Masked men appeared at anti-corruption demonstrations in Kyiv Thursday evening, carrying inflammatory signs targeting President Volodymyr Zelenskyy personally—exactly 24 hours after Ukrainian intelligence warned that Russia would deploy provocateurs to exploit the crisis.

The timing wasn’t coincidental. Defense Intelligence had warned Wednesday that “Kremlin agents are actively studying the internal situation” to weaponize protests against the law that subordinates Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies to the Prosecutor General’s Office.

When the real protesters left, others appeared

The incident unfolded around evening as legitimate demonstrators wrapped up their third day of protests against Law No. 12414. What happened next looked like textbook destabilization.

Masked individuals emerged with signs reading “Ukraine is not Kvartal! Ukrainians are not slaves!” “Killers of democracy traitors of Ukraine,” and “Heroes are dying for Ukraine and these two are destroying it!”—directly targeting Zelenskyy and his chief of staff Andriy Yermak, according to footage captured by a Euromaidan Press correspondent.

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Legitimate protesters had focused on defending institutions: “Hands off NABU and SAP!” and “The lost generation wants democracy.” These newcomers turned it into a vitriolic attack on the country’s leadership.

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The power concentration driving protest anger

Why target Zelenskyy and Yermak specifically? The anti-corruption law represents broader concerns about power centralization during wartime.

When investigators began targeting Zelenskyy’s closest associates—including Oleksiy Chernyshov, the only Cabinet minister invited to Zelenskyy’s COVID birthday party, and business partner Tymur Mindych from Kvartal 95—the response was to subordinate the investigators rather than allow the process to continue.

The law effectively places NABU and SAPO under the Prosecutor General’s control, ending a decade of institutional independence. The protesters aren’t calling for Zelenskyy’s removal—they want the law repealed while maintaining effective war leadership. Most Ukrainians still oppose holding elections while fighting Russia. Their primary concern remains winning the war.

That’s precisely what makes this moment valuable to Moscow. The Kremlin hopes to exploit these real institutional tensions to destabilize Zelenskyy’s government entirely.

Surgical timing raises questions

Witness Mladena Kachurets documented the evening’s events. The suspicious activity began about 10 minutes before an air raid alert—perfect timing for dramatic effect.

“Masked individuals gathered the remaining protesters around them and delivered some kind of recorded speech,” she wrote. Multiple distractions played out simultaneously. While media focused on MP Maryana Bezuhla giving comments, “behind her was a verbal altercation between two young men, drawing part of the attention away.”

Then came the crescendo. When the air raid alert sounded, “the masked individuals demonstratively lit flares—an impressive picture, you’ll agree.”

Classic Russian influence operation

The provocateurs’ work didn’t end with the flares. Multiple Russian media outlets, starting from TASS, quickly fabricated coverage, with headlines like “Protesters in Kyiv called Zelenskyy and Yermak ‘traitors of Ukraine'” appearing the next day.

“They unfurled posters with images of Zelenskyy and Yermak, accompanied by inscriptions: ‘Killers of democracy – traitors of Ukraine’ and ‘Dictators.’ The posters also indicated that ‘these two’ are destroying the country, and ‘Ukrainians are not slaves,’” TASS reported on the provocateurs.

They cited Strana.ua, a pro-Russian media outlet that Ukraine sanctioned in 2021, as their source without providing actual links to any such article. Strana indeed reported on the event, on their Telegram channel, using a video by UNIAN with a comment presenting this as legitimate sentiments of the protesters.

The catch is that Ukrainian media, sensing Russian hybrid warfare operations from a mile away, either did not report on the men or reported them as provocateurs. Even the opposition 5 Kanal tweeted the video with a comment “provocative action” and followed up with a comment from the organizers that dismissed the burned Yermak and Zelenskyy portraits as a “provocation.”

The UNIAN video that Strana.ua shared the video with this comment: “At a protest in Kyiv, a group of planted provocateurs are lighting flares to the sound of air raid sirens. It looks like these uninvited guests are clearly and openly staging a photo op. Makes you wonder who needs this footage besides Russian propaganda—and who’s pulling the strings?”

What unraveled in the backyard of the President’s Office in Kyiv on 24 July was a classic Russian influence operation. Its aim was to fabricate a virtual reality inside the heads of Russians to validate the propaganda narratives driving Russia’s war—that Ukrainians want this, because they don’t support Zelenskyy anyway.

The inflammatory signs calling Zelenskyy a “dictator” and “traitor” now circulate in Russian information space—manufacturing evidence that Ukraine is fragmenting internally to validate Moscow’s narrative that its invasion “liberates” Ukrainians from their government.

We’ve seen multiple examples of how these operations work in the Surkov Leaks, a collection of Vladimir Putin’s gray cardinal Vladislav Surkov, who worked to destabilize Ukraine from within after the Euromaidan revolution with hybrid warfare means. So far, it appears that the operation has influenced solely Russians, as the incendiary narrative of “down with the dictators” proved too radical for Ukrainians.

But that doesn’t mean that the Kremlin won’t keep trying and finding other ways to mess with the minds of Ukrainians—and anybody else gullible enough to fall for the Kremlin’s information warfare.

What happens next?

But here’s what actually happened to the supposed “dictator”: within three days of signing the controversial law, Zelenskyy submitted corrective legislation under intense public pressure.

“We heard the street,” he admitted, promising new legislation to restore anti-corruption agency independence. Parliament has scheduled July 31 to vote on the bill—though passage isn’t guaranteed.

Protesters haven’t declared victory yet. They’ve vowed to keep demonstrating until the corrective law actually passes and institutional independence is genuinely restored. The danger to democratic institutions was real, and vigilance remains essential.

But that’s precisely the point. The provocateur operation aimed to show Russians that Ukrainians reject their leadership and welcome “liberation.” Instead, it captured something different: a democracy under stress but still functioning. Public pressure forced a presidential retreat. Protests work. Institutions push back. Citizens stay engaged.

