Ukraine will host an informal summit of EU ministers in Lviv on December 10-11 to review Kyiv’s progress toward EU membership, Politico reports. The meeting is intended to show political support for Ukraine while allies seek ways around Hungary’s veto, which has blocked the formal accession process.

Kyiv was granted EU candidate status in 2022 and has carried out broad economic, judicial, and anti-corruption reforms amid Russia’s ongoing invasion. 

However, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán - widely regarded as Russian President Vladimir Putin's closest ally within the EU - has pledged to block accession until next year’s elections, preventing the opening of formal negotiating chapters. 

To get around the veto, EU officials are considering a “frontloading” plan, allowing Ukraine to start implementing reforms and aligning its laws with EU standards even before formal negotiations begin. This would let Kyiv advance its membership preparations so it can move quickly whenever the impasse may be lifted.

The invitation for the Lviv meeting was sent jointly by Denmark, holding the EU Council presidency, and Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka. 

Officials say the discussions will focus on reviewing reform progress, planning next steps, and reaffirming political support. Frontloading reforms also applies to neighboring Moldova, which faces a similar accession path.

Officials told Politico that frontloading will allow Kyiv to move quickly once Hungary lifts its veto, which may happen after the Hungarian parliamentary elections in early 2026.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the positive assessment of Ukraine’s reforms from Brussels, saying the country will become a full EU member “in a fair way when Ukraine is standing for itself and when the war is over.”

The European People's Party is blocking efforts to launch a parliamentary inquiry into allegations that Hungarian intelligence services ran a spy ring inside EU institutions in Brussels, arguing that an investigation would only serve Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's anti-Brussels narrative.

The EPP's opposition sets up a clash with progressive groups—the Greens, Socialists, and Renew Europe liberals—who are pushing for an inquiry committee to be established immediately following revelations that Hungarian agents posed as diplomats to recruit EU employees as informants between 2013 and 2018.

Why the EPP fears investigating spying allegations

The EPP's caution carries added irony given its own history with Orbán.

Orbán's Fidesz party was a longtime EPP member until March 2021, when Fidesz formally left the grouping after years of growing tensions over democratic backsliding in Hungary.

The EPP had suspended Fidesz's membership in 2019 but avoided outright expulsion, allowing Orbán to exit on his own terms before facing formal removal.

This creates an unusual situation where the largest political group in the European Parliament is effectively opposing accountability measures against a government accused of espionage—because holding that government accountable might strengthen its domestic political position.

The conservative bloc's stance reflects a political calculation, that a formal parliamentary probe would hand Orbán ammunition for his long-running campaign portraying Brussels as hostile to Hungary. The EPP apparently believes that keeping the investigation within the European Commission's administrative process limits Orbán's ability to turn the scandal into political theater.

The spy scandal that triggered the political standoff

The controversy erupted in October after investigative reports by Belgium's De Tijd, Hungary's Direkt36, Germany's Der Spiegel, and Austria's Der Standard revealed how Hungarian intelligence officers worked undercover at Hungary's EU mission in Brussels. The agents allegedly attempted to recruit Hungarian staff at the European Commission as informants.

The operation reportedly ran with the knowledge of the then-ambassador, Olivér Várhelyi, who now serves as the European Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare. Várhelyi denies any knowledge of espionage activities.

Key details from the investigation:

• Intelligence officers posed as diplomats at Hungary's Permanent Representation to the EU
• The spy network operated between 2013 and 2018, targeting EU employees
• Olivér Várhelyi led the mission from 2015 to 2019 during part of this period
• Multiple sources confirmed the operation, including insiders from Hungarian intelligence

The European Commission launched its own administrative probe after the reports emerged, but Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declined to suspend Várhelyi pending the investigation.

Parliamentary powers and political calculations

The European Parliament cannot remove individual commissioners—only pass a motion of censure requiring the entire Commission to resign with a two-thirds majority. This nuclear option makes progressive groups' push for a parliamentary inquiry more about political pressure and public accountability than immediate action.

The progressives see the inquiry as essential for documenting the full extent of Hungarian intelligence operations inside EU institutions and forcing transparency about security breaches. The EPP's blocking position suggests the conservative grouping is more concerned about managing political optics than investigating espionage.

Hungary has repeatedly aided authoritarian regimes or become entangled in scandals under Orbán's leadership, including extraditing Russian arms smugglers to Moscow instead of the US and helping smuggle North Macedonia's former premier across European borders to avoid corruption charges.

Without EPP support, progressive groups cannot muster the votes needed to establish the inquiry committee. The investigation remains in the European Commission's hands, where von der Leyen walks a political tightrope—she cannot appear to protect Várhelyi without risking another no-confidence motion, yet she also cannot afford to alienate the EPP support that saved her in two recent confidence votes.

Hungary became the first NATO ally to secure exemption from US sanctions on Russian energy when President Donald Trump granted Prime Minister Viktor Orban a one-year waiver during their 7 November White House meeting, a White House official confirmed to Reuters.

The exemption allows Hungary to continue purchasing Russian oil and gas in exchange for over $1.4 billion in Hungarian commitments to US nuclear, defense, and energy purchases. The move marks a significant breach in Western sanctions against Russia, as Orban—who has vowed to veto Ukraine's EU accession and opposes its NATO membership—openly aligned with Trump in characterizing the war as unwinnable and positioning both leaders as the sole "pro-peace" voices in the West.

This development threatens Ukraine's strategic position because it weakens the coordinated sanctions regime designed to constrain Russian energy revenues that fund Moscow's war effort, while emboldening an EU and NATO member to maintain financial flows to Russia and block Ukrainian integration into Western security structures.

What happened at the White House

Trump welcomed Orban for a bilateral meeting and lunch that yielded immediate economic and diplomatic results.

Politico reported that Hungary signed a memorandum of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation valued at $20 billion, including construction of 10 small modular reactors in Budapest using US nuclear technology. Hungary also committed to purchasing $114 million in nuclear fuel from US-based Westinghouse, $600 million in liquified natural gas, and $700 million in defense materials.

The centerpiece of Orban's visit was securing relief from US sanctions targeting Russian energy. According to Reuters, a White House official confirmed Hungary received a one-year exemption from sanctions on Russian oil and gas. Trump justified the decision by citing Hungary's landlocked geography, stating "it's very difficult for him to get the oil and gas from other areas" and noting that Hungary lacks seaports for alternative energy imports.

The exemption contradicts Trump's previous pressure on European nations to cut Russian energy purchases to economically isolate Moscow.

BBC analysis noted that Hungary and Slovakia together have paid Russia $13 billion for oil between Russia's February 2022 invasion and the end of 2024, providing critical hard currency to Moscow despite Western sanctions efforts.

Why this matters for Ukraine's security

The sanctions exemption directly undermines Ukraine's defensive capabilities by preserving Russian energy revenues that finance military operations. Russian oil and gas sales remain Moscow's primary source of hard currency for weapons procurement, troop salaries, and military industrial production—the economic foundation sustaining Russia's invasion.

