Fourteen more Ukrainian children have crossed from Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast back onto Ukrainian-held ground, the oblast's military administration said on 29 September. They join a years-long effort to recover children from land Russia seized in 2022, with thousands more still deported or unaccounted for.

Ukrainian authorities say Russia has deported nearly 20,000 children since its 2022 full-scale invasion, and Zelenskyy insists the true figure is far higher. Those taken to Russia are placed in institutions or Russian families and pushed through Russian "re-education" aimed at erasing their Ukrainian identity.

These 14 add to roughly 2,000 children Ukraine has brought back since 2022—a recovery effort still dwarfed by the numbers Russia holds and keeps adding to.

Who made it out

The 14 are four boys and 10 girls, aged 6 to 17, said Oleksandr Prokudin, who heads the administration. Rescuers also brought back one young adult who had been deprived of parental care.

Each case shows what pushed the children toward the return. One 16-year-old boy was being forced onto Russia's military registration rolls under occupation, part of a pipeline that moves teenagers from a Russian passport toward conscription at 18. A 17-year-old girl had sought a Ukrainian education despite the risks and Russian control, Prokudin said. A 10-year-old girl, he added, had longed to come home and did all she could to reach safety.

The running tally

The children left through Bring Kids Back UA, the repatriation program President Volodymyr Zelenskyy launched in 2023, working with the Ukrainian charity Save Ukraine. That brings to 204 the number of children returned from occupied Kherson Oblast since the start of 2026, regional authorities said.

The wider deportation campaign

In 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for Russian leader Vladimir Putin and his children's rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, over the illegal deportation of children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.

Ukraine's air defenders now have purpose-built interceptors for Russia's jet-powered attack drones—weapons whose speed and altitude make them difficult for conventional defenses to catch, Militarnyi reported. A crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Regiment downed a Geran-5 over Chernihiv Oblast with a newly delivered interceptor, according to the Serhiy Prytula Foundation.

Russia's long-range drone and missile attacks have become central to its effort to wear down Ukraine's air defenses and grid before winter, and the war in the sky now turns on which side scales its answer faster.

The Chernihiv intercept

The crew, callsign Yastrub (Hawk), made its first successful engagement with the new interceptor, hitting the jet drone at 425 km/h and above 3 km, the foundation said, releasing footage of the strike. The Prytula Foundation supplied the interceptors and said it has contracted several manufacturers to counter the jet threat.

"Our task is to scale this up and strengthen units," it said.

Why it kept slipping through

Russia first used the Geran-5 in January 2026. HUR's own specifications put its warhead at 90 kg, cruise speed at 450–600 km/h, and range at 950 km, with a ceiling of 6 km. That mix of jet speed and high altitude kept it clear of machine guns, shoulder-fired missiles, and the cheap interceptors built to swat slower piston-engine Shaheds.

Ukraine's military intelligence estimates Russian plants now turn out around 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month, according to HUR. A monitoring Telegram channel, Polkovnyk HSh, reports a newer variant that steers by ground imagery instead of satellites, which would blunt jamming—though HUR has not confirmed it and lists no such system among the drone's components. Separately, Russia moved the jet engine inside the fuselage, a change aimed at more speed and range.

Where the fight stands

Ukraine intercepts about 55% of Russia's jet drones, against more than 90% of the older models, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 26 September. Since the start of September, Russia had launched more than 2,730 jet drones, and Ukraine had downed or suppressed more than 1,500, he added. Zelenskyy also said Russia plans to spend $12 billion in 2027 on jet drones and loitering munitions alone. Ukraine already has several interceptor prototypes in combat use, and the 1020th crew's kill is one of several jet Geran intercepts Ukrainian units and drone makers have logged this month.

Russia has quietly started a new round of mobilization and plans to bring in more North Korean troops, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. He cited a new report from Ukraine's military intelligence. The same day, the Kremlin published a decree enlarging Russia's army for the fourth time this year.

Russia widens recruitment at home and abroad

Zelenskyy spoke in his evening address on 28 September, after a briefing from Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR).

"In effect, the Russians have already begun additional mobilization—they are increasing the number of people they recruit through various means," he said.

Moscow also plans to recruit more foreigners, Zelenskyy said. He urged the governments of countries whose citizens Russia recruits to counter it, and said Kyiv would inform each of them.

Ukraine says Russia has been losing soldiers faster than contract recruitment replaces them. If so, an unannounced call-up lets the Kremlin refill its ranks without a formal draft. ISW says Putin may hold off on such a draft until he sees whether his strikes work. Ukrainian intelligence had expected Russia to announce a mass mobilization after this month's State Duma elections.

More than 8,000 North Koreans in Russia, 10,000 more in preparation

More than 8,000 North Korean troops are currently on Russian territory, Zelenskyy said. Pyongyang is selecting another 10,000 for training and deployment to Russia, he added.