Ukraine’s democracy is imperfect and fragile—but it’s alive. The operation succeeded only in Russian information space, manufacturing the illusion of internal collapse for domestic consumption while the real Ukraine continued the messy, contentious work of democratic governance.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the law anyway.

Even as thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated in Kyiv, Lviv, and Dnipro—the first major protests against his government since Russia’s invasion—even as the European Union demanded explanations and G7 ambassadors expressed “serious concerns,” Ukraine’s president destroyed his country’s independent anti-corruption infrastructure with a single signature.

The reason was simple—and it reveals everything wrong with how Ukraine still operates.

Corruption investigators were closing in on Zelenskyy’s inner circle. Two men from his closest orbit faced charges: Oleksiy Chernyshov, the only Cabinet minister invited to Zelenskyy’s COVID birthday party, and Tymur Mindich, his business partner from the Kvartal 95 comedy studio.

Rather than let them face justice, Zelenskyy chose to eliminate the investigators— NABU and SAPO.

This matters because when anti-corruption agencies finally reached the president’s actual family—not just random officials, but his birthday party guests and business partners—Ukraine witnessed its first real test of whether it had outgrown the post-Soviet patronage trap.

The answer came swift and brutal: personal loyalty won, institutional accountability lost.

The family under investigation

Chernyshov wasn’t just any minister. During Ukraine’s strict COVID-19 lockdown in 2021, when gatherings were banned, Zelenskyy invited only a handful of intimates to celebrate his birthday. Chernyshov was the sole government official present. Ukrainska Pravda reported this marked him as part of Zelenskyy’s inner circle, someone beyond typical political appointees.

The relationship runs deeper than professional. Sources indicate close family friendships between the Zelenskyy and Chernyshov families, with connections predating the full-scale invasion. Despite lacking infrastructure experience, Chernyshov has held four high-level positions across six years.

When no suitable position existed, parliament created an entirely new Ministry of National Unity specifically for him.

In June, NABU charged Chernyshov with organizing a massive land scheme, allegedly manipulating state transfers to benefit developers in exchange for apartments worth $346,000 at artificially low prices — costing the state over $24 million.

Tymur Mindich represents Zelenskyy’s pre-political past as co-owner of Kvartal 95, the entertainment company that launched his career. ZN.ua describes him as “one of the main consultants to the head of the President’s Office Andriy Yermak” and a “long-time business partner of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.”

Investigators were preparing charges against Mindich himself, according to sources who told Ukrainska Pravda. When the heat intensified, MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak reported that Mindich fled Ukraine and “will likely not return in the near future.”

Here’s what makes this different from typical Ukrainian corruption scandals: these weren’t random officials caught stealing. These were Zelenskyy’s actual inner circle — the people who got him to power and stayed there with him.

The parliamentary blitzkrieg

When corruption charges reached these core members of Zelenskyy’s circle, the response was swift and systematic. The destruction happened through brazen procedural violations that would have embarrassed even Viktor Yanukovych.

On 21 July, Security Service forces conducted 70 simultaneous raids on anti-corruption officials, claiming to expose “Russian moles” in NABU.

The numbers exposed the theater immediately: 70 searches produced five charges, three involving old traffic accidents from 2021-2023. “Mathematics is an exact science,” observed Andriy Borovyk, director of Transparency International Ukraine: if there was a real reason for them, they should have produced more substantial evidence.

Twenty-four hours later came what MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak called a “blitzkrieg” against anti-corruption institutions. They disguised the attack as humanitarian legislation. MP Maksym Buzhanskyi introduced a bill about missing persons procedures.

MPs had roughly an hour to review amendments that fundamentally transformed Ukraine’s corruption oversight. The atmosphere was celebratory. “After the vote, I heard a phrase from one of them,” Zhelezniak recalled. “It was Maksym Buzhanskyi… This phrase was: ‘This football I like.'”

Parliament voted 263-13 to subordinate NADB and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office to a presidential appointee.

The message was clear: investigate mid-level officials all you want, but the president’s “family” remains off-limits.

The comedy studio government

But this wasn’t just about protecting two friends. The appointments reveal how Zelenskyy systematically recreated the exact loyalty-based system he campaigned against—just with different people.

After Zelenskyy’s presidential victory in 2019, over 30 former Kvartal 95 employees and their associates moved into government positions. Ukrainian analysts call it a “comedy studio government.”

Radio Svoboda documented the network: Serhiy Shefir, Zelenskyy’s co-owner of Kvartal 95, became First Assistant to the President. Andriy Yermak, a film producer who met Zelenskyy in 2011, rose to Head of the Presidential Office — what The Washington Post describes as “arguably the most powerful chief of staff in Ukraine’s history.”

The most catastrophic appointment was Ivan Bakanov, Zelenskyy’s childhood friend from Kryvyi Rih and Kvartal 95’s former lawyer. Despite having zero intelligence experience, Zelenskyy made him head of the Security Service (SBU) in August 2019.

Under Bakanov’s watch, the SBU appointed Oleksandr Kulinich to a critical southern defense position despite Kulinich being legally barred from state service — the man graduated from Moscow’s FSB academy in 1994. When Russia invaded on 24 February 2022, this intelligence breach proved fatal. Russian forces advanced 150 kilometers in march formation, bypassing Ukrainian positions. Kherson fell in exactly seven days.

The Washington Post reported that 651 criminal proceedings were registered regarding treason and collaboration by law enforcement officials, with over 60 from the prosecutor’s office and the SBU working against Ukraine in occupied territories.

This is why loyalty-based governance can’t coexist with institutional accountability. When you staff government based on personal relationships rather than merit, you create a state that can’t tolerate oversight — because accountability exposes the incompetence and corruption that loyalty-first appointments inevitably produce.

