: An audience member cites DOJ monopoly findings and ongoing lawsuits, providing legal specificity about Google's market dominance that Gingras cannot dismiss as opinion.
• On News Geist and CNTI: Gingras reveals that News Geist, Google's annual conference for publishers, has been moved to CNTI (Center for News, Technology & Innovation), an organization he co-founded with Marty Baron, Paula Miraglia, and Maria Ressa. Google remains a sponsor.
• The Werewolf moment: When asked if he'd ever considered that Google executives commanding blindfolded editors in a game at News Geist might be a metaphor for the actual relationship, Gingras responds: "Oh gosh. Oh my gosh. No."

Editor's note: Throughout this conversation, Gingras used "we" to refer to both the journalism industry and Google. At the end of the interview, he clarified: "I'm here representing my own views" and emphasized he was speaking for himself, not on behalf of Google. We contacted Google for comment on what was said in this conversation but at the time of publication had yet to hear back. We will update if we do. Gingras now chairs Village Media and is on the board of CNTI (Center for News, Technology & Innovation) with journalists including Marty Baron, Paula Miraglia, and Maria Ressa. The transcript of the full conversation below has been lightly edited for clarity. 

The Transcript

Natalia Antelava: Just slightly reframing the introduction (to this session): This is framed as a conversation on the program, but really, for me, it's an opportunity to ask Richard some questions that I've always wanted to ask.

My name is Natalia Antelava. I am co-founder and editor-in-chief of Coda Story, and throughout my career, first as a BBC correspondent covering conflict zones and authoritarian regimes, and then as editor-in-chief of Coda Story, I've watched how information systems shape power, how companies make choices when authoritarians demand compliance, and how journalism's business models have collapsed. I don't think anyone has more to say about all of it than Richard Gingras, who spent 15 years at Google. I'm grateful to IPI for giving me this opportunity, and grateful to you, Richard, for sitting down.

So the first question I want to ask you is actually about pronouns. I've noticed in the pieces you sent me — and I know you're no longer at Google, but even before you left — you often refer to media and journalism as "we." Can you explain that "we"?

Richard Gingras: Media and journalism, oh, you mean including me? Yes, most certainly. Well, first of all, I spent five decades of my career at the intersection of media and technology and public policy, mostly in media. I started out in public broadcasting in the United States during Watergate. So it was a pretty seminal experience. In fact, by the way, my mentor back then said something to me that influenced my career — this was 1974. He said: "Richard, if you're interested in the future of media, stay close to the technology, because it establishes the ground rules and the playing field upon which it's played." And that certainly has influenced my career, but I feel I've always been part of the media. 

Natalia Antelava: Including when you were at Google?

Richard Gingras: Including my work at Google. You know, it was obviously very much embedded in what we could do as a tech company to help enable and grow not only the media ecosystem, the journalistic ecosystem, but how we could connect our users to important, relevant, and authoritative sources of information. So to me it was very much about being journalistic in that realm as well.

Natalia Antelava: But what puzzles me about you using that pronoun when you were at Google is that the relationship between the media industry and Google was very much a power relationship. And Google had the power that journalism and media didn't. So why do you use "we" given that there was such a power asymmetry? 

Richard Gingras: I mean, I always — I guess we can get hung up on these things, but I always saw it as a collaboration. And I thought it was really important to have it as a collaboration. In fact, let me touch on something. You've heard me say this before: You know, we live in an extraordinarily polarized society and time. And we get very simplistic in the way we talk about things. We talk about things in memes, problems in memes and solutions in memes. And it's not constructive. It doesn't enable constructive dialogue. And so frankly, when I hear people refer to big tech, or the tech bros, or fake news journalism, or the mainstream media, I go, well, wait a second. In a journalistic context, I find it actually incredibly sad. These are very difficult times and very difficult challenges. And to just make these kinds of simplistic conclusions…

Natalia Antelava: Absolutely. So let's not talk about big tech and let's not talk in generalizations. Let's talk about Google. Google's relationship with the media was a relationship of power. You had the money, you had the power, you created an ecosystem in which journalism was meant to survive and in which it collapsed. So why "we"? How is that a "we"?

Richard Gingras: I don't know, I'm kind of lost in the discussion of the pronoun, right? I mean, look, I went to Google 15 years ago. I was at Google actually for a bit before that. I went because I thought in this time of the evolution of the internet — this extraordinary thing called the internet — that being at Google was going to be a very significant place to be in terms of how we expose people to diverse sources of information, in terms of how we might help drive innovation in a time of tremendous change, right? I felt it was important to do that. And frankly, it was the most extraordinary experience of my career. I will tell you, I have never in my career worked with a more significant group of principled, thoughtful people than I did at Google, in Google Search, in Google News, in our relationships with the industry. We were trying to do the right thing. Does that mean we didn't make mistakes along the way? Of course. Like, you know, search ranking is the mission.

Natalia Antelava: What would you say was the biggest mistake you made at Google?

Richard Gingras: I would say the biggest mistake, honestly, was in our work with the industry, the Google News Initiative. We spent over a billion dollars over eight years, a billion and a half dollars trying to drive innovation.

Natalia Antelava: A tiny line in the budget.

Richard Gingras: Whatever. Who else around the world was spending anything close to that, trying to drive innovation in the news industry?