Russia is paying, among other things, with technology, according to Zelenskyy. North Korea has launched production of Shahed-type attack drones with Russian technical support, he said.

That is a step beyond what Kyiv reported in June 2025. Moscow and Pyongyang had then only agreed to start preparing such production. In August, Zelenskyy warned that Russia could receive up to 50,000 North Korean troops.

Kremlin raises the army's size again

Putin's decree sets the authorized strength of Russia's armed forces at 2,441,630, including 1,550,500 military personnel, Vedomosti reported. The decree gives no reason.

The order adds 15,500 troops and is the fourth such increase this year, Euronews said. Since March, the combined increase has reached 47,860 soldiers. Putin's 2022 "partial mobilization" decree also remains in force, the outlet noted.

Moscow keeps denying a call-up

In early September, Putin claimed that reports of a coming mobilization were "complete nonsense" and "an information attack on Russia." Russian officials gave similar assurances days before the 2022 call-up.

Ukraine's military and foreign intelligence had earlier said that Russia's General Staff prepared a scenario to mobilize 600,000 people over 2026 and 2027, 300,000 each year.

Ukraine's defense forces intercepted 55% of Russia's jet-propelled drones in September—more than 1,500 out of over 2,730 launched—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his 26 September evening address.

Russia's full-scale aerial campaign has shifted from propeller-driven Shaheds Ukraine learned to shoot down at over 90% to jet-propelled models that fly faster, resist jamming, and often slip past existing defenses.

55% and climbing

Zelenskyy said military intelligence had briefed him on Russian weapons production—not just jet Shaheds but other technological systems. The documents detail what Moscow is preparing for next year: the volumes and the financing. "We are preparing our countermeasures, and for every line item there must be a Ukrainian answer," he said.

Several effective interceptor prototypes are already in combat.

"Interceptors have been identified that can become the main tool of our defense. Production, components—all of this we are scaling up. There will be an answer," Zelenskyy said.

The goal is to match the interception rate for regular propeller-driven Shaheds, which exceeds 90%. At 55%, the jet-drone rate is climbing but still leaves nearly half reaching their targets.

$12 billion for one category

Russia plans to spend $12 billion in 2027 on jet drones and loitering munitions alone, Zelenskyy said. "This concerns not only Ukraine and not only us," he added, warning that multiple intelligence agencies have information Russia wants to expand its war to other countries and regions.

He said this is why Ukraine is pushing for stronger sanctions and the Drone Deal format. Ukraine has signed 11 such agreements, the latest with Finland at the UN General Assembly this week, and is preparing a 12th with what Zelenskyy called "a strong country."

The warning came as Russia struck a Kyiv data center twice on the morning of 27 September, injuring three people including two children, Zelenskyy wrote. Overnight strikes killed three people in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and one man in Kyiv.

In total this week, Russia launched more than 2,200 strike drones, roughly 1,650 aerial bombs, and 38 missiles—a significant share of them ballistic—at Ukraine, he said.

Jet drones are now Russia's main aerial weapon

Russia's jet-propelled Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones have become the dominant threat in Russia's aerial campaign against Ukrainian cities. By August, production of jet Geran-4/5 models exceeded that of propeller-driven Geran-2s, according to Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR). Russian factories produce roughly 3,000 jet models per month alongside about 2,800 of the older type. The Geran-5 is technically a drone but functions as a small cruise missile—faster, harder to jam, and increasingly guided by AI and mesh networking that complicate interception.

Ukraine's answer has been interceptor drones—cheap, fast enough to chase a Geran, and guided by machine vision. A Ukrainian interceptor recently scored its first kills against jet Gerans and is heading into mass production, though a presidential adviser warned that speed alone cannot catch them—machine vision and automatic guidance decide the chase.

Ukraine, the country under daily Russian attack, is offering to help defend others from it. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Ukraine will share its drone-defense experience with partners facing Russia's hybrid and drone attacks, NATO members and non-members alike, through its "Drone Deal" agreements, according to UNIAN.

Russia's hybrid and drone attacks are spreading past Ukraine, to Moldova, Germany, and Romania, and Kyiv is casting itself as the country that knows how to counter them.

Asked whether he would send Ukrainian troops to defend NATO members, Zelenskyy instead pointed to the drone agreements, bilateral pacts open to partners in or out of NATO, that pair weapons sales and joint production with the transfer of Ukraine's combat experience.

Ukraine had signed such deals with nine countries by early August and is negotiating more than a dozen others, becoming, as its officials put it, "a security provider for Europe."

The attacks spread past NATO

"Russia will continue hybrid attacks against various countries, and not only NATO members," Zelenskyy said, pointing to drone incursions over Moldova, which belongs to neither NATO nor the EU.

