Overnight on 14 and 15 October, the Ukrainian navy fired a clutch of Long Neptune cruise missiles at Borisoglebsk air base in Voronezh, in western Russia some 260 km from the border with Ukraine.

The results were devastating. The ground-launched Neptunes struck the tarmac where six Russian air force Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers were parked nearly wingtip to wingtip in uncovered positions.

Satellite imagery from the morning of 15 October depicted piles of smoldering wreckage. The navy said it hit all six jets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said four Su-34s were destroyed and a further two were damaged. "I thank the warriors of the Ukrainian navy for their precision!" he wrote.

The jets, he said, were loaded with aerial bombs and ready for new strikes on Ukraine. An analyst reading the imagery counted wreckage of two to four aircraft and two empty spots where damaged jets had been moved.

An Airbus Pléiades satellite image from 11 October, four days before the strike, showed the six Su-34s on open aprons. Next to them were structures that the Russian independent outlet Istories said looked like anti-drone nets or their frames. Nets can snag a small drone. A cruise missile goes through.

At roughly $50 million apiece, by the Ukrainian Air Force's estimate, the four destroyed jets alone cost Russia some $200 million. The twin-engine, two-seat, supersonic Su-34 is the Russian air force's best fighter-bomber. Almost every day, Su-34s lob KAB precision glide bombs at Ukrainian troops and civilians.

In nearly 56 months of hard fighting in Russia's wider war on Ukraine, the Russians have now lost no fewer than 37 Su-34s destroyed, with several more damaged, by open-source counts. Sukhoi continues to deliver new Su-34s in small batches, the latest handed over on 7 October, helping the Russians sustain their overall inventory despite heavy losses.

They've still got plenty of Su-34s, but that doesn't mean the Russians shouldn't worry. As long as they're parking warplanes out in the open within range of Ukraine's best deep strike munitions, those planes are vulnerable to attack. Russia's air defenses are spread too thin to intercept every Ukrainian munition.

The strike may also hit the Russian air force's training pipeline. Borisoglebsk air base is home to the 160th Aviation Training Regiment. The regiment operates Yakovlev Yak-130 trainers for more basic flight training plus—for more advanced training—front-line combat aircraft including Su-34s, Sukhoi Su-35s, and Sukhoi Su-30s.

Russian bloggers are aghast, according to a round-up of posts on Russian social media by analyst ChrisO_wiki. "How is it that, four years after the start of the Special Military Operation, there are no protective structures for aircraft at airfields located within range of Ukrainian air strikes?" blogger Ramsay wrote. "And where did the billions of rubles allocated for their construction go?"

"Much can be said about the need to build a sufficient number of concrete shelters at all airfields," blogger Vladimir Romanov pointed out. "Reality shows that, to date, sufficient measures have not been taken."

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Close parking

Ramsay asked why the Su-34s were concentrated in one area, apparently so that ground crews could quickly service all of them with a single ground power unit, a mobile generator that starts an aircraft's systems before flight. "How is it that the APA, a utilitarian piece of equipment, has become so scarce that it forces an entire group of combat aircraft to be parked in a single area, making them an ideal target for attacks?"

The best defense is an active one, however, the Fighterbomber channel stressed. "Protecting aircraft by the usual method of moving them out of the line of fire at such ranges from long-range strike systems won’t work here; the only way to defend against them is with a full-scale, echeloned air defense system—both ground-based and airborne."

Ukrainian planners know this. Which is why, for more than a year now, they've been systematically striking Russian radars, surface-to-air missile batteries, and mobile air defense systems. By March, Ukrainian forces were “collaps[ing] the layered defensive architecture that the Russian integrated air defence doctrine depends upon to function,” according to an in-depth investigation by Tochnyi.info.

The strikes on Russian air defenses—at least 492 of them between June and early March—are part of a carefully scripted plan. Destroying the right air defenses faster than the Russians can replace them has the effect of “facilitating strikes on more critical targets deep within Russian territory,” Tochnyi.info explained.

The critical targets include air bases such as Borisoglebsk and the expensive warplanes parked on its tarmac.

On or just before Wednesday, 14 October, Russian Geran-4 one-way attack drones struck two more cargo ships—one in the Buh River Estuary near Mykolaiv and another in Chornomorsk, 20 km south of Odesa.

They're the latest strikes in competing Russian and Ukrainian countershipping campaigns that have, since this summer, throttled Black Sea grain exports.

