Ukrainians and supporters will form human chains in cities abroad at 19:00 (7 p.m.) on 24 August 2026 to mark Independence Day, Ukraine’s Mission to the European Union announced on 20 August.

Russia’s invasion has driven more than 5.6 million Ukrainians to seek refugee or other international protection abroad, according to the UN Refugee Agency. The human chains will help displaced Ukrainians and established diaspora communities show that Ukraine still needs their host countries’ support, the organizers say. Participants follow in the footsteps of Ukrainians in the Soviet era who formed human chains to demonstrate their desire for independence.

The 2026 Chain of Unity campaign website listed 55,600 participants on 22 August. Ukrainians and their supporters will gather on central streets and squares in Warsaw, London, Berlin, Rome, Toronto, New York, and other cities, where they will hold hands in local chains.

An interactive map allows people to find, join, or organize a local chain. Ukraine’s Cultural and Foreign Ministries support the action, which is being held only outside the country.

Ukrainians abroad will use Independence Day in other ways to draw attention to Ukraine’s wartime needs. Ukrainian community groups have organized rallies in 11 cities across 10 countries, calling on European governments to use Russian central bank reserves frozen under sanctions to fund Ukraine.

Why human chains still matter to Ukraine

Human chains became a powerful symbol of Ukrainian unity as Soviet rule weakened and the independence movement moved into the open.

On 21 January 1990, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians formed the nearly 700-kilometer “Ukrainian Wave” from Ivano-Frankivsk through Lviv to Kyiv. It became late-Soviet Ukraine’s largest public demonstration and helped build momentum for independence the following year.

The pro-independence People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) spent five months organizing the chain. When gaps appeared, organizers bused volunteers from Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk to fill them, while participants supplied their own fuel.

The 1990 chain marked the anniversary of the 1919 union of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, two Ukrainian states that emerged after World War I. By joining hands across regions while their country remained part of the Soviet Union, participants showed broad support for restoring Ukraine's sovereignty and unity.

After 1991, Ukrainians kept the tradition on Unity Day, the 22 January holiday marking that union. They often joined hands across Dnipro bridges to symbolize east-west unity. This year’s action takes the gesture abroad: refugees, established Ukrainian communities, and supporters are using it to show they remain part of one nation.

Ukrainian FP-1 drones struck an Ozon warehouse in Chapayevsk, Russia’s Samara Oblast, overnight on 22 August 2026, manufacturer Fire Point said.

The attack on the Chapayevsk facility expands Ukraine’s warehouse campaign from Wildberries, Russia’s largest online marketplace, to its second-largest rival, Ozon. Ukraine has repeatedly targeted Russia's major e-commerce distribution hubs to disrupt commercial logistics that Kyiv says help sustain Moscow’s war.

Ozon said the attack injured people and prompted the evacuation of more than 500 employees.

The strike was the first confirmed Ukrainian attack to damage and set fire to an Ozon warehouse, Reuters reported. A drone alert forced Ozon to evacuate a facility in Tatarstan on 31 July, but the building was undamaged and later reopened.

Fire Point said the facility is one of Ozon’s largest warehouses in Volga Oblast, storing goods and processing more than 215,000 orders for delivery each day.

Ozon and Wildberries—Russia’s two largest online marketplaces—and their smaller rivals collectively sell goods and services worth the equivalent of 8.5% of Russia’s GDP and employ 4 million people, Reuters reported in July.

Ozon suspended operations indefinitely and stopped accepting seller deliveries, the company said. As a result, shipments are being redirected to other facilities, while affected orders will either be fulfilled elsewhere or canceled and refunded.

Several people were receiving medical treatment, Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed. Neither he nor Ozon specified how many people were injured, and the extent of the damage remains unclear.

Ukraine’s previous strikes on Russian warehouses

Ukrainian drones had previously concentrated on Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer. Since 18 July, Ukraine has struck at least two dozen Wildberries warehouses, Reuters reported.

Ukrainian officials have alleged that Wildberries warehouses move military-linked goods, including drone components. The Kremlin has denied that the company supplies Russian forces. Fire Point made no corresponding claim about the Ozon warehouse.

Ukraine’s military said the same overnight wave also hit the Novokuibyshevsk refinery in Samara Oblast and caused a fire.

Russian and occupation officials claimed that the broader wave caused civilian deaths and injuries in Yeysk, Belgorod, Bryansk, and Russian-occupied Luhansk.

Ukrainian forces struck production facilities at the Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery in Russia’s Samara Oblast overnight on 22 August, sparking a fire at the Rosneft-owned plant, Ukraine’s General Staff said. The extent of the damage remains under assessment.

Ukraine has repeatedly targeted Russia’s oil refineries to restrict military fuel supplies and reduce the energy revenues supporting Moscow’s war. The latest strike came as gasoline rationing returned to Moscow and St. Petersburg, and Rosneft capped nationwide purchases. Militarnyi described the plant as one of Russia’s 10 largest refineries.

The Rosneft-owned refinery can process about 8.8 million metric tons of crude annually and produces more than 20 petroleum products, including aviation fuel and diesel, Ukraine’s General Staff said.

Fire Point said FP-1 long-range drones were used to strike the refinery.

The same overnight wave also hit an Ozon logistics center in Chapayevsk, where people were injured, and work was halted, Reuters reported, citing the company.

Neither the damage to the refinery nor any interruption to production has been independently confirmed.

Ukraine keeps pressure on Russian fuel supplies

The strike came one day after Ukraine confirmed hitting Lukoil’s Perm refinery, approximately 1,530 kilometers from Ukraine’s northern border. That attack also caused a fire, according to the General Staff.

At least four Russian refineries went offline during August amid continuing Ukrainian attacks.

By mid-August, filling stations in at least 12 Russian regions were experiencing hours-long lines. Some areas had reintroduced purchase limits or rationing based on license-plate numbers, according to the same report.

Gasoline limits had also been reinstated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, while Rosneft had capped sales at 30 liters per vehicle across its nationwide filling-station network. Diesel purchases remained unrestricted.

Russia is deploying six launchers for North Korean ballistic missiles in Voronezh Oblast, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported on 20 August. The assessment cited Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR).

Russia has already used North Korean missiles in deadly strikes across Ukraine, and Pyongyang is supplying more of them. From Voronezh Oblast, the weapons could threaten Kyiv and six other regions, adding to the ballistic arsenal Moscow can use in mass attacks intended to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.

Six launchers expand Russia’s missile threat

The North Korean missiles could reach Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, ISW said.

The unit may eventually field 120 missiles. HUR said North Korea had transferred around 50 KN-23, KN-24, and upgraded KN-30 ballistic missiles to Russia by July.

The KN-30 can carry a 2,500-kilogram warhead, though ISW has seen no evidence of Russia using it against Ukraine. Other North Korean missiles have larger warheads than Russia’s Iskander-M but are less accurate, Ukrainian military expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi said.

Those missiles could join Russia’s combined attacks. ISW expects Moscow to stockpile ballistic and cruise missiles for several days before launching large barrages intended to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses.

ISW pointed to the 19–20 August attack as the latest example of that pattern. The barrage lasted nearly nine hours and killed at least 15 people in Kyiv. Ukraine’s Air Force said it intercepted most drones and cruise missiles, but no longer routinely reports how many ballistic missiles Russia launches or Ukraine intercepts.

North Korean missiles have already killed civilians

Preliminary evidence indicated that Russia used a North Korean ballistic missile in a 30 July strike on Radushne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, that killed five members of one family.

On 10 August, a North Korean missile killed seven Zaporizhstal steelworkers and injured 21 others in Zaporizhzhia, Ukrainian officials said. The workers were heading to a shelter when the missile struck.

Ballistic missiles travel at high speed and leave civilians little time to seek cover. They are also harder to intercept than drones or cruise missiles, while Ukraine has limited supplies of the Patriot interceptors used against them.

Logistical problems are stopping Russian small infantry groups from reaching Lyman, a 53rd Brigade officer told Army TV on 21 August, ArmyInform reported.

Russia is trying to capture Lyman and use it as a launchpad for an advance toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Its forces have repeatedly tried to push into the city. They have reached its eastern edge but have not secured a foothold inside, according to Ukraine’s Joint Forces.

Junior Lieutenant Volodymyr Hirniak, a communications officer with Ukraine’s 53rd Separate Mechanized Brigade, said the situation in the unit’s sector remained tense but had “not changed too radically.”

Russian forces continued to use drones, including fiber-optic models, Hirniak said. On the ground, they were sending small infantry groups to slip through Ukrainian lines and create confusion inside the brigade’s defensive positions.

The tactic was neither new nor confined to the 53rd Brigade’s sector, he added. Russia’s immediate aim was to reach Lyman and “open a gate” for further advances.

However, logistical problems were preventing the groups from achieving that aim, according to Hirniak. Ukrainian troops later detected and neutralized the infiltrating teams, he said.

ArmyInform did not report how many groups had attempted to advance, where within the brigade’s sector the incidents occurred, or over what period. Hirniak’s account could not be independently verified.

Why Russia keeps pushing toward Lyman

Lyman is a frontline city in northern Donetsk Oblast that blocks Russia’s northern route toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, part of Ukraine’s fortified Donbas “fortress belt.” Russia occupied the city for about four months in 2022 before Ukrainian forces liberated it on 1 October.

Joint Forces spokesman Viktor Trehubov said on 4 August that Russia needed to capture Lyman and establish a base there before advancing south toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Russia has pressed towards Lyman for more than a year. In July 2025, another Ukrainian officer said Russian gains near the city remained slow and costly despite repeated attempts to exploit gaps in Ukrainian lines.

Ukrainian defense manufacturer Fire Point has delayed its Danish missile-fuel plant until late 2027 after the original building failed to meet safety requirements, pushing the estimated cost above €150 million, Euractiv reported on 19 August.

The plant will produce solid rocket propellant for Fire Point’s Flamingo cruise missiles. Denmark was the first NATO country to permit Ukrainian military production on its territory, the German outlet BILD reported. The site is intended to move some production away from Russian attacks in Ukraine, but the delay postpones that capacity by a year.

Fire Point is building the plant in Vojens, near Skrydstrup Air Base in southern Denmark, Euromaidan Press reported.

Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh announced the revised plan at DALO Industry Days, a defense-industry conference in Herning. She said Fire Point had originally expected the project to cost €50 million and called the new estimate “very rough.”

Denmark had already removed more than 20 legal barriers to speed up the project, Euractiv reported. Terekh said other European countries also remained interested in hosting Fire Point production.

What is Fire Point

Fire Point currently makes missiles and drones at 90 locations across Ukraine, Terekh told Euractiv in July.

The company supplies more than half of Ukraine’s deep-strike weapons—arms used to hit targets far behind the front line—and says it produces 300 drones daily, in a July 2026 interview with Liga.

In August 2025, Fire Point was producing 100 FP-1 long-range attack drones each day, according to the Associated Press. Its later figure includes FP-1 and FP-2 drones.

Denmark directly funds Ukrainian arms makers

Denmark has created the “Danish model” of aid, which uses allied money to buy weapons directly from Ukrainian manufacturers instead of taking equipment from donor stockpiles.

About $200 million of the €590 million military aid package announced in June was directed through the mechanism, Euromaidan Press reported. Denmark has committed about $11.7 billion in military support to Ukraine from 2022 through 2028, according to its Defense Ministry.

Ukrainian prosecutors have formally accused a captured Russian marine of executing a Ukrainian unit commander near Pokrovsk, the Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office said on 20 August. Investigators allege he took the 34-year-old captive to a forest belt after an interrogation and shot him in the back of the head on his superior’s order.

The case comes as Ukraine steps up efforts to prosecute Russian troops accused of executing or abusing Ukrainian POWs. Ukrainian investigators and UN monitors have documented a growing pattern since 2024 of Russian forces executing Ukrainian troops after capture.

The alleged gunman is now in Ukrainian custody, opening the way for an in-person trial. Russian troops also shot dead a second Ukrainian prisoner, prosecutors said.

Russian assault units had been trying to seize Shakhove on the Pokrovsk front since May 2025, according to the prosecutor’s office. On 10 October 2025, a small Russian infantry group entered the village’s outskirts and captured two Ukrainian service members, including the commander, the office alleges.

After the interrogation, the suspect took the commander to a forest belt and killed him with an automatic rifle, prosecutors said. The other Ukrainian prisoner was also shot dead. The statement names neither victim.

Investigators identified the suspect as a 34-year-old native of Russia’s Krasnoyarsk Krai who used the call sign “Tai” and served as a rifleman in the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade.

Ukrainian forces later captured him during fighting in the same sector, according to prosecutors. The office did not say when he was taken prisoner.

Prosecutors formally accused him of cruel treatment of prisoners of war resulting in death, a war crime under Ukrainian law.

Ukraine’s other cases against captured Russian soldiers

Ukraine has previously brought cases against other captured Russian soldiers over POW executions. A Zaporizhzhia court sentenced Dmitry Kurashov to life imprisonment in November 2025—the first time Ukraine convicted a Russian soldier of executing a surrendered Ukrainian POW.

In a separate case, the Security Service of Ukraine charged Sergey Tuzhilov over the execution of one bound Ukrainian POW and his alleged role in killing two others near Vovchansk in June 2024.

Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya denied reports that Moscow could launch another mass mobilization after September’s parliamentary elections, saying none was planned or expected “as far as I know,” The Moscow Times reported

Russia has avoided another draft since its 2022 mobilization triggered protests and an exodus, relying instead on contract soldiers. Ukraine says those recruits no longer replace battlefield losses, and Moscow may mobilize several hundred thousand people after the elections. That could replenish its forces and support new offensives, although Ukrainian intelligence sees no preparations now.

Nebenzya’s remarks followed a question about more than 20,000 people crossing Russia’s Verkhny Lars border checkpoint into Georgia in one day amid fears of post-election mobilization, Meduza reported.

His comments extend a series of Russian denials. Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev dismissed reports of another mobilization as “nonsense” in late July. The State Duma’s defense committee said a mass compulsory call-up was not under consideration because the army was recruiting contract soldiers, The Moscow Times reported.

Russia has avoided another mass draft since its September 2022 mobilization triggered protests and an exodus. Officials had also denied that mobilization was planned shortly before President Vladimir Putin announced it, Meduza noted.

Russian government seeks new wartime penalties

Moscow is separately seeking penalties for people and companies that ignore mobilization and military-supply orders issued by regional authorities. The bill would not itself order a new call-up.

The government submitted it to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, on 20 August, The Moscow Times reported. Companies could face fines of up to 1 million rubles or suspension for up to 90 days.

