Authorities in Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast have expanded the mandatory evacuation zone for families with children, adding five new settlements due to intensifying Russian attacks. The decision was announced by Vadym Filashkin, head of the Donetsk Regional Military Administration (RMA), on 14 August.

Why Druzhkivka matters

Druzhkivka, an industrial city of strategic importance, lies about 80 km northeast of Donetsk City and has remained under Ukrainian control since 2014. Once home to nearly 54,000 residents, its population has dropped sharply due to displacement. Its position along key transport routes makes it a vital defensive and logistical hub.

The new mandate covers Druzhkivka, Andriivka, Varvarivka, Novoandriivka, and Rohanske in the Andriivka community, where about 1,879 children currently live.

Escalating threats and governor’s warning

The evacuation decision followed a meeting of the regional commission on technogenic and environmental safety and emergency situations. Filashkin cited relentless Russian shelling—around 3,000 strikes daily—and urged parents to act:

“Take care of your loved ones — your children. Evacuate in time. Evacuate while it is still possible. Protect your loved ones and do not put them in danger.”

Children will be evacuated only with parents or legal guardians, using a coordinated process involving regional authorities, law enforcement, and local administrations.

Russian breakthrough near Pokrovsk raises alarm

Recent battlefield developments have amplified the urgency. Russian forces achieved a narrow but significant breakthrough north of Pokrovsk, advancing up to 17 km and seizing positions threatening Ukrainian supply lines. Another push near Dobropillia reached the Dobropillia–Kramatorsk highway, a key route for military logistics.

While Ukrainian commanders report stabilizing the front with reinforcements, analysts warn these advances could shift the strategic balance and increase risks for nearby civilian areas, including Druzhkivka.

Background on evacuations in Donetsk

Mandatory evacuations began in March 2023 in Bakhmut during heavy fighting. Since then, similar operations have taken place in Kryvorizka, Dobropilska, Druzhkivska, Lymanska, and Bilozerska communities as the front line has approached.

When Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin meet in Alaska this Friday, the headlines will focus on the show: a US president hosting the Russian leader in a state once sold by the Russian Empire, with Ukraine’s fate hanging in the balance. But what’s invisible to many is a fundamental problem. The two men are not even negotiating the same war.

Trump and his advisers frame the war as a territorial dispute.

In Trump’s mind, ending the war is a matter of finding the right chunk of land to trade, a deal that can be signed quickly, sold to voters, and wrapped up before the next election cycle.

Putin’s view is entirely different. For him, this war is not about lines on a map. It is about the structure of Europe’s security order. His core demand, repeated for more than a decade, is a legally binding halt to NATO expansion, not just for Ukraine, but as a principle. That means rewriting the post–Cold War rules so that Moscow has a permanent veto over the alliances its neighbors may join.

But Putin’s demands go far beyond strategic reordering. According to Russian officials, Moscow seeks Ukraine’s complete “demilitarization,” “denazification”—Putin’s euphemism for regime change—and permanent “neutrality” barring any Western security guarantees.

Russia also wants all sanctions lifted and NATO forces rolled back from Eastern Europe entirely.

In other words, Putin is not negotiating over Ukrainian territory. He is negotiating over whether Ukraine will continue to exist as an independent state.

• Trump is playing a game of Monopoly;
• Putin is erasing countries from the map.

What Ukraine cannot accept

This fundamental mismatch leaves Ukraine in an impossible position. Trump is willing to trade away frozen conflict lines, delayed NATO membership, and limited sanctions relief. But Ukraine needs what Putin refuses to give: genuine security guarantees, territorial integrity, and the sovereign right to choose its own alliances.

These are not positions Ukraine can compromise on—they are requirements for survival as an independent nation. Yet they are precisely what Trump’s deal-making approach treats as negotiable.

History’s warnings

There is no shortage of historical warnings about what happens when talks are built on such mismatches. Land swaps have been tried before as a way to paper over deeper disputes.

• Kosovo and Serbia explored trading territory to normalize relations; it collapsed under nationalist backlash.
• Serbia and Croatia’s postwar boundary negotiations left core tensions untouched, producing only fragile arrangements.
• Estonia and Russia agreed to a border treaty in 2005; Moscow withdrew when Estonia joined NATO.

In each case, the failure came from mistaking a strategic conflict for a cartographic one.

Negotiating with shadows

There is a deeper risk that analysts have largely overlooked: Trump is negotiating with his own misunderstanding of Putin’s objectives. Because he believes the dispute can be solved by trading territory, he will interpret any territorial discussion as progress.

Putin, meanwhile, will see territorial concessions only as a means to secure the larger prize of a rewritten security order.

This misunderstanding becomes Putin’s greatest asset. Russian analysts describe Trump’s dealmaking approach as a “can’t-lose proposition” for Moscow. Putin can appear reasonable and open to compromise while presenting terms designed to eliminate Ukrainian independence.

Even if Trump rejects specific demands, Putin achieves his goal of being treated as Ukraine’s equal in determining the country’s future.

Trump and Putin will leave Alaska believing they have moved closer to a deal, but they will be moving along two separate tracks that never meet.

• Trump will think he has made progress toward a territorial settlement;
• Putin will have advanced his goal of erasing Ukraine as a sovereign state.

Asymmetry in preparation

If this were merely a matter of clashing goals, careful preparation could at least surface the differences and test for overlap. But here too, the asymmetry is visible. Putin arrives in Alaska with a tightly controlled plan, informed by months of private discussions with his closest advisers, and with clear red lines. Trump arrives without a detailed framework.

Successful summits rarely happen spontaneously.

• Camp David in 1978 followed 13 days of intense, private negotiation and years of backchannel talks.
• The 1986 Reykjavik meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev, itself considered a failure at the time, was built on months of arms control groundwork.

Alaska has none of this. The meeting was triggered by a visit from Steve Witkoff, a real estate developer turned envoy, who came back from Moscow with little more than a handshake agreement to meet.

That imbalance gives Putin the advantage. He can use the summit to appear open and constructive while presenting terms designed to lock in strategic gains.

Even if Trump refuses those terms, Putin will have succeeded in demonstrating to his domestic audience, and to wavering countries in the Global South, that Russia is negotiating directly with Washington, sidelining Kyiv.

A timeline mismatch

Time itself favors Putin. Trump is thinking in months, hoping for a quick foreign policy win before the 2026 midterms.

Putin thinks in decades. His inner circle, according to Russian sources, has told him that Ukrainian resistance will collapse within months if Russia maintains military pressure.

• For Putin, a pause is not a compromise. It is a tactical stage in a longer campaign.
• For Trump, a pause can be sold as peace.

This is why a meeting that produces no concrete concessions from Moscow can still be useful to both men, but deeply damaging to Ukraine.

The symbolism problem

Then there is Alaska itself. Meeting on American soil might seem like a show of strength from Trump, but to Putin, it means something else. Alaska was once Russian territory. Hosting the summit there sends an unintended message: that borders are temporary and land can be transferred through negotiation. In a war where Russia’s central claim is that borders can be rewritten by force, this is a gift.

Diplomats understand the power of location. In 2010, Serbia and Kosovo’s EU-sponsored talks were held in Brussels precisely to avoid symbolic claims to sovereignty. Choosing Alaska to discuss Ukraine’s future undermines the very principle the US claims to defend: that states have the right to keep their internationally recognized borders.

The real danger of Alaska is not that it produces a signed surrender. The danger is that it produces the illusion of progress.

Trump could emerge declaring the talks a first step toward peace, while Putin uses the meeting to reinforce his narrative: that Washington, not Kyiv, is the true counterparty in this war, and that Russia’s demands are the baseline for any serious negotiation.

What success would require

Could Alaska succeed? Only if both leaders arrived with a shared understanding of the core dispute, a set of pre-negotiated principles, and Ukraine’s active participation.

None of those conditions exist.

Without them, the meeting is not a step toward resolution but a set piece in two domestic political dramas: Trump’s need to appear as the great dealmaker, and Putin’s need to appear as the indispensable architect of Europe’s future.

But the stakes are higher than political theater. Trump’s misunderstanding could lead him to pressure Ukraine into accepting a “peace” that eliminates its independence while allowing Putin to claim he negotiated rather than conquered.

That is why the Alaska summit may be remembered not as a turning point toward peace, but as the moment when the West negotiated away a democracy’s right to exist.

A Russian Su-30SM multirole fighter jet has likely crashed in the Black Sea southeast of Zmiinyi (Snake) Island (Odesa Oblast), according to the Ukrainian Navy.

Naval intelligence intercepted radio communications indicating the loss of contact with the aircraft during a mission. The cause of the incident remains unknown.

Russian forces have launched a search-and-rescue operation; debris has been spotted on the sea surface, but the pilot has not been found.

Why this loss matters for Russia’s air force

The Su-30SM is one of the Russian military’s most capable 4th-generation fighters, used for air superiority, long-range patrols, escort missions, radar surveillance, and command-and-control.

FlightGlobal’s 2025 world air forces directory lists 365 Su-27/30/35 fighters in Russian service (exact Su-30SM numbers are not public). Each Su-30SM is estimated to cost between $35 million and $50 million, making every loss a major hit to Russia’s high-value combat fleet.

The aircraft has been used extensively in the war against Ukraine, including for the launch of Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles aimed at suppressing Ukrainian air defenses.

Documented Su-30SM losses since 2022

Ukraine has reported multiple Su-30SM shootdowns and ground destructions since the full-scale invasion began:

• Feb–Mar 2022: Several Su-30SMs downed over the Black Sea, Odesa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv regions — some crashed into the sea, and in one case a pilot was captured.
• Aug 9, 2022 — Saky/Novofedorivka, Crimea: Satellite imagery confirmed 8–9 aircraft destroyed, including around three Su-30SMs.
• Sept 2024 — Black Sea: Ukraine reported downing a Su-30SM that had just fired a Kh-31P missile.
• Apr 24, 2025 — Rostov-on-Don: Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) released video showing a Su-30SM (tail “35”) burning after a sabotage attack.
• Aug 4, 2025 — Saky airbase, Crimea: The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said one Su-30SM was destroyed and another damaged, alongside strikes on Su-24s and an ammunition depot.
• May 2, 2025 — Novorossiysk (claim): Ukraine claims naval drones armed with air-to-air missiles downed two Su-30s over the Black Sea — independent verification is pending.
• Aug 14, 2025 — Zmiinyi (Snake) Island area: The latest suspected Su-30SM loss.

Strategic шmplications

The possible downing of another Su-30SM underscores Ukraine’s ability to inflict attrition on Russia’s front-line combat aviation. With high unit costs and a shrinking pool of trained aircrews, each loss erodes Russia’s air combat capability — particularly in contested zones like the Black Sea.

The upcoming summit between US President Trump and Russian President Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, has reignited Russian imperial rhetoric precisely as Moscow seeks to demonstrate its global reach while pressuring Ukraine to cede territory. 

The summit venue has brought renewed attention to longstanding Russian territorial claims, with statements resurfacing in which Russian state and media figures suggest the US state belongs to Moscow ahead of Friday’s meeting.

Russian officials have a history of territorial claims

State television propagandist Olga Skabeyeva has referred to the state as “our Alaska” during broadcasts in 2024. The same year, Deputy Security Council Chair Dmitry Medvedev joked on social media about going to war with the US over the territory.

Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev described Alaska as “an American of Russian origin” during recent summit discussions. State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin previously warned that Moscow would lay claim to the state if Washington froze Russian assets abroad.

In 2022, Billboards reading “Alaska Is Ours!” appeared in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia.

Alaska, the former Russian colony

Alaska was colonized by Russia from 1799 to 1867, and was administered by about 700 Russians across a territory larger than Texas. Russia sold Alaska to the United States in 1867 for $7.2 million following Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War. Nearly all Russian settlers left after the purchase, though Russian Orthodox churches remain throughout the state.

The state’s closest point lies just 3.8 kilometers from Russia across the Bering Strait, between Little Diomede Island (US) and Big Diomede Island (Russia). There are 89 kilometers between the mainlands of the two countries. 

Trump-Putin summit

Trump and Putin will meet Friday in Anchorage to discuss ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. Trump has indicated he expects “some land-swapping” in any potential deal, while Putin demands Ukraine abandon NATO aspirations and recognize Russian territorial conquests.

In the press conference about the summit on 11 August, President Trump appeared to slip up, referring to the meeting location as “Russia”. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not initially invited to the summit, though the White House is considering extending an invitation.

The summit will reportedly include discussions of a potential minerals deal, with Trump expected to present resource partnership proposals to Putin during the meeting, according to The Telegraph.

Today, there are important updates from the Pokrovsk direction. Here, on the eastern flank, the Russian forces conducted a massive push to cut off Ukrainian supply lines to Pokrovsk and starve out the defenders. However, Russians quickly got stuck in fortifications that guard the back of the Ukrainian defense line, with intense close-quarters battles breaking out.

Russia shifts focus to encircle Pokrovsk from the east

In the latest adjustment of their summer offensive, Russian forces are now concentrating their efforts on encircling Pokrovsk from the east. Despite being initially promising, the failed encirclement efforts from the west and unsuccessful infiltration attempts from the south were both successfully pushed back by Ukrainian defenders.

Ukrainians stall momentum but face new pressure on the eastern flank

Ukrainians improved their tactical standing, stalling further enemy momentum, which changed Russia’s strategy toward targeting logistics on the western flank. However, the same cannot be said for the eastern flank. After making headway there, Russian forces rapidly shifted their focus to this sector, capitalizing on their momentum to push deeper and reach the strategically vital settlement of Rodynske.

Rodynske emerges as a strategic target

Their objective is now clear: cut supply lines, threaten Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from behind, and force the Ukrainian defense into a semi-encircled position. Rodynske has emerged as a focal point in Russia’s operational plan due to its position directly behind Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, which allows it to serve as a logistical and tactical keystone for both towns. Capturing it would open a dangerous axis of advance from the rear, collapsing supply routes and placing additional pressure on Ukrainian units holding the line.

Russian reinforcements and urban warfare in Rodynske

Recognizing this, Russian commanders are pouring reinforcements into the area, prioritizing the capture of the dense urban environment of Rodynske, which would offer both protection for troop concentrations and ideal conditions for the launch of drone operations. If secured, Russian drone teams positioned in Rodynske could launch strikes with ease across a 15 to 25 kilometer radius, hitting key Ukrainian staging areas and logistical hubs.

Threat to Hryshyne and high ground control

If we look at the topographic map, we can see that the immediate threat could easily extend west toward Hryshyne, which sits in a lowland and would be vulnerable to attack. Additionally, this would allow the Russians to gain access to the same high ground that Pokrovsk is sitting on and would open up attack routes directly from behind.

Fierce battles on the eastern approaches

For now, however, the main Russian effort remains squarely focused on breaking Ukrainian resistance in Rodynske. The fierce battle for the settlement has already begun, with high-intensity engagements playing out on its eastern approaches. Geolocated combat footage paints a clear picture of the fighting, as in one clip, a Ukrainian marine fires an AT-4 grenade launcher at point-blank range into an underground cellar where Russian soldiers had holed up in. After the explosion had opened up the underground area, a Vampire hexacopter was then able to drop a heavy mine from above, obliterating the Russian position.

Drone strikes and close-quarters combat

Elsewhere, the Starfall unit of the 14th Operational Brigade of Ukraine’s National Guard is shown operating east of Rodynske, targeting Russian troops hiding near a mine with drone-dropped explosives to stop their advance.

More particularly brutal GoPro footage captures two Ukrainian soldiers responding to signs of an enemy presence. Calm and calculated, they discover two Russian assault troops hiding in a cellar. Speaking fluent Russian, the Ukrainians momentarily confuse the intruders before eliminating them with grenades tossed inside. The same team later clears a nearby house, eliminates the Russian soldiers inside, and seizes a captured assault rifle.

Pokrovsk remains the hottest frontline sector

Overall, Pokrovsk remains the hottest section of the frontline and the focal point of Russia’s summer campaign. The Russians are determined to establish a foothold in the paved neighborhoods before the fall rains make any approach on soft ground impossible, and their pivot to the east has already yielded dangerous momentum.

Rodynske’s defense could decide the fate of Pokrovsk

Yet this shift is now being met with fierce Ukrainian resistance centered on Rodynske, quickly growing to be of extreme importance. Its defense is about protecting the entire Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad sector from collapse, as if Rodynske falls, the door to encirclement opens. For now, however, Ukrainian forces are holding, fighting from house to house, and striking back with every tool available. The battle is far from over, but the outcome in Rodynske may well decide the fate of Pokrovsk.

In our regular frontline report, we pair up with the military blogger Reporting from Ukraine to keep you informed about what is happening on the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Ukrainian reinforcements are rushing to the Pokrovsk area in an urgent effort to defeat a Russian infiltration that threatens one of two main supply roads into the besieged city in Donetsk Oblast.

The reinforcements include one of Ukraine’s new multi-brigade corps—and at least one Leopard 1A5 tank.

