Russia has turned Japan into a key base for obtaining high-tech equipment to sustain its war against Ukraine. A New York Times investigation reveals how GRU military intelligence operatives work under cover in Tokyo to acquire banned components for Russian weapons.

The investigation found that officers from Russia’s GRU military intelligence service operated in Japan under diplomatic and commercial cover. GRU officers sought to acquire electronics, machine tools and other technology for routing to Russia and use in weapons production.

At the center of the operation is the GRU’s little-known 20th Directorate, according to current and former Western intelligence officials interviewed by the Times.

One of its key figures is Maksim Vladimirovich Filchenkov, a 49-year-old GRU veteran who arrived in Tokyo in February 2024. He officially works for Russia’s state airline, Aeroflot.

Western officials told the Times that Filchenkov oversees the directorate’s work from an Aeroflot office about a 10-minute walk from Japan’s National Police Agency.

Russian and Soviet intelligence officers have used Aeroflot positions as cover for industrial espionage since the Soviet era.

The network reportedly relies on relationships with shipping and logistics companies. Russian agents send sensitive goods first to countries where Aeroflot still operates, then route them to Russia through intermediaries and misleading paperwork.

According to the Times, Filchenkov developed ties with Tokyo logistics company Proco Air. Proco Air denied knowingly transporting prohibited goods and has not faced charges of wrongdoing.

Japanese components continue to reach Russian weapons

Japan is especially valuable to Russia because of its large high-tech industry and comparatively weak espionage laws.

Ukraine has repeatedly warned Tokyo that Japanese-made components are reaching Russian weapons. Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Ukraine's presidential sanctions commissioner, said Japanese parts appear in around 90% of Russian cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and drones. Vlasiuk made the remarks to Kyodo News, as reported by 47News.

He also named 13 Japanese companies whose products had been found in Russian weapons. Kyiv is now pressing Tokyo to tighten export controls on civilian dual-use goods rerouted through third countries.

There is no evidence that Japanese manufacturers knowingly supplied Russia’s military. Components can pass through several distributors and countries before reaching Russian weapons producers.

Mitsubishi is the only licensed non-US manufacturer of the advanced PAC-3 interceptor, and Zelenskyy pointed to it as a model for building Ukraine's own production capacity, speaking to journalists on 9 July. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine wants to work with Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. He also said the company demonstrates a very high level of Patriot missile production and called it perhaps the strongest example today of how a country can establish its own anti-ballistic missile production after obtaining a US license. Ukraine would like to see similar production capabilities developed domestically.

When Tokyo shipped PAC-3 interceptors to the United States in November 2025, it did so on the explicit condition that they stay under US control and never reach a third country—which is why Ukraine received not a single Japanese-made interceptor from that transfer, only the US stocks it backfilled.

What Mitsubishi makes—and why Ukraine wants it

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries produces roughly 30 PAC-3 interceptors a year under license from Lockheed Martin, with the capacity to roughly double that once its main constraint—Boeing-built seekers, still in short supply—eases.

Boeing began expanding seeker production in 2023, with results expected from 2027. Japan's leverage in the Patriot supply chain runs deeper than assembly: it is the only producer of the guidance gyroscopes fitted in PAC-2 missiles—a component the US lost the ability to make domestically and had to request from Tokyo, which approved the export on 17 July 2014.

Ukraine's interest is less about buying interceptors than about copying a template: how a non-US country took an American technology license, built a domestic manufacturing base, and became an exporter of one of the most sought-after air-defense interceptors in the world.

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The license alone won't do it

Only the US, Germany, and Japan hold the rights to produce the Patriot. Germany co-produces the PAC-2 GEM-T—a variant with limited ballistic missile defense capability—with Raytheon, but cannot independently manufacture or export the system. Japan produces under strict controls. Trump's promised license would make Ukraine the fourth government in that circle—but without a partner that has already solved the seeker, gyroscope, and scaling problems, a license on its own would take years to become missiles.

Zelenskyy's Mitsubishi comment makes the sequencing explicit: license first, then a partner who knows how to use it.