Russian law already punishes such defiance in areas under martial law but imposes no nationwide penalty elsewhere in Russia, according to the bill. Its authors said a “significant number” of violations had been recorded.

Ukraine says a new draft could provide troops for a northern offensive

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 August, citing Ukrainian military intelligence, that Russia planned to mobilize several hundred thousand people after the elections and roughly the same number in 2027.

HUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, later assessed that a post-election mobilization could enable Russia to build a strike force for a northern offensive by February 2027. Its deputy chief, Vadym Skibitskyi, stressed, however, that the agency currently sees no evidence that such preparations have begun.

Latvia has resumed publishing monthly lists of locally registered companies trading goods with Russia or Belarus after a nearly three-year pause, public broadcaster LSM reported on 20 August 2026.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs has pledged to sever its remaining economic ties with Russia and Belarus, but substantial trade remains legal because EU sanctions are not a full embargo. The monthly register makes that commerce visible by identifying the companies involved.

The Central Statistical Bureau, Latvia's national statistics agency, published the names of 171 companies for July. A subsequent analysis by Latvian news agency LETA found that more than two-thirds operated in logistics, food and agriculture, or medicine.

The disclosure is, in effect, a form of naming and shaming. Yet the statistics bureau stopped publishing a similar list in autumn 2023 because names without transaction details could not support objective conclusions. The register is not a sanctions blacklist, and inclusion does not indicate a sanctions violation.

Under an amendment adopted on 18 June 2026, Latvia’s tax authority must send the data to the statistics bureau each month. The change also lifted tax-confidentiality rules that had kept company names private, LSM reported.

The explanatory note accompanying the law said disclosure was intended to support Ukraine. The amendment's authors argued that Latvian companies should not contribute to Russian and Belarusian state revenues while Russia’s invasion continues, according to LSM.

Latvia seeks to cut its remaining trade

The Prime Minister said in June that Latvia must sever its remaining economic ties with Russia and Belarus. However, he indicated that pharmaceutical exporters would likely be exempted on national-security grounds.

Latvia’s exports to Russia and Belarus each fell only about 7% in 2025, while imports from Russia plunged by more than two-thirds, according to official data cited by Euromaidan Press.

EU sanctions do not prohibit all trade

The EU renewed its economic sanctions on Russia through July 2027, preserving restrictions on trade, finance, and energy, as well as on goods and technology with both civilian and military uses, Euromaidan Press reported in June.

The Council of the EU says its trade restrictions exclude health, pharmaceutical, food, and agricultural products to avoid harming Russian civilians. Those exclusions allow EU companies to continue lawful trade with Russia even while other parts of its economy remain under sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy allowed preparations for an AI-guided drone campaign against Moscow-area airports, The Atlantic reported on 20 August, citing two anonymous sources with direct knowledge of the proposal.

The reported plan sought to keep civilian flights grounded long enough to pressure Russia’s elite. Had it proceeded, it would have moved Ukraine toward large-scale autonomous strikes, raising questions under the laws of war about attacks without human confirmation. The Atlantic's disclosure follows months of reported Ukrainian attacks that repeatedly forced Moscow-area airport closures and sent increasingly large drone swarms toward the capital.

How the drone operation would have worked

Code-named M&Ms, the operation called for as many as 1,000 drones to fly toward Moscow-area airports each night and overwhelm Russian air defenses, one source said.

Onboard cameras would compare live views with preloaded maps and target images. They would also allow the drones to strike without pilot confirmation and to navigate without a remote-control link that is vulnerable to Russian electronic jamming, the sources said.

One source said prolonged airport closures were intended to pressure Kremlin-linked elites and push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations.

The plan was presented to Zelenskyy during the winter of 2025–26, The Atlantic reported. Preparations stopped after Zelenskyy dismissed Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, whom The Atlantic described as the operation’s mastermind, in July, both sources said. One source said another team could revive the project within about three months.

Both sources said Zelenskyy allowed preparations despite concerns that a drone could hit a civilian airliner. Planners proposed warning airlines, according to one source.

A Zelenskyy spokesperson declined to comment. Another unnamed presidential office official called the report “total nonsense,” saying Ukraine lacked long-range weapons reliable enough to strike the airports without posing undue risks to civilians.

Previous Ukrainian strikes on Moscow

The alleged M&Ms operation never launched, but other reported Ukrainian drone attacks repeatedly disrupted Moscow’s airports.

From 5 to 7 May 2026, restrictions imposed amid reported Ukrainian drone attacks delayed more than 450 flights at Moscow airports. Limits at Vnukovo remained in place for nearly 18 hours, EP reported, citing the independent Russian investigative outlet Agentstvo.

Earlier this week, Russian authorities claimed that 620 drones flew toward Moscow in one night, EP reported. The Atlantic placed Russia’s nationwide interception claim for that night at 791 drones. Ukraine’s military did not claim the attack.

Ravil Dzhamally fled when Russian forces occupied his farm in Kherson Oblast, then returned after liberation to clear mines and plant again. Now, tons of his grain lie unsold in plastic sleeves across his fields because Russian attacks have nearly halted exports through Odesa, Bloomberg reported on 20 August.

Odesa’s Black Sea ports handle almost all of Ukraine’s grain exports, Bloomberg reported. Weekly grain and oilseed exports have fallen by more than 90% since early July, data from commodity-data firm Kpler show. That threatens fall planting and the sector that generates more than half of Ukraine’s export revenue. The disruption is also raising food costs in countries that rely on imported grain, Reuters reported.

Farmers must either store harvests they cannot export or sell locally at about one-third of global prices, Bloomberg reported. They say this year’s crisis is worse than the 2022 blockade because the financial reserves that carried them through six months of disruption then have since been depleted.

Russian attacks drive ships from Ukraine’s grain corridor

Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor—the wartime shipping route from Odesa—was never formally closed, Euromaidan Press reported. Four or five ships entered Ukraine’s ports on 21 July. Still, none arrived the next day because shipowners had paused calls, not because Ukraine had restricted navigation, Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotskyi told Ukrainian agricultural outlet Latifundist.

Ukraine’s state railway, Ukrzaliznytsia, subsequently restricted selected wheat and barley shipments to Odesa ports. Its register did not state a reason, and the railway did not publicly link the orders to the shipping disruption.

Oleksandr Havryliuk, who farms near the front in Kharkiv Oblast, told Bloomberg that losing his harvest would probably bankrupt him and force him to sell the farm. The National Bank of Ukraine estimates that Ukraine could lose about $2.5 billion in export revenue during the second half of 2026, Reuters reported. Bloomberg said the disruption could trigger widespread farm bankruptcies.

Ukraine seeks EU aid and export routes as losses mount

Financing was already constrained before the port crisis: available financing and insurance were “enough to keep the sector surviving, not enough to keep it growing,” Vysotskyi told Euromaidan Press in May.

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, agriculture accounted for more than 10% of Ukraine’s economic output, according to World Bank data cited by Bloomberg.

The sector has since grown more important as Russian attacks have destroyed much of the country’s heavy industry, Evghenia Sleptsova, a senior economist at the economic forecasting firm Oxford Economics, told Bloomberg.

Her firm estimates that the disruption could cost the equivalent of 1.8% of GDP this year and 2.1% in 2027. Under a prolonged severe disruption, the 2027 loss could instead reach 5.3%, Oxford Economics said.

Ukraine could exhaust its grain-storage capacity by early November if exports do not recover, the Agriculture Ministry said, according to Bloomberg. Even using every available route, the country may export only about 30 million tons this season, leaving roughly the same volume stored or rotting, Vysotskyi said.

Ukraine’s Agriculture Ministry requested a €220 million EU grant to subsidize interest and unlock up to €4 billion in loans, the ministry said.

Ukraine and Moldova are also discussing a rail route through Moldova to Romania’s port of Constanța, Reuters reported, citing unnamed sources in both countries. Kyiv estimates the route could carry about 10% of its grain exports.

Western rail corridors have limited capacity, while low water levels restrict traffic through Danube ports. Both alternatives cost more than shipping through the Black Sea, Bloomberg reported.

Poland has held up a Ukrainian search at Łasków for months, Ambassador Vasyl Bodnar told Polish broadcaster RMF24, NV reported on 19 August. He says the eastern Polish village may contain the remains of civilians killed there by Polish underground forces in 1944.

The permit dispute is part of a much larger argument over how Ukraine and Poland remember the wartime killings of Poles and Ukrainians. Reciprocal searches resumed only recently after years of deadlock, giving both countries a way to recover and identify victims even as they disagree over historical responsibility. The latest delay tests that fragile progress while Poland remains Ukraine’s main route for Western arms and aid.

Bodnar says Ukrainian civilians were killed at Łasków in 1944 by the Home Army—Poland’s principal underground resistance force during the Nazi occupation—and the Peasant Battalions, an agrarian underground movement.

Bodnar appealed to Poland to issue "at least one permit" for searches on its territory. He said Ukraine systematically approves Polish requests in return. The ambassador blamed the holdup on unspecified “bureaucratic restrictions” and urged Warsaw not to leave the impression that Kyiv was obstructing the work.

In July, Bodnar said Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance had supported the Łasków application procedurally and that only approval from the regional monuments conservator remained. He expected work to start in August.

The institute said it had assisted with Łasków but was awaiting more documents for Ukraine’s separate applications concerning Sahryń and Przemyśl.

Past Polish-Ukrainian exhumations

Reciprocal work between Ukraine and Poland resumed only after Kyiv lifted a moratorium imposed in 2017. Ukraine had halted Polish exhumations in response to the destruction of Ukrainian memorial sites on Polish soil.

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Ukraine will keep issuing Polish exhumation permits despite historical tensions. Dispute “causes joy in Moscow,” Kyiv says

A joint team exhumed the remains of 42 Polish victims of massacres by Ukrainian nationalists at Puzhnyky in western Ukraine in May 2025. Ukrainian researchers later searched for a suspected grave of up to 18 Ukrainian Insurgent Army fighters at Jureczkowa, Poland, but found none.

Ukraine granted further permits for Polish searches in 2026. Joint work at Uhly in Rivne Oblast found no mass grave, while exhumations began at Ostrivky and Volia Ostrovetska in July.

Historical grievances strain wartime alliance

The searches are the practical core of a broader dispute over wartime killings of Poles and Ukrainians. Competing interpretations of the Volyn tragedy and battles over Ukrainian Insurgent Army symbols have increasingly spilled into Polish politics and the streets.

Kyiv says it continues approving Polish grave searches while its own researchers wait to begin work in Poland.

Now held in a POW camp in western Ukraine, Anton does not consider himself a traitor. He calls Putin “my President” and said he joined Russia’s army to defend “my land,” the BBC reported.

The BBC interviews show what more than a decade of Russian rule has produced in occupied Donbas. Moscow has replaced Ukrainian schools, media, and public institutions while presenting the occupied regions as permanent parts of Russia. It also recruits residents or forces them to fight against Ukraine.

The BBC said prisoners could refuse and were interviewed without guards or cameras.

Almost all its Ukrainian-born interviewees from territories occupied since 2014 said they had enlisted willingly. Anton said he was not a traitor and called Vladimir Putin “my President.”

His friends also volunteered. Messages announcing their deaths followed: “Dead, dead, dead.”

Forced conscription of Ukrainians in occupied territory

One prisoner from Donetsk Oblast told the BBC he had been forced to fight. He wanted only to return to his wife and children.

The BBC cited an official intelligence-based estimate that Russia forcibly conscripted more than 50,000 Ukrainians in occupied areas. It noted that other estimates were higher.

Ukrainian veteran Pavlo Pshenychnyi told Hromadske that occupation authorities used planted drug evidence to push him into Russia’s army. They threatened him with up to 12 years in prison.

Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits occupying powers from compelling protected residents to serve in their armed forces.

Anton and the Russification of occupied Ukrainian territory

Russia took control of Anton’s home while he was still in primary school. By adulthood, he called himself Russian and dismissed his Ukrainian surname as irrelevant.

Putin’s 2025 policy decree set a 95% target for “all-Russian civic identity” by 2036 and ordered the integration of occupied Ukrainian regions into Russian education, culture, and media.

Kherson-based outlet MOST reported that Russia will introduce compulsory textbooks on 1 September, presenting four occupied Ukrainian regions as historically Russian.

Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation reported in 2025 that more than 100 teenagers from occupied Luhansk attended a Russian military camp. They received firearms, drill, and guard-duty training.

The center described the camp as part of a wider effort to spread Russian war propaganda and hostility toward Ukraine.

Petro Yatsenko of Ukraine’s POW Coordination Headquarters told the BBC that these prisoners were strongly pro-Russian. He said their national identity was “very blurred.”

Ukraine still considers them Ukrainian and treats Russia’s control of their home regions as temporary, the BBC noted.

Hungary has closed the Oschadbank case after finding no crime connected to an $82 million shipment of cash and gold belonging to Ukraine’s state-owned savings bank, The Insider reported on 20 August 2026, citing the bank’s lawyer Lóránt Horváth.

Closing the money-laundering case removes the allegation used to justify seizing Oschadbank’s assets. A separate criminal investigation is examining the couriers’ detention, while Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government has opened an internal review of the agencies involved. Together with the return of the assets, these steps reverse how this case was handled under former PM Viktor Orbán and may help improve relations with Ukraine.

Hungary’s National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV), the country’s tax and customs authority, traced the assets to a documented deal between Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Oschadbank. Raiffeisen provided records establishing the assets’ origin and Oschadbank’s payment, according to Horváth’s account of NAV’s decision.

Meanwhile, a separate investigation into the couriers’ alleged unlawful detention remains open. János Hajdu, the former head of Hungary’s Counter-Terrorism Center (TEK), is a suspect. TEK is the country’s armed counterterrorism police.

A leaked prosecution document named former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and three other former officials, including Hajdu, among those involved in deciding on the operation. Orbán has not been named as a suspect, Euronews reported on 30 June.

Orbán denies wrongdoing and says the raid was lawful.

How the Oschadbank case began

TEK stopped two armored cash-in-transit vans near Budapest on 5 March 2026. They carried $40 million, €35 million, and nine kilograms of gold from Vienna to Kyiv under a routine banking contract, Euromaidan Press reported. Officers detained the seven Oschadbank employees as witnesses, kept them handcuffed for 28 hours, and denied them lawyers and Ukrainian consular access, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry said.

Hungary deported the couriers and imposed three-year Schengen bans, which barred them from most of Europe, although none had been charged with a crime. The orders and bans were later annulled.

