Putin’s airspace incursions risk ‘direct armed confrontation’ with Nato, Yvette Cooper says

Jerzy Tyc, a Polish citizen who headed an organization dedicated to restoring Soviet war memorials in Poland, has died while serving in the Russian army fighting against Ukraine.

The 60-something Pole had been living in Russia for years before joining Putin’s army under the call sign “Zygmunt.” His death was confirmed by authorities in Russia’s Kursk Oblast on their official Telegram channel.

Received Russian medal for restoring Soviet monuments in Poland

Tyc’s story reveals the complex loyalties that persist decades after the Cold War ended. He led the Kursk Association, which restored dozens of Soviet soldier monuments and graves across Poland. The work earned him Russia’s “Memory of Defenders of the Fatherland” medal in 2020, personally awarded by then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

But Polish authorities saw something different. Russian officials claimed Tyc faced “strong pressure from the Russophobic authorities of Warsaw” and was eventually “forced to leave his homeland.” In recent years, he had been living in Russia before joining the military campaign against Ukraine.

Criticized Polish government on Russian TV

Tyc regularly appeared in Russian media outlets where he criticized Polish government policies. According to RMF24, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova received a group of activists from his association during a televised event several years ago.

Yet in a 2019 interview with TASS, Tyc insisted ordinary Poles supported his work—drawing a sharp distinction between what he saw as hostile government officials and sympathetic citizens.

“For 11 years I have been restoring monuments to Soviet soldiers, traveling throughout Poland. Never has any resident raised a hand against me,” he said. “But this is what officials and politicians say.”

Believed in the “return of Polish-Russian friendship”

In a 2023 interview with the Russian portal gornovosti.ru, Tyc outlined his background, explaining that he had graduated from military school but left the army in 1989 when political changes began in Poland.

He subsequently served in police before dedicating himself to what he called fighting “falsification of history, destruction of monuments, war with the dead.”

“Poles and Russians fought together against a common enemy, but this history is inconvenient for the current Polish authorities, who would prefer to forget about it,” Tyc stated in the interview. He expressed belief in the “return of Polish-Russian friendship.”

That belief ultimately led him to die fighting against Poland’s neighbor and ally. Russian authorities said he “remained faithful to his beliefs until the end, fighting neo-Nazis”—the Kremlin’s standard propagandist justification for its aggression in Ukraine.

Russia has built a secret EU network to supply Ukrainian SIM cards for its kamikaze drones. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) has recently apprehended FSB agents who organized a large-scale operation to supply Ukrainian SIM cards to Russian combat drones through European Union countries.

Kremlin uses the EU as a war platform

Agents purchased Ukrainian SIM cards and routed them via the EU to Naberezhnye Chelny and Yelabuga in Tatarstan, the largest drone manufacturing hub in Russia. The SBU is conducting investigations to hold all network participants accountable within EU territory.

Internal agents and recruitment

Russian operatives recruited residents from Kyiv Oblast, including a former law enforcement officer, as well as employees of Ukrainian mobile operators, to collect intelligence “from within.”

This allowed the occupiers to improve communication and navigation for their combat drones.

SBU documents and stops FSB activity

During raids, authorities seized smartphones containing evidence of contacts with FSB handlers and foreign accomplices, as well as SIM cards prepared for shipment to Russia. The detainees face charges of high treason under martial law, carrying potential life imprisonment and property confiscation.

The operation was carried out by SBU officers in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast with support from the Internal Security Department of the National Police and the Kyiv City Prosecutor’s Office.

Today the biggest news comes from the Russian Federation. 

Here, Ukrainian forces are systematically striking Russian air defense systems across hundreds of kilometers. 

After months of preparation, Kyiv’s strategy is now fully visible: destroy radars, launchers and control modules until the skies are open and air superiority is established.

Precision strikes from Donetsk to Crimea

A few recent operations reveal the scale and precision of Ukraine’s effort, as near the town of Bukhoyavlenka in the Donetsk region, a Russian Buk-M1 launcher was hunted in real time. 

