A new armoured combat suit developed by Ukraine’s Major Oleh Shyriaiev is designed to protect soldiers from the growing threat of drone-dropped explosives and shrapnel. The lightweight overalls, made from Kevlar and other impact-absorbing materials, offer full-body coverage and reinforced protection in key areas, The Telegraph reports.

The move to integrate armour into clothing reflects the static nature of the war in Ukraine. Troops often remain in fixed positions for extended periods, where drone and artillery attacks pose a far greater risk than small arms fire.

“The idea of these armoured overalls was my initiative and is something that hasn’t existed before,” said Shyriaiev, recently awarded the title Hero of Ukraine, the country’s highest honour.

Built for shrapnel, not bullets

The suit uses Kevlar, a heat-resistant synthetic fibre originally developed to replace steel in racing tyres, along with other materials that can absorb explosive impact. While Kevlar is less effective than ceramic plates against bullets, it is much lighter and offers strong protection against shrapnel, now the main battlefield threat.

“When a drone drops a grenade or explosive device, there is shrapnel and ballistic powder flying around, which have different starting velocities and weight,” Shyriaiev said.

Reinforced elbows, knees, and ankles

The suit includes extra protection at vulnerable joints, such as the elbows, knees, and ankles—areas commonly injured during ground movement or shelling. It is designed to be worn alongside standard body armour and helmets, extending protective coverage without severely compromising mobility.

Shyriaiev’s team is also exploring the development of blast-resistant insoles for military boots, to guard against foot injuries from ground-level explosions.

Tech can’t replace infantry

Although drones have transformed modern warfare, Shyriaiev emphasized that human soldiers remain essential to combat operations.

“Without infantry, war is impossible,” he said. “There is no way a drone can replace a soldier. A soldier guides a drone, makes decisions, opens fire and observes with a human eye.”

The Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone—rebranded by Russia as the Geran-2—has become a central weapon in Moscow’s drone campaign against Ukraine, Forbes reports. Its low cost, long range, and substantial payload have made it a cornerstone of Russia’s evolving military strategy.

While Ukraine initially grew increasingly effective at countering these drones, Russia has recently scaled up production of upgraded Shahed variants, posing a growing threat to Ukrainian air defenses. Analysts warn that if these new drones overwhelm existing systems, the remnants of civilian life in Ukrainian cities could face renewed devastation.

Ukraine’s early success against Shahed drones

Ukraine’s air defense strategy initially kept Shahed drones largely at bay. On 25 January 2025, the Ukrainian Air Force reported intercepting all 61 drones launched in a single wave—15 jammed, 46 shot down.

The success stemmed from a layered system: electronic warfare systems jammed low-flying drones, MiG-29 jets and Mi-24 helicopters intercepted at higher altitudes, and mobile machine-gun teams engaged drones nearing urban areas.

Russia enhances the Shahed: Tougher and more lethal

Russia’s recent drone modifications have made the Shahed a tougher adversary. As Forbes defense correspondent Vikram Mittal reports, engine compartments are now armored, and fuel tanks have been moved from the wings into the drone’s core, reducing the likelihood of a single hit disabling the craft.

Some drones now deploy submunitions mid-flight, extending their damage radius and lowering the need for precise targeting.

One Ukrainian commander, quoted on social media, said: “You don’t even hear them fall, and then 20 minutes after the flight, an explosion occurs.”

Evolving tactics: Dual-altitude launches and lancet support

Beyond hardware, Russia has changed how Shaheds are used. Launching drones in dual-altitude pairs—one low, one high—allows the lower drone to mask the other from radar detection, improving strike success.

Meanwhile, Russia is pairing Shaheds with Lancet drones, which act as loitering munitions targeting Ukraine’s counter-drone teams. By knocking out interceptors first, Shaheds are more likely to reach their destinations.

25 June attack reveals shift in momentum

On 25 June 2025, Ukraine reported that only 52 of 71 drones were intercepted—32 shot down, 20 jammed. The remaining 19 drones hit their targets, a sharp increase compared to earlier in the year.

“This trend… reflects a shift in both technology and tactics,” Mittal wrote in Forbes, suggesting Russia’s changes are beginning to erode Ukraine’s defensive edge.

Ukraine responds with countermeasures and counterstrikes

In response, Ukrainian forces are upgrading radar systems to detect paired drones more effectively. Field units may also receive heavier-caliber rifles and vehicle armor to withstand Lancet attacks.

In a more offensive move, Ukraine recently targeted a Shahed production facility, aiming to slow the flow of drones at its source.

Drone warfare: The iterative arms race

As Vikram Mittal of Forbes writes, the Shahed drone’s evolution reflects the dynamic nature of this conflict: “Ukraine will adjust its defenses, Russia will continue to evolve its drones and tactics in turn.”

The drone war now embodies a larger arms race—not just in firepower, but in adaptation. Each new modification, tactic, or countermeasure feeds a rapid cycle of innovation on both sides of the front line.

On the night of June 27–28, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) carried out a drone strike on the Kirovske military airfield in Russian-occupied Crimea.

According to an official statement, the strike destroyed several Russian helicopters — including Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — as well as a Pantsir-S1 self-propelled air defense system. Additional damage was reported to ammunition depots, air defense infrastructure, and drone facilities.

“The occupiers must understand: their expensive equipment is not safe anywhere — not on the front line, not in occupied territory, not in the rear,” the statement said.

Secondary explosions and ongoing strikes

Secondary detonations continued throughout the night, suggesting munitions storage sites were hit. This marked the second consecutive day the SBU reported destroying Russian military assets in Crimea.

On 26 June, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR) announced that its Prymary (Ghosts) unit carried out a separate drone strike on five key components of Russia’s S-400 Triumf air defense system. Targets included two multifunction radars, two detection radars, and one missile launcher.

Russia acknowledges drone activity

Russia’s Ministry of Defense confirmed a drone attack over Crimea, claiming that nine Ukrainian UAVs were intercepted.

While independent visual confirmation is still pending, local Telegram channels reported explosions in the Kirovske area. The monitoring group Crimean Wind documented five to six explosions between 2:50 and 3:02 AM, following drone activity. Russian air defenses reportedly fired in the Dzhankoi district around 1:30 AM.

Fires detected by satellite

According to Crimean Wind, citing NASA FIRMS satellite data, large fires were detected at the airfield. The group published annotated imagery showing multiple heat sources, including on or near helicopter pads.

At least one helicopter was reportedly seen burning, and air defense positions and depots appear to have been hit.

At approximately 11:30 AM local time, a loud explosion shook the suburbs of Dnipro, a major city in central Ukraine.

The blast, caused by Ukrainian air defense operations, was reportedly the result of intercepting a new Russian long-range bomb-missile — a development that could signal Moscow’s expanding ability to strike targets deep inside Ukraine.

Serhiy Lysak, head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Administration, confirmed the incident and praised the air defense forces:

“Thanks to our sky defenders for shooting down the newest Grom-1 bomb-missile,” Lysak wrote on Telegram.

Missile launched from Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia

According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the missile was launched from a Russian tactical aircraft operating over temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast. It traveled more than 100 kilometers before being shot down just outside Dnipro.

“The type of the air target will be determined after examining debris at the crash site,” the military stated.

Brief air raid alert issued

A localized air raid alert was declared in Dnipro at 11:27 AM and lifted just seven minutes later, at 11:34 AM. During that short window, residents heard a loud explosion, which coincided with the interception of the missile.

Experimental long-range bomb suspected

Sources in Ukraine’s air defense told Suspilne the weapon may have been an experimental guided bomb (KAB) fitted with a jet engine — a modification designed to extend its range far beyond standard specifications.

“Standard KABs had a range of about 70 km. Now, with jet engines, they’re constantly trying to push that farther,” one Ukrainian Air Force source told the outlet.

While officials have not confirmed the exact model, Grom-1 appears to refer to a new-generation Russian weapon that may combine features of both guided bombs and cruise missiles.

The Russian government has not commented on the incident.

Growing threat to civilian cities

If confirmed, the deployment of a long-range KAB-type weapon could mark a shift in Russia’s airstrike strategy — allowing it to hit civilian and infrastructure targets well behind the front lines.

Cities like Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia already endure frequent KAB attacks, making daily life increasingly dangerous for residents.

While Dnipropetrovsk Oblast has largely avoided frontline combat, Russian forces are advancing from Donetsk, and several villages in the region have already begun evacuations.

Glide bombs like the KAB are difficult to shoot down because they travel at high speeds and low altitudes, leaving little time for air defense systems to respond.

Dnipro: Strategic and symbolic target

Dnipro is one of Ukraine’s largest cities and serves as a key cultural, industrial, and logistical hub. The use of advanced long-range weaponry against the city suggests a broadening of the war’s geographic scope, and highlights the ongoing challenge Ukraine faces in defending population centers far from the immediate front.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that Russia continues to rely on foreign-made components, including from Western countries, to build weapons used in its war against Ukraine.

Zelenskyy’s remarks come as Russia intensifies drone and missile strikes across Ukraine. This week alone, Ukrainian officials report that at least 21 civilians were killed in Dnipro, 9 in Kyiv, and 2 in Odesa.

Speaking at the Fair Play conference, Zelenskyy said the Kremlin’s ability to sustain its military effort hinges on ongoing access to global trade networks and imported technology.

“Without those ties, this war simply wouldn’t exist,” Zelenskyy said. “Russian missiles and drones are made of dozens of critical components brought in from other countries through various schemes.”

Russian weapons built with foreign machinery

Zelenskyy said that over the past year, Russian military factories have received advanced machinery from 12 countries, including China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Türkiye, and the United States.

“Russia’s weapons production directly depends on access to modern machinery,” he said. “Even today, Western countries are still supplying Russia with critical components.”

He added that some supply contracts have already been signed through 2026.

Surge in dual-use goods to Russia’s neighbors

According to an investigation by Sky News, exports of dual-use goods — items with civilian and military applications — to Russia’s neighboring countries have risen by 9% over the past nine months compared to the same period from 2022 to mid-2023.

The volume of these exports is now 111% higher than pre-invasion levels.

Update 1: Teacher and husband killed in direct hit

Odesa Mayor Hennadii Trukhanov confirmed that a teacher and her husband were killed in last night’s Russian drone strike on the city.

“A person of the world’s most peaceful profession has died,” Trukhanov wrote on Telegram. “Kateryna Borsynska, a social pedagogue at the Mykhailivskyi Lyceum, and her husband, Valentyn, were killed.”

Update 2: 17 wounded, including children as young as 3

The Odesa Regional Prosecutor’s Office reported that 17 people were injured in the overnight drone strike on the city. Among the wounded are three boys aged 3, 7, and 14.

Two people were killed in a Russian drone attack on a residential high-rise in Odesa, local authorities confirmed. Emergency responders discovered the bodies of a married couple whose apartment took a direct hit, according to Odesa Mayor Hennadii Trukhanov.

The attack in Odesa is part of a broader escalation in Russian aerial assaults. Ukrainian officials report that, this week alone, drone and missile strikes have killed at least 21 civilians in Dnipro and 9 in Kyiv, as Russia intensifies its bombardments of urban centers.

Fire and rescue efforts

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service (SES) reported that the drone struck a 21-story building, triggering fires on the 7th, 8th, and 9th floors. Several residents were trapped in their apartments due to heavy smoke and debris. Emergency crews evacuated five people, including a young child.

“Preliminary reports indicate two fatalities and at least four people injured,” the SES said.