More strategically, the exemption creates the first formal crack in the unified Western sanctions architecture. If a NATO and EU member can obtain preferential treatment on Russian energy, other nations may seek similar exemptions, accelerating the collapse of coordinated economic pressure that has been one of the West's primary non-military tools against Russian aggression.

The exemption also rewards Orban's obstructionism toward Ukraine within European institutions. Politico reported that Orban has declared he would veto Ukraine's accession to the European Union and opposes Ukrainian NATO membership—positions that directly contradict the policies of most NATO allies and EU members who view Ukrainian integration as essential to long-term European security.

Orban's opposition to Ukrainian victory and Western support

During the White House meeting, Orban openly expressed skepticism about Ukraine's ability to prevail militarily against Russia. When Trump asked whether Orban believed Ukraine could win the war, Orban responded evasively: "Miracle[s] can happen," according to Politico. This framing aligns with Trump's characterization of the war as unwinnable through military means and contradicts the position of NATO leadership and most European governments that sustained military aid is essential to Ukrainian defense.

Orban described the US and Hungary as the only "pro-peace" governments addressing the Russia-Ukraine war, and characterized other European nations as "misunderstanding" the conflict by believing Ukraine can prevail on the battlefield, according to the Politico report. This rhetorical positioning isolates Ukraine diplomatically by suggesting that support for Ukrainian military resistance represents a misguided approach rather than legitimate defense of sovereignty.

Trump also revived plans to host a peace summit in Budapest with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Ukraine. Last month, Orban was reportedly offered the opportunity to host such a summit, though that plan "quickly disintegrated," Politico reported. During the 7 November meeting, Trump stated: "If we have it, I'd like to do it in Budapest"—suggesting Hungary could serve as the venue for negotiations that would likely marginalize Ukrainian input and European perspectives on territorial integrity and security guarantees.

The trade package and Hungary's pivot

The economic package Hungary committed to represents a significant financial outlay designed to demonstrate reciprocity with the Trump administration. The BBC reported that the nuclear agreement includes construction of 10 small modular reactors valued between $10 billion and $20 billion, which Hungary needs to power expanding Chinese battery manufacturing plants around the country. These smaller nuclear facilities face fewer construction delays and licensing complications than traditional large-scale plants.

Hungary also agreed to purchase $114 million in nuclear fuel from US-based Westinghouse for its Paks 1 nuclear power station, which was built by the Soviet Union in the 1980s and currently supplies approximately 40% of Hungary's electricity needs, according to the BBC. The US agreement to lift nuclear sanctions on Hungary may help restart the long-delayed Paks 2 expansion project, which has been financed and designed by Russia's Rosatom but faces persistent technical and licensing obstacles.

Orban framed the visit as the beginning of "phase two" in Hungary's improving relationship with the Trump administration, referencing what he characterized as "politically motivated sanctions" from the Biden administration against his top aide, Antal Rogan, who was sanctioned for corruption allegations, Politico reported.

Implications for Western unity and Ukrainian support

The meeting creates several concerning scenarios for Ukraine and the broader Western alliance. If Trump's precedent encourages other nations—particularly those with less stable democratic institutions or closer ties to Russia—to request similar exemptions, the coordinated sanctions regime could fragment rapidly. The divergence between Hungary's position and that of other NATO and EU members will deepen existing tensions within both institutions, undermining the unified deterrence posture that underpins Ukrainian security.

The exemption complicates Congressional support for Ukraine. Congress controls military aid to Kyiv and now faces questions about backing a country while its NATO ally undermines sanctions on Russia's main revenue source. Trump's willingness to host peace talks in Budapest, paired with Orban's skepticism about Ukrainian victory, signals negotiations could pressure Ukraine into territorial concessions and forced neutrality.

The BBC noted that critics argue energy dependence on Russia is merely being replaced by energy dependence on the US, while the Orban government contends it is achieving greater diversity of supply. However, the one-year timeframe for the exemption—expiring just after Hungary's April 2026 election—suggests the waiver is designed primarily to boost Orban's domestic political position rather than address structural energy security concerns.

Read also:

• Sanction me softly: Trump, Orbán, and the oil that binds them
• Europe spends € 2 billion a month on Russian oil and LNG—more than its aid to Ukraine

US President Donald Trump left the door open to a potential meeting with Vladimir Putin in Budapest, telling reporters "there's always a chance" when asked about the possibility.

Trump made the comment on 7 November as he welcomed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to the White House.

The US president greeted Orbán on the White House portico but declined to answer other questions from journalists, instead pointing to the Hungarian leader and calling him a "magnificent leader."

The meeting comes as Orbán is expected to push for Hungary to be exempted from US sanctions targeting Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil. The Hungarian prime minister has reportedly prepared what sources describe as a "large-scale energy proposal" for the United States.

Orbán is also planning to try to convince Trump to meet with the Kremlin chief, according to Evropeyska Pravda.

The 7 November meeting at the White House represents Orbán's latest effort to position himself as a bridge between Washington and Moscow since Trump's return to the presidency.

Ukraine’s President said halting Russian oil exports to Hungary is inevitable. Meanwhile, after Hungary had spent months insisting that Russian oil supplies were irreplaceable, Hungary's sole refiner now says it can receive 80% of crude from non-Russian sources.

Zelenskyy says Hungary will not receive Russian oil for long

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine will stop Russian oil from reaching Hungary, though it cannot happen immediately due to various dependencies. He spoke following a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff on 7 November, Liga reported.

“We can’t allow Russians to keep making money on energy,” Zelenskyy said. “Even where they twist our arms through various contracts or obligations, we’ll still find a way to make sure Russian oil disappears from Europe. [...] We won’t let the Russians sell oil there. It’s a matter of time. We can’t do it today because there are many different dependencies in this puzzle, but we’ll still complete the picture.”

He also commented on Hungary PM Viktor Orbán’s attempts to block Ukraine’s European Union accession.

“[Russians] couldn’t do it. If he thinks delaying it by six months will stop Ukraine, then no, it won’t,” the President said.

MOL says 80% of crude can come from non-Russian sources

Hungarian oil company Mol said on the same day it can meet about 80% of its supply needs using crude delivered through Croatia’s Adriatic pipeline. The statement appeared in the company’s earnings report, a few hours before Orbán’s scheduled meeting with Trump at the White House, where Hungary's leader aimed to secure an exemption from US sanctions on Russian oil, Bloomberg reported. 

Explore further

Sanction me softly: Trump, Orbán, and the oil that binds them

Mol operates refineries in Hungary and Slovakia. It stated that “should the crude flows via the Druzhba pipeline drop significantly, Mol can increase its utilization of the Adriatic pipeline and supply ca. 80% of its landlocked refineries’ intake, although entailing higher technical risks and logistics costs.”