What Ukraine lost

NABU and SAPO were created after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution as Ukraine’s first real separation of powers. Their independence was a requirement for EU membership negotiations, visa-free travel to Europe, and billions in international aid.

Under the new law, the prosecutor general can transfer any NABU investigation to other agencies, issue binding instructions to detectives, close cases at defense request, and delegate SAP’s powers to other prosecutors.

“If the anti-corruption structure is embedded in a politicized law enforcement system, it won’t work,” MP Yaroslav Yurchyshyn explained. “It won’t present suspicions to ministers, advisors, or deputy heads of the President’s Office, or deputies.”

The strategic miscalculation

The destruction provides perfect ammunition for those questioning Ukraine aid. European reactions came swiftly. European Commissioner Marta Kos called the law “a serious step back,” warning that “independent bodies like NABU and SAPO are essential for Ukraine’s EU path.”

European Pravda reported that Brussels had secretly scheduled 18 July to open Ukraine’s first EU negotiating cluster, but abandoned the plan after Ukraine’s anti-corruption crackdown.

The timing wasn’t coincidental. American rule-of-law programs had withdrawn from Ukraine in February and March 2025, and European officials were on summer vacation. Ukrainian authorities misread signals from the Trump administration as permission to attack democratic institutions.

Putin originally justified his invasion partly by claiming Ukraine was establishing anti-corruption institutions with foreign experts. As Kaleniuk pointed out, “Ukrainian MPs are now making Putin’s argument for him.”

MP Zhelezniak recalled Putin’s February 2022 speech: “So he named one of the reasons why he’s starting war—the presence of independent anti-corruption bodies. And we liquidated them today.”

When Ukrainians said no

But Ukrainian society had other ideas. Mass protests erupted across Ukraine on 22 July — the first major demonstrations against Zelenskyy’s government since Russia’s invasion. The Washington Post reported thousands flooded central Kyiv and massed in cities across the war-torn country, by far the largest demonstrations since Russia’s 2022 invasion.

Protesters chanted “Get your hands off NABU and SAP” and “Veto the law,” while drivers honked in support. Even facing this unprecedented resistance, Zelenskyy signed the law anyway.

The next morning, he scrambled to gather law enforcement and anti-corruption agency heads for emergency meetings. On 23 July, he promised to introduce new legislation preserving anti-corruption independence. Parliament’s summer recess was canceled for an emergency session.

Meanwhile, 48 MPs began preparing a Constitutional Court challenge.

Protests against law to gut anti-corruption agencies are starting in Ukraine. Here is Lviv

Today, the parliament voted for law #12414 to bring the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Specialized Anti-Corruption Office under control of politically-appointed General Prosecutor,… pic.twitter.com/9H6PeDH07K

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) July 22, 2025

The maturity test

This was Ukraine’s first major test of whether it had outgrown the post-Soviet patronage trap that destroyed every previous government. The entertainment industry veterans who took power in 2019 tried to replicate the same loyalty-first system that had dominated Ukrainian politics for decades. When independent institutions threatened their inner circle, they attempted to destroy those institutions.

But Ukrainian civil society had matured during three decades of independence and intensified during three years of war. The massive protests forced Zelenskyy into damage control, demonstrating that Ukraine’s democratic evolution had outpaced its leaders’ authoritarian instincts.

Society won the test. Zelenskyy lost it spectacularly. The protests suggest that Ukrainian democracy—tested by war, corruption, and institutional capture — proved more resilient than the patronage networks trying to control it.

The president who campaigned against the system of untouchables had created his own version. When Ukrainians recognized the pattern, they took to the streets to defend the institutions he had promised to protect. In that response lies hope that Ukraine’s democratic future remains stronger than its authoritarian past.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law Tuesday dismantling Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies.

The timing was disastrous: Brussels had secretly scheduled 18 July to open Ukraine’s first EU negotiating cluster, bypassing Hungary entirely, but abandoned the plan after Ukraine’s anti-corruption crackdown, according to European Pravda sources within EU institutions.

Zelenskyy knew about the plan. He’d been personally involved in discussions with Danish officials and EU leadership since late June, European Pravda reported, citing unnamed European officials. But instead of supporting this diplomatic breakthrough, Ukraine systematically undermined its reform credentials by rejecting the Bureau of Economic Security selection results, conducting searches of activist Vitalii Shabunin’s home, and finally signing the law gutting NABU and SAPO independence.

Brussels was ready to break its own rules for Ukraine

The Danish EU presidency and European Commission had crafted something unprecedented: legal measures to sideline Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán, who had systematically blocked Ukraine’s accession, completely.

Bloomberg reported in May that member states pushed the Commission to explore options for opening Ukraine’s first negotiating chapter despite Hungarian objections.

The breakthrough insight: while unanimity is required to start and complete EU accession negotiations, sources told Bloomberg it’s not a legal requirement for opening individual clusters. The Commission informed member states that it intended to send the European Council a first report on starting cluster discussions with Ukraine and Moldova.

After years of Hungarian obstruction, 26 member states were willing to risk institutional precedent.

The “parallel negotiations” mechanism

The mechanism was elegant: conduct “parallel negotiations” where 26 EU states would negotiate with Ukraine while Moldova received formal recognition. When Moldova opened negotiating clusters, the 26 states would issue statements confirming Ukraine had completed the same work and that only Hungary’s veto prevented legal advancement.

• Inter-Governmental Conferences: The Danish presidency was prepared to convene working bodies pivotal to enlargement that don’t require Hungarian consent
• Political weight: Though legally non-binding for Ukraine, these would carry enormous political significance
• Synchronized progress: Ukraine’s advancement would be coordinated with Moldova’s formal recognition

The Danish presidency, which described enlargement as a “geopolitical necessity,” had exhausted diplomatic options with Hungary.