Natalia Antelava: But that was happening at the same time as Google — along with others, we cannot blame just Google — was also destroying and completely reshaping the ecosystem in which journalism existed.

Richard Gingras: How was that? How was Google destroying that? I'm serious.

Natalia Antelava: Well, because Google was extracting revenue from publishers.

Richard Gingras: No. How? Where?

Natalia Antelava: Was Google not extracting revenue from publishers?

Richard Gingras: Where? How?

Natalia Antelava: The advertising model completely collapsed.

Richard Gingras: Well, let's go to that point, because again, that's one of these things that I hear repeatedly. I heard it at a conference in South Africa, [where someone] said "Oh, platforms siphoned newspaper advertising." You know, that is not factually the case. If you actually — no, look at it: if you look at the makeup — I've studied this stuff, carefully.f you look at the makeup of advertising in a newspaper in 1980, 1990, right? 80% of it was four categories: [First] Classified ads, 30%, disappeared into the internet, into online commerce sites. Second, department stores who faded in an era of e-commerce.

Natalia Antelava: And Richard, if I were sitting down with Craig Newmark [founder of Craigslist], I would be asking him different questions, but I would like to ask you questions about Google.

Richard Gingras: And you made a claim, and I think it's fair for me to respond to the claim, right? Google did not destroy the news industry, did not take their revenue. In fact, another interesting point made by Mr. Siegel last night, which just made me shake my head: "But why did we have to reinvent advertising models?" Two-thirds of Google's advertisers—not two-thirds of its revenue—two-thirds of its advertisers are small businesses who could not afford to advertise in the world of print. And by the way, as he points out, information is vital to grow an economy. Advertising, particularly in local areas, is valued information to grow a local economy.

Natalia Antelava: So you completely stand by everything that Google did when it comes to journalism.

Richard Gingras: Actually, you didn't let me answer the question, Natalia. The things that I feel like we didn't — I don't think we drove enough innovation. We missed what I see now as a significant opportunity to drive, particularly local news organizations, to rethink what local advertising could be in their communities. I'm chairman of this company, Village Media, which is rethinking what a local media entity can be in this digital world, and it's entirely supported by local merchant advertising. That was a mistake.

Natalia Antelava: But basically you're saying that you don't agree with my premise that the relationship between Google and the media industry was one of power, where Google had all the power.

Richard Gingras: I don't know how that is even — I'm not even sure how that's relevant to the conversation. All I knew was, yes, we are, you know, Google Search was a very, very significant component of the—

Natalia Antelava: But that is kind of a yes or no question. Do you think Google — Google News Initiative — in its relationship with the media industry, do you feel like Google had the power?

Richard Gingras: I don't know. You want me to say ‘yes’? Yes. I don't understand the point. I mean, do we want to get to the substance of how we move the industry forward? 

Natalia Antelava: There are lots of people who would argue that you didn't move the industry forward — that Google, not you personally, but that Google destroyed the industry. Not just on its own — I know you will argue it wasn't just Google — but it created the information ecosystem that ultimately advanced the authoritarian rise all around the world.

Richard Gingras: Oh, good Lord. Oh, good Lord. Really? Let's look at that. No, no, no. Wait a second. Let me answer that because — let's look at that.  One of the things I've tried to study and I've written about this is the evolution of media and democracy. Let's see what happened in my country in the United States, right? Let us go back to 1980 when there was deregulation of radio and television. And that was the rise of extreme partisan talk radio, right? Which began to drive our population into very dangerous spaces. And then we had the evolution of cable and cable news networks who went to their partisan cohorts – Fox News. The most significant force in driving division in the United States was that singular company.

Natalia Antelava: I would really like to talk about Google.

Richard Gingras: I understand that, but when you make those kinds of grand statements, I think it's frankly fair for us to also look at the larger picture.

Natalia Antelava: And you do that, and we do that beautifully and very eloquently in all of your writing, which really focuses on criticizing the journalism industry — which is fair enough, I happen to agree with a lot of what you say about journalism. But it does strike me a little bit like an arsonist who criticizes the fire department for not preventing enough fires.

Richard Gingras: Okay. Let me ask you this: What do you think Google should have done differently?

Natalia Antelava: I think I am the one asking questions here, but let me ask you this: You have written about your father-in-law, Dalton Trumbo — it's an incredible story. Dalton Trumbo went to prison rather than comply with Congress. And you write about it as a man who really understands authoritarianism, like on a very personal level. It's very compelling.

But here's what it makes me think about: In 2021, during the Russian parliamentary election, Alexei Navalny, who was later subsequently killed in prison, the Russian opposition leader, came up with a very simple and unique way of fighting authoritarianism through elections. It was a voting app. Does anyone remember the name of the voting app?

[Audience member]: Smart Voting.

Natalia Antelava: Smart Voting, it was called the Smart Voting app. And if it had worked — we don't know whether it would have worked — but if it had worked, then it could have given a lot of people a blueprint for fighting authoritarianism around the world. One of the reasons it didn't work was because Google complied with the Russian government, with Putin's demand, to pull the Smart Voting app from Google stores, to pull videos from YouTube, and the whole thing flopped. You were there when these decisions were being made. How did you reconcile your personal beliefs, your family's story, with the fact that the company you were representing and working for was supporting a very nasty dictatorship?