The jet-propelled Geran-4s are Russia's weapons of choice for these ship strikes. The drones haul warheads of up to 90 kg at up to 500 km/h and can fly more than 700 km. They already had AI-assisted targeting, and the Russians recently added terrain-matching navigation to make them less reliant on satellites and harder to jam with signal-scrambling electronic warfare.

For months, the Geran-4s and other Russian munitions have pummeled Ukrainian ports and the ships hauling grain from them. But Ukrainian forces were actually the first to escalate the shipping fight in an effort to squeeze Russian logistics.

As recently as early this summer, hundreds of Russian tankers and dry cargo ships plied the Black Sea and adjacent Sea of Azov, hauling fuel and bulk supplies between ports in Russia and Russian-occupied ports in southern Ukraine.

Most of the Russian vessels were unregistered and sailed without transponders, making them a kind of regional adjunct of Moscow’s “shadow fleet” that ships Russian oil and other goods to the global market in defiance of international sanctions.

Ukrainian drones had already hit ships hauling stolen Ukrainian grain out of occupied ports in June.

On 6 July, Ukraine’s deep strike drone force finally started hunting the rest of the Russian ships. By day eight of the countershipping effort, the Ukrainians had hit 105 vessels. By day 12, drones including AI-assisted Fire Point FP-1/2s had struck 159, even a few tugboats sent to assist the damaged tankers.

Just a few days after Ukraine launched its countershipping campaign, Russia launched a retaliatory campaign targeting Ukraine’s Black Sea grain ports as well as the ships, many of them foreign-flagged, that haul grain through Türkiye’s Bosporus Strait out to the Mediterranean Sea and onward to foreign ports.

Soon, the Russian shadow fleet’s hundreds of ships were either drifting, disabled, or sheltering in Russian ports. On the other side of the Black Sea, Ukraine’s lucrative grain trade was in a state of collapse. Ports were under constant attack. International shippers were increasingly reluctant to send their vessels into the Black Sea.

Trade freefall

Grain shipment figures on both sides tell a stark tale. According to the Russian Grain Union, in September approximately 1.36 million tons of wheat shipped from Russian ports, including ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, compared to 5.4 million tons in September 2025—a 75% reduction.

Meanwhile, Ukraine exported 1.094 million tons of wheat in September, down from 2.051 million tons in September 2025—a 47% reduction. The only thing preventing further throttling of Ukrainian grain exports was Izmail, Renia, and Kilia—the country’s three small ports on the Danube River, which forms Ukraine’s southern border with Romania and flows into the western Black Sea a relatively short 435 km from the Bosporus Strait.

But the Russians were beginning to target the Danube ports and the grain ships heading to and from them, too. In October, Russian drones sank the Saint Kitts-flagged M/V Royad Mammadov, bound from Izmail to Ravenna, Italy, with Ukrainian grain, and the Togo-flagged M/V Alfa Watan, and damaged the Palau-flagged M/V Able, killing at least two seafarers.

“The Black Sea grain standoff, in which both Russia and Ukraine continue to suffer losses, persists,” Polish open-source intelligence analyst Thorkill wrote.

With global food prices rising partially as a result of the bottleneck in grain exports through the Bosporus, the United Nations and Türkiye have been trying to arrange talks between Russia and Ukraine regarding a possible Black Sea ceasefire.

A previous grain deal, brokered by Türkiye and the UN in 2022, collapsed a year later. Ukraine kept ships moving through its own corridor until Russian strikes shut it down this summer.

Update, 16 October: Drones hit at least four more merchant ships off Bulgaria and Romania between 13 and 15 October, sinking the HS Dignity off Krapets. At least 17 seafarers are missing. Romanian President Nicușor Dan called the attacks “attempts by Russia” to destabilize Romania and Bulgaria and said NATO’s North Atlantic Council would discuss them.

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“Supplying Crimea is turning into a nightmare”: Ukrainian drones hit Russian trucks 770 times in September, and winter will make it worse, analyst says

The Russians are pouring troops into a key sector just southeast of the town of Dobropillia in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, threatening to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses and march one settlement closer to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the last two big free cities in Donetsk.

But the Russians' push toward Dobropillia isn't without cost. Russian losses in this sector are "colossal," according to the mapper Playfra. And every soldier the Kremlin deploys along the Dobropillia axis is a soldier it can't deploy elsewhere.

And that may help explain why the Russians are falling back in two other key sectors, in northern Donetsk Oblast and in neighboring Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Dobropillia axis is the Russians' clear priority. For the Ukrainians, that's an opportunity to attack elsewhere.

Dobropillia, a former mining town with a pre-war population of around 28,000, is now a fortress. It anchors Ukrainian positions along the highway that threads northeast to Kramatorsk.

