Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are the last two big cities in the Donbas that Russia does not hold, and taking them has been the main Russian objective in eastern Ukraine since 2022. Ukraine is now moving forces north from the southeast to defend them.

The 46th Airmobile Brigade began that move in July. The first outside confirmation came this week.

Shifting north to plug a gap between two Ukrainian corps, the brigade could protect adjacent units as they retreat a short distance from what's left of Chasiv Yar—a battleground since the spring of 2024—and straighten the Ukrainian line where the 11th and 19th Corps meet. Both corps now sit under Biletskyi's new force grouping, according to Unit Observer—a command relationship no Ukrainian outlet has reported and which open sources cannot independently confirm.

Zooming out, the reshuffle around Kostiantynivka runs alongside a wider effort to redistribute Ukrainian troops along the 1,200-km gray zone threading through southern, eastern, and northern Ukraine. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi took over as commander-in-chief on 22 July, arriving with a mandate to unwind the Soviet-inherited command model Ukraine has fought this war with, and a reputation for favoring decentralized command. The 46th began moving before he did, in early July, according to Unit Observer, so this redeployment is not his. But the 33rd Assault Regiment was partially reassigned to Biletskyi's corps after the handover.

The best-case scenario is that the redeployment helps stabilize the front 16 km south of Kramatorsk, delaying the Russian siege of that city and Sloviansk to the north. In the worst case, the 46th Airmobile Brigade and its thousands of troops are too few and too late to make much of a difference as the Center Group of Forces and its tens of thousands of troops grind through Ukrainian defenses on their slow march toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

The 46th Airmobile Brigade spent years fighting in southeastern Ukraine. But it's arguably no longer needed along the southern end of the gray zone after a Ukrainian counteroffensive that kicked off in February halted and then rolled back Russian forces, stabilizing what was once Ukraine's most vulnerable flank.

Free to fight elsewhere, the brigade began its move north toward Kostiantynivka and Chasiv Yar two months ago. The move happened almost entirely in secret. "Strict OPSEC measures have become the standard for the Ukrainian armed forces in 2026," mapper Unit Observer noted, "with units delaying posts up to several months to avoid giving away their relocation along the front line."

That discipline is now visible across the whole Ukrainian effort. The southeastern counteroffensive that freed up this brigade ran for six months with very few videos and small teams. Ukraine's Swedish radar planes flew combat sorties for half a year before the defense ministry said so. A brigade crossing the front unremarked for two months is the same practice, applied to ground forces.

Confirmed moves

Recent videos confirmed the deployment. The 46th Airmobile is now in position just north of the ruins of Kostiantynivka and just west of the ruins of Chasiv Yar, which lie 11 km northeast of Kostiantynivka. Sitting astride the juncture between two Ukrainian corps, the 11th and 19th, the brigade is set to play a crucial role in the ongoing Ukrainian defense of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

According to Unit Observer, the 46th Airmobile Brigade's move "will likely support the gradual retreat of elements of the 24th Mechanized Brigade remaining between Chasiv Yar and the village of Stinky," 6 km west of Chasiv Yar. The 24th Mechanized Brigade has fought long and hard in and around Chasiv Yar to hold back a much larger Russian force. But incremental Russian advances north and south of the 24th Mechanized Brigade's positions have put the brigade at risk of partial encirclement.

It's a dangerous position for the weary brigade. If it could fall back to the west a few kilometers, it could eliminate the risk to its flanks—and straighten and shorten the overall Ukrainian line. It's possible the 46th Airmobile Brigade's job is to safeguard the short retreat.

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The command and control process is deceptively complex, and the confusion is exactly the kind Drapatyi is trying to engineer out. Ukraine's new corps are supposed to be its highest front-line commands, coordinating the brigades, regiments, and battalions fighting in the same sectors. But in the areas where two corps meet, it may be unclear which corps is in charge.

Ukraine's answer has been to add a layer above the corps. On 26 August, Zelenskyy announced that two reinforced groupings would take over the defense of Donetsk Oblast, commanded by Denys Prokopenko of the 1st National Guard "Azov" Corps and Andrii Biletskyi of the 3rd Army Corps, both named Heroes of Ukraine.

The 3rd Corps' zone of responsibility has grown daily since the start of the year, its deputy commander Lt. Col. Rodion Kudriashov told NV, and he framed the new groupings as Ukraine scaling up what already works.

The grouping formalizes an arrangement that had already grown up in practice. The 46th Airmobile Brigade fits the same logic. It belongs to neither the 11th nor the 19th Corps—it is an 8th Air Assault Corps unit—but it is a brigade that works, freed by an offensive that worked, arriving in the sector that matters most. It is also arriving into a corps run by its own former commander: Brig. Gen. Valeriy Skred, recently given the 19th, led the 46th through 2022 and 2023.

Only time will tell whether the reshuffling of Ukrainian forces will bolster the defense of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. And even if the redeployments do stiffen the Ukrainian line south of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, they do nothing to stiffen the line north of the twin cities.

Russian troops are closing in from that direction, too. Fortunately for the Ukrainians, there's a separate plan for that northern sector. A carefully planned series of Ukrainian counterattacks has quietly cut across a salient of Russian troops marching on Sloviansk.

The Ukrainian attacks may compel the Russians to pull back a short distance. That could give the defenders of Sloviansk more space and time to prepare for the coming siege.

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Ukraine’s secret counteroffensive is more successful than we thought

The Ukrainian air force's Swedish-made Saab ASC 890 radar early warning planes have been flying combat sorties since March, the Ukrainian defense ministry has revealed—six months of operations Kyiv kept quiet. Sweden donated the pair of planes as part of a $1.25-billion aid package Stockholm announced in May 2024.

It is the first airborne radar Ukraine has ever operated. It is not the first one Ukraine has built. The Antonov An-71 flew from the Sviatoshyn factory airfield in Kyiv on 12 July 1985, a radar plane designed and assembled in the city it would have defended. The airframe worked—one prototype logged 362 flights. The radar, built by VEGA in Moscow, never did. Funding died with the Soviet Union. Of three prototypes, one was scrapped, one sits in storage at Antonov, and one is in the State Aviation Museum in Kyiv, the only An-71 in any collection anywhere.

The two twin-propeller ASC 890s with their top-mounted radars are a powerful addition to Ukraine's aerial arsenal. Cruising at around 6 km, the radar planes can detect and track aerial targets out to 450 km—roughly 350 km against fighter-size targets in heavy jamming—and hold 1,000 airborne and 500 surface tracks at once. Their Link 16 radio data links relay target data to the air force's Lockheed Martin F-16s, Dassault Mirage 2000s and Saab Gripens.

But there's a problem, one the Russians know all too well. Radar early warning planes are big, slow and the opposite of stealthy. Radiating electromagnetic energy from high altitude, they're easy for enemy forces to locate. Hitting them is harder given how far from the front line a radar plane typically flies. But a missile with sufficient range could do the job.

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And that's why Ukraine's ASC 890 crews should worry. The more they fly and contribute to Ukraine's air defense operations, the harder the Russians may try to shoot them down.

The risk isn't theoretical. The Russian air force went to war with as few as seven of its own Beriev A-50U radar early warning planes. The lumbering aircraft tracked Ukrainian warplanes and helped vector Russian fighters to intercept.

The Ukrainians fought back. A Ukrainian drone damaged an A-50U on the ground in Belarus in February 2023. In January 2024, a long-range Ukrainian missile—reportedly a American-made Patriot—shot down an A-50U over the Sea of Azov in southern Ukraine. Six weeks later, in February 2024, another Ukrainian missile, an ex-Soviet S-200, struck a third A-50U in the air in the same area.

The Russians learned the hard way that the A-50Us can't survive within the roughly 250-km range of Ukraine's best air defenses. The A-50Us redeployed deeper into the Russian interior. Today they mostly patrol the likeliest routes for incoming Ukrainian cruise missiles targeting strategic industries along the Volga River.

No retreat

Ukraine's ASC 890s can't retreat the way Russia's A-50Us have done. Russia is big. Comparatively, Ukraine is small. The Russian air force's best R-37M air-to-air missiles, fired by Sukhoi Su-35 and Mikoyan MiG-31 fighters, fly as far as the ASC 890's radar detects. To be useful, the Ukrainian radar planes must operate inside the envelope of the R-37M.

It's apparent how the ASC 890s can help the Ukrainian war effort. They can detect and track incoming Russian drones and cruise missiles, giving ground- and air-based defenses time to get into position to intercept. The Swedish-made planes could work alongside F-16s to stage complex aerial ambushes like the kind the F-16s pulled off with help from a ground-based Patriot battery back in July. That ambush took out a Russian Su-35.

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So far Ukraine has won that gamble. The ASC 890s have flown combat sorties for six months without a loss—and for most of that time, nobody outside the Ukrainian air force knew they were flying at all. The silence may have been part of the protection. It has now ended.

But each sortie is a gamble. As long as the Russian air force can push Sukhois and MiGs armed with R-37Ms close to the disputed gray zone in Ukraine, the ASC 890s could be targets. Nor is the R-37M the only threat: analysts have flagged Russia's S-300V4 surface-to-air system and its Krasukha-4 jammers as risks to the Swedish planes. Ukraine's ground-based Patriots and S-200s and air-launched AIM-120 missiles could push the Sukhois and MiGs farther back, but all of those missiles are in short supply.

But even a more favorable aerial environment wouldn't fully protect the ASC 890s. Ukrainian drones and missiles have destroyed or damaged several Russian A-50Us on the ground at their airfields. Between missions, the ASC 890s are just as exposed to Russian drones and missiles.

Russia is launching more of its best jet-propelled attack drones and miniature cruise missiles at Ukrainian ports, cities, warehouses, and power plants. The speedy Geran-3, Geran-4, and Geran-5 drones and Banderol missiles can zoom right past Ukraine's ground-based guns and slower interceptor drones, so the Ukrainian air force is deploying more supersonic fighters to chase down the Russian munitions.

But there's a problem. The Ukrainian jets are running short of the missiles that work best against them.

A deepening shortage of infrared-guided AIM-9 missiles and radar-guided AIM-120 missiles for the Ukrainian air force's ex-European Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters has been reported elsewhere. Less well known is what has been happening to the Soviet-era missiles carried by Ukraine's older Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters.

The F-16 is probably the most numerous Ukrainian fighter type, with around 50 in service. But the MiG-29 is a close second. Despite steep losses of MiG-29s in the 55 months since Russia widened its war on Ukraine, Ukrainian aviation brigades may still fly dozens of the classic Soviet-made fighters. MiG-29s are daily sights in the sky over the port of Odesa in southern Ukraine as the twin-engine fighters chase down Russian missiles and drones.

The MiG-29 can carry the full array of Soviet-style air-to-air missiles in the Ukrainian inventory including the infrared-guided R-60 and R-73 and the radar-guided R-27. But the missile of choice for intercepting the 500 km/hr Gerans and 700 km/hr Banderols is the more modern R-73. The $300,000 heat-seeking missile is maneuverable and accurate at the close ranges that are typical of fighter-on-drone engagements. Its one known weakness is cloud: a Ukrainian pilot said in 2022 that the R-73 tracks poorly through it, which is part of why pilots sometimes fall back on the cannon.