"But this depends on the desire of the Japanese side," he said — an acknowledgment that the partnership is aspirational, not agreed.

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Japan loosened its arms rules—but not the part that blocks Ukraine

Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae's cabinet revised the Three Principles on 21 April, scrapping the rule that had confined finished exports to five non-lethal categories and permitting the export of lethal weapons in principle—a historic break with Japan's postwar pacifism.

But the revision did not remove the obstacle that matters for Ukraine. It kept the prohibition on transfers to countries in active conflict, allowing them only in narrow "exceptional circumstances." And it permits lethal exports to the 17 countries with which Japan holds Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreements—Australia, Germany, Sweden, the US, and 13 others.

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Japan has said its ban on jet fuel exports to Russia applies not only to direct shipments but also to cargoes routed through third countries or transferred between ships at sea.

The statement came after Reuters reported that Russia was preparing to import a jet fuel shipment originating from Japan through a network of traders, as Moscow faces fuel shortages following Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure.

Tokyo moves to block sanctions evasion

Japanese Trade Minister Ryosei Akazawa said on 7 July that jet fuel is among the goods covered by Japan’s export restrictions against Russia, Reuters reported.

"Exports to Russia through third countries, including ship-to-ship transfers at sea, are also covered," Akazawa said, while declining to comment on specific cases.

Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is working to prevent sanctions evasion by raising awareness among companies, issuing warnings, and sharing information with authorities in Japan and abroad, he said.

Russia sought fuel through intermediaries

Reuters reported on 3 July that Russia was expected to receive jet fuel cargo originating from Japan through intermediaries as the country dealt with fuel shortages caused by Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries and fuel depots.

According to sources familiar with the matter cited by Reuters, the shipment involved at least 200,000 barrels of jet fuel expected to load from Chiba, Japan, before being transported to South Korea and potentially transferred to another tanker near Yeosu before continuing toward Russia.

The sources said the cargo’s final destination was unclear, but the arrangement appeared designed to route the fuel through multiple jurisdictions.

Japan’s latest statement indicates that such transfers would still fall under its export restrictions.

Russian fuel crisis deepens

The reported shipment comes as Ukrainian drone strikes have increasingly targeted Russian energy infrastructure, including oil refineries and fuel storage facilities.

The attacks have disrupted fuel supplies across Russia, prompting Moscow to impose restrictions on fuel purchases as shortages affect transportation, industry, and other sectors of the economy.

Russian jet fuel exports have also declined, according to shipping data cited by Reuters. Russia exported around 13,000 barrels per day of jet fuel this year, compared with approximately 30,000 barrels per day last year.

Japan, alongside other G7 partners, has maintained sanctions and export controls aimed at limiting Russia’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine. Akazawa said Tokyo would continue enforcing strict controls in coordination with international partners.

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Japan has delivered 20 fully operational modular post offices to frontline communities across six Ukrainian oblasts, allowing residents to receive pensions, social payments, and parcels where permanent branches have been destroyed or damaged by Russian attacks.

The branches are now operating in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv, and Kherson oblasts, according to Ukraine's Ministry for Communities and Territories Development. Since the full-scale invasion began, Russia has completely destroyed 49 Ukrposhta branches, while another 648 have been damaged—leaving large swaths of frontline territory without stable access to postal and financial services. The modular units are designed to fill that gap while permanent reconstruction remains impossible.

The handover is part of Japan's Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Project, implemented jointly with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In total, since 2023, technical and grant assistance projects from the Japanese government, coordinated through JICA, have provided over $700 million in aid to Ukraine across energy, transport, healthcare, education, water supply, demining, and municipal facilities.

"Restoring access to public services in frontline communities is our absolute priority. Thanks to our Japanese partners, we are providing Ukrainians living near the front line with stable postal communication and services. These 20 modular branches mean that the state is there for people, even where permanent offices have been destroyed by Russian aggression," Deputy Prime Minister for the Reconstruction of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba said.

