[L'article Donald Trump a déjà quitté le sommet du G7 a d'abord été publié dans InfoBref.]

[L'article Mark Carney rencontre Donald Trump avant le sommet du G7  a d'abord été publié dans InfoBref.]

Days before Israel launched a sweeping air assault on Iran, dramatically escalating regional tensions, the US quietly diverted critical anti-drone munitions from Ukraine to its forces in the Middle East.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the US redirected proximity fuzes and other components of the APKWS II air defense system to CENTCOM, which oversees military operations across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea.

“We’re going to surge counter-UAS systems to our troops and bases first if we believe there’s a threat,” Hegseth told the Senate Appropriations Committee on Wednesday.

What was diverted?

The system in question is the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) — a guidance kit that converts standard 70 mm unguided rockets into laser-guided munitions. Developed by BAE Systems and used by the US Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marines, it delivers precision at a relatively low cost — roughly $25,000 per round.

The War Zone reports that the diversion included not only APKWS rockets but also specialized proximity fuzes, enabling aerial detonations near small drones. According to TWZ, Defense Secretary Hegseth approved the transfer via a memo to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, labeling it an “urgent” requirement for CENTCOM.

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Where APKWS works

APKWS II is compatible with a wide range of US and allied platforms, including:

• F-16C/D Viper
• F-15E Strike Eagle
• A-10 Thunderbolt II
• AH-64 Apache
• AH-1Z Viper, UH-1Y Venom
• MH-60R/S Seahawks
• VAMPIRE launchers, as used in Ukraine

Originally designed for ground attack, APKWS has been adapted for counter-drone and even air-to-air roles. Its modularity allows rapid integration, and with proximity fuzes — like those just redirected — it’s proven effective against drones and low-flying cruise missiles.

Why it matters

• For Ukraine: APKWS, fielded via VAMPIRE systems since late 2023, has been crucial for defending against Shahed-136 drone swarms. But now, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told ABC News that 20,000 “anti-Shahed” rockets — understood to be APKWS-equipped rounds — are being withheld, creating a serious gap in Ukraine’s air defenses.
• For US Forces: F-15E and F-16 aircraft deployed in the CENTCOM region now carry APKWS pods alongside traditional missiles. Jets operating from Jordan have been outfitted with six seven-shot rocket pods, offering up to 50 drone engagements per sortie — a loadout first tested against Houthi drones over the Red Sea.

Stockpiles and uncertainty

The Pentagon has not disclosed how many APKWS kits or fuzes were diverted or remain in stock. Asked about the possibility of resupplying Ukraine, Hegseth said:

“We’d have to review the capacity… We’ve created some challenges in other places.”

There is also no confirmation whether additional systems — including VAMPIRE launchers or electronic warfare assets — were reallocated.

Regional flashpoint—Israel strikes Iran

Amid this arms shift, Israel today launched Operation Rising Lion, a massive air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear sites, military infrastructure, and senior leadership.

• Over 200 Israeli aircraft struck dozens of high-value sites, including facilities in Natanz and Tehran.
• Major General Mohammad Bagheri and IRGC Commander Hossein Salami were reportedly killed.
• In retaliation, Iran launched more than 100 drones, triggering widespread airspace closures across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.

According to The Jerusalem Post, the drones included Shahed-129 and Shahed-136 models, both long-range loitering munitions designed for precision strikes.

Expert analysis: A strategic pivot

Ukrainian defense expert Kyrylo Danylchenko commented that the diversion of US anti-drone munitions was directly linked to preparations for an Iranian response.

“Over 300 strikes hit 100 targets overnight. Iran’s air defense was suppressed; bunker-busting bombs were used. Israel neutralized IRGC commanders responsible for Shahed operations against Ukraine,” Danylchenko wrote on Facebook.

He noted that Iran’s Shahed production lines were likely targeted, and that Israel may continue its strikes for up to two weeks if diplomatic efforts fail, exploiting what he called a rare “window of regional vulnerability.”

Bottom line

The diversion of APKWS to the Middle East — just before a major regional conflict erupted — highlights a sharp shift in US strategic priorities. A system once intended to protect Ukrainian cities is now deployed to defend against a rapidly expanding confrontation with Iran.

Whether Ukraine gets resupplied — or left exposed — is still an open question.

[L'article Mark Carney espère finaliser une entente commerciale avec les États-Unis au sommet du G7 a d'abord été publié dans InfoBref.]

“We fucked up.” It’s not often you hear a democracy activist open with those words, but Nino Robakidze, a veteran democracy activist with over 15 years fighting for Georgian freedom, isn’t interested in pretty narratives.

Speaking at the “FuckUp Night” panel at the Lviv Media Forum 2025, Robakidze laid bare how Georgian civil society enabled the fastest documented democratic collapse in modern European history.

The timeline is breathtaking: December 2023, Georgia receives EU candidate status. Eighteen months later, dozens of political prisoners, including four high-profile politicians, fill Georgian jails, independent media faces criminal prosecution, and the government has abandoned European integration entirely. Over 200 public servants were fired simply for posting pro-European statements on Facebook.

“Georgian civil society is in a perfect storm,” she says. “We saw the red flags. We really saw the red flags. But it was so uncomfortable to really talk about that.”

From EU dreams to Russian nightmare in record time

Twenty-one years after the Rose Revolution promised Georgia a European future, the country has achieved something unprecedented: the fastest documented slide from EU candidate to authoritarian crackdown in European history.

The timeline is breathtaking.