Ukraine went to war in 2022 with substantial stocks of R-73s and surely received additional copies from allies. While Ukrainian industry built some components for the 1980s-vintage missiles, they were and still are assembled in Russia—so the supply is finite. And the rate of expenditure rose sharply as Ukraine pushed the R-73 into roles it was never built for: onto ground-based launchers, after the 9M33 missiles for its Soviet Osa air defense systems ran short, and even onto some of its robotic boats.

Down to the 1970s stock

The sign of that pressure is the return of the R-60—a missile designed in the 1970s and considered obsolete when Russia widened the war. Last month an R-60 was visible in the wreckage following the crash of a Ukrainian MiG-29. And this week, video circulated of a MiG-29 downing a Banderol with one at extremely low altitude.

Ukraine's air force had enough R-73s in 2022 that nobody expected to see R-60s again. Continuous interception of Russian cruise missiles and Shahed-type drones changed that, Militarnyi reported. Nor is this improvisation: since November 2025 Ukraine has been running a program to modernize the R-60, replacing analog seeker components with digital ones to sharpen its infrared sensitivity, and adapting it for ground launch. Ihor Fedirko of the Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry called it a temporary way to put otherwise unusable missiles to work.

It's not that the R-60 isn't suitable for downing a Geran or Banderol. It's that it's less suitable than an R-73. "I don't think Ukraine would be using R-60 missiles unless it had nothing else left," one close observer of the Ukrainian air force noted.

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The only other alternative is for a fighter to use its gun. But that's risky, as the pilot must fly dangerously close to a drone or missile before opening fire; the resulting explosion could take out both the interceptee and the interceptor.

In the same way Russia is exhausting Ukraine's long-range surface-to-air missile batteries by firing more ballistic missiles than Ukrainian forces can intercept with their dwindling supply of Patriot missiles, Russia may also be exhausting Ukraine's fighters and their limited stocks of short-range air-to-air missiles.

As the Ukrainian missiles run out, more of the Russian missiles and drones get through—and strike their targets.

The problem is going to get worse before it gets better. Russian industry is ramping up production of both the jet-propelled Geran models and the Banderol, and jet output overtook piston output in August. The Russians launched a reported 1,500 jet Gerans in July and 2,500 in August. Interception rates for the fast drones specifically ran as low as 50% in July, though they may have ticked up to 60% or even 70%.

But that's still too low considering that Ukrainian air defenders usually shoot down 90% of slower propeller-driven Geran-1s and Geran-2s. "Nobody wants interception rates in the 60s/70s," explained Michael Bohnert, an analyst for the RAND think tank in California.

New models of faster interceptor drones, which several Ukrainian manufacturers are scrambling to deliver to front-line forces, may help restore the 90% kill rate for even the fastest Gerans. But "jet-interceptor output has been behind jet-drone output," Bohnert noted. So it's likely that, for a few months at least, the Russians will have the numerical edge, and the Ukrainians will have no choice but to continue sortieing F-16s and MiG-29s to reinforce ground-launched air defenses.

But what happens when the fighters run out of even their oldest missiles?

Ukraine has lost a quarter of its German-designed Leopard 1A5 tanks. But it could get many more of the nimble, 40-ton tanks. And some could have brand-new turrets that make them lighter, faster, farther-shooting, and more survivable.

The hulls are 1980s West German. The refurbishment is done in Germany, the air defense turrets are built in Rome, the tank turrets are designed in Belgium, and one of the two programs is paid for out of frozen Russian assets. Ukraine's newest armored vehicles are being assembled from the leftovers of a war Europe spent forty years preparing for and never fought.

In 2023, a German-Danish-Dutch consortium pledged 170 Leopard 1A5s to Ukraine. The 1980s-vintage tanks have come from German, Danish, and Belgian surplus stocks.

Refurbished in Germany by tank-maker Rheinmetall and fitted with add-on anti-drone armor in Ukraine, the first 135 or so Leopard 1A5s now equip at least five units: the 44th Mechanized Brigade, 5th Heavy Mechanized Brigade, the 425th Assault Regiment, the 142nd Mechanized Brigade, and the 13th National Guard Brigade.

Losses have been heavy. The Russians have struck no fewer than 37 of the four-person tanks, destroying at least 30 of them. The 44th Mechanized Brigade, which is fighting a defensive action south of the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, has been hit the hardest. The brigade has written off around half of its original allotment of 31 or so Leopard 1A5s.

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Another 35 Leopard 1A5s from the 2023 pledge should eventually reach Ukrainian units, potentially making good those losses.

But Kyiv is diverting some of those initial 170 Leopard 1A5s to a pair of conversion programs that are reinforcing Ukraine's air defense while also re-equipping the ground forces with a new generation of tank.

The first conversion program, overseen by Rheinmetall, plucks the old turrets with their 105-millimeter cannons off some Leopard 1A5s and drops in a new turret with a faster-firing 35-millimeter anti-aircraft gun. Effectively a next-generation Gepard, the resulting Skyranger 35 is a mobile, armored drone-killer that can post up between Russian drone launch sites and Ukrainian cities in order to down incoming Geran drones before they can strike.

Its revolver cannon fires 1,000 rounds a minute out to 4 km, using airburst ammunition that scatters tungsten pellets in the path of an incoming drone. An unnamed EU country is paying for the systems out of proceeds from frozen Russian assets, and Rheinmetall builds them at its subsidiary in Rome. Germany's own army has ordered 19 and is discussing hundreds more; Ukraine's arrived first.

The first imagery of a Skyranger 35 in Ukrainian service circulated online this week, with the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment.

Old tank, new turret

The second conversion program won't produce combat-ready vehicles for another year or so. This program will swap out the turrets on 31 Leopard 1A5s. The new turret, produced by John Cockerill Defense in Belgium, is unmanned: the commander and gunner move down into the hull alongside the driver, and an autoloader replaces the human loader. That drops the crew from four to three and takes everyone out of the part of the tank most likely to be hit.

The new turret is welded from ballistic aluminum instead of steel, shaving three tons off the tank's 40 and freeing weight for reactive armor, anti-drone netting, or electronic warfare kit.

As a bonus, the 105-millimeter gun in the multi-million-dollar Cockerill 3105 turret also elevates far higher than the gun in the existing turret—42 degrees, against roughly 20 on the original. That confers greater range when a tank functions as artillery, firing its cannon at targets over the horizon: Cockerill says no other Western main battle tank can shoot indirectly the way this one does, and Ukrainian trials reached 10 km from a covered position.

Kyiv has ordered 30 of the turrets and holds one more it bought for testing last year. Some time in 2027, that is a battalion of new medium tanks: a cutting-edge turret on a chassis built when Leonid Brezhnev was alive.

To provide hulls for the 31 Cockerill-converted Leopard 1A5s while also sustaining the Skyranger 35 program, Ukraine must make a choice. Combined, the two programs need potentially 50 or more tank chassis, but just 35 Leopard 1A5s from the initial 170-tank pledge are still in the queue for delivery to Ukraine.

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Ukraine's ground forces are already short on tanks; taking Leopard 1A5s from the five brigades and regiments that operate the type could deprive those units of desperately needed firepower. Fortunately for Ukraine, there are still hundreds of old Leopard 1A5s in warehouses in Europe and farther abroad—and Rheinmetall is pulling the Skyranger hulls from storage rather than from Ukraine's active fleet.

French historian Stevius made a count and concluded "the stocks in Europe are far from exhausted." As recently as 2022, German firm Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft held 99 Leopard 1A5s. Rheinmetall held 88 of the tanks in 2022 and, in 2023, bought 50 more from OIP Land Systems in Belgium. That's 237 tanks: 67 more than the Europeans pledged to the Ukrainians in 2023.

Some of those 67 excess Leopard 1A5 hulls are unusable owing to rust and other wear and tear. Even so, there should be enough Leopard 1A5s left in Europe to feed the Skyranger and Cockerill conversion efforts. And once those run out, there are still some ex-Italian and ex-Greek Leopard 1A5s that Ukraine could acquire.

And if it can secure the financing, Ukraine could convert those additional tanks—or even some of its existing ones—into faster, farther-firing Leopard 1A5s with Cockerill C3105 turrets. Cockerill has already proposed doing the whole active fleet, around 100 tanks.

In August, Russian gains ticked upward in key sectors along the 1,200-km front line of Russia's 55-month wider war on Ukraine.

The coming winter could slow Russian advances as the trees lose their leaves and infantry infiltrators have nothing to conceal them from overhead drones. But for the next month or two, the trees will still have their leaves, and the infiltrators will still have their cover.

And that means, as fall wears into winter, Ukraine may lose yet more ground in the north and especially in Donbas region in the east, where Russia enjoys a substantial manpower and firepower advantage. "Russian forces still hold the operational initiative and are slowly capturing ... Donetsk Oblast as well as border zones in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts," mapper Thorkill warned.

The Russian gains belie a greater truth, however. In the middle of the fifth year of wider war, the situation on the ground only changes along the margins even as thousands die.

According to Thorkill's tally, the Russians occupied just under 220 square km of Ukrainian soil in August. That's 25% more territory than they captured in July. "The situation has deteriorated sharply in the Donbas in August," mapper Clément Molin explained.

To be fair, the Russians are advancing much more slowly than they did a year ago. "Compared to August 2025, Russian gains are down by nearly half," Molin noted. That's cold comfort to Ukrainian civilians and defenders in the areas where the Russians are still gaining ground, however. And the sheer proximity of the most aggressive Russian formations to the most vulnerable Ukrainian settlements means it might not take much more effort on the part of the Russians to turn these settlements into battlegrounds.

The Russians' main effort is still directed at the last big free cities in Donetsk. Inching forward at great cost from several directions, Russian forces are slowly closing a pincer around Kramatorsk and Sloviansk and the tens of thousands of civilians who still live in the adjacent cities.

Thorkill's map places the forwardmost Russian forces in Mykolaivka, just 4 km east of Sloviansk. This is the middle joint of the Russian pincer. The pincer's southern claw is a zone of disputed control stretching along the road between the ruins of the city of Kostiantynivka and the battleground town of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.

If the Russians can march through Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, they can lay siege to the town of Druzhkivka, a few kilometers to the northwest. If they can capture Druzhkivka, they can turn north and assault Kramatorsk, a mere 6 km away.

Ukrainian counterattacks

The most fragile part of the claw is to the north. Bucking the overall trend of Russian gains in August, Ukrainian forces counterattacked in several sectors the same month. Most dramatically, a clutch of Ukrainian mechanized and air assault brigades extended a slow advance through the town of Nove, mostly cutting across a 100-square-km salient of Russian forces around 25 km northeast of Sloviansk.

The Nove counterattacks offer some hope that targeted Ukrainian action may slow the Russian march on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the north. Meanwhile, a reshuffling of Ukrainian units south of Kramatorsk could improve Ukrainian defenses against an assault on the twin cities from the south.

As new Ukrainian commander-in-chief Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi gradually addresses some of the imbalances in the Ukrainian ground forces, certain key units are getting help. Most notably, the 425th Assault Regiment is now subordinate to the 1st Azov Corps, which is responsible for the defense of Kramatorsk.

Keenly aware that the Russians intend to slowly infiltrate front-line settlements with small teams of infantry rather than rushing them with masses of easily-droned armored vehicles, the 1st Azov Corps has assigned the aggressive 425th Assault Regiment "to clear enemy infiltrators from the brigades’ areas of defense," the corps stated.