Hungary systematic obstruction

Orbán had forced Brussels into this position through relentless obstruction. After blocking progress during Hungary’s 2024 EU presidency, he staged a “national consultation” where 95% of 2.3 million participants opposed Ukraine membership—though an opposition poll found 58% Hungarian support for Ukraine’s EU bid.

Zelenskyy met with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen during the NATO summit in The Hague. He flew to Denmark on 3 July for private negotiations. Final details were hammered out in Rome on 10 July. Everything was set for the 18 July ceremony in Brussels.

European officials were prepared to risk institutional precedent. Ukraine chose that exact moment to implode its reform credentials.

How Ukraine sabotaged itself

The self-sabotage unfolded in a devastating sequence:

• 9 July: The Ukrainian government rejected the winner of a transparent, EU-supported competition to head the Bureau of Economic Security. The government simply overturned the selection results with no explanation.
• 11 July: Law enforcement raided anti-corruption activist Vitalii Shabunin’s home without a court warrant. They also searched the mother of fallen Hero of Ukraine pilot Andrii “Juice” Pilshchykov simply because Shabunin had briefly stayed there.
• 14 July: Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna announced her resignation as Ukraine’s chief EU negotiator—replacing a negotiator at such a sensitive moment gave Brussels another reason to pause.

Denmark quietly abandoned the 18 July proposal. European Pravda sources reported EU officials asking: “WTF? What is going on?”

Brussels draws the line

EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos warned Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka that the anti-corruption law would have “serious consequences for the entire negotiation process.” Some member states now believe “it would have been better not to rush into opening the first cluster.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called Zelenskyy directly to express “strong concerns.” Brussels views this as democratic backsliding comparable to Georgia’s retreat.

Economic consequences mounting

The OECD warned that undermining anti-corruption agencies will hurt:

• Defense investments in Ukraine
• Reconstruction funding from international partners
• Future borrowing capacity as creditors reassess risk

But European officials doubt the Presidential Office takes these warnings seriously—they are accustomed to Brussels making threats without decisive action.

Putin wins without trying

Anti-corruption architect Daria Kaleniuk pointed out the bitter irony: Zelenskyy “just gave Putin his best argument.”

Putin’s original justification for war was that Ukraine was “losing sovereignty to foreign partners, establishing anti-corruption institutions with foreign experts.” Ukrainian MPs are now making Putin’s argument for him.

Ukraine will fall behind Moldova in EU accession talks. The “decoupling” Brussels tried to avoid becomes inevitable—not because of Hungarian obstruction, but because of Ukraine own choices. As one European official noted: “Ukraine has done the dirty work instead of Viktor Orbán.”

What the law actually does

The legislation Zelenskyy signed grants the Prosecutor General sweeping authority to:

• Reassign NABU investigations to other agencies
• Issue binding instructions to anti-corruption bodies
• Unilaterally close high-level corruption cases
• Control SAPO operations through mandatory coordination

Transparency International Ukraine called it the dismantling of “prosecutorial independence.”

NABU and SAPO were established in 2015 under Western pressure following the Euromaidan Revolution. Independent anti-corruption institutions were central to EU integration and remain a key condition for visa-free travel, which stays secure despite current developments.

The timing was particularly damaging. Just as European officials prepared to risk institutional precedent for Ukraine’s benefit, Kyiv chose to demolish its reform credentials.

The timing was surgical. As security services arrested their own officials for taking $300,000 bribes from draft dodgers, Ukraine’s parliament voted to gut the very agencies designed to catch such corruption.

On 22 July 2025, lawmakers passed Bill No. 12414 by 263 votes, effectively ending a decade of post-Euromaidan anti-corruption reforms. The legislation transfers control of corruption investigations from independent agencies—NABU and SAPO—to the politically appointed Prosecutor General.

The vote came one day after authorities conducted over 70 searches against NABU employees, citing alleged Russian intelligence links that critics say provided convenient cover for the institutional demolition.

This matters because Ukraine built these institutions specifically to investigate officials close to the presidency—the very people now beyond reach. NABU had been investigating Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov in land schemes, defense sector corruption, and cases involving Zelenskyy associates. With the Prosecutor General—who reports directly to presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak—now controlling all corruption cases, those investigations effectively end.

Political control over anti-corruption institutions

Euromaidan Press: Ukraine’s Parliament just passed a law putting all corruption investigations under one politically appointed prosecutor. Ukrainian activists like you are calling this a return to Yanukovych times. What does that comparison mean?

Daria Kaleniuk: It means that Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko will control all investigations against top officials in the country. He will have access to all cases of the independent agencies NABU and SAPO.

During the Yanukovych period, he had a prosecutor general named Viktor Pshonka who safeguarded businesses and monopolies for Yanukovych and his associates. There was the so-called “family”—close family and friends of Yanukovych who controlled the most lucrative businesses in the country. No one could investigate them because the prosecutor general made sure they were untouchable.

We are coming back to the  era of untouchables in Ukraine.

If you are loyal to Zelenskyy, you will be untouchable and have access to lucrative contracts, especially in the defense sector where most Ukrainian taxpayer money is spent. You can steal, commit fraud, produce bad equipment, not deliver on time – and there will be no justice.

This is the  Yanukovych moment for Zelenskyy. 

This is what Ukraine is fighting against

What does this mean for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations?

Zelenskyy and Yermak want to silence us. They will try to develop criminal charges like state treason. Basically, you are a state traitor in Ukraine when you’re saying the truth.

This is not what the Ukrainian people are fighting against Russian aggression for. This is actually what we are fighting against, because Russia wants to suppress freedom of speech, independent thinking, and criticism of authorities.

Democracy is very deep in the veins of the Ukrainian people. All those fallen heroes were fighting for a completely different Ukraine than Zelenskyy is now trying to build – where there is freedom, dignity, and justice with the rule of law.

When Zelenskyy silences independent media and watchdog organizations, he is crossing many red lines inside Ukrainian society, which could lead to a very dangerous explosion. To prevent this,  Zelenskyy must stop this law.

