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[L'article Le gouvernement Carney va annoncer de nouveaux grands projets  a d'abord été publié dans InfoBref.]

Hungary became the first NATO ally to secure exemption from US sanctions on Russian energy when President Donald Trump granted Prime Minister Viktor Orban a one-year waiver during their 7 November White House meeting, a White House official confirmed to Reuters.

The exemption allows Hungary to continue purchasing Russian oil and gas in exchange for over $1.4 billion in Hungarian commitments to US nuclear, defense, and energy purchases. The move marks a significant breach in Western sanctions against Russia, as Orban—who has vowed to veto Ukraine's EU accession and opposes its NATO membership—openly aligned with Trump in characterizing the war as unwinnable and positioning both leaders as the sole "pro-peace" voices in the West.

This development threatens Ukraine's strategic position because it weakens the coordinated sanctions regime designed to constrain Russian energy revenues that fund Moscow's war effort, while emboldening an EU and NATO member to maintain financial flows to Russia and block Ukrainian integration into Western security structures.

What happened at the White House

Trump welcomed Orban for a bilateral meeting and lunch that yielded immediate economic and diplomatic results.

Politico reported that Hungary signed a memorandum of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation valued at $20 billion, including construction of 10 small modular reactors in Budapest using US nuclear technology. Hungary also committed to purchasing $114 million in nuclear fuel from US-based Westinghouse, $600 million in liquified natural gas, and $700 million in defense materials.

The centerpiece of Orban's visit was securing relief from US sanctions targeting Russian energy. According to Reuters, a White House official confirmed Hungary received a one-year exemption from sanctions on Russian oil and gas. Trump justified the decision by citing Hungary's landlocked geography, stating "it's very difficult for him to get the oil and gas from other areas" and noting that Hungary lacks seaports for alternative energy imports.

The exemption contradicts Trump's previous pressure on European nations to cut Russian energy purchases to economically isolate Moscow.

BBC analysis noted that Hungary and Slovakia together have paid Russia $13 billion for oil between Russia's February 2022 invasion and the end of 2024, providing critical hard currency to Moscow despite Western sanctions efforts.

Why this matters for Ukraine's security

The sanctions exemption directly undermines Ukraine's defensive capabilities by preserving Russian energy revenues that finance military operations. Russian oil and gas sales remain Moscow's primary source of hard currency for weapons procurement, troop salaries, and military industrial production—the economic foundation sustaining Russia's invasion.

More strategically, the exemption creates the first formal crack in the unified Western sanctions architecture. If a NATO and EU member can obtain preferential treatment on Russian energy, other nations may seek similar exemptions, accelerating the collapse of coordinated economic pressure that has been one of the West's primary non-military tools against Russian aggression.

The exemption also rewards Orban's obstructionism toward Ukraine within European institutions. Politico reported that Orban has declared he would veto Ukraine's accession to the European Union and opposes Ukrainian NATO membership—positions that directly contradict the policies of most NATO allies and EU members who view Ukrainian integration as essential to long-term European security.

Orban's opposition to Ukrainian victory and Western support

During the White House meeting, Orban openly expressed skepticism about Ukraine's ability to prevail militarily against Russia. When Trump asked whether Orban believed Ukraine could win the war, Orban responded evasively: "Miracle[s] can happen," according to Politico. This framing aligns with Trump's characterization of the war as unwinnable through military means and contradicts the position of NATO leadership and most European governments that sustained military aid is essential to Ukrainian defense.

Orban described the US and Hungary as the only "pro-peace" governments addressing the Russia-Ukraine war, and characterized other European nations as "misunderstanding" the conflict by believing Ukraine can prevail on the battlefield, according to the Politico report. This rhetorical positioning isolates Ukraine diplomatically by suggesting that support for Ukrainian military resistance represents a misguided approach rather than legitimate defense of sovereignty.

Trump also revived plans to host a peace summit in Budapest with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Ukraine. Last month, Orban was reportedly offered the opportunity to host such a summit, though that plan "quickly disintegrated," Politico reported. During the 7 November meeting, Trump stated: "If we have it, I'd like to do it in Budapest"—suggesting Hungary could serve as the venue for negotiations that would likely marginalize Ukrainian input and European perspectives on territorial integrity and security guarantees.

The trade package and Hungary's pivot

The economic package Hungary committed to represents a significant financial outlay designed to demonstrate reciprocity with the Trump administration. The BBC reported that the nuclear agreement includes construction of 10 small modular reactors valued between $10 billion and $20 billion, which Hungary needs to power expanding Chinese battery manufacturing plants around the country. These smaller nuclear facilities face fewer construction delays and licensing complications than traditional large-scale plants.

Hungary also agreed to purchase $114 million in nuclear fuel from US-based Westinghouse for its Paks 1 nuclear power station, which was built by the Soviet Union in the 1980s and currently supplies approximately 40% of Hungary's electricity needs, according to the BBC. The US agreement to lift nuclear sanctions on Hungary may help restart the long-delayed Paks 2 expansion project, which has been financed and designed by Russia's Rosatom but faces persistent technical and licensing obstacles.

Orban framed the visit as the beginning of "phase two" in Hungary's improving relationship with the Trump administration, referencing what he characterized as "politically motivated sanctions" from the Biden administration against his top aide, Antal Rogan, who was sanctioned for corruption allegations, Politico reported.

Implications for Western unity and Ukrainian support

The meeting creates several concerning scenarios for Ukraine and the broader Western alliance. If Trump's precedent encourages other nations—particularly those with less stable democratic institutions or closer ties to Russia—to request similar exemptions, the coordinated sanctions regime could fragment rapidly. The divergence between Hungary's position and that of other NATO and EU members will deepen existing tensions within both institutions, undermining the unified deterrence posture that underpins Ukrainian security.

The exemption complicates Congressional support for Ukraine. Congress controls military aid to Kyiv and now faces questions about backing a country while its NATO ally undermines sanctions on Russia's main revenue source. Trump's willingness to host peace talks in Budapest, paired with Orban's skepticism about Ukrainian victory, signals negotiations could pressure Ukraine into territorial concessions and forced neutrality.

The BBC noted that critics argue energy dependence on Russia is merely being replaced by energy dependence on the US, while the Orban government contends it is achieving greater diversity of supply. However, the one-year timeframe for the exemption—expiring just after Hungary's April 2026 election—suggests the waiver is designed primarily to boost Orban's domestic political position rather than address structural energy security concerns.

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In January 2025, approximately 300 mercenaries commanded by Romanian-French fighter Horațiu Potra were captured in the Democratic Republic of Congo, formally taken into UN custody, and "repatriated."

Nine months later, European police raided 70 homes across Moldova and Ukraine, hunting 654 Wagner Group suspects. Among the evidence: proof that fighters had deployed to both Ukraine and Congo as part of the Russian mercenary network.

The 300 captured fighters hadn't vanished—they'd rotated through a system connecting African battlefields to Balkan training camps to European election operations, with some appearing at a horse farm outside Bucharest where a presidential candidate allegedly planned a violent power grab.

The October raids exposed Russia's modular mercenary infrastructure: Wagner instructors training operatives in Bosnia, those operatives deploying to sabotage Moldova's vote, and the same personnel rotating between Congo wars and Ukraine combat—using foreign nationals to maintain deniability while targeting democratic elections.

The recruiter's evolution

Anatolii Prizenko understood how to spot talent. In the summer of 2024, he observed Moldovans navigating mock combat at paintball tournaments, assessing their reflexes and decision-making skills the way scouts evaluate athletes.

Those who caught his eye received an offer: $300-500 for ten days of work. No one explained what the job entailed.

Prizenko wasn't experimenting—he was testing. A year earlier, in October 2023, he'd recruited several Moldovans for a different operation—painting Stars of David on buildings in Paris during the Gaza conflict.

The European Union later determined this was a GRU operation designed to inflame French society during the Israel-Hamas war. Prizenko publicly claimed responsibility. By December 2024, the EU sanctioned him for the Paris operation's "significant destabilizing effect."

