U.S. prosecutors have charged cryptocurrency entrepreneur Iurii Gugnin with laundering over $500 million and helping sanctioned Russian entities bypass export controls.

Gugnin, a 38-year-old Russian national living in New York, founded the U.S.-based companies Evita Investments and Evita Pay. He was arrested in New York on June 9 and faces multiple charges, including wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.

According to court documents, Gugnin used his crypto payments companies to receive cryptocurrency from foreign clients, many of whom held accounts at sanctioned Russian banks. He then converted the funds into U.S. dollars through U.S. bank accounts and facilitated payments for electronics and other goods, concealing the origin of the money and the identities of those involved.

"Gugnin’s cryptocurrency company allegedly served as a front to launder hundreds of millions of dollars for sanctioned Russian entities and to obtain export-controlled technology for the Russian government," said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division.

Between June 2023 and January 2025, Gugnin used Evita to facilitate the movement of approximately $530 million through the U.S. financial system, most of which he received in the form of a cryptocurrency stablecoin known as Tether, according to the U.S. Department of Justice report.

Prosecutors allege that Gugnin laundered money used to purchase parts for Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear technology company, and helped Russian end-users acquire export-controlled U.S. technology. Assistant Attorney General John A. Eisenberg said Gugnin turned a crypto startup into “a covert pipeline for dirty money.”

The Department of Justice accused Gugnin of deceiving banks and crypto exchanges by falsely claiming that Evita did not deal with Russian or sanctioned entities. He also allegedly doctored invoices to obscure Russian customers and failed to comply with anti-money laundering rules, including neglecting to file required suspicious activity reports.

If convicted, Gugnin faces a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison for each count of bank fraud and a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each of the wire fraud.

Key to Russia’s potential defeat lies in its economy

As the war in Ukraine grinds on, attention remains fixed on the battlefield. But Russia’s most vulnerable flank is not in the trenches — it’s in the treasury. The West, and especially the United States, holds economic levers that could push Vladimir Putin toward serious negotiations or even collapse

The Kyiv IndependentWojciech Jakóbik

Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear agency, plays a central role in Putin’s war machine—not only by controlling the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, the largest nuclear facility in Europe, but also by supporting the Kremlin’s nuclear weapons program.

“People buy Russian nuclear fuel thinking it’s just energy,” says Ukrainian energy expert Mykhailo Gonchar. “They’re actually funding the modernization of Russia’s warheads.”

Yet Rosatom remains largely unsanctioned. It controls 40% of the global nuclear fuel market, operates in dozens of countries, and fosters long-term strategic dependence through cheap fuel, financing, and technology transfers.

In this exclusive interview, Gonchar explains how Western contracts with Rosatom—often treated as standard commercial deals—are, in reality, helping underwrite Russia’s strategic weapons buildup.

Rosatom: A nuclear weapons corporation disguised as energy giant

Rosatom is often mistaken for just another state-owned energy company. In reality, it is a sprawling industrial empire with military priorities.

With over 435 subsidiaries and 340,000 employees—including 88,000 directly involved in nuclear weapons production—Rosatom’s civilian division is actually its secondary function.

This means every customer—from a European utility to an American importer—buying Rosatom fuel or technology is inadvertently supporting the Kremlin’s strategic weapons programs.

Despite this, Rosatom has faced virtually no meaningful sanctions. Only a few top executives have been individually targeted by Western governments.

“They’ve been pinched a bit,” Gonchar says. “The British started, then the Americans, then the Europeans. But nothing that causes critical, let alone fatal, problems for Rosatom.”

The reason, he adds, is straightforward: “The Russian nuclear octopus—after the Cold War—deeply infiltrated Western political and industrial structures by tempting everyone with cheap fuel and materials.”

The “nuclear octopus”: How Rosatom quietly took hold

A long game of strategic infiltration

Unlike Gazprom, Rosatom didn’t use flashy PR or pipeline diplomacy. It worked in silence—offering cut-rate uranium, maintenance contracts, and technical support to build influence across borders.

“Gas pipelines can be shut overnight, as Gazprom did in 2006 and 2009. But nuclear dependency is quiet, long-term—and far more dangerous.”

Rosatom doesn’t even need to be the top uranium miner. Its control over extraction in Kazakhstan gives it global leverage—making it a critical player in nuclear supply chains even when it isn’t the producer.

Country by country: How Rosatom built global influence

Hungary and Slovakia: Kremlin’s reliable allies

These two countries remain heavily dependent on Rosatom, ignoring EU pressure. “Hungary and Slovakia are Russia’s Trojan horses in Europe,” Gonchar says.

France: Europe’s biggest enabler

Despite having its own nuclear technology, France resists sanctions. A key project under Framatome in Lingen, Germany, is building a fuel facility licensed by Rosatom—under the guise of “diversification.”

A striking example is Framatome’s project in Germany, where a Rosatom-licensed facility is being developed in Lingen under the pretense of fuel diversification.

