© Atta Kenare/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Wolfgang Kubicki, chair of Germany’s pro-business liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), proposed that Berlin summon Russia’s ambassador and use the prospect of Taurus missiles for Ukraine as leverage against further hybrid attacks during an appearance on German broadcaster ntv.
Kubicki’s proposal does not change German policy. The FDP has no seats in the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, while Chancellor Friedrich Merz has ruled out supplying the missiles. However, it recasts military aid to Ukraine as a potential cost Moscow would face for hybrid attacks inside Germany. Berlin has since formally blamed Russia for the Leipzig/Halle operation that prompted his remarks.
Kubicki said “a reasonable person” would tell the ambassador that Germany had so far withheld Taurus missiles. If the hybrid threat continued, Berlin should do everything possible to ensure Ukraine received the weapons it needed to defend itself against Russia, he added.
Taurus, the weapon Kubicki spoke about, is a German-Swedish cruise missile launched from military aircraft, with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. Ukraine has sought it for years to strike military targets far behind Russian lines.
Germany refused to supply Taurus missiles in 2025 while funding hundreds of Ukrainian-made long-range systems. Merz again ruled out a transfer in March, arguing that Ukrainian weapons were more effective.
Germany formally blamed Russia on 1 September for the attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport and said it would close the Russian consulate in Bonn and terminate the agreement under which the Russian House cultural center operates in Berlin, DW reported. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt cited evidence from German and allied intelligence services, as well as investigations across Europe. Russia has denied involvement.
The operation that prompted Kubicki’s warning involved an explosives-laden drone that struck the wing of a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 heavy cargo aircraft on the evening of 4 August but failed to detonate, Die Zeit reported. The airport handles civilian freight and NATO logistics, while Ukraine’s Antonov Airlines uses it as a base.
Investigators later found evidence that three drones were involved and discovered about 50 grams of suspected military explosive near the runways.
Russia is sending jet-powered drones against Ukrainian cities in growing numbers—no longer only the Iranian Shahed-238 it fields as the Geran-3, but the newer, faster Geran-4 and Geran-5. The fear everyone voices is their speed, but speed breaks the cheap layer, not the missiles.
Ukraine's expensive air-defense missiles already routinely shoot down cruise missiles, and to them, a fast drone is just one more target. The strain falls on the cheap layer instead—the interceptor drones Ukraine built to down thousands of Shaheds a month for a few thousand dollars each, a fraction of a missile's price.
Those were designed to catch slow drones, and against jet speed, they struggle. If that layer breaks, the cost of defending Ukraine's skies climbs—and the Defense Ministry has already started paying to keep it from breaking.
The shift is not marginal, and it continues to accelerate. Russia had sent more than 2,500 jet-powered Shaheds against Ukraine by 30 August, against roughly 1,500 in July, informal presidential adviser Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov wrote—the drones, he noted, were launched practically straight from the factory. Russia fired roughly 1,400 jet-powered drones since the start of 2026 to June, and air defenses recorded about 180 in all of 2025, Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba of Ukraine's State Research Institute said.
Ukrainian interceptor drones destroyed more than 33,000 Russian drones of all types in March 2026—roughly double the February total and a record for the cheapest layer of Ukraine's air defense, then-Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said.
Russia sent Shaheds—cheap, propeller-driven, long-range, lumbering in at about 185 kilometers per hour (115 mph)—in mass raids meant to swamp Ukraine's defenses. Ukraine adapted, with mobile fire teams, electronic warfare, and layered engagement, then added interceptor drones that destroy incoming drones for a fraction of a surface-to-air missile's cost.
As Ukraine got better at catching propeller drones, Russia reached for speed—jet-powered versions that fly more than three times faster than the Shaheds Ukraine spent three years learning to intercept.
By August, Ukraine's military intelligence said Russia had stopped building the Geran-3 and shifted to the newer jets, producing roughly 3,000 of them a month.
The worry centers on velocity: a jet drone flies several times faster than a propeller-driven or electric one, reducing the time defenders have to detect, identify, and hit it. But the fear aims at the wrong place, said Oleksii Kolesnyk, director of the Ukrainian firm Reactive Drones.
"A jet-powered UAV is, in many ways, similar to a cruise missile. For conventional air defense, jet-powered drones are simply another aerial target," he told Euromaidan Press.
Ukraine's surface-to-air systems routinely intercept cruise missiles. A fast drone is standard work for them—though Zelenskyy said in late August that the jets are the hardest to intercept, and that combat aircraft now mainly protect against them.