A reconnaissance drone tracked it to a building before a bomber drone began tearing the roof apart, finally dropping an explosive directly onto the system and causing a massive ammunition explosion. 

In Zaporizhzhia, Ukrainian forces destroyed a rare control module of a Barnaul-T air defense control system, a central node that links radar with launchers and can coordinate multiple launches at the same time.

In Rostov, one of Russia’s Neboyu long-range radars was struck overnight, with fires confirmed by NASA FIRM satellites. 

Further north, another radar site of a Sobkatu system in Voronezh was hit, reportedly destroying its antenna. 

And in Crimea, Ukraine neutralized Podlet and Nebo-M radars, a sign that even protected sites deep within the peninsula are vulnerable.

Fragmenting Russia’s defense network

These attacks span thousands of kilometers, but share a clear operational goal of systematically dismantling the infrastructure that keeps the air defense network functional. 

By knocking out early warning radars and central coordination modules, Ukrainian forces create time gaps in detection and response while effectively blinding connected missiles. 

By destroying intercept launchers with their own radar and control module built in, such as the Pantsir or Buk systems, they undermine Russia’s ability to patch holes in their layered defenses. 

By finally targeting systems, like Barnolty, which coordinate radar data, firing orders, and even external assets, they sever the entire command structure and ability of the Russian network to work together. 

The more fragmented Russia’s air defense grid becomes, the more exposed its rear area is to follow-up strikes from Ukrainian bombers, drones, or cruise missiles.

Multi-domain arsenal of weapons

Near Orlivka in Donetsk, Ukrainian reconnaissance drones adjusted fire onto Russian OSA and Strela-10 launchers, with artillery finishing the job, a typical frontline engagement against short-range systems. 

Heavier bomber drones are used for structural targets or soft-skinned vehicles, as in the Bohoyavlenka and Oleksievka strikes, where they ignited stored ammunition and set several launchers ablaze. 

Shark UAVs frequently assist in locating and guiding these strikes to their targets. For deeper targets, fixed-wing kamikaze drones are launched to strike radar installations in Rostov, Voronezh or Crimea. 

And in rare cases, Ukraine has used their fighter jets for complicated set-and-dead missions to suppress or destroy enemy air defenses. 

Geolocated footage already shows one of such missions, with the MiG-29 fighter jet launching radar-seeking missiles to target and strike Russian Tor and Buk systems in Zaporizhzhia. 

The range and variety of these tools show that Ukraine is no longer just improving, it is executing a coordinated multi-domain campaign to disable Russian air defenses.

Expanding 300-kilometer kill zone

The campaign continues daily and has now widened in scope, as in Zaporizhzhia, multiple S-300B systems have been destroyed in separate strikes north of Oleksiivka, with kamikaze drones eliminating another Buk-M3 nearby. 

In Western Crimea, Ukrainian drones targeted relay sites near known air defense positions, with fire markers visible even on satellite imagery. 

In Luhansk, partisans blew up a Russian mobile air defense group guarding a repair base, reportedly linked to earlier atrocities in Bucha. 

North of the border in the Kursk region, a Russian surface-to-air missile site was destroyed near the village of Rozhava, making it the northmost confirmed strike of the campaign. 

From Krasnodar Krai to Kursk, Ukrainians are striking Russian air defenses and creating a kill zone up to 300 kilometers deep into Russian-controlled territories.

System demolition over fighter dominance

Overall, Ukraine is not just blinding Russian air defenses, it is taking apart the system that makes them effective. 

Russia air defense systems are not infinite, each destroyed S-300 or Buk system costs millions to replace, requires specialized parts and strains an already overburdened military industry to meet wartime needs. 

This is not air superiority in the classic sense of fighter dominance, but a complete demolition of radar, control and interceptor assets to give Ukrainian air power freedom of movement across the front line and deep into occupied territory, as the Ukrainian air strike offensive only seems to intensify.

In our regular frontline report, we pair up with the military blogger Reporting from Ukraine to keep you informed about what is happening on the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

The Kremlin is reportedly preparing a large-scale operation to derail Moldova’s European trajectory and weaken President Maia Sandu’s government. According to Bloomberg, Moscow aims to discredit the ruling party, Action and Solidarity (PAS), and destabilize the country ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September.