“They say it’s an alternative to American fuel,” Gonchar says. “But that’s misleading. Westinghouse hasn’t been a truly American company for a long time—and the fuel for Europe is made in Sweden, not the US.”

Specifically, Westinghouse produces European nuclear fuel at its plant in Västerås, Sweden—acquired over two decades ago from the Swedish industrial group ABB. These European operations were created precisely to serve European clients independently of US or Russian supply chains.

Bulgaria: Strategic indecision

“Bulgaria swings between the Americans and the Russians—often under the same leadership of Boyko Borisov,” Gonchar notes. “That’s why true energy independence hasn’t materialized.”

Finland: A model of disengagement

One of the few success stories, Finland fully cut nuclear ties with Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The US and Rosatom: A dangerous dependency

Even the US has quietly bought Russian nuclear fuel for decades, often through front companies like Uranium One.

Cheap fuel was the excuse: “The Biden administration hesitated—where else would we get fuel that cheap?” Gonchar recalls.

While Congress passed a law in 2024 to phase out Russian imports, future reversals are a concern. “We’ve seen what happens to Biden-era laws under Trump,” he warns.

The dependency dates back to the 1990s, when Russia dumped MOX fuel—made from weapons-grade uranium and plutonium—on the market.

“It was a deliberate strategy,” Gonchar says. “Moscow wanted to hook the West on cut-rate uranium. Everyone applauded it back then. But the long-term damage was huge.”

Even environmental groups contributed:

“They lobbied to shut down US nuclear facilities. ‘Let’s outsource to Russia—it’s cheaper and safer,’ they said. And now we’re paying the price.”

Zaporizhzhia: A dormant burden with explosive risks

Rosatom oversees the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, seized from Ukraine in 2022. All six reactors remain in cold shutdown. After Russia destroyed the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023, the plant lost its main source of cooling water. Only shallow, inadequate groundwater remains.

Still, the Kremlin is pushing for a restart—not to produce energy, but to assert symbolic control. A reactivated reactor would serve as a geopolitical showpiece, signaling dominance over Europe’s largest nuclear facility ahead of any peace talks.

But according to Gonchar, restarting the plant is “technically impossible” at this stage.

Key barriers to restart:

• Incompatible safety systems (Russia vs. EU standards)
• Insufficient skilled staff (only 1/3 of Ukrainian personnel remain)
• Damaged or missing grid infrastructure
• High risk of incident or meltdown
• No step-by-step IAEA safety approval

“Likhachov is scared,” Gonchar says of Rosatom’s chief. “Even a minor incident could create massive political fallout. No one wants to take the blame.”

Rather than a genuine restart, Rosatom may stage a theatrical “activation”—what Gonchar calls a Potemkin village ZNPP. But behind the performance lies deep anxiety. Moscow wants the appearance of control—without the risk of catastrophic failure.

The real mission: Weapons, not watts

Rosatom is more than just a reactor operator—it is a state tool for strategic weapons development. It also serves as a legal channel for importing dual-use goods under civilian pretexts.

This is how Rosatom circumvents export controls—while continuing to operate freely in US, EU, and Asian markets.

Conclusion: Time to name the threat

Rosatom is not a partner in clean energy—it’s the backbone of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Its business empire allows Moscow to fund warhead development, import banned technology, and exert quiet influence abroad.

“The window for action is still open,” Gonchar warns. “But only if the West recognizes what Rosatom really is—a nuclear weapons company hiding behind civilian contracts.”

As long as Rosatom remains unsanctioned, Western governments are funding both ends of Russia’s war effort—from battlefield drones to strategic warheads.

Hungary and Slovakia continue to rely heavily on Russian oil, gas, and nuclear fuel, despite having technical and economic capacity to switch to alternative sources, according to a detailed joint report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD, Bulgaria) and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA, Finland). Both countries “have shown no real intention of phasing out Russian crude oil,” the report states. Similar conclusions are made regarding the Russian gas and nuclear projects.

The report, titled The Last Mile. Phasing Out Russian Oil and Gas in Central Europe, reveals that both countries have used EU sanctions exemptions not as a path to energy independence, but as a shield to deepen ties with Russian suppliers, significantly undermining EU unity and energy security strategy.

No real effort to reduce Russian dependency

The report presents a stark picture: Hungary and Slovakia have not reduced their imports of Russian oil and gas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. On the contrary, Hungary increased its Russian crude reliance from 61% in 2021 to 86% in 2024. Slovakia’s dependence remained at nearly 87% that same year. Combined, the two countries imported 8.7 million tonnes of Russian crude oil in 2024, which is 2% more than in 2021.

Since the beginning of the invasion, these imports have sent the Kremlin approximately €5.4 billion in tax revenue. As the report emphasizes, that amount could theoretically fund the production of 1,800 Iskander-M missiles—missiles used to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian areas.