Anatolii Prizenco was arrested in February 2025 for recruiting participants for the camp.

The progression revealed a methodology: test recruitment pools with low-risk provocations abroad, then scale to paramilitary operations at home.

For example, when Moldovan police arrested Prizenko in February 2025 for organizing training camps in the Balkans, they found he'd successfully moved operatives from street graffiti in Western Europe to preparing explosives instructions for destabilization in Eastern Europe within twelve months.

The camps and their instructors

The forests outside Radenka, Serbia, and Glamočani near Banja Luka in Republika Srpska, Bosnia's pro-Russian entity, became classrooms that summer and fall of 2024. 

Maxim Rosca, 41, who became a whistleblower during the journalistic investigation conducted by the Moldovan outlet CU SENS, described the regimen: trainees surrendered their phones and passports upon arrival, then spent days on combat drills, drone operations, and what he carefully termed "things like sports and psychology."

The instructor cadre told a story across continents. Alexander Volkhonsky, previously known as Sotov, had been documented by anti-corruption investigators working with the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic. Now he was training Moldovans in Bosnia—direct evidence of personnel rotating from African mercenary operations to European destabilization. 

Beside him worked Konstantin Goloskokov, who'd admitted to the Financial Times in 2009 that he participated in the massive 2007 cyberattacks that paralyzed Estonia's government, banks, and media. 17 years after attacking a NATO member digitally, Goloskokov was coordinating paramilitary training camps near NATO borders.

Mikhail Potepkin, already under EU, US, and UK sanctions for Wagner ties, served as coordinator. Mircho Angelov, a Bulgarian neo-Nazi who'd participated in Prizenko's Paris operation, brought food to trainees. And on 23 August 2024, Andrei Becker entered Bosnia and registered a company called AE 777, listing "IT services" as its business purpose, on the same day he arrived. The company remains active.

When BIRN visited Radenka in February 2025, the camps had been sanitized. Only burnt paper, melted plastic tarpaulin, and scorched earth remained at the coordinates matching the videos released by the Moldovan police. Bosnian prosecutors opened their own investigation that October.

The border stop

On 11 October 2024, Moldovan police stopped a car at the Romanian border. Inside sat Maxim Rosca alongside Vladimir Harcevnicov, a 37-year-old convicted murderer, Aliona Gotco, who held both Transnistrian and Russian citizenship, Ludmila Costenco, and Iulia Ivanova. When officers searched the vehicle, they found disassembled drones, VR headsets, radio equipment, and instructions for making explosives.

The timing wasn't coincidental. Moldova's presidential election and EU referendum were weeks away. The camps had operated from August through early October specifically to produce operatives for deployment during the voting period.

Lilian Carp, chairman of Moldova's parliamentary security committee, later told reporters the training focused on practical destabilization: "In Bosnia, they trained with drones and learned how to organize mass riots and how to provoke the police into a violent reaction."

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Romanian commandos became mercenaries—then returned for alleged coup

While camp-trained operatives prepared for Moldova's October vote, a separate operation targeted Romania's November election.

The architect was Horațiu Potra, whose biography reads like a mercenary's greatest hits: French Foreign Legion veteran, bodyguard to Qatar's emir, commander of private military companies deploying to the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

By August 2024, Romanian sources estimated he controlled approximately 1,000 fighters—Romanians and Moldovans, including personnel from Romania's Ministry of Defense (MApN), Intelligence Service, and Gendarmerie. While Potra publicly denied Wagner ties, his operation mirrored Wagner's structure: fighting in the same African conflict zones where Wagner operated, employing instructors who'd worked for Wagner in the Central African Republic, and ultimately seeing his fighters arrested as Wagner Group suspects.

Romanian investigations later revealed "the Romanian state trained Potra's private army fighters in three elite MApN units," echoing how Wagner trained at Russian bases while Moscow maintained deniability.

That August, presidential candidate Călin Georgescu texted Potra: "Please, I need support until then"—until the 24 November election.

Court records show Georgescu had met Russia's ambassador to Romania, Valery Kuzmin, at the Russian embassy. Potra's phone contained hotel bookings and flight records documenting multiple trips to Moscow.

Court rejects arrest for Potra despite coup plot evidence

Georgescu won the first round. In an unprecedented move, Romania's constitutional court annulled the result in early December, citing evidence of Russian interference. 

On December 7-8, authorities intercepted Potra and approximately two dozen associates en route to Bucharest, with weapons, explosives, and detailed lists of politicians and journalists. Searches of his residences uncovered illegal weapons and large cash sums.

Prosecutors obtained photographs of a meeting at a horse farm "shortly after [Georgescu's] election victory was overturned." Potra and Georgescu appeared alongside members of Potra's group, including Georgescu's bodyguard—who'd fought under Potra's command in Congo and whose partner posted photos with Chechen fighters expressing support for Putin.

Prosecutors alleged they were planning "a violent power grab."

Georgescu initially denied meeting Potra entirely. When photos surfaced in Romanian press, he reversed his position but insisted "no plans for an uprising were ever discussed."

Despite prosecutors' charges of attempting to overthrow constitutional order, illegal weapons possession, tax evasion on African mercenary income, and illegal campaign financing through cash payments and a luxury limousine rental for Georgescu, a court released Potra.

By February 2025, when prosecutors sought his arrest again, he had fled Romania.

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The Congo-Ukraine connection

Ukrainian police had been tracking Moldovan Wagner fighters for years. In March 2024, an operation code-named "Avengers" detained three Wagner veterans who'd fought from 2014-2023 at Donetsk airport, Bakhmut, and the Debaltseve cauldron.

Ukrainian investigators identified 85 Moldovan citizens total who'd fought for Russia. That left 82 unaccounted for.

Ten months later, in January 2025, M23 rebels captured approximately 300 of Potra's fighters in Congo while they fought alongside government forces. Official reports said they were "released and repatriated back home." The reports didn't specify where home was for each fighter. Nine months of silence followed. Then the connection materialized.

On 29 October 2025, police across Moldova and Ukraine executed 70 simultaneous raids. Europol announced they were hunting 654 suspects connected to Wagner Group and Redut, a Russian military intelligence recruitment network.

The suspects came from nine countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Among seized materials: Wagner insignia, drones, VR headsets, and crucially, evidence showing suspects had fought "in the territory of Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo." Not "or" — "and." Europol identified them as Wagner Group members. The same individuals, the same organization, rotating across continents.

The October raids answered where the 300 went: they hadn't disappeared. They'd rotated between African and European operations, with some of the "repatriated" Congo fighters appearing in the network linking Balkan training camps to Ukraine combat deployments.

Potra stranded in Dubai

On 24 September 2025, Dubai police arrested Potra, his son, and his nephew as they prepared to board a flight to Moscow. Within days, two Russians mobilized to prevent his extradition to Romania.

The first one, Igor Spivak, heads the Russian Middle East Society, an organization presenting itself as an NGO but which Spivak openly admits works with Russia's foreign ministry. 

"The ministry, of course, supports us. It would be difficult to deny that," he told The Guardian, adding that his organization includes "many former foreign ministry employees and former ambassadors." His recent projects included organizing an art exhibition in Moscow featuring works by Aisha Gaddafi, daughter of the late Libyan dictator.

The second one, Alexander Kalinin, fled Moldova to Russia after being stripped of his citizenship. Now under EU and US sanctions for destabilizing Moldova as a Kremlin collaborator, he recruits Moldovans to fight in Ukraine and has publicly vowed to lead fighters in a march on Moldova's capital, Chișinău, to overthrow President Maia Sandu's government.

"We are currently trying to stop Potra's extradition," Spivak confirmed. "We have a lot of experience, and a lot of people are working on getting him freed." He said Kalinin had requested his assistance and that he'd hired "very reputable lawyers" in the UAE.

The pairing revealed the network's architecture: a foreign ministry-connected cultural fixer and a Ukraine recruitment operative, both dropping everything to rescue a Romanian mercenary arrested in Dubai.