An interceptor drone, unlike a ground-launched missile, has to chase its target down and ram it, which worked against slow Shaheds. Against something near cruise-missile speed, the geometry breaks.
The problem exists almost only for interceptor drones, Kolesnyk said—they were never designed for these speeds. At jet velocities, guidance, target tracking, and the final homing onto the target all hit technical ceilings, and faster interceptors alone will not fix it.
"New technical solutions will be needed," he said.
Interceptor drones are why Ukraine can answer mass raids without firing a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars at each incoming drone. Break that math, and the affordability of Ukraine's whole air defense shifts.
Through the defense-tech accelerator Brave1, Ukraine backed 12 technologies under the EU4UA Defence Tech grant program, offering up to €150,000 each for high-speed interceptors capable of reaching 450 kilometers per hour (about 280 mph) or more.
That push has since produced candidates. By late August, Ukraine had four interceptor systems built to run down the jets, all already in field testing, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara said, and the Alexa Spatium had entered service. Ukraine now wants to bring them up to standard and build them in the thousands.
Colonel Oleksandr Saienko, a former Ukrainian brigade commander, rejected the idea that any of this is new.
"This is better described as an evolution of unmanned systems rather than a completely new stage of warfare," he said.
Jet drones long predate this war. "The first jet-powered UAVs appeared back in the 1970s," he said, pointing to Soviet reconnaissance drones beginning with the Tu-143 and continuing with the Tu-141 and Tu-243—platforms Ukraine itself later flew in the Donbas war and the full-scale invasion. What has changed is scale, and the problem the drones now solve: arriving before the defender can react.
Saienko's warning points past the engine.
"The decisive advantage will not belong to whoever simply has a jet engine. It will belong to whoever integrates these platforms into an effective reconnaissance-strike system, protects them against electronic warfare, manufactures them at scale, and keeps costs manageable," he said.
His frame is the kill chain—detect, identify, decide, engage—and every gain in speed compresses that cycle. "If a target is flying at 500 to 700 kilometers per hour, even a delay of several dozen seconds may make interception impossible," he said, adding: "Radars must see sooner, command systems must classify automatically, and operators get less time—until automation becomes a requirement."
Speed solves one problem and creates several. "They are simply another category of strike UAV," Kolesnyk said.
"One solution does not replace another."
Oleksii Kolesnyk, Reactive Drones.
Compact turbojets are expensive and hard to source for smaller drones. Bigger airframes have to be reinforced to take the loads and vibration, which adds weight and cost. Fuel burn climbs far above that of the electric or piston drones built for endurance, and higher speed leaves less room for navigation errors.
So, jet drones fill a niche rather than taking over the whole strike fleet. "They are most effective at ranges of roughly 200 to 600 kilometers," Kolesnyk said—fast strikes on high-value or time-sensitive targets, where getting there quickly matters more than flying cheaply or far.
Ukraine didn't drop first-person-view (FPV) drones when fiber-optic ones arrived, and jam-resistant drones didn't replace the rest. Each capability added a layer rather than erasing the previous one. Saienko expects the same. "The emergence of jet aviation did not eliminate piston-engine aircraft. The same principle applies," he said. Cheap propeller drones are ideal for mass attacks, while jet platforms handle speed.
Jet drones force defenders to decide faster, and that is the harder demand. A slow propeller drone is a wasteful target for an expensive missile. A cruise missile demands an instant answer. A jet drone sits in between—and an operator has to sort which weapon meets which target in seconds, while holding scarce interceptors back for the worst threats. Every misjudgment costs something.
"The challenge is no longer only interception—it is detecting, identifying, and assigning the target quickly enough," Saienko said.
Both experts reach the same conclusion from opposite ends: Kolesnyk through the technical limits of the interceptor drone, Saienko through the entire defensive network. Both land on automation—AI-driven target recognition, distributed sensors, and fast data sharing to shrink the gap between spotting a target and hitting it. The winner won't necessarily fly the fastest aircraft. It will process information faster than its opponent.
Over four days at the end of August, Russia fired about 800 jet drones at Ukraine, Ukraine's president said—a type most of Ukraine's cheap interceptors still cannot catch. And the problem won't stay Ukraine's alone. Drones from the same broad Shahed family have already strayed into NATO airspace and turned up in other wars. The interception race Ukraine is running now is one everyone will eventually run.
© Jędrzej Nowicki for The New York Times
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy marked the start of the academic year with children at a Kyiv Oblast school rebuilt after Russian forces destroyed it in 2022, before an air attack forced their first lessons into the shelter on 1 September 2026, the Kyiv Oblast Military Administration said.