Richard Gingras: Well, you just made the statement "supporting a nasty dictatorship." I wasn't there for that specific decision, so I really can't speak to it. I can tell you that, for instance, our market share in Russia is tiny, because obviously they have no particular interest in Google Search being successful in Russia. They've tolerated YouTube because YouTube is so popular. But we don't have much of a business there, and they regularly say…

Natalia Antelava: So it had nothing to do with compliance with Putin, it was just…

Richard Gingras: Well, you made the grand statement that we complied and propped up Putin, and frankly, I think that's nonsense.

Natalia Antelava: What about building censored search engines for China that track dissidents, and continuing business with Saudi Arabia after Jamal Khashoggi died? The Dragonfly [project] allowed the Chinese government to track searches.

Richard Gingras: We didn't deal with Saudi Arabia… Wait, where did you get this that we built a separate search engine for China? What?

Natalia Antelava: The Dragonfly allowed the Chinese government to track searches.

Richard Gingras: Actually… We pulled out of China because of that. We were not going to go into China with that.

Natalia Antelava: Selling cloud to Saudi Arabia after Khashoggi.

Richard Gingras: You want to just keep talking about that?

Natalia Antelava: Yeah, because this is important context

Richard Gingras: But you make these grand statements without any backup of fact. We were not creating a search engine to go back into China. Full stop.

Natalia Antelava: No, but you can...

Richard Gingras: In fact, if we wanted to go back into China — and I said this at the time — we would have gone into China because we lost a huge amount of business in pulling out of China. We wouldn't go in with a search engine. We would go in with a simple answer engine that said, "by the way, we're going to answer questions on all these topics like home renovation and travel and so on. We're not going to deal with politics at all."  Why would you go back into China and even presume to be a search engine on the open web in China?

Natalia Antelava: So are you saying that Google never complied with authoritarian governments around the world?

Richard Gingras: I'm sure you'll come up with an example, but I don't know. You don't understand the trickiness of the position that we're in. This is not by the way — yes, we are in, as I've said, a company that is like no other company in the history of the world in the middle of so much societal change. And it's tricky.

Natalia Antelava: Well, the company is the architect of that society.

Richard Gingras: Exactly. I sat down with, for instance, I had an hour-long conversation with the communications minister in a global South country. They wanted to talk about misinformation. I spent an hour talking about that with them and then they came, it was five minutes to go, and the minister said, "Oh by the way, Mr. Gingras, there's a politician here, and this is a country that doesn't have great love for the press, that is saying dishonest things about the government. Will you deplatform him?" No, we didn't deplatform him. We told him what we normally do: "We try to surface diverse sources of information from the press in your country. If that politician is saying dishonest things, then the presumption is that maybe others in the press will challenge that."

So we've tried to be extremely principled in every place we operate. Does that say there have never been issues or challenges of how do we survive in a country and continue forward? Like you've made a whole bunch out of the fact that—

Natalia Antelava: So pulling the app in response to Putin's request to take down the Smart Voting app, that's principled?

Richard Gingras: We didn't pull out.

Natalia Antelava: Yeah, you did.

Richard Gingras: Great. Oh, pull the app. You said we pulled out.

Natalia Antelava: You pulled the app, and after that, Google closed the offices.

Richard Gingras: That's right, because we — that was the principle.

Natalia Antelava: Yes, and I understand that you had the responsibility for your staff in the country. That is also understandable. But pulling the app — you just said Google was always principled, but that is not principled. And look, I'm not holding you responsible for the decision at that level, but I'm asking you for your reflections on how that squares with your beliefs and things that you talk about, about authoritarianism, about freedom. That's what I'm trying to get, I am trying to get your reflection on it.

Richard Gingras: My reflection, in general, because the issues you specifically raised are issues that I was not involved in. It wasn't my job. At those times, I was a VP of product in Search, also overseeing things like news and so on and so forth. So where was I? These are extraordinarily difficult times and difficult circumstances. I generally believe that Google tried, and Sundar Pichai is an incredibly principled fellow. We try to do as best we can in these complex times, in this complex world. Thank you very much.

Natalia Antelava: But, do you agree that it's not a principled thing to do, to pull the app?

Richard Gingras: There's many things that we can look at and say that was not necessarily the right decision. I didn't say we were flawless at all. We try to learn as best we can from every mistake we make and go forward. That's what we did at Google. Now, it's not "we" anymore because I'm not there, but I do have tremendous respect for the people there, including Sundar for that matter. And there's, you know, all kinds of nonsense has been made out of that photo at the inauguration. We've been at every inauguration for the last 20 years. And yes, the White House was very clever in staging that situation such that that photo happened. And I know full well that that's the last photo Sundar ever wanted taken. We don't support this administration. 

Natalia Antelava: Richard, I have another question. Let's talk about something else. So you just published a piece that you sent me about what you call the Woodward-Bernstein effect, talking about Watergate and how it's kind of set the precedent for journalism being really obsessed with accountability reporting at the expense of other kinds of journalism. It's an interesting argument and there is a lot that I agree with. What bothers me about that piece when I read it is that it's coming from you, because for so long while you were at Google, Google was one of the most opaque, non-transparent and difficult organizations that I have ever dealt with as a reporter. It was impossible to get an answer from Google on anything that Google did. How do you square that?