The reason became obvious through inversion—what would Potra's testimony expose? He knows the complete money trail for Georgescu's campaign, everyone present at the December horse farm meeting, what was discussed, what happened to the 300 Congo fighters after "repatriation," whether any trained at the Balkan camps, and how Volkhonsky's African Wagner operations connected to his European training role.

By early November, Spivak's confidence had evaporated. "The situation is difficult," he admitted, adding that Potra could be extradited to Romania "as soon as Thursday."

The system exposed

Trace the connections through time:

1. 2007: Goloskokov cyberattacked Estonia, paralyzing government and banks.
2. Pre-2024: Volkhonsky operated with Wagner in the Central African Republic.
3. October 2023: Prizenko tested recruitment methodology with Paris graffiti operation, painting Stars of David to inflame tensions during Gaza conflict.
4. January 2025: 300 mercenaries under Potra's command captured in Congo, formally "repatriated."
5. Summer 2024: Prizenko scaled up recruitment, scouting Moldovans at paintball tournaments.
6. August 2024: Camps launched. Georgescu texted Potra: "Please, I need support until then"—until the 24 November election. Volkhonsky and Goloskokov began instructing Moldovans at Balkan training sites.
7. August-October 2024: Training camps operated in Serbia and Bosnia, precisely timed to deploy operatives for Moldova's election.
8. 11 October 2024: Rosca and companions intercepted at Moldovan border with drones, explosives instructions, and VR equipment—two weeks before voting.
9. November 2024: Moldova's election (Sandu won). Romania's election (Georgescu won first round).
10. December 2024: Romania's Constitutional Court annulled results. Georgescu met Potra at horse farm, allegedly planning violent response.
11. October 2025: European raids across Moldova and Ukraine seized evidence showing fighters deployed to both Congo and Ukraine—connecting the January "repatriated" fighters to the Balkan-trained operatives.

This wasn't improvisation. Each phase built on previous operations, testing what worked, refining methods, scaling up.

When electoral manipulation failed in Moldova and Romania, the network shifted toward violence. When violence was intercepted, physical sites were destroyed. When the key commander faced extradition, a high-level rescue operation was launched.

Potra's denials notwithstanding, the evidence speaks: Wagner instructors trained his operatives, Russian state actors intervened to prevent his extradition, and Europol arrested his fighters as Wagner Group members. Whether formally affiliated or operationally parallel, the distinction collapsed in practice.

Georgescu's bodyguard moved from Congo battlefields to Romanian political meetings. The 654 suspects came from nine countries, most without Russian citizenship, providing plausible deniability while maintaining operational capability.

The network is exposed. But exposed isn't destroyed. The infrastructure exists, the methods are proven, and Russia has learned what works and what doesn't. The operation failed in Moldova and Romania. But failure generates data. And data enables refinement.

European defense possesses the economic and technological capacity to match Russian military power within five years, but severe shortfalls in ground forces and ammunition mean the continent remains dangerously unprepared for major war, according to a French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) analysis released on 4 November.

The assessment reveals a stark reality: Ukrainian resistance currently serves as Europe's primary deterrent against broader Russian aggression while the continent races to build military capabilities it should already possess.

"European countries have the necessary potential—that is, the economic means, military capabilities and technological expertise—to face Russia by 2030, provided they demonstrate the political will to do so," writes IFRI director Thomas Gomart in the report's executive summary.

That five-year timeline assumes Ukraine continues absorbing the bulk of Russian military power, giving Europe breathing room it has yet to use effectively.

Ukraine buys time for European defense to catch up

The IFRI study identifies Ukrainian resistance as one of two pillars preventing Russian military assault on Euro-Atlantic territory. The other is NATO unity, which depends on uncertain US commitment.

If either pillar erodes, the report warns, "the risk of an open armed confrontation between Russia and Europe, whatever the scale, would increase considerably."

This makes Ukraine's fight existential not just for Kyiv, but for a European continent that has failed to convert three years of elevated defense spending into the military mass needed to deter Moscow on its own.

Russia maintains what the analysis calls "a decisive advantage in terms of mass, firepower, mobilization capacity and tolerance for attrition." Ukrainian forces have countered this through innovation, Western weapons, and strategic depth—advantages European armies would struggle to replicate if forced to confront Russia directly before 2030.

Europe dominates air and sea but can't match Russia on land

The report quantifies Europe's military inadequacy in stark terms:

• Ground forces: Twenty of 30 European NATO/EU nations field fewer than 15,000 soldiers
• Ammunition: Critical shortfalls in stockpiles that would impede sustained combat operations
• Missiles: Production capabilities described as a "dire picture"
• Industrial surge: Higher defense budgets have not translated into tangible manufacturing capacity

The assessment notes Europe holds clear advantages in air and naval domains, plus qualitative edges in soldier training and command structures. But the analysis emphasizes that "the land domain remains Europe's weak point"—precisely where Ukraine has been fighting Russia to a standstill for nearly four years.

Europe's air superiority comes with a critical dependency: sustaining it requires "massive support from the United States," raising questions about readiness if US commitment wavers.

Economic strength without military output

The disconnect between Europe's economic capacity and military readiness defines the report's central tension.

European nations have enacted transformative industrial policies—the Critical Raw Material Act, Net Zero Industries Act, and Clean Industrial Act—while reducing fossil fuel import costs by 50% since 2022, saving over €250 billion annually. The continent possesses economic advantages Russia cannot match.

Yet these resources have not produced the ammunition stockpiles, artillery pieces, or troop numbers required to replace what Ukraine currently provides: a barrier against Russian territorial expansion.

The analysis concludes Europe's response to "sustained Russian hybrid warfare" has been "largely defensive and overly cautious," suggesting conventional military readiness alone cannot counter Moscow's full threat spectrum.

Russia's permanent warfare model

The IFRI assessment describes Russian strategy as "permanent, cross-domain and coercive," using subversive actions to "prepare the ground for an open military campaign, designed to be brief, intense and decisive."

This approach aims to "influence the West's risk assessment and paralyze its decision-making by instilling the fear of escalation"—a tactic that has repeatedly delayed Western weapons deliveries to Ukraine and slowed European rearmament.

Russia's updated nuclear doctrine reinforces this escalation calculus, lowering the threshold for nuclear use to include conventional wars against non-nuclear countries backed by nuclear-armed allies. While US, French, and British deterrence currently shields Europe, the report cautions that any loss of credibility in extended deterrence would leave Europe facing "a strategic imbalance with Russia."

Ukraine has effectively demonstrated how to counter Russian hybrid warfare through military resistance combined with maintaining societal resilience. The IFRI analysis states Ukraine is "showing the way to the rest of Europe" in opposing Russian aggression.

The 2030 calculation

Europe's path to matching Russian military power by 2030 depends on political decisions made now—and on Ukraine maintaining its defensive lines in the interim.

The analysis serves as both warning and roadmap: Europe possesses the resources and technology to build necessary military capabilities within five years. What remains uncertain is whether European political will can match Ukrainian military determination before the security architecture deteriorates further.

As the report makes clear, the continent faces a critical race against time, with Ukraine currently fighting the war that Europe may need to fight if it fails to prepare adequately.

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Alexandru Munteanu, the newly appointed prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, has a résumé that makes diplomats swoon: founder of the American Chamber of Commerce, French cultural ambassador, and Wall Street-style investor with an impeccable suit and better connections.

At 61, Munteanu just landed the top job in Moldova, but there is just one problem: he knows where all of Ukraine's bodies are buried. Literally and figuratively.

The man with two faces

For twenty years, Alexandru Munteanu didn't just do business in Ukraine — he lived inside its economic bloodstream. He saw the money flows, the corrupt deals, the weak points in the system. He was there during the oligarch wars, the revolutions, and the backroom arrangements that kept the lights on and ensured the right people were paid off.

Now he's the prime minister of the country next door, and nobody seems worried about what he learned.

