Austria’s energy ministry has denied that the country is considering resuming Russian gas imports after a potential peace in Ukraine, following controversial comments made by state secretary for energy Elisabeth Zehetner, Euroactiv reports.

While attending talks in Luxembourg on the EU’s Russian energy exit plan, Zehetner said on 16 June,

“Once the war is over, this must of course be taken into account,” she said. Reuters also reported that Zehetner also repeated these point to diplomats.

The remark, interpreted by many as a suggestion that Austria could return to importing gas from Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom, caused swift criticism from Austrian lawmakers in Brussels. 

Ministry issues strong denial, calls claim “false”

On 17 June, the Austrian Energy Ministry released a statement denying any such plans, saying,

“The widely circulated claim that Austria wants to resume importing Russian gas after the war, let alone at the present time, is simply false.”

According to Euroactiv, the Ministry emphasized Austria’s alignment with the EU’s energy goals, stating that an EU ban on Russian gas would send “the right signal” to Moscow. However, the statement also noted that energy policy must ensure “affordable energy prices… also in the future.”

Austria’s energy concerns ahead of 2027 deadline

Euroactiv says Vienna has raised specific questions as the European Commission prepares to propose legislation to fully phase out Russian energy by 2027. Among the concerns are whether infrastructure for alternative sources will be ready in time, the potential impact on power and gas prices, and how to ensure future gas supplies are not indirectly linked to Russia.

Moldova's Russian-occupied Transnistria region declared a 30-day state of emergency in its economy on June 11, citing a sharp reduction in natural gas supplies, Moldovan media outlet Newsmaker reported.

The unrecognized region, located in eastern Moldova along the Ukrainian border, has faced growing energy shortages since January, when Russian gas giant Gazprom halted deliveries to the territory.  

Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky issued a decree unanimously approved by parliament. Lawmakers said the state of emergency was necessary due to a "severe general economic crisis" and ongoing socio-economic decline from the energy crunch.

It is the sixth consecutive extension of emergency measures in the region since December 2024. The most recent 90-day extension expired on June 8.

Transnistria had previously received around 2 million cubic meters of gas per day, but since early June, daily supplies have been halved, according to Moldovan energy official Alexander Slusar, cited by Newsmaker.

"This is a request from the company Tiraspoltransgaz (the largest gas supplier in Transnistria), which justifies its decision by citing a lack of funds," Slusar said.

Chisinau has not been buying Russian gas since 2022, but Russian-occupied Transnistria continued to get its gas from Russia until Jan. 1, 2025. The halt in gas deliveries on Jan. 1 was due to Ukraine's decision to stop Russian gas transit, including supplies to Moldova, and Moldova's debt for gas supplies.

Transnistria had been effectively acquiring gas free of charge — a political tool that Russia used to keep the region under its control. The breakaway region's debt for Russian gas amounts to more than $10 billion, according to Moldovagaz, a subsidiary of Russian gas giant Gazprom.

On Feb. 14, Transnistria began receiving gas through a new arrangement: fuel is delivered via a Hungarian company through Moldovagaz, the largest energy company in Moldova, with payments funded by a Russian loan.

The new arrangement followed extensive power outages in Transnistria, which drove the region toward industrial collapse.

In February, Moldova's government said Transnistrian authorities rejected a 60 million euro ($62 million) EU energy aid package under pressure from Moscow, which continues to exert tight political and economic control over the region.

Transnistria, home to around 465,800 people, remains internationally recognized as part of Moldova but has been controlled by pro-Russian separatists since the early 1990s. Russia maintains a military presence in the territory, despite international calls to withdraw.

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The Kyiv IndependentAsami Terajima

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico threatened on June 10 to veto the EU's upcoming 18th sanctions package against Russia if concerns over Slovakia's reliance on Russian gas and energy exports were not addressed.

The comments come as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on June 10 that the 18th package of European Union sanctions against Russia will include additional restrictions on energy, banking, and oil, among other areas.