Mol said it is “cautiously progressing” with upgrades at its refineries in Hungary and Slovakia to expand their ability to process non-Russian crude.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán plans to ask US President Donald Trump to exempt Hungary from new American sanctions targeting Russian oil. The meeting is set for 7 November and will be the first bilateral talks between Orbán and Trump since the latter’s return to the White House, Reuters reports.

Orbán says Hungary needs a waiver due to geography and energy reliance

Orbán announced that he will seek relief from the latest US sanctions imposed on Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil. According to him, Hungary’s energy dependence and lack of sea access make it uniquely vulnerable.

“Hungary is a landlocked country... We are dependent on those transport routes through which energy can reach Hungary. These are mostly pipelines,” Orbán said. “We have to make the Americans understand this peculiar situation... if we want them to allow exemptions from the American sanctions against Russia,” he added.

The US sanctions came just days after a fire broke out at the main Danube refinery owned by Hungarian oil group MOL, forcing the plant to operate at reduced capacity, further threatening Hungary’s already fragile fuel situation.

Orbán invokes Germany’s exemption as a precedent

Orbán also cited Germany’s case as justification for Hungary’s request. Berlin had previously secured an exemption from US sanctions for the German assets of Rosneft, which owns a controlling stake in the Schwedt refinery. Reuters reports that Germany’s economy minister confirmed on 29 October that Washington granted the exemption because the refinery is no longer under Russian control.

Hungary is seeking to create a Ukraine-skeptic alliance within the EU, aligning with political forces in Czechia and Slovakia. Pro-Russian Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s inner circle is pushing to reshape regional cooperation in a way that could stall Brussels’ support for Ukraine, Politico reports.

Hungary aims to form anti-Ukraine alliance with Czechia and Slovakia

Orbán is working to form a political bloc inside the EU with Czechia and Slovakia, according to his political director Balázs Orbán. The plan involves cooperation with Czech populist leader Andrej Babiš and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, both of whom have expressed skepticism over continued European aid to Ukraine.

The political director told Politico the group would aim to coordinate ahead of EU Council summits and potentially act as a joint force to shape the bloc’s position. While the alliance remains informal for now, Hungary hopes it will grow stronger over time.

Echoes of the past: from the Visegrád 4 to a new V3

This would not be the first time such an alliance emerged in Central Europe. During the 2015 migration crisis, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland formed the so-called Visegrád 4 (V4), opposing mandatory relocation of migrants and promoting hardline border policies. At the time, the alliance was led by then-Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and coordinated closely on social and migration issues.

But after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the group fractured. Poland became a key backer of Ukraine, while Hungary took the opposite stance. The potential new formation would exclude Poland, whose current Prime Minister Donald Tusk strongly supports Ukraine.

Instead, Hungary is looking to Fico and Babiš, who have both called for negotiations with Moscow and questioned sanctions against Russia. Still, concrete steps remain limited. Fico, re-elected in 2023, has not formally joined Orbán on any shared policies, and Babiš has yet to form a government after his recent election win.

Orbán’s ambitions reach beyond the Council

Balázs Orbán said Budapest aims to grow its influence in the European Parliament. Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party, part of the far-right Patriots for Europe group, is looking to build ties with other conservative or populist factions, including the European Conservatives and Reformists and the Europe of Sovereign Nations group. He also mentioned interest in “some leftist groups.”

Hungary continues blocking Moldova and Ukraine from opening their first EU negotiation clusters despite both countries completing all screening requirements, as Moldovan President Maia Sandu rejected proposals to decouple the two countries’ accession paths.

Both countries completed screening requirements for opening negotiation clusters. Ukraine finished screening its first cluster in November 2024 and its second cluster in March 2025, while Moldova completed its screening in September 2025. The European Commission stated in October 2024 that screening was “progressing smoothly” for both countries, and the European Council acknowledged in June 2025 that “the fundamentals cluster is ready to be opened.”

Hungary stalls both countries

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has not raised objections to Moldova’s accession but continues blocking Ukraine, citing Hungarian minority rights concerns in Transcarpathia. Budapest’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó said in March, “Hungary cannot support any progress in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations until this unacceptable situation is resolved.”

The parallel accession paths became politically linked after both countries applied for EU membership in March 2022, received candidate status simultaneously that June, and opened negotiations together on 25 June 2024. Brussels has maintained this coupling as a geopolitical signal, with EU officials telling Euronews in July that “the decoupling of the enlargement process between Moldova and Ukraine is not for now”—separating them would suggest “strategic acquiescence to Russia’s destabilising goals in the region.”

Moldova’s refusal to proceed alone now forces Brussels to either bypass Hungary’s veto or accept indefinite delays for both countries.

“We are at the stage where we need to start the next round of negotiations. This is blocked by Hungary's refusal towards Ukraine,” Sandu told Moldova’s Rock FM radio. Asked about proceeding with limited membership rights, she dismissed the idea: “We have not discussed such an option. Of course, we want to become full members of the European Union.”

Ukraine’s self-inflicted setback

Beyond Hungarian obstruction, Ukraine’s path encountered complications in July when President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed controversial anti-corruption legislation. Brussels had secretly planned to bypass Hungary’s veto by opening Ukraine’s first cluster on 18 July, but abandoned the plan four days after the law was signed. The Ukrainian parliament later repealed the legislation following both internal and international pressure.

In October, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka said that “creative solutions” could enable opening six negotiating clusters in December. European Council President António Costa has proposed allowing cluster openings by qualified majority rather than unanimous consent, though the Netherlands defended Hungary’s veto rights at the October Copenhagen summit.

In her interview with Rock FM, Sandu emphasized that both countries have fulfilled their commitments, as confirmed by the European Commission. She expressed hope that “a solution will soon be found.”

The standoff tests whether EU member states can indefinitely block enlargement even after candidates meet technical requirements—a precedent that could reshape how Brussels manages future accessions.

Read also:

• Ukraine expects EU accession talks breakthrough in December as Hungary faces growing pressure
• Kyiv's EU hopes collide with Dutch veto defense at Copenhagen summit

Western policymakers hoping Hungary's April 2026 election solves the Ukraine obstruction problem need to look closer at the man they're counting on. Péter Magyar, the opposition leader polling ahead of Viktor Orbán, opposes Ukraine's fast-track EU membership, won't support weapons deliveries, and has explicitly admitted he avoids the Ukraine topic because it's "too divisive" for voters he needs to persuade.

On Thursday, hundreds of thousands filled Budapest's streets in rival demonstrations—the latest barometer of the political contest ahead of April's election. Magyar's supporters shouted "Russians go home!" at Heroes' Square, while Orbán's pro-government marchers carried banners reading "We don't want to die for Ukraine!"

Regime change won't change Hungary's stance. The problem runs deeper than one leader, Hungarian journalist Szilárd Teczár tells Euromaidan Press.

Magyar's actual position: softer words, same obstruction

Magyar calls Russia the aggressor—a rhetorical improvement over Orbán's careful silence. But when pressed on substance, he said Ukraine "is at war and currently does not meet the accession criteria, so no one can seriously consider this a relevant issue."