Within hours of his nomination, investigative journalists dropped a bombshell: possible ties to Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov through murky economic dealings. Munteanu brushed it off with the smoothness of someone who's deflected more complex questions at boardroom tables from Kyiv to Chișinău. "Grey economic zones," he called it—nothing to see here. Move along.

But start pulling on that thread, and the sweater unravels fast.

The security firm nobody wants to talk about

In a recent TV interview, Munteanu casually mentioned he owns two Ukrainian businesses. The first — a higiene paper company — is boring enough to make you yawn.

The second one he didn't call, just mentioned, that it is related to security. In accordance with the Ukrainian open data monitoring service, the company related to Munteanu is Venbest, one of Ukraine's largest private security firms, with 2,500 armed employees, 566 patrol vehicles, and operations in 20 regions. It's the kind of company that knows which buildings matter, where the cameras point, and who's paying for protection.

Munteanu claims he's no longer officially listed as owner. However, in the interview, he admits that he still has control over it.

Let that sink in: Moldova's new Prime Minister is a beneficiary of a Ukrainian security empire while sitting in the Prime Minister's chair.

Friends in low places

Venbest's partners read like the greatest hits of Ukraine's corrupt past.

For 15 years, Venbest has operated as a strategic partner with Yavir-2000, Ukraine's other major private security firm. Together they created 566 joint rapid-response groups, coordinate operations across 22 regions, and make business decisions jointly — this according to their own description in a 2024 Forbes Ukraine interview.

So when Yavir-2000 spent years installing and maintaining thousands of Russian TRASSIR surveillance cameras—systems that transmitted footage directly to Moscow servers with FSB connections — it wasn't happening in isolation. These were partners sharing strategy, resources, and clients across Ukraine's security sector.

The Yavir-2000 surveillance operation was massive: Radio Svoboda's December 2023 investigation documented Russian cameras at Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, throughout Poltava's "Safe City" system, and at countless private businesses.

The footage was routed through Moscow servers owned by companies serving Russia's FSB. Ukrainian authorities only moved to block access after the February 2022 invasion—meaning for years, a company deeply partnered with Munteanu's Venbest was potentially feeding Ukrainian intelligence to Moscow.

Munteanu's business partners? Former officials from Viktor Yanukovych's government, the kleptocracy that sparked Ukraine's 2014 revolution.

Heorgii Tupchii, Venbest's Ukrainian co-owner, has been identified as a business partner of Valerii Pysarenko—a former MP from Yanukovych's Party of Regions who voted for the "dictator laws" in January 2014 that sparked mass protests.

The business connection runs through a Cypriot offshore company that formally controls Venbest, with the same nominee directors appearing in both men's corporate structures.

Tupchii also has reported connections to Viktor Ratushniak, who served as deputy minister in Yanukovych's Interior Ministry from 2010-2014, overseeing the very security sector where Tupchii built his empire.

These aren't the kind of people you accidentally end up in business with. These are the networks you navigate when you spend 20 years building a Ukrainian business empire.

These allegations surfaced during a 2023 business dispute after Venbest lost a government contract to competitor Sheriff. Take that context into account—but also note what's independently verifiable: the Cypriot corporate structures linking Tupchii and Pysarenko, and Pysarenko's documented voting record.

When Ukraine's reformers attempted to clean up government contracts, the backlash was swift and coordinated—media attacks, criminal investigations opened within 24 hours, pressure through former law enforcement connections.

This is the business world Munteanu chose to navigate. And now he's prime minister.

The ultimate insider threat

Here's what makes Munteanu dangerous: He's not some Russian spy or principal bad actor. He's the ultimate insider — someone who spent two decades learning exactly how Ukraine works, where it's vulnerable, and how to exploit those weaknesses.

He facilitated major business deals. He moved money across borders. He identified which officials could be bribed and which institutions could be influenced. He built a network that stretches from Kyiv boardrooms to Moldovan ministries, and who knows where else.

Now imagine handing that knowledge to the prime minister of a country that shares a 1,200-km border with Ukraine, has its own Russian separatist problem, and sits at the crossroads of East-West power games.

The beautiful lie

Western capitals are celebrating Munteanu as a technocrat, a reformer, someone who understands both Ukraine and Moldova and can build bridges between them.

But what if the bridge goes both ways? What if the man who knows all of Ukraine's secrets, who built businesses on connections to corrupt officials, who still controls a massive security operation, isn't the ally everyone thinks he is?

Moldova just handed its government to someone who knows precisely where Ukraine is weakest. He speaks the language of Western reform while keeping one hand on a security empire and the other on investment networks that span the former Soviet space.

Call him a prime minister if you want. But Alexandru Munteanu is something far more interesting—and far more dangerous: He's the man who knows too much, wearing a diplomatic smile. The question isn't whether he'll use what he knows. The question is: for whom?

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US President Donald Trump said on 25 October that Russia's war on Ukraine remains deadlocked due to “a lot of hatred" between the Ukrainian and Russian leaders and a lack of progress in talks. Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One during a refueling stop in Qatar en route to Malaysia, Trump said he would not agree to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin again unless a concrete peace agreement was likely.

Trump: “I’m not going to be wasting my time”

Trump made it clear that future engagement with Putin would only happen if a settlement to end the war was realistically achievable.

“You have to know that we’re going to make a deal. I’m not going to be wasting my time,” Trump told reporters, according to RFE/RL.

He added that although he had “always had a great relationship with Vladimir Putin,” the recent contacts have been "very disappointing."

“Every time I speak with Vladimir, I have good conversations, and then they don’t go anywhere,” Trump said.

According to Forbes, Trump said earlier he had canceled the previously planned meeting with Putin in Budapest because “it just didn’t feel right.” He added, “It didn’t feel like we were going to get to the place we have to get.”

Trump noted that he expected the Ukraine war to be resolved faster than the Israel-Hamas conflict.

“I thought this would have gotten done before peace in the Middle East,” he said, according to The Hill.

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He then contrasted the lack of progress in Ukraine with his success mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan, claiming his role in the conflict resolution between the two Caucasus countries.

“We have Azerbaijan, Armenia — that was very tough. In fact, Putin told me on the phone he said, ‘Boy, that was amazing’ because everybody tried to get that done and they couldn’t. I got it done,” Trump said.

Despite his earlier optimism, Trump said that entrenched hostility is preventing progress in Ukraine.

“There’s a lot of hatred between the two,” he said, referring to Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. “I could say almost any one of the deals that I’ve already done I thought would have been more difficult than Russia and Ukraine, but it didn’t work out that way.”

He also suggested that international pressure on Russia should increase.

“You probably saw today, China is cutting back substantially on the purchase of Russian oil and India is cutting back completely. And we’ve done sanctions,” Trump said, referring to new American sanctions against Russia's top oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil.

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He added that he would urge Chinese President Xi Jinping to keep limiting Russian oil imports when they meet later during his trip to South Korea.

Western policymakers hoping Hungary's April 2026 election solves the Ukraine obstruction problem need to look closer at the man they're counting on. Péter Magyar, the opposition leader polling ahead of Viktor Orbán, opposes Ukraine's fast-track EU membership, won't support weapons deliveries, and has explicitly admitted he avoids the Ukraine topic because it's "too divisive" for voters he needs to persuade.

On Thursday, hundreds of thousands filled Budapest's streets in rival demonstrations—the latest barometer of the political contest ahead of April's election. Magyar's supporters shouted "Russians go home!" at Heroes' Square, while Orbán's pro-government marchers carried banners reading "We don't want to die for Ukraine!"

Regime change won't change Hungary's stance. The problem runs deeper than one leader, Hungarian journalist Szilárd Teczár tells Euromaidan Press.

Magyar's actual position: softer words, same obstruction

Magyar calls Russia the aggressor—a rhetorical improvement over Orbán's careful silence. But when pressed on substance, he said Ukraine "is at war and currently does not meet the accession criteria, so no one can seriously consider this a relevant issue."

What practically means: no fast-track EU membership, no urgent action. Just vague future promises.