The Ukrainian army’s 508th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalion—which retrieves, repairs and returns armored vehicles—loaded one of the 40-ton, four-person Leopard 1A5 tanks onto a heavy transport truck and hauled the tank into the Pokrovsk sector under the cover of darkness on Wednesday.

“We’ve been a little quiet the last few days,” the battalion stated on social media, “but another Leopard 1A5 with full ammunition … is successfully delivered to one of the hottest places [in the] Pokrovsk direction.”

Explore further

Ukraine deploys Leopard 1A5 “sniper tanks” with 7 brigades

It’s obvious where the German-made tank wound up: somewhere along the roughly 10-km front stretching from Rodynske in the south to Nove Shakhove in the north. That front, just northeast of Pokrovsk, is the current locus of the fighting after Russian troops slipped past under-manned—or entirely empty—Ukrainian trenches last week and hooked left to threaten Dobropillya, which sits astride the T0515 road threading into Pokrovsk.

Two of the seven Ukrainian brigades that operate the 1980s-vintage—but heavily upgraded and up-armored—Leopard 1A5s are holding the line around Dobropillya: the national guard’s 4th Rubizh Brigade and the army’s 142nd Mechanized Brigade.

Each brigade probably owns a dozen Leopard 1A5s out of 170 that a German-Dutch-Danish consortium has pledged to Ukraine. Around 100 of the tanks have shipped; the Russians have knocked out at least 14 of them. Others have been damaged.

Repaired tank

It’s likely the Leopard 1A5 the 508th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalion sneaked into the Pokrovsk area was a damaged tank that the battalion fetched from the front line and fixed up at its workshop before hauling it back to its operator.

After losing around 4,000 tanks in action in the first 42 months of its wider war on Ukraine, Russia has all but ceased deploying heavy armor along the 1,100-km front line. Production of new T-90M tanks, and the restoration of old Cold War T-72s moldering in long-term storage, simply can’t make good all those losses.

Today, the Russians mostly attack on foot or on motorcycles, counting on these hard-to-spot and fast-moving forces to slip through thinly manned Ukrainian trenches and past Ukraine’s ever-present drones. The Ukrainians still use tanks, however, fearlessly rolling the hulking vehicles from their drone-proof dugouts for close fights with infiltrating Russians.

It’s not for no reason that, last month, Ukraine lost more tanks in action than Russia did—a first in this wider war.

Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelensky insisted the Russian infiltrators threatening Dobropillya marched north and then turned west “only with weapons in their hands.” They’re lightly armed and poorly supplied, potentially making them easy targets for tanks. Assuming, of course, the tanks can shrug off any Russian drones patrolling the Russian salient northeast of Pokrovsk.

There’s a good reason for the Ukrainian tankers to be optimistic. The Leopard 1A5 and Leopard 2A4 tanks that are helping to defend the Pokrovsk sector have proved that, with enough add-on armor, they can survive repeated drone strikes—and keep fighting.

Explore further

“No Russian tank would survive”: German Leopard 2A4 withstands 10 FPV drone strikes in Ukraine

Ukraine’s Security Service head just explained exactly how Ukraine had smuggled attack drones into Russia and hit four military bases simultaneously in their most audacious operation yet.

The 1 June mission—codenamed “Spider Web”— hit 31 and destroyed 21 Russian aircraft worth over $7 billion. That’s roughly a third of Russia’s cruise missile carriers wiped out in a single coordinated strike.

But the real story isn’t the destruction. It’s how Ukrainian intelligence spent 18 months building a fake logistics company inside Russia to pull it off.

Explore further

Satellite images reveal wreckage of Russian strategic bombers after Ukraine’s Spiderweb drone operation deep in Russia

Ukrainian spies rent office space next to enemy headquarters

SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk revealed the operation’s mechanics in a recent interview. His agents didn’t just sneak across the border—they set up shop in Chelyabinsk, renting offices and warehouses practically next door to the local FSB headquarters.

Why Chelyabinsk? The industrial city over 2000 km from the front line provided perfect cover for a logistics operation. The Ukrainians bought five cargo trucks, hired Russian drivers, and started moving equipment.

The weapon? What Maliuk calls “hunting lodges”—wooden structures mounted on truck beds, equipped with solar panels and EcoFlow batteries to continuously power concealed drones. Russian customs saw camping gear. Inside were 117 combat drones waiting to strike.

When Russians drinking vodka delayed a covert op

The original plan called for a May strike. What went wrong? Russian drinking culture.

“We planned to do this before May 9, but they went on a drinking binge during Easter,” Maliuk explained.

The Ukrainian handlers couldn’t reach their Russian drivers for weeks. “One driver was missing, then another. Then May 1st—their May holidays—and they’re lying around for a week.”

The operation lost an entire month to spring festivities.

Explore further

Spiderweb operation: This is how Ukrainian drones destroy Russian bombers that attack Ukraine

The moment everything almost collapsed

Picture this: Ukrainian agents preparing their weaponized hunting lodges when someone accidentally hits the wrong button. The roof opens. A 63-year-old Russian truck driver sees rows of military drones lined up for combat.

Panic. The field agents called headquarters immediately. “We have an emergency situation. What are we going to do?”

Malyuk’s solution? Instant cover story. Tell the driver these are wildlife surveillance drones used to track animal populations and catch poachers. The 63-year-old knew nothing about modern technology. He bought it. A bonus payment helped seal the deal.

The Russian drivers who transported the drones never knew what they were carrying. They’re now in Russian detention centers, according to Maliuk, facing torture for crimes they didn’t know they were committing.

“In reality, they did nothing illegal and there was no intent in their actions,” he said. “We paid them very generously.”

All Ukrainian operatives who organized the mission have been evacuated from Russia with new identities.

Explore further

Frontline report: Ukrainian Spiderweb operation triggers mass paranoia as Russia hunts threats in every truck

Ukraine hit Russian bombers that attack civilians

The targets weren’t random. These aircraft form part of Russia’s nuclear triad—the bombers that have been launching cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities and infrastructure throughout the war.

The strike hit A-50 early warning aircraft and Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160 strategic bombers across four bases: Belaya, Dyagilevo, Olenya, and Ivanovo. The operation required coordination across three time zones.

At the predetermined moment, the hunting lodge roofs opened remotely. The drones emerged and flew to their targets.

Lessons from drug cartels

How did Ukrainian intelligence learn to smuggle military equipment past Russian customs? They studied international drug cartels, Maliuk said in the interview.

Russian customs corruption made the mission possible, he believes. His agents had to navigate what he called “seven circles of hell” due to international sanctions, but corrupt officials provided the opening they needed.

Maliuk also noted the parallels between this operation and the 2022 Crimean Bridge attack, where Ukraine used a truck loaded with 21 tons of explosives.

“If you read between the lines and look professionally, I think many noticed certain parallels.”

Fresh satellite images have confirmed extensive damage to Russia’s Unecha oil pumping station in Bryansk Oblast and the Skala-M radar complex in occupied Crimea. The confirmation follows earlier reports of Ukrainian strikes on both facilities.

Satellite proof of Unecha oil pumping station destruction

Militarnyi reports that Dnipro Osint published satellite images showing burn scars and destroyed infrastructure at the Unecha oil pumping station in Bryansk oblast. The facility is part of the Druzhba pipeline, which carries Russian crude to European countries. According to the images, the damage is concentrated near the booster pump station, where a large fire left the site unable to operate.

Two days ago, local residents reported that Ukrainian strike drones targeted the station on 12 August at around 22:00.

Unecha is located in the settlement of Vysokoye, about 60 km from the Ukrainian border, making it vulnerable to Ukrainian long-range strikes.

Satellite images confirm destruction of Skala-M radar in Crimea

Dnipro Osint also released a satellite photo showing the Russian TRLK-10 Skala-M radar complex in Abrykosivka, occupied Crimea, before and after it was hit. The strike reportedly happened overnight on 9–10 August and was carried out by Ukrainian Special Operations Forces working with local resistance. The agency did not specify, what weapons were used to hit the facility.

Explore further

Ukraine’s special forces slip into Crimea overnight — and erase Russia’s Skala-M radar from the map

The Skala-M is a Soviet-Russian stationary route radar system with both primary and secondary detection capabilities, used for monitoring air traffic on routes and in approach zones. Its operational range reaches 350 km, making it a key element in Russia’s air traffic control network over Crimea. The new images show the radar system visibly damaged.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has placed Israel and Russia “on notice” that they could be listed next year among parties “credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence,” according to his annual report to the Security Council on conflict-related sexual violence obtained by Reuters.

The warning stems from “significant concerns regarding patterns of certain forms of sexual violence that have been consistently documented by the United Nations,” Guterres wrote in the report released.

Regarding Russian forces, Guterres said he was “gravely concerned about credible information of violations by Russian armed and security forces and affiliated armed groups” primarily against Ukrainian prisoners of war in 50 official and 22 unofficial detention facilities across Ukraine and Russia.

“These cases comprised a significant number of documented incidents of genital violence, including electrocution, beatings and burns to the genitals, and forced stripping and prolonged nudity, used to humiliate and elicit confessions or information,” the Secretary-General said.

The report notes that Russian authorities have not engaged with Guterres’ special envoy on sexual violence in conflict since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Israel faces similar scrutiny over documented violations in Palestinian detention facilities. Guterres expressed grave concern about “credible information of violations by Israeli armed and security forces” against Palestinians in several prisons, a detention center and a military base.

“Cases documented by the United Nations indicate patterns of sexual violence such as genital violence, prolonged forced nudity and repeated strip searches conducted in an abusive and degrading manner,” the report states.

Russia’s mission to the United Nations in New York did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment on the report.

Ukrainian prosecutors have concluded their investigation into the forced deportation of children from an occupied special school, gathering evidence that will be used in both domestic and international legal proceedings.

Fifteen children from the Novopetrivka special school in southern Mykolaiv Oblast were tracked, seized, and shipped to Russia through a carefully orchestrated route across occupied territories, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

The children included ten without parental care, two orphans, two placed due to difficult circumstances, and one girl who had been adopted by US citizens but remained at the school when the full-scale invasion began in 2022.

Russian soldiers storms the school, forcibly remove kids

Russian soldiers weren’t subtle. From day one of occupying Novopetrivka village, they showed up at the school. Regular visits. Head counts. Making sure every child stayed put.

The school director watched this pattern for months. July 2022 rolled around, and she’d seen enough. Time to get these kids out—quietly move them to Ukrainian-controlled territory where they’d be safe.

Someone talked.

Armed Russians stormed the school. They grilled the director. What was she planning? Where were the children going? Then they posted guards. No one leaves.

Twenty soldiers arrived the next morning. Children, director, her husband—everyone loaded up. Destination: Stepanivka village, deep in occupied Kherson Oblast nearby. Three months of waiting. For what?

Two collaborators threatened violence to organize the children’s transport through a complex route: from Stepanivka to occupied Crimea and then to Anapa in Russia’s Krasnodar Oblast.

Ukrainian children are forced into cultural conversion

Ukrainian investigators asked the obvious question. Did these children need evacuation?

No medical emergencies. No additional health screening required. The school had a functioning bomb shelter, food stocks, medicine, hygiene supplies. The village remained stable throughout.

So why move them?

The Prosecutor General’s Office reported that the children faced daily ideological pressure, including forced participation in singing Russia’s anthem, attending pro-Russian events, prohibition of Ukrainian language use, and bans on Ukrainian symbols. Fifteen children became test subjects in forced cultural conversion.

Russia also incorporates thousands of Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied territories into its military-patriotic youth movement called Yunarmia (Youth Army). This youth army, under the Russian Ministry of Defense, teaches children military skills like assembling assault rifles and marching, as well as propagates anti-European sentiments and portrays Ukraine as the enemy.

The militarization and assimilation efforts by Russia are likened to historical fascist youth indoctrination, with the aim of creating obedient future soldiers for the Russian regime. Ukrainian authorities and international observers have condemned these practices as war crimes and acts of genocide against Ukrainian identity and society.

Ukraine documents systematic Russian war crimes

The charges qualify the actions as war crimes under international humanitarian law, specifically citing violations of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding forcible displacement of civilians from occupied territory. 

The children? All rescued through coordinated efforts between Ukrainian law enforcement, international partners, and volunteer networks. Every single one now lives safely abroad. The adopted girl reunited with her American family.

Explore further

“Putin’s Hitler-Jugend.” Russia builds tomorrow’s army with stolen Ukrainian children, Yale lab reveals

Ukraine’s hydroelectric reservoirs managed by Ukrhydroenergo have reached their lowest water levels in a decade due to poor spring flooding this year, the company’s press service reports.

The state enterprise faces a dual challenge as it not only generates electricity but also ensures water supply to consumers across the country. This requires maintaining stable water levels, which currently stand significantly lower than last year’s figures, according to Ukrhydroenergo.

“We are doing everything possible to accumulate sufficient reserves by autumn,” the company reported. To achieve this goal, water will be used “as rationally as possible” while preparing hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) and pumped-storage power plants (PSPPs) for the winter season.

The company is simultaneously conducting reconstruction work and scheduled repairs of its hydroelectric facilities while restoring and protecting its infrastructure from ongoing damage.

“For hydropower specialists, this is a unique experience ofconducting all these measures and implementing projects simultaneously,” Ukrhydroenergo wrote.

The water shortage coincides with broader energy storage challenges facing Ukraine. As of 5 August, the country had accumulated over 10 billion cubic meters of gas in underground storage facilities, marking the lowest reserves in at least 12 years

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported on 13 August that Russian officials will arrive at the 15 August Trump-Putin summit in Alaska with the same war aims they have maintained for years — the complete political and military capitulation of Ukraine.

According to ISW, Russian Foreign Ministry Deputy Director of the Information and Press Department Alexei Fadeev said the Kremlin’s position had not shifted since Vladimir Putin’s 14 June 2024 speech. Fadeev claimed the delegation’s goals were dictated “exclusively by national interests” and indicated that Russia would not consider any territorial concessions.

Demands include land Russia doesn’t even control

ISW noted that Putin’s 14 June list of ultimatums remains the blueprint for Russia’s stance. It orders Ukraine to withdraw entirely from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts — including territories Russian forces do not occupy. It also requires Ukraine’s demilitarization and the so-called “denazification” of its government and society, a phrase ISW said the Kremlin uses to justify removing the country’s democratically elected leadership. Another demand is Ukraine’s “neutrality,” which ISW assessed is aimed at preventing NATO membership.

ISW: Kremlin shows no interest in real negotiations

ISW says Fadeev’s remarks confirm that Moscow “maintains its long-standing objectives in the war against Ukraine that amount to Ukraine’s full military and political capitulation to Russia and has not adjusted its position ahead of the Alaska summit.”

“Russian officials reiterated that Russia’s objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations,” ISW wrote.

German public opinion is split on whether Ukraine should surrender occupied territories to end the war, according to a ZDF Politbarometer survey conducted ahead of a planned Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska.

The poll, conducted by telephone and online among 1,370 randomly selected voters between 11-13 August 2025, found 42% believe Ukraine should give up parts of its territory if this would end the war. However, a slightly larger group—45%—think Ukraine should continue fighting to liberate these territories. The remaining 13% responded “don’t know.”

The survey comes before the scheduled meeting for 15 August between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska to discuss the Ukraine war. Only 13% of Germans believe Trump can broker a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine during this encounter, while 84% doubt such an outcome.

Germans show profound skepticism toward Putin’s intentions. Just 14% consider the Russian president genuinely interested in a lasting ceasefire, while 82% reject this notion. The distrust spans across party lines, with “different-sized majorities in all party affiliations” expressing doubt, according to the survey.

An overwhelming 89% of respondents consider it important or very important that Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelensky participate directly in talks between Trump and Putin to achieve a lasting ceasefire. Only 9% view Ukrainian participation as unimportant.

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy recently confirmed he will not accept any territorial concessions in possible peace negotiations and “will be guided by the Constitution.” US President Trump has “expressed dissatisfaction” with these arguments from Zelensky.

The survey reveals the complexity of German public opinion as diplomatic efforts intensify to resolve the conflict that has lasted since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.

Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala announced that Ukraine has received over one million large-calibre ammunition rounds this year through his country’s ammunition supply initiative, Novinky reported.

Speaking during a meeting of the “coalition of the willing,” Fiala detailed the progress of the Czech-led ammunition program.

“As of today, we have already delivered one million units of large-calibre ammunition to Ukraine this year under the Czech ammunition supply initiative,” he said.

The Prime Minister also praised coordination efforts with US President Donald Trump and welcomed the first-time participation of US Vice President J.D. Vance in the coalition meeting.

The Czech ammunition initiative secured sufficient resources in April to maintain monthly ammunition deliveries to Ukraine through September 2025. The program represents part of broader Czech military support, which includes participation in the drone coalition for Ukraine.

In August, Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky opened a diplomatic mission in Dnipro, expanding the country’s presence in Ukraine beyond traditional diplomatic channels

Ukraine has already received one million large-caliber artillery shells this year under the Czech ammunition initiative, Czechia’s Prime Minister Petr Fiala said on 13 August during an online meeting of the “coalition of willing.”

