© Nur Photo, via Getty Images
A former Wagner fighter captured by Ukraine has described alleged training sessions in Mali where Russian mercenaries used African prisoners as live subjects, deliberately inflicting severe injuries so recruits could practice battlefield medicine and killing.
The fighter told Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Karpenko that Wagner instructors brought captured Africans to training sessions and turned them into human practice targets.
“We gathered for medical training, and they brought in a captured terrorist. They tied a block of TNT to his leg. They set it off, everyone moved away, and of course his leg was blown off,” he said.
The recruits then practiced stopping the resulting bleeding. According to the fighter, the prisoner was later shot in the artery near his armpit so they could practice the same procedure on his arm.
The prisoner died after the training.
In another session, he said, instructors had a prisoner's leg chopped off with an ax so recruits could practice applying a tourniquet under realistic conditions.
“They cut off his leg. Then they put on the tourniquet – everything as if it were an extreme situation, so everything would be realistic,” he said.
The alleged exercises also included training in how to kill.
The fighter said another prisoner was drugged before recruits were taught how to kill someone with a knife.
“They showed us how to kill with a knife to the heart. They chose two people who were willing and said: ‘Here, strike the heart,’” he said.
The fighter said all three prisoners died during the exercises.
The testimony comes from a Russian mercenary who joined Wagner in 2023 and was sent to Mali that September via Syria. He said around 120–130 recruits traveled with him and that Wagner paid them $3,000 a month.
Wagner was a Russian paramilitary formation that operated as a deniable arm of the Kremlin in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. After Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in 2023, the group's independent role was largely dismantled, with many of its fighters and operations brought under Russian state control. Its African operations were increasingly taken over by Russia's state-run Africa Corps.
The mercenary remained in Mali until April 2024. After returning to Russia, he signed a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry in August 2025 and was assigned to the 14th Separate Special Forces Brigade, which is subordinate to Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU.
He was subsequently captured by Ukrainian forces.
The account has not been independently verified, but it adds to years of allegations of serious abuses by Wagner and other Russian personnel in Africa.
Wagner fighters have long faced allegations of abuses in Africa, including killings and violence against civilians. In Mali, the group became a key part of Russia’s military presence after the country’s military junta turned to Moscow for support, with Wagner fighters operating alongside Malian forces. Ukrainian intelligence has also documented and targeted Wagner’s activities in Africa.
The pattern of alleged abuses has continued under Russia’s Africa Corps, the Kremlin-controlled force that replaced Wagner in Mali. Human Rights Watch reported in August 2026 that Africa Corps fighters summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, beat dozens of others, and burned and looted homes in central Mali. In June, the group also carried out airstrikes that killed eight civilians, including three children.
© Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times
Small groups of Russian infantry could slip into regional capital Zaporizhzhia this winter, a frontline commander warned in a mid-September interview with Dnipro TV, in a debate later compiled by Radio Svoboda. His forecast drew quick pushback from a military analyst, who called it far more categorical than the situation warrants. At the center of the dispute lies the drained Kakhovka Reservoir, whose dry bed Russia now uses for cover.
Dense drone surveillance has made large mechanized assaults costly, pushing Russian commanders toward small groups that probe for gaps. That shift turns unwatched terrain — here, the drained reservoir bed—into the seams they test.
Dmytro Filatov, callsign Perun, commands the 1st Separate Assault Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo. The danger will come not as a massed assault but as infiltration, he said. He expects solitary infantry groups to reach and enter Zaporizhzhia over the winter. He pointed to the Stepnohirsk axis and the dense buildings along the Dnipro shore. Fog and rain raise pressure across the whole front, and Russian troops have long fought well in winter, he said.
Zaporizhzhia is a regional capital and industrial center in southeastern Ukraine, with more than 700,000 residents before the full-scale invasion. The city sits about 25 km from the nearest active front, around Stepnohirsk to the south—unusually close for a regional capital of its size. Russian missiles, drones, and glide bombs hit the city daily. It has held since 2022, and Russia has not taken a Ukrainian regional capital since the war's first months.
Russia blew up the Kakhovka dam in June 2023 and drained the reservoir behind it. Reeds now stand several meters high across the dry basin, giving foot soldiers cover to move unseen. Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces reported in November 2025 that Russian groups use it to press into the Ukrainian flank.