Orbán’s government nevertheless portrayed the shipment as possible money laundering. Fidesz politicians also alleged, without evidence, that it was intended to finance Magyar’s then-opposition party, Tisza.

Hungary returned the vans, cash, and gold by 6 May. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called the handover a break with Orbán-era “lawlessness” and a sign that relations could advance through “mutual respect and healthy pragmatism,” Reuters reported.

Croatian police arrested a Ukrainian diver in Pula on 19 August 2026 over his alleged role in the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline explosions, Croatian broadcaster HRT reported. German prosecutors confirmed to AP that the suspect was Volodymyr Zhuravlov (Zhuravliov in Ukrainian official transliteration). Legal Tribune Online reported that he was detained on the set of Zmiinyi (Snake) Island.

The arrest gives German prosecutors a third chance to secure Zhuravliov after two attempts in Poland failed. If Croatia extradites him, he would become the second suspected member of the alleged team to face proceedings in Germany. Berlin has pursued other suspects in the Nord Stream case across Europe, but the identity of the person who ordered the sabotage remains unknown.

Previous arrests and arrest attempts

Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office said Zhuravliov was a trained scuba diver who took part in the dives needed to place explosives on Nord Stream 1 and 2 near Denmark’s Bornholm island. Prosecutors say the group sailed from Rostock aboard a yacht that middlemen rented from a German company using forged identity documents.

The 2024 European arrest warrant accuses Zhuravliov of jointly causing an explosion, anti-constitutional sabotage, and destroying structures. He would appear before an investigating judge at Germany’s Federal Court of Justice following extradition, prosecutors said. A Croatian court must first approve his surrender.

LTO reported that investigators first sought Zhuravliov’s arrest in Poland in the summer of 2024, but he crossed into Ukraine before police detained him. Polish police arrested him near Warsaw in autumn 2025. However, a court rejected Germany’s extradition request after finding that the pipelines could be treated as a legitimate military target during an armed conflict. Zhuravliov has denied involvement.

His lawyer, Tymoteusz Paprocki, told AP that Zhuravliov understood the Polish ruling applied only within Poland.

Another Ukrainian suspect, Serhii K., was arrested near Rimini in August 2025 and extradited to Germany that November after unsuccessful appeals. Prosecutors allege he coordinated the operation rather than joining the dives. They charged him in Hamburg in June 2026.

What was Nord Stream?

Nord Stream 1 and 2 ran beneath the Baltic Sea, carrying—or designed to carry—Russian gas directly to Germany while bypassing Ukraine. Explosions on 26 September 2022 damaged three of their four lines at a depth of about 80 meters.

No court has established who ordered the attack. Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office says no facts demonstrate Ukrainian state involvement and is examining whether Russia staged a false-flag operation using Ukrainians. LTO reported that Germany’s Federal Court of Justice found strong grounds in December 2025 to believe that a state had initiated and directed the sabotage, but did not identify which state.

Gasoline prices have risen roughly 10–13% in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as Russia restricts exports after Ukrainian strikes on its refineries, Kazakh economist Aidar Alibayev estimated in a 20 August interview with Current Time. He did not specify the comparison period.

Earlier Ukrainian attacks disrupted Kazakhstan’s crude exports through Russia’s Black Sea ports. Strikes at refineries are creating a different kind of squeeze: Russia has less gasoline available to dependent neighbors. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are seeking other suppliers, while Kazakhstan could face growing pressure if the shortages persist.

Tajikistan has been hit hardest because it depends heavily on Russian fuel and has the region’s most difficult delivery routes, Alibayev said. He estimated gasoline prices there had risen 12–13%. Current Time reported that Tajikistan is exploring supplies from China; Alibayev said it was also turning to Iran.

Kyrgyzstan, which sources more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia, asked its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, as well as other countries, for help. Current Time reported that a deputy prime minister said its reserves would last about six weeks. Alibayev estimated prices had climbed around 10%, compared with 11–11.5% in Uzbekistan, which he estimated gets half its fuel from Russia.

In Uzbekistan, Alibayev estimated that fuel prices had risen by about 11% and said the country gets about half of its fuel from Russia.

Russia extended its gasoline and diesel export restrictions through 31 January 2027 as shortages mounted. Intergovernmental and humanitarian shipments remain exempt, while diesel producers regain some export rights from 1 September. Current Time also reported that Russian companies had begun buying gasoline from Belarus.

Kazakhstan is better insulated than its neighbors because its refineries in Atyrau, Shymkent, and Pavlodar produce enough fuel to meet most domestic demand, Alibayev noted. Motorists from Russia and neighboring states are crossing its borders to refuel. He attributed Kazakhstan’s price rises mainly to domestic taxes and the end of an export moratorium—not Russia’s shortage alone.

Central Asia looks for routes beyond Russia as war drags on

Ukraine’s Black Sea campaign has repeatedly struck oil infrastructure around Novorossiysk, where the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal handles about 80% of Kazakhstan’s crude exports. Separate tanker attacks cut CPC loadings by a fifth and forced Kazakhstan to reduce production. In contrast, disruptions at the terminal forced Kazakhstan to send Kashagan crude to China for the first time.

At an informal summit of Central Asian leaders in Cholpon-Ata in early August, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon proposed building a refinery to serve the whole region. For now, Alibayev said, the decisive factor is how long Russia’s troubles last: the longer Ukraine’s strikes continue, the more they will weigh on prices across Central Asia.

Russian strikes in southern Odesa Oblast overnight into 20 August left 13,000 utility customers without power, Odesa Oblast head Oleh Kiper reported. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also said drones attacked a checkpoint on Ukraine’s border with Moldova.

Russia has intensified attacks on southern Ukraine’s Danube region, where ports and transport routes lie close to Moldova and Romania. The spillover from the attacks has forced these neighboring countries to close airspace, scramble aircraft, and shoot drones down.

The Odesa Oblast Military Administration said Russian strikes disrupted power in several communities, and repair crews began restoration work. It did not identify damaged electrical equipment or say whether the grid had been shut down as a precaution. Two truck trailers carrying food caught fire at another location, but firefighters extinguished both blazes, the State Emergency Service said. No casualties were reported.

Zelenskyy did not identify which crossing was attacked or describe the damage. The Izmail District State Administration later reported that Russia attacked the Reni community with Shahed-136 drones. It recorded a hit on an unspecified site near the Reni–Giurgiulești international checkpoint.

People and freight cross between Ukraine and Moldova through checkpoints such as Reni–Giurgiulești. The district administration did not describe the damage or say whether the checkpoint remained open.

Russian attacks keep reaching Moldova

At 03:16 on 20 August, surveillance systems operated by Moldova’s National Army detected an unauthorized flight, public broadcaster Moldova1 reported.

The object was preliminarily identified as a Shahed-136/Geran-2, a long-range explosive drone used by Russia. It crossed from Ukraine near Kotlovyna in southwestern Odesa Oblast and flew toward Etulia in Moldova’s autonomous Gagauzia region. It returned to Ukrainian airspace at 03:22.

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Blast marks Moldova’s third airspace breach in nine days

Similar incidents occurred earlier in August. An unidentified aerial object exploded in a Moldovan field 12 kilometers from Ukraine on 9 August. On 17 August, Moldova closed part of its airspace for 15 minutes after Ukraine’s Air Force warned that a Russian Banderol, a jet-powered missile-drone, had crossed from Odesa Oblast. The object later exploded near Talmaza.

Romania activates defenses

On 20 August, Romania’s Defense Ministry said its radars detected targets near Ukraine at 02:23 and scrambled two Spanish F-18s and a Romanian helicopter. A drone entered Romanian airspace east of Galați at 03:21 and crashed near Grindu at 03:24. Its impact started a fire that went out on its own. Romania reported no casualties or material damage.

Four days earlier, a Spanish F-18 shot down a drone that entered Romania from Moldova. NATO said it appeared to be Russian.

Russia has recently intensified attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports and struck the Mayaky bridge connecting southern Ukraine with Moldova and Romania. Such attacks can disrupt Ukraine’s transport links and force neighboring militaries to react within minutes.

Ukraine’s Defense Forces struck a major oil refinery and a Black Sea oil terminal on 19 August and overnight into 20 August, Ukraine’s General Staff reported. Drones also hit a key mainland electricity hub supplying occupied Crimea, Militarnyi reported after analyzing NASA satellite data.

Together, the reported strikes put three parts of Russia’s war machine under attack within hours: fuel production, Black Sea oil exports, and the mainland electricity bridge to occupied Crimea. They continue a deep-strike campaign intended to disrupt fuel supplies and logistics supporting Russia's invasion

A major refinery deep inside Russia

Ukraine struck the TANECO refinery in Nizhnekamsk, in the Russian republic of Tatarstan, where the General Staff reported a fire at the production site. Militarnyi had earlier identified the same facility from eyewitness footage showing a drone reaching the city’s industrial zone despite Russian air-defense fire.

Owned by Tatneft, TANECO is one of Russia’s newest, largest, and most technologically advanced refineries. It can process more than 16 million tons of crude annually and produces gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, marine fuel, and other petroleum products.

Neither the General Staff nor the available imagery established whether processing equipment was damaged or production stopped.

A Black Sea terminal moving about 20 million tons a year

Ukraine also hit the Tamanneftegaz oil and gas terminal in the village of Volna, Krasnodar Krai, where the General Staff reported another fire. Militarnyi found a corresponding fire in NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data and assessed that storage tanks were likely burning.

Militarnyi described Tamanneftegaz as southern Russia’s largest private oil terminal. The complex can handle about 19.9 million tons annually, while its tank farm held more than 1 million cubic meters before Ukrainian attacks began.

The Tamanneftegaz terminal receives, stores, and loads petroleum products onto tankers, making it an important link in Russia’s Black Sea exports. Drones previously hit three tanks and pipelines there on 30 July.

The mainland electricity gateway to occupied Crimea

Drones hit the Taman 500-kilovolt substation in Krasnodar Krai, where NASA satellite data recorded a fire, Militarnyi reported. All four lines of Russia’s power bridge across the Kerch Strait pass through this high-voltage hub, making it the principal mainland gateway for electricity sent to occupied Crimea, Militarnyi reported.

Power failed in Simferopol, Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia, and Yalta around 1:45 a.m., according to Suspilne Crimea. Electric transport stopped in several cities. Sevastopol’s occupation chief said restrictions were lifted after about 90 minutes, although the grid remained unstable and some nearby settlements still lacked electricity. Social facilities in Sevastopol switched to backup power.

Crimean Wind also reported explosions near the Kafa and Malorechenske substations inside Crimea, Suspilne Crimea reported. The available evidence therefore does not establish that the Taman strike alone caused the outages.

Ukraine’s sustained long-range strike campaign

Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russian targets have ramped up in recent months. One day earlier, drones hit a key crude-processing unit at the Bashneft-UNPZ refinery in Ufa, Militarnyi reported. Ukraine had also struck TANECO on 10 August and both Nizhnekamsk refineries on 12 June, Suspilne reported.

Euromaidan Press reported that Ukrainian deep strikes hit 18 Russian oil and gas facilities in May, making it the heaviest month of 2026 at that point. On 6 August, drones attacked a top-five refinery in Yaroslavl for the seventh time this year. Five days later, they reached Orsk, about 1,500 kilometers from Ukraine.

A deliberately set fire at a Tallinn building used by Milrem Robotics did not disrupt its deliveries of military ground robots to Ukraine, CEO Kuldar Väärsi told Reuters on 19 August 2026. Estonian prosecutors said three suspects had been detained in Latvia.

The Milrem arson case fits in a broader pattern of suspected or confirmed sabotage against Ukraine’s military supply chain. Similar attacks throughout Europe have hit plants making drones, thermal optics, and other equipment for the front. Milrem supplies unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that help Ukrainian units move supplies and evacuate wounded without putting drawing upon valuable manpower.

The fire broke out overnight on 15 August in Tallinn’s Lasnamäe district after a resident reported suspicious activity. Nobody was injured, and Milrem has not disclosed what was damaged.

Milrem says it is one of only two foreign suppliers with unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) fleets in active Ukrainian service and expects more than 200 of its systems to be operating there by year-end.

The Netherlands is funding more than 150 additional Milrem vehicles for Ukraine. In June, Milrem and VDL Defentec opened a Dutch production line to support the delivery of more than 100 THeMIS UGVs. Väärsi the fire had not affected production, supply chains, or delivery schedules for this year or next.

Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are tracked or wheeled machines with no crew aboard. ArmyInform reported that Ukrainian troops use them to carry ammunition, fuel, and food along exposed routes. A Ukrainian commander identified only as Nazar told ArmyInform that frontline units still rely mainly on UGVs for logistics, although some robots carry explosives.

Three suspects detained as investigators examine possible Russian role

State Prosecutor Gardi Anderson said prosecutors suspect all three detainees of taking part in the arson. Latvian authorities are holding them while the two countries arrange their transfer to Estonia. An Estonian court approved prosecutors’ requests to place two in pretrial detention. A decision on the third remained pending.

Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal said investigators were examining whether the fire was the result of sabotage and whether Russia was involved. Authorities have not disclosed the suspects’ alleged motive, whether anyone directed them, or released evidence connecting the attack to Moscow.

Arson has hit other European suppliers to Ukraine

In March, a fire destroyed nearly all of the production capacity at a Czech plant that makes drones and thermal optics for Ukraine. Authorities detained four suspects while investigating possible terrorism and Russian involvement.

Lithuania also charged six people over an attempt to burn a factory supplying radio-wave scanners to Ukraine. Investigators said Russia-based organizers with GRU links coordinated the operation and connected the network to attempted attacks elsewhere in Europe.

Russia has denied Western accusations that it conducts sabotage in Europe.

Estonia is investigating whether Russia was behind a suspected arson attack at a Tallinn building used by Milrem Robotics, Prime Minister Kristen Michal said on 18 August.

Officials have not released evidence yet connecting Moscow to the fire.

The fire hit a site used by a defense contractor that makes unmanned ground vehicles, including THeMIS vehicles used in Ukraine. The Estonian investigation into the Milrem fire comes amid suspected or confirmed arson plots against other European factories supplying Ukraine.

Estonian prosecutors said the fire, which began overnight into 15 August, may have been deliberately set. A resident reported suspicious activity nearby. Investigators identified suspects and asked a court to detain them. No one was injured, and Milrem CEO Kuldar Väärsi told the Estonian outlet Postimees that it was too early to assess the damage.

The company executive said the site was not an office building but declined to identify its contents or what was damaged, including whether unmanned ground vehicles were inside. The company has not said whether production or deliveries were affected.