Czech-led coalition marks major supply milestone

České Noviny reports that Fiala confirmed the deliveries during a virtual session that, for the first time, included US Vice President J. D. Vance. The coalition of willing — a group of states actively supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression — coordinated positions ahead of the Trump–Putin meeting.

Last year, the Czech ammunition program supplied 1.5 million rounds. Fiala praised the close coordination with Trump.

Praise from Ukraine and Germany

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said after the videoconference with European leaders, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, that European and Ukrainian security interests must be preserved in the upcoming US–Russia talks. Merz has previously called the Czech ammunition program “exemplary” support for Ukraine, noting that Germany contributes “out of conviction.”

Zelenskyy also expressed gratitude last week on the social platform X. He thanked the Czech Republic for its artillery supply initiative, saying it had saved many lives and strengthened Ukrainian positions.

Pro-Russian opposition in Prague

The program faces strong domestic opposition from former Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. About a month ago, Babiš told Reuters that if his ANO party wins the autumn elections, it will cancel the initiative. He labeled it “nontransparent,” “overpriced,” and “rotten,” questioning the level of Czech contributions. According to Fiala’s government, the Czech Republic provided around €35 million to the program last year.

Ukraine and Russia executed a major prisoner exchange today, each side returning 84 individuals. The exchange included Ukrainian soldiers, civilians, and Mariupol defenders, as well as Russian servicemen, and was facilitated by the United Arab Emirates.

The swap comes as the world turns its attention to a one-on‑one summit between President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin, scheduled for Friday, 15 August, at Joint Base Elmendorf‑Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska. Trump characterizes it as a “listening exercise”, aimed at exploring a ceasefire in Ukraine, though critics warn the meeting may sideline Ukraine and favor Russia.

Ukraine and Russia swapped 84 prisoners each in a UAE-brokered deal — releasing Mariupol defenders and civilians held since 2014.

The exchange, under the Istanbul framework, lands just 24 hours before Trump and Putin meet in Alaska to discuss a potential Ukraine ceasefire.… pic.twitter.com/KzKUwhHR3s

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) August 14, 2025

Captain Oleksandr Boychuk among freed

Among those released was Captain Oleksandr Boychuk, commander of Ukraine’s only minesweeper, Henichesk, who resisted Russian seizure of his ship during the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Journalist and serviceman Bohdan Kutiepov hailed his release:

“Free! My friend, a defender of Mariupol, is finally home after years in captivity. Miracles happen!”

Boychuk had been missing since March 2022, last seen in a Russian “filtration camp” near Mariupol.

Civilians held for years among freed Ukrainians

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said many released civilians had been held since 2014, 2016, or 2017. Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets noted, “This return includes 51 civilians — political prisoners, men and women, some held for nearly a decade.” The youngest freed was 26, the oldest 74.

Mykola Fedorian released to enable swap

Ukraine handed Russia Mykola Fedorian, a Russian-appointed former deputy head of Crimea’s Interior Ministry. Convicted of treason in October 2024 and sentenced to 12 years in prison, he was released by a Kyiv court to allow the exchange.

Part of a series of recent swaps

This exchange is part of an ongoing series of prisoner swaps carried out under the framework agreed during the Istanbul talks earlier this year. In those negotiations, Ukraine and Russia committed to prioritizing specific humanitarian categories — such as severely wounded and gravely ill prisoners of war, young soldiers aged 18–25, and the return of thousands of bodies of fallen troops — over strict number matching.

Since then, multiple exchanges have been conducted, with mediators like the United Arab Emirates facilitating individual deals.

As the Trump–Putin summit in Alaska draws near, one demand threatens to overshadow diplomacy: Russia insists Ukraine withdraw entirely from Donbas as part of a ceasefire deal. At first glance, giving up this embattled region might seem a way to halt a war with no clear endpoint.

Yet the push for withdrawal raises a pressing question: can Ukraine truly afford to abandon Donbas? The stakes go beyond shifting lines on a map—it’s about the survival of Ukraine’s defenses, the fate of its heartland, and what kind of peace, if any, might follow.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been unequivocal:

“We will not leave Donbas. We cannot do this. Donbas is a springboard for Russia’s future offensive… They want to take about 9,000 square kilometers—around 30% of Donetsk Oblast—and that will be a platform for new aggression.”

The term Donbas refers to two eastern Ukrainian regions: Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. As of mid-2025, Russia occupies nearly all of Luhansk—about 99%—and roughly 75% of Donetsk, leaving only a narrow stretch under Ukrainian control.

It is within this fractured and embattled landscape that Ukraine’s most critical defensive line—the fortress belt—has held firm.

The fortress belt: Ukraine’s eastern shield

The fortress belt stretches from Sloviansk through Kramatorsk to Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka, a 50-kilometer chain of fortified towns and cities. It relies as much on geography as on engineering: Karachun Hill towers over the plain, rivers carve natural moats, and slag heaps, quarries, and railway embankments reinforce defensive positions.

Victor Taran, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer and co-founder of the “KRUK” UAV training center, captures its essence:

“The paths into this agglomeration are mined, re-mined, and controlled with interlocking fire.”

Within these urban zones, streets are blocked by tank traps and trenches; anti-drone nets span chokepoints. Just behind the front line lie the arteries of resistance—supply depots, repair hubs, and medical evacuation routes—all seamlessly integrated into defense.

This fortress belt isn’t static—it’s a dynamic defense network, built over a decade. Recreating it farther west would mean starting from scratch, on flat, exposed steppe.

Why the fortress belt matters

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces have repeatedly failed to break through or encircle it. The belt’s cities aren’t mere strongpoints—they are the linchpin holding back the eastern advance. ISW notes that Russia’s demand for its surrender is a telling admission of its inability to take it by force alone.

If the belt falls: Why geography turns against Ukraine

Abandoning the fortress belt would push Ukraine’s front line 82 km west onto open fields—no hills, few settlements, no river buffers. This flat terrain is made for airpower and drones, not defense.

Again, Taran warns:

“Without the fortress belt, our troops would be in open fields. The Russians would kill them with bombs and missiles like in a shooting range.”

The rebuilding problem

To build a new defensive network farther west—in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, or Poltava oblasts—Ukraine would need months of engineering, vast resources, and unwavering Western support. And even then, the terrain offers no natural advantages like rivers, industrial strongpoints, or commanding elevations.

A front under intensifying pressure

Even without forced retreat, Ukrainian defenses are under growing strain. The situation in Donetsk Oblast worsens daily. Recently, Russian forces made their deepest breakthrough in more than a year near Pokrovsk, advancing 10–17 km into Ukrainian-held territory.

Though narrow, this salient threatens to sever supply routes feeding the fortress belt. If it widens, Ukrainian positions in Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka could face isolation and collapse—a risk that underscores how close the danger already is.

A launchpad for the next offensive

Without the fortress belt, Russia would gain a direct launchpad to strike deeper into Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Poltava. The terrain offers nothing to slow such an offensive—unless a strong, pre-prepared defense stands in the way.

The historical warning

In 1938, Czechoslovakia ceded its fortified Sudetenland to Nazi Germany, hoping for peace. Six months later, the entire country was occupied. History teaches us: surrendering fortified ground to an expansionist power rarely ends wars—it triggers the next.

What’s really at stake

Donbas is more than scarred land—it is the cradle of Ukraine’s eastern defense. Surrendering it isn’t neutral—it is giving up the very shield that has held since 2014.

The question remains: can Ukraine afford to abandon Donbas? Some may see it as a pathway to peace. But if peace means sacrificing its strongest defenses, it may be a peace paid for with its survival.

US President Donald Trump told European and Ukrainian leaders that the US is willing to contribute security guarantees for Ukraine — but only if NATO is not involved, according to Politico sources.

Politico reports that Trump’s comments came during a 13 August German-brokered virtual meeting aimed at aligning American and European positions before Trump’s 15 August summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The offer, while sparking cautious optimism, left many questions unanswered about its scope and strength.

Trump’s NATO-free security offer

According to Politico, three people familiar with the call — a European diplomat, a British official, and a person briefed on the conversation — said Trump indicated that Washington could play a role in helping Kyiv deter future Russian aggression if a ceasefire is reached. One person briefed on the call said the president made clear he would only agree to such a guarantee if it was not part of NATO. Trump did not define what the guarantees would entail, speaking only in broad terms.

A British official told Politico that Trump sees a US role in security guarantees as part of a final settlement. European officials, while encouraged that Trump appeared receptive to their calls for a deal, remain wary about the outcome of his talks with Putin.

Explore further

European leaders brace for Alaska Trump-Putin meeting after NBC says US President pledged no territorial carve-up without Kyiv’s consent

Limits on US involvement

Politico notes that Trump has stated any US guarantee will not include the direct provision of weapons or the deployment of American troops to Ukraine. Instead, his administration has allowed Europe to purchase American weapons for delivery to Kyiv. Officials say this policy has added pressure on Moscow and played a role in bringing Putin to the negotiating table. Even so, the scale of the guarantees is expected to fall short of what Kyiv and its backers want.

European governments have been exploring security arrangements without the US, including a coalition of willing ground forces to help uphold a future peace deal. However, they see American backing — even outside NATO — as essential to strengthening deterrence.

Concerns ahead of Putin meeting

Trump has long opposed lethal military assistance for Ukraine during his presidency. While some allies believe he has considered their advice in pursuit of a ceasefire, they fear what might happen once he meets Putin in person. The lack of detail about the guarantees and their enforcement leaves uncertainty over whether such a deal could prevent future Russian aggression.

Western media buzz with speculation about potential Trump-Putin meetings in Alaska. Moscow sees another bargaining chip. But in Kyiv, military planners work from a different timeline — one measured not in months of negotiations, but years of grinding conflict that Russia still believes it can win through sheer persistence.

Russia doubles down on military solution

On 30 July, as President Trump threatened new tariffs against Moscow, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov delivered a telling response: Russia has developed “certain immunity” to sanctions and no longer fears additional economic restrictions.

However, the real indicator of Russian intentions sits buried in draft legislation submitted to the State Duma. The proposal would replace traditional spring and autumn conscription cycles with year-round conscription — a move opposition Russian media trace directly to a confidential order from Vladimir Putin. This gives the proposal a strong chance of passing as early as this autumn.

The timing exposes Moscow’s calculation.

With Russian battlefield losses surpassing one million soldiers killed, wounded, and missing, the Kremlin needs constant replenishment without formally declaring mobilization.

The apparent goal of the draft law is to increase pressure on conscription-age citizens and push them toward signing contracts with the Russian Armed Forces. Human rights advocates and activists warn that such year-round conscription would allow the state to keep men under constant mobilization surveillance, enabling rapid replenishment of army ranks without formally declaring mobilization.

The numbers behind Russia’s war machine

Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that, as of late June, approximately 695,000 Russian troops, including operational reserves, were engaged in the war against Ukraine. Over the past year alone, over 440,000 contract soldiers have joined Russia’s ranks.

Despite recent Ukrainian advances in the Sumy Oblast— where several settlements were successfully liberated from Russians — the situation in Donetsk Oblast remains critical, mainly due to the overwhelming concentration of Russian forces there.

This systematic expansion suggests Moscow views the conflict as a war of attrition that it can win through numerical superiority.

Ukraine’s strategic calculation for long-term conflict

Therefore, people in Ukraine do not believe in the prospects of lasting peace with Russia soon. On the contrary, Ukrainian authorities indicate that Russia’s main goal for 2025 is to fully capture the remaining parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and by 2026, build on the success east of the Dnipro River, including an attempted occupation of Odesa and Mykolaiv, thereby cutting Ukraine off from the sea entirely.

This timeline explains why Kyiv does not believe in a lasting peace with Russia without security guarantees, nor in the effectiveness of any negotiations about Ukraine conducted without Ukraine.

On 9 August, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized that Ukraine is ready for real steps that could lead to peace, but no agreements “against Ukraine and without Ukraine” can be considered peaceful. At the same time, he stressed that Kyiv, together with international partners, is ready to seek ways to achieve a genuine and lasting peace “that will not collapse due to Moscow’s ambitions.”

Ukraine’s position, particularly regarding the inviolability of international borders, was supported in a joint statement by the leaders of Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The leaders of the Baltic and Northern European countries also stated that “negotiations can only take place in the context of a ceasefire.”

Ukraine’s asymmetric response strategy

In response, Ukraine’s military and political leadership is actively seeking ways to strengthen national defense. Given that Ukraine’s mobilization reserve is significantly smaller than Russia’s, Kyiv is focusing on military innovation and asymmetric responses to Russian aggression.

In particular, drones’ success on the battlefield led to the creation of the world’s first Unmanned Systems Forces, which use aerial, naval (both surface and underwater), and ground-based drones in combat operations.

This allows citizens to apply directly to specific units or branches of service and choose roles based on their skills and interests.

Despite calls from some international partners to lower Ukraine’s mobilization age from 25 to 18 to replenish the ranks with younger personnel, Kyiv has chosen a different approach. Young people aged 18 to 24 can voluntarily join the Defense Forces through a special contract program, gaining financial and social benefits in exchange for one year of military service, which includes mandatory combat deployment. At the same time, enlistment is only possible in specific units and for certain specialties.

As of 30 July, this “18-24” contract program has been expanded to include specialists in unmanned systems — not just aerial drone operators, but also technicians working with ground-based robotic platforms. This version of the contract entails 24 months of service, with at least 12 months of direct combat involvement.

Financial commitment to extended warfare

At the same time, Ukraine continues efforts to improve mobilization efforts and increase voluntary enlistment in the face of Russia’s ongoing summer offensive.

On 31 July, the Ukrainian government announced an additional ₴412.4 billion (about $10 billion USD) in defense and national security funding. Of this, ₴115 billion ($2.7 billion) is earmarked for military personnel salaries, while ₴216 billion ($5.1 billion) will fund the procurement and production of weapons, military equipment, drones, etc.

In fact, Ukraine has been running a program for the decentralized procurement of drones and other important battlefield equipment since last year, and thanks to its implementation, the effectiveness of striking the enemy has increased by 40%. In addition, a decision was made to increase vacation time for service members — an initiative personally proposed by President Zelenskyy, according to Deputy Head of the Presidential Office, Colonel Pavlo Palisa.

What this means for Western policy

The gap between Western diplomatic timelines and Ukrainian military planning creates a fundamental policy challenge. While international partners hope for a negotiated resolution, both Moscow and Kyiv prepare for an extended conflict.

Despite some hopes for diplomatic success, the daily missile and drone attacks on Ukraine, the deaths of civilians, and the situation on the front lines show that Moscow is not interested in peace and is betting on victory by force.

The only effective response to Russian aggression remains strengthening defense capabilities through enhancing the capacities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, developing modern technologies, and the determination and unity of the international community, understanding that Russia responds only to the language of force.

Key takeaways for international partners:

• Peace talks must be based on respect for international law and Ukraine’s territorial integrity
• Russian “immunity” to sanctions requires more creative economic pressure
• Ukraine’s long-term defense investment needs sustained Western support
• Quick negotiated solutions remain unlikely while Russia believes in military victory

Oksana Kuzan

Oksana Kuzan heads the Analytical Department at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

Submit an opinion to Euromaidan Press

US President Donald Trump’s Ukraine ceasefire plan was the focus of a call with European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 13 August, NBC News reports. European officials briefed on the discussion said the president told participants he will not discuss any division of territory when he meets Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on 15 August, but will push for an end to the fighting first.

Leaders stress truce before peace talks

NBC cites two European officials and three other people briefed on the call who said Trump’s stated goal for the Alaska meeting is to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine. The sources told NBC that Trump and the other leaders agreed no peace negotiations should begin until a truce is in place. Zelenskyy warned during the call that “Putin definitely does not want peace.”

Concerns over earlier land swap comments

European and Ukrainian officials had grown uneasy after Trump’s recent public remark suggesting there could “be some land swapping” between Russia and Ukraine. NBC’s sources said those concerns were addressed directly, with Trump assuring allies that Ukraine must decide any territorial concessions and that no such deals would be struck without Kyiv’s consent.

Sanctions threat if truce fails

According to NBC, participants in the call agreed that if Putin refuses a ceasefire, Trump will likely move to impose new sanctions on Russia. Two additional people familiar with the conversation told NBC that some European leaders left feeling more positive about the president’s approach, with one source saying achieving a truce is the top priority for the meeting.

Possible follow-up meeting with Zelenskyy

NBC reports Trump said after the call that there is a “very good chance” of a second meeting involving himself, Putin, and Zelenskyy soon after the Alaska summit. He suggested such talks could happen “almost immediately” if the first meeting clarifies each side’s position.

White House stays quiet on details

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told NBC the administration would not comment on private diplomatic conversations but reiterated that Trump wants to end the war and stop the killing. Vice President JD Vance, who also joined the Wednesday call, told US troops in the UK that ending the war in Ukraine is one of “our most important shared security goals in Europe.”