Russian troops increasingly use the bed to infiltrate and haul supplies, said Kostiantyn Mashovets of the Information Resistance group. One of their assault groups pushed as far as Malokaterynivka before Ukrainian forces blocked it, he wrote. Ukrainian troops hold northern Plavni, including the railway station and part of the E-105 highway, Mashovets added. The Institute for the Study of War pointed to the same route in its 26 September assessment, citing Ukrainian military observers.
Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military-political expert and Information Resistance coordinator, rates the threat far lower. He wrote that the warning "sounded far more categorical than it should have." Stepnohirsk, about 25 km south of Zaporizhzhia, is the closest active fighting to the city. Russia has tried for years to take the town but now controls only its 3rd microdistrict and southern Plavni.
Infiltration becomes possible only if Russia takes the whole foothold and reaches the north bank of the Konka river. That will not happen by the end of 2026, and no ground push on the city looks possible, he said. The main danger stays daily Russian strikes on the city, not a ground advance, he added.
Estonia says Russia ordered the August arson attack on Milrem Robotics’ Tallinn premises, an Estonian defense company supplying Ukraine with military ground robots.
Russian sabotage operations have been expanding across Europe in recent months, targeting companies, infrastructure and supply chains connected to Ukraine’s defense effort. European authorities have linked or investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson and other sabotage attempts in several countries, as Moscow seeks to disrupt support for Ukraine and intimidate its European backers.
Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said on 29 September that information gathered by Estonia’s Internal Security Service showed the fire at Milrem’s Tallinn premises on the night of 14–15 August was a Russian intelligence-directed sabotage operation. Estonia summoned Russia’s chargé d’affaires over the attack.
Estonian authorities had already detained three suspects in connection with the arson, with the suspects apprehended in Latvia. Tsahkna said the perpetrators had been taken into custody and no longer posed a threat to Estonia.
Russia’s attempts to divide, intimidate and sow confusion will fail.
— Margus Tsahkna (@Tsahkna) September 29, 2026
Every act of sabotage only strengthens Allied resolve, increases pressure on Russia and reinforces support for Ukraine.
We will continue to expose, deter and respond. No stone will be left unturned. https://t.co/JfdSbAUGi1
When the investigation was first announced in August, Estonian authorities had not publicly established a Russian connection or disclosed evidence linking Moscow to the fire.
Milrem Robotics makes THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles, which have been used by Ukrainian forces since 2022 for tasks including transporting ammunition, food and other supplies, evacuating wounded troops, and mine clearance.
The company said in August that the fire had not disrupted its production or deliveries to Ukraine. More than 200 of its robotic systems are expected to be operating in Ukraine by the end of 2026, including more than 150 vehicles funded by the Netherlands.
The attack is part of a growing series of suspected sabotage operations targeting companies and facilities connected to Ukraine’s defense effort. In August, Slovak authorities foiled an attempted arson attack on a Ukrainian drone factory, while European investigations have also examined suspected Russian involvement in attacks on defense-related facilities in Czechia, Lithuania and Bulgaria.
Tsahkna said Russia’s campaign is intended to intimidate European countries, divide allies and weaken their support for Ukraine.
“Russia’s sabotage campaign will not achieve its objectives,” the Estonian Foreign Ministry said, adding that Estonia and its allies would continue increasing pressure on Russia and supporting Ukraine.
Tsahkna said Estonia would respond to the attack by increasing both its support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia.
A Russian drone struck near the Yahodyn border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border, the Ukrainian Border Service and the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on 28 September. Geolocated footage of the attack shows the jet-powered Geran-5 striking near the facility. Following the incident, Poland is reviewing its air security measures.
Russia systematically strikes Ukraine’s border crossings to complicate logistics. Russian strikes near the Ukrainian-Polish border have increased over the past month. Yahodyn is one of the largest border crossings with Poland, on a route leading, among other destinations, to Warsaw, and has repeatedly been used by senior foreign officials visiting Ukraine.