Richard Gingras: What? I don't know how to square your experience at all. I know that when it comes to Google Search, I spent so much of my time—and the reason I say these things, by the way, I do consider myself a journalist. I consider myself having been in this space for five decades. And so I will stand on that in terms of the opinions I make about how journalism might move forward.

Natalia Antelava: Yeah, and you have great opinions, but what puzzles me is why are we not hearing your reflections about Google, your employer, for 15 years? You criticize journalism a lot and a lot of this critique is incredibly prescient, but what about reflections on...

Richard Gingras: I'd gladly reflect, but what you've asked me to reflect on is things that I wasn't involved with. So, you know.

Natalia Antelava: Yes, but you reflect on things in journalism that you were not involved in.

Richard Gingras: Let me try it. Once again, Natalia, if I have an opportunity to answer the question, I'll do it more broadly, OK? If I think there's something that we never did enough of, particularly with regard to our algorithmic work — and I'm extremely proud of our algorithmic work — and one of the things we always did with Google Search, particularly, said, "Well, we show the results every day. We will encourage research of people looking and analyzing our research and giving us that feedback." I think a mistake we made was we never spent enough time explaining how we did our work. We assumed people would understand. And they don't. I spent so much time in the last 10 or 15 years on the policy space and every time I would meet with a minister in another country, you were starting from scratch because they had no clue how Google worked. They didn't understand the business, they didn't understand how search worked.

Natalia Antelava: What did Google not understand? But is there something that Google didn't understand? I'm trying to get you to answer that.

Richard Gingras: I'll tell you what Google — here's one of the things that Google didn't understand, is we don't understand the public policy environment. You know why? Because we're a bunch of engineers. We're a bunch of logicians. I remember when I first met — when Axel Springer moved forward with Leistungsschutzrecht [the German ancillary copyright law], right, another bad example of public policy, pay for links, right? And I explained this, so I had to go brief Larry [Page] about this. And as typical with Larry, he was very smart. And he said, well, that's just fucking stupid. And he's right. It was stupid. It made no sense for the industry.

Natalia Antelava: Yes, it didn't make sense for the profit part.

Richard Gingras: Can I finish my answer, Natalia? The reason it didn't make sense for him was that he's a logician. And I said: "But Larry, here's the thing. In the public policy environment, logic doesn't even get invited into the room. It's a battle of particular interests. And if we want to be effective in that environment, then we have to do a whole lot more outreach. We have to do a whole lot more talking. We have to do a lot representing what we do and why we do it." All right, there's a reflection.

Natalia Antelava: But, isn't what you do and why you did it — profit? The bottom line was always profit.

Richard Gingras: Are you saying there's something wrong with…

Natalia Antelava: No, not at all. I'm not saying there is something wrong….

Richard Gingras: I do find it interesting here that we like to toss around the word non-profit as if it were a cloak of ethics. It's not a business model, it's a tax status. What we all need to be much more focused on is how do we drive sustainable news businesses. And yeah, Google—

Natalia Antelava: Yeah, but that's exactly the point I'm making. What Google was always focused on was not driving sustainable news businesses. It was focused on driving its own business, which did not go hand-in-hand with sustainable journalism.

Richard Gingras: And again, if you want to be specific, in what ways you thought that was contrary to our societal interests, I'd like to hear it. I mean, look at it.

Natalia Antelava: Oh, does it?

Richard Gingras: Fine, say it, hear it. Can we be specific?

Natalia Antelava: I just gave you a bunch of examples from Russia, Saudi Arabia. There are others: Vietnam, Turkey...

Richard Gingras: OK. We try to survive in those countries as best we can without pulling out because we don't think it's in the best interest — like in the United States we got a government that could destroy us in a heartbeat. We're trying damn hard not to be destroyed because we don't think that's A) good for our business or good for the societies we operate in. And we will try to continue.

Natalia Antelava: Yeah, it's "we," you are still saying it. I find it interesting that you say "we" both about the news industry as well as Google and I think these are two very different "we's" because these are two entities that hold completely different power in today's information ecosystem, in which the noise is overwhelming and journalism cannot get through the noise. Part of that is the architecture of the way modern information works, and Google played a key role in being the architect.

Richard Gingras: No, listen, architect of what?

Natalia Antelava: Of the current information ecosystem.

Richard Gingras: What? Operating Google Search? Operating auction-based advertising systems? Tell me what? No, go ahead, tell me what.

Natalia Antelava (addressing voices from the room): Would anyone like to say something? 

Richard Gingras: Auction-based advertising systems have created great efficiencies in the economy. Go ahead.

[Audience member]: Sure, so we know that the Department of Justice has found two illegal monopolies, so it's not an opinion, it's a legal finding that Google had monopoly rents on search. So Google was found to have an illegal monopoly in search, that included in terms of advertising search and search visibility, and it was found to be an illegal monopoly in [ad tech]. And what does that mean? That means that it took monopoly rents. That was preferential dominance. And so that doesn't have anything to do with—that was how you siphoned off revenue. So this is not an opinion of Natalia's. This is what has been determined by a US court and then many competition authorities around the world that have done investigations to look at Google's market power, as you said, in all of these domains, including now building the next generation of AI, the whole AI ecosystem, redoing the information ecosystem, and revising copyright, which has been around for hundreds of years, to self-preferencing, forcing us to use those tools in Google products without any choice. No consent, no compensation, no credit. Google search would not be very useful if it didn't have fact-based information, just as AI is not useful without fact-based information. But there is not a fair exchange of value. There is no payment for copyright. There is no payment for the use of raw data, which creates the—

Richard Gingras: And by the way, we didn't revise copyright, we are operating within copyright today. Google is operating within copyright today.