• December 2023: EU grants Georgia candidate status.
• May 2024: Government passes Russian-style “foreign agent” law.
• October 2024: Elections marked by widespread fraud.
• November 2024: Government suspends EU talks.
• January 2025: First female journalist political prisoner.

The halt to EU accession talks were the straw that broke the camel’s back. Polls show 80% of Georgians want EU membership—one of the highest rates in any candidate country.

What followed was six months of non-stop protests across Georgia—unprecedented in the country’s history. Police have violently dispersed demonstrators using water cannons and tear gas against crowds singing the EU anthem.

Hundreds have been arrested, including Mzia Amaglobeli, co-founder of independent outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, who faces up to seven years in prison for symbolically slapping a police chief after he allegedly spat in her face and verbally abused her. She became Georgia’s first female journalist to be designated a political prisoner.

But Robakidze, former Country Director for IREX Georgia, isn’t just analyzing the crisis—she’s dissecting how democracy defenders like herself enabled it through a fatal dependency that made Georgian freedom hostage to foreign funding.

For two decades, the US government poured millions into Georgian civil society—building the independent media, NGOs, and democracy programs that became the envy of the former Soviet space. That investment created something genuinely remarkable: a vibrant civil society that helped Georgia become a beacon of democratic progress in the region.

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The fatal dependency: how Western money created the weapon to destroy democracy

For two decades, Georgian civil society lived on life support: US government funding. Independent media, NGOs, democracy programs—all relied heavily on American largesse because local businesses feared government retaliation for supporting critical outlets.

“This was mainly the US government funding because there was not enough advertising money in independent media,” Robakidze explains. Vulnerable to state pressure, “big business did not want to work with media outlets like this because they were investigating government corruption.”

But the irony runs deeper—and darker. Western funding didn’t just create the vulnerability; it actively trained the oppressors.

Georgian Dream created Western-funded strategic communication units across government ministries. “And then this communication in the crisis, when the crisis was approaching, was used against those who were actually protecting Western values—civil society, media, free media, etc.”

The absurdity was complete: civil society trained its own oppressors. “We were inviting representatives of this group to different trainings, on strategic communication, on public opinion research, and they learned the lesson really well. Maybe they were the best in their class, actually.”

The students became the masters, using Western-funded skills to dismantle Western values.

Playing fair while opponents cheated

Civil society’s commitment to democratic norms became another vulnerability. While democracy defenders insisted on fact-checking, verification, and due process, their opponents weaponized speed and fabrication.

During Georgia’s October 2024 elections, civil society deployed 3,000 trained observers who knew by 11 AM they were witnessing “the worst election in Georgian democratic history.” But while they spent the day meticulously fact-checking evidence of fraud, Georgian Dream simply declared victory at 8 PM.

“We struggled to communicate this on time because we were checking each and every case, double-checking it,” Robakidze recalls. “But we lost the battle of the very important, crucial minute.”

Civil society eventually proved the elections were fraudulent—no international observer recognized the results as legitimate. But Georgian Dream had already won by ignoring the verification process that constrained their opponents.

“We collected all this evidence… But we lost the battle of the very important, crucial minute,” Robakidze reflects. It revealed a global pattern: authoritarian forces exploit democracy’s commitment to due process, turning democratic values into democratic vulnerabilities.

The statistical proof

Stolen election: how the Georgian Dream helped itself to 15% of all votes cast

Media massacre: systematic destruction of independent voices

The government’s media strategy went beyond funding manipulation—it became systematic annihilation. In April 2025, the Georgian Public Broadcaster fired two prominent journalists—Nino Zautashvili and Vasil Ivanov-Chikovani—after they openly criticized the channel’s editorial policy. Ivanov-Chikovani had stated live on air that the broadcaster’s editorial policy “fails to meet the public’s demands.”

The broadcaster’s supervisory board, headed by Vasil Maghlaperidze—a former deputy chair of the ruling Georgian Dream party—called for prosecutors to investigate journalists who criticized the channel’s coverage. The message was clear: dissent will be criminalized.

Since May 2024, more than 30 journalists covering the “foreign agent” bill have been targeted with anonymous threatening phone calls. Unknown individuals plastered posters on journalists’ homes and offices, denouncing them as “foreign agents” with messages like “There is no place in Georgia for agents.”

The new Foreign Agents Registration Act grants the state authority to criminally prosecute media outlets, NGOs, and individuals for failing to register as a “foreign agent,” with penalties of up to five years in prison. As one media executive warned: “We will work as volunteers as long as we can… But I cannot take any money from any donor past May 30, because I don’t want to go to jail.”

More than 70 journalists have been injured while covering protests, with some hospitalized. The systematic nature is unmistakable: this isn’t random violence but coordinated destruction of independent media.

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The confession: “I was not fierce enough”

For Robakidze, the crisis forced brutal self-examination. Could civil society have prevented this catastrophe?

“I always ask myself: did I do everything I could to convince my colleagues and those with whom I worked closely that what is happening is dangerous, and this might lead in a very wrong direction?”

Her answer haunts her: “I think that no, I did not.”

She was part of the problem—attending conferences, sitting at tables with government representatives, participating in dialogues even as the warning signs mounted. “Maybe I was not fierce enough, and maybe the urgent situation that we have now would not have been needed if we started being really fierce and dramatic on the very first cases.”

The first red flag came just months after the peaceful 2012 transition, when Georgian Dream defeated Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement in parliamentary elections. The victory was celebrated as a triumph of Georgian democracy—the first peaceful transfer of power in the post-Soviet space.