Those crossings have become routine: Moldova logged 39 Russian drone incursions in the first eight months of the year, and on 24 September, drones entered both Moldova and Romania as Poland scrambled fighters. Ukraine has offered help, Zelenskyy said, "above all to those countries that help us during the war."

The Drone Deal shares experience

The Drone Deal agreements cover the sale of drones and missiles and joint production, he added, "but also an exchange of experience."

He offered a precedent: "How we sent our specialists to the Middle East, how we helped protect critical infrastructure." Sharing how to defend against drones, he said, is "precisely part of this exchange."

Ukraine turns security provider

Zelenskyy did not answer the question on whether Ukraine would put troops into NATO countries under attack, steering instead to what Ukraine can already give, its hard-won experience of fighting the very weapons now reaching its neighbors' skies.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine has agreed on a new package of Patriot interceptor missiles with an unnamed partner, Suspilne reported. He made the announcement on 24 September during a meeting with the Ukrainian community in the United States. Zelenskyy did not reveal the partner's identity, the quantity, or the delivery timeline.

Russia's aerial campaign against Ukrainian cities is heading into its most dangerous winter yet, with ballistic strikes on hospitals, power stations, and residential buildings pushing monthly civilian casualties to their highest level since the war's opening weeks. The gap between the interceptors Ukraine needs and what allies have so far committed has become a central factor in both the defense of Ukrainian cities and the diplomatic standoff.

What Zelenskyy said

Zelenskyy made the announcement during a broader address to the diaspora about diplomacy, the peace effort, and cooperation with US President Donald Trump's team.

"We agreed today—I won't say with whom—on a package of [interceptor] missiles for Patriot systems. This is an important decision," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Ukrainian diaspora in New York.

He gave no further details. Zelenskyy said ending the war was the most important question facing Ukraine and awarded decorations to community members who had contributed to the country's defense.

Before the New York trip, the interceptor question had been raised with several partners. After meeting Trump on 22 September, Zelenskyy said he had asked Washington for a winter package of Patriot interceptors. That same week, he pitched Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on air-defense cooperation, noting that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries runs the only plant outside the US licensed to assemble PAC-3 missiles. Suspilne noted the issue had also been discussed with other partners Zelenskyy did not name.

Intercepting more, but not enough

On 24 September, air defenses intercepted 60% of the ballistic missiles Russia fired at Kyiv—a figure the president called significant.

"It was 60%—not 10% and not zero. And this year we had moments when it was zero. Not because someone lacks experience, but because someone lacks missiles," Zelenskyy told journalists in New York.

Since 12 August, Ukraine's Air Force has stopped publishing detailed figures on how many missiles Russia launches, reporting only what it downs—which makes Zelenskyy's percentage a rare public benchmark. By that count, Russia has fired at least 794 ballistic missiles at Ukraine since January, about 43% of all missiles used this year, with July's 174 the monthly high.

The overnight attack

Hours after Zelenskyy spoke in New York, Russia launched 295 drones at Ukraine overnight on 24–25 September. In Odesa, Russian drones killed two people—a 40-year-old woman and a 51-year-old man—and injured two others. In Kyiv, Shaheds struck high-rises in Solomianskyi district, and strikes across the broader region killed a 14-year-old boy.

Romania scrambled jets as drones drifted toward its airspace. A woman was injured in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and the morning brought further Russian strikes on Zaporizhzhia and Poltava, injuring two more people.

The interceptor crisis

Zelenskyy's announcement lands in the middle of a worsening shortage. In August, he told CNN that Ukraine held roughly 1% of American Patriot stocks and that 5% would get Kyiv through the winter. ISW assessed the same month that the interceptor shortage was one reason Russia saw no incentive to negotiate.

The EU has moved to fill the gap. Brussels cleared Ukraine to spend loan money on Patriot missiles and later released €6.1 billion ($7.1 billion) for interceptors and drones. But Ukraine's air force commander warned that newly ordered missiles would arrive too late for this winter and asked the Ramstein coalition to open existing stockpiles.

At least one partner has now moved from discussion to commitment. The quantity and delivery date remain unknown, and Russia produces ballistic missiles faster than Ukraine's allies have so far been willing to part with the interceptors that stop them.

"We agreed today—I won't say with whom—on a package of [interceptor] missiles for Patriot systems. This is an important decision," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Ukrainian diaspora in New York.

"It was 60%—not 10% and not zero. And this year we had moments when it was zero. Not because someone lacks experience, but because someone lacks missiles," Zelenskyy told journalists in New York.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has again told US officials that Russia can capture Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast within several months, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Speaking to the UN General Assembly on 24 September, Zelenskyy said this was the latest in a long series of similar promises as Russia has spent nearly five years trying to seize the region. He said Putin has made such promises 17 or 18 times, repeatedly pushing the deadline further back.

He contrasted those promises with Russia’s heavy battlefield losses and relatively limited territorial gains.