Kremlin’s plan: disinformation and protests

Leaked documents outline multiple tactics: recruiting Moldovans abroad to vote in an organized manner, staging protests and calls for government resignation, running large-scale disinformation campaigns on social media, and leveraging compromising material against officials.

Young men from sports clubs and criminal groups are expected to be mobilized for provocations during and after the elections.

On Monday, 22 September, Moldova already detained 74 people suspected of preparing violent unrest. 

Officials said the suspects had traveled to Serbia for training that included firearms handling, crowd-control tactics, and provocations during protests, allegedly under instruction from Russian citizens. Participants were reportedly paid around €400 each.

European officials sound the alarm

European authorities warn that Russia is highly likely to attempt most of these measures. Support for pro-Russian parties in Moldova ranges from political consulting to direct funding.

President Maia Sandu has previously warned of voter bribery, cyberattacks, paid protests, and disinformation campaigns, urging international partners to strengthen monitoring of democratic processes.

Elections and Moldova’s future

These elections will shape Moldova’s European path. Recent polls suggest PAS may retain the lead, but without a parliamentary majority, leaving room for political maneuvering by the opposition, which is actively supported by Moscow.

The situation remains tense, and Russian attempts to influence the outcome could determine the country’s political direction for years to come.

Authorities in Moldova said Monday they detained 74 people suspected of preparing violent unrest ahead of the country’s parliamentary elections on 28 September, Moldovan media outlet NewsMaker reports.

The arrests highlight concerns about Russian interference in Eastern Europe’s fragile democracies. Moldova, a small former Soviet republic bordering Ukraine and Romania, has recently pursued closer ties with the European Union. 

Moscow has historically exerted influence on the country through political networks, disinformation campaigns, and covert operations. Russian-backed forces have maintained de facto control over Transnistria, a narrow strip of land bordering Ukraine that comprises roughly 12% of Moldova’s territory, since the early 1990s.

Analysts say destabilization efforts ahead of elections could undermine Moldova’s pro-European government and threaten the country’s internal security.

Officials said the suspects had traveled to Serbia for training that included firearms handling, crowd-control tactics, and provocations during protests, allegedly under instruction from Russian citizens. Participants were reportedly paid around €400 each.

The investigation, led by the Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office and the General Police Inspectorate, began in July 2025.

Training in Serbia and Russian coordination

Officials said some recruits were lured to Serbia under the pretext of religious pilgrimages before being drawn into the training program. Police said they were also taught how to resist detention by authorities.

Alexandru Musteața, head of Moldova’s intelligence service, said the operation was coordinated by Russian security services, with planning on the ground in Moldova led by Andrei Pavlov, who allegedly directed recruitment through a network linked to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor.

Communication was primarily via Telegram to maintain anonymity, Musteața said.

Authorities carried out more than 250 searches across the country, including at four prisons, and seized weapons, ammunition, camouflage clothing, tents, passports, and other materials.

Police said links to Moldovan political parties and criminal groups were uncovered during the investigation. Socialist Party leader Igor Dodon said four party members were among those detained.

If convicted, the suspects face four to eight years in prison.

The detentions come days after reporting by Bloomberg and the BBC highlighted Russian attempts to influence Moldova’s elections through disinformation and covert operations.

President Maia Sandu has warned that the country’s independence and pro-European course are under direct threat.

A Ukrainian military-intelligence portal that publishes information about sponsors and accomplices of Russia’s aggression has uncovered the production network behind the Russian guided glide bomb D-30SN. Identified suppliers include manufacturers from Ireland, China, Switzerland, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan.

The intelligence service presented a list of 36 enterprises involved in its production cooperation; some of these still evade sanctions pressure.

Why is D-30 SN especially dangerous?

This bomb is not a simple free-fall weapon. It is fitted with aerodynamic surfaces like wings or special gliding surfaces that allow it to glide, significantly extending its flight after release from an aircraft. Its guided accuracy enables large-scale destruction.