What practically means: no fast-track EU membership, no urgent action. Just vague future promises.

His Tisza Party MEPs voted for a September 2024 European Parliament resolution calling for more weapons to Ukraine. They wore Ukrainian flag T-shirts for Zelenskyy's 1,000-day war speech.

But when it mattered—when the European People's Party drafted a hawkish defense declaration in March 2025—Magyar's signature mysteriously appeared and then mysteriously disappeared.

The document called for unconditional military support, lifting restrictions on Western weapons striking Russian territory, and requiring member states to allocate 0.25% of GDP to Ukraine. Magyar claimed for days his signature was added "by mistake"—until European Parliament President Roberto Metsola confirmed the error would be "remedied."

Even if genuine, the incident reveals Magyar's dilemma: the EPP expects full Ukraine support as the price of membership, but Hungarian voters punish politicians who provide it.

Why he can't change course

"Magyar openly admitted in an interview that he shouldn't emphasize this topic too much because it's very divisive in society, and he needs to concentrate on things where he can persuade the most voters," explains Szilárd Teczár, a Hungarian researcher specializing in disinformation and foreign information manipulation, in an interview with Euromaidan Press.

The numbers back his caution. When Magyar's own Tisza Party conducted an informal referendum on Ukraine's EU membership, only 58% of his supporters favored it—hardly a mandate for championing Kyiv's cause. Meanwhile, Orbán's government-backed consultation claimed 95% opposition, though Magyar dismissed it as propaganda with just 3-7% actual participation.

"Society is very polarized," Teczár says. On one side, people who see Putin as a war criminal. On the other, Orbán supporters who've absorbed years of anti-Ukraine messaging. Magyar's right-wing voter base won't tolerate a pro-Ukraine shift, and Fidesz stands ready to brand any Ukraine support as betrayal.

They've already started. The government ran billboards portraying Zelenskyy alongside Magyar, painting both as threats to Hungary. When one of Magyar's military advisors, former Chief of General Staff Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, suggested that EU membership could enable troop deployment to Ukraine, Fidesz weaponized it instantly: "Magyar wants to send Hungarian soldiers to die in Ukraine."

"All the smear campaign tactics don't really work against them the way they did before," Teczár notes, since Magyar came "from inside Fidesz—he's a right-winger as well." But this means Magyar must be even more careful not to provide ammunition. Pro-Ukraine positions are ammunition.

The electoral math that prevents change

Magyar's Tisza Party has surged since emerging in early 2024, achieving nearly 30% in the European Parliament elections and polling competitively with Fidesz heading into April 2026. Opposition-aligned polls show Tisza leading 43-44% to Fidesz's 35-41%, though pro-government pollsters dispute these numbers.

But those voters Magyar needs to win? They're not pro-Ukraine. Fidesz's base—older, rural, less educated Hungarians who've dominated elections since 2010—opposes Ukraine support even more strongly than the national average. Meanwhile, younger urban voters who might support Ukraine are already with Magyar. He has little to gain and much to lose by championing Kyiv's cause.

"I would still be very cautious about predicting election results," Teczár warns. "Fidesz has advantages in terms of financial resources, representation in the state apparatus, and so on."

Even if Magyar wins, his hands remain tied. He's promised to prioritize "Hungary's national interests" over personal political motives when using EU vetoes—a distinction without much difference when Hungarian public opinion opposes Ukraine membership and weapons deliveries.

The Publicus Institute poll conducted 11-18 October 2024 showed Tisza at 24% among the entire population versus Fidesz at 23%, but among decided voters, the breakdown was 39% for Tisza versus 37% for Fidesz. 

According to Medián poll from November 2024, among those with party preference, Tisza's lead was 43% against 39% for Fidesz, and among voters promising to participate, Tisza garnered 46% while Fidesz gained only 39%.

Vox Populi, which compiles polling institute data, showed Tisza in the lead in September 2025 by anywhere from 4% to 14%.

What would actually change

The optimistic scenario: Magyar might be quieter about opposition. He won't actively tour Europe undermining Ukraine the way Orbán does. He might not veto every single Ukraine-related measure, just most of them.

Teczár sees a marginal shift possible: "Maybe after the elections, if they win, there could be changes." But the timeline matters—any softening would come after April 2026, meaning another year of Hungarian obstruction at minimum.

The rhetoric would improve. Magyar acknowledges Russia as the aggressor. He criticizes Orbán for using veto power for "personal political motives" rather than national interests. But when Magyar says he'll use the veto for Hungary's interests instead, what does that mean? The same obstruction, just with better PR.

The structural problem Western allies miss

This isn't about Viktor Orbán's personal relationship with Putin. It's not about one leader's corruption or authoritarian tendencies. Those factors matter, but they're not the whole story.

Hungary's media ecosystem has been captured. Orbán's government controls most major outlets, and they've spent years framing Ukraine support as dangerous for Hungary.

The narratives have penetrated: Ukraine membership threatens Hungarian jobs, Ukrainian language laws oppress Hungarian minorities in Transcarpathia, supporting Ukraine means war escalation that Hungary can't afford.

"Because of the very close alignment between Fidesz narratives and Kremlin narratives, my feeling is that Russia simply doesn't need to invest too many resources in Hungary," Teczár explains. "Very powerful players are already doing their job anyway."

Even if Magyar wanted to help Ukraine—and there's little evidence he does—he couldn't survive it politically. Fidesz would paint him as Brussels' puppet, as a warmonger sending Hungarian boys to die for foreign interests, as an enemy of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine. And enough voters would believe it to cost him the election.

The lesson for Western policymakers

Betting on April 2026 to solve the Hungary problem means another year minimum of obstruction, followed by—at best—marginally softer obstruction from a leader who still opposes Ukraine's fast-track EU membership and weapons deliveries.

Western allies need Plan B. That might mean finding ways to work around Hungarian vetoes, strengthening bilateral support for Ukraine that doesn't require unanimity, or making Hungary's obstruction so costly that even Magyar's "national interest" calculation shifts.

But the magical thinking that regime change automatically means policy change? That needs to end. Magyar's own words and actions show he's offering Orbán-lite on Ukraine, not a reversal.

The sooner Western capitals accept this, the sooner they can develop strategies that don't depend on Hungarian cooperation that isn't coming—regardless of who wins in April.

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Romania could’ve been Ukraine’s biggest ally. Hungary made sure it isn’t.

Two young Ukrainians walked into a Nova Post office in central Bucharest on 21 October 2025, carrying packages disguised as headphones and car parts. Inside: thermite devices designed to torch the building and sever the connection between millions of displaced Ukrainians and their families back home.

Romanian intelligence neutralized the attack and arrested the suspects—two Ukrainians allegedly recruited by Russian intelligence to sabotage their own community's lifeline. The operation was hailed as a victory against Russian sabotage networks on NATO soil.