Germany will fund a $500 million package of US-sourced weapons for Ukraine under NATO’s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. NATO said the shipment will focus on urgent operational needs, such as air defense systems to counter intensified Russian air strikes.

Germany commits to fast-track weapons delivery

On 13 August, Germany’s Foreign Ministry said the PURL initiative covers military equipment either not produced by European industry or available more quickly from the United States than from European partners or Canada. The list includes critical air defense capabilities needed to counter Russian aerial attacks that are causing growing civilian casualties across Ukraine.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte welcomed Berlin’s decision, calling it proof of Germany’s enduring commitment to Ukraine’s defense. He said the new package will help Kyiv defend itself against Russian aggression and underlined Germany’s role as NATO’s largest European military donor to Ukraine.

Germany’s Defense Ministry confirmed the package will be one of the first major contributions under the NATO mechanism. Officials stressed that the funding is intended to meet Ukraine’s most urgent battlefield requirements.

A multinational NATO effort

Germany’s contribution follows earlier announcements by the Netherlands, as well as a joint pledge from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Each package is valued at about $500 million and is sourced from US stockpiles to accelerate delivery.

The German government said the decision underscores its commitment to substantial and reliable support for Ukraine, as well as solidarity within the alliance. Coordination with NATO and allied governments on the details is ongoing.

Previously, US President Donald Trump announced on 14 July that the United States will supply Ukraine with multiple packages of military equipment and munitions, purchased by NATO. He named Patriot air defense systems among the weapons planned for delivery.

Trump and Putin will likely walk away Friday with aligned foreign policy against Europe—but no path to peace.

Trump has already demonstrated his negotiating skills by offering Russia substantial concessions before talks have even started. He has offered Putin nearly everything he demanded to even start negotiations with Ukraine.

In July 2023, I argued that Trump’s “peace plan” was a blueprint for Russian victory over Ukraine and the West. He has since offered even greater concessions while pressuring the victim and rewarding the aggressor.

That’s not negotiations. It is capitulation at the peril of the rule-based world order, Europe and the transatlantic relationship.

The talks between Trump and Putin in Alaska are unlikely to result in an unjust, temporary peace on Russian conditions. Nor will they produce the just and lasting peace the free world is calling for.

Why? Neither has the cards to change the strategic situation. But they will produce something both leaders want: deeper alignment against European allies.

Neither leader can deliver what they promise

Trump wants more than anything else to achieve a diplomatic victory, resetting relations between Russia and the United States, turning Russia away from China through a “reverse Nixon” strategy, and ensuring increased trade and access to Russian minerals.

These goals are far more important to him than lasting and just peace. They are also far more unrealistic than the latter.

There is a big gap between what Trump wants and what he can achieve.

• The United States cannot force Ukraine to withdraw from government-controlled territories, change its constitution, or recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied territories.
• It cannot force the Ukrainian population—the source of Ukrainian resolve and resilience—to accept anything contrary to their interests.
• Having stepped away from the Budapest Memorandum, any US security guarantee lacks credibility. Trump lost most cards when he stopped aid to Ukraine.
• Nor can the US force Europe to return frozen Russian assets, lift sanctions, or recognize Russian territorial conquests that violate international law. It cannot force the free world to stop supporting Ukraine’s fight for existence.

Trump has also forsaken all means necessary to force Russia to seek peace. He has aligned his foreign policy with Putin’s and declared himself unwilling to use US military power to pressure Russia. Threats of secondary sanctions and tariffs are unlikely to sway a country that is not waging war for territory but for great power status, strategic parity with the US, and a sphere of influence over parts of NATO territory.

The Kremlin has “played” all its “cards” short of nuclear weapons.

• It is bleeding soldiers and weapons on the battlefield without any prospect of an imminent breakthrough.
• It is advancing at a foot pace and will need an additional 3-4 years to occupy the rest of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts.
• More crucially, at the present speed of advance, Russia will not occupy the rest of Ukraine before 2120.
• By the end of this year, it will have lost 1.5 million soldiers on the battlefield.
• More importantly, it will have lost most of its main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery pieces.
• It has already lost the ability to conduct mechanized maneuvers, crucial for any hope of decisive battles.
• While it refuses to abandon its strategic aims and objectives, its economy is slowly collapsing.

Yet Putin believes he is winning. He has repeatedly rejected Trump’s so-called Peace Plan. Kremlin statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals and will not sign up to anything that does not deliver a victory.

Explore further

Putin came for the summit. Trump brought the white flag.

How Russia manipulates America’s diplomatic collapse

Besides the support from China, Iran, and North Korea, President Trump is possibly Russia’s best hope for a victory in Ukraine. He has already demonstrated his willingness to betray allies and partners to secure what he sees as the US national interests (hence his America First policy).

The Trump administration is actively pursuing a reset or normalization of relations with Russia. The administration and Russian officials are discussing economic cooperation and removing barriers to mutual trade, with Trump’s tone increasingly favorable toward potential business ties.

Additionally, the policy shift is naively believed to pull Russia away from China, undermining the strategic alliance between Moscow and Beijing.

The Kremlin is actively entertaining the idea that a reset of relations is both possible and mutually beneficial, offering potentially great economic rewards. It is actively manipulating a US administration that has recently fired over 1,300 career diplomats and civil servants, losing institutional knowledge, diplomatic capacity, language and cultural expertise.

Russia, in contrast, maintains a professional diplomatic corps with deep US expertise.

The talks between the US special envoy, Steven Witkoff—an American lawyer and real estate investor—and highly experienced Russian diplomats like Sergey Lavrov (Foreign Minister), Yuri Ushakov (Presidential Aide), Kirill Dmitriev (Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund; Special Representative for Foreign Investment), and not least President Putin, demonstrates the extreme imbalance between the two parties.

Combined diplomatic experience? 172 to 0.5 years in favor of the Russian Team.

As Daniel Hannan, former member of the European Parliament, observed: “Whatever his motives, Trump has behaved exactly as a Russian asset would.”

President Trump has threatened allies with land grabs by military force, annexation, started a trade war, and increasingly aligned his foreign policy with that of Russia. The President sees the EU, which represents most of the US’s European allies, as “worse than our so-called enemies.” He argues that the EU was formed to screw the US.

The fundamental break with Europe

Statements by the Trump administration signal a deepening of the transatlantic chasm beyond different perceptions of Russia to an even deeper societal rupture about values and the nature of democracy. They mark an end to the era of shared US-European values.

President Trump’s repeated concessions to Russia and the absence of European representatives at the negotiations underline the scale and scope of the strategic split.

Given Trump’s all too generous offers, Putin’s persistent refusal to engage in meaningful negotiations, and their common refusal to involve Europe in the talks, the fear of betrayal comes easily.

What Friday’s meeting will actually achieve

The meeting between Trump and Putin will likely have limited impact on the war but significant impact on Western unity.

The meeting will likely be a “feel-out session” sharing perspectives on the war and the way forward. But both presidents will walk away with even more aligned foreign policy, united in ramping up pressure on Europe and Ukraine.

Trump has blinked, shown his cards, and demonstrated weakness and is, consequently, left without leverage. Putin gets an American partner in pressuring European allies while Trump gets to claim he’s pursuing “peace” while avoiding confrontation with Moscow.

It is, unfortunately, smoke and mirrors.

Hans Petter Midttun

Hans Petter Midttun, independent analyst on hybrid warfare, Non-Resident Fellow at the Centre for Defense Strategies, board member of the Ukrainian Institute for Security and Law of the Sea, former Defense Attaché of Norway to Ukraine, and officer (R) of the Norwegian Armed Forces. 

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

Submit an opinion to Euromaidan Press

A Russian Feniks (“Phoenix”) reconnaissance drone washed ashore in Bulgaria and was destroyed by the Bulgarian Navy. Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defense said the unmanned aircraft was found on a beach in Sozopol on 12 August, after vacationers noticed it in the sand. The drone, similar in design to the Russian Orlan-10 but with distinct features, appeared damaged from long exposure to seawater.

Drone discovered by beachgoers in Sozopol

According to the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, the fixed-wing drone was spotted in the morning by people relaxing on Harmani Beach in Sozopol — the city on the Black Sea’s southwestern coast about 50 km from Türkiye. The local Burgas Oblast administration contacted the military at 10:00, prompting authorization from Chief of Defense Admiral Emil Eftimov to deploy a navy team.

Navy specialists move in

A specialized unit from the Bulgarian Navy, led by Captain Third Rank Zhivko Karchev under the order of Fleet Admiral Vanio Musinski, arrived to investigate, mark, extract, transport, and dispose of unexploded ordnance. Upon inspection, the team determined the drone was of an unknown model and could not confirm whether it contained any munitions.

Destroyed on site for safety

For security reasons, and on the recommendation of the operation’s lead, the navy received permission to destroy the drone on site. At 11:20 local time, the UAV was eliminated in line with safety regulations. The Ministry of Defense later posted images of the wreck on Facebook, showing broken wings and a damaged fuselage.

Identification as Feniks UAV

Described by the Bulgarian military as an unidentified model, Ukrainian military news portal Militarnyi initially identified the drone as Orlan-10 — a widely-used Russian UAV model, very similar to the rarer Feniks. The Telegram community “Potuzhnyi informator,” however, later correctly identified the photos of the wreck as Feniks.

Bulgarian officials said the condition of the wreck suggested it had been in the water for several months before washing ashore. 

Exclusives

Putin came for the summit. Trump brought the white flag. For six months, Trump has found excuses for Putin, punished allies instead of adversaries, and now arrives at the table already conceding the game.

As sanctions bite, Russia’s war chest nears empty by Christmas. The Russian economy is not collapsing, but it is stagnant and suffering high inflation. And this economic decline could be a tipping point, because Russia may run out of liquid reserves, prompting the Kremlin to cut public expenditures.

Ukraine’s new Privet-299 drone spies on Russians where FPVs can’t reach — and bombers can’t fly. The recently revealed Privet-299 drone could help extend the robotic kill zone by tens of kilometers from the front line.

Top 7 must-have gadgets for modern college students. Seven practical, everyday gadgets that help students stay on track, get around, and make the most of campus life

The West is losing the information war because it won’t fight dirty. Facts don’t defeat fascists. Fear does.

Military

50-kilometer fortress: Why Ukraine’s Donetsk defense belt matters more than territory. Eleven years of Ukrainian military investment in Donetsk Oblast’s primary defense network could face elimination through diplomatic concessions rather than military defeat, the ISW reported

Zelenskyy: Ukrainian Armed Forces will not leave Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on their own. Ukraine faces the prospect of a “third war” if its forces abandon Donbas territories either voluntarily or under international pressure, Zelenskyy said three days before Trump-Putin meeting

Drones attack refineries in Sloviansk-on-Kuban and Volgograd, fire reported

. Russian oil refineries in two regions came under drone attack overnight, with debris from intercepted aircraft damaging a residential building in Volgograd

Intelligence and technology

FT: European defense plant space tripled since 2021. Three years after Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe has constructed an industrial war machine spanning 7 million square meters of new weapons facilities, marking the continent’s largest defense buildup since World War II.

Ukrainian Intel: North Korean troops remain in Kursk Oblast. 11,000 North Korean soldiers remain stationed across four brigades in Russia’s Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, with an additional 6,000 personnel expected for infrastructure and support operations.

Norwegian intelligence considers Russia the biggest threat to country. The Norway’s top spy said that Russia poses the biggest threat to Norwegian security, even as Moscow’s cyber operatives target the nation’s dams.

International

Court orders Ukrainian airline to pay beyond $180,000 limits to families of victims in Tehran plane crash. Canadian court found UIA failed to assess risks before flying 167 passengers and 9 crew members from Tehran on the same day in 2020 Iran retaliated against the US for assassinating general Qasem Soleimani.

The Telegraph: Russia is racing to seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible ahead of peace talks with Trump. Small Russian reconnaissance groups have infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in eastern Donetsk, forcing Kyiv to deploy special forces units to prevent further territorial losses before scheduled peace negotiations in Alaska

Norway’s domestic intelligence suspects Russian trace in cyber sabotage of dam. Norwegian intelligence officials blame pro-Russian hackers for a cyber attack that kept dam gates open for four hours in April, releasing 500 liters per second.

Merz meets Zelenskyy in his office in Berlin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived by helicopter at the German chancellery for a videoconference with Donald Trump and European leaders, one day before the US president’s planned summit with Vladimir Putin in Alaska

Belarus confirms nuclear weapons training drills with Russia this September

. Belarus will practice planning nuclear weapons deployment alongside Russia during military exercises next month, Defense Minister Viktor Krenin announced

The Telegraph: Ukraine may agree to cede already occupied territory but reject further concessions as Trump-Putin talks near. Russia currently occupies roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory, but Zelenskyy cited intelligence Monday showing Moscow “moving their troops and forces in such a way as to launch new offensive operations.”

Humanitarian and social impact

Russian terror continues: drones hit civilian cars, then ambulance. Three people died in two different locations.

Read our earlier daily review here.

Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign has struck deep inside Russia again, igniting a massive fire at the Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka refinery in Volgograd overnight on 14 August. The attack set off explosions, triggered a fuel spill, and forced the temporary closure of the city’s airport.

The Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka plant is Russia’s largest petroleum producer in the Southern Federal District, with an annual capacity of 14.8 million tons. It is located roughly 500 km from the war zone.

Southern Russia’s largest refinery hit overnight

Russian Telegram channels, including Astra, reported explosions and fires at the Lukoil facility in the early hours. Volgograd Oblast governor Andrei Bocharov claimed the region came under a massive drone attack. He alleged that falling debris from intercepted drones caused petroleum products to spill and ignite at the refinery. Bocharov said firefighting crews were deployed immediately and claimed there were no casualties.

Multiple explosions and fire after the strike

Local accounts described several blasts before the blaze engulfed parts of the facility. Russian sources later confirmed that the refinery was the site of the attack. Authorities shut down Volgograd’s airport during the incident, citing safety concerns.

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed its air defenses destroyed 44 Ukrainian drones overnight across Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea, including nine over Volgograd Oblast. It alleged that 14 drones were downed over the Black Sea, seven over Russian-occupied Crimea, seven over Rostov Oblast, four over Krasnodar Krai, two over Belgorod Oblast, and one over the Azov Sea.

Previous strikes on the same facility

This was not the first time the Volgograd refinery was targeted. Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the plant on 13 August, hitting the Krasnoarmeysky district where the facility is located. On 15 January, Russian media reported an explosion and subsequent fire at the refinery. In 2024, Ukrainian drones also attacked the plant twice — on 3 February and 11 May.

Georgia’s ruling party released new campaign material featuring cemetery footage of buried Ukrainian soldiers and bombed residential buildings, escalating its controversial practice of exploiting Russian war crimes for domestic political gain.

Georgian Dream’s central campaign message warns that supporting pro-European opposition would bring Ukrainian-style war to Georgia. The practice demonstrates how Russia’s invasion has become a tool in Georgian domestic politics, as the government exploits the conflict to shape voter behavior around Western integration versus accommodation with Moscow.

The Facebook video juxtaposes haunting black-and-white footage from Russian-bombed Ukrainian cities with colorful Georgian infrastructure. The campaign includes military cemeteries filled with Ukrainian defenders, destroyed residential towers, and grieving parents standing in rubble where their children died.

The Ukrainian footage (left) is captioned “no to war!”, while the Georgian side (right) reads “choose peace!”

Political campaign exploits Ukrainian suffering

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the materials as “yet another unfriendly act by the ruling party ‘Georgian Dream’ that for its own political PR purposes keeps using videos depicting the horrific consequences of the Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine.”

“Such cynical actions demonstrate disrespect towards the Ukrainian people and the victims of the Russian aggression,” the statement continued, expressing “just indignation among Ukrainian society.”

This follows the party’s previous use of bombed Ukrainian theaters and churches in October 2024 election banners, which featured destroyed sites like Mariupol’s drama theater where hundreds of civilians died in targeted Russian airstrikes.

“Crawling before Moscow”

The ministry delivered particularly harsh criticism of Georgia’s broader trajectory under billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia and has steered the country away from Western integration.

“It is regrettable to observe how the Georgian authorities crawl before Moscow and disregard the principles of dignity and independence, which [are] historically inherent to the Georgian nation,” Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry stated.

The statement suggested Georgian Dream’s political technologists should “be honest with their own people and post a more truthful image on their pages: the Russian tricolor on the right and closed doors of the EU and NATO on the left.”

Pattern of Russian influence

Since 2022, Georgian Dream has refused to sanction Russia, passed Moscow-style “foreign agents” legislation, and suspended EU integration talks until 2028 despite winning disputed elections in October 2024.

The party’s “fear of war” strategy exploits trauma from Russia’s 2008 invasion, which left 20% of Georgia under occupation. 

International observers called Georgia’s October elections fraudulent, with statistical analysis suggesting the party stole 15% of votes cast. Mass protests have continued for over eight months, while the EU has effectively frozen Georgia’s membership path.