Russia has paid a huge price for its Donetsk offensive

Zelenskyy said Russian forces suffered 248,964 troops killed or severely wounded between January and August 2026.

He said Russia had captured only slightly more than 1,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory this year, while Ukraine had already liberated a significant portion of those gains.

Zelenskyy presented the figures as the human cost of Putin’s continued attempt to seize Donetsk, arguing that Russia is paying an enormous price for relatively limited territorial gains.

“Always the same: ‘Just a few more months,’” Zelenskyy said, adding that Putin would again fail to meet his latest deadline.

The Russian offensive is also facing a recent setback in northern Donetsk. Ukraine launched Operation Vivaldi in September to clear Russian infiltrators and retake ground near Lyman, disrupting Russia’s plan to encircle the fortified cities of the Donetsk “Fortress Belt.”

Ukrainian forces have reported retaking several settlements and clearing up to 125 square kilometers in the operation, although the full scope of the offensive remains undisclosed.

Zelenskyy also warned that Russia’s ambitions extend beyond Donetsk. After saying Putin would again fail to capture the region, he said Russia would continue seeking other Ukrainian cities, naming Odesa, Kharkiv and Dnipro, while also pointing to Russian pressure on Moldova and threats toward Poland and the Baltic states.

Russia continues to pour missiles and drones into Ukraine

The battlefield campaign has been accompanied by a sustained Russian long-range attack campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

Since the beginning of 2026, Russia has launched more than 2,100 missiles against Ukraine, including more than 950 ballistic missiles, according to Zelenskyy.

Ballistic missiles are particularly difficult for Ukraine to counter because it has a limited supply of interceptors capable of engaging them. Russia’s heavy use of ballistic weapons is therefore contributing directly to civilian deaths and infrastructure destruction.

Over the first eight months of the year, Russia also used 63,000 attack drones of various types, Zelenskyy said. More than 7,700 were jet-powered Geran drones, which he described as particularly destructive and dangerous.

The newer jet-powered drones are faster and more advanced than earlier Shahed-type models, making them harder to intercept and adding to the pressure on Ukraine’s air defenses as Russia attacks cities and infrastructure.

Zelenskyy said Russia was using the drones continuously to disrupt economic activity and normal life in Ukrainian cities, including by making it harder for children to attend school.

The figures show the scale of the Russian campaign beyond the front line. Alongside its ground offensive, Russia is using sustained missile and drone strikes to kill civilians, destroy infrastructure, and exhaust Ukraine’s air-defense resources.

North Korean troops add to Russia’s war effort

Zelenskyy also highlighted North Korea’s direct involvement in Russia’s war, saying its troops have suffered heavy losses while gaining battlefield experience alongside Russian forces.

He said North Korea’s military capabilities were also benefiting from its cooperation with Russia, pointing to improvements in its ballistic missiles and drone capabilities.

Ukraine recently transferred two North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea. Zelenskyy said capturing the soldiers alive had been difficult and described one prisoner’s attempt to take his own life after realizing he was about to be captured.

He said the soldiers had been conditioned to believe they had to die rather than surrender.

“Do you really want to give such a force more time to learn how to fight?” Zelenskyy asked.

Zelenskyy calls for de-escalation before winter

Zelenskyy separately warned that Russia could again target Ukraine’s energy and heating infrastructure this winter.

Russia has already intensified attacks on Ukraine’s energy system ahead of the cold season.

Russia has also explicitly threatened to “freeze” Ukraine this winter, with its Defense Ministry linking the threat to attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. The country spent much of the previous winter dealing with the consequences of Russian strikes on power and heating infrastructure, including blackouts and disruptions to heat supplies.

Zelenskyy said Ukraine expects the coming winter to be difficult but warned that if Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy and heating systems, Ukraine will make the winter painful for Russia as well.

He called for steps toward de-escalation before winter, saying that diplomacy and military strength were both needed to end the war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has used the UN General Assembly in New York to court partners outside Ukraine's NATO core, pitching air-defense cooperation with Japan and drone cooperation with Chile, Ukrainska Pravda reported. In a single day of bilateral talks, he met Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, Chile's President José Antonio Kast, and UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham.

The meetings turned on shielding civilian infrastructure before winter and trading Ukraine's battlefield-tested technology for capabilities it still needs. More than four years into Russia's war, a nation that entered the war reliant on donated arms now iterates drones faster than many of its Western backers, and that expertise has become leverage in its own diplomacy.

Zelenskyy pitches Ukraine's know-how for Japan's air-defense tech

In their first summit meeting, Zelenskyy cast the relationship as a two-way exchange.

"Ukraine is ready to share its experience and technologies on a mutually beneficial basis," he said.

While Japan has advanced technologies for protecting lives, particularly in air defense, that could carry Ukraine through the winter if Russia again rejects talks, the President's Office reported.