The 20 modular Ukrposhta branches are part of a wider 66-unit technical equipment package Japan is transferring to Ukraine's frontline regions under the same project. The remaining equipment includes 40 units of heavy machinery for debris clearance in Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, and Chernihiv oblasts, as well as construction equipment and a training simulator for operators at a vocational center in Bila Tserkva.

Japan is stepping up drone cooperation with Ukraine to develop its own unmanned forces from Kyiv's wartime experience, and the two are building a joint drone cluster, the South China Morning Post reported. The centerpiece is a planned Japan-Ukraine Drone Cluster linking the two countries' industries. The drones are meant for Japan's defense against Russia and China, not for Ukraine.

Inside the cluster

The proposed cluster would unite Japanese manufacturers with Ukrainian defense firms, research centers, universities, and technology companies, the South China Morning Post says. Japanese companies are also working with European partners on anti-submarine drones.

Masayuki Masuda, who heads Chinese studies at Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, the Defense Ministry's think tank, said the world has watched warfare change since Russia's invasion, and that drones will carry "much of the fighting on the future battlefield." He credited Ukraine's strong performance largely to drones.

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Masuda argued that quantity now matters as much as quality. Japan's many small firms, he said, could quickly turn out cheap drones in the numbers a war might demand.

A defense turn

The cooperation is part of a wider overhaul of Japan's defense policy. In May, Tokyo sent Self-Defense Force officers to NATO's mission headquarters in Germany for the first time—to a facility that coordinates weapons deliveries and training for Ukraine. Japan also joined the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), the program through which allies fund US weapons for Ukraine, including Patriots. Japan, however, pledged funds only for buying non-lethal equipment from the US.

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The drive is not only about Russia's war. It is also a response to China's growing military activity, with Tokyo tracking Chinese drones near the disputed Senkaku Islands, close to Taiwan, and across the South China Sea.

Russia's escalating missile campaign has exposed one of Ukraine's most dangerous shortages. Russian attacks killed at least 274 Ukrainian civilians in May, the UN says — the deadliest month since Moscow's full-scale invasion — and have damaged all 15 of Ukraine's thermal power plants. The weapon that most reliably stops Russia's ballistic missiles, the US Patriot, is scarce, and Ukraine's interceptor shortage has no quick fix.

That was the problem hanging over the 18 June 2026 Ramstein-format meeting in Brussels, where Ukraine's partners pledged $4 billion and signed a deal with Germany to build Freya, a Ukrainian ballistic-missile interceptor.

But neither the money nor Freya can fix the shortage soon, says Marc DeVore, a senior lecturer at the University of St Andrews who has advised the UK government on Russia's war against Ukraine.

The bottleneck is global, he says. Only five or six countries can build interceptors capable of stopping ballistic missiles, and Patriot is ordered years in advance: the US makes about 600 a year, while Russia builds around 70 ballistic missiles a month, each requiring two or three interceptors to stop.

With another hard winter approaching, Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal warns that the 2026–2027 heating season could be as punishing as the last.

DeVore spoke to Euromaidan Press about why ballistic missiles are so hard to stop, why Freya won't reach the battlefield this winter, and why Ukraine's next interceptors may come from outside the usual Western supply chain — through sanctions, long-range strikes, and suppliers like Japan and South Korea.

This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.

The global anti-ballistic shortage and what it portends for Ukraine

Daniel Thomas: Does anything that came out of Brussels actually fix Ukraine's supply problem? 

Marc DeVore: The Freya initiative is good, and I hope it works. But there's a significant challenge here if we think globally.

There are only about five or six producers in the world of air-defense missiles with some degree of ballistic-missile interception capability: the United States and Japan, which both build the Patriot; South Korea, with the M-SAM and L-SAM; Russia, with the S-300 and S-400; China; the Franco-Italian Aster behind the SAMP/T; and the US-Israeli Arrow.

These interceptors are expensive, [with a single Patriot PAC-3 interceptor running about $4 million], take years to develop, and are hard to build well, so there are significant shortages right now. 