If he signed it, he has to withdraw his signature.

All those who invented this attack on anti-corruption bodies are either intentionally or unintentionally helping the Kremlin win this war from inside Ukraine.

Start of their end

You’ve been doing this work since 2012 through three different presidents. What’s the common pattern when leaders try to capture such institutions? How does this moment feel different?

It is the start of their end. Agony.

It’s complicated in Zelenskyy’s case because we’re simultaneously fighting a large-scale war. If there were no war, Zelenskyy and his parliament would not be in power.

Unfortunately, for Zelenskyy and Yermak, the only strategy they’re thinking about is maintaining power. This causes them to roll back reforms and dismantle democracy because they understand they cannot win democratic elections.

It smells like they feel elections are coming. All these crackdowns are related to the fear of not being in power longer.

How to stay in power? Get rid of watchdog organizations naming names and saying the truth. Get rid of independent media – sanction media owners to shut down outlets like Ukrainska Pravda, Novaya Vremya. Intimidate individual activists and journalists. Then destroy possible political opponents.

There is a lot of trust in Ukraine’s armed forces. Therefore, the State Bureau of Investigations will attack military commanders who have the trust of the Ukrainian people.

In Shabunin’s case, Zelenskyy and Yermak showed they can use this instrument to destroy any person serving in the military.

Zelenskyy becomes villain against whom he campaigned in 2019

It’s ironic that Zelenskyy campaigned as the anti-corruption outsider in 2019. Now he’s dismantling the very institutions built to fulfill these promises. Why this turn? Why now? Doesn’t he understand this is suicidal?

I think he needs to thank Mr. Andriy Yermak, who controls 90% of information flow to Zelensky, shapes his mind, and helps him appoint very loyal managers.

Yermak appointed Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko, basically suggested him as a very good prospective Pshonka for Zelensky.

Zelenskyy might not understand or is too busy and tired. But he’s not coping with his role as leader, which should reflect the mood of the Ukrainian people.

If he entrusted so much power to Yermak and Oleg Tatarov – guys against democracy, against fundamental freedoms, against checks and balances – it reflects his view of society.

He campaigned in “Servant of the People” against untouchables. He created untouchables inside his circle. So he became the [anti-]hero against whom he was campaigning.

Could you give us more context about what NABU and SAPO have accomplished that is now at risk?

They have charged hundreds of people in high-level positions, tackling critical cases in different sectors.

Just this year, there were charges in defense sector food procurement, against key state officials in land schemes, and charges against Oleksiy Chernyshov, the former deputy prime minister and close friend of Zelenskyy.

NABU also looked deeply into defense contracts. Zelenskyy didn’t like this, which triggered his reaction and had horrible results for these institutions, the country, and Zelenskyy himself.

We’ve been using these cases since 2022 as powerful arguments to advocate for more weapons, more support for Ukraine, fast-track European integration, the Danish model.

These are the narratives the Kremlin tried to spread through propaganda – that Ukraine is absolutely corrupt, that Zelenskyy is autocratic, oppresses opposition, and silences critics.

Two months ago, I was defending Zelenskyy against this. When Trump was saying Zelenskyy is a dictator, I wrote pieces and did interviews saying there is a system of checks and balances in Ukraine, these anti-corruption institutions are working.

Now I can’t say anything. Yermak, Zelenskyy, and the MPs voting for this law have created beautiful arguments for the Kremlin to make Ukraine a country not worth supporting.

I hope international partners will keep supporting Ukraine with military assistance – it’s critical for our armed forces dying defending Ukraine. But clearly, Russia will use this to discredit support.

Is NABU infested with Russian spies?

The government says this is about national security after finding Russian spies in NABU. You’re saying it’s about protecting corrupt officials. How do we know who’s right?

It’s very simple. The Security Service, Prosecutor General’s Office, and State Bureau of Investigations conducted simultaneously 80 searches against more than 15 NABU detectives and their family members without court warrants, claiming it was a special operation to unveil Russian spies.

So far, we have only two cases in which a suspicion was announced. All the other cases are not related to cooperating with Russia—car accidents from years ago, other crazy cases.

Even the security-related charges aren’t extraordinary cases with clearly significant security damage. One NABU worker allegedly sold cannabis to Dagestan through relatives with Russian citizenship. Another allegedly provided information to a former security service officer during the Yanukovych period.

Simultaneously, the security service is verifying how SAPO handles state secrecy and getting access to all pending investigations—whistleblowers, agents cooperating with NABU, and all operative information.

They already accessed files and saw where NABU was looking. Coincidentally, the next day, Zelenskyy passed a law empowering the prosecutor general with all rights to control when NABU moves and breathes.

He’s directly receiving orders from Yermak, executing Zelenskyy’s will. Zelenskyy is pissed off that NABU and SAPO are investigating his close associates like Chernyshov.

Perfect moment

The timing seems strategic – wartime, no elections, weakened opposition. Was this the perfect moment?

It is the perfect moment because our European partners are on vacation drinking prosecco and enjoying the summer seaside. I’m joking obviously, but that’s important – how to mobilize proper reaction from European partners.

Protests against law to gut anti-corruption agencies are starting in Ukraine. Here is Lviv

Today, the parliament voted for law #12414 to bring the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Specialized Anti-Corruption Office under control of politically-appointed General Prosecutor,… pic.twitter.com/9H6PeDH07K

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) July 22, 2025

Overall, this attack is strategically important for the Kremlin and plays into their hands. If they’re trying to accuse us of state treason, they should look at themselves – how they’re creating reasons and grounds for the Kremlin to attack Ukraine internationally.

What concretely happens now? If there’s a billion-dollar corruption case tomorrow, who investigates it?

The Prosecutor General controls that case. NABU can investigate, but there will be just the name NABU. The substance of having a truly independent agency with SAPO supervision will be over.