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Infiltrators aren't the only problem, however. The Russians' favorite tactic combines small teams of infantry with massive aerial firepower in the form of precision-guided KAB glide bombs flung by supersonic Sukhoi Su-34 fighter bombers.

"Glide bombs hurt," Ukraine's 4th National Guard Brigade reported. "It's about 200 kg of explosives flying your way. And you can't really shoot them down like you can shoot down drones. They can collapse fortified buildings, bunkers, and entire urban blocks much more effectively than artillery."

After the dust settles from the glide bomb impacts, Russian infantry "infiltrate through the damaged areas, using the ruins for cover and concealment," the national guard brigade explained.

The same lack of long-range air defenses that exposes Ukrainian cities to relentless Russian bombardment also deprives front-line forces of protection from the Su-34s and their glide bombs. And so the Russians can keep bombing and keep infiltrating as long as the trees offer some concealment for the infantry.

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The clock is ticking. The Russians will aim to position their forces for more direct assaults on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk no later than next year. The Ukrainians will aim to slow down the Russians, trading a little space for more time. Time Drapatyi may use to institute further reforms in the Ukrainian ground forces.

Zooming out and taking the long view, no one should expect major changes on the map of Russia's wider war as the fifth year of fighting grinds toward the sixth. Yes, the last two big free cities in the Donbas are in trouble. But "the overall situation remains unchanged since October 2023," Thorkill wrote.

The Russians slowly advance. The Ukrainians slowly fall back. And losses deepen on both sides.

Desperately short of missiles for its roughly 10 Patriot air defense batteries, Ukraine has just a few options as colder weather looms—and the Russians prepare to fire even more hard-to-intercept Iskander ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities and power plants.

The Iskander is a unique threat, and Ukraine is uniquely vulnerable. The Patriot is one of just a few systems that stands any chance of hitting an incoming Iskander as the Russian missile barrels in at six or seven times the speed of sound. And the Patriot is, or was, the most plentiful anti-ballistic interceptor. It usually takes two or three of them to bring down one Iskander.

Then came Iran. Coalition forces fired an average of 225 interceptors a day during the first four days of the war against Lockheed Martin's production rate of 1.7 a day, the Foreign Policy Research Institute calculated—a 132-to-one gap between use and manufacture. Lockheed built 620 Patriots in all of 2025. And every Patriot the Americans fire at an Iranian missile is a Patriot Ukraine won't be able to fire at a Russian missile.

Ukrainian batteries have so few missiles that air defenders can do little more than watch as the 3.8-ton Iskanders and other heavy Russian missiles barrel in. "This is a really heartbreaking sight when you have equipment but you're not able to intercept any missile," Dmytro, the chief engineer of Ukraine's Patriot fleet, told CNN. "Ballistic missiles are flying over your head and you are not able to do anything with it, and behind you, there are civilians." He first ran out of interceptors in December 2025.

Across the 39-day campaign, CSIS estimates 1,060 to 1,430 Patriots were expended—more than half the US prewar inventory. At Lockheed's rate, replacing them takes three years.

And a Patriot cannot be conjured. A single PAC-3 MSE takes about 24 months to build, its solid rocket motor 30. In January the Pentagon signed a seven-year deal for Lockheed to reach 2,000 Patriots a year—by 2030, by which point the Russo-Ukrainian war will be eight years old. Far too late to save Ukraine from the coming hard winter.

The Ukrainian air force has two other batteries that can intercept ballistic missiles, both French-Italian SAMP/Ts, and they are short of missiles too. France agreed in November to send eight next-generation SAMP/Ts over two years—a schedule, not a stockpile.

Winter looms

The interceptor crisis will only worsen as winter looms and the supply of electricity for residential heating once again becomes a matter of life and death for millions of Ukrainians. Iskanders "could hit all significant non-nuclear electricity generation," Jakub Janovsky, a Czech military analyst, explained to Euromaidan Press. The Kremlin has cut production of several other missile types—including, as Euromaidan Press reported this month, the Kinzhal—to pour more into the Iskander.

"I wanted to secure 300 missiles for the Patriot systems as part of the winter package. The request from our Air Force is for 360," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told journalists on 23 August, in remarks posted to X. "But when only 600 are produced a year, 360 is not easy to obtain." He has asked Washington for 5% or 10% of the US stockpile, and says Ukraine will pay. By his own account it holds about 1%.

What are Ukraine's non-Patriot options?

Its own ballistic interceptor

Frantic for air defenses, Ukraine is developing its own. In May, Kyiv munitions-maker Fire Point unveiled Freya, a pan-European anti-ballistic project built around the FP-7.x—a 7.25-m composite interceptor derived from the company's FP-7 surface-to-surface missile. Cued by European radars and guided in the final moments by an infrared seeker from Germany's Diehl Defence, it is meant to cost around $700,000 a shot against a Patriot's $3.8 million.

Fire Point had run at least five tests by the end of July, and co-founder Denys Shtilerman told the Financial Times mass production could begin as early as this month. But the first attempt at intercepting an actual ballistic target is planned for around July 2027—a winter away, and then some. Infrared guidance is also reckoned less reliable than radar, since spoofing can mislead the seeker.

Sanctions on the Iskander supply chain

Sanctions may seem attractive, and there is a narrow chokepoint. Ammonium perchlorate makes up 45% to 52% of the Iskander's solid fuel, and Russia has exactly one plant that makes it—the state-owned ANOSIT—according to the Economic Security Council of Ukraine.

That plant depends on imported sodium chlorate, a chemical Russia lost the ability to make when the USSR collapsed. Russia bought more than $40 million of it in 2024 and the first half of 2025, 61% from China and most of the rest from the Farg'onaazot chemical plant in Uzbekistan. The largest Russian importer, Pioneer Trade, sells on to firms that supply the Iskander's designer, its cluster-warhead maker, and the Votkinsk plant that builds the missile.

But Russia gets around sanctions by buying through third parties. And while the European Union already restricts the export of sodium chlorate to Russia, neither Farg'onaazot nor any of the Russian importers moving it is under blocking sanctions. Even where the bans hold, they just "make things more costly and less convenient," Janovsky told Euromaidan Press. "They can't stop things from happening if the other side really wants to do something."

Deep strikes against the Iskander supply chain

Ukraine has already tried this one. The main Iskander factory is in Votkinsk, 1,400 km from the border, and on the night of 20–21 February Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missiles hit it. Zelenskyy said every missile launched reached the plant. Satellite imagery confirmed damage to a workshop where Iskanders and Oreshniks are assembled; local officials reported two shops damaged and 11 people injured.

Iskander production rose anyway. So the question is not whether Ukraine can reach Votkinsk—it can, and did—but whether it can launch enough munitions at once to inflict damage that lasts. "Ukraine can try a massive saturation strike with hundreds of drones and dozens of cruise missiles to overwhelm local defenses and wreck enough of the factory complex to at least temporarily disable the production," Janovsky said. That might take essentially the entire Ukrainian deep strike force—and if it failed, Russian industry would get a months-long reprieve.

Kill the launchers before they shoot

This is the hardest one. Russian crews keep their Iskander launchers 140 to 150 km behind the front line, beyond the reach of Ukraine's HIMARS, and move them to firing positions along forest roads—sometimes for five hours—to stay out of satellite view. Once in position, a launcher needs about 16 minutes to send its first missile and four for the second, then it leaves. Twenty minutes, in the open, somewhere in a forest, a hundred and fifty kilometers away.

Ukraine is trying anyway. On 23 August, Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces had struck an Iskander launcher near the border, and described a dedicated program to hunt the launch sites. Euromaidan Press could not independently verify the strike. He was explicit about why the program exists. "When our anti-ballistic missile stocks are at a minimum, there is another tactic," he said. "It is more difficult, and we developed it."

All options but one arrive after the cold

Unable to shoot down all the Iskanders, Ukraine may have no choice but try everything all at once: sanction the suppliers, attack the supply chain, hunt the launchers, and scurry to deploy homemade interceptors. All while continuing to beg for every available Patriot.

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Ukraine may have just lost its first Swedish assault boat—to a Russian jet drone

A rare armored vehicle has made a surprise appearance in the Ukrainian order of battle. A recent official photo depicts a three-person, 49-ton T-64BM alongside tankers from the Ukrainian army's 57th Motorized Brigade. The brigade holds the line in northern Ukraine around 30 km northwest of Kharkiv.

What's unusual is that the 57th Motorized Brigade was known to operate the lighter T-64BV tank, the standard tank in Ukrainian service. Moreover, the Ukrainian army doesn't have many T-64BMs. There were around 80 in the Ukrainian inventory on the eve of the wider Russian invasion in February 2022, and at the time all but a handful belonged to the 1st Tank Brigade and the 12th Independent Tank Battalion.

Both units had a single T-64BM battalion with around 31 tanks.

In 54 months of hard fighting, the 12th Independent Tank Battalion and 1st Tank Brigade—the latter now reorganized into the less tank-heavy 1st Heavy Mechanized Brigade—has lost around a quarter of their T-64BMs. Even if the units cannibalized a few T-64BMs from training grounds, today they'd both struggle to field a full battalion of T-64BMs.

Given the thin supply, where did the 57th Motorized Brigade's T-64BMs come from? It's a question that vexes French historian Stevius. And it may point to a growing shortage of the best tanks in the Ukrainian armed forces as losses deepen and years of combat take their toll on vehicles' material condition. "The use of a few specimens from training units to fill the gaps ... would tend to show that the Ukrainians have practically exhausted their stock of tanks that they can bring back to operational condition," Stevius noted.

Overall, the Ukrainians have lost no fewer than 1,400 tanks, according to a tally by the Oryx open-source intelligence collective. That's more tanks the the Ukrainian armed forces had in their inventory in 2022. The Ukrainians have largely made good their losses by restoring old stored T-64s and T-72s while also accepting donations of hundreds of surplus tanks from foreign allies.

But even with the restored and donated tanks, there's still a shortfall. It's fortunate, then, that tanks are growing less important by the day as tiny drones—which are lethal to tanks—fill the sky over the 1,200-km disputed gray zone in Ukraine.

Up-armored T-64

The $2.5-million T-64BM is a better-protected variant of the standard T-64, which the tank factory in Kharkiv produced first for Soviet forces and, later, for Ukrainian forces. To produce a T-64BM, the Kharkiv Tank Plant swapped in the 125-mm main gun from the newer T-80 tank, tweaked the fire controls and added slabs of Nozh modular armor on the front of the hull, the turret face and the roof.

The problem was, and still is, that the add-on armor weighs three tons. "The weight of the Nozh armor modules unbalances the tank toward the front and strains the shock absorbers," Stevius explained. Even replacing the T-64's 700-hp diesel engine with a more powerful 850-hp model didn't fully compensate for the added weight. That "results in the T-64BM Bulat suffering from underpowering, regularly causing engine overheating," Stevius pointed out.