Despite government hostility, Ukraine emphasized its “consistent and unwavering support to the friendly Georgian people in their aspiration to build up an independent, democratic, and European state.”

What happens if Putin refuses to end the war? Donald Trump isn’t saying. But the consequences will be “very serious.”

The warning came during a White House briefing this week, Sky News reports. When pressed by journalists for specifics, Trump declined to elaborate.

“I don’t need to say. There will be very serious consequences.”

Why the cryptic threat now? Trump and Putin are set to meet 15 August in Anchorage, Alaska. The stakes couldn’t be higher.

Trump expects this to be just the beginning. A second meeting could happen within days, he told reporters, possibly including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

“There’s a very high probability that we’ll have a second meeting that will be more productive than the first, because in the first one I’m going to find out where we are and what we’re doing.”

The president was blunt about his track record. When asked whether he believes he can persuade Putin to stop shelling Ukrainian civilians, Trump acknowledged failure. He’d raised the issue before “but it didn’t happen.”

Here’s what’s driving the Alaska talks: Washington and Moscow are pursuing an agreement that would let Russia keep occupied territories. The Wall Street Journal says Putin has already presented Trump’s team with a ceasefire proposal.

The price? Ukrainian territorial concessions.

Trump has suggested any peace deal would require “some territorial exchange for the benefit of both sides.” Russia demands: Ukraine withdraws troops from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, parts of which are not even occupied. 

Ukraine’s response was swift.

Zelenskyy declared Ukraine “will not give away its lands to anyone.” European Union leaders echoed that position, insisting Ukraine must shape any peace framework.

The timing matters. On 13 August, just two days before the Alaska meeting, Zelenskyy and European leaders arranged their own session with Trump. Their goal: coordinate positions before Trump sits down with Putin.

What emerges from Alaska could reshape the war’s trajectory. Putin arrives with territorial demands. Trump brings unspecified threats. Ukraine and Europe are scrambling to ensure their voices aren’t drowned out.

The consequences, as Trump says, could indeed be serious.

A Ukrainian Orthodox priest was running spies for Moscow. Right from his pulpit in Zaporizhzhia, a city close to the front line in southern Ukraine.

The The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that the network was run by an abbot from a Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) parish who used his religious position to identify and recruit pro-Russian sympathizers. The priest used Sunday sermons to scout for recruits, justifying Russia’s invasion to identify sympathizers in his congregation.

How did Ukrainian counterintelligence find him? They caught a Russian spotter operating in the city first. Under interrogation, he gave up the priest. This led to surveillance of the priest’s activities and the discovery of the broader network.

The cleric had recruited a 41-year-old Ukrainian soldier deployed to a local base. The man was feeding Moscow detailed intelligence about Ukrainian positions, troop numbers, and equipment along the Zaporizhzhia front lines. He photographed classified documents showing new Armed Forces deployments and reported on his own battalion’s activities.

But the network went higher. Both the priest and soldier answered to a handler from Russia’s 316th reconnaissance center—part of the GRU military intelligence service. Ukrainian investigators identified this controller as a former Ukrainian police officer who fled to occupied territory and switched sides.

The evidence was everywhere. During raids, the SBU found phones and computers packed with incriminating communications. In the priest’s possession: a Russian passport, Kalashnikov ammunition, and knives.

Why did the priest risk everything? The SBU says he used his religious position systematically, weaving pro-Russian propaganda into sermons before approaching potential recruits privately.

Both men now face five criminal charges, including high treason during martial law. The most serious carry potential life sentences.

Explore further

Yes, Tucker, Christians are really killed in Ukraine — for refusing to spy for Putin

President Trump hates the moniker TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out). But regarding Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine, Trump has repeatedly earned this sobriquet.

Despite repeated warnings that he would impose large secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian energy, Trump has caved to China and instead imposed substantial sanctions on India. This jeopardizes a generation of rapprochement with India and drives it closer to Moscow and Beijing.

When Trump, after six months of finding excuses for Putin and virtually offering him victory, announced his dissatisfaction with Putin’s refusal to commit to peace, many commentators argued he had finally seen the light. Now, they claimed, he would impose crushing sanctions on Russia and its Asian supporters—China and India.

This expression of irritation with Putin’s stalling was allegedly a turning point. Alas, it was not to be.

Trump’s unilateral concessions

On 7 August, Trump and the Russian government announced that instead of draconian sanctions being imposed on Russia, Trump and Vladimir Putin would hold a summit next week. Trump would probably meet with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy afterward.

But Moscow refused to commit to meeting Zelenskyy, although it might meet with other Ukrainians—again implying the illegality of Zelenskyy’s tenure. Trump duly conceded that Putin did not have to meet Zelenskyy, just hours after a White House aide stated that Putin indeed had to meet with Zelenskyy.

Russia rubbed salt in this wound by claiming the idea for a summit was Trump’s, emphasizing that he, not Putin, was the supplicant. Russian media, now exulting that Washington will finally accept Moscow as an equal by meeting with it, suggest this summit will not even discuss Ukraine but other bilateral issues.

Whether such claims have validity cannot be known. But they indicate Putin’s belief, shared by the Russian elite, that even if the West had the fortitude to impose greater sanctions or furnish Ukraine with more assistance, it would not matter—Russia is going to win.

Russian elite confidence

As Mikhail Zygar has written, the Russian elite is not scared and treats Trump’s earlier threats with disdain. This episode reveals that for all his bravado, Trump has imposed no sanctions on China or Russia but rather attacked America’s allies and partners in an act of extreme strategic incompetence.

Trump has already made two unjustified and unreciprocated concessions to Putin: asking to hold a summit with him and agreeing to exclude both Ukraine and Europe. When asked about this summit, a European official stated he was distraught:

“For all the bluster, Trump has not put a single iota of pressure on Putin—yet. Zero, zip.”

Cosmetic Russian concessions expected

Beyond these unilateral gestures to Putin, speculation suggests Russia will present nothing but cosmetic concessions—for example, suspending aerial and missile attacks on civilian targets. This costs Russia very little but impedes Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy and logistics targets. This approach was reportedly what Belarusian President Lukashenka communicated to Washington.

Putin will not change his government to suit Russia’s taste, nor will he give ground regarding the five Ukrainian provinces Russia has seized since 2014: Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.

Instead, this “agreement” will likely pave the way toward Russia’s annexation of those provinces, as Putin and the Russian government have long embarked upon their Russification. There is little to expect here unless Trump magically departs from his fear of Putin and his steadfast refusal to understand what this war is about and how it connects to both international security in general and European security in particular.

Explore further

Nordic-Baltic nations remind before Trump-Putin meeting: international borders must not be changed by force

Putin’s broken promises

We already know in advance of this summit—even if Trump does not—that any agreement with Putin will not be worth the paper it’s written on. In invading Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022, Putin broke eight international treaties guaranteeing Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty.

He has also broken or walked out of virtually every arms control treaty except the ABM treaty and is obviously not interested in talks on a new one. Even assuming Russia negotiated such a treaty, it is unlikely to adhere to it. Apart from the eight treaties he broke, Putin also refused to abide by the terms of the Minsk agreements following Russia’s 2014 invasion.

Echoes of Munich 1938

This summit, taking place over the heads of the most directly interested parties, has already triggered considerable anxiety—like the Munich summit of 1938.

That anxiety, based on the first six months of Trump’s second term and his summits with Putin during his first term, is all too justified.

Stephen Blank

Dr. Stephen J. Blank, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is an expert on Russian foreign policy, Eurasian security, and international relations.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

Submit an opinion to Euromaidan Press

A Polish man attempted to join Putin’s army by swimming across an Estonian river on an inflatable mattress. Estonian border guards stopped him. Now he is arrested.

The 49-year-old was caught last week trying to cross the Narva River, which separates Estonia from Russia, according to RMF24. His plan? Float across on a mattress and enlist in Russian forces fighting Ukraine, according to prosecutors.

The Polish citizen had traveled to Estonia from Serbia and was carrying items that demonstrated support for Russian military actions in Ukraine—possibly a St. George ribbon or the letter “Z” that Russian supporters display.

Can foreigners just decide to join Russia’s military? Not through Estonia. The country’s internal security service treats this as a criminal act under national law.

“Joining the army of the Russian Federation indirectly threatens the security of Estonia, as well as all European Union member states,” prosecutor Gardi Anderson told reporters.

The Viru district court ordered two months detention. Why so long? Prosecutors argued the man might flee or try crossing again if released immediately.

Estonian Internal Security Service spokesperson Marta Tuul explained their approach:

“To prevent such actions, we also prosecute citizens of other states who try to support Russia’s military actions through Estonia.”

What happens next? The Polish citizen faces charges under Estonian law that criminalizes participation in foreign acts of aggression. His case could set precedent for how Baltic states handle similar attempts to reach Russian military recruiters.

Can an airline walk away from a tragedy by invoking international payment caps? Not this time.

Ontario’s Superior Court just delivered a crushing blow to Ukraine International Airlines, upholding a ruling that strips the carrier of its right to limit compensation for the 176 people killed when flight PS752 was shot down over Tehran, Iran, in 2020.

The court’s reasoning? UIA acted negligently because it “failed to assess the risks associated with operating flights from Tehran.” That single finding changes everything for the families seeking justice.

Here’s why this matters. Under international aviation law, airlines typically pay up to $180,000 per passenger when fault is proven. But when negligence enters the picture? Those caps disappear. 

This determination allows victims’ families to seek compensation beyond the standard international aviation limits.

The Ontario Court of Appeal wasn’t buying UIA’s challenge either. “I dismiss the appeal, ordering court costs to be paid by the appellant in favor of the defendants,” the court stated. 

What actually happened that January morning?

January 8, 2020. Tehran’s airport. A Boeing 737-800 climbs into the dawn sky carrying 176 people on board—11 Ukrainians, plus citizens from Iran, Canada, Britain and Afghanistan, all of them died.

Minutes later, Iranian forces shoot it down. 

Why? They mistook the civilian aircraft for a hostile military target. Iran initially denied responsibility, then admitted what officials called a “catastrophic mistake” three days later.

The timing tells the story. Hours earlier, Iran had launched missile strikes on US military bases in Iraq, retaliating for the assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. Tensions were sky-high.

Could this have been prevented?

That’s the million-dollar question the Canadian court answered with a resounding yes.

French investigators decoded both flight recorders in July 2020. The data confirmed what Ukraine suspected: the aircraft was functioning normally when the missile struck. No mechanical failure. No pilot error.

The plane was fine. The decision to fly wasn’t.

Why is Iran’s investigation controversial?

The Iranian probe has drawn fire from multiple countries. In February 2021, UN special rapporteurs accused Iran of violating international law and conducting a non-transparent investigation riddled with “inaccuracies.”

Ukraine joined that criticism. So did other affected nations.

Iran did sentence 10 military personnel in April, according to reports. But details? Those remain classified.

What happens now?

UIA can no longer hide behind international treaty provisions that would have capped compensation payments. The airline faces potentially massive financial exposure.

For the families, this ruling represents more than money. It’s acknowledgment that their loved ones died because of preventable negligence—not just Iranian missiles, but Ukrainian miscalculation.

Two people died when a Russian drone hit their car on a highway in Kherson Oblast on 13 August morning. But that wasn’t the end of it.

When police arrived to help, Russian forces struck again. Three officers were wounded in the second attack.

Why target rescue workers? Ukrainians authorities describe this pattern as what appears to be a coordinated campaign to cause terror among the civilian population.

Three separate attacks, same target – civilians

Russian forces hit civilian vehicles in three locations on 13 August. In another part of Beryslav district, a drone killed one person and wounded a woman in a passenger car. Emergency crews pulled out the dead and got the injured woman to medical care.

Then came the ambulance strike. Russian forces hit the emergency vehicle directly, sparking a fire that local firefighters had to extinguish, the State Emergency Service reported.

Over in Donetsk region? Same story, different location. A Russian drone slammed into a car carrying three people, sending it careening into a roadside ditch. Police pulled two men from the wreckage while rescue teams freed the third passenger and handed him to medics.

Ukraine documents more Russian war crimes

The Beryslav prosecutor’s office isn’t treating this as random violence. They’ve opened a war crimes investigation under Article 438 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code—the section that covers war crimes resulting in death.

What makes this a war crime? Deliberately targeting civilians. And the follow-up strike on police during rescue operations? That crosses another line entirely.

For months, Russia’s official inflation rate has hovered around 10%. In June, the Central Bank of Russia boasted that the rate had fallen to 9.4%, but it then dampened the celebration by reporting that expectations for inflation one year from now are 13% (which may well be the actual inflation rate today). Yet, on 25 July, the central bank dared to cut its very high interest rate, which has weakened growth and caused a severe credit crunch, from 20% to 18%.

Deceitful appearances

True, Russia’s economy appeared surprisingly dynamic in 2023 and 2024, with the official growth rate reaching 4% each year. But this was largely because the Russian government revived dormant Soviet military enterprises beyond the Ural Mountains. Moreover, real growth figures may have been exaggerated because some inflation was hidden by state-owned enterprises selling their goods to the state at administered prices.

In any case, official growth has fallen this year, probably to 1.4% in the first half of 2025. Since October 2024, the Kremlin itself has begun to report that Russia is experiencing stagflation – a message that was reinforced at the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June.

Improvement is unlikely. The country’s financial reserves are running out, energy revenues are declining, and there are increasingly severe shortages of labor and imported technology. All are linked to the war and Western sanctions.

Since 2022, Russia has had an annual budget deficit of about 2% of GDP, implying that it needs $40 billion each year to close the gap. But owing to Western financial sanctions, Russia has had virtually no access to international financing since 2014.

(Indeed, two small Chinese banks were just sanctioned by the European Union for such sins.) So, Russia must make do with the liquid financial resources held in its National Wealth Fund. Having fallen from $135 billion in January 2022 to $35 billion by May 2025, these are set to run out in the second half of this year.

Dwindling oil revenues

Traditionally, half of Russia’s federal revenues have come from energy exports, which used to account for two-thirds of its total exports. But in the face of Western sanctions, Russia’s total exports have slumped, falling by 27%, from $592 billion to $433 billion, between 2022 and 2024.

The federal budget for 2025 assumed an oil price of $70 per barrel, but oil is now hovering closer to the Western price cap of $60 per barrel, and the EU has just set a ceiling of $47.6 per barrel for the Russian oil that it still purchases. In addition, the West has sanctioned nearly 600 Russian “shadow fleet” tankers, which will reduce Russian federal revenues by at least 1% of GDP.

Against this backdrop, the Kremlin has announced that while it intends to spend 37% of its federal budget – $195 billion (7.2% of GDP) – on national defense and security this year, it must cut federal expenditures from 20% of GDP to about 17%. But since the government has already cut non-military expenditures to a minimum, it claims that it will reduce its military expenditures by some unspecified amount in 2026.

Reducing military expenditures at the height of a war is rarely an auspicious signal. As the commentator Igor Sushko points out, “The Confederacy did this in 1863-1865 (American Civil War), Germany in 1917-1918 (WWI), Japan in 1944-1945 (WW2),” and the outcome every time was “total military defeat.”

Of course, actual economic strength is not the issue. Ukraine spends about $100 billion per year on its defense, which amounts to 50% of its GDP, but no one bothers to question this, because for Ukrainians, the war is existential. Ukraine would not survive if the war was lost.

If he had a popular mandate, Russia could spend much more on the war. But he apparently does not think his popularity could withstand devoting much more of the budget to the effort.

Short of everything — except corruption

Meanwhile, it is increasingly clear that something else is rotten in Russia besides the economy. Russia has fallen to 154th place out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s authoritative Corruption Perceptions Index, while Ukraine is in 105th place. Since the start of the war, a dozen or so senior Russian energy managers have fallen out of windows.

And more recently, former Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov was sentenced to no less than 13 years in prison for corruption; Transportation Minister Roman Starovoit allegedly committed suicide just hours after Putin fired him; and a gold-mining billionaire was arrested, and his company was nationalized to help the treasury.

These were high officials. Ivanov was a top protégé of former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and Starovoit was the right-hand man of Putin’s close friend Arkady Rotenberg. Such developments are clear signs of Russia’s economic instability.

Officially, unemployment stands at only 2%, but that is partly because many Russians have left. Since the start of the war, and especially after Putin attempted a minor mobilization in 2022, approximately one million people fled the country, including many young, well-educated men.

He has not dared to pursue another mobilization since.

Now, labor scarcities are holding back production and driving up wages, while Western export controls limit Russia’s supply of high-tech goods (though Chinese supplies have mitigated the impact).

Russia’s economy is fast approaching a fiscal crunch that will encumber its war effort. Though that may not be enough to compel Putin to seek peace, it does suggest that the walls are closing in on him.

Anders Åslund

Anders Åslund is the author of Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy (Yale University Press, 2019). Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025. www.project-syndicate.org

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

Submit an opinion to Euromaidan Press

The head of Norwegian intelligence has identified the Russian Federation as the primary security threat facing Norway, according to VG.