But the honeymoon was brief. On 17 May 2013—International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia—a small solidarity gathering of maybe 50 people, mostly journalists and human rights defenders, planned to remember LGBTQI+ victims in Tbilisi’s city center.

Instead, they were attacked by a massive, organized mob, with things getting so out of hand that the 50 protesters needed to be bussed out.

For Robakidze, this wasn’t random violence—it was a test. “At that moment Georgia government had a really brilliant police structure. There was no way, no chance, if the state wanted to protect these people, that things could get so ugly and so violent.”

The attack was “visible that it was organized… And those people were having the blessing or green light from the government and Ministry of Interior.”

The red flag was a warning of things to come: 12 years later, the Georgian police disperses hundred-thousand-strong protests; the state’s repressive apparatus has been fully unleashed on the people.

More red flags followed. In 2016, Azerbaijani investigative journalist Afgan Mukhtarli was kidnapped from Tbilisi’s Freedom Square and appeared in an Azerbaijani prison. No footage existed. “We knew that there was no possibility without state interference for such things to happen.”

But civil society and international partners found it easier to focus on Georgia’s successes than confront uncomfortable realities—so they were ignored.

The lesson crystallized too late: “There is no small compromise with non-freedom. If you compromise that small thing, you definitely need to compromise the bigger thing tomorrow.”

Why Georgia will still win: the freedom advantage

Despite the catastrophic failures, Robakidze remains optimistic about Georgia’s ultimate victory. Her reasoning cuts to the heart of what separates Georgia from Russia and Belarus—and why this matters for democracies worldwide.

“Georgia was a democracy for 30 years. And we enjoyed the freedom of speech, freedom of arts, freedom of movement, everything,” she says. “We tasted freedom.”

Even under Soviet rule, Georgia maintained psychological independence. “Even during the Soviet Union, Georgia was still having that sense of freedom alive because of the language we were using, which was never Russian.”

This creates a fundamental difference from Georgia’s neighbors: “We are genuinely not part of the Russian thinking world.” The government’s target audience—those susceptible to pro-Russian messaging—consists mainly of “mostly older men in regions who had only good things happening in their early years” and “have the sentiments of the Soviet Union.”

But the crucial difference is ideological. Georgian Dream lacks what Putin possesses: an ideology, which makes long-term authoritarian consolidation questionable.

The government is “on their lowest level. Lowest approval ratings in their 12-year history.”

From dependency to independence: The silver lining

The loss of US funding, while painful, may have been necessary medicine. For the first time, Georgian civil society is learning to survive independently.

“Now, first time I see that really viable… society will support independent media and society will support civil society actions,” Robakidze observes. “Whatever happens right now is completely 100% financed by ordinary citizens who are just crowdfunding.”

This grassroots renaissance extends beyond civil society. “We also see for the first time big business also understanding the responsibility that if things go wrong in this part, we can die with them as well.”

The protests themselves represent this new independence. You cannot find “the industry or the sphere where the most prominent people are not part of the protest in Georgia.” All major theaters, singers, and composers have joined the streets. “These are theaters that young people are going to, and you cannot find a ticket for months if you want to attend a theater.”

Even government employees are risking everything. More than 200 public servants were fired simply for posting pro-European statements on Facebook—a purge that backfired by revealing the government’s desperation and creating martyrs.

Explore further

“Russia makes nations slaves”: a Georgian activist explains her country’s revolt

Global warning: your democracy is next

Georgia’s crisis reflects a global phenomenon that Robakidze calls the “spirit of non-freedom spreading.” The mechanics are eerily familiar across continents.

“A lot of people in the world were living many years thinking that freedom is granted and guaranteed, taking freedom for granted,” she explains. “In Europe, in the US, in the West in general, they had this problem maybe even deeper than the Georgian society has.”

Western societies “allowed in their societies this darkness to spread without reacting to it when it’s needed.”

The warning signs are identical:

• Small compromises that seem manageable
• External funding creating dependency vulnerabilities
• Strategic communication training weaponized against democracy
• Media capture through economic pressure
• Civil society taking freedom for granted.

“Right now weather is the worst for beginner democracies,” she warns. But the crisis is a “wake-up call for not just for us, for societies who want to be democratic and consolidated democracies one day, but for everyone.”

The clock is ticking

As Georgia’s protests continue into their seventh month, the timeline offers a stark warning: democratic collapse can happen faster than anyone imagines. Eighteen months from EU candidate to authoritarian crackdown.

“There is never a bad time to think about your mistakes, and we can never be uncomfortable discussing the elephant in the room, because this elephant will never go anywhere,” Robakidze reflects. “And the only problem that this discussion creates is this uncomfortable feeling, which I think is very important—better experienced earlier than later.”

The uncomfortable truth: external funding made Georgian democracy vulnerable by creating dependency rather than genuine grassroots strength. But losing that crutch may have forced the authentic resistance needed to survive.

Georgia faces its ultimate test—not just of its democratic institutions, but of whether a society that truly tasted freedom can recognize and defeat authoritarianism when it matters most. The answer will determine not just Georgia’s fate, but offer crucial lessons for every democracy grappling with its own “spirit of non-freedom.”

For Robakidze, the fight continues: “We will not let Georgia slide back under Russia’s influence.” The question is whether the world’s other democracies will learn from Georgia’s mistakes before their own 18-month countdown begins.

Ukrainian analyst Dmytro Zolotukhin recently posed a haunting question: Ukraine has been striving to be a democracy ever since it regained independence, but aren’t Ukrainians, by chance, playing in the team of losers now?