Still, the type fought hard in the initial Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine starting in 2014. And eight years later, T-64BMs with the 1st Tank Brigade successfully defended the city of Chernihiv from invading Russian forces. "The faster autoloader on the T-64 allowed Ukrainian tank crews to achieve significant damage against surprised Russian units," Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds wrote in a 2022 report for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

As the war ground on and drones replaced heavy vehicles as the main means of attack and defense for both sides, the T-64BMs lost some relevance. Yes, both sides still deploy tanks—but mostly as mobile artillery firing at targets located by drones many kilometers away.

The lighter usage of tanks belies the shortage of functional tanks owing to combat losses and wear and tear, however, especially on the Ukrainian side. A sweeping reorganization of Ukrainian force structure last year eliminated many tank battalions, but the tank shortage persisted even after the unit reduction.

Stevius is stumped. "The presence of a T-64BM Bulat in the 57th Motorized Brigade, which until now has only used T-64BV, is therefore a surprise because their number is insufficient to equip both two or even one tank battalion of the 1st [Heavy Mechanized Brigade] and the ranks of the 12th Independent Tank Battalion," Stevius mused.

The likeliest explanation is the most worrying. The Ukrainians stripped tanks away from training units while also compelling front-line battalions to go into battle with fewer tanks. All in order to make sure all the tank units have at least a few tanks.

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Russia’s weirdest armored vehicle was built to fight infantry. The infantry stopped coming

On Monday, a small team of Russian infiltrators reportedly slipped 10 km behind the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian troops just north of Kostiantynivka in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.

Sneaking into the town of Druzhkivka, 10 km north of Kostiantynivka along the H20 highway, the Russians reportedly ambushed, captured and executed a group of three or four unarmed Ukrainian drone operators.

It's possible the drone operators had just arrived in Druzhkivka when the Russians appeared. According to analyst and mapper AMK Mapping, Ukrainian drone operators pulled out of the village of Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka—which lies between Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka—owing to the increasing threat from Russian KAB glide bombs. "It's likely that Russian forces monitored the withdrawals of Ukrainian drone operators and sent in [an infiltration group] after the new position was identified," AMK Mapping concluded.

The atrocity underscores the Russian military's new approach to ground warfare as Russia's wider war on Ukraine grinds through its 54th month. An army that once counted on its own artillery to suppress enemy artillery in order to allow mechanized forces to advance now uses precision bombs, small cruise missiles, tiny drones, and, yes, some artillery to suppress the Ukrainian drone teams that represent the main obstacle to a swift Russian advance.

And when the Russian firepower manages to suppress Ukrainian drone operators, allowing small teams of infantry to advance, the infantry's objective is often to take out the same drone operators whose suppression was a necessary pre-condition of any successful assault.

In short, the Ukrainians largely defend with drones. That means the Russians are fixated on first striking the drone teams in order to prevent them from launching their tiny lethal robots—and then, when they can, assaulting the drone teams' positions in order to capture or kill them. Or capture then kill them, as reportedly happened in Druzhkivka.

The Russians have learned the hard way that they can't advance without first finding and attacking Ukrainian drone operators. That hard experience has driven a profound transformation of the Russian way of war in just the last few years.

Precision suppression

As 2025 wore into 2026, Ukrainian forces finally deployed enough $500 drones to effectively halt any sustained Russian advance along the 1,200-km gray zone stretching across eastern and southern Ukraine. Between February and July, the Russians captured around 260 sq km of Ukrainian soil, according to a tally by the Black Bird Group. That's barely a fifth as much ground as they seized in the same six months in 2025.

Realizing they couldn't just fire an artillery barrage and then roll out the tanks the way they used to, the Russians have mostly parked their thousands of armored vehicles. Now they advance in small teams of lightly equipped infantry that, Russian commanders reason, stand a better chance of avoiding detecting and destruction by drones.

"Broadly speaking, current Russian military theory appears to emphasize restoring the ability to maneuver," Sidharth Kaushal and Sam Cranny-Evans wrote in a new study for the Royal United Services Institute in London. But the infantry infiltrators who do most of the maneuvering these days don't march out without support. A lot of it.

In the early months of the wider war in 2022 and 2023, the Russians counted on artillery—lots of artillery—to support the maneuver forces. But massed artillery is just as exposed to drone attack as massed tanks are, so Russian fire support has had to evolve, too.

Today, the Russians still fire artillery from fewer but more spread-out guns. But they also launch their own drones, small cruise missiles, and—perhaps most important—KAB glide bombs to force Ukrainian defenders, including drone teams, into their dugouts before the infantry dash across the gray zone. "Russian theorists appear to see the solution in highly mobile units designed to exploit lower-risk tunnels created by
precision strike," Kaushal and Cranny-Evans explained.

It's explosive choreography requiring careful communication between the infantry, the artillery, drone teams and the air force. "Sustaining momentum in the face of adversary precision strike is a considerable challenge," Kaushal and Cranny-Evans wrote. But a necessary one as the Russian military "contemplates how it can break the current positional deadlock" in Ukraine "and avoid future ones."

But when it works, it works to catastrophic effect for Ukrainian defenders. As those unfortunate, murdered drone operators found out.

The suppress-then-advance method, but with precision munitions and small teams of infiltrators, works for both sides, of course. The Ukrainians can do it, too—and they recently did in some unspecified sector of the gray zone.

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Ukraine’s secret counteroffensive takes the pressure off Sloviansk

On the same day the Russians executed those drone operators, fellow Ukrainian drone pilot Dmytro Putiata reported a small Ukrainian mechanized advance. "At one of the direction at the front line, one of the Ukrainian brigades used four [infantry fighting vehicles] during the attack," Putiata wrote. "They have managed to break through up to three km; dismounted infantry and all of the vehicles managed to retreat."

They break through with the help of friendly drones units that suppressed Russian troops along the assault route, Putiata explained. "How did they manage not to be targeted by drones? The battlefield was prepared for that."

Ukraine secret eastern counteroffensive seems to have been even more successful than some observers reported. It's possible that, in the sector just north of the town of Lyman in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps is just a few kilometers short of encircling two Russian regiments.

That doesn't mean the Russian units can't escape. After all, there isn't a contiguous line of Ukrainian forces—nor a contiguous line of Russian forces for that matter—anywhere along the 1,200-km disputed gray zone that threads across eastern and southern Ukraine.

But the closing pincer around elements of the Russian 2nd and 144th Motor Rifle Divisions could strain the Russians' logistics and compel the Russians to reconsolidate in order to preserve their combat power—by retreating east. That would take a lot of pressure off Lyman and, by extension, also take a lot of pressure off Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the last two big free cities in Donetsk.

Lyman, which lies 15 km northeast of Sloviansk—the northernmost of the free cities—is the main obstacle between at least six Russian regiments and Sloviansk. The Russians have been inching toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from several directions for months now, racing against the coming winter to position forces for a possible siege of the twin cities next year. Winter in Ukraine punishes any attacker by depriving them of the leafy tree canopy that can conceal infiltrating troops during warmer months.

According to the most recent map from analyst and mapper Thorkill, one of the more reliable observers of unit-level action in Ukraine, the Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade is just a few kilometers away from linking up with the 60th Mechanized Brigade in or around the village of Kolodyazi.

Galloping advance

If true, that means the 3rd Assault Brigade and adjacent units from the 3rd Army Corps have carried out one of the more successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in memory. In April they first exploited gaps in Russian defenses north of the village of Nove. In May and June they advanced toward the village. In July they captured it.

After that, the attacking Ukrainians kept pushing south into the right flank of a 10-km-by-10-km salient that advancing Russian regiments created as they maneuvered around Lyman from the north, aiming to surround the town instead of directly assaulting it on their way toward Sloviansk.

Leaving their flank exposed, the Russians trying to encircle Lyman found themselves at risk of encirclement, instead. If the 3rd Assault Brigade or 60th Mechanized Brigade—together possessing thousands of troops, on paper—can march through Kolodyazi, they will have closed a ring of loose Ukrainian control around at least two Russian regiments, also with potentially thousands of troops.

Emphasis on loose control. Again, there aren't enough Ukrainian forces on the ground north of Lyman to prevent any "encircled" Russians from retreating back to the east. But that retreat would represent a major victory for the Ukrainian defenders north and east of Sloviansk. "The fall of this salient [north of Lyman] would significantly delay the fall of Lyman," analyst and mapper AMK Mapping predicted.

No one expects the Russians to halt their offensive toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. But in potentially taking two steps forward and one step back in their northerly march on the free cities, the Russians sacrifice time. Time the Ukrainians can use to stiffen their defenses in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and evacuate more of the tens of thousands of civilians who remain in the cities despite the constant danger from Russian drones and bombs.

The possible extent of the Ukrainian gains north of Lyman—a 10-km march since April—is impressive given Russia's overall advantage in manpower and firepower in the east. Equally impressive is the operational security, or OPSEC, that cloaked the offensive until now. Sure, there were a few videos of action around Nove that hinted at a major Ukrainian action.

But the units involved exercised surprising discipline, and prevented too much information from leaking. "Someone in the 3rd Corps responsible for [OPSEC] is actually trying to do their job diligently and has quite effectively cut off information," Thorkill noted. The secrecy may have facilitated the Ukrainian advance by delaying any sense of panic among the Russian commanders who are responsible for reinforcing the Lyman salient, but who also tend to ignore bad news as long as possible because they know it could reflect poorly on them.

News of the counteroffensive is now available for all to see, even if official Ukrainian sources have yet to confirm it. That may mean time is running out for the 3rd Army Corps to close its pincer before the Russians retreat or reinforce. AMK Mapping has already seen some evidence of a "partial withdrawal from the most vulnerable positions in the salient.

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Can Ukrainian forces save Sloviansk and Kramatorsk?

Russian forces are fighting against time to close a pincer around the last free cities in eastern Ukraine. The deadline: the coming winter, which will strip the leaves from the trees and leave any attacking force exposed to overhead surveillance and attack.

But in one key sector, Ukrainian forces are spoiling the coordinated Russian operation to partially surround Sloviansk and neighboring Kramatorsk. With admirable operational security, or OPSEC, a clutch of Ukrainian brigades under the 3rd Army Corps hasn't just blunted the advance of the Russian Center Group of Forces—it has pushed the Russians back.

This Ukrainian counterattack along the axis through the town of Lyman, ongoing since May, has largely escaped widespread notice. Yes, there is some scant video evidence of Ukrainian attacks. And yes, a few analysts have adjusted their maps to account for apparent Ukrainian advances, especially in the direction of Nove, a Russian-occupied village 15 km north of Lyman, which itself lies 15 km north of Sloviansk.

But for the most part, Ukrainian and Russian sources have avoided talking about Lyman. "The Ukrainians kept a good level of OPSEC and the Russians have been reluctant to publish videos from these areas" depicting their retreats, analyst and mapper Clément Molin noted in June, just a few weeks after the Ukrainians attacked toward Nove.

Molin, for one, expects the OPSEC to lift in the coming days. "By the end of the month, we should have an official update on the good results of a Ukrainian offensive that has largely remained secret," he wrote on Monday.

April offensive

The Ukrainians' limited counteroffensive around Lyman apparently kicked off on in mid-April. One of the first attacks that left any real evidence occurred on 22 May, when a small Ukrainian mechanized force—perhaps from the 60th or 66th Mechanized Brigade, the 77th Air Assault Brigade, or the Presidential Brigade—attacked in armored trucks and M-113, Stryker, and BTR-4 armored personnel carriers. Heavy bomber drones flew top cover.