The EU has proposed for the first time a ban on transactions involving the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines, as well as a reduction in the oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel, as one-third of Russia's government revenue still comes from oil exports, according to von der Leyen.

Fico said on Facebook that he would block additional sanctions unless the bloc finds "a real solution to the crisis situation that Slovakia would face following a complete halt in the supply of gas, oil, and nuclear fuel from Russia."

Historically, Slovakia has been heavily reliant on Russian gas and energy transfer, serving as a key transit hub for Russian exports to Western Europe.

Since taking office in 2023, Fico has also reversed Slovakia's previous pro-Ukraine policy, ending military aid to Kyiv and questioning the value of EU sanctions on Russia.

EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions, require unanimous approval by all member states. A Slovak veto could force concessions or delay enforcement in future rounds.

Fico's comments come as Slovakia’s parliament passed a resolution on June 5 urging the government to oppose any new international sanctions or trade restrictions against Russia, citing alleged negative economic impacts. The non-binding resolution argued that sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have driven up energy prices, disrupted supply chains, and harmed Slovak industry.

Fico subsequently vowed on June 8 that he would veto new sanctions if they harm national interests, adding that he would not support any measure that halts Russian fuel imports that are used to power Slovakia's nuclear power plants.

Unlike Ukraine-skeptic Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has repeatedly obstructed and delayed the bloc's sanctions against Russia and military aid for Ukraine, Slovakia has not previously attempted to block EU sanctions.

On May 6 the EU presented a detailed roadmap to fully sever the bloc’s energy dependence on Russia by 2027. National governments, including Kremlin-friendly Hungary and Slovakia, will be required to submit individual phase-out plans by year’s end.

EU unveils 18th package of sanctions against Russia, targeting energy, banking, oil

The EU has proposed for the first time a ban on transactions involving the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines, as well as a reduction in the oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel, among other measures.

The Kyiv IndependentKateryna Hodunova

U.S. President Donald Trump offered to increase supplies of American energy exports to Berlin but did not pledge additional military support to Ukraine or sanctions on Russia in a meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on June 5.

The meeting was Merz's first visit to the White House since becoming chancellor.

When asked whether Trump would impose additional sanctions on Russia, the president dodged the question by boasting that he "ended Nord Stream 2" and hinting at future energy deals with Germany.

"We have so much oil and gas, you will not be able to buy it all. ... I hope we'll be able to make that part of our trade deal," Trump said during a joint press conference with Merz.  

While Merz spoke of a "duty" to assist Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression, Trump did not make any commitments to further military aid for Kyiv. In the same press conference, he compared Russia and Ukraine to fighting children and refused to name a deadline for imposing sanctions on Moscow.

Merz nonetheless praised Trump's role as a peacemaker between the two nations.

"I told the president before we came in: He is the key person in the world who can really (end the war) by putting pressure on Russia."

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The Kyiv IndependentOlena Goncharova

Trump has frequently brought up Europe's reliance on Russian energy when questioned about Washington's role in pressuring the Kremlin or supporting Ukraine.

Nord Stream 1 and 2 are gas pipelines running between Russia and Germany under the Baltic Sea. Nord Stream 2 has never been activated, and the pipes shut down after suspected sabotage in 2022.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed in March that discussions were underway with the U.S. to resume gas flows through the pipelines. Trump has pursued warmer relations and stronger economic ties with Moscow since his inauguration in January 2025.

Merz said on May 28 that the German government will "do everything to ensure that Nord Stream 2 cannot be put back into operation," German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on May 28.

The leaders' discussion on June 6 focused primarily on Russia's war against Ukraine, NATO, and trade policy, Merz said in Berlin the day after the meeting. Merz insisted that Trump remains committed to NATO, despite the U.S. president's history of disparaging the alliance.

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The Kyiv IndependentLuca Léry Moffat

France and Belgium are not ready to accept the European Commission's latest proposal to phase out Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), calling for additional assurances, Politico reported on June 3.