Russia has attacked here before. In August 2025, Russian troops pushed a salient toward the Dobropillia–Kramatorsk highway, and Ukrainian counterattacks cut it apart. By October that year, President Volodymyr Zelensky put Russian losses on the Dobropillia front at about 13,000.

Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets describes the push on Dobropillia as the southern flank of a Russian operation to envelop the whole Sloviansk–Kramatorsk urban area. The other approaches are harder going. From the southeast, the Russians are blocked by stubborn Ukrainian forces still clinging to positions in the ruins of Kostiantynivka. From the north, starting this spring, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps rolled back 18 months of Russian gains.

For an army that's been struggling to complete its conquest of Donetsk, to say nothing of breaking through in other front-line oblasts, Dobropillia has become the priority.

And that's why the Russians are channeling fresh forces into the Dobropillia sector. Part of the 41st Combined Arms Army and units of its 90th Guards Tank Division are now fighting there, Mashovets wrote on 9 October, and the Russian command keeps feeding fresh assault infantry into the sector through the village of Nove Shakhove despite heavy losses. The open-source account Unit Observer tracked the buildup as early as September.

Potentially tens of thousands of troops from those formations join the main forces of the 2nd and 51st Combined Arms Armies, according to Mashovets, as well as elements of the Russian naval infantry, facing the Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps and 19th Army Corps around Dobropillia.

The reinforcements give Russian commanders more options. Mashovets expects the 51st CAA to push south and southwest of Dobropillia and the 2nd CAA toward Raksha and Sviatohorivka, enveloping the town and cutting its supply routes from Bilozerske before any direct assault. The neighboring 8th CAA is fighting around Kostiantynivka. The Russians' immediate goal is "to maintain this offensive pressure from summer into the fall," Unit Observer wrote, setting conditions for a possible siege of Kramatorsk next year.

The outlook for the Ukrainian defenders of Dobropillia is "worsening," Playfra warned on 13 October:

The Ukrainians aren't without options, Playfra explained. They should double down on their current strategy of saturating the fields around Dobropillia with drones in a ring at least 2 to 3 km deep, forestalling large-scale Russian movements until the winter strips the leaves off the trees, depriving the Russians of their best cover from overhead surveillance. This could buy Dobropillia "much more time," Playfra predicted.

Mashovets puts a date on how long Dobropillia has to hold. If it and Druzhkivka, the town just south of Kramatorsk, hold until mid-to-late December, he wrote, the whole Russian plan for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk would collapse and have to be rewritten almost from scratch.

Help isn't coming

Just don't expect a lot of Ukrainian reinforcements along the Dobropillia axis. Many of Ukraine's best troops are busy attacking.

Taking advantage of the surge of Russian manpower in the direction of Dobropillia, Ukrainian forces have counterattacked where the Russians are weakest: in northern Donetsk Oblast and also in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, just south of Donetsk.

In months of carefully planned assaults supported by ground robots and intensive drone strikes, Ukrainian forces have liberated hundreds of square kilometers in northern Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk largely removed the immediate northern threat to Sloviansk and neighboring Kramatorsk.

But it didn't do anything to help in the direction of Dobropillia, where the Russians have many more troops, much more firepower, and—equally importantly—a singular focus: closing the southern jaw around the last big free cities in Donetsk.

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Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps took the lessons of the failed 2023 counteroffensive into Operation Vivaldi. It fought small, and won.

Five months after launching Operation Vivaldi, a local counteroffensive in northern Donetsk Oblast, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps has eliminated the Russian bridgehead on its most important long-term objective: the Zherebets River, which flows south through eastern Ukraine and forms a natural defensive barrier east of the last big free cities in Donetsk: Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Attacking methodically under strict secrecy, the 3rd Army Corps has pushed back the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies and returned 176 sq km of northern Donetsk to Ukrainian control as of 30 September, according to Ukraine's presidential office. The figure could not be independently verified. Operation Vivaldi netted the Ukrainians hundreds of Russian prisoners and erased 18 months of Russian advances toward Sloviansk.

"Ukrainian forces have defeated the 2026 Russian campaign to seize Donetsk Oblast," the Institute for the Study of War in Washington concluded.

It's a remarkable feat for the overall outgunned and outmanned Ukrainian forces. Equally remarkably, the Ukrainians deftly dodged several potentially fatal traps as they flanked the 20th and 25th CAAs. They didn't get stuck in the Russians' dense minefields. They didn't expose themselves to devastating air attack. Perhaps most importantly, they didn't set their sights on distant objectives. They thought small instead of big, stacking small gains on top of small gains until those wins amounted to a big victory.