The Russian 144th Motor Rifle Division fought back with its own drones. Interceptor drones took aim at the bombers. First-person-view and heavy bomber drones blasted at least one BTR-4, hitting it before and after it dropped off its infantry passengers. Drones struck some of the disembarked Ukrainian infantry.

How many Ukrainian troops survived and entrenched in new positions on 22 May is unclear. Regardless, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps wasn't done with Nove. Attacks continued. And sometime after the 22 May assault on Nove, "the Ukrainians managed to consolidate their gains," Molin concluded after scrutinizing a few videos and some satellite imagery.

By early July, Ukrainian forces had succeeded in "operationally encircl[ing] the Russian forces defending the village of Nove," according to analyst and mapper Thorkill. "Fierce fighting is currently underway to expel the Russians from that locality," Thorkill reported at the time.

The aim of the Ukrainian counterattacks is obvious. The 3rd Army Corps intends to put pressure on the northern right flank of 10 km-by-10-km salient jutting into the battleground north of Lyman. The Russian 144th Motor Rifle Division has been pouring troops into the salient, clearly intending to surround and isolate Lyman instead of directly assaulting it—all in order to clear a path toward Sloviansk.

Salients are risky for both sides, however. The farther the Russians extend their Lyman salient, the more exposed they are on their flanks. The Ukrainians know this. And even if the 3rd Army Corps can't fully cut across the salient in order to surround the Russians inside of it, the corps can at least take advantage of the salient's exposed flanks.

Capturing Nove, on the very northern edge of the salient, could allow the Ukrainians to bring to bear more artillery and drones on the Russians south of Nove. The 3rd Army Corps doesn't have to fully encircle the Russian troops closest to Lyman in order to hammer them with withering firepower.

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Just how successful the 3rd Army Corps has been in its local counteroffensive could become clearer very soon. That won't spell lasting relief for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, however. Fighting against the clock as summer begins turning into fall and then winter, the Russians are slowly advancing toward the twin cities from several directions.

The siege of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk is coming. Perhaps not this year, but surely by 2027. To fully safeguard the twin cities, the Ukrainians would need to duplicate their success north of Lyman along several other directions.

That's a big ask of a Ukrainian force that's overall still outnumbered and outgunned.

Russia is now building its TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers with factory armor wrapped around the rocket tubes. The tracked TOS-1A and its flame-producing 220-mm rockets are a powerful and terrifying weapon. But the launcher is also extremely vulnerable to Ukraine's drones and artillery. The add-on armor may be the only way the launchers can survive.

The TOS-1A is a T-72 with the turret swapped out for 24 thermobaric rockets, and the newest ones arrive inside a welded steel shell that lifts open when the tubes elevate. Russia is armoring the launcher the way it armors the tanks it's built from. What happens when the armor fails is not the same.

The TOS-1A adds a 24-round launcher onto the hull of a T-72 tank. The system's MO.1.01.04M rocket travels as far as 6,000 m with a payload of fuel that, once ignited, burns as hot as 3,000 degrees Celsius. The fuel can spread across the ground and into buildings and bunkers, allowing even a single TOS-1A to scorch a wide area.

It's not for no reason that the TOS-1A is one of Russia's preferred siege weapons. TOS-1As rolled into action early in Russia's wider war on Ukraine. In one of their first actions, in May 2022, TOS-1As staged on hilltops overlooking the city of Lyman, in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, rained fire down on the front-line city. A few days later, Russian troops temporarily occupied Lyman.

The best day the TOS-1A ever had came at Bakhmut. In early April 2023, Russian crews fired across the Bakhmutka River at entrenched Ukrainian positions and opened a 300-m gap in the line, US Army analysts later reconstructed. Wagner mercenaries poured through and covered 1.25 km in a single day. At Pavlivka, thermobaric fire breached the Ukrainian line and the settlement eventually fell—though it took five months and cost Russia two wrecked naval infantry brigades.

With its origins firmly in the 1970s, the TOS-1A was designed for a different era, however. An era where rocket launchers could, with a little support, safely approach to within a few kilometers of the enemy. Artillery is an ever-present danger, of course. But artillery can be suppressed—usually by other artillery.

The era of relative safety for the TOS-1A ended as tiny explosive drones began filling the sky over Ukraine in 2023. Even the tiniest of these tiny drones has the range to hit a TOS-1A before the TOS-1A can get into position to fire its rockets. Worse, the TOS-1A's thermobaric rockets are extremely volatile—and tend to explode in massive fireballs when struck.

"Nasty weapons—and also great targets" for anti-tank missiles and other munitions, is how Czech analyst Jakub Janovsky described the TOS-1A in the war's opening days, before the drones even arrived.

The launcher has a weather problem, too. Its rockets carry an oxidizer premix, which means crews can't fire them in the rain or from high ground.

Deep losses

The Russians started losing TOS-1As almost immediately. Retreating from Kyiv Oblast on 1 April 2022, they left behind at least three launchers—two of them knocked out by Ukrainian Stugna-P missiles, one captured intact. Then the losses began piling up.

Today, 54 months into the wider war, the Ukrainians have destroyed, damaged or captured no fewer than 36 TOS-1As. 27 of them burned. Ukrainian crews turned at least one captured launcher on its former operators, firing it near Kreminna during the 2023 counteroffensive.

The losses are a problem for the Russians. US Army analysts estimated Russia's prewar TOS-1A fleet at 48 launchers, only a portion of which ever went to Ukraine. Documented losses now stand at 36, and Oryx counts only what it can see in a photograph. How much of that gap Russian factories have refilled isn't public.

What the losses did not do was change the war. For all its ferocity, the TOS-1A has had little to no effect on the conflict's outcome, US Army analysts concluded—and they name the short reach as the reason. A weapon that has to park within 6,000 m of the enemy is a weapon the enemy can find.

Armor, not range

The Russians got to work improving the TOS-1A and building more copies. The Omsk transport machinery plant, Omsktransmash, has turned out fresh batches for the defense ministry in September 2022, November 2022, November 2024 and again in November 2025, its parent concern Uralvagonzavod announcing each handover. It's unclear just how many replacement launchers the Russians acquired, but it's safe to assume they number in the dozens.

They also changed how they use the thing. Russian units now move single launchers up to the line under covering artillery fire rather than travelling in groups, reducing the likelihood of detection, the same US Army analysts reported. And the latest copies are up-armored against drones, with a shell of additional armor protecting the 24 launch tubes and their highly flammable rockets.

That isn't a brand-new idea. An earlier drone-protection variant was showcased in April 2024, and a different, serially produced kit went onto the batch shipped in November 2025. What circulated this month is fresh footage of the up-armored TOS-1As working out at a training range in Russia's Saratov Oblast.

The add-on armor is apparently factory-standard at this point, and it's a purpose-built enclosure rather than the improvised slat and mesh Russian regiments tend to weld onto their tanks before sending them across the drone-patrolled gray zone. The function is the same: put something between the drone and the thing that matters.

The best up-armored "turtle tanks" have been known to absorb dozens or even scores of drone impacts. A TOS-1A crew should hope the launcher's new armor is equally tough. After all, the consequence of a turtle tank losing its shell and taking a direct drone hit is often immobilization: the tank throws a wheel or a track or loses power and simply can't move anymore.

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Armor is the cheap answer, and it isn't the real one. The real one is a launcher that doesn't have to park 6,000 m from a Ukrainian drone operator.

Uralvagonzavod says a modernized TOS-1A on a T-80 chassis is nearing the end of trials, with better accuracy, more automation and a longer reach. How much longer, the company hasn't said. Analyst Alexey Tarasov expects a new launch module able to take longer-range rockets, perhaps carrying the system to roughly the 15 to 20 km of the wheeled TOS-2. Until then, the crews get a steel box.

It had better hold. The earlier, cruder answer didn't: a TOS-1A wearing a field-built metal cage burned anyway when a Ukrainian FPV drone found it. And if a TOS-1A's armor fails, the next drone hit could trigger 24 rockets each weighing 217 kg and packed with concentrated fuel that's primed to explode.

The Russian navy still has enough missile-armed warships in its battered Black Sea Fleet to sustain Kalibr cruise missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, if recent launches are any indication.

Overnight on 19 August, an unscathed Russian corvette lobbed eight Kalibrs at Ukraine. Seven were intercepted. The eighth struck the Antonov Aircraft Plant in Kyiv, according to the open-source monitor OSINT Warfare, in an attack that killed 15 overall. Ukrainian commanders had hoped that wouldn't be possible. A week earlier, they thought they had knocked the Kalibr shooters out of the fight.

Overnight on 12 August, Ukrainian drones and missiles targeted the Black Sea Fleet's main anchorage in Novorossiysk in southern Russia. Russians on the ground recorded fireballs billowing into the night sky, seemingly indicating significant damage to the port or its moored warships, potentially including the Black Sea Fleet's seven or eight surviving frigates, corvettes, and submarines that are compatible with the 2,500-km Kalibr.

The Ukrainian general staff in Kyiv claimed its forces had struck three Kalibr carriers—the frigates Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen and a Buyan-M corvette—as well as a lightly armed guard ship. But the uncertainty was, and still is, high. Even the general staff stressed its munitions had inflicted "varying degrees" of damage "according to preliminary information."

"Information is being clarified," the general staff stressed.

When the sun rose over the following days, commercial satellites snapped high-resolution photos of Novorossiysk, helping analysts assess damage from the 12 August strikes. The photos were hard to interpret. Yes, there were dark patches on the hulls of the two frigates and single corvette, but the discoloration didn't necessarily indicate drone or missile damage—to say nothing of confirming serious damage.

The pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team concluded Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen "sustained damage in the area of their launchers," potentially impacting the ships' ability to fire Kalibrs.

A later battle-damage assessment by OSINT account Absolutely Reliable Source said both frigates had suffered critical damage. It assessed that direct hits on Admiral Essen destroyed its eight-cell 3S14 vertical launch system for Kalibr missiles, while strikes on Admiral Makarov caused an internal detonation and burned out its 3S14 launch cells. The account said both ships had lost their strike capability and would require extensive repairs.

Uncertainty

Caution was prudent. In the first three years of Russia's wider war on Ukraine, Ukrainian forces succeeded in destroying or damaging around two dozen of the roughly 85 large ships in the Black Sea Fleet. Perhaps most notably, a pair of Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles holed and sank the Russian missile cruiser Moskva in April 2022.

But the strikes mostly missed the Kalibr carriers. Yes, the Ukrainians took out a Kalibr-armed Improved Kilo-class submarine in September 2023 and a Karakurt-class corvette, also armed with Kalibrs, in November 2023. But that left at least seven Kalibr shooters in the Black Sea Fleet. Eight if the Russians have managed to repair the Improved Kilo that apparently suffered some damage from a Ukrainian one-way unmanned attack submarine back in December.

It wasn't for a lack of trying that Ukrainian forces failed to eliminate, or even seriously dent, the Black Sea Fleet's Kalibr capacity prior to the 12 August raid on Novorossiysk. On 22 May, Fire Point FP-1 drones operated by the Ukrainian 414th Separate Unmanned Strike Aviation System Brigade motored the roughly 430 km to Novorossiysk and spotted a warship moored to a pier.