[Audience member]: No, I mean, there are so many publishers that have aligned to create, to try to get their rights, their copyrights. But Google has so much money that it can afford to resist more than 54 lawsuits that are happening around the world.

Richard Gingras: Again, right, let the courts decide.

[Audience member]: They have decided…

Richard Gingras: You want me to give constructive [advice] to the industry, as me, not as Google, talking about AI? Go ahead, put up the robots.txt. Feel free. Pay to crawl {a bot that browses the net and discovers raw data from webpages, a critical step for search engines to function].. Great. My only guidance to you would be: be very cautious about what you expect in return dollar-wise. And if you want to analyze the information economy at large, you'll get a pretty clear understanding of where the value is and where the value isn't, right? But do that. I have no problem with that personally at all.

[Audience member]: We did it. [Another publisher] did it, I did it!

Richard Gingras: Great, do it, and then fine, and you can block whoever you block. That's fine, go ahead, but that's not a copyright issue. If there are copyright lawsuits and lawsuits that win, fine, but I haven't seen them yet.

[Audience member]: The Thompson Reuters case.

Richard Gingras: And just think, wait, let's see how the courts resolve those issues. But again, the same point is, if you want to block the crawlers, block the crawlers. If you want to try to extract payment from the crawler, extract payment for the crawlers, so be it. I don't disagree with that.

Natalia Antelava: I mean the issue with that is that if you control the oxygen and then you tell people "you don't have to breathe this air if you don't want to"—

Richard Gingras: What do you mean control the oxygen?

Natalia Antelava: I think everyone in this room understand the metaphor. Can you raise your hand if you know what I mean?

(hands go up)

Richard Gingras: Well don't, why don't you just explain it to me instead of talking in metaphors?

Natalia Antelava: Richard, I think of all people you really understand metaphors.

Richard Gingras: Thank you. Okay, Natalia, I don't know what to say. When you say you control the oxygen, what does that mean? Seriously, you giggle, just answer the question. Is it that hard to answer?

Natalia Antelava: You control the ecosystem in which publishers had to survive.

Richard Gingras: What control? Google Search? Control? Look, here too. Really interesting. When they say gatekeepers, we came from a pre-internet ecosystem where breaking into the dialog of the media was extraordinarily difficult. Now we have this thing called the internet and we have these things called search engines which help you find these sources. Now if you want to criticize the algorithm, criticize the algorithm and I'll gladly defend that or not. And if you want to be specific about those criticisms, do...

Natalia Antelava: No, I'm much more interested in—

Richard Gingras: But if you want to be in search, then yes, we need to crawl

Natalia Antelava: Yeah, that's right. That's what I mean. You control the oxygen and say “go ahead and breathe some other air”

Richard Gingras: What are you suggesting as the alternative model? I want you to just kind of play some of these scenarios through for a second. Because I'm saying, we need to pass a law saying that LLMs need to pay for the content they crawl. Can I finish the point, Natalia? Think of how that might play out. Because I suspect what might play out is those LLMs—first of all, the money isn't in news at all. It's not in news at all, it's not what the enterprises are paying for, so there's not gonna be a whole lot of money to be spent—but what they will do is they'll go pick off a number of publishers or wire services here, a big publisher there, and it'll be end of story. So much for that nice, wonderful, diverse ecosystem that we're talking about here. It won't happen. So again, you can impose that model. Is that ultimately to the benefit of the knowledge ecosystem of the world? I kind of question that.

Natalia Antelava: I mean, the knowledge ecosystem that is very questionable and is full of rubbish — I'm not blaming you for that. What I'm trying to get out of you are genuine reflections about the specifics. You're very good at giving them when it comes to critique of the media and you're not able to do it at all when it comes to critique of the company that was your employer for a long time. It sounds like you did everything right and publishers did everything wrong.

Richard Gingras: I did not say that, I did not say that Natalia, you know, honestly, you put words in my mouth, you raise non-specific questions for me to react to.

Natalia Antelava: I think I raised very specific questions.

Richard Gingras: These are specific questions about things that I again [was not a part of], I worked in search.

Natalia Antelava: But you understand how the power structures work. And you using the "we" pronoun and hosting journalists and being part of the journalism industry conversation has helped Google to obscure the fact that it was also destroying the business.

Richard Gingras: Again, people can decide whether they want to engage with Google or not.

They don't have to come to conferences that we've sponsored, they don't have to use the tools that we have provided, you don't have to at all. 