His Tisza Party MEPs voted for a September 2024 European Parliament resolution calling for more weapons to Ukraine. They wore Ukrainian flag T-shirts for Zelenskyy's 1,000-day war speech.

But when it mattered—when the European People's Party drafted a hawkish defense declaration in March 2025—Magyar's signature mysteriously appeared and then mysteriously disappeared.

The document called for unconditional military support, lifting restrictions on Western weapons striking Russian territory, and requiring member states to allocate 0.25% of GDP to Ukraine. Magyar claimed for days his signature was added "by mistake"—until European Parliament President Roberto Metsola confirmed the error would be "remedied."

Even if genuine, the incident reveals Magyar's dilemma: the EPP expects full Ukraine support as the price of membership, but Hungarian voters punish politicians who provide it.

Why he can't change course

"Magyar openly admitted in an interview that he shouldn't emphasize this topic too much because it's very divisive in society, and he needs to concentrate on things where he can persuade the most voters," explains Szilárd Teczár, a Hungarian researcher specializing in disinformation and foreign information manipulation, in an interview with Euromaidan Press.

The numbers back his caution. When Magyar's own Tisza Party conducted an informal referendum on Ukraine's EU membership, only 58% of his supporters favored it—hardly a mandate for championing Kyiv's cause. Meanwhile, Orbán's government-backed consultation claimed 95% opposition, though Magyar dismissed it as propaganda with just 3-7% actual participation.

"Society is very polarized," Teczár says. On one side, people who see Putin as a war criminal. On the other, Orbán supporters who've absorbed years of anti-Ukraine messaging. Magyar's right-wing voter base won't tolerate a pro-Ukraine shift, and Fidesz stands ready to brand any Ukraine support as betrayal.

They've already started. The government ran billboards portraying Zelenskyy alongside Magyar, painting both as threats to Hungary. When one of Magyar's military advisors, former Chief of General Staff Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, suggested that EU membership could enable troop deployment to Ukraine, Fidesz weaponized it instantly: "Magyar wants to send Hungarian soldiers to die in Ukraine."

"All the smear campaign tactics don't really work against them the way they did before," Teczár notes, since Magyar came "from inside Fidesz—he's a right-winger as well." But this means Magyar must be even more careful not to provide ammunition. Pro-Ukraine positions are ammunition.

The electoral math that prevents change

Magyar's Tisza Party has surged since emerging in early 2024, achieving nearly 30% in the European Parliament elections and polling competitively with Fidesz heading into April 2026. Opposition-aligned polls show Tisza leading 43-44% to Fidesz's 35-41%, though pro-government pollsters dispute these numbers.

But those voters Magyar needs to win? They're not pro-Ukraine. Fidesz's base—older, rural, less educated Hungarians who've dominated elections since 2010—opposes Ukraine support even more strongly than the national average. Meanwhile, younger urban voters who might support Ukraine are already with Magyar. He has little to gain and much to lose by championing Kyiv's cause.

"I would still be very cautious about predicting election results," Teczár warns. "Fidesz has advantages in terms of financial resources, representation in the state apparatus, and so on."

Even if Magyar wins, his hands remain tied. He's promised to prioritize "Hungary's national interests" over personal political motives when using EU vetoes—a distinction without much difference when Hungarian public opinion opposes Ukraine membership and weapons deliveries.

The Publicus Institute poll conducted 11-18 October 2024 showed Tisza at 24% among the entire population versus Fidesz at 23%, but among decided voters, the breakdown was 39% for Tisza versus 37% for Fidesz. 

According to Medián poll from November 2024, among those with party preference, Tisza's lead was 43% against 39% for Fidesz, and among voters promising to participate, Tisza garnered 46% while Fidesz gained only 39%.

Vox Populi, which compiles polling institute data, showed Tisza in the lead in September 2025 by anywhere from 4% to 14%.

What would actually change

The optimistic scenario: Magyar might be quieter about opposition. He won't actively tour Europe undermining Ukraine the way Orbán does. He might not veto every single Ukraine-related measure, just most of them.

Teczár sees a marginal shift possible: "Maybe after the elections, if they win, there could be changes." But the timeline matters—any softening would come after April 2026, meaning another year of Hungarian obstruction at minimum.

The rhetoric would improve. Magyar acknowledges Russia as the aggressor. He criticizes Orbán for using veto power for "personal political motives" rather than national interests. But when Magyar says he'll use the veto for Hungary's interests instead, what does that mean? The same obstruction, just with better PR.

The structural problem Western allies miss

This isn't about Viktor Orbán's personal relationship with Putin. It's not about one leader's corruption or authoritarian tendencies. Those factors matter, but they're not the whole story.

Hungary's media ecosystem has been captured. Orbán's government controls most major outlets, and they've spent years framing Ukraine support as dangerous for Hungary.

The narratives have penetrated: Ukraine membership threatens Hungarian jobs, Ukrainian language laws oppress Hungarian minorities in Transcarpathia, supporting Ukraine means war escalation that Hungary can't afford.

"Because of the very close alignment between Fidesz narratives and Kremlin narratives, my feeling is that Russia simply doesn't need to invest too many resources in Hungary," Teczár explains. "Very powerful players are already doing their job anyway."

Even if Magyar wanted to help Ukraine—and there's little evidence he does—he couldn't survive it politically. Fidesz would paint him as Brussels' puppet, as a warmonger sending Hungarian boys to die for foreign interests, as an enemy of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine. And enough voters would believe it to cost him the election.

The lesson for Western policymakers

Betting on April 2026 to solve the Hungary problem means another year minimum of obstruction, followed by—at best—marginally softer obstruction from a leader who still opposes Ukraine's fast-track EU membership and weapons deliveries.

Western allies need Plan B. That might mean finding ways to work around Hungarian vetoes, strengthening bilateral support for Ukraine that doesn't require unanimity, or making Hungary's obstruction so costly that even Magyar's "national interest" calculation shifts.

But the magical thinking that regime change automatically means policy change? That needs to end. Magyar's own words and actions show he's offering Orbán-lite on Ukraine, not a reversal.

The sooner Western capitals accept this, the sooner they can develop strategies that don't depend on Hungarian cooperation that isn't coming—regardless of who wins in April.

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Romania could’ve been Ukraine’s biggest ally. Hungary made sure it isn’t.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer urged European leaders at a "coalition of the willing" summit in London on 24 October 2025 to send more long-range missiles to Ukraine, as the White House's first major sanctions against Russia's energy sector this year signal a strategic shift in Western pressure on Moscow.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in London for the summit. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Denmark's Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Netherlands' Dick Schoof also attended, with other leaders including French President Emmanuel Macron joining virtually. The summit comes shortly after US President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Russia's two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, following the collapse of planned Trump-Putin talks.

Why long-range missiles in focus now

Starmer's push for long-range weapons represents a strategic shift from defensive operations to actively degrading Russia's deep logistics network. "I think there's further we can do on capability, particularly... long-range capability," Starmer told Zelenskyy at Downing Street before the summit.

The timing reflects Ukraine's growing momentum in striking strategic Russian targets. On 21 October, Ukrainian forces used British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles in a combined strike on the Bryansk Chemical Plant, a facility producing ammunition and serving as a frontline artillery repair hub for Russian troops, according to Euromaidan Press.

While Russia continues devastating strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure—destroying approximately 60% of the country's natural gas production and forcing nationwide blackouts, according to Institute for the Study of War assessments—Starmer cited a recent Russian strike on a nursery as proof Putin lacks seriousness about peace.

"The only person involved in this conflict who does not want to stop the war is President Putin," he said during his speech.

UK's pioneering role on long-range weapons

Britain became the first Western country to provide long-range cruise missiles in May 2023 by sending Ukraine its Storm Shadow system, which can strike targets over 500 kilometers away. The UK subsequently lobbied intensively—particularly targeting Washington—to lift restrictions on using these weapons inside Russia.

Storm Shadow missiles have proven their strategic value, playing a critical role in destroying multiple vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and forcing the remainder to withdraw from the northwestern Black Sea, according to Euromaidan Press. France restarted production of the SCALP variant at MBDA's UK Stevenage facility in 2025 after a 15-year pause.