The two nations, the largest EU importers of Russian LNG, argue they need stronger legal and economic guarantees before committing to the plan. Russia's energy exports remain a major source of revenue for the Kremlin's military campaign against Ukraine.

The Commission's proposal, unveiled on May 6, outlines a roadmap to end the bloc's dependence on Russian fossil fuels — gas, oil, and nuclear — by 2027.

Although the EU has slashed its reliance on Russian gas from 45% in 2021 to 19% in early 2025, several key member states remain cautious about cutting LNG ties entirely.

French Energy Minister Marc Ferracci told Politico that Paris supports diversification but prefers to prioritize securing replacement supplies.

France has been sourcing alternative LNG from Qatar and other suppliers, but it remains bound to long-term contracts with Russian firms.

"The stock of existing contracts… needs to be legally protected," Ferracci said.

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France's TotalEnergies, which owns a 20% stake in the Yamal LNG project in Siberia, has a supply contract with Russia's Novatek valid through 2032.

Belgium, Europe's second-largest Russian LNG customer, is seeking an "in-depth impact assessment" before backing the Commission's plan.

Belgian Energy Minister Mathieu Bihet said Brussels must evaluate how ending imports would affect its LNG terminals and storage infrastructure, which are expected to handle Russian shipments until 2035.

The cautious stance by France and Belgium diverges from that of Spain and the Netherlands, who have both expressed readiness to endorse the Commission's strategy.

Ukrainian officials and civil society groups have consistently urged the EU to cut these financial lifelines, pointing to the ongoing Russian attacks and occupation.

The Commission's proposed cutoff forms part of a broader push to safeguard European energy sovereignty and reinforce the EU's sanctions architecture. The internal divisions among member states risk delaying implementation.

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The Kyiv IndependentOleg Sukhov

Hungary and Slovakia continue to rely heavily on Russian oil, gas, and nuclear fuel, despite having technical and economic capacity to switch to alternative sources, according to a detailed joint report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD, Bulgaria) and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA, Finland). Both countries “have shown no real intention of phasing out Russian crude oil,” the report states. Similar conclusions are made regarding the Russian gas and nuclear projects.

The report, titled The Last Mile. Phasing Out Russian Oil and Gas in Central Europe, reveals that both countries have used EU sanctions exemptions not as a path to energy independence, but as a shield to deepen ties with Russian suppliers, significantly undermining EU unity and energy security strategy.

No real effort to reduce Russian dependency

The report presents a stark picture: Hungary and Slovakia have not reduced their imports of Russian oil and gas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. On the contrary, Hungary increased its Russian crude reliance from 61% in 2021 to 86% in 2024. Slovakia’s dependence remained at nearly 87% that same year. Combined, the two countries imported 8.7 million tonnes of Russian crude oil in 2024, which is 2% more than in 2021.

Since the beginning of the invasion, these imports have sent the Kremlin approximately €5.4 billion in tax revenue. As the report emphasizes, that amount could theoretically fund the production of 1,800 Iskander-M missiles—missiles used to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian areas.

Despite disruptions in the Druzhba pipeline in 2024 and multiple opportunities to diversify through the Adria pipeline, both Hungary and Slovakia continued to rely on Russian supply chains. Slovakia began marginal non-Russian crude imports in the latter half of 2024, while Hungary saw its non-Russian crude intake fall to nearly zero.

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MOL and the role of state-linked energy networks

The report highlights the central role of Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, which owns the only refineries in both Hungary and Slovakia. MOL’s strategic decisions on crude origin determine national energy sourcing. Although the Hungarian state does not directly own MOL, it controls over 30% of the company through government-aligned foundations, effectively shaping its energy policy.

MOL secured multiple contracts for non-Russian oil via the Adria pipeline—2.2 million tonnes in 2023 and 2.1 million tonnes in 2025—but actual delivery in 2023 was less than half that amount. Meanwhile, MOL continues to process discounted Russian crude, profiting from price gaps that are not passed on to consumers. In fact, gasoline and diesel prices in Hungary remained 5% above the EU average in 2024.