But Romanian expert Sorin Ionița, head of ExpertForum (EFOR), warns that this success shouldn't obscure deeper problems. "The intelligence services, instead of fighting the threats, were occupied with other things," Ionița tells Euromaidan Press in an exclusive conversation. "Now they don't want to talk about that anymore."

The question remains: If Romanian intelligence can stop individual attacks, why did they overlook Wagner-connected networks, far-right extremists, and Kremlin-backed politicians building infrastructure for Russia's massive intervention in Romania's 2024 presidential election?

What the world missed about Romania's near-catastrophe

"The perception of Romania abroad was quite schematic," Ionița explains. "Not only in Ukraine, but also in the West, the nuances and games of internal politics aren't correctly perceived. Romania doesn't have a very clear profile and doesn't take strong positions on the European scene, so I wouldn't blame the world for not understanding what's happening inside Romania."

For years, Romania appeared as one of Eastern Europe's most reliably anti-Russian states—ethnically homogeneous, without a significant Russian-speaking minority, and consistently pro-NATO. Ukraine and Western partners saw it as largely immune to Kremlin subversion.

Then came the 2024 presidential election. The scale of Russian interference and the extensive networks Moscow had built inside the country shattered that assumption, forcing Romania's neighbors to reassess what they thought they knew.

While Washington saw Romania as a reliable NATO ally supporting Ukraine, Romanian government ministers were publicly exploiting anti-Ukrainian narratives for popularity points. While Brussels praised Romania's European alignment, Romanian intelligence services tolerated Wagner veterans recruiting for African operations. While the West counted Romania as solidly pro-democracy, major political parties flirted with extremists until those extremists nearly won.

Take Romanian mercenary Horatiu Potra, who worked with Wagner Group in Africa and later funded far-right presidential candidate Călin Georgescu's 2024 campaign.

Potra is now an international fugitive with proven Kremlin connections.

"It's impossible that the services—for example, the Romanian military information services—didn't know that people who were in the army, veterans, but even active military or from the gendarmerie, from the Ministry of the Interior, took unpaid leave and went to Africa with Potra to do Wagner's work there," Ionița says.

They knew. Romanian intelligence tracked these movements. The question is why they did nothing while Wagner veterans returned home and channeled money into a presidential campaign that nearly succeeded.

The overlooked corruption-extremism alliance

While Western analysts focused on Russian disinformation and TikTok algorithms, Romania's real vulnerability lay closer to home: a political establishment so consumed by corruption that it actively enabled the far-right's rise. The country's major parties didn't just ignore the extremist threat—they collaborated with it, viewing far-right parties as useful tools for managing voter anger while they continued looting state resources.

"Romania's public agenda wasn't very clear," Ionița explains. "Yes, in general, pro-Europe. We help our neighbors, Moldova, Ukraine. But the first priority of the big parties, like PSD and PNL, was different. It was about stealing more—controlling state contracts, appointments, resources. Fighting Russian influence was secondary to protecting their own corruption schemes."

Romania's major parties—the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and National Liberal Party (PNL)—maintained a pro-European facade while key figures exploited anti-Ukrainian, anti-NATO narratives for domestic popularity. When grain shipments from Ukraine created minor disruptions, ministers who officially supported Kyiv suddenly started reproducing far-right talking points.

"Every time there was a controversial issue [about Ukraine, vaccines, LGBT rights, migration, energy prices etc. - ed.] you would find a minister, usually from the Social Democrats, who was exploiting it populistically," Ionița says.

"Romania's official position was supportive: we discuss and support Ukraine. But individual ministers would reproduce speeches from the far-right AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians) because they wanted to be popular with their voters. And those speeches were profoundly anti-European, anti-NATO, anti-Ukrainian, and very conspiratorial."

This wasn't accidental spillover—it was deliberate strategy. AUR party served as a useful tool for siphoning votes from angry constituents. Government ministers adopted their talking points. Intelligence services looked the other way while their networks built connections to Wagner Group and Russian operatives. Nobody thought the extremists would actually threaten the establishment's power.

Then came November 2024.

When the useful extremists stopped being useful

Călin Georgescu—a far-right candidate with minimal political infrastructure and openly pro-Russian positions—won the first round of Romania's presidential election. Not through conventional campaigning, but through a sophisticated TikTok operation that bypassed traditional media entirely.

Suddenly, the extremists Romania's establishment had tolerated as manageable protest votes weren't manageable anymore. They were winning.

"The big parties thought they could control the far-right," Ionița says. "They thought AUR and candidates like Georgescu served their interests by channeling voter frustration away from the establishment parties. They were wrong."

The TikTok campaign that propelled Georgescu revealed networks Romanian intelligence had ignored for years. Accounts were coordinated. Messaging was sophisticated. Funding sources traced back to figures like Potra, who had operated openly despite his Wagner connections.

Romania's Constitutional Court ultimately annulled the election—an unprecedented move that sparked debate about democratic legitimacy versus democratic defense. But the annulment only addressed the symptom. The networks that made Georgescu's rise possible remain intact.

The Moldova comparison nobody wants to hear

Moldova faced similar Russian interference in its 2024 elections. The difference? Moldova's institutions actually fought back before the crisis reached catastrophic levels.

"In Moldova, you had very strong efforts to counter Russian influence," Ionița notes. "The intelligence services were focused, the prosecutors were active, civil society was mobilized. They weren't perfect, but they were serious about the threat."

Romania's response? Years of looking the other way, followed by panic when extremists nearly won, followed by attempts to claim credit for stopping threats they had enabled.

"I don't think they put in as many resources as they did in Moldova," Ionița says of Romanian intelligence efforts against Russian interference. The institutional priorities were elsewhere—namely, protecting the corruption networks that the major parties depended on.

/medu

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Washington joins Moscow in embracing sovereignism

And now there's a new factor Americans need to reckon with.

Romania's nightmare scenario evolved further: Just as Romanian institutions finally mobilized against Russian-backed sovereignism, American political figures started amplifying similar narratives.

US Vice President JD Vance began promoting "sovereignism" as an alternative to both Russian imperialism and liberal internationalism—the exact framing that Russian operations had spent years developing in Eastern Europe.

"We expected trolling from Moscow, yes, but we didn't expect that sovereignism would become the new thing in Washington," Ionița says.

The disruption wasn't just tactical—it was strategic. Romanian intelligence services had spent months developing counter-narratives to Russian sovereignist propaganda, framing it as anti-democratic, authoritarian, and contrary to Western values.

Then American officials started using identical language to describe their own positions, but in positive terms.

How do you tell Romanians that sovereignism threatens democracy when Washington promotes it as democratic renewal? How do you counter Russian narratives about Western hypocrisy when American officials validate those narratives by embracing the same frameworks Moscow developed?

You can't do both.

"All this story about the complexity of the political game in Romania is very difficult to explain in the West," Ionița notes.

Romanian institutions kept their corruption and double-dealing quieter than Hungary's Viktor Orbán—whose public controversies regularly draw Western attention and criticism—until the incompetence and complicity publicly broke in November 2024.