Ukraine walks into winter with two air-defense problems. It is still testing home-built interceptors to catch Russia's jet-powered drones. And it does not have enough Patriot interceptors to stop ballistic missiles over its cities. Japan holds the key to the second one.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries runs the only plant outside the US licensed to assemble the PAC-3, the advanced Patriot interceptor. Japan is also the sole maker of the guidance gyroscopes inside older PAC-2 missiles. It has already shipped Japanese-made PAC-3s to the US to refill stocks drained by transfers to Ukraine, and Zelenskyy has floated Mitsubishi as the model for Ukraine's own Patriot line.

The exchange runs both ways. Russia keeps pressing Japan over the Kuril Islands the Soviet Union seized in 1945. Against that backdrop, Ukraine's combat-tested drones could appeal to Tokyo. Kyiv offers the drone know-how it now leads in, and asks for the air-defense edge Japan already has.

Zelenskyy also thanked Tokyo for its sanctions on Russia, energy packages, and humanitarian projects, and Takaichi assured him of continued support. Zelenskyy invited her to Ukraine, including the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, which Japan helped restore after a Russian drone strike in June.

Chile opens a door to Latin America

With Kast, Zelenskyy discussed deepening security and drone-technology ties and thanked Chile for backing Ukraine at international forums and for helping return Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. He welcomed Santiago's willingness to help expand Ukraine's presence across Latin America, calling it an opening for "even more promising opportunities," and invited Kast to visit.

Building on ties already in place

Both partnerships rest on existing ground. Japan, barred by its own laws from sending lethal weapons, has delivered generators, transformers, and non-lethal gear, pledged a $6 billion package for 2026, and agreed to help rebuild the Lavra through UNESCO. Talks in Tokyo in July recast Ukraine as a security partner rather than an aid recipient.

Chile joined the coalition to bring abducted Ukrainian children home and, in an April call, heard Zelenskyy float a security arrangement modeled on Ukraine's Gulf-state pacts. The outreach tracks Kyiv's drive to turn its wartime industry into an export business under its "Drone Deals" framework.

At 2:30 in the morning of 14 September, one week after he first claimed his innocence and then resigned, Ukraine's prosecutor general Ruslan Kravchenko crossed the border and left the country. Hours before he went, he used his office to sign a criminal suspicion against the chief of the anti-corruption bureau investigating him. His wife had crossed a day earlier.

Such was the unglorious fate of President Zelenskyy's man, the prosecutor general who in July 2025 nearly leashed Ukraine's independent anti-corruption agencies. Saved by mass street protests, the anti-graft institutions built after the Euromaidan revolution rebounded, and went first after President Zelenskyy's friend Tymur Mindich, then after his right hand Andriy Yermak.

And now they had reached the prosecutor general himself: in Ukraine, the one official who can veto any anti-corruption case against a member of parliament.

"For the first time in Ukraine, after a suspicion was announced, it was the prosecutor who fled abroad, not the suspect," anti-corruption campaigner Daria Kaleniuk wrote as it happened.

Things are, of course, far better than in 2014, when then Prosecutor General Pshonka criminalized the Euromaidan revolution and pursued the political rivals of then President Yanukovych, before both fled to Russia. Papers later found in Pshonka's abandoned mansion, published by Ukrainska Pravda, showed his office drawing up plans to arrest MPs and open thousands of criminal cases against Maidan activists, using prosecution, in the office's own notes, as a political instrument.

But things are still not as good as in 2019, the one time the office worked the other way. That year Ukraine's new chief prosecutor, Ruslan Riaboshapka, named fresh suspects in the PrivatBank case, which ran into Ihor Kolomoisky, the oligarch whose television channel had helped put Zelenskyy in office. He also refused to sign charges against Zelenskyy's political opponent Petro Poroshenko, calling them groundless.

Signature-gathering for Riaboshapka's dismissal began the next day. Parliament removed him in March 2020, and his successor rolled back the reforms he had tried to launch. David Arakhamia, the head of Zelenskyy's parliamentary faction, later named the refusal to charge Poroshenko as the last drop.

It keeps repeating. The official whose job is to hold the powerful to account ends up serving them instead.

Of the prosecutors general who followed Riaboshapka, two left under a cloud.

Andriy Kostin resigned in 2024 after investigators exposed a nationwide market in fake disability certificates used to dodge mobilization, a scheme that reached prosecutors inside his own service. And now Kravchenko, whom Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies had begun investigating over the alleged protection of an international network of fraudulent call centers.

It keeps repeating. The official whose job is to hold the powerful to account ends up serving them instead. The problem is structural, and so is the fix: the same mechanism behind Ukraine's working post-Euromaidan reforms. A bill to have independent experts vet candidates for the Prosecutor General exists; it has sat in parliament since June, untouched.

Whether Zelenskyy's Servant of the People party, which holds the Rada majority, will let it move is unclear. What hangs on the answer is whether Ukraine finishes becoming a state of law, or stays a state of protection.