“Absolutely not,” rebutted Timothy Garton Ash at the 2025 Lviv Media Forum, the British historian and Professor of European Studies at Oxford University, whose latest book, “Homelands: A Personal History of Europe,” chronicles the continent’s transformation over half a century and won the 2024 Lionel Gelber Prize.

“You’re on the winning team. It just may take a bit of time for the victory to come.”

Ash, Europe’s self-described “historian of the present” who has spent decades “breathing Europe,” believes democracy is experiencing growing pains, not death throes.

In fact, he argues that Putin’s war against Ukraine proves democracy’s enduring power.

Ash believes that one of the reasons for Russia’s ongoing invasion was the 2004 Orange Revolution, in which Ukrainians rebelled against the electoral fraud that gave a pro-Russian president victory instead of a Western-leaning candidate: “Putin thought that democracy was coming towards him, in addition to his motives of restoring the Russian Empire.”

The strength of democracy, Ash contends, is evidenced by its unprecedented expansion: “According to Freedom House, in early 1974, there were only 35 free countries in the world. By early 2004, 89.”

What we’re witnessing now, he suggests, is not democracy’s failure but a natural “anti-liberal, anti-democratic counter-revolution” in response to this historic spread, despite all of liberal democracy’s faults. The autocracies and hybrid regimes are simply not delivering—hundreds of thousands of people protesting in Hungary, Serbia, and Hungary are proof of that, Ash believes.

But the data tells a different story

Reality, however, presents a more sobering picture: democracy is hemorrhaging support worldwide at an unprecedented pace.

Only 6.6% of the world’s population live in states defined as full democracies, while 72% live in autocracies—a historic reversal that has seen the global Democracy Index score fall from 5.52 in 2006 to an unprecedented low of 5.17 in 2024.

Even the Western democracies Ukraine aspires to join are backsliding. France’s score fell below the threshold to qualify as a “full democracy” and was downgraded to a “flawed democracy” in 2024.

The United States continues to be classified as a “flawed democracy,” ranked 28th globally. Hungary has recorded the biggest decline ever measured, plummeting to become a “transitional” or “hybrid regime.” When weighted by population, the level of democracy in Europe has fallen back forty years, to where it was in 1978.

Between 2020 and 2024, in one in five elections worldwide, losing candidates publicly rejected the outcome.

Also at LMF

“I was not fierce enough”: Georgian activist’s brutal confession as democracy collapses

Democracy’s three critical ailments

Despite this grim landscape, Timothy Garton Ash maintains his diagnosis offers hope. The historian identifies three fundamental weaknesses that have made democracies vulnerable to authoritarian assault:

1. Democracy degrading into oligarchy

“The great achievement of modern liberal democracy was to separate wealth and power,” Ash explained. “Most of human history, wealth and power have gone together. In oligarchy, they come back together.”

Ukraine knows this threat intimately from its own struggle with oligarchs. But even in established democracies, the lines are blurring dangerously. “Now, even in the United States, we see, with Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and all the tech bros, Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos and others, lining up to support him, democracy degrading into oligarchy.”

2. Liberalism creating its own resistance

The second ailment emerges from democracy’s own successes. “What was associated with liberalism over the last 40 years, in particular neoliberalism, globalized, financialized capitalism, but to some extent also identity politics, left a huge part of our societies, in countries like Britain or America, feeling both economically and culturally neglected.”

Into this vacuum step the populists, who revolt against the “liberal cosmopolitan elites” and the big cities.

“They say, we hear you. We’re on your side. And they counterpose democracy to liberalism.” They claim to speak for “the people”—but as Ash notes, “it’s not the whole people. It’s only one part of the people.”

Trump himself once distinguished between “the people, and then there are the other people. And the other people are the bloody foreigners, quote, unquote. The immigrants, the outsiders, the others.”

3. Fragmentation of the public sphere

Democracy depends on shared reality, Ash argues, invoking ancient Athens: “All the citizens meet on the Pnyx. They hear all the facts. They can debate freely all the different policy options. And then together they decide to fight the invading Persians on sea rather than on land, which is how they win the Battle of Salamis.”

Today’s digital revolution has shattered this foundation.

“What’s happened over the years over the last 40 years is because of the digital revolution in media, we have the phenomenon of both monopoly, Facebook, Google, and fragmentation, so that we are losing the kind of public sphere, the kind of information environment you need for democracy to flourish.”

Ash’s seven-point prescription to save democracy

Ash’s remedy is both pragmatic and urgent:

1. “Tough on populism, tough on the causes of populism.” Address the genuine economic and cultural neglect that feeds populist resentment rather than dismissing it.

2. Strengthen all pluralist, anti-majoritarian institutions.”The independence of the courts, the civil service, auditors, obviously the different houses of parliament, and so on and so forth. These are the things that are coming under attack now, for example, in Trump’s America, and have been eroded in countries like Hungary.”

3. Learn from success. “Poland, two years ago, was very close to going down the Hungarian path, to state capture, to the demolition step-by-step of liberal democracy, and they came back. How? By winning an election that was not wholly free and fair. More people turned out to vote than ever before. More young people than old. More women than men voted in that election.”

4. Rebuild the media environment. “If you have public service media worthy of the name, hang on to them for dear life, strengthen their editorial independence, and quadruple the budget.” Ash credits the BBC with helping Britain avoid America’s fate: “You in Ukraine have Suspilne. Hang on to it for dear life. Strengthen its editorial independence. Quadruple the budget.”