The blast wave damaged the checkpoint building at the terminal entrance, Ivan Romaniuk, head of the Volyn Regional Military Administration, reported on 28 September. It was a jet-powered drone, but there was “preliminarily no direct hit” on the border crossing, BBC Ukraine reported, citing its own sources in the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
On the afternoon of 28 September, Poland reported the involvement of Polish military aviation because of Russian drone attacks against Ukraine. That day, it was also reported that the airports in Rzeszów and Lublin suspended operations.
Jacek Horyszewski, a spokesperson for the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command, said on TVN24 that a Russian drone had struck near the Yahodyn border crossing in Volyn Oblast on the border with Poland.
Romaniuk confirmed the attack in the village of Starovoitove, Kovel district, Volyn Oblast, where the Yahodyn international border crossing is located.
“There have been no reports of injuries or fatalities,” he said.
Videos that appeared online show the drone falling in a forest near people and border infrastructure.
— Breaking News (@breakingUAnews) September 28, 2026
Момент удару «Герані-5» поблизу КПП «Ягодин», – місцеві канали.
BBC з посиланням на ДПСУ пише, що реактивний дрон вдарив неподалік кордону з Польщею: «Влучання у пункт пропуску «Ягодин» попередньо, не було». pic.twitter.com/VNq7QMy2Ly
The Russians carry out such attacks on Ukraine’s western regions using repeaters on Belarusian territory that amplify signals for Shahed- and Gerbera-type drones, BBC Ukraine reported, citing State Border Guard Service data.
Detonation of a Russian Geran-5 drone at the YAGODIN BORDER CORSSING, Ukraine. The explosion occurred ~1km from Polish territory.
— acceladealer (@acceladealer) September 28, 2026
POV: 51.193867, 23.821266@FaytuksNetwork @GeoConfirmed
geolocated by @Grimm_Intel pic.twitter.com/IeVClA06WF
The same day, Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk said Poland will change its engagement rules "in the coming days." Currently, helicopter and fighter jet pilots can use weapons only after visually identifying a target: the aircraft must approach the object and determine what it is. After the rules are changed, however, a pilot or operational commander will be able to make a decision to engage based solely on radar data.
“It is notable that Polish authorities have taken this step as NATO states attempt to find an adequate response to Russian drones nearing or entering their airspace from Ukraine, often leaving NATO air defense insufficient time to identify and target such threats before they have entered allied airspace,” the Institute for the Study of War noted in its 28 September report.
On 10 September, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Poland had prevented a threat to one of its border crossings with Ukraine overnight and expected its border crossings to be attacked as Moscow targets trade routes in an attempt to economically weaken Kyiv. He made the statement after drones struck a border crossing between Ukraine and Moldova on the previous day, killing two people.
On 13 September, Russian forces struck the locomotive of a passenger train two kilometers from the Polish border and hit a gas station near the Yahodyn international border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border.
— @UA_Peacemaker (@UaPeacemaker) September 13, 2026
Також на кордоні із Польщею рашисти атакували залізничну інфраструктуру - відео. pic.twitter.com/3XLc3B4FFw
The drone attack forced passengers on a train from Ukraine to leave the carriages for safety. Those evacuated included Boris Johnson, security advisers to European governments, German Bundestag lawmakers, diplomats, and academics.
After the Russian attacks, Poland deployed military units on the border with Ukraine and strengthened infrastructure near the border crossings, Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz said on 15 September.
On 17 September, Russian forces struck near the Yahodyn border crossing with a jet-powered drone.
Russia plans to sharply increase military spending in 2027 while expanding the authorized size of its armed forces, according to budget documents seen by Reuters and a report by Novaya Gazeta Europe.
The developments point to Moscow preparing to expand its war effort into next year, even as its battlefield gains remain limited and its campaign increasingly relies on missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. It is also doing so as the Russian government faces a widening budget deficit and falling projected oil and gas revenues.
Russia plans to spend 17.1 trillion rubles ($202.6 billion) on defense in 2027, according to government documents reviewed by Reuters. That is about 27% more than the 13.5 trillion rubles originally budgeted for defense in 2027 and would be the highest level of military spending since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The documents project total defense spending of 50 trillion rubles over the next three years. The actual amount Russia will spend on defense in 2026 is classified, Reuters reported, while some military-related spending can be recorded under other parts of the state budget.