Unlimited power, total political control

For the office meant to guarantee that everyone, including those in power, is equal before the law, real powers are necessary. The problem in Ukraine, said Iryna Korzhenkova, a parliamentary analyst at the Chesno movement for political transparency, is that those powers come bundled with total political control.

The president appoints the prosecutor general with the Rada's consent, under a procedure that provides neither transparent selection nor any assessment of competence. He can be dismissed by a simple 226-vote majority. No prosecutor general has served a full term, and the average tenure is under two years.

"The position that is supposed to keep politicians in check works as their insurance policy instead," Korzhenkova told Euromaidan Press.

Capturing the office is a tempting political prize. Under Article 482-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, only the prosecutor general can register a criminal case against a sitting MP, and only he can approve a search, a wiretap, or a detention against one.

Since MPs lost their formal immunity in 2020, in the same reform that handed the prosecutor general sole power to open cases against them, this has become a kind of modified immunity: one politically appointed person can decline to open a case, and no court can challenge the refusal. This was the case in 2020, when then Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova rejected a draft suspicion against an MP handed to her by NABU, reversing only under public pressure.

So valuable is the office that in 2016 parliament stripped out the need for a law degree altogether, to fit the president's man, Poroshenko ally Yuriy Lutsenko; the press called it "the personal law of Lutsenko."

His appointment came as the old guard crushed a reform born on the wings of Euromaidan: a team of reformist prosecutors who had just exposed the "diamond prosecutors," senior officials caught with bags of cash and gems linked to the sitting prosecutor general, was purged, and the case died.

A demand the EU has made since 2014

Depoliticizing this chair has been an EU condition for Ukraine's membership path since 2014, and a live one since negotiations on the Fundamentals cluster, the first stage of accession talks and the one covering rule of law, opened in June.

This is why the day that Kravchenko fled, the EU issued a reminder that Ukraine promised to reform the Prosecutor General's Office and introduce a contest for the chair.

"The prosecutor general is the gateway to the criminal justice system for everyone in power," Korzhenkova explained.

Today, that gateway is held by the political majority: appointed by Zelenskyy, dismissable by his Servant of the People party, which controls parliament. Any case against that majority has to pass a filter the majority appoints.

The EU's interest in prying the office loose is twofold, she said.

1. Brussels sends Ukraine money and must be sure that money stolen gets prosecuted;
2. and it has watched the reform reverse in Poland and Bulgaria, which is why it now wants the guarantees written in before the fact.

The internal price is steeper still: war raises the cost of a dependent prosecution, with defense procurement, mobilization, and aid flows all resting on it.

Europe's own standard, set out by the Council of Europe in its 2014 charter on prosecutors, prescribes no single model. Governments may have a hand in choosing the prosecutor general, so long as the method earns public confidence and the term is stable enough to make the office "independent of political changes."

On dismissal it is blunter: protection from "arbitrary or politically motivated dismissal" is "particularly relevant" for prosecutors general, and the law "should clearly define the conditions of their pre-term dismissal."

Ukraine fails at both ends, and, as Korzhenkova puts it, no version that leaves the president's discretion untouched can meet that standard.

The international expert lifehack

But how do you clean an office when cronyism runs through the class that appoints it? Ukraine has a partial answer, from the part of its post-Euromaidan reforms that worked.

The directors of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention are chosen through open competitions in which a panel of independent experts, foreign ones among them with a decisive vote, can veto compromised candidates.

The Ukrainian half of a commission can be captured. The foreigners with a decisive vote are the part no Ukrainian official can phone up and instruct.

The success of those agencies, now breaking up the very rings of cronyism they were built to reach, is why the Venice Commission and Ukraine's Western partners have consistently defended the model.

In a 2021 joint statement, the EU, US, and partner embassies called the international experts' role "temporary but crucial," aimed at resisting "the influence of vested interests." When Zelenskyy's team moved to strip NABU and SAPO of their independence in July 2025, the G7 ambassadors publicly welcomed the reversal that restored it.

Those independently selected agencies produced Operation Midas, the case that reached Mindich and forced out Yermak, and, weeks later, Operation Forrest Gump.

The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), created in 2018 through the same kind of expert council, reaches officials the courts never could: it convicted the highest-ranking judge in the country, Vsevolod Kniaziev, over part of a $2.7 million bribe. Before it existed, all of Ukraine's general courts together had delivered roughly 40 verdicts in NABU and SAPO cases; in seven years the specialized court has delivered 431, against 601 people, and for the first time a sitting MP drew a real prison term.

The foreign vote is not a hypothetical safeguard. At an August hearing for Olha Stefanishyna, the former deputy prime minister for European integration, a SAPO prosecutor read out messages in which, they say, she steered the very commissions that select Ukraine's watchdog agencies. To the head of the 2022 panel choosing the NABU director: "Do what you want, I need numbers 60 and 62 from the list. Postpone the sessions, I shouldn't have to think for you." Her influence reached three commissions at once.