A Russian drone strike hit a high-rise in Odesa, killing 2 and injuring 9.

A direct hit on the 9th floor set the building ablaze.

A rescuer carries out a smoke-inhaled 3-year-old as his mother runs behind.

“The blast wave threw us. Our neighbor was covered in blood.” pic.twitter.com/VSzbApM2po

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) June 28, 2025

Six injured, including two young children

The Odesa Regional Administration initially reported six people injured: four adults and two children, ages seven and three. Governor Oleh Kiper confirmed that the 7-year-old boy is in moderate condition, while the 3-year-old suffered from smoke inhalation. All four adults were also hospitalized in moderate condition.

Police: Nine injured in total

Ukrainian police later updated the casualty count, stating that at least nine people were injured, including the two children. The drone made a direct hit on the 9th floor, severely damaging that level. The blast wave also impacted the 8th and 10th floors, with other parts of the building sustaining collateral damage.

Eyewitness: “We were thrown by the blast wave’

A resident of the damaged building shared her account with local outlet Dumska:

“There was an air raid alert. I heard a Shahed drone approaching—it was getting louder. I managed to reach the hallway just in time. The blast wave threw my husband and me. Fortunately, we weren’t seriously hurt. I saw fires on the lower floors. Our neighbor was badly injured—covered in blood—his wife was screaming. While my husband helped him, I gathered our documents. Together with our neighbors, we carried him outside on a blanket and evacuated.”

Ongoing emergency response

Emergency crews continue working at the scene, and local authorities are assessing structural damage and providing aid to affected residents.

Ukraine and the Council of Europe have signed a formal agreement to establish a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, marking a step toward legal accountability for Russia’s full-scale invasion.

The signing ceremony, held in Strasbourg, was broadcast live on the Council of Europe’s official website. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Alain Berset, Chair of the Committee of Ministers, formalized the agreement.

“Every war criminal must know: justice will prevail — and that includes Russia,” said Zelenskyy.

Tribunal to target senior Russian leadership — with limits

The tribunal is designed to prosecute high-level political and military figures responsible for launching the war against Ukraine. However, under current international law, sitting officials such as President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov enjoy legal immunity.

This means they cannot be prosecuted while in office. Trials can only begin once they leave power.

“This was a necessary compromise,” international law scholar Gleb Bogush of the University of Cologne told the BBC. “The G7 — especially the US — insisted on maintaining immunity for top officials. It sets a troubling precedent.”

Tribunal can still try other Russian and Belarusian officials

Despite immunity for top leaders, the tribunal will be empowered to investigate and try other senior Russian and Belarusian officials, potentially even in absentia. Legal experts believe this still sends a strong message about international accountability.

Bogush noted that the tribunal’s presence serves as a “persistent reminder” of the crime of aggression and the obligation to prosecute it under international law.

Questions raised over independence of investigations

The tribunal’s prosecutorial independence has already sparked debate. The agreement gives the Ukrainian Prosecutor General the sole authority to submit names and evidence to initiate cases. The tribunal’s prosecutor cannot act independently of Ukraine’s referral.

“This raises serious concerns about impartiality,” said Bogush. “The tribunal’s ability to act freely is significantly limited.”

Filling the legal gap left by the International Criminal Court

The Special Tribunal is being created to fill a jurisdictional gap in international law. The International Criminal Court (ICC) can investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, but not the crime of aggression unless both states involved have ratified the Rome Statute.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine had ratified the statute when the war began. Ukraine formally ratified it in August 2024, and cooperation between the ICC and the new tribunal is expected going forward.

Structure, location, and next steps

The tribunal’s statute was approved by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on 24 June. It will consist of 15 judges, appointed by a committee made up of representatives from participating states.

While the location has not been confirmed, The Hague remains a likely option. The agreement is open to Council of Europe members and other interested countries.

Zelenskyy’s visit follows NATO summit

President Zelenskyy traveled to Strasbourg following his participation in the NATO summit in The Hague. He is also expected to address the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers later in the day.

Russia formally withdrew from the Council of Europe in 2022 after launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its membership had been suspended prior to the withdrawal.

Why they say it’s a win — even if Putin walks for now

• First international court effort aimed at prosecuting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
• Builds legal pressure on Russian officials for launching the invasion.
• Highlights how Putin and other top leaders remain protected by legal immunity while in office.
• Shows the trade-offs behind creating global justice mechanisms through political compromise.
• Supports Ukraine’s broader strategy to seek legal accountability after the war.

Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the upcoming BRICS summit in Brazil in person, the Kremlin confirmed. Instead, he will participate via video conference during the July 6–7 meeting in Rio de Janeiro.

Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov directly attributed Putin’s virtual attendance to Brazil’s membership in the International Criminal Court (ICC). The court issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March 2023, charging him with the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied territories—charges stemming from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

“This is related to certain complications in the context of the ICC’s requirements. The Brazilian government could not take a clear position that would allow our president to participate in person,” Ushakov told Interfax.

Lavrov to attend in Putin’s place

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who is not under any ICC indictment, will represent Russia on-site at the summit.

Although Putin has previously visited ICC member countries such as Mongolia without facing arrest, the Kremlin is treating the situation in Brazil differently due to the perceived legal and diplomatic uncertainties.

Xi Jinping also expected to miss BRICS summit

Chinese President Xi Jinping is also expected to skip the BRICS summit, according to Bloomberg, with Premier Li Qiang representing China instead. This would mark Xi’s first absence from a BRICS summit since taking power.

Sources cited by the South China Morning Post said “scheduling conflicts” were officially cited, but noted that Xi has already met frequently with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Beijing generally avoids sending Xi to the same country two years in a row, with Russia being the exception, according to sources.

Modi to attend in person; India eyes state visit

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi plans to attend the summit in person and may stay on for a state visit to Brazil afterward, a source familiar with the matter told Bloomberg. Details of the trip are still being finalized.

Xi’s absence, contrasted with Modi’s high-profile visit, could create unfavorable optics for Beijing, as China and India cautiously improve bilateral ties.

BRICS expands amid global power shifts

Formed in 2006, BRICS—originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, and Indonesia. The group aims to serve as a counterbalance to Western-dominated institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Xi’s decision not to attend could also delay diplomatic engagement with Iran, which joined BRICS in 2024 amid ongoing tensions with Israel. The summit would have marked Xi’s first direct meeting with Iranian officials since the conflict began.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a 50-minute meeting during the NATO summit in The Hague — their first formal talks in months, amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and growing pressure on the West to boost support.

Trump called the meeting “couldn’t have been nicer,” acknowledging “rough times” in US–Ukraine relations.

“We’ve had some rough times… I’m going to see if we can end the war,” Trump told reporters.

Zelenskyy called the conversation productive and constructive.

“We covered all the truly important issues,” he wrote on Telegram, adding that they discussed peace efforts, a potential ceasefire, and civilian protection.

Trump, however, later gave a different account:

“We didn’t talk about a ceasefire. I just wanted to know how he was doing.”

A Notable change in presentation

In a symbolic departure from his usual wartime attire, Zelenskyy arrived at the NATO summit in a dark suit-style jacket and collared shirt — a look he had avoided throughout the war. It was the first time in over three years that Ukraine’s president opted for formal civilian clothing at a major diplomatic gathering.

The change was widely noted in both Western and Ukrainian media. While Zelenskyy did not wear a tie, the choice of jacket contrasted sharply with his signature olive drab shirts and combat-style gear. Observers saw it as a calculated shift — a gesture toward diplomatic normalcy and renewed appeal for support from allies.

The moment also carried personal resonance. After a tense meeting in the Oval Office earlier this year, Trump had reportedly made a dismissive comment about Zelenskyy’s attire. Asked then whether he’d consider wearing a suit again, Zelenskyy responded wryly:

“When the war is over.”

Patriot missile systems: Critical to Ukraine’s defense

Asked about supplying more Patriot missile systems, Trump was cautious:

“They do want the Patriots. We are going to see if we can make some available. They are very hard to get and we need them too. We were supplying them to Israel, they are very effective,”

Patriots are critical to Ukraine’s air defense, capable of intercepting Russian ballistic and cruise missiles, which continue to strike Ukrainian cities on a near-daily basis.

Closed-door concern: “Totally out of control”

Bloomberg reported that in a private session with NATO leaders, Trump warned the war in Ukraine is “totally out of control” and that urgent action is needed. He also told leaders he plans to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin, though he did not specify when or under what conditions.

Publicly, Trump referred to “thousands” of battlefield casualties last week, later clarifying the figure included losses on both the Ukrainian and Russian sides.

Ukraine losing ground, under daily fire

Despite continued Western backing, Ukraine is losing territory and enduring heavy casualties. Russian forces are intensifying drone and missile attacks across multiple regions.

This week alone, Ukrainian officials reported that strikes killed at least 19 civilians in Dnipro and 9 in Kyiv.

Meanwhile, a new Russian offensive in Sumy Oblast has opened another front in the north, pushing toward the regional capital and placing additional strain on Ukrainian defenses.

Ukraine’s air defense systems are overstretched, with limited capacity to intercept the growing volume of attacks. Civilians face daily threats.

Western military aid falls short

While the EU has announced €35 billion in financial aid, military support remains limited and slow. With US backing uncertain, European partners have failed to deliver long-range missiles, Western fighter jets, and modern tanks in meaningful numbers.

Ukraine operates with a handful of Western aircraft, aging tanks, and almost no long-range strike capability.

Symbolic support at NATO

At the summit, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned:

“Russia produces in three months what NATO does in a year — with an economy 25 times smaller.”

Zelenskyy also met with top EU officials, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who offered public reassurance:

“Volodymyr, you are among friends.”

Despite public solidarity, no new binding military commitments were announced during the summit.

Background: Tense history

The meeting in The Hague marked the first substantive conversation between Trump and Zelenskyy since a contentious Oval Office session in February, which ended with the Ukrainian delegation walking out over a disagreement on natural resource agreements.

A planned meeting during the June G7 summit was also canceled, as both leaders departed early due to separate international crises.

Their only other encounter this year was a brief exchange at Pope Francis’s funeral in April.

From junk food packaging to deep-strike drone raids, Ukraine is turning everyday materials into weapons—and using them to fight one of the largest militaries in the world, Defense News reports.

In early 2024, near the front lines of Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian drone operator Vadim Adamov reached for an empty Pringles can. Out of standard metal casings for explosives, he packed the can with sulphate and plastic explosive, hooked it to a DJI Mavic drone, and sent it flying.

“I don’t need your f***ing American shells,” Adamov said, launching the makeshift bomb at a Russian armored vehicle. It worked.

The can cost $1.50. The drone, a few thousand. The destroyed target? Likely worth hundreds of thousands.

Ukraine’s low-cost drones are delivering high-value results

Ukraine’s improvised weapons strategy—born from necessity—is now at the core of its military doctrine. Drones, especially first-person view (FPV) types, are being used for surveillance, direct attacks, and long-range sabotage.

In 2024 alone, Ukraine produced 2.2 million drones. Officials expect that number to more than double to 5 million in 2025.

Much of this production happens in basements, garages, and converted print shops, where parts like motors and cameras are assembled by hobbyists and technicians—many of them self-taught or under 25 years old.

Operation Spiderweb was a warning shot

The June 2024 Operation Spiderweb made headlines when hundreds of Ukrainian drones were smuggled into Russia and used to destroy strategic bombers and spy planes.

But experts say the surprise wasn’t the technology—it was the scale.