Milrem’s THeMIS vehicles have operated in Ukraine since 2022. By 2023, the company had delivered 15 of the vehicles to Ukrainian forces and border guards. A Dutch-funded order for more than 150 additional vehicles followed in 2025. A new Dutch production line began making them in June 2026 and handed over its first vehicles for Ukraine.

Other factories supplying Ukraine have faced arson

In March, a fire damaged a Czech facility belonging to LPP Holding, which had supplied hundreds of AI-guided drones to Ukraine. Czech authorities investigated possible terrorism and later detained a fourth suspect.

In January, Lithuania charged six people over an attempt to burn a factory supplying radio-wave scanners to Ukraine. Investigators said Russia-based organizers with GRU links coordinated the operation and connected the network to attempted attacks elsewhere in Europe.

Estonia has traced earlier attacks to Russian intelligence

Estonia has also uncovered Russian-directed attacks on its own territory. In 2024, Estonia’s security service detained 10 people over a Russian-coordinated operation that included damaging cars belonging to then-Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets and a journalist and defacing monuments. Officials said the operation sought to spread fear and tension. Journalists from The Insider, Re:Baltica, and Delfi reported how the GRU recruited Baltic residents for vandalism and arson.

In 2025, an Estonian court found that a Moldovan national working for the GRU burned a supermarket as a trial run before firebombing a Ukrainian restaurant in Tallinn. His cousin filmed the second attack.

Those cases explain why investigators are examining a possible Russian role in the Milrem fire, but they do not establish who caused it.

Polish prosecutors have charged a 46-year-old woman over a nationality-based attack on two Ukrainian siblings in Bydgoszcz, days after police detained her and a 34-year-old man, whom they questioned as a witness, Polish Radio's Ukrainian Service reported the detentions on 18 August 2026, with the charges filed the same evening.

The detentions came four days after the alleged attack in a park near Bydgoszcz’s main railway station. The Bydgoszcz-North district prosecutor charged the woman with insulting the siblings and violating a minor's bodily integrity on nationality grounds. She denied intentionally insulting or assaulting the children and gave police a different account of the encounter.

The case comes amid rising reports of suspected hate crimes against Ukrainians and worsening relations between Warsaw and Kyiv. Police received 180 such reports in the first half of 2026—about one a day. At that pace, 2026 would end more than 30% above 2025 and nearly 35% above 2024.

Prosecutors charged only the woman; the 34-year-old man detained with her was questioned as a witness, even though the mother and the consulate described both adults as aggressors. The prosecutor placed her under police supervision, imposed a no-contact order, and set bail at 5,000 zł ($1,340). The destruction of the boy's toy drone was treated as a misdemeanor because the toy was worth just over 100 zł ($27).

The siblings—a 14-year-old girl and her 12-year-old brother—were playing with a toy drone in the park when the adults confronted them about using it, their mother told police. The Ukrainian consulate said the adults also insulted and threatened the children after hearing them speak Ukrainian.

“They twisted a child’s arm, broke a toy drone, and threw fragments at the boy,” Ukraine’s Consulate General in Gdańsk said.

The consulate said the fragments scratched the boy but caused no serious injury.

Other attacks on Ukrainians in Poland

The Bydgoszcz case is one of several recent assaults involving Ukrainian victims.

Police detained two women on 14 August over an attack on Ukrainian men outside a Poznań restaurant the previous day. A video showed one woman insulting, spitting at, and striking the men.

In July, three men allegedly beat a Ukrainian couple in Wrocław after asking whether they were Ukrainian. In Łódź, a man allegedly attacked a passerby he mistook for Ukrainian, breaking his nose and jaw.

The violence has prompted public protests. On 9 August, the Committee for the Defense of Democracy organized “Don’t be indifferent” rallies in 22 cities. Two days earlier, Warsaw organizers delivered a petition with more than 11,000 signatures calling for government action against attacks on Ukrainians.

Deepening Polish-Ukrainian rift and decline in relations

The rise in anti-Ukrainian violence in Poland has unfolded amid worsening political relations between Kyiv and Warsaw. Polish support for accepting Ukrainian refugees fell from 94% in March 2022 to 48% by early 2026, while politicians increasingly use Ukraine as a wedge issue.

Historical disputes over the Volhynia massacres and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) have also strained relations. The rift sharpened after Zelenskyy signed a decree granting a Ukrainian special forces unit the honorary title “Heroes of the UPA.” Polish President Karol Nawrocki announced on 19 June that he had decided to revoke Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state honor.

A Russian court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced 61-year-old Ukrainian Andrii Hulak to five years and four months in a penal colony over alleged service in Ukraine’s Azov brigade, Mediazona reported on 17 August 2026. The court gave no details of when he allegedly served in Azov, what role he supposedly held, or any specific act Hulak was accused of committing.

Russia declared Azov a “terrorist organization” in August 2022 and has since prosecuted Ukrainians it claims served in or were connected to the brigade. Mediazona says Russian courts have treated an alleged connection to units such as Azov as enough to bring charges.

Azov is a Ukrainian National Guard brigade that became a symbol of Ukrainian resistance during the defense of Mariupol. The military unit has since become a primary target of Russian propaganda campaigns aimed at defaming Ukraine.

Hulak’s detention date and location remain unknown

The human rights group Memorial identified the charge as Part 2 of Article 205.4 of Russia’s Criminal Code, which covers participation in a “terrorist group.”

Hulak was born in Prymorske, Donetsk Oblast, and lived in Russian-occupied Urzuf near Mariupol before his detention, Mediazona reported. Memorial says Russia added him to its state register of “extremists and terrorists” on 21 October 2025 and lists him as a political prisoner.

His detention date and current location remain unknown.

Russia prosecutes Ukrainians in occupied territories

Hulak’s case is part of a broader pattern of Russian prosecutions of Ukrainians from occupied territories, including civilians accused of supporting Kyiv and service members prosecuted over their military affiliations.

In occupied Crimea, rights monitors documented 520 Ukrainians facing politically motivated criminal charges by April 2026—more than twice the number recorded when the full-scale invasion began. Of those, 351 were in pre-trial detention or serving sentences.

Outside Crimea, a Russian-installed court in occupied Donetsk sentenced a 17-year-old to six and a half years for allegedly sharing military information with Ukraine’s Security Service. In occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, a Russian court gave two women from Enerhodar 14-year sentences over alleged donations of $120 and $57 to Ukrainian forces.

Russia could assemble a strike force for an offensive into northern Ukraine by February 2027 if Moscow launches another mobilization, Ukrainian military intelligence's (HUR) deputy chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi told RBC-Ukraine on 18 August.

Skibitskyi said another mobilization could follow Russia’s September parliamentary elections. Depending on its scale, that call-up could produce a strike force by February 2027. Skibitskyi based the February estimate on Russia’s 2022 mobilization. He said some personnel reached the front in December 2022, while combat-ready units arrived in January 2023.

Earlier warnings identified a northern route

The February estimate follows Ukrainian warnings about possible attacks across the northern border. In May, Zelenskyy said Ukraine was tracking five scenarios for expanding the war through the north, including an advance through Chernihiv Oblast toward Kyiv.

Syrskyi called an attack from Russia’s Bryansk Oblast into Chernihiv Oblast Moscow’s most realistic northern option, ranking it above an operation through Belarus. Its purpose, he said, would be to draw Ukrainian forces away from the east and south.

Russia has also struggled to prepare other major campaigns as Ukraine targeted the forces and systems needed to carry them out. ISW assessed that Ukrainian drones likely disrupted preparations for a spring–summer offensive in Donetsk Oblast, while a planned Russian naval-drone campaign reportedly stalled after Starlink access was blocked.

Ukrainian intelligence says Russia lacks the manpower

Skibitskyi said Moscow cannot form the units required for a new offensive without mobilization. HUR estimates Russia lost more personnel than it recruited in both June and July. The shortfall reached 3,000 in June and at least 1,000 in July, meaning monthly contracts no longer replaced battlefield losses.

The agency says Russia’s operational reserve is about one-tenth the size of its combat component against Ukraine. Moscow also lacks enough personnel to expand brigades into divisions, while recruitment for its unmanned-systems forces has reached only 30% of its quota.

CSIS estimated in January that Russia had suffered losses unmatched by any major state since World War II while advancing extremely slowly.

Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) has named 10 people and two institutions it says are teaching Ukrainian children under occupation to handle weapons—and preparing them to serve Russia.

HUR says those named use youth groups, occupation education authorities, and schools to erase children’s Ukrainian identity and prepare them for Russian military service. Publishing their names supports Ukraine’s efforts to document the system and hold its organizers accountable, but HUR announced no charges or sanctions with the update.

How Russia militarizes Ukrainian youth in occupied territory

At a May 2026 “Zarnitsa 2.0” competition, the Kremlin-backed Movement of the First taught children to handle weapons and explosives and operate drones, HUR said.

At the competition’s stage in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, regional organizer Viktoria Kostromina stated those skills would provide children with a “reliable foundation in life.”

The training sits inside a much larger school system. From 1 September, occupation schools will add a separate basic military-training track alongside a new Russian ideology class and behavior grades. More than 582,000 children across nearly 2,000 schools study under the imposed Russian curriculum, according to the Almenda Center of Civil Education.

Russia is also embedding combat preparation more deeply. “Cossack classes” will make ideological and combat-related drills compulsory for fifth-graders in four occupied Donbas cities. In Crimea, occupation authorities say they have built a pipeline that selects schoolchildren for drone training and ultimately for the Russian military reserve.

The policy has a long horizon. Putin’s 2025 strategy set a 95% “Russian civic identity” target for occupied populations by 2036.

Who HUR says is behind the indoctrination

HUR linked the individuals to the Movement of the First, Yunarmia, occupation education bodies, and a school in Simferopol.

Whom the HUR identified

• Artur Orlov: chairman of the Kremlin-backed Movement of the First.
• Oleksii Lavrentiev, Marina Tsvetinskaya, Ruyal Aliyev, Ekaterina Kozyr, Viktoria Kostromina and Kateryna Popova: regional Movement of the First organizers in occupied Ukraine.
• Svitlana Bespalova: occupation deputy education minister in Crimea.
• Nikita Polyakov: Yunarmia organizer in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• Dmytro Pryvidion: director of School No. 5 in occupied Simferopol.

HUR also identified two institutions: Pryvidion’s School No. 5 and the Selet–Ak Bars youth center in Foros. It says the school holds militaristic activities and produces devices for loading rifle magazines, while the center stages pro-war events for children.

All 12 entries now appear in the “Child Kidnappers” section of HUR’s War&Sanctions database.

Ukraine has previously pursued individual organizers through criminal cases. In 2024, the SBU accused a Crimea occupation official of using schools and military camps to indoctrinate pupils and encourage enlistment in Russia’s forces.

Ukraine’s ombudsman later asked the ICC and Ukrainian law enforcement to recognize systematic child militarization as a crime against humanity.

Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) sees no battlefield signs that Russia is preparing for a ceasefire, deputy chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi said in an interview with RBC-Ukraine on 18 August 2026. The agency expects no peace agreement before the end of 2026.

Russia’s General Staff plans to capture the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by year-end, Skibitskyi said. Meanwhile, HUR estimates that Russian personnel losses exceeded contract recruitment in June and July, leaving Moscow unable to create new military formations without mobilization.

HUR estimates Russia lost more troops than it recruited in both June and July. Losses exceeded new contract personnel by 3,000 in June and by at least 1,000 in July, leaving recruitment unable to replace battlefield losses. The agency says Russia’s operational reserve is only about one-tenth the size of the part already engaged in combat against Ukraine.

Russia has set a 2026 target of recruiting 409,000 personnel. Without mobilization, however, Moscow cannot create new formations or turn existing brigades into divisions because it lacks personnel, Skibitskyi said. The recruitment plan for Russia’s unmanned-systems forces is only 30% complete, and the command is trying to fill the gap with personnel from other military branches, he added.

If Russia mobilizes after its September parliamentary elections, it could assemble a powerful strike group by around February 2027, according to HUR. Skibitskyi did not rule out its use for a northern offensive. At present, however, HUR sees no conditions, indicators, or troops for such an operation.

Russia previously targeted September for Donbas

In April, Skibitskyi told the Financial Times that Moscow aimed to capture all of Donbas by September, after missing its deadlines to take Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. Russia was transferring 20,000 troops from strategic reserves to sustain the offensive, although this amounted to less than one month's worth of its battlefield losses.

By early August, DeepState reported 36 square kilometers of additional Russian-controlled territory across Ukraine in July, a figure that included map corrections for May and June. Without those corrections, Russia gained about 88 square kilometers.

DeepState reported limited progress near Rodynske and Kostiantynivka and toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the heart of Ukraine’s “fortress belt.” At that pace, Russia had “no chance” of capturing all of Donetsk Oblast even by 2027, the group said. It cautioned that another wave of mobilization or a wider deployment of North Korean troops could change the forecast.

An unidentified aerial object exploded in a cornfield outside Talmaza in southeastern Moldova, tearing a crater about two meters wide and 50 centimeters deep, Moldovan police said on 18 August. The shock wave spread across roughly 45 by 20 meters, but nobody was injured.

Russia has intensified its attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube ports, bringing drones and missiles close to Moldova’s border. Moldova has recorded three aerial incidents in nine days, with the latest forcing authorities to close part of the country’s airspace.

Investigators recovered fiberglass body fragments, damaged electronics, and a turbojet engine, which Militarnyi noted is also used by the Banderol. Police said the components resembled those of a jet-powered missile-drone but could not identify the aircraft conclusively.

Ukraine's Air Force reported on 17 August that a Russian Banderol had crossed from Odesa Oblast toward Moldova. Militarnyi identified the weapon as an S8000 and placed the crossing near the Moscow-backed breakaway region of Transnistria.

Moldova’s Defense Ministry separately said it had tracked an unidentified object flying from Kuchurhan toward Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria.

Authorities closed central Moldovan airspace for 15 minutes before the object disappeared from radar near Talmaza, Militarnyi said.

Moldova’s Foreign Ministry called the incident a serious violation of its sovereignty and a threat to public safety.

Talmaza blast follows two recent drone incidents in Moldova

The Talmaza explosion followed two similar incidents near Moldova’s border with Ukraine. On 9 August, an unidentified aircraft exploded in a field 12 kilometers from Ukraine and started a fire. Another object entered Moldovan airspace the following evening and was believed to be a jet-powered Shahed.

The recent incidents continue a longer pattern. Six Russian drones entered Moldova during an attack on Ukraine in November 2025, and one landed on a civilian roof.