Natalia Antelava: Because if you don't, you don't exist. But since you brought up conferences, there is one question I’ve always wanted to ask you. I've only been to one News Geist — two News Geists [Google's annual conference for publishers] — as probably most of you in the room know. I went to Athens, was never invited back, I wonder why... But the one memory that I have from News Geist — it was a great conference, excellent conversations, really fun dinners, fantastic cocktails at the bar — and you know, one night after the cocktails, after everyone had lots of cocktails, all these people gathered into the ballroom for the big News Geist tradition, the Werewolf game. And those of you who don't know, it's basically like the same kind of game as Mafia. It's a power and deception game, where you've got the killers and the innocents – the villagers and the werewolves. And then you have the game masters. And this is happening at a time when lots of publishers are shutting down and the business is in tatters and, you know, there's this Google-facilitated conversation about how we can save journalism. And here I look across this room and there are several big circles of chairs and on the chairs are senior editors and publishers from across Europe and many of them are blindfolded or they've got their eyes closed and Google executives, yourself included, were going around playing the game masters, commanding when people could see, when they couldn't see, who lives, who dies. Did it ever cross your mind that this was a metaphor for Google's relationship with the media?

Richard Gingras: Good lord. Okay, so let me give you a quick bit of history. Our conferences came out of the software industry. They were called FooCamps. O'Reilly Publishing decided to do one for news called News Foo. And then they decided, well, not a very good business, and so Google said we would do it. Now it's like 12 years ago. And we've done these around the world. It's an absolutely great model. I wish more people would use it. Werewolf was part of it way before we started it. We didn't pick the game. It's a fascinating game. Reporters particularly like it because it's an interesting game that gets down to, can I detect when someone is lying or not? It's a game.

Natalia Antelava: Did it ever, after years of doing News Geist, did it ever cross your mind that this is a metaphor for Google's relationship with the media? Because I'll tell you, this is what everyone else thought!

Richard Gingras: No, it didn't. Oh gosh. Oh my gosh. No, no. So let me just say one thing.

Natalia Antelava: We are out of time.

Richard Gingras: Let me say two things. First of all, I'm here representing my own views. I'm also here representing an organization called CNTI [Center for News, Technology & Innovation], which was founded by the likes of Marty [Baron], Paula [Miraglia], me, Maria Ressa. That organization was founded to foment dialogue on these complex issues between different people. We don't always agree on things. So I want to be clear. What I'm speaking here for is my views. And by the way, our conference is going forward, News Geist is going forward. It's run by CNTI. What a nice thing. We've moved it from Google to CNTI. We hope to be doing one in Europe. 

Natalia Antelava: Google's still paying for it, though.

Richard Gingras: Google's a sponsor. So if you want to come up with $150,000 to sponsor the event, we'll gladly take your check. But Google has never imposed their agenda on it. We don't even have logos up at the event. 

Natalia Antelava: That is really the power of Google, when you don't need logos.

Alright, thank you so much. I really hope that we will all get to read pieces by you about your time at Google that have the same analysis and depth as your critiques of journalism.

Postscript: Gingras sat for this interview knowing the questions would be uncomfortable, which deserves acknowledgment. At the end, he said I should have been more specific in my questions. I would welcome the opportunity to continue this conversation with whatever specificity he'd like. His current writing on journalism and media can be found here.

The post The Werewolf game: an interview with Google’s former news chief Richard Gingras appeared first on Coda Story.

🎧Édition du 31 octobre 2025 :– OpenAI dévoile Aardvark, agent IA de cybersécurité autonome– Sora 2 ajoute avatars “cameos” et montage multi-scènes– Pinterest lance un assistant vocal d’achat par IA– Apple prévoit d’intégrer Gemini, Claude et Perplexity à Siri– Google teste un mode ultra-économe pour Maps sur Android « 120 secondes de Tech », un regard sur le […]

Ukraine has showcased a new concept for a jet-powered unmanned fighter aircraft at the first-ever Drone Warfare Summit in the Philippines, Defence Blog reports.

The presentation highlights Ukraine’s growing efforts to promote its defense technologies internationally, as Kyiv increasingly positions itself as a key innovator in drone warfare amid its ongoing war with Russia.

During its presentation, the Ukrainian delegation revealed the Fighter Aircraft FA v1, a concept for a compact jet-powered drone designed for high-speed reconnaissance and strike missions. 

According to technical data shown at the event, the FA v1 can reach speeds of over 250 km/h, with an operational range of 30 kilometers and a flight ceiling of 5,000 meters. It also features a detection range of up to 15 kilometers for aerial targets.

Images from the presentation indicate a twin-tail design, similar to small-scale experimental unmanned jets under development in other countries. While Kyiv did not disclose the manufacturer or production plans, officials said the project reflects Ukraine’s wartime experience in deploying and countering drones on the battlefield.

The Ukrainian delegation also shared insights into how unmanned and autonomous systems have reshaped its defense strategy, particularly in electronic warfare and multi-domain operations.

The three-day summit, held from 27 to 29 October at Subic Bay, brought together military officials, defense manufacturers, and experts from across the Indo-Pacific to discuss the rapidly evolving role of unmanned systems in modern warfare.