“These are the same basic tactics we’ve seen since the start of the war,” a Ukrainian defense official told Defense News. “Spiderweb just showed how far they can go.”

Frontline pilots, gamified warfare

At drone units near Lyman in eastern Ukraine, operators watch footage of confirmed hits, train on obstacle courses, and even earn digital medals and bonuses for successful strikes.

“The best thing to do if you hear one is to play dead,” one pilot said. “But if it gets that close, you’re probably dead already.”

This war now includes leaderboards, ranking systems, and financial incentives for drone kills. It’s war fought with joysticks and VR goggles—sometimes by soldiers barely out of their teens.

Russia responds, and Ukraine counters again

The drone war is now a back-and-forth tech race. Ukrainian forces began using signal jammers to break drone communications. Russia responded by adding ultra-thin fiber-optic spools to their drones, making them resistant to jamming.

Ukraine’s latest move: physical netting over trenches and roads to intercept incoming drones.

The battlefield is evolving daily—this is a “digital trench war,” with each side pushing the limits of adaptation.

More than air power: Ground and sea drones on the rise

At the BraveOne defense-tech conference in Kyiv (February 2025), Kharkiv-based engineer Sasha Rubina unveiled a prototype unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to deliver food and ammunition to the front.

“The idea is that the person controlling it is in a safe place,” Rubina said. “The fewer people exposed, the more lives we save.”

Ukraine’s strategy now includes land, air, and sea drones, and many of these platforms are produced domestically and deployed within weeks.

Why this matters: Cheap can beat powerful

Ukraine’s military is stretched thin. Since the failed 2023 counteroffensive, the army has faced manpower shortages and frontline fatigue. With negotiations stalled and traditional weapons in limited supply, drones offer a scalable alternative.

As Kipling wrote in Arithmetic on the Frontier:
“Two thousand pounds of education falls to a ten-rupee jezail.”

The line, originally about British officers being killed by cheaply armed fighters in colonial wars, underscores a core truth of asymmetric warfare: expensive training and hardware can still fall to low-cost, clever resistance.

In 2025, it’s a $100 drone destroying a $100,000 tank.

“The odds,” Kipling added, “are on the cheaper man.”

Ukraine has significantly weakened Russia’s artillery advantage, but now faces a growing threat from drones. As Forbes tech correspondent David Hambling reports, both sides are turning to drones for faster, more precise strikes—reshaping how the war is fought.

Ukrainian drone teams use radar systems like the US-made AN/TPQ-36 and locally produced acoustic sensors to detect firing positions. But drones are critical for pinpointing exact targets.

“Drones are essential for confirming the exact location of artillery,” said ‘Michael,’ commander of Ukraine’s Typhoon drone unit.

Precision strikes and rapid response

Visual observation with powerful zoom cameras is often the most effective way to locate Russian guns—especially while they’re firing.

“Muzzle flashes, smoke, or movement make them visible,” Michael explained.

Once a gun is confirmed, drones strike quickly—often faster than artillery. Though a drone travels at 100 mph, it can hit faster than a 700-mph shell because it homes in directly on the moving target. “With FPV drones… the first strike often hits,” said Michael. “With artillery, it often takes several rounds.”

Self-propelled guns are vulnerable when on the move, but even towed guns—though harder to destroy—can be taken out with precision hits to specific parts like the breech or towing vehicle. Videos from units like Birds of Magyar show drones hovering inches from targets before detonating.

Russian drones on the rise

Despite still having large artillery stockpiles, Russia is also rapidly expanding drone use.

“We’re observing several hundred FPV strikes per day,” said Michael.

Russia plans to produce 2 million FPV drones in 2025—nearly matching artillery shell output. Recon drones remain ever-present. “There’s no sign of a shortage,” Michael noted.

What’s notable is that drones were once seen as a Ukrainian fallback due to limited artillery. Now, even Russia—despite its superior stocks—is leaning heavily on drones for precision strikes.

A new kind of war

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi recently stated that Russia’s long-range firepower has been halved. But the transition from heavy artillery to high-precision drone warfare is redefining how the war is fought.

As Hambling writes: “The days of massed firepower will have passed. But the era of massed precision drone strikes will just be beginning.”

Residents of Tucson, a city in southern Arizona near the US-Mexico border, were startled earlier this week when a group of helicopters, including a rare Russian-designed Mi-17 “Hip,” conducted low-flying nighttime maneuvers as part of a previously undisclosed US military training operation.

While domestic urban training is not uncommon for US forces, this incident stood out for its secrecy and the presence of unusual aircraft.

Social media captures mysterious choppers

Videos began circulating on Instagram the night of 17 June, showing a gray-painted Mi-17 flying in formation with three Bell 407 helicopters just outside Tucson. One clip was filmed near an abandoned school, later confirmed by local authorities as the training site.

The Pima County Sheriff’s Department confirmed the helicopters were affiliated with the US military. However, Sheriff Chris Nanos admitted to KOLD News 13 that his office was not notified in advance.

“The only thing I knew was that there was a lot of noise, flash bangs, helicopters, personnel, lights, sirens, that type of stuff,” Nanos said.

Links to elite army aviation unit suspected

A report by The War Zone (TWZ) suggests the Mi-17 spotted over Tucson strongly resembles helicopters operated by the Aviation Technology Office (ATO) — a highly secretive US Army aviation unit based at Felker Army Airfield in Virginia. ATO is believed to specialize in clandestine support and cutting-edge aircraft testing.

The Mi-17’s configuration — including armor plating, advanced sensors, and radar — matches aircraft previously attributed to ATO. The unit also operates Bell 407s, which have been seen flying alongside ATO Mi-17s in earlier covert operations, including an emergency landing in North Carolina in 2021.

Local officials apologize for lack of notice

KOLD reported that the sheriff’s SWAT team helped coordinate the use of the school as a training site weeks in advance, but communication with the public fell short.

“This was on us,” Sheriff Nanos said. “We could easily have said, use our location [elsewhere] at 10 p.m. I don’t understand what the thinking was there.”

Nanos pledged better coordination in the future and apologized for the confusion caused.

US use of Mi-17s not new

While seeing a Russian-designed helicopter over a US city may seem strange, Mi-17s have been used for years by the US military and intelligence agencies. The CIA and Department of Defense have employed the type for training, logistics, and covert missions, especially in regions like Afghanistan, where the platform is common among local forces.

The Mi-17’s global footprint makes it a valuable platform for realistic training, even when those missions remain officially unacknowledged.

A major scandal is unfolding within the Ukrainian government. Under normal circumstances, it might be framed as a political crisis — but amid martial law and suspended elections, politics in Ukraine has largely ground to a halt. What remains is power without electoral accountability.

At the center of the growing controversy is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Unity Oleksiy Chernyshov, who has been abroad for over a week and has yet to return. His absence coincides with a widening criminal investigation that has already ensnared several of his former subordinates.

Journalist raises alarm over Chernyshov’s disappearance

Mykhailo Tkach, an investigative journalist with Ukrainska Pravda, was the first to draw public attention to Chernyshov’s absence. His reporting has tracked a network of arrests involving individuals who previously worked under Chernyshov — first in government, then at Naftogaz, Ukraine’s powerful state-owned oil and gas company.

“NABU and SAPO have detained two of Chernyshov’s close associates — Maksym Horbatiuk and Vasyl Volodin. Both worked with him in the Ministry and later at Naftogaz. Horbatiuk was detained at the border as he attempted to go on vacation. Chernyshov remains abroad, reportedly on an official trip,” Tkach reported.

What are NABU and SAPO?

The investigation is being led by two key Ukrainian anti-corruption bodies:

• NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine) is an independent law enforcement agency responsible for investigating high-level corruption among state officials and public institutions.
• SAPO (Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office) works alongside NABU, overseeing legal procedures and prosecutions related to their investigations.

Together, these agencies form the backbone of Ukraine’s efforts to combat elite corruption — a mission made even more urgent during wartime, when oversight is weakened.

What is Naftogaz?

Naftogaz of Ukraine is the country’s largest and most strategically important state-owned enterprise. It manages the production, transport, and distribution of oil and natural gas, and plays a central role in Ukraine’s economy and national security — especially amid wartime infrastructure attacks and energy shortages.

Chernyshov was appointed CEO of Naftogaz in November 2022, and later took on an additional cabinet role in government.

A new ministry with familiar faces

In December 2024, Ukraine created the Ministry of National Unity by reorganizing the Ministry for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories. Chernyshov was appointed to lead it while retaining his position at Naftogaz.

Although rebranded, the ministry retained much of its original staff and leadership — including individuals now under investigation.

The Ministry’s formal mandate includes overseeing the rights and support of over 700,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 7 million Ukrainian refugees. In practice, however, its activities remain vague and poorly documented.

“Some MPs now joke that Chernyshov has become an IDP himself — one of the very people his ministry is supposed to help. Others note that the man tasked with encouraging Ukrainians to return appears reluctant to return himself,” Tkach observed.

High-level arrests and a multi-million dollar construction scheme

On 13 June, NABU and SAPO revealed a large-scale corruption scheme in the construction sector, allegedly involving officials closely associated with Chernyshov.

The charges include:

• Abuse of official position
• Receiving and facilitating large-scale bribes
• Deliberate undervaluation of state-owned assets during wartime.

Kyiv land deals and massive state losses

Prosecutors allege that:

• A developer, in coordination with ministry insiders, illegally acquired land in Kyiv for a residential development.
• Senior officials ensured the land was transferred to a state enterprise under their influence.
• That enterprise signed investment contracts with a pre-approved construction company.
• The value of the land and existing buildings was intentionally underestimated by nearly five times, dramatically reducing the share of housing the state would receive.

As a result, the state stood to lose over ₴1 billion — equivalent to approximately $25 million— in public assets.

“To reward their role in the scheme, top officials and their associates allegedly received significant discounts on apartments in newly built complexes,” prosecutors stated.

Officials travel freely, while ordinary men are barred

The scandal has reignited public anger over Ukraine’s wartime travel restrictions. Ukrainian men aged 18 to 60 are banned from leaving the country under martial law, except in rare cases. In contrast, high-ranking officials — even those under investigation — can travel freely, often citing “official duties.”

The Ministry of National Unity told Suspilne that Chernyshov is on a planned EU business trip, and that it is proceeding “in normal working mode.” His meetings, they said, are being documented on his official social media pages.

Timed departures raise suspicions

Soon after Chernyshov left Ukraine, Maksym Horbatiuk, a longtime associate, tried to cross into Poland and was detained. He had previously served as an unpaid adviser in Chernyshov’s ministry and later became a commercial director at a Naftogaz subsidiary.

Another former aide, Vasyl Volodin, was also arrested. He had served as State Secretary during Chernyshov’s ministry tenure and was later appointed to the Naftogaz board.

Authorities reportedly acted quickly out of concern the men would flee or destroy evidence. Their arrests appear to have been both urgent and strategic.

“The timing suggests law enforcement acted quickly, once Chernyshov was out of the country. From abroad, he is reportedly watching anti-corruption court hearings about his former subordinates — and likely hearing a lot about himself,” Tkach wrote.

Key questions remain unanswered

Was Chernyshov tipped off before his departure?
Was Horbatiuk fleeing or simply vacationing?
Would Volodin have escaped if not detained?

These questions remain unanswered — but the timing, proximity of roles, and overlapping appointments suggest a tightly knit circle of influence that is now unraveling under pressure.