Despite disruptions in the Druzhba pipeline in 2024 and multiple opportunities to diversify through the Adria pipeline, both Hungary and Slovakia continued to rely on Russian supply chains. Slovakia began marginal non-Russian crude imports in the latter half of 2024, while Hungary saw its non-Russian crude intake fall to nearly zero.

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MOL and the role of state-linked energy networks

The report highlights the central role of Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, which owns the only refineries in both Hungary and Slovakia. MOL’s strategic decisions on crude origin determine national energy sourcing. Although the Hungarian state does not directly own MOL, it controls over 30% of the company through government-aligned foundations, effectively shaping its energy policy.

MOL secured multiple contracts for non-Russian oil via the Adria pipeline—2.2 million tonnes in 2023 and 2.1 million tonnes in 2025—but actual delivery in 2023 was less than half that amount. Meanwhile, MOL continues to process discounted Russian crude, profiting from price gaps that are not passed on to consumers. In fact, gasoline and diesel prices in Hungary remained 5% above the EU average in 2024.

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This arrangement has allowed MOL’s operating income to rise significantly: to $26.4 billion in 2022 and around $25.3 billion in both 2023 and 2024. The company’s profits helped stabilize Hungary’s strained budget through a windfall tax—initially 25%, later raised to 95%. By 2024, the tax yielded only $15 million, compared to $521 million in 2022, as discounts narrowed and fiscal benefits declined.

Between 2022 and May 2024, Hungary and MOL earned an estimated €1.7 billion in “extra profit” from this setup, according to a Hungarian nonprofit G7 investigation cited in the report.

Exploiting legal loopholes and export exemptions

The report details how both Hungary and Slovakia used EU exemptions to re-export petroleum products made from Russian crude to Czechia. Originally set to expire in December 2023, this export exemption was extended twice—first to December 2024, then to June 2025—despite Czechia’s objection.

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In 2024, Slovakia exported 710,000 tonnes of petroleum products to Czechia, worth €520 million, while Hungary added another 39,000 tonnes worth €40 million. Slovnaft, MOL’s Slovak subsidiary, is identified as the primary beneficiary.

Gas dependency entrenched via TurkStream

Hungary has positioned itself as a regional hub for Russian gas, increasing imports via TurkStream and re-exporting to Slovakia. Hungary’s 15-year contract with Gazprom, signed in 2021, was expanded in 2024 with an additional 2 billion cubic meters per year.

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Slovakia, whose contract with Gazprom runs until 2034, has likewise expanded imports from Hungary, effectively bypassing Ukraine as a transit country. The report notes that this arrangement severely weakens the EU’s diversification efforts and severely weakens “the EU’s collective energy security strategy and reinforce long-term risks of political leverage by the Kremlin.”

Hidden networks, offshore intermediaries, and Kremlin ties

Central to the report is the exposure of intermediary networks, particularly Normeston Trading SA—a company tied to Soviet-era oil traders and Russian oil majors. Normeston, once based in Belize and later in Cyprus and Switzerland, acted as a shadow intermediary for Russian crude shipments to Hungary and Slovakia.

The company has long-standing ties to MOL executives and Russian oil firms, including Lukoil and Bashneft. The report alleges that Normeston facilitated massive markups on Russian oil imports by acting as a middleman, effectively skimming profits outside the scope of EU oversight.

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The nuclear dimension

Although Slovakia signed a fuel supply deal with US-based Westinghouse, and Hungary with France’s Framatome, both continue to receive large volumes from Rosatom. The Paks II nuclear project in Hungary, led by Rosatom and financed 80% through a Russian loan, is flagged as a long-term strategic risk that locks Hungary into Russian influence for decades.

The report points out that the key contract details for Paks II are classified, and oversight is minimal. It describes the entire project as lacking transparency, with regulatory bypasses and rising costs now estimated at €15 billion—about 12% of Hungary’s GDP.

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Infrastructure and alternatives: No technical barriers

Tests confirm both MOL refineries can process non-Russian crude. In 2019, during a Druzhba contamination crisis, Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil temporarily dropped to 48% as it switched to Adria-supplied crude.

Similarly, alternatives to Russian gas exist through expanded LNG infrastructure in Greece, Croatia, and Poland, and new interconnectors with Austria, Romania, and Poland. The report insists that technical constraints do not justify continued Russian dependency.

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Recommendations: End exemptions, enforce traceability, dismantle capture networks

The report urges the EU to:

• Terminate the crude oil import exemptions under Regulation 833/2014 by 30 June 2025.
• End the loophole allowing oil product exports derived from Russian crude.
• Audit and enforce transparent pricing in the Adria pipeline to dispel Hungary’s cost-related claims.
• Impose full traceability of oil and gas origin.
• Sanction Rosatom and all subsidiaries to reduce nuclear dependence.
• Investigate MOL’s role in prolonging dependency through the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

It concludes that continued exemptions and reliance on Russian energy sources serve no technical or economic rationale and must be ended to protect European energy security, reduce Kremlin revenues, and restore EU sanctions integrity.