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A trio of US Army officers—Col. Timothy Price, Capt. Patrick Visser, and Capt. Andrew Carter—described this achievement in academic terms. The corps' defeat of the Russian bridgehead on the Zherebets "had little to do with maneuver warfare," the officers wrote for the Modern War Institute at the US Military Academy in West Point, New York.

In military parlance, "maneuver" generally involves heavy ground forces supported by air strikes and artillery decisively breaking through enemy lines and then rushing vehicles and troops into the panicking enemy's unguarded rear area to quickly inflict maximal destruction and achieve maximal territorial gains.

That's not what the 3rd Army Corps did in its five-month—and ongoing—counteroffensive. No, the Ukrainians "won through systematic, geometric interdiction and positional pressure," Price, Visser, and Carter wrote. Put plainly, the corps carefully probed for tree-covered assault lanes toward key settlements, deployed unmanned ground vehicles to clear mines and explode the most important nearby Russian strongpoints, and then rushed in armored vehicles carrying infantry.

They marched step by step, incrementally liberating a kilometer at a time instead of running a marathon toward a major objective tens of kilometers away. In that way, Operation Vivaldi is the very opposite of Ukraine's failed 2023 summer counteroffensive, which massed tanks for what commanders hoped would be a decisive breakthrough around the village of Mala Tokmachka in southern Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The objective at that time was to break into the Russian rear and speed tanks 80 km to the occupied city of Melitopol near the Sea of Azov. That never happened. The Ukrainians got mired in minefields around Mala Tokmachka, suffered badly from Russian air attacks, and, after a grueling season of costly attacks, lost momentum just 10 km south of Mala Tokmachka. Later Russian counterattacks erased even those modest Ukrainian gains.

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Old thinking versus new

The planners of the failed 2023 counteroffensive were stuck in an old way of thinking about maneuver warfare. The planners of the successful 2026 counteroffensive shrugged off obsolete ideas. They thought smaller—and, ironically, achieved much more as a result.

The 3rd Army Corps couldn't, and didn't, do it alone. Indeed, the corps depended on the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces to fray the Russians' supply lines, electronic warfare teams to jam Russian drones, and the Ukrainian air force to bomb Russian drone operators the EW teams couldn't suppress. By contrast, the Ukrainian forces attacking south from Mala Tokmachka in 2023 did so without much aerial support.

The aerial and electronic preparation was a prerequisite for each of the 3rd Army Corps' incremental advances this spring and summer. The lesson, the officers argue, is that "higher headquarters must degrade key enemy capabilities" before a smaller ground formation can expect to gain ground and keep it. If the support falters, the ground forces won't be able to hold.

Think small. Prepare hard. Now that the Ukrainians know this is how to win on the ground, can they repeat Operation Vivaldi's success?

There's some evidence they're already doing so in the southeast, where a clutch of Ukrainian air assault brigades has been pushing back the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army.

Ukraine's campaign of so-called "middle strikes" targeting Russian supply lines isn't generating the same headlines it did back in the spring, when the campaign was intensifying.

But that doesn't mean Ukrainian units aren't launching thousands of drones a month and blowing up a lot of Russian trucks. Indeed, the pace of Ukrainian strikes, concentrated along the main supply routes threading through occupied southern Ukraine into occupied Crimea, has leveled off without ever really decreasing since an early summer surge.

It's evident Ukraine's middle-strike campaign "didn't stop and wasn't slowed down," noted French mapper Clément Molin, one of the most important observers of the counterlogistics campaign.

For September, Molin tallied 770 confirmed drone strikes on Russian trucks in the logistical zone 10 km beyond the line of contact. That's up from 630 strikes in August, 656 in July, and 586 in June, the month the campaign really got underway. There were just 214 strikes in May and at most a few dozen in each of the previous three months.

Whether Ukrainian troops can take advantage of the Russians' weakening logistics anytime soon is less evident.

Since June, the Ukrainians have hit around 700 Russian trucks a month that analysts can confirm with video and photographic evidence. There are undoubtedly many more damaged and destroyed trucks that left no digital evidence.

There are thousands of Russian trucks on the road in Ukraine every day, so hitting 700 of them in a month won't immediately strangle Russian logistics. But that accumulating destruction does strain Russian logistics—and terrify the truck drivers who are in the drone crosshairs. "Russian drivers post videos on a daily basis, showing how dangerous a ride in southern Ukraine is getting," Molin wrote.