To operate under electronic warfare conditions, the D-30 SN’s navigation system includes a satellite navigation module with an adaptive antenna array (CRPA) or the “Kometa-M8” familiar from other systems. This provides the navigation signal with resilience to jamming and interference commonly used to disrupt guided munitions.

The D-30SN can be carried by Su-34, Su-30SM, Su-35, Su-24 aircraft, and the S-70 “Okhotnik” UAV. When released from altitudes of 12–15 km, its effective range is up to 100 km.

Preliminary reports indicate that these glide bombs can also be launched from ground platforms, such as 300 mm Tornado-S MLRS, using a booster motor.

Conventional air-defence systems do not always intercept D-30 glide bombs because of their range, high accuracy, and gliding characteristics.

Who is responsible for D-30SN assembly?

The patent holder and main organizer of UMPB production is the Russian corporation Tactical Missile Armament Corporation (KTRV). The principal manufacturer is an enterprise within the corporation, the JSC Concern “Granit-Electron”.

Dozens of enterprises involved in D-30SN production are long known for their ties to Russia’s military-industrial complex and are already under sanctions by most members of the sanctioning coalition.

What’s inside the D-30SN?

Ukrainian intelligence has found a part from the Irish manufacturer TE Connectivity inside this bomb — a low-level signal relay IM06 12VDC.

TE Connectivity has operated in industrial technologies for about 80 years. The relay is an important element in the electrical control systems of a complex navigation-guided bomb, ensuring stable operation in combat conditions. In 2024, TE Connectivity agreed to pay $5.8 million in fines related to illicit supplies of goods, including wires and connector assemblies, connected with certain military projects in China, Reuters reports. 

Ukraine also found a Chinese sensor MT6701 STD 243 produced by Shanghai MagnTek Microelectronics Inc. (MagnTek). This company has been sanctioned by the US in the context of supplying microelectronic components to Russia. Nevertheless, these parts continue to be found in Russian weapons, which have killed at least 13,800 civilians in Ukraine (not counting the hundreds of thousands of victims in occupied cities such as Mariupol).

Also among the identified details was a Schottky diode SS54 by Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. The company is based in Yangzhou near Shanghai and has ties to several sanctioned Russian enterprises, including Simmetron Electronic Components, which supplies the Russian military. Despite sanctions, supplies continue and contribute to Russia’s battlefield capabilities in Ukraine.

Yangjie is the parent company of the US manufacturer Micro Commercial Components (based in California) and has production and R&D facilities in China, Vietnam, Japan, and Taiwan. This makes the company’s role notable in the context of sanctions circumvention and support for Russia’s military industry.

Another Chinese component found is a step-down DC/DC converter by XLSEMI, which has also been blacklisted by the US and other Western countries. Nevertheless, its deliveries persist.

Ukraine’s intelligence has uncovered a quartz resonator ATS8SASM CTS172131 by American CTS Corporation in a deadly D-30 SN bomb. CTS Corporation appears on lists of companies whose products or components have repeatedly been found in Russian weapon samples on Ukrainian battlefields despite sanctions. This points to challenges in export-control enforcement and the difficulty of stopping illicit flows of military-related technology to Russia.

Another US company spotted in the list is Linear Technology Corporation (Analog Devices), which supplies DC/DC converters LTM4613V and LTM4615V. The US and EU have also sanctioned it for supplying microelectronic components to Russia, including for Orlan-10 UAV production.

Two Swiss companies were also detected in the D-30SN: STMicroelectronics and U-blox. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, U-blox has halted sales to Russia, Belarus, and the occupied territories of Ukraine.

Nevertheless, U-blox modules have still been found in Russian-made reconnaissance drones. The company explains that such components could have been removed from civilian devices such as e-scooters, e-bikes, and cars and repurposed for military use.

How does Russia circumvent sanctions?

The ability of Russian President Vladimir Putin to circumvent Western sanctions is one of the major shortcomings of the Western response to the war in Ukraine. Rather than becoming economically isolated, Russia, after more than three years of war, feels relatively confident.