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The 414th Brigade believed it was Admiral Essen—and also believed it may have hit the ship. "The frigate Admiral Essen … entered the strike zone," the brigade crowed. "Damage level unknown."

In fact, it seems the ship the propeller-driven FP-1 barreled toward, and potentially struck with its warhead, wasn't Admiral Essen. The vessel in the FP-1's video feed, relayed via satellite or a mesh radio network, appeared to be a derelict Krivak-class frigate. Not Admiral Essen.

It was yet another near miss. Earlier, on 6 April, FP-1s dove down on Admiral Makarov. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces posted footage from the FP-1s' forward-facing thermal cameras that indicated the drones got close to Admiral Makarov. But the footage didn't point to an obvious hit.

Overhead satellite imagery from later on 6 April seemingly told a more complete story. The drones may have left a scorch mark on the frigate's bow, but there was no sign of structural damage. If the 12 August raid really did inflict meaningful damage on Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen and a Buyan-M, it represented a profound reversal for Ukrainian forces. After trying and trying again for months, they'd finally hit some of the ships that really mattered among the survivors of the Black Sea Fleet.

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The problem for the Ukrainians is that, even if three Kalibr shooters are temporarily out of the fight, there are still four, possibly five, Kalibr shooters left. And that's enough to sustain frequent attacks on Ukrainian cities. A single Buyan-M corvette can fire eight Kalibrs at a time. And eight, as it turns out, is a typical number of Kalibrs in the mix when Russian air, sea, and ground forces launch their combined drone and missile barrages.

The Black Sea Fleet reminded everyone of that uncomfortable fact overnight on 19 August. A Buyan-M corvette at Novorossiysk fired eight Kalibrs—exactly one magazine—into a barrage that also carried Onyx and Zircon missiles, Iskander-M and KN-23 ballistic missiles, three dozen air-launched cruise missiles, and 168 drones. Ukrainian air defenses stopped seven of the eight Kalibrs. They could not stop the ballistic missiles, and the eighth Kalibr got through to the Antonov plant, which had already been hit that night by Iskanders and Zircons.

If the attack on 12 August actually did eliminate or even just temporarily sideline three Kalibr carriers, it still represents a partial victory for Ukraine. It's likely no fewer than four shooters remain. And given how long it took Ukrainian deep strike forces to maybe damage Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen and that Buyan-M, the Black Sea Fleet may be able to continue blasting away at Ukrainian cities for many months to come.

Ukraine's southeastern counteroffensive has rolled back Russian advances at the intersections of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk Oblasts. The Ukrainian attacks set back, by months if not years, the Russian plan for marching on Zaporizhzhia City from the northeast.

But there's a shorter path for the Russians: the southern approach through the town of Orikhiv, around 50 km from Zaporizhzhia City. And the Russians may not need to travel all of it. The stated Russian objective on this axis, according to the Institute for the Study of War, is to advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City—which means getting to within 20 or 30 km of a regional capital, not capturing it. That is what Russian forces did to Kharkiv.

The route is short but hard. And for three years, it has been blocked at its first obstacle by the ruins of a prison.

The first obstacle for the Russians is the village of Mala Tokmachka. In particular, the thickly built ruins of a former prison, which function as an interlocking series of bunkers for the Ukrainian 118th Mechanized Brigade. The second obstacle is Orikhiv itself, which sits astride all the passable roads leading to Zaporizhzhia City.

The Russian Defense Ministry announced the capture of Mala Tokmachka on 16 November 2025. Ukrainian government sources still had the village under Ukrainian control in April 2026. Russian milblogger Boris Rozhin's repeated claims that the village was nearly cleared became, in Meduza's account, the most popular Russian military meme of the first half of 2026—shorthand for the distance between what the Russian army announces and what it holds.

Observer Thorkill has watched closely as Russian forces have probed for weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses between the disputed gray zone and Zaporizhzhia City—and found very few.

The Russian army's 270th Motor Rifle Regiment, which is part of the 42nd Motor Rifle Division, has been trying to advance through Mala Tokmachka "for many months," Thorkill noted. But the Russian attacks "have always faltered against the strongly fortified strongpoint in the complex of ruins of the former prison buildings."

If the Russians can't capture Orikhiv, they can't get their artillery within range of Zaporizhzhia City. But they can't capture Orikhiv if they don't first capture Mala Tokmachka. And they can't take Mala Tokmachka if they don't overrun the old prison.

Surround first, storm later

Frustrated in their attempts to directly assault the prison, the Russians took a different approach in early July. Borrowing tactics that have worked for Russian field armies all along the 1,200-km gray zone, the Russians set out to cut off Mala Tokmachka and starve its garrison before trying again to capture the prison complex.

The geography lends itself to this approach. The Russians control the village of Robotyne, 10 km south of Orikhiv, as well as the road leading north from Robotyne through the village of Novodanylivka, which lies just south of the Mala Tokmachka-Orikhiv conglomeration.

If the conglomeration has a soft underbelly, it's Novodanylivka. And in a series of actions in early July, the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment pushed enough small infiltration groups into Novodanylivka to take the village from the 118th Mechanized Brigade. In capturing Novodanylivka, the Russians "drove a narrow wedge into the Ukrainian defense," according to Thorkill.

The wedge was not the end of the plan. It was the preparation for it. With Novodanylivka in Russian hands and the supply route between Orikhiv and Mala Tokmachka under threat, the Russians came back to the assault.

Five days in August

In the five days to 17 August, Russian forces "massively stepped up their assault operations towards Orikhiv from several different directions, resulting in a partial collapse of Ukrainian defences," mapper AMK Mapping reported. The mapper counted a Russian gain of around 26 sq km across the sector.

The Russians re-established control over the eastern part of Mala Tokmachka and began infiltrating the northern part. Several groups crossed north over the Kinska River and are now attacking Ukrainian trench fortifications on the tactical heights beyond. "If they are able to consolidate," AMK Mapping wrote, "a defense of Mala Tokmachka by Ukraine will become nearly impossible." To the northeast, Russian forces broke through north of Bilohirya, putting the Ukrainian troops there at risk of being cut off.

The Polish Centre for Eastern Studies reached a similar reading on 18 August, reporting that Russian assault sub-units had begun to replace the sabotage and reconnaissance groups, that the battle for the eastern part of Orikhiv appeared to have begun, and that the eastern part of Mala Tokmachka was most likely under Russian control.

Heavy fighting continues for the prison complex and the residential streets around it. "The goal of the offensive operations by the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division is not, for the time being, the capture of Orikhiv," Thorkill wrote, "but rather the elimination of the presence of Ukrainian soldiers in the Mala Tokmachka area."

If the Russians can squeeze the Ukrainians out of Mala Tokmachka, they could pivot toward Orikhiv without worrying about Ukrainian positions at their rear. And they would be one strongpoint closer to putting a regional capital of several hundred thousand people under daily artillery fire.

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Russian troops inch toward Lyman. Drones keep delaying the plan.

Russia's Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, a version of the ground-launched Iskander, travels as far as 2,000 km at a claimed 10 times the speed of sound while packing a 500-kg warhead. It was one of a clutch of purported super-weapons that Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin revealed in a dramatic announcement in 2018.

Launched in mid-air by specially modified Mikoyan MiG-31 interceptors in order to boost its speed and range, the Kinzhal is, in theory, a powerful deep strike munition capable of blasting right through all but the best and rarest air defenses.

In practice, it kept missing. Russia stopped building the $4.5-million missile in April, Maj. Gen. Vadym Skibitskyi, Ukraine's deputy chief of defense intelligence, told RBC-Ukraine—and the rocket fuel and components that had gone into Kinzhals now go into Iskanders, sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles, and air-launched Kh-101 cruise missiles instead.

A missile of this class needs to land within five to seven meters of its aim point to be worth firing. The Kinzhal, according to Skibitskyi, lands within 30 meters or more. "We can hardly recall a single instance where this missile hit the target precisely," he said. Satellite imagery of the Ukrainian air base at Starokostiantyniv, a favorite Kinzhal target, shows the craters ringing the airfield rather than sitting on it.

The Kolomna Machine Building Design Bureau reportedly contracted 44 Kinzhals in 2024 and 144 in 2025, Militarnyi reported from Russian defense ministry documents. The line climbed for two years and then stopped dead.

The Kinzhal isn't the only munition reportedly getting the ax. The Kremlin is also halting production of the Kh-32 air-launched cruise missile, which Russian engineers repeatedly failed to improve before the program was sent back for further work. "This would explain why Russia has not launched any Kinzhals for multiple months, and very few Kh-32s," AMK Mapping noted.

At least one analyst anticipated this development years ago. Way back in 2022, then-CNA analyst Michael Kofman wrote that he didn't "understand the interest in Russian use of Kinzhal. There's nothing special or particularly exciting about this system." It is, according to Kofman, just an Iskander but with a more complicated and expensive launch method.

It may have taken the Russians a few years to come to the same conclusion. The last Kinzhal strike might have been on 14 May, when the Russians launched three Kinzhals as part of a wider strike on Ukrainian cities involving 731 missiles and drones.

The purported Kinzhal shutdown, if true, could orphan the boutique fleet of around two dozen MiG-31K/I interceptors whose main role is to haul a Kinzhal to high altitude before launch. The Kinzhal carriers account for around 20% of the wider MiG-31 fleet, whose main mission is air defense over the vast Russian interior.

The MiGs may end up as victims of ruthless efficiency-seeking. If Skibitskyi is right, the Kremlin simply can't afford to keep every munition in production as it seeks to escalate its bombardment of Ukrainian cities amid growing economic losses from Ukrainian deep strikes targeting Russian strategic industries.

It's possible the only way the Russians can boost production of their best deep strike munitions is to cut production of the underperforming ones. According to the pro-Ukrainian Conflict Intelligence Team, the savings in fuel, components, and funds from the suspended Kinzhal and Kh-32 assembly lines "were redirected to other types of missiles."

Production winners and losers

That's how, in July, Russia reportedly produced 65 Iskanders, surpassing its target of 60 by nearly 10%. Meanwhile, production of Kh-101s reached 140% of the monthly target. Kalibr production 111%. Across its main missile lines, Russian industry is running at 110 to 120% of plan. Certain Russian munitions may soon disappear from the sky over Ukraine, if they haven't already. But only because more copies of better munitions are taking their place.

Ironically, the Kinzhals and their carriers are fading away at the same time Ukraine's own deep strike forces may have landed their most powerful blow against the aerial hypersonic strike force. On 15 August, a barrage of Ukrainian drones and cruise missiles struck a range of targets deep inside Russia.

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Among the targets was Savasleyka air base, in Nizhny Novgorod around 785 km from Ukraine. "Direct hits and fires reported," WarTranslated noted.

Among other aircraft, Savasleyka air base hosts some of the MiG-31Ks that carry Kinzhal missiles. Or once carried them, if Skibitskyi is correct and the missile has fallen out of use. It's unclear whether the attack on Savasleyka damaged or destroyed any MiG-31s.

Even if the Kinzhal launchers burned to the ground, it may be too late to matter. The Russians may have rendered the planes and their missiles irrelevant before the Ukrainians could drone them.

Russian forces may have finally found a way to protect their tanks from Ukrainian first-person-view drones. And it's not the usual add-on armor applications that have defined mechanized combat in Ukraine since the early months of Russia's wider war.