Nils Andreas Stensones made the declaration during an event titled “Hybrid attacks against Norway: are we at war?” While opening his remarks, Stensones clarified that he does not consider the current situation equivalent to wartime conditions.

“However, Russian President Putin believes that Russia is in constant conflict with the West… Russia is currently the biggest threat to Norway,” Stensones said.

The intelligence chief expressed his assessment that Russia does not aim to influence this year’s elections in Norway.

At the same event, the head of Norway’s domestic intelligence service revealed evidence of Russian involvement in a cyber sabotage operation targeting a dam in the western part of the country during spring 2024.

The Norwegian assessment aligns with broader European security concerns. A French top general believes Russia could pose a real threat to Europe by 2030, according to France’s National Strategic Review for 2025, which calls for preparations for high-intensity warfare in Europe.

Norway’s Police Security Service (PST) believes pro-Russian hackers orchestrated a cyber attack on a Norwegian dam in spring 2025, according to VG.

PST chief Beate Gangas said the service considers the April 2025 cyber sabotage of a dam a work of pro-Russian hackers. The incident occurred at a dam on Lake Risevatnet in southwestern Norway, where cybercriminals seized control of the system. The gates remained open for four consecutive hours and released large volumes of water before staff detected the intrusion and took action.

“Over the past year, we have seen a change in the activities of pro-Russian cyber actors. In April, a dam in western Norway became the target of such an operation,” Gangas said. “Our Russian neighbor has become more dangerous.”

The PST chief explained that Russia employs multiple methods in its activities against Norway and Western countries generally.

“This can be subversive activity, influence, polarization, covert intelligence operations – methods aimed at weakening our security, but which cannot be characterized as acts of war,” Gangas said. “The goal is to influence Norwegian society, create feelings of unrest and instability, and identify our strengths and weaknesses.”

She added that similar activities are expected to continue against various European countries. “They don’t necessarily aim to cause damage, but intend to show what they are capable of,” the intelligence chief said.

The hackers took control of the digital control system managing water flow at the Risevatnet dam in Bremanger in April. For four hours, valves remained open, releasing nearly 500 liters per second before the breach was discovered and stopped. Both Kripos and PST have investigated the incident.

“The purpose of this type of action is to contribute to influence and create fear or unrest among the country’s population,” Gangas said.

The security service reports that Russia uses composite measures against Norway and the West. Gangas described this as state actors’ use of various tools against specific vulnerabilities in an opponent’s society.

“These are tools and methods that Russia uses to influence the security situation in other countries. The goal is to influence Norwegian society, spread unrest and instability, and map our strengths and weaknesses,” the PST chief said.

She said that Russia will likely carry out more actions against various targets in Europe.

“Since the end of 2023, Russian intelligence has been behind several dozen actions in Europe. Last year they targeted an IKEA warehouse in Estonia, a shopping center in Poland, and a warehouse with Ukraine deliveries in Britain. So far this year, a Ukrainian restaurant in Estonia has been hit and there were plans to send incendiary devices by plane from Germany to targets in Ukraine,” she said.

In Poland, six individuals have been charged with subversive activities on behalf of another country. Romania suspects sabotage in a fire at an arms factory producing small arms and ammunition.

Intelligence chief Nils Andreas Stensønes opened by dismissing that Norway is at war, but noted: “Russia’s President Putin considers Russia to be in a permanent conflict with the West.” He called Russia “an unpredictable neighbor” and stated: “It is Russia that is primarily the greatest threat to Norway today.”

Regarding potential election interference, the intelligence chief believes autumn’s parliamentary elections are not a target. “Together with PST, we assess that foreign states do not intend to significantly influence the outcome of this autumn’s parliamentary elections. But Russia has an interest in influencing us from a more long-term perspective,” he said.

The Ukrainian army and air force teamed up for a precise air strike on a concentration of Russian troops in Bakhmut—with a Sukhoi Su-27 fighter and a mysterious new surveillance drone.

The Aug. 11 raid targeted what the army’s 24th Mechanized Brigade described as “a temporary deployment site of enemy personnel” around 15 km from the front line in Donetsk Oblast.

The personnel were reportedly from Russia’s 98th Airborne Division. The division’s paratroopers have been fighting in Chasiv Yar—and slowly pushing Ukrainian troops out of the ruins of that front-line town.

The twin-engine, supersonic Su-27—one of dozens the Ukrainian air force inherited from the Soviet air force in 1991—probably struck the site with one of its new Western-supplied precision munitions: the French Hammer glide-bomb or American Joint Direct Attack Munition, which can also be fitted with wings for gliding attacks.

A glide bomb can range tens of kilometers when tossed in a fast climb. The combination of satellite guidance, glide kits and the toss-style release method helps Ukrainian pilots attack Russians behind the front line while also staying outside the range of many Russian air-defenses.

But distant strikes require help spotting targets—and then assessing the damage following the strike. For that, the 24th Mechanized Brigade deployed a previously unknown drone type. “You can see the work of the new Ukrainian fixed-wing drone ‘Privet-299,'” the brigade stated.

Aside from the fact it’s got fixed wings—as opposed to rotors—we know almost nothing about the Privet-299. Russian forces operate a “Privet-82” drone that may be broadly similar to the Ukrainian Private-299.

Plywood drone

The mostly plywood Privet-82, which costs just a few thousand dollars, ranges 50 km or farther with a 5-kg payload. Russian drone start-up Oko designed the Privet-82 to be inexpensive and easy to produce.

The Russian Privets are cheap enough to be single-use. Some Russian drone teams are even overloading their Privet-82s with 10-kg TM-62 anti-tank mines and flying them into Ukrainian targets. “This is basically Russia’s answer to the Ukrainian heavy bomber drones,” American analyst Andrew Perpetua observed.

It’s unclear whether the Ukrainian Privet-82 is strictly a surveillance drone—or whether it too can be sent on one-way missions with an explosive payload. For now, we know the mysterious Privet-299 as an airborne spotter for manned fighter raids.

The Privet-299 could meet growing demand for medium-range attack drones.

At present, Ukraine’s FPV drones dominate the battlefield as far as 15 km from the line of contact. Efforts are underway to extend the drone kill zone to 40 km. “The goal: deny Russian forces the ability to move undetected across the front,” American-Ukrainian war correspondent David Kirichenko wrote.

The Privet-299 should range 40 km with a meaningful payload, filling a critical gap between the FPVs and Ukraine’s much bigger—and much more expensive—deep-strike drones, which range thousands of kilometers, but at a unit cost of potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Ultimately, the Ukrainians will seek to establish “layers of drone superiority,” Perpetua said. They’ll need slightly heavier, but still affordable, drone models to patrol layers 50 km and 100 km from the front line.

As it happens, the Russian Oko drone firm is developing a bigger Privet drone, the Privet-120, which should range 200 km with a 20-kg payload.

Explore further

Ukraine’s Liutyi drone warhead grew by 50%—at the cost of 400 km of range

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz received Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at his chancellery, where Zelenskyy arrived by helicopter for a videoconference with US President Donald Trump and other European leaders.

Bild reported on 13 August that Zelenskyy landed directly on the grounds of the German chancellor’s office, where Merz greeted him upon arrival.

The leaders are expected to have lunch together before beginning online negotiations with European partners and US President Donald Trump. The virtual meeting precedes Trump’s scheduled summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska.

Zelenskyy’s spokesman Serhiy Nykyforov said the visit includes the videoconference and bilateral meeting with Merz, plus an online session of the “coalition of the resolute.”

“Following the meeting, around 4:00 pm Berlin time, statements by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Friedrich Merz to the media are possible,” the spokesman added.

Earlier, American media cited local officials reporting that President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance will participate in Wednesday’s virtual meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European allies.

Belarus will practice “planning the use” of nuclear weapons and Oreshnik missiles during joint military exercises with Russia scheduled for 12-16 September, Defense Minister Viktor Krenin announced, according to Belarusian state news agency BELTA.

“We will, of course, within the framework of the West-2025 exercise, together with our Russian colleagues, work out issues of planning the use of this type of weapons,” Krenin said when asked whether the drills would include planning for nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system.

The Belarusian defense chief emphasized that “nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on potential adversaries” while describing them primarily as “an important element of strategic deterrence.”

Krenin repeated Russian narratives about the alleged “militarization” and “military activity” of the West along Belarus’s western and northern borders. He warned that NATO leadership was supposedly using West-2025 as a pretext for conducting their own exercises and threatened a “response.”

“What worries us most is the decision of the Polish military leadership to create a grouping of more than 30-34 thousand servicemen. In our opinion, this is already a serious grouping. We need to monitor this very carefully (and we will do this) and react. If they show any aggression towards the Republic of Belarus, we have something to respond with,” the minister expressed particular concern about Polish military plans.

Historical Context

Russia accumulated military forces in Belarus before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, officially citing joint exercises as justification. In February 2022, Russian forces attacked Ukraine from Belarusian territory and subsequently launched ballistic missiles at Ukrainian targets from Belarus.

In December 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Oreshnik systems could be deployed in Belarus in 2025, using the weapon system to pressure the West after Ukraine received permission for long-range strikes against Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded that Putin was “waving the Oreshnik” to prevent US President Donald Trump from ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced Ukraine was developing its own air defense system and missile system as a deterrent against Oreshnik strikes.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has made contradictory statements about receiving the Oreshnik system, claiming in January 2025 that Belarus would receive it “any day,” then acknowledging in March that the promised weapons had not arrived. In July, Lukashenko stated the Oreshnik would allegedly be deployed in Belarus by year’s end.

European weapons manufacturers have expanded their industrial facilities at three times the peacetime rate since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with building activity covering over 7 million square meters of new development across the continent, according to a Financial Times analysis of radar satellite data.

The analysis, which tracked 150 facilities across 37 companies, found that areas marked by changes jumped from 790,000 square meters in 2020-21 to 2.8 million square meters in 2024-25. About a third of the sites reviewed showed signs of expansion or construction work.

“These are deep and structural changes that will transform the defence industry in the medium to long term,” said William Alberque, a senior adjunct fellow at the Asia Pacific Forum and former director of Nato arms control. “Once you’re mass-producing shells, the metals and explosives start flowing, which drops the cost and complexity of missile production.”

Satellite surveillance reveals industrial transformation

The Financial Times used more than 1,000 radar satellite passes from the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 satellites to track changes at sites associated with ammunition and missile production. The satellites fire radar pulses and record their echoes to reveal surface alterations that may be hard to discern on conventional satellite images.

Among the sites with the biggest expansion was a joint project between German defense giant Rheinmetall and Hungarian state defense company N7 Holding, which has built a production site for ammunition and explosives in Várpalota in western Hungary. The first factory at the site was completed in July 2024, producing 30mm ammunition for Rheinmetall’s KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicle.

“We cannot comment on the alleged outlines of our production facilities on satellite images for reasons of corporate security,” said Patrick Rohmann, a spokesperson for Rheinmetall.

Construction continues as the site will also produce 155mm artillery shells and 120mm ammunition for the Leopard 2 tank and, potentially, the Panther, according to Rheinmetall. The site will also house an explosives factory.

EU funding drives rapid expansion

The analysis examined 88 sites linked to the EU’s Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) programme, which has invested €500 million ($586 mn) to tackle bottlenecks in ammunition and missile production. Clear physical expansion was visible at 20 sites with ASAP funding, including the construction of entirely new factories and roads. At 14 sites, small expansions such as new car parks were visible.

Companies receiving ASAP funds expanded more rapidly than those without EU funding, the analysis indicates. The Financial Times also examined 12 sites that were wait-listed for ASAP and 50 other sites in the EU and UK linked to missile production for comparison.

EU defense commissioner Andrius Kubilius told the Financial Times that since Moscow’s invasion, Europe’s annual capacity to produce ammunition had increased from 300,000 to reach about 2 million by the end of this year.

Rheinmetall’s expansion accounts for a significant portion of this growth. The company said its annual production capacity for 155mm rounds was set to rise from 70,000 in 2022 to 1.1 million in 2027.

Major projects across Europe

At the German headquarters of missile-maker MBDA in Schrobenhausen, new roads and building works are clearly visible. The radar identified changes affecting 94,000 square meters of terrain since 2022. The site benefited from €10 million through ASAP to expand production of the portable shoulder-launch Enforcer missile, but also received a $5.6 billion Nato commission to produce up to 1,000 Patriot GEM-T surface-to-air missiles on European soil.

“The order volume will enable MBDA to set up a production facility for Patriot missiles in Germany, as well as major subcomponent production,” said MBDA Germany director Thomas Gottschild.

Norwegian manufacturer Kongsberg opened a missile factory in June 2024, backed with NKr640 million ($62 million) of funding to increase missile production, including €10 million ($12 mn) from ASAP. “The expansion led to an exponential increase in our total missile production capacity,” said company spokesperson Ivar Simensen.

BAE Systems received support from Westminster and increasing orders from the UK Ministry of Defence, investing more than £150 million in its British munitions factories since 2022. At its Glascoed site in south Wales, digging is clearly visible on satellite images. BAE says it will increase the production capacity of 155mm shells sixteen-fold when the new explosive filling facility starts operating later this year.

Nordic expansion and future challenges

Norwegian-Finnish manufacturer Nammo received about €55 million ($65 mn) under ASAP to boost manufacturing of shells, propellant and powder. Significant expansion is clearly visible at Nammo’s Finnish production site in Vihtavuori.

“ASAP has been instrumental in helping Nammo make critically important investments in production,” said Thorstein Korsvold, a spokesperson for the company. Similar programmes in other areas were needed, Korsvold said, pointing out that “air defence missiles as well as high explosives are currently produced only in very small quantities.”

The EU is negotiating a new €1.5 billion ($1.7 bn) defense programme that “replicates the logic of ASAP” through grants, and would also fund joint procurement, according to the European Commission. Kubilius said the commission was looking at whether similar methods could be used “to incentivise industries to expand their production in other areas,” with priority areas including missiles and air defence, artillery and drones.

Production bottlenecks remain

Despite the expansions, officials and industry insiders say actual output in Europe is likely to be significantly below potential capacity. Experts believe that long-range strike capabilities remain a serious issue for Europe and Nato more broadly, as Russia is outpacing its adversaries.

Fabian Hoffmann, a researcher at the University of Oslo, said missiles were critical for a convincing deterrent against Russia’s superior ground forces. “Missiles are the precondition for Nato’s theory of victory. Because we are not going to keep up with Russia’s pace of mobilisation,” said Hoffmann.

“With Russia’s dramatic expansion the best we can do to establish a credible deterrence that if you shoot at us, we are going to shoot right back. But if we are ever going to get there, then we have to drastically expand our production.”

Hoffmann noted that “miniature jet engine production for long-range missiles are a huge bottleneck” for European missile production, suggesting these could be the next target of future EU spending programmes along with explosive filler.

“We cannot comment on the alleged outlines of our production facilities on satellite images for reasons of corporate security,” said Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže, who called the expansion “a very positive and much needed development” but said it was “crucial” the defense industry was ready to deliver on Nato’s growing spending and use taxpayers’ money “effectively.”

Read also:

• Drones attack refineries in Sloviansk-on-Kuban and Volgograd, fire reported
• FT: European defense plant space tripled since 2021
• Ukrainian Intel: North Korean troops remain in Kursk Oblast
• The Telegraph: Russia is racing to seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible ahead of peace talks with Trump

Over 10,000 North Korean soldiers continue their deployment at training grounds in European Russia, according to Ukraine’s military intelligenc, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, said in an interview with Suspilne.

“D​PRK servicemen continue to remain in Kursk Oblast, in the European part in general, at training grounds where these four brigades were created, they remain there,” Skibitskyi said. He specified that approximately 11,000 soldiers are involved in the deployment.

The intelligence official outlined the geographical scope of North Korean operations. “It is clearly defined that their main area of responsibility is Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. And we saw this both in combat application and in their presence specifically in this region,” Skibitskyi said.

Ukrainian intelligence expects the arrival of the first batch of North Korean military personnel – approximately 1,200 people – to Kursk Oblast. The deployment follows a preliminary agreement between Russia and North Korea to send 6,000 fighters for demining operations, engineering work, infrastructure restoration, bridge and road construction, plus medical personnel.

“Those who will perform tasks, again, Kursk and Belgorod oblasts,” the general clarified regarding the new contingent’s operational area.

The arrival of 1,200 North Korean military personnel was scheduled for late July or early August. They will serve and perform tasks, Skibitskyi said.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate reported on 1 July 2025, that no direct participation of North Korean soldiers in combat operations alongside Russia against Ukrainian Defense Forces had been recorded. The same intelligence service stated that about 3,500 D​PRK soldiers completed training at military training grounds in Russia’s Far East, with potential redeployment to Kursk Oblast.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units have punched through Ukrainian defenses in eastern Ukraine, advancing up to six miles behind front lines within 48 hours, according to The Telegraph’s battlefield reports.

The breakthrough occurred near Dobropillya in Donetsk, targeting strategically vital territory that could threaten Ukraine’s control of Kramatorsk.