5. Keep looking for what people have in common. “You’re going to have this problem in Ukraine in the next few years when the hot phase of the war is over… there’s a big danger of all the tensions and divisions in Ukrainian society coming to the surface. So keep looking for the things that keep people together.”

6. Don’t try to out-populist the populists. “It never works. We know that. If you adopt the rhetoric of the populists, if you do the dog whistle to the populists, voters will say, why should I vote for the dog whistle when I can have the real dog? It only strengthens the Marine Le Pens and the AFDs and the Nigel Farages.”

7. Don’t collaborate, even in very small ways. Drawing on Václav Havel’s wisdom: “Every dictatorship, every authoritarian regime isn’t just built on force. It’s built on these thousands and millions of tiny individual acts of collaboration. So don’t collaborate, even in the smallest way.”

The Ukrainian test case: when optimism meets reality

Ash’s confidence in democracy’s resilience faces its ultimate test in Ukraine. While he speaks of democracy’s long-term victory, Ukrainian survival depends on short-term Western commitment—commitment that’s eroding as anti-democratic populists gain power across the democratic world.

The very democratic backsliding Ash diagnoses is producing leaders hostile to Ukrainian aid. In Poland, despite historical solidarity, anti-Ukrainian sentiment is rising among voters frustrated with economic pressures, culminating in the victory of Karol Nawrocki, who has questioned Ukraine’s EU and NATO aspirations.

Slovakia’s Robert Fico has explicitly cut aid and adopted a Russia-friendly stance.

Romania’s Călin Georgescu, a pro-Putin candidate who praised Russian values and opposed NATO support for Ukraine, won the first round of presidential elections before the vote was annulled due to Russian interference. His political ally George Simion then ran in the 2025 rerun and lost by just 7% in May 2025—meaning pro-Putin forces came within single digits of controlling a NATO country bordering Ukraine.

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In the United States, Donald Trump promises “peace deals” that would reward Russian aggression by forcing Ukraine to cede territory.

Ukrainian soldiers die defending democratic ideals while voters in those same democracies choose leaders who would abandon Ukraine to Putin’s sphere of influence—exactly what happened to Georgia after its 2008 war with Russia.

The brutal mathematics are stark. Ukraine’s European integration depends on sustained Western support, but the rise of anti-democratic populists—fueled by the very ailments Ash identifies—is putting that support in jeopardy. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has already blocked EU aid packages. The Trump administration is raising suspicions of directly serving Putin’s interests. The recent Polish election of Nawrocki is sure to send shockwaves regarding supporting Ukraine through Europe.

If Ash is wrong about democracy’s resilience, if the current crisis represents not growing pains but terminal decline, Ukraine faces a choice starker than any since independence: submit to Russian domination or stand alone against an empire. No less than centuries of Ukraine’s national liberation struggle hang in the balance.

The historian’s gamble

Ash’s seven-point plan may be academically sound, and his historical perspective offers valuable long-term hope. But for Ukraine, the timeline of democratic recovery matters as much as its ultimate success. His prescription assumes democracies have the luxury of time to heal themselves—time Ukraine may not have as Western support wavers and Russian pressure intensifies.

The historian’s optimism about democracy’s eventual triumph rings hollow when Ukraine’s immediate survival depends on democracies that are currently failing his own diagnostic tests. While Ash speaks confidently about democracy being “on the winning team,” Ukrainian leaders must plan for the possibility that the team might forfeit the game before victory arrives.

For Ukraine, Timothy Garton Ash’s confidence isn’t just an academic question—it’s an existential gamble. If he’s right, Ukraine’s democratic aspirations will eventually be vindicated. If he’s wrong, they may not survive to see it.

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A policy document presented in Brussels on 26 May calls for the European Union to assume leadership of the international sanctions coalition and strengthen economic pressure on Russia.

Western countries imposed extensive sanctions on Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, aiming to cripple Russia’s economy, restrict access to finance and technology, and pressure Moscow to change its political behavior.

The “White Paper: The Future of European Leadership in the Economic Deterrence of Aggression” analyzes the achievements and vulnerabilities of EU sanctions policy while proposing practical tools to enhance the bloc’s economic security.

The document, prepared by the National Sanctions Coalition, outlines specific instruments for both responding to Russian aggression and countering future threats. Key recommendations include creating a unified EU sanctions body, implementing an analogue to the US entity list, strengthening control over high-risk goods exports, introducing extraterritorial (secondary) sanctions for circumvention assistance, and maintaining sanctions against Russia’s defense sector and critical infrastructure even after hostilities end.

“The sanctions instruments proposed in the White Paper are aimed at ending the Russian war in Ukraine as quickly as possible — by reducing Russia’s income and limiting its military-industrial potential,” said Denis Gutyk, executive director of the Council of Economic Security of Ukraine and co-author of the document.

According to the white paper, Russia has earned approximately €887 billion ($1,014.4 bn) from energy exports since February 2022, significantly exceeding the €211 billion ($241.4 bn) spent on its war effort during the same period. The document notes that from February 2022 to early 2025, the European Union spent more than €207 billion ($236.8 bn) on imports of Russian fossil fuels despite existing sanctions.

Tomáš Šindelář, Deputy Head of the Sanctions Unit at the European External Action Service (EEAS), supported the nitiative outlined in the White Paper. Using the example of countering Russia’s shadow fleet, he explained how EU sanctions instruments have already evolved.