No, the Russians have begun deploying tanks fitted with the Arena-M active protection system (APS), which detects incoming FPVs and automatically fires a small projectile at them. The first few assaults by Arena-M-equipped tanks ended in defeat for the Russians, but limited combat footage shows the system can destroy incoming FPVs.

At least one Arena-M did work against FPVs—it just did not work long enough to save the tank. Observer Andrei_bt stressed that a reported 12-round loadout "does not match modern realities." Footage published on 7 August showed Ukrainian FPVs attacking an Arena-M-equipped T-72B3M near occupied Volodymyrivka, though the Institute for the Study of War assessed that it likely showed the late-July mechanized assault. Ukrainian drone operator Dmytro Putiata reported that one Arena-M shot down seven FPVs before Ukrainian forces destroyed the tank.

That is a smaller problem than the one the Russians had a month ago, and it is why the burned-out tanks along the road in Donetsk Oblast are not the whole story. Russia has spent three years accumulating tanks it cannot safely send anywhere—thousands of them, rebuilt and parked for want of a defense against $500 drones. An Arena-M that does not run dry halfway to the objective is the thing that would let those tanks out of the yard.

The good news for Russian mechanized forces is that developers now know Arena-M needs a bigger ammo loadout. The bad news is that packing more projectiles into the system could prove extremely difficult. The main problem: adding any further bulk to the turret-mounted projectile launchers could block a tank's engine compartment, preventing access for maintenance.

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If there's a workaround, it may involve redesigning the Arena-M to fire smaller but more numerous projectiles.

Ammunition may not even be the binding constraint. Ukrainian aviation expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi put the Arena-M's engagement range at 20 to 30 meters and its detection range at around 50—numbers that leave very little time against a drone diving from above, however many charges are in the launchers.

The Institute for the Study of War, for its part, assesses that the Arena-M alone is currently insufficient to protect Russian mechanized assaults from Ukrainian drones because the system can be saturated, though it raises the cost and effort required of Ukrainian forces.

An Arena-M with more rounds could be the development Russian commanders were waiting for as they continue stockpiling new and refurbished tanks and fighting vehicles. Doubling down on production of T-90 and T-72 tanks, the Kremlin has more than made good its combat losses in the first 54 months of the wider war.

Tank-led assaults have been rare in the last year of fighting as Russian forces have pivoted to infantry-led infiltration tactics. That may change as infantry losses deepen and commanders gain confidence in the Arena-M to protect tanks from drone attack.

Combat debut

The Arena-M, designed by the Kolomna Engineering Design Bureau, uses Doppler radar to spot incoming rockets, missiles, and drones, and counter-munitions meant to shred a threat shortly before impact. The concept is old: the Soviets fitted the Drozd system to modernized T-55ADs in the 1980s, and Russian designers have been chasing active protection since their tanks were mauled in Chechnya.

Three decades on, the Russian government daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta conceded on 7 August that there is still no generalized battlefield data on how the Arena-M performs, and that its potential against threats attacking from above needs further study.

Anti-Drone Armor Evolution

Evolution of Russia's anti-drone protection of tanks

From crude cages to shooting back—four years of trial and error

2022

Cope cage

Metal slats or mesh bolted over turrets to block incoming FPV drones

Spring 2023

Turtle tank

Entire vehicles wrapped in drone-blocking metal shells

Spring 2025

Porcupine

Hundreds of thick rebar spines welded to cope cages and shells

Autumn 2025

Hedgehog & dandelion

Thousands of thin aluminum hairs; branching stalks with Kevlar mesh

July 2026

Arena-M

Radar-cued charges shoot drones down instead of blocking them—reported fielded loadout: 12 rounds

Chart: Euromaidan Press

The system had its major combat debut in Ukraine on and around 23 July, over several days of Russian mechanized attacks in the Dobropillia sector of eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast. The Russian Center Group of Forces rolled a large mechanized assault group along the road through the village of Pankivka, roughly 36 km southwest of Kramatorsk and its twin free city of Sloviansk.

Ukrainian drones spotted the tanks coming, and attacked. When the smoke and dust cleared, the Russians had lost at least nine tanks. Reportedly seven of them were T-72B3A models with Arena-M installations.

The losses belie the Arena-M's effectiveness. The protection systems shot down drone after drone, and only stopped shooting down drones when they ran out of projectiles. "In general, it took from 15 to 20 FPV drones to destroy a tank," Ukrainian drone operator Dmytro Putiata reported.

While some of the best-protected turtle, porcupine, and hedgehog tanks have been able to withstand more than 20 FPVs before being immobilized, the add-on metal plates and bars that comprise turtle, porcupine, and hedgehog installations are extremely heavy—and tend to ruin a tank's transmission, weigh on its mobility, and prevent it from rotating its turret and aiming its main gun.

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Russia took the cages off its newest tanks. The new Arena-M shield bought them a few minutes.

In other words, the add-on armor prevents tanks from fighting like tanks—using their speed and firepower to close with and destroy the enemy.

The Arena-M installation is bulky but it's not heavy. With Arena-M, a tank can defend itself from drones without sacrificing its mobility. If an Arena-M had, say, 24 rounds instead of just 12, an attacking tank might be able to fend off drones long enough to reach its objective across the disputed gray zone.

But only barely. "15 to 20 FPV drones to destroy a tank is a perfectly viable rate," Czech analyst Jakub Janovsky noted in a comment on Putiata's social media. "At those numbers, Russia could throw its entire [armored fighting vehicle] fleet at the Ukrainian front line over a few months without achieving much more than creating a future low-grade iron ore deposit."

What if the Russians could fit 36 rounds in an upgraded Arena-M installation? Would that be enough?

No one knows for sure until they try. What we do know is that "the Russian military is learning and is experimenting in how to employ armor on a drone-saturated battlefield," explained Rob Lee, an analyst with the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. "The Arena-M APS demonstrated effectiveness and will likely be improved."

And those improvements could unlock those thousands of tanks the Russians have parked for want of drone defenses.

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Russia mastered drone-proofing its tanks—Ukraine is copying its tricks

On or around 12 August, a Russian Geran-4 attack drone found a Ukrainian navy CB-90 in the waters off the Kinburn Spit and attacked it. Three days later, another Geran-4 went after a Ukrainian tugboat in the same waters. If the CB-90 sank, it may be the first one the Ukrainian navy has lost.

The CB-90 is a Swedish design and a Swedish gift, and it is the reason Ukraine can raid the spit at all. Fifteen meters long, armored against small arms, gun-armed and capable of around 40 knots, it can put 21 troops—or a ton of machinery—onto a hostile beach and be gone before the defenders react. Sweden has supplied most of the more than 38 in Ukrainian service; Norway, the Netherlands and the Ukrainian billionaire Rinat Akhmetov's Steel Front initiative supplied the rest. Swedish instructors trained the crews.

Russia has now answered Ukraine's raids, and it is aiming at the boats rather than the raiders. The Geran-4s doing the hunting are jet-propelled, AI-assisted and fast enough to outrun most of what Ukraine can shoot back with. If the campaign continues, it could close the approach that has made the raids possible.

What that approach makes possible is worth spelling out. In July, unmanned boats belonging to the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces landed at least one gun-armed unmanned ground vehicle on the Kinburn Spit, the westernmost Russian outpost in occupied Ukraine. As aerial drones watched, the UGV opened fire on a nearby Russian installation. No Ukrainian was anywhere near the beach.

Russian forces on the Kinburn Spit can monitor Ukrainian maritime traffic, making the narrow sandy spit a key outpost in the ongoing battle for the Black Sea's most important sea lanes. Ukrainian forces are determined to dislodge Russian forces from the spit. The Russians are determined to cling to their sandy outpost.

The Geran attacks are helping. The 12 August Geran raid targeted the CB-90. The 15 August Geran raid targeted the tugboat. It's unclear how much damage the Gerans inflicted, but it's worth noting that the CB-90 is just 15 m long; a tugboat might be slightly longer. A Geran's warhead weighs as much as 90 kg—probably enough to sink such a small vessel or burn it down to the keel.

The Ukrainian navy has only a few large warships, and they're all donated minehunters that have been waiting out the current wider war in the relative safety of European waters. The bulk of the Ukrainian fleet is made up of small patrol boats, auxiliaries such as tugs, and several types of unmanned surface vessels. These vessels defend waterways and ports and, more rarely, support offensive operations.

Spit raids

The July robot landing was one episode in a long Ukrainian raiding campaign along the spit—the kind of operation the Geran-4s are now trying to spoil.

The Geran strikes on Ukrainian boats could blunt these raids and help the Russians maintain their tenuous hold on the Kinburn Spit. The Russian strikes are part of a wider maritime campaign. Shortly after Ukrainian drone units began targeting the unregistered cargo ships and tankers belonging to Russia's shadow fleet, Russian drone and missile units retaliated—with devastating attacks on Ukrainian ports and the ships sailing to and from these ports in support of Ukraine's lucrative grain exports.

The Ukrainian attacks on the shadow fleet damaged hundreds of ships and effectively ground Russian Black Sea trade to a halt. But Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports effectively ground Ukrainian Black Sea trade to a halt, too.

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The new jet-propelled Geran-4s with their AI-assisted targeting were central to the effort. Their 500 km/h top speed makes them hard to shoot down. And the AI makes jamming far less useful than it used to be: the operator locks the drone onto a target, and from there the machine vision flies the attack, holding the lock even if Ukrainian electronic warfare severs the radio link in the final seconds.

That makes the CB-90s valuable targets. Armed with guns and armored against enemy small arms fire, they're perfect for raiding far-flung enemy outposts such as those on the Kinburn Spit. But they're vulnerable to drone attack—and each one is irreplaceable in the sense that matters, since Ukraine cannot build them and has to wait for the next donation.

Ukrainian forces aren't powerless to stop the Russians from spoiling Ukrainian raids on the spit. Geran-4s might be too fast for Ukrainian gun teams, armed light aircraft, and cheap interceptor drones, but they're not too fast for supersonic Ukrainian air force MiG-29 fighters.

Several of the MiGs patrol over the western Black Sea. One crashed recently, but others remain.

The scale of Ukrainian forces' counteroffensive in southeastern Ukraine early this year is finally becoming clear. In six months of maneuver starting on 29 January, a clutch of Ukrainian units, including the 78th, 79th, 80th, 82nd, and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 1st and 425th Assault Regiments—tens of thousands of troops, in all—marched through gaps in Russian defenses and, according to Ukrainian officials, liberated around 745 square km and 26 settlements. Mostly in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but also in neighboring Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts.

That is Kyiv's own accounting, and it is the high end. The Institute for the Study of War, which maps control from geolocated imagery, put the figure at roughly 627 square km across the Oleksandrivka direction and the northern Hulyaipole direction—while noting its own conservative method probably undercounts. Either number describes the largest Ukrainian territorial gain since 2023.

The Ukrainian gains helped to offset Russian gains around the last few free cities in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast. Between the start of February and the end of July, Russian regiments captured a net total of just 260 square km of Ukrainian soil, according to a tally by the Black Bird Group. It would've been more than 1,000 square km if those air assault and assault units hadn't been busy clearing the Russians from a wide swathe of the southeast.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive kicked off on 29 January. Three days later, Elon Musk's Starlink bricked Russia's thousands of smuggled and stolen satellite terminals. Practically overnight, the Russians lost their best method for controlling small drones and guiding assault units across the disputed gray zone. Drones couldn't fly. Troops couldn't navigate.