Update

On 21 June, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal told parliament that he had authorized Chernyshov’s foreign trip through the end of the week (June 16–22). The statement came during a government Q&A session in the Verkhovna Rada.

Ukrainian investigative journalist Denys Bihus, founder of Bihus.Info, has confirmed he serves as a non-staff operative for Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). The admission followed allegations from MP Oleksiy Honcharenko, who published documents he claims show Bihus is a registered public operative of the SBU’s operational unit, including a signed agreement and receipt.

Bihus insists the cooperation is informal, unpaid, and unrelated to his editorial work. Still, the revelation has raised concerns about the independence and transparency of journalists with any degree of affiliation to state security services.

The disclosure

In a video statement, Bihus explained that he works with the SBU’s Military Counterintelligence Department, describing the cooperation as unpaid and informal, with no salary, mobilization deferment, or official benefits.

“It gives me absolutely nothing — just the ability to occasionally assist with operations or access certain locations when needed,” Bihus said.

He added that he was discharged from military service in November 2023 due to his role in the Patrol Police, after which he registered with a military recruitment office. He emphasized that he is not on any reserve list, has no deferment, and receives no compensation for his cooperation with the SBU.

His relatively straightforward discharge has drawn public attention, highlighting frustrations among Ukrainian soldiers and families who face significant barriers to leaving military service, as the country still lacks a clear demobilization framework.

Rejecting surveillance allegations

Bihus also addressed speculation that his cooperation with the SBU resulted from a past incident in which Bihus.Info journalists were allegedly surveilled and caught using drugs. He clarified that he works with the Military Counterintelligence Department, which supports frontline operations, and not the SBU’s Internal Security Directorate, the unit responsible for the surveillance.

“I’m assisting military counterintelligence during wartime. That’s not scandalous — it’s service,” he said. “And when the SBU messes up, our newsroom reports on it.”

Honcharenko’s counterattack

MP Honcharenko responded with sarcasm, framing Bihus’s statement as a reluctant admission:

“More than a day later, Denys Bihus finally pulled himself together and recorded a video about his work for the SBU. He made a coming out,” he wrote on Telegram.

Honcharenko questioned the ease of Bihus’s discharge, suggesting most Ukrainian soldiers are not afforded the same privilege:

“It’s unfortunate others can’t just walk away from the army whenever they want. The recruitment office hasn’t seen this ‘unique combat veteran’ for over a year and a half.”

He also criticized Bihus’s silence on abuses by military recruitment offices, which have faced growing scrutiny over forced conscription and civilian mistreatment.

The broader conflict

The clash between Bihus and Honcharenko follows a Bihus.Info investigation that accused the MP of self-promotion through his nationwide Honcharenko Centers. In response, Honcharenko demanded that the outlet disclose its financial backing — a move Bihus described as political pressure on independent journalism.

Bihus.Info has since filed complaints with both the Parliamentary Committee on Freedom of Speech and the Parliamentary Ethics Committee, citing improper attempts to interfere with its work.

North Korea is reportedly considering sending 25,000 workers to a drone manufacturing facility in Russia in exchange for training in drone operation, according to Japanese broadcaster NHK.

The move underscores deepening military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. In June 2023, the two countries signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, pledging mutual military assistance in the event of unforeseen threats. Soon after, North Korea began deploying troops to Russia.

According to UK intelligence, around 11,000 North Korean troops—mainly combat engineers and infantry—have been sent to Russia’s Kursk Oblast to support defensive operations near the Ukrainian border. Over 6,000 of them have reportedly been killed, wounded, or gone missing in heavy frontline fighting. The deployment, approved by Kim Jong Un and acknowledged by Russian officials, highlights a growing exchange of manpower for weapons and military training.

NHK reports that the civilian workers under discussion would be sent to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, home to key drone production facilities.

The initiative appears designed to help Russia scale up drone output amid its ongoing war in Ukraine, while enabling North Korea to gain advanced UAV expertise and bolster its own military capabilities.

Vladimir Putin is facing deepening strategic isolation as Israel’s military offensive against Iran threatens to unravel a key alliance underpinning Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, writes Con Coughlin, Defence and Foreign Affairs Editor at The Telegraph.

In a sharply worded column, Coughlin argues that “Putin’s primary concern… will be the impact that Israel’s continuing assault on Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure will have on Tehran’s ability to continue its support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.”

Since last week, Israeli forces have launched targeted strikes against Iranian missile and drone production sites — the same systems that have been regularly supplied to Russia since the summer of 2022. According to Coughlin, the Israeli campaign “appears to have paid dividends,” with a notable drop in attacks originating from Iran.

A strategic blow to Moscow

The deepening Russia-Iran relationship, sealed in January with a 20-year strategic pact, has been critical to sustaining Russia’s campaign in Ukraine. In exchange for military hardware from Tehran, Moscow had promised to boost Iran’s air defenses and air force capabilities. But Coughlin notes that this “has clearly failed to deter Israel from launching its military offensive.”

As Iranian military capacity is degraded, Putin risks losing a crucial source of support. “If the Iranians are unable to provide sufficient weaponry for their own military campaign against Israel,” Coughlin writes, “they will be in no position to support Russia’s offensive in Ukraine.”

Regional influence under threat

The ramifications extend beyond Ukraine. With Syria’s Assad regime reportedly collapsed and now “languishing in exile in Moscow,” Russia’s Middle East strategy appears to be unraveling. Coughlin suggests Putin’s broader effort to project power in the region is now in jeopardy.

The article also highlights the precariousness of Russia’s position within the informal alliance of authoritarian states — Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia — warning that Israel’s attacks could weaken their interconnected military and economic interests.

Coughlin concludes: “Putin’s standing in the region is in danger of precipitous collapse.”

EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen confirmed that the European Union will not resume imports of Russian natural gas—even if a peace agreement is reached in Ukraine.

Russia supplied about 45% of EU gas in 2021, a figure expected to fall to 13% by 2025. Despite progress, the EU imported record volumes of Russian LNG in 2024.

“This is a ban that we introduce because Russia has weaponised energy against us, because Russia has blackmailed member states in the EU, and therefore they are not a trading partner that can be trusted,” Jørgensen said.

“That also means that, irrespectively of whether there is a peace or not—which we all hope there will be, of course—this ban will still stand.”

EU plans full phase-out of Russian fossil fuels by 2028

The gas ban is part of a broader EU strategy to end reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2028. The proposed legislation would prohibit EU companies from importing Russian pipeline gas or providing services to Russian clients at liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. Importers must also declare the source of their fuel to prevent Russian gas from being disguised as coming from another country.

Any new contracts signed after the plan is adopted must end by 1 January 2026. Existing contracts must be terminated by 1 January 2028.

Austria walks back vomments on Russian gas

Austria’s junior energy minister, Elisabeth Zehetner, caused a stir earlier this week by suggesting the EU should remain open to reconsidering Russian gas imports in the event of a peace deal. However, her office later clarified Austria’s position, stating that the country “strongly condemns” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and supports the proposed gas ban.

“The allegation that Austria wants to import Russian gas again after the war, let alone now, is simply false,” the statement read.

Austrian Green MEP Lena Schilling called the initial suggestion “shortsighted and morally irresponsible,” asking, “Have we learned nothing from bombed hospitals, abducted children and a war of aggression in the heart of Europe?”

Austria previously relied heavily on Russian gas, but supplies were halted in 2023 due to a contractual dispute. Deliveries via Ukraine ended the same year.

Hungary and Slovakia maintain opposition

Hungary and Slovakia continue to oppose the EU’s fossil fuel phase-out. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szíjjártó claimed Hungarian consumers could face utility bills four times higher. He also posted a dramatic video on social media to criticize the plan. EU officials have rejected those claims, saying there’s no evidence prices would spike.

The current gas legislation does not affect an existing exemption from the EU’s oil embargo. Hungary and Slovakia were granted a carve-out in 2023 allowing continued imports via the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline—a provision that falls under a separate legal framework.

Russian oil also in the crosshairs

The EU is also targeting Russian oil, aiming to end imports entirely by 2028. Russian oil made up 27% of EU imports in 2021 but has already dropped to around 3%. The oil ban, like the gas proposal, is part of the EU’s broader strategy to cut energy ties with Moscow and boost long-term energy security.

Emergency crews have completed search and rescue operations at a residential building in Kyiv’s Solomianskyi district, where a Russian missile strike on 17 June caused extensive destruction.

The strike was part of a large-scale, coordinated Russian attack on Ukraine that night. One missile directly hit the nine-story residential building, destroying an entire section.

Rescue efforts end after 39 hours

Ukraine’s Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko confirmed that the operation lasted over 39 hours. At 7:20 PM on 18 June, first responders officially concluded search efforts at the site.

“Sadly, 23 lives were lost at this site alone,” Klymenko said. “Across the capital, 28 people died and over 140 were injured as a result of the strike.”

Although search operations have ended, crews continue to dismantle damaged structures and clear debris.

Emergency response faced harsh conditions

The rescue effort was one of the most intensive in recent months and involved:

• Over 400 personnel from the State Emergency Service (SES)
• More than 200 units of specialized equipment
• Drones, search dogs, and heavy engineering machinery

Two people were rescued from beneath the rubble. Around 50 others were evacuated from apartments and stairwells during the response.

Stairwell collapse in nearby damaged building

Later the same day, Kyiv officials reported an internal collapse in a nearby five-story residential building also damaged in the strike. A stairwell between the upper floors gave way, but no injuries were reported. Five residents were safely evacuated.

City in mourning as recovery continues

Kyiv declared 18 June a day of mourning to honor the victims of the attack. More than 2,000 emergency workers have been deployed across the capital to assist with ongoing recovery operations.

Next week’s Nato summit in The Hague will be significantly shortened to accommodate President Donald Trump’s short attention span — and a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be carefully avoided, The Times reports.

Nato format cut to single session

The 25 July summit will consist of just one 2.5-hour session, a major departure from NATO’s usual multi-session format. According to The Times, diplomats hope the streamlined event will reduce the risk of tension or unpredictability.

“It is about keeping the summit focused, short and sweet,” a diplomat told the paper. “Trump can be impatient and has — [he has] said it himself — a short attention span. The shorter the better.”

There will be no joint press conference between Trump and Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte, and the summit’s final communiqué will be just five paragraphs, printed on a single sheet of paper.

Zelenskyy excluded from main talks

President Zelenskyy will be present in The Hague only for a leaders’ dinner on 24 June. He has not been invited to the main summit session, and no meeting of the NATO–Ukraine Council at the heads-of-state level is scheduled. Instead, he is expected to speak at a Defense Industry Forum on the sidelines.

Diplomatic sources suggest the decision aims to prevent any direct confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy. While Euractiv and ANSA reported the US opposed Zelenskyy’s formal invitation, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has denied that claim.

Ukraine dropped from final statement

Despite Ukraine’s long-standing bid to join the alliance, the country will neither be invited to join nor even mentioned in the final NATO communiqué, diplomatic sources told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The statement will label Russia as a “direct threat”, but omit any language about Ukraine’s future in the alliance.

Ukraine’s desire for NATO membership dates back to 2008, and its constitution enshrines the goal of joining. Yet even after three years of full-scale war against Russia, no formal steps toward membership are expected in The Hague.

“This issue is definitely not on NATO’s agenda, and there have been no expectations of an invitation in The Hague,” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys told LRT.

Defence spending target to please Trump

The summit’s main goal will be agreement on a new defence spending target of 5% of GDP by 2032, with a review in 2029. The proposal includes 3.5% for core military budgets and 1.5% for defense-related spending.