“Initially, we focused exclusively on ships, but recent analysis showed that there is an entire ecosystem of operators around the shadow fleet — insurance companies, fleet managers, service providers,” Šindelář said. “And if these entities are also seriously affected by sanctions, this allows disrupting the operation of the entire mechanism while maintaining pressure on the fleet itself.”

The 17th sanctions package became the first where Europe applied such an approach, according to Šindelář. Europe more than doubled the number of vessels under sanctions and for the first time included in the restrictions not only the vessels themselves, but also related operators — not only in Russia, but also in third countries.

The white paper identifies several challenges facing EU sanctions policy, including limited extraterritorial application of restrictive measures, consensus requirements that slow decision-making, and heterogeneous enforcement approaches across member states. The document said that while the US has imposed 494 secondary sanctions targeting entities across 57 countries since the invasion began, the EU’s sanctions regime cannot yet be regarded as fully extraterritorial.

According to the document, approximately 70% of Russia’s oil exports are now transported via a “shadow fleet” of over 1,000 vessels, of which only 153 are currently subject to EU sanctions. The paper warns that more than 72% of these vessels are over 15 years old, increasing risks of mechanical failures, collisions, and oil spills that could cost coastal states up to €1.6 billion ($1.8 bn) in damages and cleanup efforts.

Russia uses a “shadow fleet” of vessels to evade sanctions by frequently changing ship names and flags, turning off AIS tracking, using complex ownership structures, and conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers at sea to obscure the origin of cargo.

The white paper also addresses the issue of frozen Russian assets. Approximately €210 billion ($239 bn) in Russian Central Bank assets have been frozen within the EU, with more than half held at Euroclear Bank. Despite substantial volumes of frozen assets, the document identifies legal challenges to confiscation, including the principle of sovereign immunity under international law.

Among specific recommendations, the document calls for adopting EU Council decisions to confiscate Russian sovereign assets and transfer them to support Ukraine.

Earlier, the Baltic states, Northern European countries, and Finland have openly called for the immediate confiscation of frozen Russian assets, with Finland’s finance minister Riikka Purra urging the EU to proceed with seizure.

France has also proposed seizing assets if Russia breaches a future ceasefire in Ukraine, while key EU officials like Valdis Dombrovskis and Maria Luís Albuquerque support the idea, though major states like Germany and France remain cautious about full confiscation.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Latvia — a small country of under 2 million people — has emerged as one of Ukraine’s most committed and proactive allies. Despite its size, Latvia considers supporting Ukraine a national priority, driven by its own history of Soviet occupation and the reality of having an aggressive Russia as a direct neighbor. For Latvia, Ukraine’s fight is not just about territorial defense — it’s about the future of European security and the rules-based international order.

As a NATO and EU member, Latvia has consistently provided Ukraine with military aid, humanitarian assistance, and political support, far surpassing expectations for a country of its size.

This commitment was formalized in April 2024, when Latvia became the first Baltic nation to sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine, reaffirming its role as a key strategic partner. This 10-year agreement outlines comprehensive support across multiple areas — from defense industry cooperation and military training to sanctions and energy infrastructure restoration.

In collaboration with the Dnistrianskyi Center, Euromaidan Press presents this English-language adaptation of Dariia Cherniavska’s analysis on Latvia’s role in Ukraine’s defense, recovery, and pursuit of justice.

Military aid: A small nation with big impact

Latvia’s military support is both substantial and strategic. Under the security agreement, Latvia committed to dedicating 0.25% of its GDP annually to military assistance for Ukraine from 2024 through 2026. In practice, it exceeded that pledge in 2024, delivering €170 million in military aid — well above its promised €112 million.

This aid included a mix of essential defense equipment:

• 42 Patria 6×6 armored personnel carriers, manufactured in Latvia
• 9 CVR(T) reconnaissance vehicles donated from British stock
• A batch of NBS air defense systems
• Participation in the Czech initiative with a €10 million contribution to purchase 3,000 artillery shells

But one of Latvia’s most impactful contributions is in the drone warfare domain. Together with the UK, Latvia co-launched the Drone Coalition in February 2024 — a multinational effort to scale Ukraine’s unmanned aerial capabilities. Latvia contributed €20 million to this initiative in its first year, delivering nearly 5,000 drones, with 12,000 more UAVs scheduled for delivery in the first half of 2025.

In a bold policy stance, Latvia authorized Ukraine to use all weapons provided — including drones — to strike inside Russian territory, reinforcing Ukraine’s right to defend itself fully.

Building defense industry ties

Latvia’s commitment doesn’t end with deliveries. It is also fostering long-term defense industry cooperation with Ukraine. At least €10 million of Latvia’s drone funding in 2024 was invested in Latvian companies producing UAVs specifically for Ukraine.

In 2025, that investment continues, and Latvia has pledged another €10 million for joint defense manufacturing projects. Two Latvian companies — unnamed for security reasons — are producing the 12,000 drones being delivered in early 2025.

Additionally, the Finnish company Patria opened a production facility in Latvia in 2024, which now builds the armored vehicles supplied to Ukraine. This move strengthens Latvia’s own defense sector while reinforcing Ukraine’s ground capabilities.

Training Ukrainian forces to NATO standards

Latvia has provided crucial training for Ukrainian soldiers, ensuring they meet NATO military standards. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, over 4,000 Ukrainian troops have undergone training in Latvia.

The programs have covered a wide range of specializations: snipers, sappers, engineers, commanding officers, and, more recently, UAV operators. Latvia began drone operator training in mid-2024 as part of its support to the Drone Coalition.