What's remarkable is that the counterlogistics campaign hasn't faltered even as the Russians have adapted. Early on, Russian trucks mostly traveled alone and without protection, making them fairly easy picking for a bevy of Ukrainian middle-strike drone types including the Hornet, the B-2, the RAM 2X, the Chaklun, and various high-endurance first-person-view quadcopters.

The drones ride along Ukraine's overlapping command and control systems, which include Starlink satellite terminals (some dangling from balloons) as well as mesh radio networks. Many of the drones have built-in AI for autonomously detecting and homing in on trucks in the final seconds of flight.

Convoy operations

Reeling from the truck strikes, the Russians adapted this spring. Commanders began requiring all trucks to travel in convoys including mobile fire support groups, analysis group Tochnyi reported in May, citing Dmytro Putiata, a retired command post battle captain from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces 20th Brigade "K2."

Today the Russian convoys have a standard structure, according to Molin. "Convoys usually gather three to five trucks and two to three air-defense trucks." Combined with radio jamming gear that's increasingly common on both the supply trucks and the gun trucks, that's seemingly a lot of protection.

But the drones target the gun trucks, too, peeling back the protection in order to expose the supply trucks to follow-on attacks. In that way, the Ukrainians have sustained their attacks on the supply trucks despite the increase in mobile air defense activity along the most important supply routes.

And it's going to get worse for the Russians as fall wears into winter. "Supplying Crimea is turning into a nightmare and the arrival of winter and more difficult conditions will not help," Molin wrote.

There will be less foliage on the trees lining the roads, and thus less cover from Ukrainian surveillance. Moreover, Molin pointed out, "it will be more difficult to go off-road" and avoid the big paved roads that are the main drone kill zones.

Russian logistics are under pressure, and that pressure is only increasing. Ultimately, the Ukrainians aim to starve Russian forces in Crimea. Strikes on cargo ships plying the Black Sea prevent the Russians from simply shifting the logistics off the coast. Meanwhile, strikes on overland logistics "may lead to substantial softening of front-line positions," Tochnyi noted in May.

Softening those front-line positions to the point of melting away could facilitate what Tochnyi described as "eventual breakthrough operations" in occupied southern Ukraine.

It's not inconceivable. Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps recently proved, by way of its successful Operation Vivaldi, that local Ukrainian counteroffensives are possible.

But that doesn't mean they're easy. To win, the 3rd Army Corps had to carefully husband its forces and meticulously prepare the battlefield under conditions of strict secrecy before attacking. That same kind of preparation is underway along the supply lines into Crimea, but it's unclear whether local Ukrainian forces have enough combat power in reserve to shift from defense to offense and exploit Russia's deepening supply woes.

At least not yet.

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Ukraine retook 240 square km north of Lyman and nobody reported it for three months

Armored vehicles aren't dead in Ukraine—they just need a lot of help. That's one of the biggest lessons from the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi, its recent successful counteroffensive just north of the town of Lyman in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.

Russia spent 18 months building its salient toward Sloviansk; Ukraine took much of it back in three. By 30 September, three of four planned phases in, the operation had returned 176 sq km to Ukrainian control, taken 250 Russian prisoners, and cost Russia more than 5,000 killed and wounded, Ukraine's presidential office said. It also foiled a Russian plan to break into the rear of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban area, the office said.

Defying critics who insisted vehicles couldn't possibly survive in the drone-patrolled gray zone, the 3rd Army Corps repeatedly deployed mechanized forces as it counterattacked across a roughly 100 sq km salient the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies had extended toward Sloviansk, one of the last two big free cities in Donetsk Oblast.

Maneuvering for months under a veil of secrecy, the 3rd Army Corps found and exploited gaps along the flanks of the 20th and 25th CAAs, ultimately breaking into the Russian armies' rears and forcing them to pull back across the Zherebets River in order to avoid encirclement.

Armored vehicles were key to the Ukrainian effort. They sped assault troops into battle, dropped them off under fire, and then supported them as they clashed with the Russians. "Maneuver warfare isn't going anywhere," stated Ryan O'Leary, a US Army veteran who once commanded volunteers in Ukraine.

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3rd Army Corps commanders knew they were taking a risk deploying armored vehicles in a Russian-controlled salient patrolled by first-person-view drones from Russia's elite Rubicon Center drone unit. But they clearly believed that, with adequate support, the vehicles could accomplish their missions—and survive.

They were right. A dramatic video shot by 3rd Army Corps troopers depicts the troopers disembarking from their armored trucks and rushing into the fight while small arms fire clatters all around them.