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This arrangement has allowed MOL’s operating income to rise significantly: to $26.4 billion in 2022 and around $25.3 billion in both 2023 and 2024. The company’s profits helped stabilize Hungary’s strained budget through a windfall tax—initially 25%, later raised to 95%. By 2024, the tax yielded only $15 million, compared to $521 million in 2022, as discounts narrowed and fiscal benefits declined.

Between 2022 and May 2024, Hungary and MOL earned an estimated €1.7 billion in “extra profit” from this setup, according to a Hungarian nonprofit G7 investigation cited in the report.

Exploiting legal loopholes and export exemptions

The report details how both Hungary and Slovakia used EU exemptions to re-export petroleum products made from Russian crude to Czechia. Originally set to expire in December 2023, this export exemption was extended twice—first to December 2024, then to June 2025—despite Czechia’s objection.

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In 2024, Slovakia exported 710,000 tonnes of petroleum products to Czechia, worth €520 million, while Hungary added another 39,000 tonnes worth €40 million. Slovnaft, MOL’s Slovak subsidiary, is identified as the primary beneficiary.

Gas dependency entrenched via TurkStream

Hungary has positioned itself as a regional hub for Russian gas, increasing imports via TurkStream and re-exporting to Slovakia. Hungary’s 15-year contract with Gazprom, signed in 2021, was expanded in 2024 with an additional 2 billion cubic meters per year.

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Slovakia, whose contract with Gazprom runs until 2034, has likewise expanded imports from Hungary, effectively bypassing Ukraine as a transit country. The report notes that this arrangement severely weakens the EU’s diversification efforts and severely weakens “the EU’s collective energy security strategy and reinforce long-term risks of political leverage by the Kremlin.”

Hidden networks, offshore intermediaries, and Kremlin ties

Central to the report is the exposure of intermediary networks, particularly Normeston Trading SA—a company tied to Soviet-era oil traders and Russian oil majors. Normeston, once based in Belize and later in Cyprus and Switzerland, acted as a shadow intermediary for Russian crude shipments to Hungary and Slovakia.

The company has long-standing ties to MOL executives and Russian oil firms, including Lukoil and Bashneft. The report alleges that Normeston facilitated massive markups on Russian oil imports by acting as a middleman, effectively skimming profits outside the scope of EU oversight.

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The nuclear dimension

Although Slovakia signed a fuel supply deal with US-based Westinghouse, and Hungary with France’s Framatome, both continue to receive large volumes from Rosatom. The Paks II nuclear project in Hungary, led by Rosatom and financed 80% through a Russian loan, is flagged as a long-term strategic risk that locks Hungary into Russian influence for decades.

The report points out that the key contract details for Paks II are classified, and oversight is minimal. It describes the entire project as lacking transparency, with regulatory bypasses and rising costs now estimated at €15 billion—about 12% of Hungary’s GDP.

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Infrastructure and alternatives: No technical barriers

Tests confirm both MOL refineries can process non-Russian crude. In 2019, during a Druzhba contamination crisis, Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil temporarily dropped to 48% as it switched to Adria-supplied crude.

Similarly, alternatives to Russian gas exist through expanded LNG infrastructure in Greece, Croatia, and Poland, and new interconnectors with Austria, Romania, and Poland. The report insists that technical constraints do not justify continued Russian dependency.

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Recommendations: End exemptions, enforce traceability, dismantle capture networks

The report urges the EU to:

• Terminate the crude oil import exemptions under Regulation 833/2014 by 30 June 2025.
• End the loophole allowing oil product exports derived from Russian crude.
• Audit and enforce transparent pricing in the Adria pipeline to dispel Hungary’s cost-related claims.
• Impose full traceability of oil and gas origin.
• Sanction Rosatom and all subsidiaries to reduce nuclear dependence.
• Investigate MOL’s role in prolonging dependency through the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

It concludes that continued exemptions and reliance on Russian energy sources serve no technical or economic rationale and must be ended to protect European energy security, reduce Kremlin revenues, and restore EU sanctions integrity.