However, Storm Shadow strikes deep inside Russia require US approval due to classified American cartography data used in the missile's guidance system, Defense Express has noted. Without access to this data, the missiles would be limited to GPS navigation, potentially making them vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare.

New air defense aid accelerated

Separately from the long-range weapons push, Starmer announced Britain will accelerate delivery of 140 Lightweight Multirole Missiles to Ukraine this winter, ahead of the original schedule. This forms part of a £1.6 billion deal for over 5,000 such missiles, supporting hundreds of jobs at Thales in Belfast.

The summit also pressed allies to "finish the job on Russian sovereign assets" to unlock billions for Ukraine's defense. The day before, EU leaders tasked the European Commission to develop options for funding Ukraine for two more years, leaving the door open for a €140 billion "reparations loan" backed by frozen Russian assets—though Belgium, where most frozen assets are held, has raised legal objections.

Read also:

• US, EU sanction Russian energy; Putin downplays hit, Trump says "We'll see"
• Storm Shadows strike major Russian munitions plant in growing strategic campaign

Two young Ukrainians walked into a Nova Post office in central Bucharest on 21 October 2025, carrying packages disguised as headphones and car parts. Inside: thermite devices designed to torch the building and sever the connection between millions of displaced Ukrainians and their families back home.

Romanian intelligence neutralized the attack and arrested the suspects—two Ukrainians allegedly recruited by Russian intelligence to sabotage their own community's lifeline. The operation was hailed as a victory against Russian sabotage networks on NATO soil.

But Romanian expert Sorin Ionița, head of ExpertForum (EFOR), warns that this success shouldn't obscure deeper problems. "The intelligence services, instead of fighting the threats, were occupied with other things," Ionița tells Euromaidan Press in an exclusive conversation. "Now they don't want to talk about that anymore."

The question remains: If Romanian intelligence can stop individual attacks, why did they overlook Wagner-connected networks, far-right extremists, and Kremlin-backed politicians building infrastructure for Russia's massive intervention in Romania's 2024 presidential election?

What the world missed about Romania's near-catastrophe

"The perception of Romania abroad was quite schematic," Ionița explains. "Not only in Ukraine, but also in the West, the nuances and games of internal politics aren't correctly perceived. Romania doesn't have a very clear profile and doesn't take strong positions on the European scene, so I wouldn't blame the world for not understanding what's happening inside Romania."

For years, Romania appeared as one of Eastern Europe's most reliably anti-Russian states—ethnically homogeneous, without a significant Russian-speaking minority, and consistently pro-NATO. Ukraine and Western partners saw it as largely immune to Kremlin subversion.

Then came the 2024 presidential election. The scale of Russian interference and the extensive networks Moscow had built inside the country shattered that assumption, forcing Romania's neighbors to reassess what they thought they knew.

While Washington saw Romania as a reliable NATO ally supporting Ukraine, Romanian government ministers were publicly exploiting anti-Ukrainian narratives for popularity points. While Brussels praised Romania's European alignment, Romanian intelligence services tolerated Wagner veterans recruiting for African operations. While the West counted Romania as solidly pro-democracy, major political parties flirted with extremists until those extremists nearly won.

Take Romanian mercenary Horatiu Potra, who worked with Wagner Group in Africa and later funded far-right presidential candidate Călin Georgescu's 2024 campaign.

Potra is now an international fugitive with proven Kremlin connections.

"It's impossible that the services—for example, the Romanian military information services—didn't know that people who were in the army, veterans, but even active military or from the gendarmerie, from the Ministry of the Interior, took unpaid leave and went to Africa with Potra to do Wagner's work there," Ionița says.

They knew. Romanian intelligence tracked these movements. The question is why they did nothing while Wagner veterans returned home and channeled money into a presidential campaign that nearly succeeded.

The overlooked corruption-extremism alliance

While Western analysts focused on Russian disinformation and TikTok algorithms, Romania's real vulnerability lay closer to home: a political establishment so consumed by corruption that it actively enabled the far-right's rise. The country's major parties didn't just ignore the extremist threat—they collaborated with it, viewing far-right parties as useful tools for managing voter anger while they continued looting state resources.

"Romania's public agenda wasn't very clear," Ionița explains. "Yes, in general, pro-Europe. We help our neighbors, Moldova, Ukraine. But the first priority of the big parties, like PSD and PNL, was different. It was about stealing more—controlling state contracts, appointments, resources. Fighting Russian influence was secondary to protecting their own corruption schemes."

Romania's major parties—the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and National Liberal Party (PNL)—maintained a pro-European facade while key figures exploited anti-Ukrainian, anti-NATO narratives for domestic popularity. When grain shipments from Ukraine created minor disruptions, ministers who officially supported Kyiv suddenly started reproducing far-right talking points.

"Every time there was a controversial issue [about Ukraine, vaccines, LGBT rights, migration, energy prices etc. - ed.] you would find a minister, usually from the Social Democrats, who was exploiting it populistically," Ionița says.

"Romania's official position was supportive: we discuss and support Ukraine. But individual ministers would reproduce speeches from the far-right AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians) because they wanted to be popular with their voters. And those speeches were profoundly anti-European, anti-NATO, anti-Ukrainian, and very conspiratorial."

This wasn't accidental spillover—it was deliberate strategy. AUR party served as a useful tool for siphoning votes from angry constituents. Government ministers adopted their talking points. Intelligence services looked the other way while their networks built connections to Wagner Group and Russian operatives. Nobody thought the extremists would actually threaten the establishment's power.

Then came November 2024.

When the useful extremists stopped being useful

Călin Georgescu—a far-right candidate with minimal political infrastructure and openly pro-Russian positions—won the first round of Romania's presidential election. Not through conventional campaigning, but through a sophisticated TikTok operation that bypassed traditional media entirely.

Suddenly, the extremists Romania's establishment had tolerated as manageable protest votes weren't manageable anymore. They were winning.

"The big parties thought they could control the far-right," Ionița says. "They thought AUR and candidates like Georgescu served their interests by channeling voter frustration away from the establishment parties. They were wrong."

The TikTok campaign that propelled Georgescu revealed networks Romanian intelligence had ignored for years. Accounts were coordinated. Messaging was sophisticated. Funding sources traced back to figures like Potra, who had operated openly despite his Wagner connections.

Romania's Constitutional Court ultimately annulled the election—an unprecedented move that sparked debate about democratic legitimacy versus democratic defense. But the annulment only addressed the symptom. The networks that made Georgescu's rise possible remain intact.

The Moldova comparison nobody wants to hear

Moldova faced similar Russian interference in its 2024 elections. The difference? Moldova's institutions actually fought back before the crisis reached catastrophic levels.

"In Moldova, you had very strong efforts to counter Russian influence," Ionița notes. "The intelligence services were focused, the prosecutors were active, civil society was mobilized. They weren't perfect, but they were serious about the threat."

Romania's response? Years of looking the other way, followed by panic when extremists nearly won, followed by attempts to claim credit for stopping threats they had enabled.

"I don't think they put in as many resources as they did in Moldova," Ionița says of Romanian intelligence efforts against Russian interference. The institutional priorities were elsewhere—namely, protecting the corruption networks that the major parties depended on.

/medu

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Washington joins Moscow in embracing sovereignism

And now there's a new factor Americans need to reckon with.

Romania's nightmare scenario evolved further: Just as Romanian institutions finally mobilized against Russian-backed sovereignism, American political figures started amplifying similar narratives.

US Vice President JD Vance began promoting "sovereignism" as an alternative to both Russian imperialism and liberal internationalism—the exact framing that Russian operations had spent years developing in Eastern Europe.

"We expected trolling from Moscow, yes, but we didn't expect that sovereignism would become the new thing in Washington," Ionița says.

The disruption wasn't just tactical—it was strategic. Romanian intelligence services had spent months developing counter-narratives to Russian sovereignist propaganda, framing it as anti-democratic, authoritarian, and contrary to Western values.