It means one person, Kravchenko, goes to another person, Yermak, and they agree: “Should we investigate this billion-dollar case? Probably not, but we’ll ask this defense producer for 10% bribe. Let’s introduce our affiliated companies as co-owners, and then we won’t investigate anything. Everybody’s happy.”

We are building new oligarchs in Ukraine. This is the thinking happening inside the president’s office among those designing this scheme.

10 years of Ukraine’s progress annulled

What does this mean for Ukraine’s European integration prospects?

It puts us back 10 years. I have déjà vu of November 2013, when Yanukovych refused to sign the EU association agreement and told the Ukrainian people, “I don’t care what you think.”

The establishment of these institutions was written in all documents related to EU accession, IMF loans, and visa liberalization. If you dismantle these agencies, you can’t remove them from these documents. These are Ukraine’s obligations, which are now nullified. All progress will be nullified.

How to repair that overnight when the destruction is already done? It’s impossible.

Parliament members voting for this trash were so happy, congratulating themselves. Folks like Maksym Buzhanskyi from Servant of the People were celebrating with Yuliia Tymoshenko, who spreads the same messages Putin spread in early February 2022 before invading Ukraine.

Putin said Ukraine is losing sovereignty to foreign partners, establishing anti-corruption institutions with foreign experts. For that, Ukraine needs to be liberated. This is how Putin started the large-scale war.

Now our MPs are saying the same thing Putin was saying. Are they nuts? They should quit and work in Russia.

International partners stay mum as red lines crossed

What has the international response been? Is it what you expected?

Very slow. This escalation could have been prevented if before the Ukraine Reform Conference, when the Cabinet violated the law and didn’t appoint a BEB director, URC leaders clearly told Zelenskyy it’s unacceptable.

At the end, as there was no reaction, came these searches of Shabunin without court warrants, absurd accusations.

Did we see the international partner’s reaction? No, everybody was waiting. “Let’s see how it develops.” 

Red lines were crossed. Yermak and Zelenskyy tested them, to no reaction.

“Everybody doesn’t care about corruption and the rule of law anymore. We’re the bosses in our home. We decide what we do. We don’t care about your reforms.”

This approach was bred by self-censorship of our international partners.

Daria, thank you very much. Let’s hope President Zelenskyy will roll back this law.

Ukraine’s parliament voted to strip anti-corruption agencies of their independence just as a major bribery scandal emerged within the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), exposing the government’s attack on oversight institutions while corruption flourishes unchecked.

The $300,000 bribery case involving an SBU official who helped draft dodgers avoid military service reveals systemic corruption within the same agency that justified dismantling independent anti-corruption institutions.

The timing demonstrates how Ukraine is eliminating accountability mechanisms while the problems they were designed to address persist across the system.

SBU official sold draft exemptions for $300,000

An SBU Department for Protection of National Statehood sector chief exploited his unit’s role in a National Police investigation targeting illegal border crossings by draft dodgers. Through two intermediaries—including a former SBU employee—he demanded $300,000 from a suspect to destroy case materials and leak investigative details, NABU and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) reported.

The official threatened prosecution under more severe charges if the suspect refused to pay. Investigators documented him receiving $72,000 before filing charges under Article 368 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code for abuse of office.

The scheme targeted Ukraine’s most sensitive wartime issue—military service evasion during an existential fight for survival. The corruption reached into the security apparatus responsible for protecting national defense, showing how graft undermines Ukraine’s war effort at the highest levels.

The SBU confirmed their Internal Security Department discovered the corruption in 2024. The case was subsequently transferred to the State Bureau of Investigations, then to NABU due to the large bribe amount—following standard procedures for high-value corruption cases.

Parliament guts anti-corruption oversight

Hours after NABU announced the completed investigation, Parliament passed Bill No. 12414 by 263 votes, fundamentally restructuring Ukraine’s anti-corruption system. The legislation transfers key oversight powers from independent agencies to the politically-appointed Prosecutor General.

The new rules allow the Prosecutor General to reassign NABU cases, override SAPO prosecutorial decisions, and resolve inter-agency disputes. SAPO prosecutors now report to the Prosecutor General rather than their own leadership, while NABU’s director must seek permission to claim jurisdiction over cases.

NABU and SAPO were created after the 2014 revolution specifically to investigate high-level corruption with independence from political interference. The new law eliminates that independence entirely.

Political analyst Ihor Chalenko told Euromaidan Press the changes create “a lasting centralization of authority over Ukraine’s law enforcement system.” All investigative agencies now operate under a single hierarchy, with the Prosecutor General holding decisive power over case assignments and prosecutorial decisions.

A pattern of institutional conflict

This isn’t the first time Ukraine’s security agencies and anti-corruption bodies have clashed. In 2017, the SBU detained seven NABU employees working undercover, sparking what became known as the “war of anti-corruptionists.” That conflict escalated to threats of dismissing NABU’s director, prompting warnings from the US that aid could be cut if anti-corruption institutions were dismantled.

The SBU has also faced criticism for targeting journalists investigating corruption. In February 2024, the agency was exposed for illegally surveilling investigative outlet Bihus.Info, while in 2024, President Zelenskyy fired the SBU’s cybersecurity chief for allegedly retaliating against a journalist who investigated his family’s questionable property purchases.

These patterns suggest institutional tensions that extend beyond the current crisis, with the SBU repeatedly finding itself involved in controversies while serving as both investigator and subject of corruption probes.

International stakes rise

The G7 Ambassadors expressed “serious concerns” about developments at NABU and requested meetings with Ukrainian government officials. Ukraine’s EU aspirations and billions in Western aid depend heavily on anti-corruption performance, making institutional changes a potential threat to international support.

The Anti-Corruption Action Center described recent developments as “an attempt to destroy independent institutions” to prevent investigations into officials close to President Zelenskyy. The European Union has not yet considered suspending funding over the anti-corruption agency changes, but observers worry about the precedent.