🎧Édition du 30 octobre 2025 :– 1X Technologies lance Neo, robot humanoïde à 20 000 $– Google commence le déploiement de Gemini for Home– YouTube améliore la qualité vidéo en HD par IA– AOL devient un service italien– Character.ai interdit les conversations aux mineurs– Yoshua Bengio alerte sur les dérives et l’autonomie des IA « 120 secondes […]

🎧Édition du 29 octobre 2025 :– Amazon supprime 14 000 postes pour miser sur l’IA– YouTube restreint les vidéos de jeux violents et d’argent– Adobe et YouTube unissent leurs outils pour Shorts– Google impose une vérification d’âge sur le Play Store– Uber déploiera 100 000 robotaxis Nvidia dès 2027– La Chine inaugure un centre de données […]

🎧Édition du 28 octobre 2025 :– L’IA atteint le niveau d’un pro dans la moitié des tâches testées– Threads lance les publications fantômes de 24 heures– Des applications vendent de fausses photos de vacances– Microsoft prépare une Xbox-PC pour 2027– Spotify ajoute podcasts vidéo sur Apple TV « 120 secondes de Tech », un regard sur le quotidien […]

Three wounded Ukrainian soldiers waited more than a month near the front lines. No armored vehicle could reach them—drones would strike anything that moved. So Ukraine sent robots instead.

That rescue captures how battlefield medicine is changing in Ukraine, where the "golden hour" for saving wounded soldiers has vanished under constant drone surveillance. Medics can't reach casualties, armored vehicles get destroyed, and soldiers die from wounds that would have been survivable in any previous war.

The shift to robotic evacuation marks a fundamental change in battlefield medicine—one that could determine whether Ukraine can sustain its defense as the war grinds on.

With Russia willing to expend seemingly endless numbers of people and Ukraine needing to preserve every soldier, these robots aren't just saving individual lives. They're helping Ukraine fight asymmetrically against a much larger force.

The ground drones are only one prong of this uncrewed army. Drones are now playing a central role across every domain of combat. The skies are now filled with aerial drones, and their kill zone continues to expand in all directions. Drones have revolutionized warfare on land and at sea as well.

Any future conflict is likely to be drone-dominated—and that means that ground robots will need to save the lives of soldiers under a sky saturated with drones not only in Ukraine.

Why Ukraine lost the golden hour

Colonel Kostiantyn Humeniuk, the chief surgeon of the Medical Forces of Ukraine, said, "As of today, the war has fundamentally changed because our enemy uses modern unmanned aerial vehicles." He added, "On the battlefield, armored vehicles are almost absent."

"So we are faced with a modern war where drones are the main type of weapon. Today, in the theatre of war, almost all the injuries we see among our service members are drone-related injuries."

According to Humeniuk, the biggest challenge is that they've lost the golden hour—the period in which medical attention has a higher chance of saving someone suffering traumatic injury. The army can no longer evacuate wounded from combat zones quickly.

"That's the most serious problem. Evacuating a wounded soldier from the battlefield using any kind of armored vehicle, medical or otherwise, is practically impossible," Humeniuk said. "Drones have shown that they are low-visibility. They don't make much noise and are almost unnoticeable on the battlefield."

Douglas Davis, an Assistant Professor of Radiology at the Medical College of Wisconsin and a frequent medical volunteer in Ukraine, commented on how battlefield injuries are changing,

"Tourniquet Syndrome from delayed evacuation was the main reason many lost limbs. This is very different than what we saw in the first 2 years."

How ground robots solved the unsolvable problem

"Ukraine is one of the first countries to implement drones for medical evacuation, on land, by air, and even by water. They're low-visibility and almost silent," Humeniuk added. "They can carry the wounded one to three kilometers from the front."

Current medical training is often outdated, like the application of tourniquets, said Rima, a medic in Ukraine's International Legion.

"It doesn't prepare you for the kind of catastrophic injuries we're seeing from drone-dropped munitions. Close-quarters combat is rare now; it's almost all shrapnel and blast trauma," she said.

"Medics out here are forced to learn on the fly because we have no other choice. And nine times out of 10, it's not just one or two wounded, it's a full-blown mass casualty situation."

Volodymyr Rovenskyi, an officer in the ground force's Department for the Development of Ground Control Systems for Unmanned Systems, said in a briefing that 47% of Ukrainian UGV missions involved delivering supplies or evacuating soldiers.

The work is still far from safe. Units avoid operating UGVs during daylight hours, as movement of the machines is easy to spot and they are highly vulnerable to strikes from first-person view drones (FPVs).

Third Assault Brigade soldier Kostas, known as El Greco, said FPVs were "the number-one threat to UGVs."

UGVs' primary roles were "logistics and evacuation, followed by engineering tasks, and finally kamikaze strikes or fire support," he said.

Lyuba Shipovich, chief executive of Dignitas—a non-profit that supports the military—and head of the Victory Robots project for deploying UGVs, said "returning both the wounded and the dead" was now one of the main functions of ground robots.

The connectivity challenge keeping robots offline

But it's not as simple as it seems. Connectivity remains one of the biggest challenges. Soldiers cannot risk being evacuated on a ground robot that loses its radio-control signal or satellite navigation or suffers a technical failure, leaving it stranded and the casualty exposed to drone strikes.

To counter this, frontline units are experimenting with multiple, parallel channels for connectivity—such as wi‑fi mesh networks, Starlink satellite links, and LTE terrestrial networks—to keep the robots online.

Analogue radio systems make ground robots highly susceptible to enemy jamming, so most units are trying to move to multi‑node networks with data relaying combined with satellite control links. This greatly improves resilience. However, these upgrades significantly raise costs, which are already a barrier to widespread adoption.