Then American officials started using identical language to describe their own positions, but in positive terms.

How do you tell Romanians that sovereignism threatens democracy when Washington promotes it as democratic renewal? How do you counter Russian narratives about Western hypocrisy when American officials validate those narratives by embracing the same frameworks Moscow developed?

You can't do both.

"All this story about the complexity of the political game in Romania is very difficult to explain in the West," Ionița notes.

Romanian institutions kept their corruption and double-dealing quieter than Hungary's Viktor Orbán—whose public controversies regularly draw Western attention and criticism—until the incompetence and complicity publicly broke in November 2024.

"For us in Romania, it's a very difficult position," Ionița says. "We depend on America for security. We need American support against Russia. But when American political figures amplify the same narratives that Russian operations developed, what do we do?"

Why this matters beyond Romania

Romania's near-catastrophe exposes a pattern playing out across NATO's eastern flank: Institutional corruption creates vulnerabilities. Russian operations exploit them. Local establishments tolerate the exploitation until it threatens their power. Then they mobilize—often too late, always incompletely.

"The lesson for other countries is simple," Ionița says. "If you really want to fight Russian interference, you can win. But you have to start fighting before the crisis, not after. And you have to be willing to confront the corruption and institutional capture that makes your country vulnerable in the first place."

Most NATO allies aren't willing to do that work until a crisis forces the issue.

Romania matters less to Washington than Ukraine does, Ionița acknowledges. "We're not a zone of interest."

But that's precisely why Romania matters as a case study. If institutional rot can nearly capture a NATO member that nobody's watching closely, what happens when similar dynamics play out in Poland, the Baltics, or elsewhere in Central Europe?

The corruption-to-Russian-influence pipeline doesn't require geographic proximity to Moscow—just leaders more interested in protecting their own power than their country's security.

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Romania could’ve been Ukraine’s biggest ally. Hungary made sure it isn’t.

The uncomfortable questions

The Nova Post sabotage operation failed. Two suspects sit in Romanian custody. The thermite devices were neutralized before they could sever connections between displaced Ukrainians and their families at war.

Success—in the narrow tactical sense. But zoom out to the strategic picture:

• How many NATO allies are still in the "toleration" phase? Still letting Wagner connections operate while pretending not to notice? Still allowing government figures to exploit anti-Ukrainian narratives while officially supporting Kyiv?
• What happens when institutions finally decide to fight—but Washington backs the other side? When American political figures actively support sovereignist forces connected to Russian operations?
• How do you defend democracy when both Moscow and parts of Washington push in the same direction?

Romanian intelligence stopped this attack—one of several tactical victories against Russian sabotage—but only after years of overlooking the networks behind them. The institutions now seeking credit for these disruptions had long ignored warning signs about Wagner connections and far-right infiltration.

The deeper problem remains unresolved. The political establishment that enabled extremists faces no accountability. The institutional weaknesses and political compromises that made Romania vulnerable to Russian exploitation continue. And the networks that enable such operations are still active.

For American policymakers watching NATO's eastern flank, Romania offers an uncomfortable lesson: tactical successes in stopping individual attacks matter less than addressing the systemic vulnerabilities that invite them. Whether through corruption, political opportunism, or willful blindness, these weaknesses create openings for foreign intelligence services to exploit.

Washington celebrates when allies disrupt Russian sabotage. But Sorin Ionița's assessment raises a harder question: Why do some NATO members tolerate the conditions that make such operations possible until crisis forces action?

Romania and Ukraine share over 600 kilometers of border and parallel paths of post-communist transformation. Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, making it Ukraine's obvious champion for European integration.

But when Ukraine needs Romanian support, there's silence and Romanian journalist Romeo Couți explains why it is so. In an interview with Euromaidan Press Couți noted: "Romania at this moment is almost entirely dominated by Hungary."

The mechanism? A Hungarian minority party that holds permanent veto power over Romanian policy—and takes orders from Budapest.

Why Romania matters for Ukraine

Romania's position makes it Ukraine's natural bridge to Europe. The countries share over 600 kilometers of border—longer than Poland's frontier with Ukraine. Romania's NATO membership since 2004 and EU membership since 2007 mean it knows the accession process. Its location links Ukraine to Central Europe.

Romania already traveled Ukraine's path. It reformed post-communist institutions, met Western standards, navigated EU accession, and joined NATO.

"Romania could be a link in the European path of both Moldova and Ukraine," Couți said.

Yet this partnership barely exists.

The silence when Ukraine needs support

"In any unpleasant or tense situation, there's silence from Kyiv and silence from Bucharest," Couți observed. "This type of silence shows there's no communication between the Romanian and Kyiv governments, which shouldn't be the case."

The silence appears everywhere cooperation should exist. Romanian minority issues in Ukraine get no joint diplomatic approach. Regional development shows no bilateral projects. EU integration lacks visible partnership. Security cooperation beyond NATO remains minimal.

"I think it's more about incompetence and lack of ability to develop common projects with Ukraine," Couți said. "Romania has some very good specialists in negotiation. I don't have information that anything natural and normal has developed between Romania and Ukraine outside the established framework from Brussels."

Romania only does what Brussels explicitly directs. Independent Romanian-Ukrainian cooperation? Blocked.

But the constraint runs deeper than incompetence. "Romania doesn't have an independent foreign policy—at this moment Romania is subordinated to Brussels," Couți said.

In reality, Romania answers to Brussels on paper and Budapest in practice.

How Hungary controls Romania

The control mechanism revealed itself at the UDMR congress in Cluj. The party—the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania—represents Romania's Hungarian minority of approximately 1 million people.

"Let's not forget what happened at that congress, where all high-ranking Romanian officials stood before Viktor Orbán," Couți recounted. Romania's Prime Minister and other top officials attended on their own territory—not as equals but as supplicants.

The symbolic moment: attendees sang the Székely anthem, associated with Hungarian territorial claims in Romania.

"As head of government, it's not acceptable to attend moments with so much symbolism—I'm referring to the singing of the Székely anthem," Couți said. "It's not that the Prime Minister is an uninspired leader. It's that a foundational institution of the Romanian state, the government and the office of the Prime Minister, was humiliated."

When Hungary finally approved Romanian Schengen membership after years of blocking, Couți asked: "I don't even know what Romania offered for the vote Hungary gave when we joined Schengen. What was the deal?"

"Through these tactics, Hungary managed to break any desire for cooperation," he said.

The mechanism of control

The control runs on coalition math. Romania's Hungarian minority, concentrated in Transylvania, constitutes approximately 6% of the population. UDMR wins 5-7% in elections—enough to make or break governments.

UDMR has joined Romanian coalition governments repeatedly since 1996, spanning both left and right administrations.

"UDMR has a very strong position in Romania because it's eternally in the coalition of power," Couți said. "Kelemen Hunor is presented as a strong leader, taken up by the whole press, adulated, portrayed as a very well-prepared man."

UDMR can collapse any government by withdrawing. Budapest directs UDMR positions. UDMR threatens to leave if not followed. The government complies.

"Viktor Orbán succeeded—he has control in Romania through UDMR," Couți said.

For Ukraine, this creates an invisible veto. Any Romanian policy contradicting Hungarian interests gets blocked behind closed doors. The government simply doesn't propose it.

Hungarian territorial ambitions in Romania

"Hungary will take advantage of this situation to advance some territorial claims, because the traumas related to what the Treaty of Trianon meant for Hungary still drive policy today," Couți explained.

The 1920 Treaty of Trianon transferred Transylvania to Romania after World War I. Hungary lost approximately 72% of its pre-war territory. This century-old "trauma" still drives policy.

Current moves show the pattern. "Hungary is conducting intense negotiations to acquire land in Romania in the Sulina area, where—on the pretext of opening a port—Hungarian private companies, actually under government control, want to acquire land to open a port in Sulina," Couți revealed.

Sulina sits where the Danube meets the Black Sea—strategic for commerce and military logistics.