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More than 100 drones detected near Romania in four days, NATO jets scrambled seven times

President Maia Sandu has called for counter-drone technology capable of intercepting and destroying hostile drones that violate Moldovan airspace, acknowledging that the country currently lacks such capabilities.

Russia’s port campaign reaches Moldova’s border

Across the border, Russian attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports have reached a recent high, with Romania detecting more than 100 drones during seven recent attacks, interim Defense Minister Radu Miruță said.

Kyiv and Chișinău are also discussing a rail route through Moldova to Romania’s Constanța port as Russian strikes disrupt Ukraine’s maritime exports. Ukraine estimates the route could carry only about 10 percent of its grain exports.

The Greek-run oil tanker Skiros was attacked near Novorossiysk on 16 August 2026 after loading Russian crude at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal, Bloomberg reported.

The Suezmax-class vessel can carry about 1 million barrels. Bloomberg identified no attacker and provided no information about damage. Skiros’s Athens-based manager told the outlet that no one was injured and no pollution occurred.

CPC primarily exports Kazakh oil and carries more than two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Its shipments recently accounted for almost 2% of the global oil supply. Russian crude typically makes up only 5% to 10% of CPC exports.

Earlier in August, Ukraine agreed not to attack CPC infrastructure or non-Russian ships bound for the terminal if they were not under Ukrainian sanctions and did not carry Russian cargo. Because Skiros carried Russian crude, the protection did not apply to it under the terms Bloomberg described.

Following the July attacks, CPC considered suspending operations due to environmental and safety risks but decided to continue operations, Bloomberg reported.

The Skiros attack ended an almost three-week lull in attacks on ships using the terminal. Bloomberg did not say whether it disrupted oil loading, and CPC declined to comment.

Earlier attacks cut Kazakhstan’s oil production

Earlier attacks suspended loading at the terminal. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry confirmed a temporary reduction in oil production to prevent storage facilities from reaching capacity, while Reuters reported CPC loadings fell by a fifth in July.

The disruption also increased shipping and war-risk insurance costs as some operators became reluctant to call at the terminal, The Financial Times reported.

Paralysis of the logistics

Ukraine has not claimed responsibility for the Skiros attack, and Bloomberg did not identify an attacker. In a separate operation in July, the SBU and Navy acknowledged striking sanctioned Russian oil tankers Louise 1 and Banda with Mamai sea drones.

Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, later described the wider objective as the “paralysis of the logistics” of oil, fuel, and cargo that bypasses sanctions.

Romania detected more than 100 drones involved in seven attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports in recent days, interim Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruță told Romanian channel Digi24 on 17 August 2026. He said the attacks were the most intense recorded recently and that Ukrainian forces destroyed most of the drones “a few dozen meters from Romanian airspace.”

Russia’s growing attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports put a key export route at risk as Kyiv seeks other outlets while its Black Sea ports are under attack. They also put Ukraine's southern border region under pressure as Kyiv develops trade links with Moldova and Romania, and NATO routes more military aid through Romania.

The latest drone swarms remained over Ukraine, and officials found no indication that Romania’s threat level had risen, Miruță stated. The Romanian military nevertheless remained on alert as attacks intensified across the Danube.

Ukraine looks south for trade and military aid

With Russia hitting its ports, Ukraine is turning to Romania and Moldova to keep trade moving. Kyiv and Chișinău are discussing a rail link through Moldova to Romania’s Constanța port, though Ukraine estimates it could carry only about 10% of its grain exports.

The rail proposal comes as Russian port strikes have cut monthly agricultural exports by 20–30% and left up to 10 million tons of grain in storage without buyers, Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotskyi has said.

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More than 100 drones detected near Romania in four days, NATO jets scrambled seven times

NATO said in December that a second aid hub in Romania would begin operating in January. It was designed to supplement the main center in Rzeszów, Poland, and route supplies toward Ukraine’s southern and eastern fronts.

Romania faces repeated drone incursions

Russian drones targeting Ukraine have repeatedly entered Romania as Moscow attacks Ukrainian ports across the Danube. More than 40 such incursions had been recorded by early June, Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu said.

The most serious occurred on 29 May, when a drone hit an apartment building in Galați. Two people were injured, and about 70 residents fled or were evacuated.

Vladimir Putin suggested that the aircraft might have been Ukrainian, but Romania’s forensic investigation later identified it as a Russian-built Geran-2.

Romanian forces later shot down three drones in 72 hours in July, while Miruță said Spanish pilots and Romanian troops destroyed a fourth on 16 August.

Debris from drones intercepted over Ukraine has also washed onto Romania’s coast, prompting temporary access restrictions while specialists checked for explosives.

Bucharest is buying low-altitude radars and ground interceptors through the EU’s SAFE program. Miruță said drones often fly at 70 to 150 meters, and ground systems would be cheaper to use than fighter-launched missiles.

Ukraine plans to temporarily rebury Yevhen Konovalets, a leading Ukrainian nationalist between World Wars I and II, at its National Military Memorial Cemetery, President’s Office head Kyrylo Budanov wrote in a Telegram post.

His remains will later be transferred to the planned Ukrainian National Pantheon, Budanov said.

The National Pantheon is intended to honor political leaders, soldiers, and cultural figures who built or defended Ukraine. Responding to a citizen's petition, Zelenskyy described the memorial as a way to unite Ukrainians around defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Budanov cast Konovalets’ planned reburial as linking the current war against Russia with earlier struggles against foreign rule.

Budanov portrayed Konovalets as a threat to Ukraine’s enemies because he organized military and political resistance to Russian and Soviet rule. He said attempts had been made for decades to erase or distort Konovalets’ name and that returning his remains had long been considered “untimely.”

“The enemies of a free Ukraine feared the colonel during his lifetime—they still do,” Budanov wrote.

Konovalets’ remains were exhumed at Crooswijk Cemetery in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on 11 August. They returned to Ukraine two days later, deputy head of the President’s Office Iryna Vereshchuk said.

A memorial service was held in Kyiv on 15 August. Officials have not announced when Konovalets will be temporarily reburied or when his remains will be transferred to the Pantheon.

Who was Yevhen Konovalets?

Born near Lviv in 1891, Konovalets commanded the Sich Riflemen, which defended the Ukrainian People’s Republic after the Russian Empire collapsed. The republic was proclaimed in 1917 and declared independence in 1918 before Bolshevik forces defeated it three years later.

Konovalets continued the struggle for independence from exile. He helped establish the Ukrainian Military Organization, an underground group preparing armed resistance to Polish and Soviet rule.

In 1929, Konovalets brought the organization together with other nationalist groups to found the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Vienna and became its first leader.

He prepared the OUN for armed struggle and sought European support for Ukrainian independence.

On 23 May 1938, Soviet secret police operative Pavel Sudoplatov killed Konovalets in Rotterdam with a bomb concealed in a box of chocolates. Two years after his death, the OUN split into rival factions.

What is the National Pantheon?

Ukraine plans the National Pantheon as a permanent burial and memorial site for major figures in its history, including those buried abroad.

Parliament approved President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s bill on 1 July. The government selected part of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a historic Orthodox monastery in the capital, as its site.

The Pantheon plan has raised concern in Poland over whether it could honor members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The UPA fought for Ukrainian independence during and after World War II. Poland holds it responsible for killing up to 100,000 ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia between 1943 and 1945. Poland's parliament has declared the killings a genocide.

Konovalets was assassinated in 1938, before World War II, the OUN’s split, and the UPA’s formation. The Volhynia killings and the OUN factions’ wartime collaboration with Nazi Germany, therefore, postdated his leadership.

Even so, Ukraine’s broader effort to honor nationalist leaders has drawn criticism over the wartime records of Konovalets’ successors. Its May 2026 state reburial of Andrii Melnyk, who succeeded Konovalets as OUN leader, drew objections from Israel’s Foreign Ministry and Yad Vashem over Melnyk’s collaboration with Nazi Germany.

Russians moving into occupied Mariupol are buying apartments built over Ukrainian homes destroyed during Russia’s 2022 siege, German broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) reported on 15 August 2026. Ukrainians who lived on the sites received none of the new units, a source told the outlet.

The construction is part of Russia’s wider Russification of occupied Mariupol. Occupation authorities have separately listed nearly 900 apartments for redistribution, including properties belonging to residents forced out by the siege.

Economist Vyacheslav Shiryaev said the new apartments are being bought primarily by newcomers, including Russian security personnel, officials, and military logistics workers. Some simply want to live by the sea but cannot afford property in occupied Crimea or Sochi, a Russian Black Sea resort, he said.

In Russia-occupied regions, borrowers with Russian citizenship are offered mortgages at 2% annual interest, DW reported.

Occupation authorities also ordered some residents out of apartments that had survived the attacks. Some were sent to hostels or accommodation on Mariupol’s outskirts instead of receiving replacement apartments, a source told DW.

Unable to enter occupied Mariupol, DW based its investigation on former residents’ accounts, satellite imagery, and online research.

Homes erased, residents pushed out

For former residents, homes destroyed in the siege are being replaced with apartments for newcomers.

Halyna Artemova, an English teacher, lived in one of the demolished apartment blocks for almost 40 years. A Russian missile struck the building in March 2022. Wounded by shrapnel, she escaped with her mother and son. A new high-rise now stands where her home once did.

Yevhen Sosnovskyi, a photographer, and his wife had lived in a neighboring building for 20 years. It caught fire during the attack, and Russian troops drove residents out without allowing them to take food or clothes.

Sosnovsky photographed his apartment before and after the attack, preserving a record of the home they lost. A parking lot now covers the site.

“They’re building on human bones, and fast, to eradicate the traces of their crimes,” Sosnovsky told DW.

Russia remakes a city it destroyed

The new housing is part of a wider Russian effort to reshape Mariupol after its forces destroyed and occupied the city. The UN assessed that up to 90% of the city’s residential buildings were damaged or destroyed.

On 16 March 2022, Russia bombed the Mariupol Drama Theater, where civilians sheltered beneath a large “CHILDREN” sign. An eyewitness described chaos, blood, and survivors using torn blankets as bandages.

In the wake of its destruction of the city, Moscow plans to move about 114,000 of its citizens into occupied Ukraine, with Mariupol as one of the main destinations.

Russia has built or expanded at least 10 drone bases along its borders with Ukraine and Belarus, creating launch capacity for newer jet-powered attack drones, the most powerful of which could reach Warsaw, The Telegraph reported on 16 August 2026.

The network expands Russia’s capacity for mass drone attacks on Ukraine, while some sites could later threaten NATO. The findings come as Russia is also expanding bases and other military infrastructure along NATO’s northern and Baltic borders. The Telegraph found no evidence that Moscow is planning such an attack.

Seven of the 10 sites were used during recent bombardments of Kyiv, tracking data cited by The Telegraph showed. Using leaked documents, satellite imagery, and DroneSec's analysis, the newspaper identified at least 59 launch rails—tracks that launch fixed-wing drones without runways.

Around 20 appeared long enough for Russia’s latest long-range models, while one base could reportedly store over 1,000 drones.

Leaked Ukrainian documents cited by The Telegraph say the jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 can carry 90-kilogram warheads. However, Ukrainian military intelligence puts the Geran-4’s range at up to 450 kilometers, while the larger Geran-5 has a stated range of up to 1,000 kilometers — enough to reach Warsaw from several of the new sites.

DroneSec founder Mike Monnik said expanded launch capacity and harder-to-intercept technology together increase pressure on Ukrainian air defenses.

Russia builds military infrastructure along NATO’s northern flank

Russia is also expanding military infrastructure elsewhere along NATO’s borders. A Nordic-Baltic investigation identified new or expanded infrastructure from Norway to Kaliningrad, with potential capacity for up to 115,000 personnel.

Satellite imagery showed new barracks, ammunition warehouses, and expanded bases near NATO’s northern and Baltic members.

The Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, assessed that the construction likely supports future Russian operations against NATO rather than an imminent attack. Most Russian combat power remains committed to Ukraine, it said.

Other drone hubs support rapid Russian attacks

Russia has already built comparable hubs for attacks on Ukraine. Satellite imagery analyzed by the open-source intelligence group Strategic Aviation of Russia showed 10 additional launchers under construction at Tsymbulova in Oryol Oblast, following the start of work on 22 April 2026.

At occupied Donetsk Airport, the group identified enlarged launch pads, roads to a Geran and Gerbera drone warehouse, and the apparent construction of another storage building.

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) said it struck Shahed storage and launch sites at Primorsko-Akhtarsk on 2 August 2025. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi reported hitting drone logistics, warhead-storage, and preparation facilities at Donetsk Airport on 30 December 2025.

486 Africans recruited into Russia’s armed forces are dead, while Ukraine is holding 35 citizens from 17 African countries as prisoners of war, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne in findings published on 16 August 2026. Its overall tally rose only slightly from May, climbing from 2,965 recruits from 36 countries to at least 2,982 from 37.

Russia’s recruitment in Africa is part of a broader effort to enlist foreigners for its war. A joint human-rights investigation found that Russia had recruited at least 27,000 people from more than 130 countries since 2022. The system helps Moscow replenish its forces while shifting battlefield risk onto foreigners, many of whom are drawn in by financial pressure, deception, or coercion.

The largest groups of recruits came from Kenya, Egypt, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Algeria, and Mali, the ministry told Suspilne.

Russia’s wider recruitment pipeline in Africa

Russian security services use a “broad arsenal of manipulative methods,” the Ukrainian MFA said. Recruiters promise civilian jobs, education, high salaries, Russian citizenship, or migration benefits. In many cases, foreigners must sign Russian-language military contracts under threat of deportation or imprisonment.

The FIDH–Truth Hounds–KIBHR report found recruiters using social media and intermediaries to advertise civilian jobs. Of 16 foreign POWs interviewed, 13 said they had been promised they would not fight. Most reached combat positions within weeks.

The human toll on African recruits

Kenyan engineer Francis told journalist Dmytro Karpenko, who interviews prisoners captured while fighting for Russia, that he thought he had accepted a security job. In Russia, he received a military uniform instead. After two weeks of training, he reached the front and was captured.

Nigerian recruits Hamzat Kazeen Kolawole and Mbah Stephen Udoka died in an assault after receiving little or no training, Ukrainian military intelligence said. Botswana reported “heartbreaking calls” from its citizens describing “perilous conditions” at the front.

Ukraine’s response to Russia's recruitment campaign

Ukraine’s diplomatic missions regularly inform African officials about the recruitment of their citizens and run awareness campaigns, according to the ministry.