"In practice, solutions that simply attach fiber optics to UGVs may prove more effective and solve the immediate challenges," said Vitaliy Honcharuk, CEO of A19Lab and former Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine.

But the effectiveness of these missions also improves when combined with other efforts to distract the enemy. "During evacuation missions, especially when we're evacuating wounded soldiers, we need distraction maneuvers, artillery support, and drones to ensure the soldier is evacuated as safely as possible," said Shipovich.

"In our last 60 missions, we lost two UGVs, one due to operator error, one to an FPV drone," said Yehven, callsign "Kharkiv," a UGV company commander in the 92nd Assault Brigade. One member of the unit, a former software engineer in his late twenties, has built custom software to enhance the UGVs' functionality.

This is part of a trend in which engineers in workshops across the front are tinkering and testing to improve their UGVs.

What Ukraine's frontline medicine means for future wars

These ground robots are only beginning to transform frontline medicine, carrying out more and more evacuations. They are also taking on an increasing share of logistical work. In time, Ukraine's frontline commanders expect to deploy many more robots across the front, continuing to wage asymmetrical warfare against Russia.

Ukrainian electronic warfare expert Serhii ("Flash") Beskrestnov believes that, in the future, infantry will stay underground, with only robots operating on the surface and taking the greatest risks.

Even if Western military planners believe they can establish air dominance in future conflicts, Ukraine shows how modern battlefields can still turn into battles of grinding attrition. Preparing for that possibility is no less essential than working to prevent it.

The innovations Ukrainian units are developing—from fiber-optic control to multi-node networks—represent the emerging playbook for warfare in contested environments where drones dominate the skies.

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Ukrainian company Degree-Trans LLC, doing business as Bullet, on 16 October signed a letter of intent with US aerospace company AIRO Group Holdings to make this happen.

Bullet makes modular drone interceptors that fly up to 450 kilometers per hour, making them some of Ukraine’s fastest, with a range of up to 200 kilometers. The drones can carry payloads of up to 9 kilograms and are highly configurable for different types of missions.

AIRO is playing the role of manager to “integrate” these UAVs “into US manufacturing and defense infrastructure," according to AIRO’s press release.

“This partnership unites the innovation and front-line experience of Ukrainian engineers with AIRO’s manufacturing and program-management expertise,” AIRO executive chairman Chirinjeev Kathuria said in the statement.

Bullet director Viacheslav Lvovych said this would allow his company to expand battlefield-proven tech into new markets. “Our shared objective is to deliver rapid, reliable air-defense solutions that strengthen Ukraine and the wider NATO alliance.”

While preliminary, the agreement is a sign that Ukrainian and foreign companies are looking to take advantage of Kyiv’s intention to loosen restrictions on arms exports to countries it can trust.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the UN General Assembly in September that his country has decided to open up exports. Ukraine needs the revenue — most domestic defense contractors are operating far below capacity because the government lacks the cash to pay them to make more weapons.

Kyiv is also looking to leverage its military innovation to gain closer integration with its allies from the European Union and NATO.

The players involved

Modularity and adaptability is quite standard for Ukrainian tech, as innovation has kept the country in the fight against a wealthier, more numerous foe, in the face of constantly changing battlefield conditions.

According to Ukrainian transparency platforms YouControl and Opendatabot, Bullet (Degree-Trans) used to service and sell parts for ground transport vehicles, but has since transformed into a drone-maker, which itself is not uncommon. Many mechanically handy Ukrainian firms switched to making drones or parts for them after the full-scale invasion.

AIRO has been around since 2005 and has four segments: drones, avionics, training, and air mobility, with drones being the focus. It already makes recon drones like its Sky-Watch brand and its RQ-35 Heidrun.

The company completed a successful initial public offering in June, with stocks rapidly rising above the IPO price, pushing the company's market value to around $650 million and giving it $60 million in gross proceeds.

Ukraine looking to harness its biggest asset: battlefield experience

AIRO’s deal appears to be what Zelenskyy and his government envision in their two-pronged effort to export battle-tested tech to interested allies, while launching as many joint cooperation agreements with partners in allied states as possible.

On top of being tested, Ukraine’s drones also tend to be much cheaper than those produced in NATO countries.

In July, Zelenskyy discussed a drone "mega deal" with the White House, to the tune of tens of billions of dollars.

As Counteroffensive.pro reported, key challenges with the export scheme will be navigating the separate approvals required from the Ministry of Defense and its intelligence arm, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ukraine's Security Service, then having it reviewed by the Intergovernmental Commission on Export Control.

Main issues include protection of intellectual property, specifying which countries are eligible for export, threat of sabotage, and estimating domestic production capabilities to ensure an exportable surplus.

Over 25 foreign companies looking to get in on the action

Kyiv recently established its Build With Ukraine program to allow domestic firms to open foreign production facilities.

According to a 22 October statement by the Ministry of Defense, more than 25 foreign companies are "at various stages" of production localization inside Ukraine. These include:

• BAE Systems from the UK to develop L119 howitzers.
• Rheinmetall of Germany, to create repair and production facilities for armored vehicles.
• SAAB of Sweden, to produce air defense systems.
• Northrop Grumman of the US for the joint production of ammunition.

Per the MOD, other companies include developers of unmanned systems, cybersecurity and anti-drone warfare systems.

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