She calls the case a storm in a teacup, and the charges are unproven. But it is the reformers' own argument: the Ukrainian half of a commission can be captured. The foreigners with a decisive vote are the part no Ukrainian official can phone up and instruct.

The model is no panacea, Korzhenkova warns:

"The international experts are not the motor of reform. They are a circuit breaker. They can keep out the worse candidate. They cannot make those in power want to do better."

The anti-corruption court convicts, but whether the guilty serve time is another matter. Of its 398 convictions in seven years, more than half were settled by plea bargain, others ended in fines or suspended sentences, and a stack of cases had simply run out the clock before any verdict. As of the last public tally, in spring 2026, only about 80 of the convicted had actually drawn real jail time.

For years, the court sat short of judges, which Ekonomichna Pravda read as quietly convenient for those in power: an understaffed court slows cases and lets them lapse without the visible fight of dismantling it. Most of the vacancies were only filled in August 2026, when the EU tied the appointments to money Ukraine needed.

What the bill would do, and the perennial objection

Full depoliticization would mean amending the constitution, which martial law rules out, and the EU mandates no specific route. So the reformers' instrument is an ordinary law, bill 15343.

It adds a filter to the current system: the president would pick not freely, as now, but from candidates pre-selected by an open competition run by a six-member commission, three of them vetted by Ukraine's international partners. Four votes choose a candidate, two of them the internationals'.

And it moves the power to discipline and dismiss a sitting prosecutor general to the High Council of Justice, the body that governs Ukraine's judges, itself reformed in 2021 through the same international-expert vetting, and the one disciplinary body not under the prosecutor general's own control.

If the mechanism works, and Ukraine has used it for its anti-corruption prosecution, bureau, and court, the obvious question is why the prosecutor general was left out.

The answer is not constitutional, though a constitutional objection has been raised. A legal analysis on the site Sud.ua argued the model has no analog in most of the EU and breaks the constitution: the president is reduced to a technical executor of the commission's choice, and the judges' council is handed power over the head of the prosecution, which is not the judiciary. Foreign experts with a veto over a constitutional office, one commentator wrote, are a gift to any populist and to Moscow.

But this is the argument Ukraine's powerful always reach for when the anti-corruption bodies get close.

In 2020, when NABU accused the judge Pavlo Vovk of running a scheme to seize control of the courts, the same sovereignty-and-separation-of-powers reasoning was deployed to shield him, and EP reported at the time that the prosecutor general's own office was accused of moving to disrupt the case against him. The office meant to prosecute the powerful was protecting them instead, which is the whole reason reformers want it taken out of political hands.

There is no legal reason the reform cannot be done, Korzhenkova says. The same constitutional objections applied to the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Justice, both reformed through international vetting; the filter was added anyway.

"The constitutional argument suddenly appeared only for the prosecutor general," she said.

The real reason for the stall is political: the prosecutor general is the last great lever that decides who gets prosecuted, and the majority that would have to give up control of it is the same majority those prosecutions would reach.

The Rada's own tempo shows it. To save the system from a scandal, it found 317 votes to dismiss Kravchenko in a single day and installed an acting prosecutor general by decree. To limit the system, it has left the bill untouched for three months; in early September the relevant committee declined even to put it on the agenda, and moved only after individual MPs pushed.

At least 50 members of the current parliament, Chesno documents, are themselves under criminal suspicion.

What happens now

The interim answer is Anton Kovalskyi, the Khmelnytskyi Oblast chief prosecutor, appointed acting prosecutor general by decree on 17 September, chosen the old way: hand-picked, from at least four candidates, with no public account of why him.

The Anti-Corruption Action Center laid out the rest in a dossier: property registered to relatives, a wife from Russia whose year-old sole proprietorship reported earnings of over UAH 500,000 ($11k) a month, a deputy whose father-in-law fled to Russia and was convicted in absentia of collaboration.

Asked whether the reform bill would have produced a different result, Korzhenkova declined to guess, and said the guessing is the problem. "I don't know, and neither does anyone else, and that is exactly it."

Under an open competition, his selection would have been vetted by international experts; everyone could have submitted data on the candidates.

The bill would not have guaranteed a good prosecutor general, but it would at least have made the appointed one checkable. This is what the Rada majority is, for now, declining to allow.

The case that finally reached Kravchenko had a name. NABU and SAPO called it Carthage: a scheme, run out of the Prosecutor General's Office itself, to shield a network of fraudulent call centers, with five officials handed suspicions.

Carthage put investigators inside his building, and Carthage he was answering when, on his way out, he turned the office's power to prosecute the man using it against him and signed a suspicion against Semen Kryvonos, the NABU director.