The decision will be framed as a personal win for Trump, who has long demanded more spending from European allies.

“Keeping unity in the alliance is as much a priority as spending more on defence,” said EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas.

Trump left G7 early, skipped meeting with Zelenskyy

The decision to avoid a Trump–Zelenskyy encounter at the NATO summit follows a similar scene just days earlier. Trump abruptly left the G7 summit in Canada, skipping a planned meeting with Zelenskyy.

According to The Guardian, Trump exited early, “citing the Israel‑Iran conflict.” Reuters reported that Zelenskyy was denied a meeting with his most powerful ally, leaving the Ukrainian side frustrated and empty-handed after the gathering.

US President Donald Trump says he declined an offer from Russian President Vladimir Putin to mediate rising tensions with Iran, stating that unresolved issues between Washington and Moscow should be addressed first.

“I spoke with him yesterday. He actually offered to help with mediation. I said, ‘Do me a favor—let’s mediate Russia first,’” Trump told reporters, according to Russian news outlet RBC.

Trump calls Russia and Ukraine “foolish”

President Trump also took aim at both Russia and Ukraine, calling them “foolish” during his remarks and once again asserting that the Ukraine war would not have happened had he been in office at the time of its outbreak.

Trump-Putin call on 14 June — the President’s birthday

Although the Kremlin did not officially confirm the exchange, both Moscow and Washington acknowledged a 14 June phone call between the two leaders. The conversation reportedly lasted nearly an hour and focused largely on Middle East tensions, particularly involving Iran.

“The call was substantive, candid, and, most importantly, very useful,” said Yury Ushakov, a senior aide to Putin.

On Truth Social, President Trump revealed that Putin called to wish him a happy birthday and discuss Iran—a country Trump said Putin “knows very well.” He added that Ukraine was only “briefly” discussed.

Ukraine peace talks still in deadlock

President Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine a central focus of his second term. He’s pushing for renewed peace talks and a 30-day ceasefire. While limited humanitarian efforts, such as prisoner exchanges, have occurred, no formal peace deal has been reached.

Sticking points remain over territorial control and long-term security guarantees.

Trump has faced criticism from lawmakers and allies for appearing to pressure Ukraine more than Russia, and for his calls to end all US military aid to Kyiv—a stance that has raised concerns about America’s global commitments and Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

Ukraine will neither be invited to join NATO nor mentioned in the final communiqué of next week’s NATO leaders’ summit in The Hague, according to diplomatic sources.

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has made NATO membership a central pillar of its national security strategy. The country’s constitution enshrines this goal, and public support remains strong. NATO first declared in 2008 that Ukraine “will become a member,” and in recent years, Western leaders have repeatedly referred to Ukraine’s “irreversible path” toward the Alliance.

Yet despite three years of full-scale war fought under the banner of Euro-Atlantic integration—and multiple high-level assurances—Ukraine has not been invited to join. Now, it won’t even be mentioned in NATO’s top-level statement.

NATO membership not on the table

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys confirmed that Ukrainian membership is not up for discussion.

“This issue is definitely not on NATO’s agenda, and there have been no expectations of an invitation in The Hague,” Budrys told LRT. “We haven’t heard this from the Ukrainians either.”

According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the final communiqué is expected to be unusually brief—likely a single page. While it will identify Russia as a long-term threat, it is not expected to reference Ukraine at all.

Allies push for higher defense spending

Member states are expected to commit to raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2032, with a review in 2029. That timeline aligns with the end of a potential second term for Donald Trump, who has supported higher military spending but has questioned NATO’s direction and further expansion.

Zelenskyy’s limited role at the summit

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will attend a leaders’ working dinner on 24 June, where Trump is also expected. However, he will not participate in the main summit session, and no meeting of the NATO–Ukraine Council at the heads-of-state level is scheduled. Zelenskyy is instead expected to speak at a Defense Industry Forum held on the sidelines.

On 2 June, Zelenskyy confirmed Ukraine had been invited to the summit in some capacity, but the format and prominence of his involvement remain unclear.

On 15 May, Euractiv reported that, for the first time in three years, Zelenskyy would not be invited to participate in NATO’s main discussions—allegedly to avoid provoking Donald Trump. Around the same time, ANSA reported that the US was reportedly opposed to his formal invitation. However, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio later denied these claims, saying the United States had no objection to Zelenskyy’s participation.

More than 6,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed, wounded, or gone missing while fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, according to a new report from UK intelligence.

The British Ministry of Defence, in its 15 June intelligence update, states that around half of the estimated 11,000 North Korean troops deployed to the area have become casualties.

A costly campaign tied to Ukraine’s cross-border offensive

In August 2024, Ukraine launched a rare cross-border operation into Kursk, briefly capturing territory and forcing Russia to redeploy troops. While initially successful, the campaign was eventually reversed. By March 2025, Ukrainian forces had withdrawn, ending the offensive without holding ground. However, Kyiv claims the operation disrupted Russian logistics and diverted enemy forces from other fronts.

High casualty rates from brutal ground combat

“Significant D​PRK casualty rates have almost certainly been sustained primarily through large, highly attritional dismounted assaults,” the report said, pointing to intense and costly infantry engagements on the ground.

UK intelligence analysts believe these tactics are leading to unsustainable losses for North Korean units involved in front-line fighting.

Shoigu holds talks with Kim Jong-un

On 4 June, Russia’s Security Council Secretary and former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited North Korea for the second time in three months. He met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, signaling deepening military coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Shoigu is believed to be the Kremlin’s lead negotiator managing North Korea’s military support for Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.

North Korean involvement confined to Kursk—for now

As of mid-June, North Korea’s military activity remains limited to the Kursk direction. According to UK intelligence, any expansion beyond Russian borders—particularly into internationally recognized Ukrainian territory—would almost certainly require joint authorization from both Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un.

Casualty estimates reflect rising toll

In April, a South Korean lawmaker citing intelligence sources reported that about 600 North Koreans had died in the conflict. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking in January, estimated that 4,000 North Korean troops had been killed or wounded.

Later, on 25 April, Ukraine’s General Staff announced that more than 4,500 North Korean troops had been neutralized since the launch of the Kursk offensive.

The United States is ending military aid to Ukraine, shifting responsibility for Kyiv’s defense onto Europe — which has so far failed to match its rhetoric with real support. That’s the conclusion drawn by journalist and war analyst Owen Matthews in a recent Telegraph opinion piece.

Speaking at Congressional hearings on the 2026 US defense budget, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the Trump administration has a “very different view” of the war than its predecessor, favoring a “negotiated peaceful settlement.” The move brings an end to the Biden-era policy that sent $74 billion in US military aid to Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion.

That aid included critical systems like Patriot missile defenses, HIMARS, tanks, and long-range artillery—support Kyiv now stands to lose.

Europe promises more than it pays

With the US stepping back, Europe is expected to take the lead. But Matthews points out that Europe’s follow-through has been inconsistent at best.

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s widely publicized ReArm Europe plan suggested €800 billion in defense spending—but the figure relied on easing borrowing rules, not actual funds. A proposed €40 billion EU arms package for Ukraine was blocked by member states, including Hungary and Italy. Only €1 billion, pulled from frozen Russian assets, has so far materialized.

Meanwhile, Europe is projected to spend over €20 billion on Russian oil, gas, coal, and uranium in 2025—more than it is expected to spend on Ukraine’s defense.

“As long as Europe continues to spend more on financing Putin’s war machine than it does on Ukraine’s, its promises… ring rather hollow,” Matthews writes.

Ukraine ramps up but faces gaps

Despite limited external support, Ukraine is expanding domestic arms production. Local output now meets up to 50% of military needs, including howitzers, drones, and electronic warfare tools. Matthews notes that Ukraine’s Limma jamming system outperforms Western and Russian equivalents.

Still, Ukraine remains vulnerable: shortages in ammunition, spare parts, and trained soldiers persist. Reports of forced conscription have triggered online backlash.

Russia, meanwhile, is set to spend $160 billion on defense this year—double Ukraine’s—and benefits from lower production costs.

With US aid gone and European promises still falling short, Matthews argues Kyiv is now fighting for survival with diminishing resources and uncertain allies.

At least five Ukrainian citizens, including three children, were killed when an Iranian missile struck a residential apartment building in Bat Yam, a suburb of Tel Aviv, on the night of 14 June. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the deaths, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

The missile impact caused the collapse of the multi-story building. Rescue efforts are ongoing, with dozens injured and at least 20 residents believed to be trapped beneath the rubble. Israeli authorities report that 61 buildings were damaged in Bat Yam, six of which are considered beyond repair.

Strike follows Israeli air operation across Iran

The Iranian missile attack was a direct response to an Israeli air campaign launched a day earlier, on 13 June. As part of Operation “Rising Lion,” the Israel Defense Forces deployed approximately 200 fighter jets and carried out strikes on more than 100 targets across Iran. The IDF described the operation as a series of “precise preemptive strikes” targeting nuclear infrastructure, missile production sites, and military leadership facilities.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the goal of the operation was to degrade Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons, claiming Iran possessed enough enriched uranium to produce up to nine nuclear warheads.

Nationwide toll: Civilian casualties and widespread damage

Iran’s retaliatory strike, which included ballistic missiles and drones, targeted multiple cities across Israel overnight between June 14 and 15. According to The Times of Israel and emergency service Magen David Adom, at least 10 people were killed and more than 245 were injured. Six remain in critical condition.

Among the victims were four members of a single family in the northern Israeli city of Tamra, a predominantly Arab Muslim community, killed in a separate missile strike.

As of 15 June, Israeli authorities warn that the death toll could rise as search and recovery efforts continue.

On Sunday, Ukrainian drones targeted the city of Yelabuga in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, according to reports from Russian Telegram channels. The outlet Baza stated that one person was killed and 13 others were injured.

Tatarstan’s regional head, Rustam Minnikhanov, confirmed the attack. He said the deceased was a factory worker, and one of the injured remains in critical condition. Debris from the downed drones reportedly struck a checkpoint building at a local car factory.

Fires and flight disruptions follow impact

Following the impact, a fire broke out near the Aurus and Sollers automotive plant buildings, Mediazona reported. In response, Russia’s civil aviation authority, Rosaviatsiya, temporarily restricted flights at airports in Kazan, Nizhnekamsk, and Izhevsk.

Repeated targeting of drone production zone

Yelabuga has been hit by drone attacks multiple times in recent months. In April 2024, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate claimed responsibility for a strike on the city. In 2025 alone, attacks have occurred in April, May, and June.

The nearby Alabuga Special Economic Zone hosts drone production facilities reportedly involved in strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian drones have previously targeted the site.

So far, Ukrainian military officials have not commented on the latest strike. Yelabuga is located more than 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

A building used by Boeing in Ukraine’s capital was severely damaged during a massive Russian airstrike on 9 June, in what multiple sources say appeared to be a deliberate strike on the prominent US aerospace company.

The incident was first reported by the Financial Times, which cited six sources — including Boeing employees, Ukrainian officials, and the head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine (ACC). Photos verified by the FT and released by Ukraine’s state emergency service show fire crews responding to heavy damage at the site.

Targeted strike on US aerospace operations

Russia launched a barrage of 315 drones, two ballistic missiles, and five cruise missiles, hitting Kyiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities. The Boeing facility was among the confirmed targets.

“No operational disruption,” said Andriy Koryagin, deputy general director of Boeing Ukraine, confirming no employees were harmed.