According to a New York Times, Russia’s technology imports often begin when US chipmakers sell products to international distributors. Chip manufacturers are not legally required to track the downstream destinations of their goods.

What should be done?

What should governments do? 

• Approve a list of goods subject to enhanced export controls.
• Prohibit their re-export to Russia, Belarus, Iran, and D​PRK.
• Formalize strengthened inspection procedures for shipments to high-risk jurisdictions.
• Increase penalties and liability for violations and negligence; involve banks in compliance checks (similar to AML/CFT measures).
• Exchange information and synchronize efforts with other countries.

What should manufacturers and distributors do?

• Create a list of products whose shipments require enhanced scrutiny.
• Approve and regularly update screening procedures that take into account recommendations, red flags, and common sanction-evasion schemes.
• Distribute new screening policies to counterparties and include compliance clauses in contracts.
• When products are discovered in the aggressor’s weapons, investigate supply chains, inform stakeholders and governments, and take measures to stop deliveries.

According to ISW: for the first time since its full-scale invasion began, Russia has achieved what had long eluded the Kremlin: operational breathing room. Since January 2025, Moscow has signed contracts with 292,000 new recruits more than the active armies of most European countries allowing fresh troops to be held back from the front lines.

Russian troops are attempting to advance in the different directions but Ukrainian units demonstrate flexible defense and a high level of coordination. 

Falling Russian casualties in August and September have enabled the formation of long-anticipated strategic reserves key for any future large-scale offensive. Meanwhile, Ukrainian partisans are striking deep behind enemy lines. On 21 September, the Atesh group sabotaged a key railway in Russia’s Smolensk Oblast, disrupting supply lines to a major plant producing Kh-59 cruise missiles, drones, and aircraft parts. Over 10 control elements were destroyed, potentially halting deliveries for weeks.

ISW reported that in the north, Russia continues to build buffer zones along the Sumy and Chernihiv borders. This is not just about defense it’s about staging future offensives. Deployed units include Black Sea Fleet marines, the 72nd Motor Rifle Division, elements of the elite 106th Airborne Division, and the Anvar special unit.

In Kharkiv Oblast, the battle for Vovchansk reflects Russia’s attritional approach. Waves of infantry attack across the Vovcha River under relentless drone surveillance and strikes. Near Kupiansk, Russian troops have seized Kindrashivka and pressure Ukrainian positions daily. Analysts say Russia trades lives for minor territorial gains.

In the Borova-Lyman direction, Russian forces attack from multiple directions. Pro-Russian sources claim the capture of Shandryholove, though independent confirmation is lacking. In Donetsk, most attacks have failed, but near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka, Russia has advanced, deploying six battalions against single Ukrainian units.

ISW mentioned that Russian progress stalls, attacks on civilian infrastructure escalate. On the night of September 20–21, Russia launched 54 drones; 33 were downed, the rest hit targets in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. In one week, Moscow fired over 1,500 drones, 1,280 glide bombs, and 50 missiles. Over 132,000 foreign-made components have been found in downed Russian weapons proof of widespread sanctions evasion.

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has concluded that Russian armed forces deliberately target civilians with short-range drones in settlements along the Dnipro River. 

The investigators said these systematic strikes constitute crimes against humanity of murder and war crimes of attacking civilians, with the clear purpose of spreading terror among the population.

This landmark finding validates reporting from 2024-2025 documenting Russia’s systematic transformation of civilian areas in southern Ukraine into hunting grounds where drones pursue individual victims with deadly precision.

Russian forces killed 133 civilians and injured 1,350 between July and October 2024 alone in what locals call “human safaris.”

Documentary evidence shows these attacks intensified throughout 2024, with Kherson residents reporting up to 100 drone attacks daily by spring 2025.

UN documents widespread and systematic attacks on civilians

In its latest findings, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine documented drone assaults across Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts, spanning more than 300 kilometres of front-line territory. 

Russian units operating from the opposing left bank of the Dnipro used drones with real-time tracking to pursue individuals, drop explosives directly on them, and attack civilian vehicles.