Knowledge Day, Ukraine’s traditional start of the academic year, fell during the full-scale invasion for the fifth time. Russia’s war now determines whether children can learn alongside their classmates: local security and shelter access govern classroom returns, while about 200,000 pupils near the front will remain fully remote.
Around three million pupils began the 2026–2027 academic year, including roughly 240,000 first-graders, 10% fewer than a year earlier, Member of Parliament Iryna Borzova of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Youth and Sports told Ukrinform. Most will learn in person or through a blended format, but some 200,000 children near the front will study entirely online, she said.
More than 82% of school pupils and preschoolers can access shelters, Education Minister Andrii Butenko said. The government has allocated UAH 6 billion this year to expand access to shelters and other educational safety infrastructure.
Russian forces destroyed the school Zelenskyy visited in March 2022. It reopened only last autumn with a shelter and backup power, according to the Kyiv Oblast Military Administration.
Zelenskyy said Russia had spent the preceding two weeks attacking infrastructure partly to disrupt the start of the academic year.
Ahead of Knowledge Day, Kyiv Oblast Military Administration head Tymur Tkachenko advised schools in high-risk communities not to hold mass opening ceremonies. Each school was to decide whether to proceed based on the security situation in its community.
“First and foremost, there must be safety,” Tkachenko said. If a ceremony went ahead, he recommended holding it directly in a shelter where possible. For events outside shelters, attendance was not to exceed the capacity of the nearest protective facility, and schools were told to avoid large gatherings of pupils, parents, and staff.
Ukraine’s 2026 Knowledge Day began after six consecutive days of Russian attacks on Kyiv and its surrounding region, culminating overnight in a massed missile and drone strike. Eight people were killed, and seven were injured, including three children, while civilian infrastructure was damaged across five Kyiv districts.
Russia’s invasion has turned school safety and reconstruction into central parts of Ukraine's education policy. By September 2024, more than 3,500 educational institutions had been damaged and nearly 400 destroyed, with the World Bank estimating that almost $14 billion would be needed to rebuild them.
Attacks on Ukraine’s energy system have also left classrooms without heat or electricity, forcing prolonged holidays and renewed distance learning.
Ukraine's Armed Forces are forming the 446th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade, which is recruiting servicemembers while formation continues, MilitaryLand reported. The new unit joins a force that hit 32,485 Russian personnel over the summer alone, the Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS) reported on 1 September.
Ukraine is facing a shortage of military personnel, yet the Armed Forces are forming their second separate unmanned systems brigade this year. The force's commander wants unmanned systems covering the entire front at tactical, operational, and strategic depths.
Military personnel from other units can apply for a transfer through Army+, according to MilitaryLand.
The first of the two was the 445th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade Chata, whose formation became known in July. Both units are recruiting for posts running from operators of ground robots, FPV, bomber, and interceptor drones to psychological-support officers, analysts, and accountants, Militarnyi reported.
The deployment of such units is part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' broader effort to increase the number of unmanned systems in the military. Ukrainian drones accounted for about 96% of Russian casualties in March—33,988 of roughly 35,000 killed or severely wounded—Zelenskyy said in April.
The expansion of unmanned systems brigades is part of a broader effort initiated by Robert Brovdi, callsign Madyar, to increase the role of the SBS within Ukraine's Defense Forces, Militarnyi notes.
Brovdi told Reuters in June that he wants to raise the drone forces from about 2.5% of Ukraine's armed forces to 5%, a goal he first stated publicly in September 2025. At that share, the drone units accounted for roughly a third of Russian losses over the previous 12 months, according to figures the force gave Reuters, which said it could not verify them independently.
Then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi described unmanned systems as one of the key factors shaping modern warfare. Current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Mykhailo Drapatyi stated that one of his priorities is the development and scaling of the unmanned component.
Overall, the SBS struck 58,465 targets in August, its own tally for 1–31 August shows.
On 1 September 2026, Latvia banned imports of Russian- and Belarusian-made books, clothing, toys, and other consumer goods, including shipments routed through third countries, Latvian Public Media reported.
The restricted goods were worth approximately €12.5 million ($14.5 million) in 2025, or 6.5% of Latvia’s remaining imports from the two countries. Although modest economically, the measure goes beyond EU-wide sanctions and advances Riga’s effort to deny Moscow and Minsk revenue during Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The restrictions cover the following:
Latvia’s Cabinet approved the final product list on 25 August following a Foreign Ministry proposal, completing restrictions parliament authorized on 23 July.