The MFA and Ukraine’s POW Coordination Headquarters also launched Stop Russian Recruiters, a website that explains recruitment methods, shares victims’ accounts, advises people at risk and their families, and accepts reports about recruiters.

Two adults allegedly attacked a 14-year-old Ukrainian girl and her 12-year-old brother after hearing them speak Ukrainian, Ukraine’s Consulate General in Gdańsk said. The attack occurred on 14 August 2026 in a park near a railway station in Bydgoszcz, north-central Poland.

The case comes amid a documented rise in anti-Ukrainian violence in Poland, with recent attacks reported throughout the country. Recent incidents include attacks on Ukrainians in Poznań and Wrocław, as well as on people mistaken for Ukrainians or defending them. Police data obtained by the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita showed 180 hate-crime reports involving Ukrainian citizens in the first half of 2026, over 30% more than a year earlier.

The pair, a man and woman with a small dog, shouted obscenities and made nationality-based threats, the consulate said.

“They twisted a child’s arm, broke a toy drone, and threw fragments at the boy,” the Ukrainian consulate said, adding that the fragments scratched him.

The consulate said a complaint had been filed, police were searching for the pair, and the children were physically safe but severely stressed. It urged witnesses to contact the police. Polish police had not commented by the time of publication.

Other attacks on Ukrainians in Poland

The attack on the children came amid a string of assaults on Ukrainians across Polish cities.

Shortly after midnight on 13 August 2026, an intoxicated woman insulted two Ukrainian men, spat at one, and struck one of them outside a restaurant in Poznań, according to Polish media. Police detained her and another woman the following day.

In July, three men allegedly beat a young Ukrainian couple in Wrocław after first asking whether they were Ukrainian. Police detained two suspects and continued searching for the third.

That month, a man in Łódź attacked a passerby he supposedly mistook for a Ukrainian, breaking his nose and jaw. Three men also reportedly beat a 60-year-old Pole who intervened when they harassed a Ukrainian teenager on a Poznań tram.

The deepening Polish-Ukrainian rift and decline in relations

The attacks coincide with a broader decline in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Polish support for accepting Ukrainian refugees fell from 94% in March 2022 to 48% by early 2026, while politicians increasingly use Ukraine as a wedge issue.

Much of the fallout stems from disputes over the Volhynia massacres—the 1943–44 mass killings of Polish civilians by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and Polish retaliatory violence against Ukrainian civilians.

The dispute escalated after President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a 26 May decree granting a Ukrainian special forces unit the honorary title “Heroes of the UPA.” Polish President Karol Nawrocki responded on 19 June by stripping Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland's highest state honor.

Former Polish prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński accused groups in western Ukraine of desecrating remains and stealing WWII-era victims’ jewelry. The leader of the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) wrote on X on 14 August 2026 that his party would demand Polish government intervention.

Kaczyński’s claim comes amid growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland and a dispute with Kyiv over how Polish wartime victims are remembered. However, Kaczyński’s X post named no location and provided no public evidence, while authorized Polish-Ukrainian teams continue exhuming and reburying Polish victims.

“Illegal excavations at the sites of former Polish villages in Eastern Galicia are turning out to be real,” Kaczyński wrote, referring to a historical region now largely in western Ukraine.

He called the alleged looters “black diggers,” a term for people who dig through burials or archaeological sites for valuables. He said they were pilfering the graves of Poles killed in the World War II-era Volhynia massacres and alleged that local Ukrainian officials were allowing it.

Kaczyński said PiS would appeal to Poland’s state authorities, including the Foreign Ministry, and demand “explanations and a response.”

The evidence described by PiS has not been made public. Onet reported that it was unclear which incidents he meant and that neither government had responded at the time. PiS spokesperson Rafał Bochenek later told the publication Interia that citizens had sent photographs allegedly showing damaged graves and listings for excavated objects. Interia published neither.

Polish-Ukrainian teams continue authorized exhumations

Meanwhile, Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), the country's state historical institute, said Ukraine authorized its latest excavations at Ostrówki and Wola Ostrowiecka in Volyn.

From 13 July to 7 August, Polish and Ukrainian specialists recovered 55 victims, including 26 children. They also secured more than 300 personal items and pieces of clothing. The remains are due to be buried at Ostrówki cemetery on 30 August.

The excavation followed a wider thaw. Ukraine lifted its moratorium on Polish searches, while joint teams exhumed and reburied 42 people at Puźniki in 2025. Both countries have exchanged lists of sites for further searches.

Historical disputes deepen the Polish-Ukrainian rift

Relations between Kyiv and Warsaw worsened after Ukraine gave a military unit the honorary title “Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)."

The UPA fought for Ukrainian independence but is held responsible in Poland for the World War II-era massacres of Polish civilians. Polish President Karol Nawrocki later stripped President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state honor.

Violence is also rising on the Polish streets. Reports of suspected hate crimes against Ukrainians in Poland rose by more than 30% in the first half of 2026, even as anti-xenophobic voices became more visible online. Kaczyński’s claim adds an unverified criminal allegation to the dispute.

Ukrainian forces have used British drones to attack targets inside Russia for the first time, adding two UK-built systems to Kyiv’s arsenal, The Sunday Times reported on 15 August, citing Ukrainian military sources. The newspaper explicitly identified oil refineries in Volgograd and Yaroslavl among the targets struck during the previous six months.

Ukraine still relies mainly on domestically produced drones. But the British systems give Kyiv cheaper weapons that can be replenished and launched in volume. They help sustain Kyiv's attacks on Russian oil, logistics, and military targets without running down limited stocks of Western long-range missiles.

The Sunday Times called this a new phase in UK–Ukraine military cooperation. A senior British defense source said the deployments showed London was “not nervous anymore” about Russian pressure.

What British support adds to Ukraine’s homegrown drone force

Britain has supplied Ukraine with two systems with very different ranges. The Nyan, a jet-powered one-way attack drone made by BAE Systems subsidiary Callen-Lenz, can travel more than 150 miles. The second is catapult-launched and has a range above 600 miles; The Sunday Times withheld its manufacturer’s name on security grounds.

Long-range drones typically cost £50,000 to £100,000, compared with more than £750,000 to replace a Storm Shadow missile, the newspaper said. They can also be stockpiled and launched in swarms, helping Ukraine strain Russian air defenses without exhausting finite missile stocks.

The drones extend wider British support. In June, the UK announced funding for 150,000 Ukrainian-produced drones by the end of 2026. Ukrainian forces have also deployed British Rapid Ranger systems against Russian Shaheds and used UK-supplied Storm Shadows inside Russia, protecting Ukraine at home while widening its options across the border.

Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign reaches 52 Russian regions

Across Ukraine’s overall campaign, The Sunday Times reported almost 700 successful deep strikes between January and June. They reached 52 Russian regions and caused more than £35 billion (about $47.3 billion) in economic damage.

A senior Ukrainian military source said the British systems were proving successful. “When we launch them, we always say Slava Ukraini and God save the King,” the source told The Sunday Times.

Former UK Air Marshal Greg Bagwell predicted Moscow would “sabre rattle” and potentially declare British factories legitimate targets. Other defense sources warned of intensified cyberattacks or espionage against the UK.

France, Germany, and the UK are working to create a format representing Europe in talks over Russia’s war against Ukraine, The New York Times reported on 15 August, citing five European officials. Known collectively as the E3, the three countries would support Ukraine’s position and protect European interests in any settlement.

The initiative is Europe’s attempt to secure a place in talks the US is expected to lead. The three governments fear that Washington and Moscow could reach a deal without them, although Europe would have to enforce sanctions, decide how to use frozen Russian assets, and help protect Ukraine afterward. European officials also doubt Washington will stay committed to serious negotiations.

The officials expect Washington to lead negotiations with Moscow. The E3 wants to become the core group supporting Ukraine, following Kyiv’s request that it prepare for talks. France and Germany are shaping the position, while Britain fears damaging relations with Trump.

Poland, Italy, and the Nordic countries would be consulted, with the EU later involved. Some Baltic states and Hungary do not trust France and Germany to represent them. London called the discussion speculative.

The Coalition has rehearsed a force but not agreed to deploy it

The E3 forms the core of the Coalition of the Willing. At a 7 June meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, its leaders backed an immediate ceasefire and legally binding guarantees, including the deployment of a multinational force.

More than 600 British troops rehearsed with French paratroopers and an Italian platoon in February for a possible deployment. They could form the core of a 10,000-strong force pledged by London and Paris after a ceasefire.

Yet some members reportedly made Russia’s consent a condition for deploying troops, effectively giving Moscow a veto. Bulgaria has left, and Germany has not committed troops. The Coalition’s leadership is also shifting after Keir Starmer’s resignation and ahead of Emmanuel Macron’s departure in 2027.

Ukraine talks still misunderstand Russia's intentions

European officials see few signs that Vladimir Putin is ready for serious negotiations, the NYT reported. A separate EU attempt to open direct contact with Moscow divided member states.

Experts told Euromaidan Press that Russia uses peace processes to stall, press maximalist demands, and improve its battlefield position. Moscow also dismissed a Black Sea ceasefire proposal after Kyiv offered a mutual halt to attacks on civilian targets.

Ukraine’s partners risk mistaking Russia’s presence at talks for a willingness to compromise. Former Ukrainian diplomat Iuliia Osmolovska warned that Moscow also benefits from failed negotiations by exhausting Western governments until they pressure Kyiv to concede.

Before 2022, Russia signed 26 ceasefires in eastern Ukraine; none lasted more than two weeks. A pause can bank concessions, rotate troops, and let Moscow resume fighting from a stronger position.

A dog was caught in mesh beside a frontline road and could not free itself. Ukrainian soldiers stopped their vehicle, cut away the netting, and released it, as footage Ukrainian serviceman Denys Lysak posted on 10 August 2026 shows.

The netting is meant to shield traffic from Russian FPV drones, but it can also trap animals left in the combat zone. The roadside rescue reflects how Russia's war against Ukraine has adversely impacted animals throughout Ukraine, while also highlighting a familiar relationship along Ukraine’s front, where soldiers feed, shelter, and sometimes take in the animals they encounter.

Lysak wrote that animals left without owners suffer greatly in areas affected by fighting. Ukrainian troops try to feed, evacuate, or shelter them, he said. Many units have taken in several rescued cats and dogs.

“Unfortunately, you can’t help all of them, but we try,” Lysak said.

The animals Ukrainian troops find at the front

Across Ukraine, animals are caught in the crossfire—injured, stranded, or driven from their habitats. Sometimes Ukrainian troops reach them in time, as they did during the Special Operations Forces' (SSO) “Operation Bambi.”

Rangers from the 6th Separate Special Operations Regiment found a frightened fawn while clearing a Russian position, according to footage the SSO released on 15 August. The video shows the animal nestled against one soldier as the unit moved out.

Some animals remain with the units that find them. Euromaidan Press reported in 2022 on Max, a Belgian shepherd abandoned by a Russian National Guard unit in Mykolaiv Oblast. A villager sheltered him before handing him to Ukraine’s National Guard, where handlers began teaching the former Russian service dog to follow commands in Ukrainian.

The fawn’s destination remains unknown. The SSO said only that it had been evacuated from the danger zone. Kharkiv volunteers had evacuated 18,800 animals by October 2024, but only around one-fifth had been reunited with their owners.

Russia's assault on Ukraine's ecosystem

Russia’s war has also affected wildlife beyond the trenches. Marine biologist Ivan Rusev estimated that more than 100,000 Black Sea dolphins have died since 2022, with sonar, underwater blasts, mines, and pollution among the suspected causes.

Russia’s destruction of the Kakhovka Dam dealt another blow. The floodwaters swept through areas holding 70% of the world’s Nordmann’s birch mice and half its sandy blind mole-rats, while killing tens of thousands of nesting birds.

Ukrainian emergency services confirmed a large fire at the Pochaina book market in Kyiv’s Obolonskyi district after an overnight Russian ballistic attack on 16 August. Several rows of stalls were burned. The strike comes amid mounting losses across Ukraine’s book industry, as Russian strikes burn printing houses, markets, and the millions of books within them.

Pochaina’s latest fire is at least the third to damage the market or adjoining trading rows since mid-June. For decades, the sprawling market has served as part bookshop, part flea market, and part archive of Kyiv life — a place to hunt through rare titles, vinyl, and remnants of the 20th century. Officials have not said Russia deliberately targeted it, however, the damage lands amid repeated attacks on Ukraine’s publishing chain and efforts to remove Ukrainian literature under occupation.

By 9:36 a.m., rescuers had extinguished fires at four locations in Kyiv and were dismantling damaged structures. Three people were hospitalized: two in moderate condition and one with light injuries. Pochaina metro station remained open, but damage to its glass entrance temporarily closed one vestibule.

Founded in 1997, Pochaina grew into Kyiv’s largest book market, offering everything from novels to specialist literature, according to a 2020 preservation petition. Independent vendors organized to defend it after plans emerged to clear the site for another shopping center. The campaign described the market as a cultural institution that supported thousands of jobs.

The adjoining weekend flea market endured the invasion and disappearance of tourists. In 2023, the Associated Press found hundreds browsing stalls stocked with vintage medals, ceramics, VHS tapes, and cracked guitars.

Russia destroys books as part of its war against Ukraine

Russian attacks have damaged publishing houses, printing plants, warehouses, libraries, bookshops, and markets across Ukraine.

The 16 August attack was not the first time Russia had hit Pochaina. A Russian attack damaged book-market pavilions in mid-June. On 30 July, falling missile debris ignited nearby stalls and destroyed collections of antiques, vinyl, and Ukrainian household artifacts, Suspilne reported.

Russia's war against Ukraine has particularly devastated Ukraine's publishing houses and their infrastructure. A 2024 Russian strike on Kharkiv’s Factor Druk printing house killed seven workers and burned 50,000 books. On 1 August 2026, a drone destroyed about eight million books at publisher Ranok’s warehouse.

Reuters reported that Russian strikes destroyed more than 10 million books in recent months.

In occupied areas, Russian forces have also seized Ukrainian history books and burned Ukrainian literature in boiler houses, Ukrainian authorities say.

Yet the Ukrainian book industry continues to thrive, despite Russia's assault. In 2025, Ukraine registered a record 117 new publishing businesses.

On 14 August 2026, Polish broadcaster RMF FM identified American-Ukrainian rapper and video blogger Kyivstoner as the previously unnamed target of an alleged Russian-directed assassination plot in Warsaw. The case comes as European authorities investigate suspected Russian attacks and sabotage across the continent.