Why this matters for Ukraine’s future

The timing of these separate developments—a completed corruption case against the SBU and Parliament’s vote to centralize anti-corruption control—reveals the complexity of Ukraine’s institutional challenges during wartime.

With elections suspended and political opposition limited, independent anti-corruption agencies represented among the last checks on executive power. The SBU case demonstrates that corruption exists across the security apparatus, raising questions about whether concentrating oversight authority in the Prosecutor General’s Office addresses the problem or simply relocates it.

Ukraine must simultaneously fight external enemies and maintain internal accountability. The latest revelations suggest the corruption challenge extends throughout the law enforcement system that’s now being reorganized under centralized control.

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Oleksandr Usyk knocked out Daniel Dubois in the fifth round at Wembley Stadium on 19 July 2025 to become undisputed heavyweight champion for the second time, using a left hook he calls “Ivan” after a Ukrainian farm worker.

The 38-year-old from occupied Crimea achieved something even Muhammad Ali never managed – becoming undisputed heavyweight champion twice in the modern four-belt era. Ali won the heavyweight title three times, but during simpler periods with fewer sanctioning bodies. Usyk’s achievement is rarer: undisputed championships in two different weight classes while navigating boxing’s most fragmented landscape.

The punch that carries Ukrainian soul

Usyk ended the fight with what he calls his signature punch: “Ivan.” Asked about it after the fight, the champion explained why he named his left hook after a Ukrainian everyman.

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“It’s a punch name, Ivan. Yeah, left hook,” Usyk said, demonstrating the motion. “It’s Ukrainian name. Yeah, Ivan is, you know, it’s like a big guy who live in a village and work in a farm. It was a big guy, like a Cossack. What is your name? My name is Ivan. Yeah, it’s a hard punch, yeah.”

The left hook that dropped Dubois for the final time carried more than technique – it embodied the kind of strength Ukrainians associate with their countryside, the tough rural workers who’ve always been the backbone of the nation.

Two Crimeans on Wembley’s stage

Before Usyk entered the ring, another voice from occupied Crimea commanded the stadium. Singer Nadia Dorofeeva performed Ukraine’s national anthem before 90,000 spectators, creating one of those moments where sport becomes something bigger.

Dorofeeva, who gained fame as part of “Vremya i Steklo” before going solo, has become a vocal supporter of Ukraine during the war. Her anthem performance before the fight connected two Crimean natives on British soil, both representing their occupied homeland on a global stage.

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Fighting for those who can’t watch

Right after winning, Usyk delivered the message that mattered most to him – acknowledging the soldiers who make his career possible.

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“I want to thank all Ukraine, all the guys, who are now defending our country,” Usyk said in the ring. “I received many messages yesterday and today as well from various units, who are defending my country on the front line. Guys, Glory to Ukraine! You are incredible! You allow me to be here now!”

The champion’s words connected his boxing triumph directly to Ukraine’s broader fight for survival. While Usyk dominated at Wembley, Ukrainian forces were engaged in combat that determines whether their country continues to exist.

Ukraine’s new Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko praised Usyk’s victory as “a triumph of will and discipline,” writing on Facebook:

“Every victory charges us with a good mood. Congratulations, champion! Thank you for everything you do for Ukraine.”

Building on his Fury masterclass

This victory built on Usyk’s historic achievement in May 2024, when he defeated Tyson Fury by split decision to become the first undisputed heavyweight champion since Lennox Lewis in 1999. That fight was massive – finally unifying all heavyweight belts after 25 years of fragmentation.

But Usyk couldn’t keep all four belts. Boxing politics forced him to choose between defending against Fury in their contracted rematch or facing IBF mandatory challenger Dubois. He vacated the IBF title, allowing Dubois to claim it. Saturday’s fight put the championship back together.

The first Usyk-Dubois fight in August 2023 ended controversially when a disputed low blow in the fifth round gave Usyk time to recover before he knocked out Dubois in the ninth. This time was cleaner – Usyk dominated from the start before finishing Dubois decisively in round five.

What happens to boxing’s best

Usyk’s professional record now stands at 23-0 with 14 knockouts. He’s beaten every top heavyweight of his generation – Anthony Joshua twice, Fury twice, and now Dubois twice. His amateur record of 335 wins and 15 losses included Olympic gold in 2012 and World Championship gold in 2011.

The Ukrainian’s next move remains unclear. At 38, he’s hinted this might be among his final fights. Potential opponents include another Fury trilogy fight, or mandatory challengers from various sanctioning bodies.

From Crimea to global champion

Usyk’s journey represents something larger than boxing success. When Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, many athletes from the peninsula faced difficult choices. Usyk packed up his family and moved to Kyiv, choosing Ukrainian identity over convenience.

His ring entrances always feature Ukrainian elements – traditional patterns, Cossack symbols, his distinctive “oseledets” haircut. It’s not performance; it’s identity. Every fight becomes a statement about what he chooses to represent.

Saturday’s victory delivered another moment of Ukrainian excellence during wartime, proving that Ukrainian athletes continue performing at the world’s highest levels while their country fights for survival. For Ukrainian fans watching globally, Usyk’s left hook named “Ivan” carried the strength of their rural traditions straight through a British opponent’s guard.

Valery Gergiev, the Russian conductor and longtime ally of Vladimir Putin, is scheduled to perform on July 27 at the Un’estate da Re festival in the Royal Palace of Caserta, Italy. Tickets are already on sale.

But behind the mask of the great conductor lies something far more troubling. A recent Linkiesta investigation exposes a sophisticated network of shady foundations, fictitious companies, and significant real estate holdings spanning Venice, Milan, Rome, and the Amalfi Coast.

At its center sits a monumental estate in Massa Lubrense that allegedly hosts meetings aimed at circumventing international sanctions and diffusing Russian propaganda narratives through cultural interventions.