The planned increase comes alongside worsening fiscal pressures. Russia has raised its forecast for the 2026 budget deficit to 3.2% of GDP, from an earlier estimate of 1.6%, according to Reuters. Overall government spending is expected to rise 13.2% this year to 48.6 trillion rubles, or 20.9% of GDP.
The government also expects to increase net borrowing by 26% in 2026 to 5 trillion rubles and withdraw 459 billion rubles from its National Wealth Fund, Reuters reported. Its forecast for 2026 oil and gas revenues has been cut to 7.6 trillion rubles from 8.9 trillion.
Russia is reportedly planning new tax increases for 2027 to help cover the growing deficit. A new windfall tax on metals and mining companies is expected to bring in about 200 billion rubles a year, according to the documents. State debt is projected to rise to 21.7% of GDP in 2027, above the 20% level Russian authorities have previously considered safe.
The draft budget is expected to be submitted to Russia's parliament by October 1.
At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin has again increased the authorized size of the country's armed forces.
Putin signed a decree raising the official staffing level of the Russian Armed Forces to 2.44 million people, including 1.55 million military personnel, Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on September 28. The increase is 15,500 personnel compared with the previous decree issued in August.
It is the fourth increase in the authorized size of the Russian military in 2026 and the seventh since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to Novaya Gazeta Europe. Before the invasion, the authorized force stood at 1.90 million people, including 1.01 million military personnel.
The increases in military staffing and spending come as Russia continues to pursue its maximalist war aims despite limited battlefield progress. The Institute for the Study of War assessed on September 27 that Russia's frontline has remained largely static in recent months and that the Kremlin is increasingly relying on long-range missile and drone strikes as part of its effort to force Ukraine to capitulate during the winter of 2026–27.
ISW assessed that Putin may be trying to make Ukraine's infrastructure and air defense capacity buckle under sustained Russian strikes rather than relying solely on further territorial gains. The institute also said the Kremlin may delay a large-scale mobilization while it assesses whether its expanded long-range strike campaign can achieve its objectives.
The planned increase in military spending and the repeated expansion of the armed forces show that Moscow is preparing to sustain and expand its war effort into 2027, even as its forces make limited territorial gains in Ukraine.
© Arif Kartono/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
© Kenzo Tribouillard/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Lithuania is getting its US troops back although the overall American presence in Europe will shrink, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said. He tied the wider drawdown to Washington's demand that Europe take more responsibility for its own defense. Lithuania's case, he suggested, is the exception.
While waging all-out war on Ukraine, Russia keeps probing Europe with drones and sabotage that stop just short of open attack. Its small Baltic neighbors are already preparing their people for a possible invasion, and American soldiers on their soil have long been the clearest sign that attacking them means fighting the US. With Washington weighing a pullback and telling Europe to fend for itself, each US unit that stays on Russia's doorstep carries more weight than its size.
Nausėda spoke in an interview with LNK television on 28 September.
"There will be fewer US troops in Europe. This is partly related to what US President Donald Trump says, to the signals the US administration is sending us that Europe must take on more responsibility itself," he said.
Europe must do more for itself, and it is already doing so, Nausėda added. The US presence in Lithuania matters not only for its military power but also for deterrence, he argued.
"The presence of these troops is precisely what reduces the likelihood of military conflict or military aggression," he told LNK, ELTA reported.
Nausėda called the decision a kind of encouragement for Lithuania. "As the overall number of US troops in Europe decreases, in Lithuania that number will at least remain, will not decrease, and perhaps will even be slightly larger," he said. "In any case, the heavy battalion will be here."
The battalion will keep its Abrams tanks, but an engineer battalion will replace the artillery battalion, Nausėda said on LRT's Savaitė program. The rotation will again last nine months. The Americans will number roughly as before, over 1,000, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said.
Estonia has also secured the return of US troops, at least temporarily, LRT noted.
More than 1,000 US troops began leaving Lithuania when their rotation ended in early June, and no replacement arrived, LRT said. It was the country's first gap in the US presence since 2020. American heavy battalions have rotated through Lithuania since 2019.
The Pentagon is weighing a withdrawal of about 25,000 US troops from Europe, and possibly as many as 40,000, NBC News reported, adding that no final decision had been made. About 80,000 US troops are now stationed on the continent. Germany, Italy, and Spain would likely be among the countries most affected.