The alleged plot against Kyivstoner comes amid attacks on Kremlin critics abroad, including the fatal shooting of a Russian opposition artist in Poland in June.

Polish authorities disclosed the Kyivstoner's case on 13 August but withheld the target’s identity. RMF’s identification points to a possible motive, though it relies on unverified allegations from the FSB, Russia's domestic security agency that Kyivstoner of managed drone deliveries intended for attacks near Moscow.

Who is Kyivstoner?

Kyivstoner was born Albert Vasiliev and uses the name Slevin Dadyan on his US passport. He gained attention through humorous videos and the Ukrainian group Hryby before releasing solo tracks, including “Leto” (Summer) and “Zvuk” (Sound).

In a 2025 interview, Vasiliev voiced support for Ukrainians and opposition to Russian occupation, saying Russian ruler Vladimir Putin made him angry and that he wanted civilians and soldiers to stop dying.

In July 2026, Russia’s FSB accused Kyivstoner of overseeing logistics for a foiled drone attack on a defense enterprise near Moscow.

The agency alleged that 35 drones assembled in Kyiv were concealed in a shipment of ceramic tiles and smuggled into Russia through Slovakia, Poland, and Belarus. Russian authorities also added Vasiliev to a register of people they label as involved in extremist or terrorist activity.

Vasiliev responded on Instagram by mocking Russia's allegation, saying he had been relaxing and playing video games rather than organizing an attack.

Russian authorities also accuse him of cooperating with Ukrainian intelligence. He denies the accusations, and RMF offered no independent evidence to substantiate them.

Suspect detained before alleged attack

Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Polish services detained the Russian suspect on 7 August, stopping the alleged attack “at the last minute.” US services assisted the operation. A Polish court remanded the man in custody for three months.

The journalists described the Russian citizen as a native of Donbas in eastern Ukraine. Tusk said the target, who holds Ukrainian and US passports, was “inconvenient to the Putin regime.”

The prime minister called it the first Russian-ordered attempt of its kind against a US citizen in another NATO country.

Killings and disrupted plots across Europe

Throughout Europe, Russia has tried to hunt down and kill anti-Kremlin critics and supporters of Ukraine. In June, Russian opposition artist Robert Kuzovkov, known as Semyon Skrepetsky, was shot dead in eastern Poland. Hours earlier, he had reported threats from “Russian patriots.” Polish authorities detained two Belarusian nationals, but have not attributed the killing to Moscow.

US and German services also reportedly foiled a Russian plot against Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger in 2024. German intelligence later treated the surveillance of Bavarian drone manufacturer Donaustahl’s CEO as a suspected planned assassination.

Polish police detained two women in connection with an attack on Ukrainian men outside a Poznań restaurant, Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński announced. The incident comes as Polish-Ukrainian relations grow more strained and public attitudes toward Ukrainians worsen. The incident occurred shortly after midnight on 13 August on Półwiejska Street.

Police data obtained by Rzeczpospolita show 180 hate-crime reports involving Ukrainian citizens in the first half of 2026, over 30% more than a year earlier. Police have not said whether they are treating the Poznań case as a hate crime, although the recording includes nationality-based abuse.

One woman insulted two Ukrainian men, spat at one, knocked over a restaurant parasol, and struck one of the men, the Polish radio station RMF FM reported.

Regional police spokesperson Iwona Liszczyńska said officers responded to reports of two apparently intoxicated women. However, the women had left before officers arrived. Police contacted the restaurant manager, who filed a formal complaint on the morning of 14 August. Officers had already begun identifying the women before the complaint was filed.

Kierwiński first reported that police had detained one woman and identified the other. He later announced the second woman’s detention and declared “zero tolerance for aggression and hatred.”

Previous attacks on Ukrainians in Poland

Kierwiński’s warning followed a series of attacks against Ukrainians in Poland this year. In July, three men allegedly beat a Ukrainian couple in Wrocław after asking whether the woman was Ukrainian. Police detained two suspects and treated the assault as a nationality-motivated hate crime.

In May, police detained five suspects aged 15 to 18 after an attack on three Ukrainian teenagers in Warsaw. One of them, 16-year-old Artem, suffered a fractured skull. 

Earlier in July, two men linked to Poland’s far right confronted a Ukrainian woman at her legal-aid office in Poznań. They demanded entry and asked whether she supported Stepan Bandera, a WWII-era Ukrainian nationalist disliked by many Poles.

Historical dispute deepens political rift

The Poznań incident comes as anti-Ukrainian themes have gained ground in Polish far-right politics, while Warsaw and Kyiv remain divided over the WWII-era Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Many Ukrainians honor the UPA for resisting Soviet rule. Poland holds it responsible for massacring Polish civilians. 

Poland and Ukraine’s dispute over the Volhynia massacres, exhumations, and UPA symbols has prompted protests and a diplomatic clash over state honors. Police have not linked the Poznań attack to that dispute. 

Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev confirmed that a missile struck an unnamed industrial enterprise overnight on 15 August 2026. Andrii Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, said the Progress Rocket Space Center was burning. He provided no damage details.

Progress would be a significant target because it builds Soyuz-2 rockets used to launch Rassvet, Russia’s planned alternative to Starlink. Its Soyuz-2.1b rockets carried Russia’s first serial-production Rassvet satellites into orbit this year. However, neither the governor’s statement nor available imagery establishes that Progress itself was hit.

Exilenova+ published early footage from Samara and reported that a Flamingo cruise missile had struck the city.

A mature Rassvet network could reduce Russia’s dependence on unauthorized Starlink terminals. For now, neither damage to Progress nor the reported use of a Flamingo missile has been independently confirmed.

Open-source analysts at Falcon Insight Map geolocated the smoke near Aviakor’s Building No. 106. Militarnyi said Aviakor and Progress sit a few hundred meters apart, and available images could not establish which enterprise was hit. The industrial area lies roughly 900 kilometers from Ukraine.

Kyiv pushes strikes deeper into Russia

Ukraine has increasingly attacked factories far behind the front to disrupt the supply chains sustaining Russian weapons production.

Speaking separately to Euromaidan Press, defense scholar Marc DeVore urged Ukraine to disrupt Russian missile production and launches. Retired US Lieutenant General Ben Hodges noted that Ukraine’s interceptor shortage means it is better to “kill the archer” than try to stop every arrow. 

In June 2026, Ukrainian cruise missiles hit a Voronezh semiconductor plant supplying components for the Pantsir-S1, Iskander-K, and Kh-101.

A reported Flamingo strike in July also damaged the Avitek defense plant in Kirov, more than 1,200 kilometers from Ukraine.

The deeper strikes come as Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) says Russian factories are producing 110% to 120% of their monthly missile quotas. 

How the Samara plant supports Russia’s Starlink alternative

The Progress factory in Samara makes the Soyuz-2.1b rockets used to launch Rassvet satellites developed by Russia’s Bureau 1440. A second batch of 16 entered orbit in July, bringing the serial constellation to 32.

Rassvet’s coverage remains intermittent. However, Moscow plans to deploy 292 satellites by the end of 2027 and 924 by 2035. A Ukrainian defense adviser estimated that continuous service would require 200–250 satellites.

On 14 August, Ukraine's Military Intelligence (HUR) published data on 26 vessels via its War&Sanctions portal, noting that 18 ships face no sanctions from any of Ukraine's partner countries.

The agency said the ships carry Russian oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), or agricultural products from occupied Ukraine. Euromaidan Press could not independently verify HUR’s vessel records.

Russia relies on maritime trade both to fund its war through energy exports and to sell crops taken from occupied Ukraine. Kyiv began building a dedicated system against Russia’s shadow grain fleet in April, modeled on its oil-fleet campaign. A US bill introduced this week would also target vessels, owners, insurers, and ports involved in sanctions evasion. HUR’s new list shows how many ships remain outside those restrictions.

Russia’s grain shadow fleet

HUR divided the 26 vessels into three groups:

• oil tankers serving Lukoil, Rosneft, Surgutneftegas, Novatek, Tatneft, and Gazprom;
• dry-cargo ships using the occupied ports of Berdiansk, Sevastopol, Kerch, and Feodosia;
• LNG carriers moving gas from the sanctioned SAAM FSU floating storage unit, which holds LNG from the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project.

HUR highlighted three of the 18 vessels that are not facing partner sanctions. The bulk carrier LAMAR S repeatedly loaded wheat at the Avlita terminal in occupied Sevastopol in 2026 for delivery abroad, including to Syria, the agency said.

NAYA FALCON carried baking soda and granulated wheat bran from occupied Sevastopol to Egypt and Cyprus, HUR said. The agency linked the oil tanker GREGAL to UAE-based Cymare Navigation FZC, which it described as affiliated with Sovcomflot, Russia’s state-controlled shipping company.

Russia steals grain while striking Ukraine’s exports

Crops taken from occupied land are sold abroad as Russian produce, while Russia's attacks leave Ukraine’s legitimate harvest with fewer routes to market.

Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service said Russia sold more than 2 million tons of grain from occupied Ukraine as Russian produce in 2025. The agency said ship-to-ship transfers at Kavkaz helped conceal its origin.

Meanwhile, Russian attacks have squeezed Ukraine’s legitimate grain trade. Strikes on civilian ships brought the Black Sea corridor to a near standstill during the July harvest peak. Ten people died when Russian missiles hit the grain-laden Golden Leo on 19 July.

HUR called on Ukraine and its partners to synchronize sanctions and detain vessels that violate restrictions. It said the measures could curb Russia’s maritime logistics and war funding.

A former fighter from the Akhmat forces, armed formations loyal to Chechnya’s Kremlin-backed ruler Ramzan Kadyrov, said he wants to fight for Ukraine after nearly a year in captivity.

Identified only as Magomed, he gave his account to Dmytro Karpenko, a Ukrainian journalist and blogger known for interviewing Russian prisoners of war, in a video published on 9 August 2026. Militarnyi, a Ukrainian military news outlet, reported on the interview on 13 August.

Magomed’s reported crossing reflects a divide that has placed Chechen fighters on both sides of Russia’s war. Since 2014, Kadyrov-loyal formations have fought for Moscow, while anti-Kremlin Chechens seeking independence from Russia have supported Kyiv.

Magomed’s account traces one fighter’s claimed passage from the first camp toward the second after Russians allegedly killed his brother. His account has not been independently verified.

The Chechen fighter said he had served near Svitlodarsk, Bakhmut, and Horlivka, including evacuating soldiers’ bodies.

Magomed also claimed two Chechens had crossed before him, prompting Russian commanders to check fighters’ phones and tighten surveillance.

According to Magomed, he later followed a Ukrainian drone toward Ukrainian positions with other Chechens. Ukrainian troops dropped medicine, water, and a radio to guide them. A Russian FPV drone attacked during the crossing and killed one Chechen, he alleged.

Ukrainian forces received the survivors and handed Magomed to the police brigade "Liut". His captivity began on 29 August 2025. Magomed also alleged that Russians killed his brother and called the death an epileptic seizure. Magomed said that drove him to fight Russia.

Militarnyi reported that Magomed had joined the International Legion, which is run by Ukraine's military intelligence. However, Karpenko’s video description says he wants to join the legion. Neither source explained the discrepancy.

What is Akhmat?

Akhmat, the unit Magomed belonged to, provides Russia with frontline troops and rear-area security. UK intelligence estimated in 2024 that around 9,000 personnel served in pro-Russian Chechen units in Ukraine.

Kadyrov’s reach has also expanded during the war. A later investigation found that his armed network had grown to 20 units across Russia’s military and security structures.

The Akhmat group's influence may extend beyond military operations. In January 2026, ATESH, a Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar partisan group, said Moscow planned to hand occupied Mariupol to Akhmat as a reward for Chechen leaders’ loyalty. The resistance organization claimed that arriving Chechen forces sought control of the city’s resources and industry.

Chechens also fight for Ukraine

On the other side, Chechens seeking an independent Ichkeria (the indigenous Chechen name for Chechnya) have fought for Ukraine since 2014.

In April 2026, Ukrainian intelligence said Shamanbat, a Ukrainian special unit that includes Free Ichkeria fighters, helped conduct drone and artillery strikes on Akhmat positions. The agency claimed the operation killed dozens of Akhmat personnel and wounded about 80.

Russia dismissed the idea of a Black Sea ceasefire on 14 August, Reuters reported, a day after the agency disclosed that Ukraine had proposed a mutual halt to attacks on civilian targets there.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said Moscow saw no grounds for measures that would give Kyiv a temporary reprieve.

Russia’s dismissal comes after its strikes drove shipowners from Odesa as Ukraine’s wheat harvest peaked. More than 90% of Ukraine’s farm exports leave through three deepwater Odesa ports. Reuters reported that Ukraine’s 12 August operation at Novorossiysk targeted a naval base and warships, although nearby grain terminals also suspended operations.

Russian forces, by contrast, have repeatedly struck foreign-flagged ships and Ukrainian port infrastructure. The disruption is stranding Ukrainian crops and raising concerns over global food supplies.

Zakharova accused Ukraine of deliberately destabilizing civilian shipping but did not mention Russia’s attacks, Reuters said. She was responding to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who said Ankara had proposed a Black Sea moratorium to both sides.

Zakharova also said Moscow had received no formal proposal from Türkiye and ruled out reviving the 2022–23 Black Sea grain deal, calling it one-sided.

Ukraine’s harvest has nowhere to go

Reuters said Ukraine’s grain exports had fallen 76% year on year so far in August. Ukraine’s Agriculture Ministry projects agricultural exports could nearly halve, from 64.4 million to 29.6 million tonnes. It expects silos to fill by October as grain backs up.

World Grain, citing the US Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service, reported that corn exports could fall 39% and wheat exports 26%. The US agency expects unsold corn stocks to rise more than tenfold.

The ministry has asked the EU for €220 million to subsidize farm loans and help producers finance autumn sowing. Reuters separately reported, citing unnamed sources in both countries, that Kyiv and Chisinau were discussing a rail route to Romania’s Constanța port. Kyiv estimates it could carry only 10% of Ukrainian grain exports.

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Ukraine and Moldova discuss rail corridor for grain amid Russian Black Sea attacks

Russia turns ports into targets

After Russia refused to extend the UN- and Türkiye-brokered grain deal in 2023, Ukraine opened its own maritime corridor. It remained operational until this summer’s escalation.

Russian forces repeatedly struck foreign-flagged vessels in July. On 19 July, Russian missiles hit the Guinea-Bissau-flagged, Turkish-owned Golden Leo as it left Odesa carrying corn. The attack killed 10 people, Ukraine’s Navy and Sea Ports Authority said. Ag Bull Trading reported that the attacks brought the corridor to its first full stop since it opened in August 2023.