The location carries significant strategic weight. If Russian forces establish a foothold, the breach could enable Moscow to cut off Kramatorsk, one of Ukraine’s most important strongholds in the Donetsk Oblast still under Kyiv’s control.

Ukraine has publicly denied any major breakthrough. “A number of small Russian groups are constantly putting pressure on Ukrainian positions and attempting to bypass the first line of defense,” Victor Tregubov, spokesman for the Dnipro group of forces, said in a statement. “It is important to understand that this does not mean Russian forces have taken control of the territory. It means a small group, five to 10 people, has infiltrated the area.”

Kyiv has diverted special forces units to confront the infiltrators in an attempt to prevent additional territory from falling under Russian control before Friday’s scheduled peace talks between Russia and the United States in Alaska.

The seized territory sits east of Dobropillya, north of Pokrovsk, and within striking distance of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka—the “fortress belt” that has anchored Ukraine’s Donetsk defenses since 2014, The Telegraph reported.

DeepState, an open-source mapping group, reports Russian units are pushing toward the Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway, which carried military convoys and civilian traffic until mid-July. Russian troops are also probing for positions in Petrivka and Novovodiane on the far side of the road.

Ukraine’s military confirmed recently clashes around Kucheriv Yar, acknowledging Russian advances. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia was preparing new “offensive operations” without elaborating on locations.

The mining town of Dobropillia faces direct threat from the new corridor. Already hit by repeated drone strikes, civilians are fleeing the area.

“It’s a really difficult situation right now,” an officer from the 68th Brigade, who until recently lived in Dobropillia, told The Telegraph. “FVPs, gliding bombs and many other weapons are being used.”

Recent fighting has occurred along an unfinished defensive line. Where there should have been three anti-tank trenches, dragon’s teeth and concertina wire, the section breached by small assault groups had just one trench—and even that was incomplete, according to The Telegraph.

Sternenko, a military blogger, wrote on Telegram that Russian forces had seized parts of the highway linking Donetsk’s major population centers. “The situation is critical,” he said.

The Dobropillia-Kramatorsk route serves as a key artery connecting the fortress belt to Pokrovsk and other hubs, facilitating supply flows, reinforcements and evacuations. Control or disruption could strangle Ukraine’s logistics, hampering defense of the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk stronghold.

Reports indicate Russian FPV drones are already striking the road. If the highway is severed, Pokrovsk could face isolation, with a potential advance from Dobropillia completing its encirclement. Pokrovsk has endured sustained Russian pressure for nearly a year and is flanked on three sides.

For Moscow, success would boost momentum as Russia makes steady gains across the front line. The advance would secure a key logistics chokepoint and open a direct route into the Donbas heartland.

With Ukraine and Europe set to be excluded from Friday’s talks between Russia and the US, Zelenskyy said Tuesday: “We see that the Russian army is not preparing to end the war. On the contrary, they are making movements that indicate preparations for new offensive operations.”

Criticism of Ukraine’s leadership has intensified. Bohdan Krotevych, a lieutenant colonel in the national guard, accused decision-makers of ignoring warnings and claimed Zelensky was not receiving full briefings.

“The line of combat engagement as a fixed line does not actually exist,” Krotevych said. “Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are almost surrounded. Kostiantynivka is in a semi-encirclement. The enemy is advancing toward Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka.”

Yuri Podoliak, a pro-Russian military blogger, said Russia had yet to commit substantial forces to secure an operational breakthrough, with the offensive carried out by sabotage groups—small, specialized units trained for covert operations behind enemy lines.

The Institute for the Study of War said the move was not yet a major breakthrough but warned the next few days could prove pivotal as Russian forces look to consolidate gains.

Ukraine has deployed the 33rd Brigade in the area of Russian infiltration. Fresh forces from the newly-established 1st Azov Corps—comprising five brigades—have been sent to stem the advance. Elements of the 92nd Brigade were also dispatched in recent days.

DeepState reported Ukrainian troops were rushing to establish new defensive lines around Zolotyi Kolodiaz, Shakhove and nearby settlements—positions currently bypassed by Russian troops but vulnerable to seizure.

Moscow has previously used peace talk periods for offensive operations. In 2014, Russian forces staged escalations before and during negotiations, creating facts on the ground to lock in gains before ceasefires.

“This is critical. In both 2014 and 2015, Russia launched major offensives ahead of negotiations to gain leverage,” said Tatarigami_UA, a former Ukrainian army officer whose Frontelligence Insight tracks the conflict.

Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, said the advance may have been designed to increase pressure on Kyiv to cede land to prevent the Russian army from eventually taking the rest of Donetsk by force.

Some analysts have downplayed the immediate severity. “We are still talking about a penetration rather than a breakthrough as the operational implications are still limited,” said John Helin, analyst and founder of the Black Bird Group. “Despite the depth, we’re still mostly moving in the realm of tactics here, for now.”

Officers speaking to The Telegraph fear the ongoing assault could precede a much larger breach. The road reportedly taken by Russian forces runs along high ground, similar to the route near Ocheretyne—a village beyond Avdiivka whose fall in spring 2024 was followed by major territorial losses.

Read also:

• 50-kilometer fortress: Why Ukraine’s Donetsk defense belt matters more than territory
• Zelenskyy: Ukrainian Armed Forces will not leave Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on their own
• FT: European defense plant space tripled since 2021

The Institute for the Study of War reported 8 August that surrendering remaining territories in Donetsk Oblast as a ceasefire prerequisite without securing a final peace agreement would grant Russian forces tactical advantages for future military operations.

“The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their attacks on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for the ground,” the ISW analysed.

Such concessions would compel Ukraine to abandon what the institute terms its “fortress belt” — the primary fortified defensive line established in Donetsk Oblast in 2014. The ISW emphasizes that “conceding such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its ‘fortress belt,’ the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting will not resume.”

The fortress belt consists of four major cities and multiple smaller settlements positioned along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Sloviansk highway. The defensive line stretches 50 kilometers from north to south — approximately the distance between Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, Maryland — and housed over 380,537 residents before the current war.

Sloviansk and Kramatorsk anchor the northern section of this defensive network, functioning as logistics hubs for Ukrainian military operations throughout Donetsk Oblast. Kramatorsk currently serves as the oblast’s provisional administrative center, replacing Donetsk City, which remains under Russian occupation. The southern portion of the fortress belt includes Druzhkivka, Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka.

The defensive infrastructure originated following Ukraine’s 2014 military operations against pro-Russian proxy forces. These forces initially captured Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka in April 2014, but Ukrainian troops regained control by July of that year.

The ISW reports that Ukraine has invested 11 years in strengthening these positions, building “significant defense industrial and defensive infrastructure in and around these cities.” This sustained development effort represents substantial financial and strategic commitments that would be lost under any territorial concession scenario.

The analysis suggests that Russian forces would gain considerable operational advantages by securing these positions without conducting costly urban warfare operations. The fortress belt has served as what the ISW describes as “a major obstacle to the Kremlin’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine over the last 11 years.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on the evening of 13 August that Ukrainian forces will not voluntarily withdraw from territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts currently under their control, speaking to journalists three days before a scheduled Alaska meeting between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

“We will not leave Donbas – we cannot do this. Everyone forgets the first part – our territories are illegally occupied. For the Russians, Donbas is a bridgehead for a future new offensive. If we leave Donbas of our own free will or under pressure – we will open a third war,” Zelenskyy said, according to Radio Liberty.

The Ukrainian leader challenged potential American positioning on territorial concessions. “Of course, I would like to see America’s position given how it all started – our territory was occupied, Ukrainians are being killed, and after that they tell me: ‘Listen, do you want to stop being killed? You need to leave.’ And what security guarantees? Leave Donetsk oblast?” Zelenskyy said.

Zelenskyy said earlier that Kyiv would not recognize any Ukraine-related decisions made at the US-Russia Alaska summit. The Ukrainian president characterized the Trump-Putin meeting as potentially significant only for bilateral US-Russia relations, calling the very fact of the meeting Putin’s “personal victory.”

“It is impossible to talk about Ukraine without Ukraine, and no one will accept this. Therefore, the conversation may be important for their bilateral track, but they cannot decide anything about Ukraine without us. I hope that the US president understands and takes this into account,” Zelenskyy said at the “Youth Here” forum.

In domestic policy developments, Zelenskyy announced he has instructed the government and army to work on lifting travel restrictions for men under 22 years old. “This is a positive, correct story that will help many Ukrainians maintain ties with Ukraine and pursue education in Ukraine,” the president said.

Since Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has maintained martial law and general mobilization. Men aged 18 to 65 cannot leave the country’s territory. Men aged 25 to 60 are subject to mobilization, while men aged 18 to 24 can be called for basic military service, which during martial law lasts three months.

Unmanned aerial vehicles targeted oil refining facilities in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai and Volgograd Oblast during overnight attacks on 13 August, according to Russian sources.

The Russian Telegram channel Shot reports that drone debris fell on the territory of a refinery in Sloviansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai.

“Debris from one of the drones fell on the territory of the refinery, as a result of which a car allegedly caught fire,” Shot reported. Russian authorities claim no casualties resulted from the attack and that the fire was “promptly extinguished.”

Volgograd also came under drone attack, with the city’s oil refinery identified as the primary target by local Telegram channels. Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov confirmed that “debris from one of the downed drones fell on the roof of a 16-story residential building in the Traktorozavodsky district.”

Residents in southern districts of Volgograd reported air defense systems activation in areas housing industrial zones with the refinery and oil depot, according to Telegram channel Baza.

The overnight strikes follow a pattern of drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. On 7 August, Russia faced massive drone attacks that ignited the Afipsky refinery and a military unit in Sloviansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai. Local emergency services confirmed the fire at military unit No. 61661 in Sloviansk-on-Kuban following the drone strike. Regional authorities also verified the fire at the Afipsky refinery.

Exclusives

WWII Nazi-fighter’s “dirty” tactics could break Putin but the West won’t use them. Facts don’t defeat fascists. Fear does.

“I don’t know what they report to you, Mr. President” — Ukraine hero explodes at Zelenskyy as Russia nears Pokrovsk. Russian troops are advancing past empty Ukrainian trenches. Do Ukraine’s leaders really understand the scale of the breach?

Trump can’t find Alaska on mental map—thinks he’s traveling to Russia for Putin talks. The US President again falsely claimed Ukraine’s leader chose to begin Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and said Ukraine must give up territory to Russia.

Military

Zelenskyy announces Ukraine’s estimated losses in the war over one night. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy revealed Ukraine faces a 1:3 personnel disadvantage against Russian forces while detailing August 11 casualties that left 18 Ukrainian soldiers dead and 243 injured.

Zelenskyy: Russia redeploys 30,000 troops from Sumy Oblast to three directions

. Russia is preparing for September offensive operations across three Ukrainian front sectors, moving its strongest brigades and 30,000 personnel from the unsuccessful Sumy direction

Russia’s troop deployment to Belarus, echoing 2022 buildup before all-out war, is planned for September 2025. As Russian and Belarusian forces flex their muscles in joint exercises, Kyiv and NATO prepare for the worst, watching closely for signs of a new offensive.

Ukraine hits core of Moscow’s drone war machine for second time in single week. Ukrainian forces target Russia’s expanding Shahed production network with precision strikes 1,300 km from the border.

Ukraine’s special forces slip into Crimea overnight — and erase Russia’s Skala-M radar from the map. The destruction of the long-range installation in Abrykosivka has punched a hole in the Russian air surveillance network across the occupied peninsula.

Azov Corps rushes to block Russian advance threatening key cities in Donetsk Oblast. Deployment targets the area where the Russian breakthrough threatens the Pokrovsk encirclement and road access to Donetsk Oblast cities.

Two Russian defense plants hit in under 24 hours — drones strike Orenburg helium site and Stavropol sapphire factory. Both sites supply critical materials for Russia’s military systems and advanced technologies.

Chief of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence visits Zmiinyi Island and gas production platforms in the Black Sea. Two years after Russian forces abandoned Zmiinyi Island, Ukraine’s top intelligence official visited the strategic outpost to inspect current defensive capabilities and honor fallen soldiers.

Ukraine just cleared two Sumy villages—monitoring maps never showed them as occupied

. Russian forces may have attempted a stealth breakthrough with small assault groups before being pushed back across the border.

Frontline report: Russian Navy collapsing on all fronts: carrier scrapped, earthquake hits subs, Ukraine steals secrets. Single Ukrainian drone cancels St. Petersburg parade as carrier decommissioning marks end of era

Intelligence and technology

Kyiv sends first wartime text via new Starlink’s tech — no Russian-made blackout can interrupt it. Starlink Direct to Cell lets Ukrainians text through darkness of Russia’s aggression.

Czech shell initiative changes Russian artillery advantage from 10-to-1 to 2-to-1, Lipavsky says. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky declared his country opposes any “false goals” in Ukraine’s EU accession process and expects rapid opening of membership negotiations during his meetings with Ukrainian officials in Kyiv.

International

White House confirms Trump-Putin meeting in Anchorage without Zelenskyy. The largest city in Alaska will host a bilateral summit between Trump and Putin to discuss ending the Ukraine war, while the White House acknowledged that “only one side participating in this war will be present.”

Latvia to contribute $ 2.3 mn to NATO’s initiative to supply Ukraine with US weapons

. The Baltic nation becomes the latest NATO member to fund American weapons deliveries to Ukraine through the alliance’s Priority Ukraine Requirements List

Putin’s team issues expectations ahead of Alaska meeting to help Trump to “keep the face” after sanctions failure. The Kremlin is pushing a bilateral Trump–Putin ceasefire plan that would redraw Ukraine’s borders, ban NATO entry, and sideline both Kyiv and Europe from the negotiating table.

Zelenskyy insists on clear security guarantees from West before any peace deal with Russia. The Ukrainian president lays out a straightforward roadmap for peace but warns the West must offer concrete guarantees to prevent repeated Russian aggression.

Despite pouring more billions in military aid for Ukraine than US, Europe’s leaders will not be present at Alaska talks. This leaves Kyiv diplomatically isolated and is raising fears that Ukraine may be pressured into concessions without its strongest allies at the negotiating table.

Kremlin’s propaganda threatens Azerbaijan with war after Baku sends millions in aid to Ukraine. Once tightly controlled by Moscow, Azerbaijan now defies Kremlin orders, prompting a fierce propaganda offensive that paints Baku as a “Western puppet”.

Estonia invokes “Munich 1938” as Trump prepares Putin talks. Estonia’s foreign minister has invoked one of history’s most ominous diplomatic moments to warn about Friday’s Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska — comparing it to the 1938 Munich Agreement that greenlit Hitler’s expansion.

Ukraine’s right to self-determination non-negotiable, all EU leaders say, except for Hungary’s. With the backdrop of potential territorial concessions looming over Trump’s meeting with Putin, European leaders stand united in their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Humanitarian and social impact

Foreign volunteers killed in Russian strike on training camp near Kropyvnytskyi – NYT. An American recruit from Florida witnessed “at least 15 dead soldiers and more than 100 wounded” when Russia targeted a mess hall packed with international volunteers eating lunch at a training camp in central Ukraine.

Ukrainian artist who died fighting Russians: “True anarchists share their people’s hardest struggles”. David Chychkan turned down thousands of euros from European cultural institutions to create art abroad, choosing instead to volunteer for a Ukrainian mortar crew where the 39-year-old fought alongside a vegan chef, software developer, and engineer.

Political and legal developments

Switzerland slashes Russian oil price cap to $ 47.6 in new EU sanctions package. Switzerland cut the price ceiling on Russian oil to $47.6 per barrel and banned 105 third-country vessels as part of the EU’s 18th sanctions package.

Russian court sentences Ukrainian medic to 5+ years for 2018 service in Ukraine’s Forces. Russian authorities sentenced 54-year-old Olena Ipatova to prison for terrorism six years after she served as a Ukrainian military medic.

Read our earlier daily review here

Will Ukraine give up land to end the war? According to The Telegraph, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has quietly signaled yes—but only territory Russia already holds.

European diplomats and Western officials told the newspaper that Zelenskyy acknowledged this position in conversations with European leaders. The catch? Ukraine would reject any deal requiring it to surrender additional territory.

Why the shift now? Trump and Putin set to meet in Anchorage, Alaska on 15 August.

The White House described the meeting as a “listening exercise” for Trump to better understand how to potentially bring the war to an end.

The timing matters. European leaders worry Trump might negotiate over Ukraine’s head. “I have many fears and a lot of hope,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Monday.

Zelenskyy emphasized that any peace deal must include Ukraine’s involvement and that Ukrainian territorial integrity is non-negotiable. Trump, however, hinted that any agreement might involve territorial concessions, a point strongly opposed by Zelenskyy. 

What exactly would Ukraine accept? Freezing current front lines. Russia would keep de facto control of occupied areas in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea—roughly 20% of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory.

But there’s a constitutional problem. Ukraine’s constitution requires a nationwide referendum for territorial concessions.

Trump criticized this constraint Monday: “I was a little bothered by the fact that Zelenskyy was saying, ‘Well, I have to get constitutional approval’. I mean, he’s got approval to go into war and kill everybody, but he needs approval to do a land swap?”