Take Patriot, the most important system for Ukraine. US production runs about 600–650 missiles a year. So far, roughly 1,600 Patriots have gone to Ukraine and another 1,900 or so to the Middle East: about 3,500 in recent wars, almost six years of production.

The big problem is that Patriots are forward-ordered by years. Even before the Iran war, the wait was about five years.

"If you had put in a commercial order for Patriots in January 2026, you would probably receive them in 2031." 

So even if Europe funds a lot of Patriots, when Ukraine gets them, it depends on politics. The Trump administration may prioritize rebuilding its own stocks for a possible war with China, reassuring Gulf allies after the Iran war, or arming Taiwan.  My priority would be Ukraine, but with the shortfalls and Lockheed Martin's years-long PAC-3 backlog, the US gets to choose who's first in line. 

The French push SAMP/T as a viable European alternative, but it's made at maybe 100 a year, and tested far less than Patriot. Even a Franco-Italian "tiger team" aims to make just 300 a year by 2028, under half US Patriot output. The same Aster missile is in demand for European naval air defense, too, so I don't know how many reach Ukraine.

Those are the only commercially produced missiles on the table for Ukraine. As a Ukrainian or European diplomat, I'd reach out to the Japanese about buying Patriots from their line, though they make only several dozen a year, and to the South Koreans about their [home-built] interceptors, the M-SAM and longer-range L-SAM. 

Ukraine has about seven Patriot batteries operational and would need around 14 to cover its territory, so even with more missiles, it's short on the radars and launchers themselves.

In that context, the Freya initiative is good, but I don't see it as a short-term fix. In Ukraine's shoes, I'd focus more on disrupting Russian missile production and launches.

Why ballistic missiles pose a harder problem than drones

Thomas: Is intercepting ballistic missiles a different order of challenge from drone production, where Ukraine has made much progress? And how realistic would it be to release Freya by this winter, a timeline that has been floating around?

DeVore: I would not bet on producing it by this winter.

Ukraine has achieved things that, before the war, any defense-industrial expert would have called impossible. What it's done with Hornets, Fire Points, Flamingos, and its cruise-missile programs has been remarkable. But the challenges of ballistic-missile interception are much, much greater.

It means building an interceptor capable of high-G maneuvers involving tight turning and integrating it with radars and guidance that can steer it to the target, historically very hard. In the first Gulf War, in 1991, the US had about a 2% success rate: probably one of the roughly 70 Patriots fired hit a Scud. It's improved a lot since then, but intercepting a ballistic missile is still very challenging.

I'd be very happy if Freya were a truly operational system by December 2027; I'm fairly doubtful it'll be by December 2026.

That doesn't mean I wouldn't go forward with [Freya]. Given how critical ballistic missiles are to Russia's campaign, and the global interceptor shortage, Ukraine and its allies have to find ways past the production bottlenecks. Systems like Patriot and SAMP/T are simply too exquisite for money alone to provide enough.

But there's no silver bullet. If I were Ukraine, I'd pursue programs like Freya, push diplomatically for as many Patriots as possible—along with alternatives like the L-SAM, M-SAM, or Japanese-produced Patriots—and analyze Russia's missile production and launch ecosystem to see whether I could go after it. None of those three is a perfect solution.

Daniel Thomas: So, is making up the shortage the Iran war created within six to 12 months a tall order?

DeVore: On the positive side, Russia has the same problem producing ballistic missiles that the US has producing Patriots. Russia’s ballistic missiles still depend on fairly exquisite components and almost hand assembly. So they haven’t been able to scale up ballistic-missile production the way they’ve scaled up drones.

Sanctions, logistical strikes, and interceptors must work in tandem

Thomas: Tell me more about the other side of the coin — Russia’s own bottlenecks. Beyond exquisite, hard-to-assemble parts, what holds its missile production back?

DeVore: NAKO, a Ukrainian anti-corruption watchdog, has done a good job publicizing data on Russian missile components, especially in the Iskander and Kinzhal.