Boeing has operated in Ukraine for years, focusing on engineering and technical support, and had largely remained operational despite Russia’s full-scale invasion beginning in 2022.

Boeing’s deepening role in Ukraine’s defense sector

Boeing maintains a close relationship with Ukrainian aircraft manufacturer Antonov, known for its heavy transport and military-capable aircraft. In 2023, Boeing and Antonov signed a memorandum of understanding to explore joint defense-related projects.

In early 2025, Boeing executives met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov to discuss collaboration on ammunition manufacturing and unmanned aerial systems.

The company was still expanding its Ukraine operations as recently as 2 June, when it posted a job opening in Kyiv for an aircraft interior design and certification engineering manager.

A Boeing spokesperson told the FT the company remains focused on employee safety and praised staff for their resilience under “difficult and dangerous circumstances.”

Strike highlights Russia’s shift toward Western defense-linked firms

Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha said the attack on Boeing highlights a growing pattern.

“Russian strikes on American companies in Ukraine are yet another example of Putin’s disregard for US peace efforts,” he told the FT.

Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have warned of increasing Russian sabotage and subversion targeting Western-linked firms involved in weapons production or aid to Ukraine.

US businesses in Ukraine suffer broad impact

Boeing is not alone in being affected. According to ACC President Andy Hunder, 32% of the chamber’s nearly 700 member companies have lost employees in Russian attacks since 2022. Nearly half reported damage to offices, factories, or facilities.

A Coca-Cola plant in Kyiv Oblast was occupied and destroyed early in the war. Hunder noted that Russian soldiers who found a stash of Jack Daniel’s whiskey inside drank it, which unexpectedly slowed their advance toward the capital.

“This is part of a wider Russian campaign to degrade Ukraine’s defense production capacity,” a Ukrainian official told the FT.

Days before Israel launched a sweeping air assault on Iran, dramatically escalating regional tensions, the US quietly diverted critical anti-drone munitions from Ukraine to its forces in the Middle East.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the US redirected proximity fuzes and other components of the APKWS II air defense system to CENTCOM, which oversees military operations across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea.

“We’re going to surge counter-UAS systems to our troops and bases first if we believe there’s a threat,” Hegseth told the Senate Appropriations Committee on Wednesday.

What was diverted?

The system in question is the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) — a guidance kit that converts standard 70 mm unguided rockets into laser-guided munitions. Developed by BAE Systems and used by the US Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marines, it delivers precision at a relatively low cost — roughly $25,000 per round.

The War Zone reports that the diversion included not only APKWS rockets but also specialized proximity fuzes, enabling aerial detonations near small drones. According to TWZ, Defense Secretary Hegseth approved the transfer via a memo to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, labeling it an “urgent” requirement for CENTCOM.

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Where APKWS works

APKWS II is compatible with a wide range of US and allied platforms, including:

• F-16C/D Viper
• F-15E Strike Eagle
• A-10 Thunderbolt II
• AH-64 Apache
• AH-1Z Viper, UH-1Y Venom
• MH-60R/S Seahawks
• VAMPIRE launchers, as used in Ukraine

Originally designed for ground attack, APKWS has been adapted for counter-drone and even air-to-air roles. Its modularity allows rapid integration, and with proximity fuzes — like those just redirected — it’s proven effective against drones and low-flying cruise missiles.

Why it matters

• For Ukraine: APKWS, fielded via VAMPIRE systems since late 2023, has been crucial for defending against Shahed-136 drone swarms. But now, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told ABC News that 20,000 “anti-Shahed” rockets — understood to be APKWS-equipped rounds — are being withheld, creating a serious gap in Ukraine’s air defenses.
• For US Forces: F-15E and F-16 aircraft deployed in the CENTCOM region now carry APKWS pods alongside traditional missiles. Jets operating from Jordan have been outfitted with six seven-shot rocket pods, offering up to 50 drone engagements per sortie — a loadout first tested against Houthi drones over the Red Sea.

Stockpiles and uncertainty

The Pentagon has not disclosed how many APKWS kits or fuzes were diverted or remain in stock. Asked about the possibility of resupplying Ukraine, Hegseth said:

“We’d have to review the capacity… We’ve created some challenges in other places.”

There is also no confirmation whether additional systems — including VAMPIRE launchers or electronic warfare assets — were reallocated.

Regional flashpoint—Israel strikes Iran

Amid this arms shift, Israel today launched Operation Rising Lion, a massive air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear sites, military infrastructure, and senior leadership.

• Over 200 Israeli aircraft struck dozens of high-value sites, including facilities in Natanz and Tehran.
• Major General Mohammad Bagheri and IRGC Commander Hossein Salami were reportedly killed.
• In retaliation, Iran launched more than 100 drones, triggering widespread airspace closures across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.

According to The Jerusalem Post, the drones included Shahed-129 and Shahed-136 models, both long-range loitering munitions designed for precision strikes.

Expert analysis: A strategic pivot

Ukrainian defense expert Kyrylo Danylchenko commented that the diversion of US anti-drone munitions was directly linked to preparations for an Iranian response.

“Over 300 strikes hit 100 targets overnight. Iran’s air defense was suppressed; bunker-busting bombs were used. Israel neutralized IRGC commanders responsible for Shahed operations against Ukraine,” Danylchenko wrote on Facebook.

He noted that Iran’s Shahed production lines were likely targeted, and that Israel may continue its strikes for up to two weeks if diplomatic efforts fail, exploiting what he called a rare “window of regional vulnerability.”

Bottom line

The diversion of APKWS to the Middle East — just before a major regional conflict erupted — highlights a sharp shift in US strategic priorities. A system once intended to protect Ukrainian cities is now deployed to defend against a rapidly expanding confrontation with Iran.

Whether Ukraine gets resupplied — or left exposed — is still an open question.

Russia has likely used a new jet-powered attack drone, the Geran-3, in a recent missile and drone strike on Kyiv, according to Ukrainian defense outlet Defense Express.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in Moscow’s drone warfare. Russia is now deploying high-altitude, dive-bombing Shahed drones at scale—reportedly producing thousands monthly using Iranian designs and domestic assembly lines. These drones increasingly strike civilian infrastructure, overwhelming Ukrainian defenses and causing mounting casualties and destruction.

Whistling sounds and jet engine wreckage

Photos of the downed UAV show several key components, including a compact jet engine, indicating that the drone was likely the Geran-3 — a Russian variant of the Iranian Shahed-238. This model marks a significant upgrade over the slower Shahed-136 (Geran-2), boasting reported speeds of 550–600 km/h and a range of up to 2,500 km, compared to the Shahed-136’s 185 km/h.

Residents of Kyiv reported hearing a distinct whistling sound during the strike, consistent with a jet-powered drone and unlike the quieter propeller-driven models previously used.

Among the wreckage, investigators found an avionics panel nearly identical to those used in the Shahed-136 — responsible for flight programming, engine control, and onboard systems — suggesting a shared design lineage.

Though the drone was heavily fragmented, Defense Express says the evidence points to either an imported Shahed-238 or a Russian-produced version built with Iranian-sourced components.

Russian production and intelligence warnings

This is not the first suspected use of a jet-powered Shahed-type drone in Ukraine. A similar incident occurred in January 2024, but confirmation was inconclusive at the time.

In February 2025, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (GUR) warned that Russia had begun domestic production of a jet-powered Shahed-style drone, designated Geran-3. It is believed to use a Tolou-10/13 jet engine, an Iranian-made, unlicensed copy of the Czech PBS TJ100.

Defense Express reports that analysis is still underway, but early findings strongly suggest that the drone used in the Kyiv attack was indeed the Geran-3.

Russia has shifted its drone strike tactics, making it increasingly difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to respond, Kharkiv regional governor Oleh Syniehubov said.

The change comes amid a sharp escalation in Moscow’s drone campaign. Russia is now deploying high-altitude, dive-bombing Shahed drones at scale—reportedly producing thousands each month using Iranian designs and domestic facilities. These drones are increasingly hitting civilian targets, overwhelming defenses, and causing growing casualties and destruction.

In a major overnight assault, 15 Shahed drones struck Kharkiv, with two more hitting nearby areas. Eleven sites were hit within minutes, including three residential buildings.

Drones now fly higher before diving at targets

Syniehubov noted that the drones now fly at significantly higher altitudes before striking.

“Russian forces have changed tactics—they’re now launching drones at 4,000 to 5,000 meters, then dropping them sharply just before impact,” he wrote on Telegram.

The latest strike killed four people and injured 64 others, including children. Among the victims was a woman who died in hospital hours after her husband, both wounded in the same attack.

The Osnovianskyi and Slobidskyi districts sustained direct hits on apartment blocks, private homes, playgrounds, public transport, and key infrastructure. Fires were reported at several locations.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy condemned the strikes as “cowardly” and “deliberate,” warning that such Russian attacks have become a grim daily occurrence.

Ukraine’s General Staff has officially confirmed a series of drone strikes on key Russian military targets, putting to rest speculation stemming from local reports and social media activity.

In a statement, Ukrainian officials said that overnight on 11 June, drone units, in coordination with other defense elements, struck multiple facilities across Russia, including the Tambov Gunpowder Plant, an ammunition depot in Kursk Oblast, and the Buturlinovka airfield in Voronezh Oblast.

“A number of critical facilities belonging to Russia were struck,” the General Staff said, adding that the operations were part of an effort to “undermine the enemy’s capacity to produce explosives and use ammunition.”

Targets confirmed by Ukraine:

• Tambov Gunpowder Plant: The facility was hit and fires were recorded. It plays a central role in Russia’s military-industrial complex, producing gunpowder and pyroxylin, an ingredient used in explosives.
• Kursk Oblast: Ukrainian forces targeted an ammo depot linked to Russia’s 106th Airborne Division. Regional officials said one civilian was injured and two medical posts were damaged near Rylsk.
• Voronezh Oblast: The Buturlinovka airfield was also hit. Russian officials reported over 15 drones were intercepted overnight, with no damage on the ground.

The statement noted that damage assessments are ongoing: “The effects of the fire strike are being clarified.”

Ukraine has received the remains of 1,212 fallen servicemembers as part of a recently agreed exchange with Russia, officials confirmed.

The bodies were returned from multiple regions, including Russia’s Kursk area and Ukraine’s Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, according to the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

“Forensic experts and law enforcement will begin the identification process immediately,” the agency said in a statement.

Disputed exchange timing and official statements

The body transfer follows a broader agreement reached during the second round of Ukraine–Russia negotiations in Istanbul on 2 June. The deal covers the exchange of all critically wounded or seriously ill prisoners of war, as well as all servicemembers aged 18 to 25.

Both sides also agreed to repatriate the bodies of 6,000 fallen soldiers from each side.

Russia claimed it delivered the remains on 7 June but alleged that Ukraine initially declined to accept them. Ukrainian officials countered that a final date for the transfer had not been agreed at that time.

“We handed over 1,212 bodies of Ukrainian troops. In return, we received 27 fallen Russian servicemen,” said Vladimir Medinsky, aide to the Russian president and head of the Russian delegation, via Telegram.

New rounds of exchanges underway

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) later released photos of the returned remains and thanked the International Red Cross for its assistance.

Additional exchanges have since taken place. On 9 June, Ukraine and Russia carried out a further transfer of prisoners—reportedly including wounded and severely injured servicemembers, as well as those under 25—though exact figures were not disclosed.