Given the intensity of the Russian fire, a mechanized assault "was the only real way to push positions in an effective manner to keep losses low as well as gain and hold momentum and aggression," O'Leary wrote. Walking into battle under the cover of trees might help the infantry avoid the attention of overhead drones, but it takes too long to sustain an aggressive assault, and it can be difficult to mass enough footborne infantry to overcome stiff enemy defenses.

"This is something that hasn't changed even with the advent of drone warfare coming of age," O'Leary added. "Suppression tactics and such have changed and now there is more than just indirect fires and counterassaults that you must be able to suppress and plan for."

But the concept of the infantry-carrying armored vehicle "isn't going anywhere," O'Leary stressed. "Especially when it takes a drone tens of minutes to get to target area, acquire target and hit the target. Right now, the front is extremely susceptible to maneuvering forces on assaults if it is planned right and executed properly."

The 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi is an excellent example of an operation that was planned right and executed properly—in ways that helped the corps' mechanized forces fight and survive.

Careful preparation

The corps explained that it deployed footborne scouts to find the best paths for follow-on vehicular assaults—and subsequent medical evacuations. Scouts "conducted recon of the front lines, ensured the breakthrough of equipment and led adjacent units along secret paths while evacuating the wounded," the 3rd Army Corps stated.

Before the armored vehicles rolled into action along the pre-scouted paths, the 3rd Army Corps deployed robotic engineering vehicles to clear Russian mines. After that, the corps sent in old BTR-60 wheeled armored vehicles modified for remote control and packed with anti-tank mines. These "robotic kamikaze complexes ... were used to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications," the corps said.

Only after the assault routes were scouted and cleared of mines and Russian strongpoints did the manned vehicles and their precious infantry cargo roll out. We don't know how many losses the 3rd Army Corps' mechanized infantry suffered on the attack, but we do know they ultimately prevailed—when the battered Russian 20th and 25th CAAs retreated.

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"Recent Ukrainian operations demonstrate that maneuver is not dead," stressed Mick Ryan, a retired Australian army general. "Despite the difficulty in ground operations maneuver observed in eastern Ukraine over the past few years, offensive operations are still possible in modern war. But they need the intellectual effort to develop new techniques to make them viable and repeatable at scale."

In addition to the reconnaissance and robots-first engineering and suppression tactics the 3rd Army Corps employed, Ryan recommended commanders deploy more drone-grounding electronic warfare and use AI tools to help plan attacks.

But ages-old human elements are still essential, Ryan wrote. "Developing viable methods for offensive tactical and operational maneuver in the 21^st century also demands the inclusion of older ideas about the employment of mass, logistic support and casualty evacuation [and the] maintenance of morale and leader's provision of purpose to their people."

Even when the assault route is clear, it's understandably terrifying to ride in an armored vehicle across drone-patrolled terrain. But a good leader can motivate their troops to try.

Ukraine has fired its new Fire Point FP-7 ballistic missile in anger for the first time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on Thursday, 1 October.

Kyiv hasn't said what the missile targeted or how much damage it caused. The Wall Street Journal, citing an unnamed source, reported that it struck a target in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Zelensky was ecstatic on social media. "Thank you for the result," the Ukrainian president wrote. "Next up: production. Glory to Ukraine!"

The FP-7 can hit back at Russia, but it can't stop the Iskander ballistic missiles Russia fires at Ukrainian cities. Its twin is meant to. Fire Point is building an interceptor version, the FP-7.X, as the core of Freyja, its bid for a cheaper alternative to the American Patriot, and the company aims for a first ballistic missile interception by mid-2027.

Kyiv drone- and missile-maker Fire Point, most famous for its FP-1 and FP-2 one-way attack drones and FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles, has been hard at work on ballistic missiles for at least a year. Ballistic missiles can cost millions of dollars per round, making them much more expensive than a $50,000 drone or $500,000 cruise missile.

But the extra expense buys a lot more destructive potential. An FP-1 packs a 60-kg warhead; an FP-7's warhead weighs about 200 kg. While an FP-1 might motor as far as 1,000 km, it's slow and fairly easy to shoot down. An FP-7 possesses less range—up to 250 km under the best conditions—but it streaks through the atmosphere at several times the speed of sound, making it extremely difficult to intercept.

The only Russian air defense systems that stand any chance of swatting down an incoming FP-7 are also among the most in-demand in the Russian inventory and thus the most over-stretched: the S-400 surface-to-air missile batteries.

Ukrainians know better than anyone the kind of damage and terror ballistic bombardment can inflict. Since effectively running out of Patriot surface-to-air missiles earlier this year, Ukraine has been unable to defend itself against weekly Russian bombardment that now usually includes several Iskander ballistic missiles.