The ban applies regardless of whether the products arrive directly or through another country. Russian- and Belarusian-made goods may still transit Latvia on their way to other EU markets, Meduza reported.
Food and beverages are not covered. The restrictions are scheduled to remain in force until 1 July 2027 and will be reviewed annually.
The Foreign Ministry said the measure is also intended to limit the entry of Russian propaganda material. The targeted products accounted for only 0.05% of Latvia’s total imports in 2025, according to Euronews.
Latvia’s combined imports from Russia and Belarus have already fallen by 91%, from €2.13 billion ($2.47 billion) in 2022 to €193 million ($224 million) in 2025, according to Latvian Public Media. Much of that decline followed the country’s departure from Russian energy supplies and the Baltic states’ disconnection from the Russian and Belarusian electricity grids.
The latest prohibition blocks consumer goods that Brussels has not collectively banned.
Latvian Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs previously pledged to eliminate the country’s remaining commercial links with Russia and Belarus, although pharmaceutical exporters were expected to remain exempt.
In August, Latvia also resumed publishing a monthly register of businesses trading with either country, naming 171 companies. Inclusion on the list does not itself indicate a sanctions violation.
Russia's Zircon runs on two solid-propellant motors, a booster and a sustainer, Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) said in a breakdown of the missile's structure and components. That leaves no room for the scramjet Moscow advertised, Defense Express wrote.
Russia presented Zircon as a hypersonic missile capable of penetrating modern air defenses. HUR says it instead uses solid-propellant motors, which Defense Express reads as demolishing Moscow's claims about a superweapon. The intelligence agency also listed an Altera programmable chip and a TriQuint amplifier among the missile's components, the same finding investigators keep making in Russian weapons.
HUR published an interactive 3D model of Zircon through its War&Sanctions database, the latest in a series on Russian ballistic weapons. The agency said the recorded maximum speed to date does not exceed Mach 6.8—about seven times the speed of sound—and that the missile does not hold it through the whole flight. Russia claims Mach 9 at some stages of flight. Zircon carries a roughly 120-kilogram warhead.
Defense Express reported that a 2010 contract with solid-fuel specialist NPO Iskra indicates that this propulsion system was planned from the earliest stages of Zircon's development.
Zircon is a Russian anti-ship missile developed for surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia later adapted it for Bastion-M coastal launchers amid difficulties operating its Black Sea Fleet, HUR said.
Ukrainian forensic experts first confirmed Russia had fired a Zircon at Kyiv in February 2024. Defense Express reported that Ukraine intercepted two more over the capital the following month. Russia has continued using Zircon against land targets: in February 2026, it launched four at Ukraine’s power grid, of which Ukrainian air defenses downed two.
Solid fuel does not make Zircon slow: Mach 6.8 is still hypersonic. A scramjet draws oxygen from the atmosphere to sustain hypersonic flight; Zircon instead flies on self-contained rocket motors. HUR calls it a ballistic missile rather than the hypersonic cruise missile Russia advertised, and notes its onboard computer is the type fitted to all Russian ballistic missiles. Defense Express says the trajectory may be aeroballistic and the motor possibly dual-pulse, given the range Russia wanted from a missile that had to fit a ship's launch silo.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in 2019 that the missile could reach Mach 9 and travel 1,000 kilometers, up from earlier official figures of Mach 6 to 8 and 400 to 500 kilometers. A year earlier, the former head of its manufacturer said it flew on a jet engine, Defense Express said.
In February 2024, Kyiv's forensic institute concluded from the debris that the engine was air-breathing rather than solid-fuel, and Defense Express went further the following month, reporting from its own sources that Russia had built a working scramjet. The outlet has since appended a correction to that article, noting that HUR found a solid-fuel 3L2211 motor from NPO Iskra where the scramjet was supposed to be.
HUR identified two components from US manufacturers inside Zircon: a programmable gate array from Altera, now part of Intel, and a TGA2704 amplifier from TriQuint Semiconductor, now Qorvo. It also mapped 70 companies involved in its production, along with their personnel and foreign manufacturing equipment.
The finding fits a wider pattern. Investigators have found Western electronics in Russia's UMPK glide-bomb kits and traced at least 28 foreign parts from 15 companies in the Kh-101 that struck Kyiv's Okhmatdyt children's hospital.
A 2026 examination found 62 US-made parts in an Iskander missile, while a Russian Geran drone combined a Soviet missile with Western electronics and a Chinese modem.
© Paulo Nunes dos Santos for The New York Times
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