"Together with China, Hungary has acquired land in the Trieste area at the sea, where a port has already been arranged," he added.

The pattern uses "economic" projects to establish territorial footholds—the same playbook Russia uses.

"Hungary doesn't want to establish itself as an element of peace negotiations," Couți warned. "Hungary wants to become a regional power only to impose some claims related to control of certain territories, even if it won't actually recover them physically."

"Let's not forget that Viktor Orbán has a fairly deep dispute with Ukraine, starting from formal issues like the language law and ending with territorial ones," Couți noted.

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What Ukraine loses

Ukraine's natural EU champion has been neutralized.

"Romania doesn't have an independent foreign policy—at this moment Romania is subordinated to Brussels," Couți explained.

The reality is worse: Romania formally answers to Brussels but effectively takes orders from Budapest.

This matters for Ukraine. As neighbors sharing both a border and Hungarian pressure, Romania and Ukraine should be natural allies pushing back together against Orbán's obstruction. Instead, Hungary's control over Romania means Ukraine loses a critical partner precisely when needed most.

What they could accomplish together: Active lobbying for Ukraine's EU candidacy, bilateral security cooperation beyond NATO, cross-border infrastructure projects, and a united front against Hungarian vetoes. Romania's post-communist transformation offers practical lessons Ukraine needs.

What actually happens: Romania issues generic statements only when Brussels permits. Minimal bilateral engagement. Silence when Hungary objects.

For Ukraine, watching Romania under Budapest's control offers a disturbing preview of how Hungarian influence operates inside the EU institutions it seeks to join. Two countries facing the same opponent can't coordinate their defense because one has already been captured.

Hungary's control demonstrates that EU membership doesn't protect democratic institutions from capture. NATO partnership doesn't prevent it. Good intentions don't matter if mechanisms allow control.

If Hungary controls a full EU and NATO member this completely, what will it demand from Ukraine during accession? What permanent constraints will it embed?

The playbook Ukraine will face

Hungary refined this mechanism in Romania and will deploy it against Ukraine. Ukraine has an ethnic Hungarian population in Zakarpattia Oblast where Hungary already uses minority rights as leverage for political influence.

Once Ukraine enters EU structures, Hungary will have institutional tools to replicate the Romanian pattern. Budapest funds and directs an ethnic minority party, makes it essential to governing coalitions, then uses that coalition position to influence national policy. Any resistance gets framed as discrimination, invoking EU minority protection frameworks. The target country faces an impossible choice: accept foreign control or appear to violate minority rights.

This creates a trap where legitimate minority rights protections—which are essential and should be defended—get weaponized as tools of foreign influence. Ukraine's Hungarian community deserves genuine rights and representation. But those rights shouldn't come packaged with Budapest's political control, and protecting national sovereignty shouldn't require undermining minority protections.

Ukraine sees the playbook now. Romania learned too late. Ukraine can build defenses that protect both national independence and minority rights—if it distinguishes between the two before accession.

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Why this matters beyond Romania

Hungary's control shows Ukraine's EU path faces obstacles beyond obvious vetoes. Budapest neutralized a potential ally from within. Even after Ukraine joins, Hungarian influence through minorities and coalition politics could limit support.

The obstacles aren't just Russian aggression and Western hesitation. They include control mechanisms that already neutralized potential allies inside European structures.

Will Ukraine build institutional defenses, or end up like Romania—formally sovereign, practically constrained, unable to support its interests when they conflict with Budapest?

"There are many unknowns," Couți said. "I see that the Ukrainian president is moving in an area where there's no turning back."

Romania's silence shows the stakes. Hungary's control shows the mechanism. Couți's analysis reveals that even Ukraine's natural allies may not help when needed—not because they don't want to, but because someone else holds the strings.

For Western policymakers supporting Ukraine's EU integration: membership alone doesn't guarantee independence. Democratic institutions can be captured. Hungary already demonstrated how.

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European Union foreign ministers sharply criticized plans for Russian President Vladimir Putin to visit Budapest despite an International Criminal Court arrest warrant, exposing deep divisions as Hungary prepares to welcome the war crimes suspect for talks with US President Donald Trump.

The controversy centers on Budapest—the same city where Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal in 1994 for security assurances Moscow now violates. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned against "another Budapest scenario" but would attend if included in talks with Trump and Putin. The planned summit follows August's Alaska meeting between Trump and Putin that produced no breakthrough, while Hungary's defiance of the ICC undermines European credibility on international law.

EU foreign ministers split into opposite camps on Putin's visit to Budapest

As they gathered on Monday for a meeting in Luxembourg, foreign affairs ministers of the European Union balanced between backing Trump's diplomatic efforts and upholding the International Criminal Court (ICC), which seeks Putin for the deportation and transfer of tens of thousands of Ukrainian children. However, some ministers voiced sharp criticism of Putin's anticipated Budapest visit.

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas said at a press briefing on 20 October that “…is not nice. To see that really a person, with an arrest warrant put by the ICC, is coming to a European country." She questioned whether the Budapest summit would yield results, noting that "Russia only understands strength and only negotiates when it is really put to negotiate."

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys, speaking to the press ahead of an EU foreign ministers' meeting in Luxembourg, stated that a "clear message" must be sent regarding Europe's stance on Russia. He declared, “We have to hold the principles of Europe that we all agree. And the only place for Putin in Europe that's in The Hague, in front of the tribunal, not in any of our capitals."

While calling it “useful” for Americans to be able to speak with Russians, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot emphasized that Vladimir Putin's presence on EU territory has a specific purpose. “But this presence of Vladimir Putin on European Union soil only makes sense if it allows for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire,” he said, according to Euractiv.

Other Western European ministers adopted more accommodating positions.

When Euractiv asked if Hungary was setting the EU’s agenda, Denmark’s Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen replied that Budapest is “just a venue for a meeting.”

According to Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister David van Weel, there are some reservations among European leaders about the location of the meeting. “On the other hand, the most important thing is that we have a negotiating table, that we get the parties around the table,” Weel said.

Germany’s Europe Minister, Gunther Krichbaum, commented, “It’s good that such a meeting is happening,” but also warned about the danger of excluding Ukraine from any potential agreement, according to Euractiv.

Spain's Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares encouraged Europeans to focus on what they can do to support Ukraine rather than "asking what others will do," Euronews reports.

The split reflects broader tensions over Hungary's democratic trajectory. In September 2022, the European Parliament declared Hungary "can no longer be considered a full democracy" in a 433-123 vote, characterizing it as an "electoral autocracy."

Hungary vows to ensure Putin's safe passage despite ICC obligations

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó announced, "We are a sovereign country. We will respectfully welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin, receive him as a guest and provide conditions for his negotiations with the American president."

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán posted on X, “The planned meeting between the American and Russian presidents is great news for the peace-loving people of the world. We are ready!”

Hungary announced its intention to withdraw from the ICC in April 2025 when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also under an ICC arrest warrant, visited Budapest. The Hungarian parliament approved the withdrawal in May, but it remains technically bound by the Rome Statute until June 2026.

An ICC spokesperson told Euronews that "a withdrawal does not impact ongoing proceedings or any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective."

History haunts: Where Ukraine gave up nukes for broken Russian promises

The choice of Budapest carries bitter historical irony for Ukraine. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed in the Hungarian capital, saw Ukraine surrender the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom—promises Moscow now violates through its war of aggression.

Zelenskyy told reporters on 20 October he wants to avoid "another Budapest scenario," referencing the failed security guarantees. He also said that Ukraine would agree to a meeting in Budapest provided that it would take place in a trilateral format or in a "shuttle diplomacy" format, when Trump meets separately with him and Putin.

However, Zelenskyy expressed skepticism about Orbán's role, doubting the Hungarian leader's ability to "provide a balanced contribution."

Related:

• Hungary vows Putin honored guest treatment for Trump talks despite legal duty to arrest him
• "Putin outplayed Trump again": Russia pulls US president into Budapest meeting on its terms, says expert

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