The Commission reported that ambulances, fire engines, and other emergency responders bearing visible markings were also struck, preventing life-saving work in the aftermath of attacks. 

The Commission also noted that civilian casualties from explosive weapons in Ukraine rose by 40 percent in the first eight months of 2025 compared to the previous year, with drone strikes representing a growing share. 

Older people in front-line communities are particularly vulnerable, as many are unable to escape.

Telegram channels linked to Russian forces have circulated videos of civilians being hunted and killed, which investigators said amounts to the war crime of outrages upon dignity.

Civilian areas rendered unliveable

Beyond individuals, Russian forces have directed drones at residences, infrastructure, and other civilian sites, leaving entire communities devastated. 

One Kherson resident told investigators: “Drones chase us, we hide from them. Drones sit on rooftops, and if they see something, there will be consequences.”

The systematic nature of the attacks has forced essential services to shut down and compelled thousands to flee. The Commission said this may amount to the crime against humanity of forcible transfer of population.

Broader pattern of deportation

The inquiry is also examining deportations and transfers of civilians from Russian-occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. 

Taken together, investigators said these practices reveal “coordinated and organized efforts” by Moscow to consolidate control over occupied territories while driving local populations out.

Accountability imperative

“The circumstances of the attacks show the perpetrators’ intention to kill, harm and destroy,” the inquiry concluded. 

Its chair, Erik Møse, stressed that avoiding impunity and holding perpetrators accountable is essential for sustainable peace. The full report is set to be presented to the UN General Assembly in October.

Russia operates approximately 17% of all active oil tankers worldwide through its “shadow fleet,” according to analysis published by The New York Times.

The 940 aging vessels allow Moscow to sidestep Western sanctions and keep war funding flowing.

The fleet has exploded in size—up 45% in just one year, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence data cited by the Times. These aren’t legitimate commercial operations. They’re Moscow’s workaround.

How Russia avoids shadow fleet restrictions

Here’s how it works: Ships use sketchy insurance or sail without coverage entirely. They fly flags from third countries. Most importantly, they transmit false location data to hide where they loaded Russian crude.

“The sanctions don’t put them out of business,” maritime security expert Ian Ralby told the Times. “They put them out of legitimate business.”

The fleet emerged after Europe banned Russian seaborne oil imports in late 2022 in response to its full-scale aggression in Ukraine.

Moscow suddenly needed India and China to buy its oil instead of European customers. Those longer shipping routes to Asia required more vessels. Russia also wanted to dodge the $60-per-barrel price cap imposed by the G7, European Union, and Australia. The EU and Britain have since dropped that ceiling even lower.

The deception creates what the Times calls “plausible deniability” for oil buyers who can claim they didn’t know the cargo’s true origin.

Explore further

Oil tanker from Russian shadow fleet towed to German port after floating adrift in Baltic Sea

Environmental and security threats of shadow fleet

However, this system poses significant environmental risks, according to experts quoted by the Times. The shadow fleet vessels average 20 years in age, compared to 13 years for the global oil tanker fleet broadly.

“Lack of insurance combined with the really old vessels — this just increases the risk of environmental catastrophe,” Natalia Gozak, office director of Greenpeace Ukraine.

Western intelligence also suspects some vessels of underwater sabotage against pipelines and cables.

Explore further

Russian shadow fleet’s Eagle S remains under arrest as damage claims mount

Western enforcement response

In response, Western nations have intensified enforcement efforts. The European Union has placed more than 500 shadow fleet ships on sanctions lists as of its latest announcement, while the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia are also targeting these vessels.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in August that the EU would adopt its 19th sanctions package against Russia in September. The package was expected on 17 September, but Brussels postponed its presentation.

However, the ships continue finding workarounds, including transferring cargo at sea and “flag hopping” by changing registrations to conceal identities.

Ben Harris, a former Biden administration Treasury official who helped architect the price cap, acknowledged the system’s imperfections while arguing that sanctions still impose costs on Russia through expensive shipping routes and fleet construction.