The Russian bombardment threatens to disrupt commerce, throttle electricity generation, and grind down Ukrainian morale at a critical juncture in Russia's wider war on Ukraine. Ukrainian troops are holding their own along the 1,200-km front line, but behind the front line everyday Ukrainians are suffering under missile and drone impacts.

That suffering will only get worse as winter closes in, temperatures drop, and the Russians resume intensive attacks on the electrical grid, potentially depriving millions of people of household heating. Ukrainian batteries firing FP-7s can't directly prevent Russian attacks. But they can retaliate for the attacks.

Expect the ballistic tit for tat to intensify. It may not be the first Ukrainian ballistic missile fired in anger: in June, Russia said it shot down a Ukrainian ballistic missile over Moscow, and Kyiv never said what it was. But the FP-7 is the first Kyiv has confirmed using in combat, and it has the range and payload to inflict serious damage on targets inside Russia. But an even more powerful Ukrainian missile, the Fire Point FP-9, is coming soon. It reportedly ranges 850 km with an 800-kg warhead.

The ballistic phase

The FP-7 can smash Russian depots, air bases, and factories in oblasts bordering Ukraine. The FP-9 could wreak havoc as far as Moscow. The only major constraint on the Ukrainian bombardment will be Fire Point's production capacity, and Kyiv's ability to finance that production.

The Ukrainians will be incentivized to produce as many FP-7s—and, later, FP-9s—as possible. The same factories that produce surface-to-surface FP-7s will also churn out a surface-to-air variant, the FP-7.X.

That missile, which is overall similar to the standard FP-7 but includes a sophisticated seeker head, is the main munition for Ukraine's new mostly homemade air defense system being developed by Fire Point and various foreign partners under the auspices of the European missile defense program Freyja.

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If the FP-7.X works as advertised and Fire Point can scale production, it could bolster Ukraine's defenses against Russian ballistic missile strikes while the standard FP-7 and its bigger cousin the FP-9 retaliate for Russian ballistic missile strikes.

A new phase of the wider war is about to begin—the ballistic phase, where both sides can pummel the other with hard-to-intercept missiles.

The side that makes the most and best missiles, for offense and defense, will prevail in the coming ballistic fight.

Ukraine has lost another Mikoyan MiG-29 fighter and its pilot. The Thursday shoot-down extends the steady attrition of the Ukrainian air force MiG fleet, potentially drawing down the fleet to its pre-war strength.

That means Ukraine may have lost as many of the twin-engine, supersonic MiG-29s as it has received from its allies or restored from surplus stocks since February 2022.

It's an ominous milestone. The Soviet-vintage MiG-29 is no longer the Ukrainian air force's most important fighter. That honorific belongs to the air force's ex-European Lockheed Martin F-16s.

But the MiG-29 is still the air force's second most important fighter—and will remain so through 2027 as Ukraine awaits its first ex-Swedish Saab Gripens, due early next year, and French-made Dassault Rafales, due from 2028. Ukraine sorties MiG-29s for ground attack missions targeting Russian troop concentrations, strikes on Russian air defense systems, and air defense sorties over Ukrainian cities and ports.

The air force announced the loss of the MiG-29 and its pilot, Capt. Marat Mambetov, shortly after it occurred on Thursday. Mambetov, 25, was a flight commander in the 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade, known as the "Ghost of Kyiv" brigade. "Flying a MiG-29 fighter jet, [Mambetov] carried out missile and bomb strikes against Russian occupiers along one of the front-line directions," the air force stated. "During the mission, his aircraft was hit by an enemy missile. The pilot ejected, but tragically did not survive."

It's the 37th confirmed combat loss of a Ukrainian MiG-29 since Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022, according to a tally by the Oryx open-source intelligence collective. Oryx has also registered damage to an additional three Ukrainian MiG-29s.

Thirty-seven write-offs, plus the likely grounding of several previously flyable MiG-29s owing to intensive wear and tear since 2022, may have reduced the Ukrainian air force's MiG-29 fleet to around three dozen active jets.

Fighter subtraction

The math is simple. The air force probably had between 30 and 35 MiG-29s in service when Russia attacked in February 2022. As losses cut into the fleet, Poland donated 14 surplus MiGs, Slovakia donated 10, and Azerbaijan reportedly donated three. Meanwhile, Ukrainian engineers tapped a global pipeline of spare parts to reactivate an estimated 20 grounded MiG-29s moldering in hangars at various Ukrainian airfields.