A second phase occurred on 10 June, with more wounded Ukrainian soldiers returning home. “12 June, we will begin urgent ‘medical exchanges’ of severely wounded prisoners from the front line,” Medinsky added.

This large-scale agreement on repatriations remains the only publicly confirmed result of the 2 June Istanbul talks.

When Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian cyber warfare was supposed to be a game-changer. Intelligence agencies worldwide expected devastating digital attacks to cripple Ukrainian power grids, government systems, and military communications within hours.

Instead, the cyber offensive largely failed – and now exclusive leaked documents reveal why. GRU Unit 29155, Putin’s most notorious kill squad responsible for poisoning dissidents with Novichok and bombing weapons depots across Europe, had secretly built a hacking unit specifically for this moment. But their digital army was undone by the very traits that define modern Russia: corruption, incompetence, and personal scandals.

A year-long investigation by The Insider reconstructed this hidden history with surprising ease. By examining call logs, travel records, and leaked internal chats, investigators identified dozens of GRU hackers—convicted cybercriminals, young university recruits, and seasoned saboteurs with no technical training.

Their common weakness? Extraordinary sloppiness.
Many used personal phones and real identities when conducting operations or arranging meetings with mistresses and sex workers. The investigation reveals for the first time how Unit 29155’s hackers prepared for the invasion – and why their own incompetence doomed them to fail.

The spies who couldn’t keep secrets

Unit 29155’s cyber operations began modestly in 2012 under Tim Stigal (real name probably Timur Magomedov), an ethnic Chechen blogger from Dagestan recruited by then-GRU director Igor Sergun. Operating under the alias “Key,” Stigal initially focused on disinformation in Azerbaijan before expanding to more ambitious false-flag operations.

In 2016, they penetrated Qatar’s largest state bank, stealing 1.5 GB of customer data and falsely attributing the hack to Turkish nationalists. They impersonated Ukraine’s Right Sector, a far-right nationalist group, to inflame tensions with Poland, and created fake “Anonymous” accounts to target Bellingcat, an independent investigative outlet known for exposing Russian intelligence operations.

Their most valuable asset became Dilyana Gaytandzhieva, a Bulgarian journalist who, according to investigators, maintained contact with GRU operatives and published material advancing Kremlin disinformation—most notably, conspiracy theories accusing the US of running secret bioweapons labs in Eastern Europe. In 2019, she launched ArmsWatch.com, a site styled as an investigative outlet but used to publish hacked documents and reinforce Russian intelligence narratives in the run-up to the war in Ukraine.

Preparing for war

By 2021, as Russia prepared for its invasion, Unit 29155’s cyber efforts in Ukraine escalated sharply. The unit paid locals $1–5 to spray anti-Zelenskyy graffiti across Ukrainian cities and infiltrated nationalist groups like the Azov Battalion, with Stigal impersonating Akhmed Zakayev, a pro-Ukrainian Chechen separatist leader living in exile in London, to gain the trust of nationalist groups and individuals—one of whom is now serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

They compiled dossiers on key Ukrainian officials, including Ihor Zhovkva, deputy chief of President Zelenskyy’s office. In October 2021, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at Zhovkva’s home in Kyiv by a 20-year-old who said he had been promised $7,000—the exact sum recorded in Unit 29155’s expense logs for “processing Zhovkva.”

When Colonel Yuriy Denisov, the overseer of Unit 29155’s hackers, saw news of the attack, he left a telling comment in a chat group: “idiots.”

Server records show the hackers spoofed websites for Zelenskyy’s office and Ukrainian ministries, setting up spear-phishing campaigns and credential theft targeting energy providers, anti-corruption agencies, and military infrastructure.

The new generation

Starting in 2019, Unit 29155 began recruiting from university coding competitions in Russia’s Voronezh. These recruits — nicknamed “eaglets” — were managed by GRU officer Roman Puntus and paid salaries of 400,000 rubles ($5,100) per month.

The first recruit, Vitaly Shevchenko, a 22-year-old Moldova-born hacker, successfully breached Estonia’s Ministry of Defense. He and five others — Borovkov, Denisenko, Goloshubov, Korchagin, and Amin Stigal (Tim’s son) — were later indicted by the US Department of Justice for the WhisperGate campaign, a pre-invasion cyberattack that deployed data-wiping malware across Ukrainian government and infrastructure networks.

Sex, lies, and cyber warfare

As the war neared, the cyber unit began to collapse. Stigal resigned or was sidelined due to COVID-19 illness, replaced by Puntus, who turned out to be more invested in romantic escapades than cyber sabotage.

The affair that doomed a cyber war: GRU officer Roman Puntus began a long-term relationship with accountant Darya Kulishova, whom he installed as the nominal head of a shell company called Aegaeon-Impulse. He made frequent luxury trips from Moscow to Sochi to visit her. By November 2023, Kulishova had given birth to his son—while Puntus funneled GRU funds through the company to support his second family.

Meanwhile, Colonel Yuri Denisov left a massive digital footprint: over 687 Telegram messages full of racism, anti-LGBT hate, and criticism of military leadership. He reused a single phone number across four cover identities — exposing the unit’s entire hacker network.

The failed invasion

When the invasion began in February 2022, Unit 29155’s cyber efforts fizzled. Rather than disabling Ukraine’s power grid, they managed only cosmetic website defacements. On January 13–14, they falsely claimed to have deleted government databases — which Ukrainian authorities later confirmed remained intact.

Their main server, Aegaeon, was left unprotected and discovered by hacktivists. Its mythological namesake — a traitorous titan punished for betrayal — proved painfully apt.

A broader shadow war

Though Unit 29155’s cyber operatives failed spectacularly in Ukraine, they haven’t vanished. Intelligence sources say they’ve repurposed their flawed tactics for a broader shadow war across Europe. Using playbooks first developed for Ukraine, GRU agents now recruit saboteurs via Telegram, offering cryptocurrency payments for arson attacks on NATO facilities and critical infrastructure.

The Insider’s investigation exposes how one of Russia’s most feared covert units, built for hybrid warfare, collapsed under the weight of corruption, dysfunction, and internal betrayal. Their mission didn’t fall to enemy fire — it failed from within.

In the end, Russia’s greatest cyber threat wasn’t the West. It was Russia itself.

A large-scale fire continues to burn for the third straight day at the Kristall oil depot in Engels, Russia’s Saratov Oblast, following a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of 6 June. The depot is reported to supply fuel to the Engels-2 airbase, which houses Russia’s Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers used in cruise missile attacks on Ukraine.

Satellite imagery from PlanetLabs shows today’s smoke plume stretching nearly 15 kilometers, visible from multiple areas of the city.

According to Ukraine’s General Staff, drone strikes targeted two Russian military airfields—Engels and Dyagilevo. At least three fuel storage tanks were reportedly damaged in Engels.

Despite the visible impact, Saratov regional authorities claim that air quality in residential areas remains within safe limits. However, Russian Telegram channels report thick black smoke rising over Engels.

Ukraine renews strikes on Russian fuel infrastructure

This marks the first Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian fuel depot in months, signaling a renewed campaign against Russian military logistics. The 6 June attack on Engels came alongside strikes on military and industrial targets across at least six Russian regions.

The broader strategy targets fuel depots, airfields, and defense infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, aiming to disrupt operations supporting the war in Ukraine.

Engels oil depot previously targeted in January

The Kristall depot, located over 600 km from Ukraine, has been targeted before. In January 2025, Ukrainian drones struck the facility twice:

• On 8 January, three fuel tanks with a capacity of 120,000 cubic meters each were destroyed, and six more were damaged. The estimated fuel loss reached 800,000 tons.
• A second drone strike followed on 14 January, while fires from the initial attack were still burning.

Governor Roman Busargin confirmed a fire broke out at “one of the industrial enterprises in Engels” after the recent strike but did not name the site. NASA’s FIRMS satellite system detected thermal anomalies consistent with the reported fire, further confirming the incident.

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said the repatriation of fallen Ukrainian soldiers will begin next week as scheduled, rejecting Russian claims of delay and accusing Moscow of staging a propaganda stunt.

“Everything is proceeding as planned,” Budanov wrote on Telegram, noting that all relevant parties were informed in advance. He called the Russian narrative a “dirty information campaign.”

The return of wounded soldiers, prisoners, and up to 12,000 war dead was the only concrete outcome of the second round of peace talks held in Istanbul on 2 June. While Russia claims to have delivered 1,212 Ukrainian bodies to the designated site for exchange, Ukraine says no specific handover date had been set.

Russia pressures, Ukraine pushes back

Over the weekend, Russian officials including Vladimir Medinsky, a top aide to President Putin, and General Alexander Zorin accused Ukraine of stalling the exchange. Zorin said Russia was waiting for Kyiv’s confirmation and suggested the transfer may occur next week — a timeline consistent with Budanov’s statement.

“Some Russian propagandists are cynically exploiting human grief — grief they themselves caused,” Budanov said, reaffirming Ukraine’s commitment to the agreed terms and rejecting what he called unilateral pressure from Moscow.

Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War also denied that a final date had been confirmed. The agency accused Russia of manipulation and urged an end to what it called “dirty games” surrounding the humanitarian exchange.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense claims that its 90th Tank Division has reached the western border of the occupied part of Donetsk Oblast and is advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The statement was published on the ministry’s official Telegram channel.

Ukrainian officials strongly deny the claim. Andrii Kovaliov, spokesperson for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, told Ukrainska Pravda that Russia’s statement “does not reflect reality.”

“Fighting continues in Donetsk Oblast. The enemy has not entered Dnipropetrovsk,” Kovaliov said.

Regional governor Serhii Lysak also dismissed the reports as “fake,” accusing Russia of trying to spread panic and destabilize the region.

Heavy fighting reported near Dnipropetrovsk border

Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces stated that Russian troops are actively attempting to breach the Dnipropetrovsk border but emphasized that Ukrainian forces are holding firm.

“Our section of the front is in critical condition. They’re coming like cockroaches, nonstop,” said a soldier from the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, describing relentless small-group infantry assaults.

Both the 72nd and 31st brigades reported heavy fighting near the oblast’s borders. The 31st Brigade noted that while the situation remains tense, Ukrainian defenders continue to repel Russian advances.

Military analysts suggest that Russia’s push toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast may be driven more by propaganda goals than strategic necessity. Although the region has faced frequent missile and drone attacks, it has not previously seen ground combat.

Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear agency, plays a central role in Putin’s war machine—not only by controlling the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, the largest nuclear facility in Europe, but also by supporting the Kremlin’s nuclear weapons program.

“People buy Russian nuclear fuel thinking it’s just energy,” says Ukrainian energy expert Mykhailo Gonchar. “They’re actually funding the modernization of Russia’s warheads.”

Yet Rosatom remains largely unsanctioned. It controls 40% of the global nuclear fuel market, operates in dozens of countries, and fosters long-term strategic dependence through cheap fuel, financing, and technology transfers.

In this exclusive interview, Gonchar explains how Western contracts with Rosatom—often treated as standard commercial deals—are, in reality, helping underwrite Russia’s strategic weapons buildup.

Rosatom: A nuclear weapons corporation disguised as energy giant

Rosatom is often mistaken for just another state-owned energy company. In reality, it is a sprawling industrial empire with military priorities.

With over 435 subsidiaries and 340,000 employees—including 88,000 directly involved in nuclear weapons production—Rosatom’s civilian division is actually its secondary function.

This means every customer—from a European utility to an American importer—buying Rosatom fuel or technology is inadvertently supporting the Kremlin’s strategic weapons programs.