Many of the guidance components are Western-made, especially American, and are subject to dual-use sanctions. 

Russia has built fairly sophisticated smuggling operations to import the chips and equipment in the quantities it needs.

A more vigilant, joined-up sanctions effort could disrupt that, but it would mean holding the original producers accountable when their parts end up in Russian hands.

This means holding a Texas Instruments, or whatever other US producer, responsible when it sells chips to an unvetted Hong Kong shell company set up months earlier to dodge sanctions.

“It doesn't help that the EU, the US, and the UK haven't harmonized their lists of prohibited dual-use components, leaving gaps the Russians can exploit.”  

Russian missiles also tend to require skilled labor; Russian drones don't. The drone factory in Tatarstan is very basic, staffed largely by South Asian laborers with relatively few skills, and Shaheds are mostly built on fiberglass frames, basically the same way you'd make a surfboard. It's very low-tech.

Missiles require qualified craftspeople, so striking factories, destroying jigs, and wounding or discouraging workers from showing up could have a greater impact on missile production.

What Ukraine and its partners need to do

Thomas: To keep Russian ballistic missiles off Ukrainian cities, where should the main effort go: building more interceptors, or disrupting Russia's production chain through sanctions and deep strikes inside Russia? 

DeVore: I'd ask whether I'm speaking for Ukraine or for the broader European coalition behind it. Taking the two together, I'd rank four things in order of priority.

First, go after production. The area where Ukraine can do the most good is to destroy the missiles at their source: map the defense-industrial supply chains, find the factories, and hit them as hard as possible. For something like the Kinzhal, which needs an exquisite launcher like the MiG-31, go after the launchers too. The goal is for Russia to fire fewer missiles.

Second, extend an air-defense zone into western Ukraine — for the broader Western coalition. Russian drones have for years transited Polish and Romanian airspace to hit Ukraine from other directions, a violation of NATO airspace. The Biden administration chose to accept this out of paranoia about escalation.

The simplest move would be for NATO to intercept any drone or missile heading toward NATO airspace with its own assets. Since no NATO country wants the debris crashing on its own territory, it makes sense to push that zone into western Ukraine, possibly as far as Odesa. If Poland and Romania, backed by Britain, France, and Germany, did that, Ukraine could pull its Patriots eastward to concentrate on protecting Kyiv and the east.

Third, concentrate diplomacy on South Korea and Japan, the two countries that could sell interceptors in the short term: Patriots from Japan's line, M-SAMs from South Korea. I'd also do everything I could to butter up the Trump administration, without putting much stock in my success there.

Fourth, make more initiatives like Freya — domestic products and innovations that can shoot down ballistic missiles. But that's the longest-term option, the slowest to bear fruit.

Why the next interceptors may come from Tokyo and Seoul

Thomas: December 2027 sounds optimistic and more feasible than December this year. Regarding South Korea and Japan, is that trend tied to Europe's broader push to decouple from the US after the war in Iran? 

DeVore: Even if you didn't want to decouple from the US, you really can't buy more interceptors than the Americans have to offer at the moment.

South Korea and Japan are the two places with substantial numbers of ballistic-missile interceptors to spare, partly because neither is in the habit of selling such systems abroad. Japan's Patriot line was built for sovereign supply, not export, and any sale would still need American permission.

Japan only recently amended its constitution to allow defense exports at all, so exporting Patriots in large numbers would be novel. But it has been supportive of Ukraine's war effort, and I don't see why it wouldn't.

And the first buyer of Japanese Patriots could well be Ukraine. Japan is reluctant to get involved in the Middle East, which it sees not as a clean war of good guys and bad guys but as a complicated mess. So Ukraine, funded by Europe, has a far better shot than, say, Qatar or Saudi Arabia.

South Korea is similar: it has kept M-SAM a purely domestic program, but vigorous diplomacy might change that.