That's as many as 82 MiGs in and, as of Thursday, 37 out owing to Russian action—plus additional jets grounded due to airframe fatigue. The resulting active fleet should number around three dozen planes, around as many as Ukraine had on the eve of the wider war.

There aren't many more old MiGs that Ukraine could obtain to bolster the fleet. Poland still has as many as nine very tired airframes, but Kyiv and Warsaw have consistently failed to negotiate a transfer. There may yet be a few ex-Soviet MiG-29s, grounded for years or even decades, that Ukrainian engineers can restore to flightworthy status. Other than that, options are scarce.

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The three dozen MiGs still in the inventory may have to last a little while alongside the few survivors of Ukraine's other Soviet-vintage warplanes, including Sukhoi Su-27s, Sukhoi Su-24s, and Sukhoi Su-25s.

Older Western types—the 80 or so F-16s European allies have pledged, about half delivered, as well as potentially a dozen or so ex-French Dassault Mirage 2000s—are steadily replacing the ex-Soviet jets. (So far, Ukraine has lost five F-16s and one Mirage.) Next year, the transformation of the Ukrainian air force from a largely Soviet-equipped force to a largely Western-equipped force will accelerate when the first of 32 Gripens arrive. Sixteen Rafales are to follow from 2028.

Barring catastrophic combat losses among Western types and assuming Ukraine can maintain and arm these new warplanes, by the end of 2027, the air force may not need its remaining MiGs and Sukhois, which by then could be very tired.

Russian missiles are steadily reducing the MiG and Sukhoi fleets, effectively forcing Ukraine to switch to new types.

Russian infiltrators have been slipping into villages and towns along Ukraine's northeastern border with Russia, likely aiming to draw Ukrainian troops away from the bigger fights farther south around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Desperate to clear out the infiltrators without dedicating too many precious infantry to the task, the Ukrainian 475th Assault Regiment formed a unique team: two heavily up-armored tanks plus three different types of drone. The drones scouted ahead of the tanks and protected them as they trundled through Russia's own drone kill zone on their way to a point-blank clash with Russian troops.

In this mission, the blend of mechanized and unmanned forces worked: the tanks accomplished their mission and survived to fight another day. If the tank-drone pairing keeps working, expect it to become more common all along the 1,200-km gray zone as Ukraine struggles with a deepening shortage of manpower.

It's unclear what kinds of tanks the 475th Assault Regiment operates. It is clear how the regiment protects the tanks from ever-present Russian drones. The unit wraps the tanks in metal cages and then welds hundreds of metal spines on the cages. The spines trigger incoming explosive drones at a safe distance from the tank's hull. The cage supports the spines and catches any drones the spines may miss.

We call these kinds of tanks "hedgehog tanks." The Russians developed the hedgehog application but, seeing that it worked, deflecting potentially dozens of drones at a time, the Ukrainians copied it.

Hedgehog helpers

But even the best-protected hedgehog tank might struggle to get through the enemy's kill zone when that kill zone may include bomber and one-way attack drones in the air and loitering ambush drones waiting on the ground as well as mines and other threats.

Sometimes the best defense against a drone is another drone, and the 475th Assault Regiment put that truism into practice. To shepherd those two hedgehog tanks into battle with Russian infiltrators in the village of Vilkhuvatka, in Kharkiv Oblast 9 km from the border with Russia, the regiment deployed a Vampire heavy bomber drone, at least one explosive first-person-view (FPV) quadcopter, and at least one surveillance quadcopter.

The surveillance drones could scout ahead. The bomber drone could blast mines and loitering ambush drones. The FPVs could intercept incoming enemy FPVs. The layered protection was effective. As evident in the 475th Assault Regiment's video depicting the two-tank counter-assault, the tanks took multiple hits from Russian drones and mines, but not enough hits to slow them down.

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Both tanks reached an intersection inside Vilkhuvatka, fired their cannons at nearby Russian infiltrators, and then withdrew.

It should come as no surprise that the 475th Assault Regiment is pioneering mixed formations of drones and tanks. The regiment recently partnered with the 1st Assault Regiment to develop new "multi-domain" tactics combining ground, air, and cyber forces. "We came to the conclusion that fighting in only one domain makes no sense," said "Perun," the 1st Assault Regiment commander. "We'd simply lose because the enemy would bring another domain into play."

The key takeaway is that, despite the serious threat that drones and mines pose to tanks in the fifth year of Russia's wider war on Ukraine, tanks can still fight, win, and survive—if they have plenty of support from the same kinds of drones that, in enemy hands, vex them along every kilometer of disputed terrain. The tank isn't dead yet. It just needs a little help.