In 2025, Latvia plans to train an additional 4,000 soldiers and has joined efforts to form and train the Nordic-Baltic Brigade — a 3,000–5,000-strong Ukrainian formation supported by Latvia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, and Lithuania.

Latvia’s role in sanctions and legal accountability

As a member of the European Union, Latvia plays a vital role in implementing and advocating for sanctions against Russia and its enablers. Between April 2024 and April 2025, the EU announced three new sanctions packages — with Latvia consistently supporting stronger measures.

Latvia has also taken individual steps. In February 2024, it became the first EU country to ban agricultural imports from Russia and Belarus, setting a precedent later followed by others. Latvia also contested EU decisions to remove certain Russian individuals from the sanctions list and maintained national sanctions against those dropped at Hungary’s request.

Beyond sanctions, Latvia is deeply involved in international justice efforts. It is an active member of the Joint Investigation Team on Russian war crimes and has helped draft the legal framework for a special tribunal on aggression against Ukraine. In March 2025, Latvian courts sentenced a citizen to five years in prison for participating in the war on Russia’s side — a rare case of domestic enforcement.

Cybersecurity and non-military security support

Latvia’s support extends into the information and digital realm. In 2024, it joined the IT Coalition, helping to raise €482 million for Ukraine’s cyber defense and communications capabilities.

Through this partnership, Latvia provided:

• €100,000 worth of frontline communications equipment
• Over 1,000 computers and monitors to bolster cybersecurity in Ukrainian government institutions
• A bilateral cybersecurity memorandum, establishing protocols for cooperation and intelligence sharing

This kind of digital support is crucial as Ukraine faces increasingly complex cyber threats from Russian-linked actors.

Humanitarian aid and reconstruction: Focus on Chernihiv Oblast

Latvia has also made post-war recovery a core part of its Ukraine strategy, particularly in the Chernihiv region, where it has pledged €15 million for 2024–2026.

In 2024 alone, Latvian funding helped rebuild:

• The Talalayivka Lyceum, damaged by shelling
• The Chernihiv Regional Children’s Hospital
• Educational and preschool facilities in surrounding communities

Latvia also delivered medical equipment worth €345,000, including 36 ventilators, and helped supply Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Hospital after a missile attack.

Its support for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been equally significant. Latvia donated over 70 transformers, dozens of diesel generators, and even a 250 MVA high-voltage transformer formerly used at Riga’s hydroelectric power station.

During mass Russian attacks on Ukraine’s power grid in 2024, Latvia and 13 other countries sent 2,400 tons of emergency energy equipment, aiding 57 Ukrainian utility companies.

Demining: Clearing the path to recovery

Latvia plays an active role in humanitarian demining through the Demining Coalition, which raised over €50 million in 2024. The coalition provided Ukraine with armored vehicles, demining machines, mine detectors, and obstacle-clearing systems.

Latvia specifically contributed €270,000 to HALO Trust, supporting the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance in liberated and front-line territories.

The coalition announced a long-term commitment of €700 million through 2034, with €130 million allocated for 2025 — a critical investment in civilian safety and rebuilding efforts.

Macro-financial support and international programs

Latvia also participates in key international financial initiatives aimed at stabilizing Ukraine’s economy and institutions. It contributed to:

• The Ukraine Capacity Development Fund (UCDF), managed by the IMF, raising $36 million
• The World Bank’s URTF, which gathered $2 billion from donor countries for recovery and reform

Through the EU’s ERA program, Latvia supports Ukraine’s access to loans financed by frozen Russian assets. By April 2025, Ukraine had received €5 billion in three tranches, and a total of €35 billion is planned through the EU’s broader Ukraine Facility.

Latvia has also taken part in the Medevac medical evacuation program, treating 545 wounded Ukrainian soldiers in Latvian hospitals since 2022.

Conclusion: Latvia’s leadership in Ukraine’s fight and future

Latvia has emerged as one of Ukraine’s most consistent and impactful supporters. It has provided some of the highest levels of military aid per capita, led innovative efforts like the Drone Coalition, helped rebuild war-torn communities, and pushed for legal accountability for Russian aggression.

This support is part of a broader framework of long-term commitments. Latvia’s 10-year security agreement with Ukraine is one of 29 such agreements signed as of February 2025 — 27 with G7-aligned nations, one with the EU, and one with Croatia. These agreements stem from the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, adopted at the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023.

While they offer structure and stability, they remain a substitute for what Ukraine ultimately seeks: full NATO and EU membership, neither of which yet has a clear timeline.

Until then, Latvia — driven by its history, geography, and commitment to European security — continues to lead by example. Its sustained and strategic military aid to Ukraine places it among the most steadfast contributors.

Hungary and Slovakia continue to rely heavily on Russian oil, gas, and nuclear fuel, despite having technical and economic capacity to switch to alternative sources, according to a detailed joint report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD, Bulgaria) and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA, Finland). Both countries “have shown no real intention of phasing out Russian crude oil,” the report states. Similar conclusions are made regarding the Russian gas and nuclear projects.

The report, titled The Last Mile. Phasing Out Russian Oil and Gas in Central Europe, reveals that both countries have used EU sanctions exemptions not as a path to energy independence, but as a shield to deepen ties with Russian suppliers, significantly undermining EU unity and energy security strategy.

No real effort to reduce Russian dependency

The report presents a stark picture: Hungary and Slovakia have not reduced their imports of Russian oil and gas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. On the contrary, Hungary increased its Russian crude reliance from 61% in 2021 to 86% in 2024. Slovakia’s dependence remained at nearly 87% that same year. Combined, the two countries imported 8.7 million tonnes of Russian crude oil in 2024, which is 2% more than in 2021.