"For us in Romania, it's a very difficult position," Ionița says. "We depend on America for security. We need American support against Russia. But when American political figures amplify the same narratives that Russian operations developed, what do we do?"

Why this matters beyond Romania

Romania's near-catastrophe exposes a pattern playing out across NATO's eastern flank: Institutional corruption creates vulnerabilities. Russian operations exploit them. Local establishments tolerate the exploitation until it threatens their power. Then they mobilize—often too late, always incompletely.

"The lesson for other countries is simple," Ionița says. "If you really want to fight Russian interference, you can win. But you have to start fighting before the crisis, not after. And you have to be willing to confront the corruption and institutional capture that makes your country vulnerable in the first place."

Most NATO allies aren't willing to do that work until a crisis forces the issue.

Romania matters less to Washington than Ukraine does, Ionița acknowledges. "We're not a zone of interest."

But that's precisely why Romania matters as a case study. If institutional rot can nearly capture a NATO member that nobody's watching closely, what happens when similar dynamics play out in Poland, the Baltics, or elsewhere in Central Europe?

The corruption-to-Russian-influence pipeline doesn't require geographic proximity to Moscow—just leaders more interested in protecting their own power than their country's security.

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The uncomfortable questions

The Nova Post sabotage operation failed. Two suspects sit in Romanian custody. The thermite devices were neutralized before they could sever connections between displaced Ukrainians and their families at war.

Success—in the narrow tactical sense. But zoom out to the strategic picture:

• How many NATO allies are still in the "toleration" phase? Still letting Wagner connections operate while pretending not to notice? Still allowing government figures to exploit anti-Ukrainian narratives while officially supporting Kyiv?
• What happens when institutions finally decide to fight—but Washington backs the other side? When American political figures actively support sovereignist forces connected to Russian operations?
• How do you defend democracy when both Moscow and parts of Washington push in the same direction?

Romanian intelligence stopped this attack—one of several tactical victories against Russian sabotage—but only after years of overlooking the networks behind them. The institutions now seeking credit for these disruptions had long ignored warning signs about Wagner connections and far-right infiltration.

The deeper problem remains unresolved. The political establishment that enabled extremists faces no accountability. The institutional weaknesses and political compromises that made Romania vulnerable to Russian exploitation continue. And the networks that enable such operations are still active.

For American policymakers watching NATO's eastern flank, Romania offers an uncomfortable lesson: tactical successes in stopping individual attacks matter less than addressing the systemic vulnerabilities that invite them. Whether through corruption, political opportunism, or willful blindness, these weaknesses create openings for foreign intelligence services to exploit.

Washington celebrates when allies disrupt Russian sabotage. But Sorin Ionița's assessment raises a harder question: Why do some NATO members tolerate the conditions that make such operations possible until crisis forces action?

Romania and Ukraine share over 600 kilometers of border and parallel paths of post-communist transformation. Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, making it Ukraine's obvious champion for European integration.

But when Ukraine needs Romanian support, there's silence and Romanian journalist Romeo Couți explains why it is so. In an interview with Euromaidan Press Couți noted: "Romania at this moment is almost entirely dominated by Hungary."

The mechanism? A Hungarian minority party that holds permanent veto power over Romanian policy—and takes orders from Budapest.

Why Romania matters for Ukraine

Romania's position makes it Ukraine's natural bridge to Europe. The countries share over 600 kilometers of border—longer than Poland's frontier with Ukraine. Romania's NATO membership since 2004 and EU membership since 2007 mean it knows the accession process. Its location links Ukraine to Central Europe.

Romania already traveled Ukraine's path. It reformed post-communist institutions, met Western standards, navigated EU accession, and joined NATO.

"Romania could be a link in the European path of both Moldova and Ukraine," Couți said.

Yet this partnership barely exists.

The silence when Ukraine needs support

"In any unpleasant or tense situation, there's silence from Kyiv and silence from Bucharest," Couți observed. "This type of silence shows there's no communication between the Romanian and Kyiv governments, which shouldn't be the case."

The silence appears everywhere cooperation should exist. Romanian minority issues in Ukraine get no joint diplomatic approach. Regional development shows no bilateral projects. EU integration lacks visible partnership. Security cooperation beyond NATO remains minimal.

"I think it's more about incompetence and lack of ability to develop common projects with Ukraine," Couți said. "Romania has some very good specialists in negotiation. I don't have information that anything natural and normal has developed between Romania and Ukraine outside the established framework from Brussels."

Romania only does what Brussels explicitly directs. Independent Romanian-Ukrainian cooperation? Blocked.

But the constraint runs deeper than incompetence. "Romania doesn't have an independent foreign policy—at this moment Romania is subordinated to Brussels," Couți said.

In reality, Romania answers to Brussels on paper and Budapest in practice.

How Hungary controls Romania

The control mechanism revealed itself at the UDMR congress in Cluj. The party—the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania—represents Romania's Hungarian minority of approximately 1 million people.

"Let's not forget what happened at that congress, where all high-ranking Romanian officials stood before Viktor Orbán," Couți recounted. Romania's Prime Minister and other top officials attended on their own territory—not as equals but as supplicants.

The symbolic moment: attendees sang the Székely anthem, associated with Hungarian territorial claims in Romania.

"As head of government, it's not acceptable to attend moments with so much symbolism—I'm referring to the singing of the Székely anthem," Couți said. "It's not that the Prime Minister is an uninspired leader. It's that a foundational institution of the Romanian state, the government and the office of the Prime Minister, was humiliated."

When Hungary finally approved Romanian Schengen membership after years of blocking, Couți asked: "I don't even know what Romania offered for the vote Hungary gave when we joined Schengen. What was the deal?"

"Through these tactics, Hungary managed to break any desire for cooperation," he said.

The mechanism of control

The control runs on coalition math. Romania's Hungarian minority, concentrated in Transylvania, constitutes approximately 6% of the population. UDMR wins 5-7% in elections—enough to make or break governments.

UDMR has joined Romanian coalition governments repeatedly since 1996, spanning both left and right administrations.

"UDMR has a very strong position in Romania because it's eternally in the coalition of power," Couți said. "Kelemen Hunor is presented as a strong leader, taken up by the whole press, adulated, portrayed as a very well-prepared man."

UDMR can collapse any government by withdrawing. Budapest directs UDMR positions. UDMR threatens to leave if not followed. The government complies.

"Viktor Orbán succeeded—he has control in Romania through UDMR," Couți said.

For Ukraine, this creates an invisible veto. Any Romanian policy contradicting Hungarian interests gets blocked behind closed doors. The government simply doesn't propose it.

Hungarian territorial ambitions in Romania

"Hungary will take advantage of this situation to advance some territorial claims, because the traumas related to what the Treaty of Trianon meant for Hungary still drive policy today," Couți explained.