Russia’s dismissal leaves Ukraine’s corridor officially open while Russian attacks continue to drive shipowners away.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said authorities had detained a Russian citizen recruited by Moscow to kill a man in Warsaw. The target holds US and Ukrainian passports, the Associated Press (AP) reported on 13 August. Tusk said Polish security services stopped the alleged attack “at the last minute.” 

Since 2022, AP has mapped about 200 acts of sabotage, arson, and disruption across Europe that officials have linked to Russia. European governments say the campaign aims to intimidate Ukraine’s supporters and disrupt military aid, while Ukrainian authorities report similar recruitment tactics inside Ukraine.

The suspect was detained on 7 August and remanded for three months, Warsaw police said. Tomasz Siemoniak, the minister overseeing Poland’s intelligence services, said the operation involved US services.

PM Tusk called it the first Russian-ordered attempt of its kind against a US citizen in another NATO country. He said the target was “inconvenient to the Putin regime,” without explaining why.

In their bulletin, Reuters reported that Russia’s Warsaw embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Moscow denies conducting a sabotage campaign in Europe.

Russia has already gone after a German arms CEO and critics of the Kremlin

European authorities had already reported plots against arms-industry figures supplying Ukraine. CNN reported in 2024 that US and German services foiled a plot against Rheinmetall chief Armin Papperger. 

Former Bellingcat investigator Christo Grozev said an intelligence insider told him he was on Russia’s kill list. He also warned Putin critic Garry Kasparov that a Russian agent trained in assassination had infiltrated exile groups to approach him.

Russia has also been accused of targeting Kremlin opponents abroad. In June, Kremlin critic Robert Kuzovkov was shot dead in Poland. Tusk said the killing resembled a political assassination, but Warsaw has not attributed it to Russia.

Russia uses disposable agents, not career spies

The alleged recruitment in Warsaw resembles tactics reported elsewhere in Europe. German investigators identified a former Ukrainian bricklayer and an untrained Romanian woman as the suspected operatives surveilling Stefan Thumann, head of Bavarian drone maker Donaustahl. German intelligence later classified the case as a suspected planned assassination.

Ukrainian authorities have reported similar recruitment at home. The SBU said an FSB-directed foreign pair killed Colonel Ivan Voronych in Kyiv in July 2025. Both suspects later died in a shootout with law enforcement.

Ukrainian police say Russian recruitment can escalate from surveillance and simple deliveries to arson, terrorism, and murder. Since the start of 2026, police and the SBU have registered 31 terrorist attacks and prevented another 14.

Ukraine and international partners agreed to work urgently on a mechanism for up to €4 billion ($4.6 billion) in farm loans, Ukrinform reported on 13 August. The plan would use a proposed €220 million ($253 million) EU grant, the Agriculture Ministry said.

Ukraine rebuilt its maritime trade after pushing Russia’s fleet away from its coast. By 2025, its Black Sea route carried about 92% of the country’s grain and oilseed exports. Russia is now striking the Odesa ports sustaining that recovery. The ministry says the attacks have closed three deep-water ports. Ukraine planned to export 64.4 million tons of agricultural products in 2026/27, but now says shipments may reach only 29.6 million tons. The proposed loan mechanism is meant to cover that cash shortfall before next year’s sowing.

EU and Norwegian diplomats joined the meeting with representatives of the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

The participants agreed to develop the plan through the Ukraine Facility and EU guarantee institutions. They aim to do so in the coming weeks, before fall storage use peaks. The grant has not yet been approved.

Odesa attacks send Kyiv toward Baltic ports

The loan plan comes as Russia’s attacks force Ukraine to seek new export routes.

Russia initially blockaded Ukraine’s ports after launching its full-scale invasion. Ukraine later restored a sea corridor after forcing much of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet away. Moscow then shifted pressure to missiles and drones, hitting Ukrainian ports 90 times in 2025 and intensifying attacks this summer.

A Russian strike killed 10 people aboard the grain-carrying Golden Leo on 19 July. Three days later, no ship passed through the corridor.

Kyiv is now considering the Polish Baltic ports of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Świnoujście. Yet the ministry estimates that all alternative routes may eventually carry only 2.9 million tons a month. Ukraine’s monthly target was 5.4 million tons.

Farm loans target next year’s sowing

The €220 million would not go directly to growers. It would subsidize interest and partly cover banks’ lending risks, including by expanding Ukraine’s “5-7-9%” affordable-loan program.

The ministry wants the support to generate €4 billion in farm loans at annual rates no higher than 10%. It calculates that every euro of grant money could mobilize more than €18 in lending.

Ukraine has also temporarily adjusted minimum export price coefficients to offset higher logistics costs, meeting participants noted. Without grain sales, farmers struggle to pay wages and land rents or buy fuel and fertilizer. By November, Ukraine's storage shortfall could reach 11 million tons of crops, with more than €10.8 billion ($12.4 billion) tied up in unsold stocks.

On 13 August, the Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar partisan movement ATESH said its agents had disabled a communications tower near Pylna in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The group said the damage disrupted links between two Russian motor rifle regiments near the border.

Pylna lies on the Russian border and was among the villages seized when Moscow opened the northern Kharkiv front in May 2024. The claimed tower attack is part of a wider Ukrainian resistance effort behind Russian lines. Moscow's forces still depend on infrastructure in occupied territory to communicate, move supplies, and hold the line. Ukraine’s underground fighters exploit that dependence from within, targeting communications, transport, and fuel supplies to create problems for Russian units at the front.

ATESH said the tower carried data between Russian command posts and coordinated units in the area. The movement said its loss disrupted command channels and delayed border-zone mobile groups. It did not say how agents disabled the tower or how long the interruption would last.

The partisans stated that the communications between Russia’s 345th and 380th motor rifle regiments were hit hardest. The regiments operate in neighboring sectors and rely on stable links for joint action and rapid responses, according to the group. ATESH claimed their offensive tempo and ability to support each other had fallen.

Neither the claimed ATESH sabotage nor its reported effects have been independently verified.

ATESH attacks on Russian supply lines

The tower claim follows ATESH’s 10 August account of sabotaging an electric locomotive near Voronezh. The group said it carried military supplies toward the Kupiansk front in Kharkiv Oblast. In June, ATESH also said agents damaged power and rail equipment near Russia’s Novomoskovsk Azot plant, whose output feeds explosives production.

ATESH has also reported intelligence work inside Russian forces. In July, the group said an agent reported a Ukrainian strike on five military fuel trucks in occupied Luhansk. Together, the claims describe a campaign against transport, fuel, and communications behind the front.

Ukrainian resistance works behind the front

The claimed tower operation is one part of the Ukrainian resistance behind Russian lines. Underground networks also gather intelligence and sustain civil defiance. 

A Euromaidan Press investigation documented groups planting explosives, tracking Russian positions, distributing leaflets, and painting Ukrainian symbols despite the threat of imprisonment and torture.

ATESH says its network includes Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, anti-war Russians, and sources inside Russia’s military and occupation administrations. Its claims are often impossible to verify independently. Taken together, they portray a campaign to make Russia’s rear less secure while other groups preserve Ukrainian identity under occupation.

Russia may expand hybrid attacks against Poland and the Baltic states, including infrastructure sabotage or false-flag attacks, Bloomberg reported on 12 August, citing an unnamed European intelligence official. 

The warnings come amid concern that Moscow wants to intimidate Ukraine’s supporters. The CIA warning follows Russian threats, incursions, alleged sabotage plots, and disinformation against Poland and the Baltic states. Most Western military aid reaches Ukraine through Poland, while the Baltic states rank among Kyiv’s strongest supporters. Sabotage of transport, energy, or communications can slow aid delivery and test NATO while hiding Russia’s role.

Separately, a European government official told Bloomberg that the CIA had warned countries in the region of a possible future Russian attack. The CIA declined to comment.

The same official said Russia might instead be creating the impression of an impending attack to sow fear as part of an information operation. The official saw no signs that Moscow was preparing a conventional attack or invasion.

Moscow tests NATO’s eastern flank

Poland and Lithuania had already raised similar concerns. In July, Poland said it had credible intelligence that Russia was planning new provocations. Lithuania later warned that Moscow might rebuild captured Ukrainian drones for false-flag strikes on critical infrastructure.

In September 2025, between 19 and 23 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, shutting down airports and damaging buildings. Poland closed four airports as NATO aircraft responded.

Meanwhile, five people are on trial in Lithuania over attacks allegedly organized for Russian military intelligence in 2024, Bloomberg reported. Lithuania has reinforced infrastructure sites and deployed troops since June.

These warnings and incidents place the CIA alert within a wider pattern of pressure on NATO’s eastern flank and Ukraine’s supporters. 

How Russia strikes without starting a war

Bloomberg cited several recent unexplained drone incidents in Germany alongside the CIA warning. Citing Die Zeit, Euromaidan Press reported that an explosive-laden drone struck the wing of a parked Ukrainian An-124 at Leipzig-Halle airport and failed to detonate. A US Defense Department official in Europe told CNN that Washington assessed the drone belonged to Russian intelligence. 

Bloomberg also reported that a cargo plane hit an unidentified object and that drones appeared over a military base the following day. It did not connect either incident to Russia.

More broadly, Russian hybrid operations have grown sharply since the full-scale invasion. CSIS found that attacks in Europe tripled from 2023 to 2024, after quadrupling the previous year. Separately, the US Helsinki Commission mapped nearly 150 operations in NATO territory attributed to or suspected of Russia between February 2022 and November 2024.

Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges told Euromaidan Press in February that attacks on ports, railways, and cables can probe routes needed for NATO reinforcements. Their deniability raises the political cost of responding.

By hiding its role, Moscow can disrupt support for Ukraine and test NATO without openly starting a war. 

A 12-year-old with a high fever died without medical care in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast, Hola Prystan official in exile Svitlana Linnyk told Ukrinform on 13 August 2026.

No medicine or medical worker was available locally, and the child’s mother could not reach an ambulance pickup point, she said.

The child's reported death comes amid a wider humanitarian crisis in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast. UN and OSCE monitors found drone attacks, mines, and movement restrictions obstructing medical aid and evacuations around Oleshky and Hola Prystan, two occupied communities across the Dnipro from Kherson city. About 6,000 civilians, including 200 children, remained in and around the two communities as of May. Similar medical shortages span occupied Ukraine, while access to free medicines has been tied to having a Russian passport.

The Hola Prystan community where the child died has no operating hospital or rural medical post, Linnyk said. Only two pharmacies remain: one in the city of Hola Prystan and another in the nearby village of Nova Zburivka. Both are selling their remaining supplies.

The nearest hospital is in Skadovsk, an occupied Black Sea port about 60 kilometers by road from Hola Prystan. Nova Zburivka’s ambulance has not operated since 2025. 

Russian occupation authorities have distributed no humanitarian aid for at least eight months to villages surrounding Hola Prystan, or for over a year in the city itself, Linnyk said. 

Linnyk said a Moscow Patriarchate priest occasionally brought supplies but gave them only to Russian passport holders. This reflects a broader pattern of tying basic services in occupied Ukraine to accepting Russian citizenship.

Ukrainian children face a medical system stripped bare 

The medical dangers surrounding the 12-year-old’s death are not confined to Hola Prystan.

In April 2025, Ukraine’s National Resistance Center reported that occupation officials were administering vaccines to children under six in Luhansk Oblast. It described the vaccines as uncertified and of unknown origin.

That November, the Center said a Russian inspection found Crimea’s main children’s hospital lacked breathing bags and cardiac monitors. It said infant mortality on the occupied peninsula had risen 9% over the previous year.

Aid comes with a Russian passport

Hola Prystan is not the only occupied community where access to care has depended on Russian citizenship.

In 2023, Russian-installed officials in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast threatened to deny medical care to residents without Russian passports. A 2025 Kremlin policy later tied free medicines for chronic illnesses to Russian citizenship.

Ukraine’s Health Ministry reported in July 2024 that Russian forces had destroyed 214 medical facilities. It said the full toll remained unknown because authorities had limited access to occupied territories. 

Russia has ceased producing its Geran-3 jet-powered attack drone, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR) told the Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi. The agency estimates Russian industry now makes about 3,000 newer Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones per month.

Russia is shifting toward faster jet drones as Ukraine’s low-cost interceptors have become more effective against slower Shaheds. The Geran-4 and Geran-5 leave defenders less time to react, requiring faster interceptors or short-range air defenses. At the reported production rate, these newer Geran models, previously used in limited numbers, could become a regular feature of Russian attacks.

HUR said Russia has established serial assembly of the two newer models at the Alabuga complex in Tatarstan, with other Russian companies supplying components. The agency also said Russia’s Defense Ministry wants to expand Alabuga’s capacity. Construction began in May. Satellite imagery showed large-scale work by early July 2026, although the purpose of the new buildings remains unknown.

From Geran-3 to newer jet drones

Russia first used Geran-3 drones in large numbers during a combined nighttime attack on Ukraine on 30 July 2025. At least eight flew alongside propeller-driven Shaheds and decoys. The model retained the Geran-2 airframe but replaced its piston engine with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet. HUR gave it a speed of 300–370 kilometers per hour and a range of up to 1,000 kilometers.

In May, then-Defense Ministry adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said Ukrainian defenses stopped 95% of incoming Shaheds during the most recent documented strike and predicted Moscow would produce more jet-powered Geran variants.

The newer Geran-4 has a more robust airframe than the Geran-3 and is designed for high-speed flight and maneuvers. It can reach 500 kilometers per hour.

The larger Geran-5 carries a roughly 90-kilogram warhead and has a stated range of up to 1,000 kilometers. HUR has said Russia may equip it with R-73 air-to-air missiles, potentially threatening aircraft sent to intercept it.

The Chinese engines that Russia itself can't build

The Geran line combines Iranian designs, Russian assembly, and imported technology. HUR described the Geran-3 as a localized version of Iran’s Shahed-238. It found 45 foreign components inside, including parts from the United States, China, Switzerland, Germany, Britain, and Japan.

Russia depends on China for the turbojet engines in newer Geran models. HUR deputy chief Vadym Skibitskyi told RBC-Ukraine that Russia remains fully dependent on Chinese turbojet engines for the Geran-4 and Geran-5. Each costs about $35,000–$40,000, he said.

A Chinese XK-F358 mesh radio recovered from a Geran-5 also helps Russian drones resist jamming. Its manufacturer remains outside the US, EU, UK, and Ukrainian sanctions, according to a review by Euromaidan Press.