Ukrainian commanders surely knew their communications advantage wouldn't last: the Russians would eventually adapt with new methods of command and control. Seizing the opportunity, Ukrainian paratroopers and assault troops pressed the attack. And in stark contrast to the usual assault tactics for both sides, the Ukrainians attacked in tanks and other armored vehicles, counting on the Russians' connectivity problems to clear a path for heavy forces.

The blackout was not the only thing working in Ukraine's favor. ISW credits the gains to five reinforcing factors: better operational planning, a campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses, deeper strikes on Russian logistics, Ukrainian drone superiority at the tactical level—and the Starlink cutoff. But the cutoff is the one that arrived all at once, and it arrived just as Ukrainian armor was starting to move.

Mechanized assaults

Not all the vehicles got through. The assault troops lost one up-armored M-1 Abrams tank in early February. But by March, other assault forces M-1s were engaging Russian troops at point-blank range with their 120-mm main guns. After clearing a few disputed villages along a 45-km front between Dobropillya and Zelenyi Hai, the Ukrainians focused their maneuver and firepower on Komar, 12 km southeast of Zelenyi Hai.

The Ukrainians "started a slow and quiet offensive, with very few videos and small teams, during April and May," mapper Clément Molin recalled. The strict information security obscured the Ukrainian moves for all but the closest observers, allowing Ukrainian commanders to press their attacks without drawing too much attention—and risking a Russian countercounteroffensive.

By summer, the Ukrainians were within mortar range of Komar. Embarrassed Russian commanders resorted to sending out small teams on virtual suicide missions to plant Russian flags in disputed territory. The flags could create the impression of Russian control on terrain that, in fact, neither side controlled. "Russia is trying to intoxicate us with flag videos, which are meant to hide the real situation to both us and their command," Molin wrote.

The reality was that the Ukrainians had gained ground. A lot of it.

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Announcing the results on 12 August, Ukrainian officials also claimed 9,550 Russian troops killed and more than 6,600 wounded—figures no independent body has verified. Former commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, who planned the operation, said it proved the Ukrainian army "is capable not only of steadfastly holding its defences, but also of launching offensives, seizing the initiative, and liberating Ukrainian land."

But the momentum was unsustainable. As the Russians gradually restored command and control through the summer, the Ukrainians encountered more resistance. Now the gray zone is stabilizing again. Observer Moklasen predicted new Ukrainian commander in chief Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi will order his corps and brigade commanders "to dig in positions, consolidate and strengthen more army corps" instead of continuing to attack.

After all, the Russians are pushing hard in Donetsk, and the resources the Ukrainians had devoted to the southeastern counteroffensive could boost the defensive effort in the east. Moreover, there are worrying signs the Kremlin may attempt another mobilization soon, potentially surging hundreds of thousands of fresh troops into Ukraine.

The Ukrainians may soon prioritize holding over attacking.

On 16 July, one-way attack drones from the Ukrainian state security service—the vaunted SBU—motored 800 km to strike Engels-2 air base in western Russia. At the time, there were reportedly five bombers on the ground at the base: four Tupolev Tu-22Ms and a single Tupolev Tu-95.

The drones struck the four-engine, propeller-driven Tu-95. "According to preliminary data, the plane suffered critical damage," the SBU claimed. "It completely tore off the tail part." That particular aircraft, the SBU added, had been used systematically to launch massed missile strikes on Ukraine. Satellite imagery later confirmed the bomber's destruction.

Nearly a month later, we finally know which drone type the SBU flung at Engels-2 and its parked bombers. They were MICH 2000s—Ukrainian aircraft that began as copies of the Chinese ZTK-150, built after Beijing stopped selling. Ukrainian website Oboronka, which visited the factory, broke the news. "Today, the Mich' is no longer just a Chinese plane, but a drone that is exclusively used by the SBU Special Operations Center 'Alpha.'"

According to Oboronka, whose report was agreed in advance with the manufacturer and the SBU, the MICH 2000 flies as far as 2,000 km with a warhead weighing 25 to 60 kg. "The list of targets hit by this drone is updated every week," Oboronka noted. They include Russian ports, military and industrial sites around Moscow and Engels-2.

The Engels-2 raid might be the most immediately impactful. After the 16 July raid, the Russians may be down to 43 Tu-95s, only a dozen of which are usually active at any given time.

The plane that came from China

The MICH 2000 started as someone else's drone. In the summer of 2023, Beijing restricted exports of the civilian aircraft Ukrainian units had been buying and converting into deep-strike munitions. At the end of that year, a team of Ukrainian developers flew to China to buy some anyway.

At the factory, they found dozens of ZTK-150s coming off the line—Shahed lookalikes distinguished mainly by a pair of forward canards. The Chinese intermediaries floated selling the production technology outright, and Ukrainian commanders liked the idea. But when the team came back ready to buy, the factory's management refused.

The intermediaries wanted the deal anyway. They offered to assemble the drones somewhere without export restrictions—and to train Ukrainian pilots. The team took the training. "We came there to teach pilots to fly Chinese drones," one member told Oboronka. "And in parallel with the training we photographed everything that was there. Everything from the production process to the arrangement of the shelves and cabinets." They flew home with trained pilots and eight Chinese drones.

Two years later, the Ukrainian version costs $48,000 in its basic configuration. The Chinese original costs $50,000. And according to the manufacturer, almost nothing of the Chinese drone survives in the MICH 2000 now except its outline.

Whittling down the bomber fleet

Ukrainian drones are slowly chipping away at the Tu-95 fleet. A 2022 drone raid badly damaged one of the lumbering turboprop bombers at Engels-2, potentially leaving no more than 51 intact Tu-95s in the Russian air force inventory at the time. Smuggling tiny explosive drones across Russia in trucks on 1 June, 2025, the SBU hit at least seven more Tu-95s as well as four Tu-22Ms, among other aircraft.

The 16 July raid is the more recent Ukrainian effort to shrink the Russian bomber force, but it surely won't be the last. The Russians' roughly 120 bombers—Tu-95s, Tu-22Ms and Tupolev Tu-160s—launch the cruise missiles that routinely blast Ukrainian cities and power plants.

Struggling to intercept all Russian deep strike munitions in the target zone, in part owing to a deepening shortage of the best air defense missiles, Ukrainian forces increasingly aim to prevent the Russian munitions from even launching—by smashing munitions factories or, yes, destroying irreplaceable bombers. Of the three Russian bomber types, just one—the Tu-160—is still in production, albeit at a rate of barely just one every year or two.

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Expect more MICH 2000 raids. The type's anonymous builder churns out 6,000 MICH 2000s a year but aims to boost output to 10,000 a year. And the firm customizes the drones to suit particular missions.

According to Oboronka, there are eight main versions. "Fighters can choose what kind of communication they need: analog, digital or Starlink. They can choose the warhead, the size of the fuel tank, the possibility of additional guidance." The navigation system can be made more jam-proof by adding additional jam-resistant controlled reception pattern antennas.

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Russia has figured out how to stop Ukraine’s most powerful missile

Drone strikes by MICH 2000s and other drone types aren't the only ways Ukrainian forces are trying to blunt Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and power plants. Ukrainian drone teams are also trying to take out the last five warships in the battered Russian Black Sea Fleet that can fire Kalibr cruise missiles.

On 11 August, drones struck at least three of the ships in the port of Novorossiysk in southern Russia. The frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov and the corvette Bykov all suffered visible damage.

Russia has been shooting down most of Ukraine's best long-range cruise missiles as fast as Ukraine can launch them. Just one or two of the $500,000 Fire Point FP-5 Flamingo missiles have hit their targets in recent weeks.

That means Russian air defenses are working for now. Whether they'll continue to work is the critical question for Ukrainian strike planners.

Under the cover of darkness on 6 August, the Ukrainian army's 19th Missile Brigade launched at least three of the six-ton, jet-propelled Flamingos toward Tyumen Oblast in western Siberia. The missiles traveled around 2,500 km before disappearing, according to mapper AMK Mapping.

The apparent shoot-downs capped a difficult week for Ukraine's deep strike campaign. AMK Mapping claimed the Russians shot down 10 of 11 launched Flamingos since 1 July. That count is one mapper's, based on open-source tracking, and no official Ukrainian or Russian figures exist to check it against.

The mapper may be off by one. Between 24 and 25 July, at least one Flamingo struck the Vyatka Machine-Building Enterprise Avitek missile plant in Kirov Oblast 1,300 km from the border with Ukraine. Michael Bohnert, an analyst with the RAND think tank in California, concluded that two Flamingos hit the plant, causing visible damage.

It was a potentially powerful blow. Among other things, Avitek produces parts for the Tor medium-range surface-to-air missile system. Slowing Tor production "will have the most impact," Bohnert explained. And the Ukrainian system that a Tor slowdown might benefit the most is ... the Flamingo.

After all, the Tor is one of the air defense systems the Russians could use to shoot down Flamingos. "Any slow-down in the production of these could greatly improve the prospects of FP-5 performance over time," Bohnert noted.

Aerial defenses

At present, however, it seems that the Flamingo's biggest problem is in the air, not on the ground. Russia is shooting down most of the incoming FP-5s because it has eyes in the sky.

The Russian air force's fleet of lumbering Beriev A-50U radar early-warning planes now has one mission and one mission only: the A-50Us with their fuselage-mounted radars patrol over the likeliest flight paths for Flamingos motoring into the Russian interior to strike strategic industries.

The A-50Us are effective in the role. As recently as June, more Flamingos were getting through Russian defenses. Between 9 and 10 June, the 19th Missile Brigade launched five Flamingos at the VNIIR-Progress electronics plant in Cheboksary, in western Russia, 960 km from the Ukraine border.

Two missiles struck the plant, punching right through anti-drone protections and inflicting major blast and fire damage with their 1,150-kg warheads, the biggest on any Ukrainian deep strike munition.

Russia adapted fast. On 4 July, an A-50U helped missile batteries on the ground spot and shoot down five FP-5s flying toward Votkinsk, 1,360 km from Ukraine. From its perch thousands of feet in the air, the A-50U has a much longer detection range against low targets than any radar on the ground can manage.

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Targeting A-50Us on the ground and in the air in a series of drone and missile ambushes, the Ukrainians have destroyed two A-50Us and damaged at least two others, reducing the fleet to no more than five. Russia has no way to build replacements. But those five planes are now fully committed to the anti-Flamingo fight.

On 7 July, the Russians reportedly launched four of the irreplaceable planes at the same time in order to coordinate the Flamingo shoot-downs. Now, almost all Flamingos go down in flames before they reach their targets.

Ukraine isn't powerless. Fire Point has been working hard to improve the Flamingo and make it harder to shoot down. Perhaps most importantly, it seems the company tweaked the missile's altimeter in order to help it fly lower. The lower a missile flies, the better chance it has of hiding among the radar clutter created by surrounding terrain.

But if a lower-flying Flamingo is harder to shoot down, the improvement hasn't yet registered in the statistics. For now, Russia has figured out how to take out almost all of Ukraine's heaviest deep-strike missiles.

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