The 1920 Treaty of Trianon transferred Transylvania to Romania after World War I. Hungary lost approximately 72% of its pre-war territory. This century-old "trauma" still drives policy.

Current moves show the pattern. "Hungary is conducting intense negotiations to acquire land in Romania in the Sulina area, where—on the pretext of opening a port—Hungarian private companies, actually under government control, want to acquire land to open a port in Sulina," Couți revealed.

Sulina sits where the Danube meets the Black Sea—strategic for commerce and military logistics.

"Together with China, Hungary has acquired land in the Trieste area at the sea, where a port has already been arranged," he added.

The pattern uses "economic" projects to establish territorial footholds—the same playbook Russia uses.

"Hungary doesn't want to establish itself as an element of peace negotiations," Couți warned. "Hungary wants to become a regional power only to impose some claims related to control of certain territories, even if it won't actually recover them physically."

"Let's not forget that Viktor Orbán has a fairly deep dispute with Ukraine, starting from formal issues like the language law and ending with territorial ones," Couți noted.

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What Ukraine loses

Ukraine's natural EU champion has been neutralized.

"Romania doesn't have an independent foreign policy—at this moment Romania is subordinated to Brussels," Couți explained.

The reality is worse: Romania formally answers to Brussels but effectively takes orders from Budapest.

This matters for Ukraine. As neighbors sharing both a border and Hungarian pressure, Romania and Ukraine should be natural allies pushing back together against Orbán's obstruction. Instead, Hungary's control over Romania means Ukraine loses a critical partner precisely when needed most.

What they could accomplish together: Active lobbying for Ukraine's EU candidacy, bilateral security cooperation beyond NATO, cross-border infrastructure projects, and a united front against Hungarian vetoes. Romania's post-communist transformation offers practical lessons Ukraine needs.

What actually happens: Romania issues generic statements only when Brussels permits. Minimal bilateral engagement. Silence when Hungary objects.

For Ukraine, watching Romania under Budapest's control offers a disturbing preview of how Hungarian influence operates inside the EU institutions it seeks to join. Two countries facing the same opponent can't coordinate their defense because one has already been captured.

Hungary's control demonstrates that EU membership doesn't protect democratic institutions from capture. NATO partnership doesn't prevent it. Good intentions don't matter if mechanisms allow control.

If Hungary controls a full EU and NATO member this completely, what will it demand from Ukraine during accession? What permanent constraints will it embed?

The playbook Ukraine will face

Hungary refined this mechanism in Romania and will deploy it against Ukraine. Ukraine has an ethnic Hungarian population in Zakarpattia Oblast where Hungary already uses minority rights as leverage for political influence.

Once Ukraine enters EU structures, Hungary will have institutional tools to replicate the Romanian pattern. Budapest funds and directs an ethnic minority party, makes it essential to governing coalitions, then uses that coalition position to influence national policy. Any resistance gets framed as discrimination, invoking EU minority protection frameworks. The target country faces an impossible choice: accept foreign control or appear to violate minority rights.

This creates a trap where legitimate minority rights protections—which are essential and should be defended—get weaponized as tools of foreign influence. Ukraine's Hungarian community deserves genuine rights and representation. But those rights shouldn't come packaged with Budapest's political control, and protecting national sovereignty shouldn't require undermining minority protections.

Ukraine sees the playbook now. Romania learned too late. Ukraine can build defenses that protect both national independence and minority rights—if it distinguishes between the two before accession.

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Why this matters beyond Romania

Hungary's control shows Ukraine's EU path faces obstacles beyond obvious vetoes. Budapest neutralized a potential ally from within. Even after Ukraine joins, Hungarian influence through minorities and coalition politics could limit support.

The obstacles aren't just Russian aggression and Western hesitation. They include control mechanisms that already neutralized potential allies inside European structures.

Will Ukraine build institutional defenses, or end up like Romania—formally sovereign, practically constrained, unable to support its interests when they conflict with Budapest?

"There are many unknowns," Couți said. "I see that the Ukrainian president is moving in an area where there's no turning back."

Romania's silence shows the stakes. Hungary's control shows the mechanism. Couți's analysis reveals that even Ukraine's natural allies may not help when needed—not because they don't want to, but because someone else holds the strings.

For Western policymakers supporting Ukraine's EU integration: membership alone doesn't guarantee independence. Democratic institutions can be captured. Hungary already demonstrated how.

European Union foreign ministers sharply criticized plans for Russian President Vladimir Putin to visit Budapest despite an International Criminal Court arrest warrant, exposing deep divisions as Hungary prepares to welcome the war crimes suspect for talks with US President Donald Trump.

The controversy centers on Budapest—the same city where Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal in 1994 for security assurances Moscow now violates. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned against "another Budapest scenario" but would attend if included in talks with Trump and Putin. The planned summit follows August's Alaska meeting between Trump and Putin that produced no breakthrough, while Hungary's defiance of the ICC undermines European credibility on international law.

EU foreign ministers split into opposite camps on Putin's visit to Budapest

As they gathered on Monday for a meeting in Luxembourg, foreign affairs ministers of the European Union balanced between backing Trump's diplomatic efforts and upholding the International Criminal Court (ICC), which seeks Putin for the deportation and transfer of tens of thousands of Ukrainian children. However, some ministers voiced sharp criticism of Putin's anticipated Budapest visit.

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas said at a press briefing on 20 October that “…is not nice. To see that really a person, with an arrest warrant put by the ICC, is coming to a European country." She questioned whether the Budapest summit would yield results, noting that "Russia only understands strength and only negotiates when it is really put to negotiate."

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys, speaking to the press ahead of an EU foreign ministers' meeting in Luxembourg, stated that a "clear message" must be sent regarding Europe's stance on Russia. He declared, “We have to hold the principles of Europe that we all agree. And the only place for Putin in Europe that's in The Hague, in front of the tribunal, not in any of our capitals."

While calling it “useful” for Americans to be able to speak with Russians, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot emphasized that Vladimir Putin's presence on EU territory has a specific purpose. “But this presence of Vladimir Putin on European Union soil only makes sense if it allows for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire,” he said, according to Euractiv.

Other Western European ministers adopted more accommodating positions.

When Euractiv asked if Hungary was setting the EU’s agenda, Denmark’s Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen replied that Budapest is “just a venue for a meeting.”

According to Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister David van Weel, there are some reservations among European leaders about the location of the meeting. “On the other hand, the most important thing is that we have a negotiating table, that we get the parties around the table,” Weel said.

Germany’s Europe Minister, Gunther Krichbaum, commented, “It’s good that such a meeting is happening,” but also warned about the danger of excluding Ukraine from any potential agreement, according to Euractiv.

Spain's Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares encouraged Europeans to focus on what they can do to support Ukraine rather than "asking what others will do," Euronews reports.

The split reflects broader tensions over Hungary's democratic trajectory. In September 2022, the European Parliament declared Hungary "can no longer be considered a full democracy" in a 433-123 vote, characterizing it as an "electoral autocracy."