For decades, Europe operated on a series of assumptions: that borders were essentially settled; that economic interdependence would constrain major-power conflict; that international law would increasingly regulate state behavior; that military force was becoming less relevant; and that, ultimately, the United States would guarantee European security.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shattered those norms, as Moscow attempts to change borders by force and reshape the European security order. NATO now describes Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allied security, while also identifying sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and other hybrid actions as part of the threat.
The foreign policy of the Trump administration is further undermining past postulations. It threatens to annex Canada, speaks of occupying Greenland by force, and ignores Spain's sovereignty. It disrespects European military contributions, then demands European support for operations of its own choosing, legal justification optional. It negotiates European security over Europe's head while resetting relations with the power that threatens the continent, calls European countries "decaying" and their leaders "weak," and has launched a trade war against its former allies while pursuing business with its former strategic opponent.
Discussing solutions without first agreeing on the problem is meaningless. Yet that is what Europe has done since the war started in 2014.
Analyzing the security environment, before recommending solutions, I have identified eight fixed points that I regard as constants.
Russia has offered the West four tales, all unpleasant, one designed to look like an "easy way out." The first calls on Ukraine to give up Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, the lie Trump's plan is built on. But Putin's demands transcend Donbas, as his 2024 speech and Russia's operations show. The second, "Novorossiya," adds Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Odesa to the first lie.
The third, "one people, one nation," claims all of Ukraine. In the words of former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski: "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire." The fourth, "the Russian World," is the only one formalized in Russian strategic documents, encompassing the "former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation."
Ukraine's defeat is crucial to Russia's broader strategy. Integrated with Belarus, a subjugated Ukraine would give Russia the population, economy and technology to be seen as a near peer to the US and China, project power across the post-Soviet space, and ease its own demographic decline, while handing Moscow the country's defense industry, farmland and mineral, gas and oil deposits, and moving Russian military power nearly 900 km closer to London, Berlin and Paris.
It would create an aggressive, imperialist power on Europe's border, emboldened to force NATO's withdrawal to its 1997 borders and to deny the US the ability to deploy forces and nuclear weapons to Europe. The West, not Ukraine, has been defined as Russia's enemy.
Russia has been conducting an ever-escalating hybrid war against NATO's European member states since 2014. The EU Parliament acknowledged as much in September 2021. Its aggressions include sabotage against critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, disinformation, GPS jamming affecting civilian aviation, repeated airspace violations by strike drones, and attacks on Europe's defense-industrial base.
Russia's acts of violence against Western targets are becoming increasingly brazen. In August, Western intelligence sources reported a new wave of attacks on weapons factories in Europe under cover of "plausible deniability," The Telegraph reported. A CIA report shared with European governments warns Russia may attack Spain, France or Italy with Gerbera drones launched from ships, El Mundo reported, citing Lithuanian sources.
It is the same hybrid war Ukraine faced until 24 February 2022, one expected to turn open by 2029. Article 5 could, and probably should, have been triggered years ago. Having failed to respond, NATO has lost credibility, raising the risk of war.
In May 2022, I began using the term tsunami of ripple effects to describe the cost of not intervening in a war that threatens the security of the Alliance. It is the reverberations that raise the cost of living, undermine food and energy security, and spread famine, recession and inflation, raising the risk of unrest, extremism, and, ultimately, the fall of governments. Europe is living through the biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War.
The international security architecture is being dismantled, our institutions discredited, and NATO no longer deters Russia. Building on public frustration, the tsunami of ripple effects gave us Trump and the rise of right-wing parties across Europe.
If Russia were deterred, it would not have launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO's strategic concept commits it to ending, by political and military means, conflicts that threaten Alliance security, including in Ukraine. Nor would Russia be conducting an ever-escalating hybrid war against NATO's European states, or preparing for a military conflict with the Alliance, as US and European intelligence services warn. Lack of deterrence raises the risk of Russian strategic miscalculation and war, especially since NATO was the only military power able to deny Russia its Great Power aspiration and its demand for a sphere of influence over the post-Soviet space.