Despite this, Rosatom has faced virtually no meaningful sanctions. Only a few top executives have been individually targeted by Western governments.

“They’ve been pinched a bit,” Gonchar says. “The British started, then the Americans, then the Europeans. But nothing that causes critical, let alone fatal, problems for Rosatom.”

The reason, he adds, is straightforward: “The Russian nuclear octopus—after the Cold War—deeply infiltrated Western political and industrial structures by tempting everyone with cheap fuel and materials.”

The “nuclear octopus”: How Rosatom quietly took hold

A long game of strategic infiltration

Unlike Gazprom, Rosatom didn’t use flashy PR or pipeline diplomacy. It worked in silence—offering cut-rate uranium, maintenance contracts, and technical support to build influence across borders.

“Gas pipelines can be shut overnight, as Gazprom did in 2006 and 2009. But nuclear dependency is quiet, long-term—and far more dangerous.”

Rosatom doesn’t even need to be the top uranium miner. Its control over extraction in Kazakhstan gives it global leverage—making it a critical player in nuclear supply chains even when it isn’t the producer.

Country by country: How Rosatom built global influence

Hungary and Slovakia: Kremlin’s reliable allies

These two countries remain heavily dependent on Rosatom, ignoring EU pressure. “Hungary and Slovakia are Russia’s Trojan horses in Europe,” Gonchar says.

France: Europe’s biggest enabler

Despite having its own nuclear technology, France resists sanctions. A key project under Framatome in Lingen, Germany, is building a fuel facility licensed by Rosatom—under the guise of “diversification.”

A striking example is Framatome’s project in Germany, where a Rosatom-licensed facility is being developed in Lingen under the pretense of fuel diversification.

“They say it’s an alternative to American fuel,” Gonchar says. “But that’s misleading. Westinghouse hasn’t been a truly American company for a long time—and the fuel for Europe is made in Sweden, not the US.”

Specifically, Westinghouse produces European nuclear fuel at its plant in Västerås, Sweden—acquired over two decades ago from the Swedish industrial group ABB. These European operations were created precisely to serve European clients independently of US or Russian supply chains.

Bulgaria: Strategic indecision

“Bulgaria swings between the Americans and the Russians—often under the same leadership of Boyko Borisov,” Gonchar notes. “That’s why true energy independence hasn’t materialized.”

Finland: A model of disengagement

One of the few success stories, Finland fully cut nuclear ties with Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The US and Rosatom: A dangerous dependency

Even the US has quietly bought Russian nuclear fuel for decades, often through front companies like Uranium One.

Cheap fuel was the excuse: “The Biden administration hesitated—where else would we get fuel that cheap?” Gonchar recalls.

While Congress passed a law in 2024 to phase out Russian imports, future reversals are a concern. “We’ve seen what happens to Biden-era laws under Trump,” he warns.

The dependency dates back to the 1990s, when Russia dumped MOX fuel—made from weapons-grade uranium and plutonium—on the market.

“It was a deliberate strategy,” Gonchar says. “Moscow wanted to hook the West on cut-rate uranium. Everyone applauded it back then. But the long-term damage was huge.”

Even environmental groups contributed:

“They lobbied to shut down US nuclear facilities. ‘Let’s outsource to Russia—it’s cheaper and safer,’ they said. And now we’re paying the price.”

Zaporizhzhia: A dormant burden with explosive risks

Rosatom oversees the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, seized from Ukraine in 2022. All six reactors remain in cold shutdown. After Russia destroyed the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023, the plant lost its main source of cooling water. Only shallow, inadequate groundwater remains.

Still, the Kremlin is pushing for a restart—not to produce energy, but to assert symbolic control. A reactivated reactor would serve as a geopolitical showpiece, signaling dominance over Europe’s largest nuclear facility ahead of any peace talks.

But according to Gonchar, restarting the plant is “technically impossible” at this stage.

Key barriers to restart:

• Incompatible safety systems (Russia vs. EU standards)
• Insufficient skilled staff (only 1/3 of Ukrainian personnel remain)
• Damaged or missing grid infrastructure
• High risk of incident or meltdown
• No step-by-step IAEA safety approval

“Likhachov is scared,” Gonchar says of Rosatom’s chief. “Even a minor incident could create massive political fallout. No one wants to take the blame.”

Rather than a genuine restart, Rosatom may stage a theatrical “activation”—what Gonchar calls a Potemkin village ZNPP. But behind the performance lies deep anxiety. Moscow wants the appearance of control—without the risk of catastrophic failure.

The real mission: Weapons, not watts

Rosatom is more than just a reactor operator—it is a state tool for strategic weapons development. It also serves as a legal channel for importing dual-use goods under civilian pretexts.

This is how Rosatom circumvents export controls—while continuing to operate freely in US, EU, and Asian markets.

Conclusion: Time to name the threat

Rosatom is not a partner in clean energy—it’s the backbone of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Its business empire allows Moscow to fund warhead development, import banned technology, and exert quiet influence abroad.

“The window for action is still open,” Gonchar warns. “But only if the West recognizes what Rosatom really is—a nuclear weapons company hiding behind civilian contracts.”

As long as Rosatom remains unsanctioned, Western governments are funding both ends of Russia’s war effort—from battlefield drones to strategic warheads.

Concerns are growing over Russia’s efforts to restart the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear facility in Europe. While official statements suggest the plant could soon reconnect to Russia’s grid, the technical and political reality on the ground is far more complex.

Meanwhile, Rosatom—the state-owned corporation now managing ZNPP—remains largely unsanctioned by the West, even though it plays a central role in Russia’s nuclear weapons program.

In this in-depth report, energy analyst Mykhailo Gonchar explains what’s really happening inside the plant—and why it matters far beyond Ukraine.

The water crisis that changed everything

The current phase of the nuclear crisis began in March 2022, when Russian forces took control of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Despite the occupation, the facility initially continued to operate. But the risks from military activity soon became too great. By September 2022, all six reactors were placed in cold shutdown.

The real turning point came on 6 June 2023, when the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed, eliminating the plant’s primary source of cooling water. Since then, ZNPP has been forced to rely on limited groundwater reserves.

“Zaporizhzhia NPP was built in that exact location for a reason—because a lot of water is needed,” says Gonchar.

The plant was originally intended to be the world’s largest, with 10 reactors. Only six were completed, as plans were scaled back following the Chornobyl disaster—but it still became Europe’s largest nuclear facility—and one that now lacks the essential infrastructure for safe operation.

Behind Moscow’s messaging: The real plan

Since occupying the plant, Russia has made repeated claims that ZNPP will be reconnected and restarted. According to Gonchar, those claims are politically driven and technically misleading.

“They’re considering launching one or maybe two units — that’s the internal plan,” he says. “But publicly, they act like everything is ready and will work immediately.”

Gonchar notes that the Kremlin is exerting intense pressure on Rosatom. Former chief Sergey Kiriyenko, now a senior presidential adviser, is pressuring his successor, Alexey Likhachov, to show progress. But the technical team is hesitant.

“The reactors have sat idle for three years, with no proper maintenance or inspections. Restarting even one poses a serious danger.”

The stakes are high. If something goes wrong—even a minor incident—the political fallout could be severe.

Why restarting the plant isn’t technically possible

One of the least understood obstacles is technological incompatibility between Ukrainian and Russian nuclear systems.

“People assume the VVER reactors in Ukraine and Russia are the same,” Gonchar says. “Yes, the core hardware is similar. But everything around it—the energy periphery—is completely different now.”

Beginning in the mid-2000s, Ukraine partnered with Westinghouse —a company of American origin— and European firms to modernize its entire nuclear infrastructure. These upgrades weren’t just about fuel—they included safety systems, control units, and compliance with EU and WENRA standards after the Fukushima disaster.

With only a third of the original Ukrainian staff remaining at ZNPP, and Russian replacements unfamiliar with the Westernized systems, a safe restart is not technically feasible.

“They say they can. They claim they know everything. But in reality—they don’t.”

Is Russia rebuilding the grid?

Recent satellite imagery shows new transmission lines and towers between occupied areas like Mariupol and Berdiansk. Some reports suggest these could be used to reconnect ZNPP to Russia’s grid.

But Gonchar says appearances are misleading.

Electricity from ZNPP is generated at 750 kilovolts, far above consumer-level power. For it to be usable, it needs to pass through multiple step-down substations—none of which currently exist in the occupied zone.

“You can’t launch anything—nuclear or conventional—without a complete transmission chain. If any part is missing, nothing works.”

Why Russia wants Zaporizhzhia online (it’s not about power)

According to Gonchar, Russia’s motivations are geopolitical, not economic or technical.

“For the Kremlin, commercial considerations are secondary. What truly matters is the ability to use the plant as a powerful tool of nuclear blackmail.”

If even one reactor were restarted, the risk of a nuclear incident would rise significantly. That risk could be used as leverage in negotiations—particularly if Moscow blames future sabotage or drone attacks on Ukraine.

There’s also a regional energy incentive. Russia’s southern grid has long suffered from shortages, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Reconnecting ZNPP could relieve pressure on those systems—if it were actually possible.

The real threat: Rosatom is a nuclear weapons enterprise

Rosatom presents itself as a civilian nuclear energy firm. But its primary mission is nuclear weapons production. Of its approximately 340,000 employees, around 88,000 work in nuclear weapons divisions, while about 62,000 are involved in civilian nuclear energy.

This matters because every contract signed with Rosatom—for fuel, reactors, or services—helps fund Russia’s military-industrial complex, including warhead production.

Rosatom is also a vehicle for importing dual-use technology. Many of its international transactions are labeled as “machine-building products”—a category broad enough to cover nearly anything—allowing it to sidestep sanctions and obtain components that can be used in both civilian and military applications.

“They say it’s for the Rostov or Leningrad NPPs,” Gonchar adds, “but the same components can be used in missiles, drones—anything.”

The global fallout if ZNPP fails

A nuclear incident at Zaporizhzhia wouldn’t just be a local disaster. It would undermine Rosatom’s global operations, including major projects in:

• Hungary (Paks NPP expansion)
• Türkiye (Akkuyu NPP)
• India (Kudankulam)
• Egypt (El Dabaa)
• Bangladesh (Rooppur)

Yet ironically, project delays often benefit Rosatom financially, since extended timelines mean higher costs and more revenue.

“Delays only work in Rosatom’s favor,” Gonchar notes. “Timelines stretch, costs rise—and Rosatom gets paid more.”

What about the IAEA?

Russia cannot restart ZNPP without the approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While the agency has allowed limited inspections under occupation, it retains final authority on operational safety.

According to Gonchar, if IAEA teams report no restart preparations, that likely reflects the truth. Even hidden activities would eventually be detected.

The real strategy: Optics over operation

What Russia can do, says Gonchar, is stage a performance—an on-camera ceremony to make it look like the plant is operational.

The timing may be strategic. As potential geopolitical talks (e.g., a Trump–Putin meeting) loom, Russia may try to present ZNPP as a fait accompli—even if the reactors never truly come back online.

Bottom line: Nuclear risk as political leverage

The key technical and operational barriers:

• No cooling water
• Incompatible systems with Russian technology
• Loss of qualified staff
• Incomplete infrastructure
• Required IAEA approvals
• Elevated incident risk

But the bigger threat isn’t the restart itself—it’s the narrative of activity, the coercion, and the continued acceptance of Rosatom as a civilian actor.

The opportunity to act remains—but the cost of further delay could be devastating.