Hungary vows to ensure Putin's safe passage despite ICC obligations

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó announced, "We are a sovereign country. We will respectfully welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin, receive him as a guest and provide conditions for his negotiations with the American president."

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán posted on X, “The planned meeting between the American and Russian presidents is great news for the peace-loving people of the world. We are ready!”

Hungary announced its intention to withdraw from the ICC in April 2025 when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also under an ICC arrest warrant, visited Budapest. The Hungarian parliament approved the withdrawal in May, but it remains technically bound by the Rome Statute until June 2026.

An ICC spokesperson told Euronews that "a withdrawal does not impact ongoing proceedings or any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective."

History haunts: Where Ukraine gave up nukes for broken Russian promises

The choice of Budapest carries bitter historical irony for Ukraine. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed in the Hungarian capital, saw Ukraine surrender the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom—promises Moscow now violates through its war of aggression.

Zelenskyy told reporters on 20 October he wants to avoid "another Budapest scenario," referencing the failed security guarantees. He also said that Ukraine would agree to a meeting in Budapest provided that it would take place in a trilateral format or in a "shuttle diplomacy" format, when Trump meets separately with him and Putin.

However, Zelenskyy expressed skepticism about Orbán's role, doubting the Hungarian leader's ability to "provide a balanced contribution."

Related:

• Hungary vows Putin honored guest treatment for Trump talks despite legal duty to arrest him
• "Putin outplayed Trump again": Russia pulls US president into Budapest meeting on its terms, says expert

Hungary's government announced on June 26 that 95% of participants in a national consultation opposed Ukraine's accession to the EU, Hungarian news outlet Telex reported.

The poll, promoted by Prime Minister Viktor Orban's government, has already drawn criticism over its credibility and turnout. Telex reported that the system could be manipulated — testing showed that users were able to vote twice using different email addresses.

According to Telex, 2,278,000 people participated in the consultation — approximately 29% of the electorate that voted in the 2024 European Parliament elections. Of those, the government claimed 95% voted against Ukraine joining the EU, while only 5% supported the bid.

Ukraine applied for EU membership shortly after Russia launched its war in 2022 and was granted candidate status within months. As an EU member, Hungary has veto power over further progress.

The consultation results were released on the eve of the European Council summit, giving Orban leverage to delay Ukraine's membership. But the process itself has drawn skepticism.

Government spokesman Gergely Gulyas claimed printed ballots were notarized and secure, and that electronic votes, which made up 10% of the total, were being verified. However, he could not confirm whether the system could detect if someone voted both by mail and online.

Opposition leader Peter Magyar on June 22 dismissed the consultation as a "government propaganda campaign" and cited internal data from Magyar Posta indicating that only 3-7% of mailed ballots were returned.

"It's the lowest-ever turnout for any such consultation," Magyar wrote on social media.

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Since 2010, Orban's government has conducted more than a dozen similar national consultations — non-binding letter campaigns with leading questions designed to reinforce government positions.

Previous campaigns targeted topics like LGBTQ rights and EU migration policy. In one 2023 consultation, voters were asked whether they supported Brussels' alleged plans to create "migrant ghettos" in Hungary — 99% voted no, with turnout under 20%.

On April 22, Orban said he voted against Ukraine's accession to the EU in the consultation, publicly sharing photos of himself marking "against" on the poll ballot. He warned earlier this year that allowing Kyiv to join the EU would "destroy" Hungary.

Orban, the EU's most openly pro-Russian leader, has blocked or delayed military aid to Ukraine, maintained close ties with President Vladimir Putin, and echoed Kremlin talking points.

Hungary's opposition and Western critics view his administration as increasingly authoritarian, citing the erosion of press freedom, judicial independence, and electoral fairness.

Despite the low turnout and widespread allegations of manipulation, Orban is expected to use the consultation's outcome to justify future obstruction of Ukraine's EU integration.

Hungary’s soft power meets Ukraine’s hard reality in Zakarpattia

BEREHOVE, Zakarpattia Oblast — Thin gray smoke drifts beyond the patchwork of Soviet-era apartment blocks, historical buildings, and hillside vineyards that make up Berehove — the heart of the Hungarian community in Ukraine’s westernmost Zakarpattia Oblast. “That’s Hungary, over there, where you see the smoke,” gestures Vitalii Antipov, a member of the local council, toward the not-so-distant horizon. He stands on top of a hill adorned by a massive white cross with a makeshift inscription thank

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

Hungary's national consultation on Ukraine's accession to the EU had the lowest ever turnout at such a poll, Hungarian opposition leader Peter Magyar said on June 21.

"The... government propaganda campaign is a total failure. Based on information we received from multiple sources within Magyar Posta (Hungarian Post), only 3-7% of the sent 'ballots' were returned," Magyar said in a post to social media.

The poll was announced by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in early March and officially launched on April 19 with ballot papers sent to Hungarian citizens. Many ballot papers explicitly encouraged voters to reject Ukraine’s EU bid.

Orban, on April 22, said he voted against Ukraine's accession to the EU in the national consultation, publicly sharing photos of himself marking "against" on the poll ballot.

"This means that realistically, a maximum of 500,000 people may have 'voted' on paper... the Prime Minister’s Office revealed... that the number of online submissions was negligible compared to the paper-based ones," Magyar said.

"This aligns with information received from government sources — indicating that despite the propaganda lies, the total number of 'voters' could be at most 600,000," he added.

Despite the government's resistance, polling shows public support for Ukraine's accession to the bloc. According to Magyar's opposition party, Tisza's "Voice of the Nation" initiative, which received over 1.1 million responses, 58.18% of participants supported Ukraine's EU bid.

Magyar claims that the national poll garnered around 600,000 responses would mean that the opposition party's own polling received more responses than the government poll.

"This is the lowest number in the 'glorious' history of (national consultations). And this was only achieved over several months, with total mobilization and the burning of tens of billions in public funds. A total failure," Magyar said.

Hungarian officials have repeatedly threatened to undermine Ukraine's EU candidacy and EU support for Ukraine. Hungary has repeatedly blocked or delayed EU aid packages for Kyiv.

"(T)he failed, corrupt regime doesn’t care about people's real problems, and doesn’t dare to look people in the eye. They only send them letters," Magyar said.

Comrades, be proud of lying about two million pen pals, funded by 10 billion forints ($29 million) in state propaganda," he added, addressing Hungary's ruling government.

European officials have denounced Hungary for aligning with Russia. European officials, including Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, have suggested stripping Hungary of its voting power within the bloc.

Hungary maintains positive relations with Russia in contrast with other EU members. On March 26, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto visited Moscow to discuss continued economic cooperation between the two countries.

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Editor’s note: This story was published in conjunction with Grist. Twenty-two-year-old software developer Artem Motorniuk has spent his entire life in the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, living in the north and visiting his grandparents in the south. It’s been almost four years since he’s seen them in person.

The Kyiv IndependentChad Small