NATO used to display readiness and capabilities. Today it has become a religion. Europe begs it is still almighty while Russia is a disbeliever.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put it plainly at Davos on 20 January 2026: "We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition." We "cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination," he said, calling for countries to organize in the face of great-power rivalry through different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests. As he told the World Economic Forum: "We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we wish to be."
Ukraine is fighting for its right to exist. Russia is fighting for its Great Power status, strategic parity with the USA and China. If it is defeated in Ukraine, it will forever remain a pariah state, potentially imploding. For a negotiation to succeed, it must solve the cause of the war: Russia's Great Power ambitions, which cannot be negotiated away, only denied through military power.
Even with the tools to evict the Russian Armed Forces, Ukraine cannot expect Russia to accept defeat by a nation that, in its distorted narrative, "does not exist." Russia would only accept withdrawal from Ukraine if the alternative were to fight a far superior military power and thereby risk losing the means that secure the survival of the regime and the state.
Several European intelligence services warn of war by 2029;
International law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity remain fundamental principles. But without the capability and political will to defend them, principles become aspirations, not constraints on states prepared to use force. Acknowledging the world as it is means acknowledging that power still matters. It means accepting that deterrence requires more than statements of concern: ammunition, air and missile defense, long-range strike and counter-drone systems, secure communications, logistics, cyber resilience, and the industrial capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict.
Values mean nothing unless one is prepared to defend them.
This is where Carney's second formulation matters: countries must rely not only on "the strength of our values, but also the value of our strength." Values mean nothing unless one is prepared to defend them, as Canada is doing, raising defense spending and strengthening domestic industry. Europe needs to draw the same conclusion: strategic autonomy, not abandoning NATO, but ensuring Europe can defend itself and its interests even when an ally's priorities change.
The European Council already calls Russia's war an existential challenge and demands defense readiness be strengthened by 2030. But acknowledging reality means going further than setting targets.
It means recognizing that Ukraine is not merely the recipient of European security assistance. Ukraine is an integral part of Europe's security architecture. Its battlefield experience, defense industry, intelligence, and ability to absorb and defeat Russian attacks are crucial to European security.
Because individual member states refuse Ukraine as a member, NATO has made itself a liability, and some of the same countries are erecting hindrances to its EU membership too, letting national interest block common security.
The choice is not between idealism and realism. It is between pretending that the old assumptions still hold and building the capabilities required by the reality that has replaced them.
Acknowledging the world as it is means seeing the threats clearly; defending the world as it should be means acting on that knowledge, and the bridge between the two is strength.
Strength is not found in numbers, but in unity: agreeing on the enemy and a real will and capability to fight.
Accept those eight fixed points, and Europe's room for maneuver is gone, along with its present strategy. Europe cannot afford another 12 years of futile diplomacy while Russia exploits our naivety to prepare for war in the next two to three years, diplomacy that has undermined Europe's need to rearm and establish credible deterrence.
European governments have long acknowledged that their armed forces no longer provide credible defense, yet their security policy still assumes NATO guarantees collective security.
Acknowledge reality, and the illusion shatters.
Europe urgently needs a new strategy, one that looks beyond NATO and the EU's inherent weaknesses toward a military alliance credible enough to reshape the strategic environment. This is why I have long argued for a Coalition of Like-Minded European countries (CALM). It offers a path from recognition to action, from acknowledging NATO's failure to building something that works.
Strength is not found in numbers, but in unity: agreeing on the enemy, his aims and strategy, and committing to countermeasures that demonstrate real will and capability to fight.
Unlike NATO or the EU, CALM does not have to wait for Europe's rearmament to reach 2035. It builds on existing NATO interoperability.
The force already exists: Ukraine's battle-hardened army, National Guard, Special Operations Forces, air defense, and Unmanned System Forces, combined with European fifth-generation aircraft and state-of-the-art navies, are credible, combat-proven, and in place.
Russia already struggles to fight Ukraine alone; it would face a different reality entirely if Ukraine formally joined a coalition of European military powers. That is why the declaration matters now, not after the capability is fully built: with the interoperability already proven, it changes Russia's strategic assessment immediately, not in 2035.
This is not only about physical capabilities. It is about changing Russia's perception of its strategic environment. It starts with a declaration; preparing for military intervention comes next. But it begins with the declaration.
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
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