Marc DeVore is a senior lecturer at the University of St Andrews' School of International Relations, specializing in military innovation and defense-industrial matters. He has advised the UK's Foreign Office on Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Ukrainian drone companies are stepping up efforts to enter Asian defence markets, targeting Japan and Taiwan as regional militaries accelerate spending in response to rising tensions with China, according to Reuters reporting on 19 June.

Several firms are seeking production partnerships, supply chains, and export opportunities across East Asia, positioning Ukraine’s battlefield-tested drone sector as a model for “modern warfare” capabilities.

The push comes as US and allied planners increasingly frame drones as central to any potential conflict over Taiwan, including concepts of large-scale autonomous systems designed to overwhelm enemy forces.

Ukraine’s battlefield drone industry seeks Asian foothold

UFORCE, a Ukrainian producer of attack and maritime drones, has been among the most active in outreach efforts. Its CEO, Oleg Rogynskyy, travelled to Tokyo in April to present proposals to Japanese officials and defence contractors on local production partnerships.

The company told Reuters it is seeking to scale up manufacturing cooperation with allies in the region, arguing that lessons from the Black Sea theatre can be applied to East Asia’s maritime environment.

Other Ukrainian firms, including Skyeton and General Cherry, are also exploring partnerships in Japan, which is expanding its domestic drone production capacity and relaxing long-standing restrictions on arms exports.

According to Reuters, Japan’s defence spending on unmanned systems is rising sharply, with plans to scale annual drone output to tens of thousands of units by the end of the decade.

Taiwan interest grows despite political sensitivities

Ukrainian companies are reportedly also exploring contacts in Taiwan, where military planners are accelerating preparations for a possible conflict with China and expanding investment in asymmetric defence systems, including drones.

The engagement remains cautious, reflecting the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Kyiv and Taipei, but Ukrainian firms and industry groups say early-stage discussions are taking place on technology and supply chains.

Some cooperation is focused on industrial inputs, with Taiwan seen as a key source of microelectronics, sensors, and camera systems used in drone manufacturing.

“Unmanned hellscape” doctrine shapes demand

The growing interest in Ukrainian systems comes amid US defence planning that increasingly emphasises mass drone deployments in a potential Taiwan contingency.

Senior US commanders have previously described scenarios involving large-scale autonomous systems designed to create what they call an “unmanned hellscape” to slow or deter an adversary advance.

Military analysts say drones are also expected to play a key role across the island chain stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines, shaping surveillance, strike, and maritime denial capabilities.

According to Reuters, US troops recently used waterborne UFORCE drones to sink a vessel during a secretive exercise in waters where the South China Sea meets the Pacific, underscoring growing interest in Ukrainian-designed systems. 

Japan seen as regional production hub

Japanese industry is emerging as a key focus for Ukrainian firms due to its advanced manufacturing base and government backing for defence industrial expansion.

Tokyo has increased defence budgets for unmanned systems and is encouraging domestic firms – many of which traditionally focused on civilian electronics – to enter weapons production.

Ukrainian executives say Japan could serve as a gateway to wider Asian markets, including potential indirect exports to countries such as the Philippines, where maritime tensions with China have also intensified.

Ukraine pushes “battlefield proven” pitch

Ukrainian companies argue their advantage lies in rapid iteration and combat experience gained during the war with Russia, where drones have become central to both strike and surveillance operations.

Industry representatives say they are increasingly framing Ukraine’s drone sector as a tested model for modern conflict, offering systems that can be adapted for maritime and island defence environments.

At the same time, Ukrainian firms are also seeking to reduce dependence on Chinese components by building supply chains in Japan and Taiwan, where many key electronic parts are also manufactured.

Wider diplomatic and industrial outreach

Ukraine has expanded defence technology diplomacy since the start of the full-scale war, securing partnerships in Europe and the Middle East while promoting joint production deals for drones and other systems.

Officials in Kyiv have signalled readiness to share technologies such as maritime drones with partners, as part of broader efforts to integrate Ukraine’s defence industry into allied supply networks.

The latest outreach in Asia reflects a broader shift: from wartime production at home to export-oriented industrial cooperation abroad, anchored in rising regional security concerns over China.