Trump to find out if he can make a deal with Putin

Can Trump deliver on his promises? The US president said Monday he would try recovering Ukrainian territory during his Putin meeting. “Russia has occupied a big portion of Ukraine. We’re going to try to get some of that territory back for Ukraine.” There would be “some swapping, some changes to land.”

Trump described Friday as a “feel-out meeting.” His confidence? “Probably in the first two minutes, I’ll know exactly whether or not a deal can be made because that’s what I do. I make deals.”

Europe warns no more Ukrainian concessions

Here’s what Europe thinks. Six major powers—the European Commission, France, Italy, the UK, Poland, and Finland—issued a joint declaration stating “the current line of contact should be the starting point of negotiations.”

Translation: No more Ukrainian concessions.

France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Friedrich Merz backed this hardline approach over the weekend. Their message to Trump: territorial exchanges are a “red line.”

Russia prepares to launch more offensives, not ready to stop war

Is Russia actually ready for peace? Zelenskyy doesn’t think so. Monday evening he cited intelligence reports showing Russia “moving their troops and forces in such a way as to launch new offensive operations.”

The Institute for the Study of War agrees. Russia still seeks Ukraine’s “full capitulation”—toppling the Western-facing government, blocking NATO membership, and forcing demilitarization.

Why can’t Ukraine afford to lose more territory? Geography. Ceding additional areas in Donetsk would let Russian forces bypass fortifications built since the 2014 Donbas war. Ukraine would lose strategic defensive positions it’s held for years.

What about those Kursk bargaining chips? Gone. Ukraine had controlled parts of Russia’s Kursk region, potentially useful for prisoner swaps or negotiations. But Moscow’s forces broke Ukrainian control of that border area.

Ukraine emphasizes security guarantees in any peace deal

Therefore, Zelenskyy insists on clear and reliable security guarantees from Western countries before agreeing to any peace deal with Russia. He emphasizes Russia’s history of repeatedly violating ceasefires since 2014.

He also highlights the importance of starting peace efforts with confidence-building measures like the release of thousands of Ukrainian prisoners and stresses that Ukraine deserves not only to join the EU but also receive NATO security guarantees. 

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte framed the central challenge: “How to deal with the factual situation that the Russians are holding, at this moment, Ukrainian territory.” His distinction? Russia may control land factually, but this can never be accepted legally—”in a de jure sense.”

Will Ukrainian voters accept territorial losses? European officials believe Zelenskyy has room to maneuver. A growing number of Ukrainians might stomach surrendering Russian-held land as the price for ending the war.

Trump plans to call Zelenskyy first “out of respect,” then European leaders after meeting Putin. But the constitutional referendum requirement means any territorial deal would need approval from war-weary Ukrainian voters.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Friday’s Alaska meeting will test whether Trump’s deal-making confidence can bridge the gap between Russia’s maximalist demands and Ukraine’s red lines.

You show Russians footage of their soldiers dying in Ukraine. They get angry—and mobilize to avenge them. You appeal to their humanity with pictures of Ukrainian children killed by Russian bombs. They shrug. You try facts about war crimes. Nothing.

But tell them criminals are being released from prison to join the army? That their sons might get raped by fellow soldiers? That crime is soaring back home while they’re dying in Ukraine?

Now you’ve got their attention.

This counterintuitive discovery comes from Ukrainian psychological operations teams who’ve spent three years learning what British propagandist Sefton Delmer figured out fighting the Nazis: facts don’t defeat propaganda. Self-interest does.

“People see the corpses of dead Russians and they’re like, well, I’m going to go and defend them,” Peter Pomerantsev tells me, describing Ukrainian research into failed propaganda attempts.

The author of “How to Win an Information War” has spent years studying both Soviet disinformation and Western attempts to counter it. His latest book, just translated into Ukrainian, resurrects Sefton Delmer, a forgotten genius who ran Britain’s “black propaganda” operations against Nazi Germany.

What Delmer understood—and what Ukraine is rediscovering—is that authoritarian propaganda doesn’t work through logic. It works through permission.

The inner pig dog strategy

Delmer called it appealing to the “inner pig dog”—that part of human nature that’s selfish, greedy, and looking for an excuse to save its own skin.

While the BBC broadcast noble appeals to German democracy, Delmer’s radio stations told Germans it was fine to be corrupt because their officers were stealing everything anyway. Why die for these scum?

“He’d never say that, though,” Pomerantsev explains.

One of Delmer’s most successful creations was “Der Chef,” a fake German radio station that posed as an underground voice of disgusted German soldiers. Der Chef would rail against SS corruption with stories so scandalous they became irresistible. When the Nazis converted the monastery of Münsterschwarzach into a military hospital, Der Chef spun a lurid fantasy:

“Two hundred SS men marched into the monastery… A bawdy house was made out of the monastery for the SS men and their whores. The holy mass gowns are used as sheets, and the women wear precious lace tunics made out of choir robes with nothing underneath them… Like this, they go into the chapel and drink liquor out of the holy vessels…”

Der Chef was outraged at such blasphemy—but always returned to these topics, the way tabloids show disgust at depravity while giving readers an excuse to enjoy it.

But Delmer’s genius wasn’t just in the sensational content.

His operations provided genuinely useful information to Germans—warnings about which districts would be bombed, updates on cities that had been struck, so soldiers could take guaranteed leave to help their families.

The stations posed as German broadcasts, so listeners wouldn’t get in trouble if overhead. They treated Germans as human beings, even while subverting them.

“His radio shows were full of pornography, aggression, a lot of color. It was definitely more than the BBC. It was very tabloid and really rather remarkable,” Pomerantsev explains.

But Delmer’s method was always indirect: “He tells stories about people deserting and we’ll always be like, how horrendous, these traitors are deserting, and give details how they desert with the intention of making people want to desert.”

The parallels to Russia today are striking. Ukrainian research has found similar patterns:

“Several research groups have found the same thing—that the most effective messaging is around the rise of crime rates in Russia to undermine the desire of people to send their families to the war,” Pomerantsev notes.

The crime messaging works because it targets what Putin supporters actually value:

• Order and stability – Rising crime rates suggest Putin’s “strong hand” is failing
• Personal safety – Stories about criminals in the army threaten families directly
• Elite competence – Military chaos reflects broader governmental failure

“People who support the war the most are very authoritarian. They want Putin’s strong hand. They want order,” Pomerantsev explains. “The idea that chaos is growing because of the war undermines their entire worldview.”

Why facts bounce off

Delmer worked with Cambridge’s first professor of psychoanalysis to understand Nazi psychology. They identified three elements that make authoritarian propaganda work:

• Identification with the leader – Leaders who normalize aggression, sadism, and narcissism, creating what Pomerantsev calls “a carnival of evil feelings”
• Toxic collective identity – A sense of superiority over others based on supremacism
• Ersatz agency – The illusion of control when people actually have none

“The less control we have over our lives, the more propaganda we need,” Pomerantsev quotes Delmer as observing.

This explains why showing Russians their casualties backfires. In an authoritarian mindset, those deaths demand vengeance, not reflection. Appeals to humanity assume a moral framework that propaganda has already dismantled.

“It’s not that he didn’t believe in facts. He just wanted to find the facts that worked for his aims,” Pomerantsev notes about Delmer’s approach.

“I don’t think there’s an important democratic movement in Germany to support,” Delmer concluded about Nazi Germany.

The same pragmatism should guide effective operations against Russia today. As opposed to the current Western strategy of supporting Russian opposition media, which can influence only 11% of critically-minded Russians, disruptive propaganda operations should focus on themes that resonate with authoritarian mindsets rather than moral appeals.

Pomerantsev’s research reveals the psychological mechanism behind this.

Working with teams in Russia, he found “the largest correlation between being ready to send your kids to die in the war is to do with belief in Russian supremacism”—the conviction that Russia is superior to others while simultaneously being victimized by them.

When Russians are primed with messages reinforcing this supremacist-victim narrative, their support for war actually increases. However, other messages do work: those hinting at rising crime inside the army and China humiliating Russia.

For Russians who actively support Putin (55% of the population), messaging about personal safety could undermine war support

For Russians who are passive loyalists, (34 % of the population), messages suggesting China’s advantage over Russia decrease war support

It is precisely these kind of messages that Ukraine is using in successful offensive propaganda operations against Russia, Pomerantsev suggests, hinting at the presentation of his book in Kyiv that the Delmers of today are sitting in the room, incognito.

The resource problem

The tragedy is that Ukraine knows what works but lacks the resources to scale it.

“Delmer had the backing of a state which allowed him to experiment,” Pomerantsev points out. “He had a team of hundreds of people working in this beautiful vast country estate outside of London. He managed to persuade the government to give him the most powerful radio transmitter in the world.”

Ukraine has no such luxury. While fighting for survival, it can barely manage domestic information space, let alone mount the massive multimedia campaign needed to truly destabilize Russian mobilization.

“If we were fighting this war as we did the war on terror, we would have set up dozens of radio stations like in Afghanistan,” Pomerantsev notes.

“We had huge information operations during our intervention in Iraq. If we were doing this, it would be such a key element of what we were doing. But we want to undermine mobilization, we say we want to slow down Russia’s war machine, and we haven’t done the ABCs of undermining mobilization and military morale. It just shows you how fundamentally pathetic Ukraine’s partners are.”

The Kremlin’s real fear

What would work if resources were available? Pomerantsev outlines the pressure points that actually worry the Kremlin:

• Putin’s approval rating – Which collapsed to under 60% during Ukraine’s Kursk operation
• Economic stability – The ruble’s weakness, rising short-term loan defaults, a growing credit crisis
• Military compensation – Soldiers’ families not getting paid, creating resentment
• Elite loyalty – Growing mistrust between different power centers
• China’s reliability – Deep anxiety about Beijing potentially abandoning Moscow

“Any attempt to deter Russia has to be linked into their sense of control,” he argues.

The Kremlin’s leadership remains traumatized by how quickly the Soviet system collapsed. When they sense loss of control, they retreat.

The Kursk incursion proved this. Putin’s rating plummeted. The government panicked, posting and deleting contradictory messages. That was the moment to pile on pressure—NATO exercises, shadow fleet blockades, secondary sanctions. Add coordinated information operations targeting those specific vulnerabilities.

Instead, nothing.

Beyond good and evil

Delmer’s approach offends our democratic sensibilities. He promoted desertion, normalized corruption, used pornography to grab attention.

His radio shows were, by his own admission, an exercise in encouraging Germans to be “bad.”

“I think we have to think very carefully when we think about good and bad in politics,” Pomerantsev reflects. “If you’re stimulating someone to think for themselves, if you’re provoking them to act for themselves, if you’re provoking them to break through a kind of passivity which has been fed to them by authoritarian propaganda—I think that’s good.”

He sees Delmer’s work as fundamentally liberating:

“I think at the core of it was a deeply anti-authoritarian project because in stimulating people to think and act for themselves, he was giving them a way to break through authoritarian psychology.”

The Nazis used the language of nobility and sacrifice to enable genocide. Delmer used the language of greed and self-interest to stimulate individual thinking. When you’re deserting or stealing from your factory, you’re reclaiming agency from an authoritarian system.

As Pomerantsev puts it:

“The Nazis used the language of noble and the nation and sacrifice in order to enable genocide and rape, while Delmer was using the language of naughtiness, greed, corruption, sexual hanky-panky in order to stimulate good.”

The inversion is profound: Nazis told Germans they would be good by doing very bad things, while Delmer told Germans to be bad, achieving a very good thing.

This isn’t about making Russians good people. It’s about making them bad soldiers.

Radio then, full-spectrum now

If Delmer were alive today, he wouldn’t pick just one channel.

“We live in a multimedia age, so you need everything and you need scale,” Pomerantsev explains. “You’d be using radio, you’d be using satellite TV where it’s relevant, some of the great things the Ukrainians do—hacking into Russian local TV and playing content. You want all of those. You want to have a sense that you’re everywhere. Robo calls, SMSs, everything. You’re using everything and you’re thinking how they work together to create a full spectrum movement.”

As Pomerantsev puts it: “The Ukrainians are doing a lot, and I think, like with Delmer, we’ll find out after the war.”

The question is whether Ukraine’s partners will provide the resources for a real information offensive before it’s too late. Because knowing what works means nothing if you can’t execute it at scale.

Facts don’t defeat propaganda. But appealing to fear, greed, and self-preservation might. Delmer knew it. Ukraine has proven it.

The pig dog is waiting.

White House spokesperson Caroline Levitt announced that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Anchorage, Alaska’s largest city. The meeting is scheduled for 15 August to discuss ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Levitt confirmed that details and the meeting schedule are currently being coordinated. When asked why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not invited to the negotiations, the White House spokesperson said the meeting was happening at Putin’s request.

She confirmed that Trump plans to visit Russia in the future. The purpose of the Alaska negotiations, Levitt explained, is for Trump and Putin to “better understand how to end this war.”

When asked what Trump would do if Putin was not serious about negotiations, Levitt said she would not “put forward any hypothetical assumptions.” However, she said she was “very confident” that Trump would remain satisfied with the meeting.

The White House spokesperson said the US president was “determined to stop the killings” and “deeply respects all sides of the conflict and everyone trying to end it.”

“This administration has truly used all levers of influence, taken all measures to achieve peace through diplomatic resolution,” the White House spokesperson said.

Trump previewed terms of a potential peace deal that could include “some swapping of territories.” Bloomberg previously reported that Washington and Moscow were seeking to reach an agreement to end the war in Ukraine that would secure occupied territories for Russia.

The Wall Street Journal wrote that Putin presented the Trump administration with a ceasefire plan in exchange for territorial concessions from Kyiv. Trump suggested that a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine would likely require “certain territorial exchanges for the benefit of both sides.” Specifically, Ukraine would need to withdraw troops from all of Donetsk Oblast, and Crimea would be recognized as sovereign Russian territory.

Against the backdrop of these reports, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Ukraine would not give up its lands to anyone. Zelenskyy and European leaders plan to meet with Trump on 13 August to discuss the course of action.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy disclosed that Ukraine sustained 340 casualties on 11 August, with 18 military personnel killed, 243 injured, and 79 missing in action, according to Ukrinform.

Speaking to journalists, Zelenskyy said that Russian losses were three times higher. “Russians lost 968 soldiers in one day: 531 killed, 428 injured, and 9 captured,” the president said.

President revealed the overall personnel ratio between Ukraine and Russia stands at 1 to 3 in favor of the occupying forces. In artillery, the ratio is 1 to 2.4 in Russia’s favor, Zelenskyy said. However, Ukraine maintains a 1.4-fold advantage in FPV drones.

On the morning of 12 August, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Russia has lost 1,065,220 personnel since the war began. Ukrainian forces have also destroyed 11,098 Russian tanks, 31,406 artillery systems, 421 aircraft, and 340 helicopters, according to the General Staff.

The General Staff does not release current data on Ukrainian losses.

In February 2025, Zelenskyy said that 45,000 Ukrainian servicemen had died in the war against Russia. Previously, in December 2024, the president said Ukraine’s losses had reached 43,000 military personnel.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Russia is transferring approximately 30,000 troops from the Sumy direction to three other front sectors after failing to achieve success in the northern region.

Accorrding to Zelenskyy, Russia began moving troops to the Zaporizhzhia and Pokrovsk directions.

The president outlined Russia’s preparations for offensive operations across three main directions: Zaporizhzhia, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka. According to Zelenskyy’s assessment, Russia plans to deploy approximately 15,000 additional troops to the Zaporizhzhia direction, around 7,000 to Pokrovsk, and about 5,000 to Novopavlivka.

Of the 53,000 Russian forces concentrated on the Sumy direction, approximately 30,000 will be redirected to these three sectors, according to the president’s assessment.

Zelenskyy emphasized that Russia’s strongest brigades currently positioned on the Kursk direction will be among those redeploying. “We believe this is the main source of troops, these are their strongest brigades that are standing on the Kursk direction, they will be moving,” he added.

The president provided a timeline for expected Russian preparations, saying they will prepare for offensive actions after the 15th and will be ready with these brigades by September. “We believe they will be ready by September with these brigades. We believe that with additional [forces] they may be ready in November,” Zelenskyy said.

According to the president, these three directions were targeted by Russia a year ago, and Russian forces are operating according to the same plans and maps. Zelenskyy said that the offensive mission on Zaporizhzhia and Pokrovsk was delayed by a year due to the Kursk operation.

The president suggested that throughout this month, Russian forces will attempt to demonstrate progress on all directions to exert political pressure on Ukraine, seeking various concessions.

The announcement comes as Ukrainian forces have achieved several tactical successes in Sumy Oblast. On 12 June, the president reported that Ukrainian defenders were “gradually pushing back” Russian forces in the region. Two days later, on 14 June, Zelenskyy announced the liberation of Andriivka in Sumy Oblast. Most recently, on 27 July, the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported the liberation of Kindrativka in the Khotyn community.