Since the beginning of the invasion, these imports have sent the Kremlin approximately €5.4 billion in tax revenue. As the report emphasizes, that amount could theoretically fund the production of 1,800 Iskander-M missiles—missiles used to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian areas.

Despite disruptions in the Druzhba pipeline in 2024 and multiple opportunities to diversify through the Adria pipeline, both Hungary and Slovakia continued to rely on Russian supply chains. Slovakia began marginal non-Russian crude imports in the latter half of 2024, while Hungary saw its non-Russian crude intake fall to nearly zero.

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MOL and the role of state-linked energy networks

The report highlights the central role of Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, which owns the only refineries in both Hungary and Slovakia. MOL’s strategic decisions on crude origin determine national energy sourcing. Although the Hungarian state does not directly own MOL, it controls over 30% of the company through government-aligned foundations, effectively shaping its energy policy.

MOL secured multiple contracts for non-Russian oil via the Adria pipeline—2.2 million tonnes in 2023 and 2.1 million tonnes in 2025—but actual delivery in 2023 was less than half that amount. Meanwhile, MOL continues to process discounted Russian crude, profiting from price gaps that are not passed on to consumers. In fact, gasoline and diesel prices in Hungary remained 5% above the EU average in 2024.

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This arrangement has allowed MOL’s operating income to rise significantly: to $26.4 billion in 2022 and around $25.3 billion in both 2023 and 2024. The company’s profits helped stabilize Hungary’s strained budget through a windfall tax—initially 25%, later raised to 95%. By 2024, the tax yielded only $15 million, compared to $521 million in 2022, as discounts narrowed and fiscal benefits declined.

Between 2022 and May 2024, Hungary and MOL earned an estimated €1.7 billion in “extra profit” from this setup, according to a Hungarian nonprofit G7 investigation cited in the report.

Exploiting legal loopholes and export exemptions

The report details how both Hungary and Slovakia used EU exemptions to re-export petroleum products made from Russian crude to Czechia. Originally set to expire in December 2023, this export exemption was extended twice—first to December 2024, then to June 2025—despite Czechia’s objection.

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In 2024, Slovakia exported 710,000 tonnes of petroleum products to Czechia, worth €520 million, while Hungary added another 39,000 tonnes worth €40 million. Slovnaft, MOL’s Slovak subsidiary, is identified as the primary beneficiary.

Gas dependency entrenched via TurkStream

Hungary has positioned itself as a regional hub for Russian gas, increasing imports via TurkStream and re-exporting to Slovakia. Hungary’s 15-year contract with Gazprom, signed in 2021, was expanded in 2024 with an additional 2 billion cubic meters per year.

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Slovakia, whose contract with Gazprom runs until 2034, has likewise expanded imports from Hungary, effectively bypassing Ukraine as a transit country. The report notes that this arrangement severely weakens the EU’s diversification efforts and severely weakens “the EU’s collective energy security strategy and reinforce long-term risks of political leverage by the Kremlin.”

Hidden networks, offshore intermediaries, and Kremlin ties

Central to the report is the exposure of intermediary networks, particularly Normeston Trading SA—a company tied to Soviet-era oil traders and Russian oil majors. Normeston, once based in Belize and later in Cyprus and Switzerland, acted as a shadow intermediary for Russian crude shipments to Hungary and Slovakia.

The company has long-standing ties to MOL executives and Russian oil firms, including Lukoil and Bashneft. The report alleges that Normeston facilitated massive markups on Russian oil imports by acting as a middleman, effectively skimming profits outside the scope of EU oversight.

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The nuclear dimension

Although Slovakia signed a fuel supply deal with US-based Westinghouse, and Hungary with France’s Framatome, both continue to receive large volumes from Rosatom. The Paks II nuclear project in Hungary, led by Rosatom and financed 80% through a Russian loan, is flagged as a long-term strategic risk that locks Hungary into Russian influence for decades.

The report points out that the key contract details for Paks II are classified, and oversight is minimal. It describes the entire project as lacking transparency, with regulatory bypasses and rising costs now estimated at €15 billion—about 12% of Hungary’s GDP.

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Infrastructure and alternatives: No technical barriers

Tests confirm both MOL refineries can process non-Russian crude. In 2019, during a Druzhba contamination crisis, Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil temporarily dropped to 48% as it switched to Adria-supplied crude.

Similarly, alternatives to Russian gas exist through expanded LNG infrastructure in Greece, Croatia, and Poland, and new interconnectors with Austria, Romania, and Poland. The report insists that technical constraints do not justify continued Russian dependency.

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Recommendations: End exemptions, enforce traceability, dismantle capture networks

The report urges the EU to:

• Terminate the crude oil import exemptions under Regulation 833/2014 by 30 June 2025.
• End the loophole allowing oil product exports derived from Russian crude.
• Audit and enforce transparent pricing in the Adria pipeline to dispel Hungary’s cost-related claims.
• Impose full traceability of oil and gas origin.
• Sanction Rosatom and all subsidiaries to reduce nuclear dependence.
• Investigate MOL’s role in prolonging dependency through the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

It concludes that continued exemptions and reliance on Russian energy sources serve no technical or economic rationale and must be ended to protect European energy security, reduce Kremlin revenues, and restore EU sanctions integrity.

[L'article Les ministres des finances du G7 affichent leur unité  a d'abord été publié dans InfoBref.]