Kryvonos says it never reached him; the office itself later conceded that the suspicion was legally void.

Kravchenko's last act as prosecutor general was a business trip he wrote for himself, five days in Paris for a hearing of the PACE parliamentary network, and he left by car on 13 September. He was due back on the 18th. He did not return, and his former office says it does not know whether he has asked for asylum in the EU.

Ukraine has spent a decade building institutions that reach the powerful. The prosecutor general's office is the one it never got to. The man who ran it signed his own exit papers and was across the border by half past two in the morning.

US President Donald Trump repeatedly asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to stop attacks on Russian oil refineries during a phone call on 20 September, Axios reported, citing a person familiar with the conversation. The two leaders are due to meet in New York today, 22 September, during the UN General Assembly.

For Ukraine, the strikes are a way to disrupt the fuel supply supporting Russia's military. Trump is now linking the attacks to global diesel prices. The International Energy Agency (IEA) said disruptions to Russia's refining system following intensified Ukrainian attacks have compounded diesel supply losses.

Trump backed the strikes two months ago

At a NATO summit on 8 July, speaking alongside Zelenskyy, Trump said Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries could help end the war. "It's an escalation, but it's also an escalation that can help lead to an end," he said. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Ukraine's ability to strike deep into Russian territory was one of the changes in the war in recent months and said the escalation could create space for negotiations.

On 13 September, Trump called on Zelenskyy to stop the attacks.

"Mr. Zelenskyy has to do one thing: he has to stop knocking out diesel fuel in Russia," Trump said. "There are plenty of other targets. Don't hit diesel fuel. That's hurting the world."

Trump added that the rise in prices was not caused by the Iran conflict. "This isn't done by the Middle East, this is done by what's happening with Russia and Ukraine," he said.

On 20 September, Trump raised the demand again in his call with Zelenskyy. "The word diesel came up many times" during the conversation, a person familiar with the call told Axios.

What is driving diesel prices

US diesel prices had reached $6.06 per gallon by 13 September, up from $3.71 a year earlier. The IEA said in June that global energy markets were contending with their largest supply disruption in history because of the near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz, though it also noted that a US-Iran agreement to reopen the strait had begun easing prices from their April peak. A Bipartisan Policy Center analysis attributed the diesel surge to the Iran conflict and did not address Ukrainian strikes.

Ukraine's refinery campaign has also disrupted Russian fuel production. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said on 4 July that attacks had disabled 42.7% of Russia's oil-refining capacity. Russia's gasoline production fell an estimated 25% year-on-year in the week of 15–21 June, while Moscow has extended its ban on diesel exports through at least September.

Zelenskyy confirms Tuesday meeting

After the call, Zelenskyy said it had been "an important conversation" and that today's meeting "could change a lot." He said there was "diplomatic momentum" and that Ukraine was ready "to take really serious steps." He also said the call covered ideas for de-escalation and fundamental security issues including energy and food security.

Rustem Umerov, head of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service and Kyiv's chief negotiator, told Axios that US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner had helped with the peace talks, where the number of stumbling blocks had fallen from "dozens to essentially one or two key issues." Umerov was rebutting a Kyiv Independent report that Kyiv was frustrated with Witkoff, which he called false.

Ukraine's largest arms-industry group says it is backing the country's drive to sell and co-produce weapons abroad, while pressing the government to fix two separate obstacles in its way. The Council of Defense Industry, which represents more than 400 companies, wants a costly new export-permit fee and a stalled joint-production program to be upgraded, it said on Facebook.

The two problems are distinct. Resolution 875, the wartime rules for shipping arms abroad, charges a 20-30 percent fee on export permits, which the industry says prices Ukrainian goods out of the market.

The export fee bites

Resolution 875, adopted in July, was intended to streamline exports, with a 30-day review period and a streamlined path for partner countries. But the fee has choked it: only about 10 small export contracts have been signed since exports began, and not one permit has been issued under the new rules, Militarnyi reports.

"Resolution 875 in its current form contains provisions that could substantially worsen the competitiveness of Ukrainian producers," the group says.

Build with Ukraine is a separate track

The program lets producers export their technology and set up joint production abroad, reaching EU markets, financing, and infrastructure, while partners fund weapons production inside Ukraine.

The program lets producers export their technology and set up joint production abroad, reaching EU markets, financing, and infrastructure, while partners fund weapons production inside Ukraine. Talks are underway with Denmark, Norway, and Germany.

President Zelenskyy has said $43 billion was raised for Ukraine's defense industry in 2025, floated a goal of partner states each spending 0.25 percent of their GDP on it, and stressed that no Ukrainian technology will reach countries tied to Russia.

The Council, whose ecosystem spans more than 360 manufacturers, 28 drone-pilot schools, and 20 defense venture funds, says it is ready to help refine the mechanism.