Where Gergiev is banned vs. where he’s welcome

Unlike Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian nations — where cultural institutions severed ties with pro-Kremlin artists — Italy has chosen a more “tolerant” or “neutral” approach. Some even echo the favorite mantra of Russian propaganda: “Art is above politics.”

Here’s a reminder of where Gergiev has been banned:

• Germany: Fired from the Munich Philharmonic.
• UK: Removed from the Edinburgh Festival and other programming.
• USA: Canceled performances and tours.
• France: Banned from Théâtre des Champs-Élysées and other venues.
• Canada: Included in the list of individual sanctions.

But in Italy, Gergiev seems to be welcomed with open arms — all in the name of “cultural dialogue,” even as war crimes continue in Ukraine.

Putin’s conductor: A history of regime support

Gergiev, Putin’s most loyal cultural ally who received the specially revived Hero of Labour award in 2013, has never hidden his loyalty to the Putin regime.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cultural leaders around the world called for a boycott of Gergiev, accusing him of direct complicity in the Kremlin’s aggression. Major orchestras and opera houses in Europe and the US dropped him. In 2022, La Scala dropped him from its programming after he refused to condemn the war in Ukraine.

His appointment to control both the Bolshoi and Mariinsky theaters wasn’t just ceremonial — it followed the ouster of Vladimir Urin, who had dared to sign an anti-war petition in 2022, making Gergiev’s loyalty even more valuable to the Kremlin.

His fondness for dictators and warlords predates Ukraine. In 2016, following the Russian and Syrian military seizure of Palmyra, Gergiev performed a highly publicized “liberation concert” among the ruins. Broadcast widely on Russian state TV, the concert served as cultural propaganda to legitimize Moscow’s role in Syria and reinforce Putin’s image as a “defender of civilization.”

The €100 million Italian empire and sanctions evasion network

The financial mechanics behind his Italian operations reveal a more complex picture. As early as 2022, Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation documented that Gergiev had diverted over 300 million rubles into personal accounts, using cultural foundations funded by Gazprombank, Rosneft, and VTB.

Gergiev owns a real estate empire in Italy, reportedly worth more than €100 million, inherited from Countess Yoko Nagae Ceschina, a Japanese harpist and philanthropist. Her will granted him the Barbarigo Palace on Venice’s Grand Canal, the historic Caffè Quadri in Piazza San Marco, an 18-room villa in Olgiate, vast land holdings in Romagna, and a villa on the Sorrento Coast.

Recently, Italy’s famous Alajmo restaurant family renewed its rental agreement for Caffè Quadri — paying Gergiev €3.5 million over seven years. This means a sanctioned Kremlin-aligned figure is directly profiting from Italy’s most prestigious public spaces.

Massimiliano Coccia’s Linkiesta investigation reveals something more systematic: at least a dozen satellite companies orbiting around Gergiev’s main operations, spanning real estate, cultural, and logistics sectors across Campania, Lazio, and Lombardy.

EU funds for Putin’s ally

And now, in July 2025, Gergiev is scheduled to perform in Campania — at a festival funded in part by the Italian government, the Campania regional administration, the Teatro Verdi in Salerno, and Italy’s Ministry of Culture. It is officially branded as a cultural initiative supported by EU Cohesion Funds (Fondi Coesione Italia 21/27).

This makes any attempt to “normalize” Gergiev’s presence even more troubling.

Art as propaganda: The Bolshoi’s latest production

Gergiev himself constantly proves art isn’t neutral. Just this month, his Bolshoi Theatre closed its season with a production of Prokofiev’s opera Semyon Kotko that ended with a message glorifying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:

“In 2014, a junta seized power in Kyiv and began repressions against its own citizens. In response, the residents of the city and region proclaimed the Luhansk People’s Republic. Instead of negotiations, the criminal Kyiv regime began the destruction of Donbas.”

Immediately following that, the next paragraph was projected:

“In February 2022, the Russian army came to the aid of the people of Donbas, who had been fighting for their lives and freedom for eight years. As a result of a nationwide referendum, Luhansk has forever returned to being part of Russia.”

This wasn’t art — it was state propaganda using opera as a delivery system, reversing historical facts to justify war crimes. As La Repubblica noted in its coverage, Gergiev’s own theater made it explicitly clear that the opposite of “art is outside politics” is true.

Why cultural neutrality during wartime is complicity

And now — after three years of genocide, missile strikes on residential buildings, torture and executions of prisoners, and mass atrocities documented by international bodies — this concert in Campania becomes part of a broader trend: the normalization of brutality through culture.

At this point, let’s be clear: art is never apolitical — especially during a war. We cannot ignore the fact that Valery Gergiev is not merely a world-class conductor, but a public ally of a regime internationally accused of war crimes. His return to the European stage is not a neutral cultural gesture — it is a political act.

Gergiev’s return to the European stage is not a neutral cultural gesture — it is a political act.

Yes, in peacetime, one might argue for “separating art and politics.” But in wartime — especially a war of conquest launched in 2014 and escalated into full invasion in 2022 — such neutrality becomes complicity.

The unanswered question about local facilitators

Inviting Gergiev to Campania — with European funds — is a dangerous appeasement of Russia’s cultural offensive, which seeks to blur the line between art and propaganda.

While De Luca tries to mask this performance under the guise of tolerance, peace, and dialogue, Picierno confronts him with a point that is hard to refute: among the many equally famous and talented Russian musicians who have condemned the war, the Campania Region chooses Putin’s faithful friend and ally.

But the crucial question raised by investigators remains unanswered: which local entrepreneur or company proposed Gergiev’s engagement to the Campania Region? Who acted as facilitator for an event that showcases Russian power while a war rages?

The protests growing internationally

The announcement has ignited protests across Italy and abroad.

• Over 700 intellectuals—including Nobel laureates—signed an open letter declaring the event “a gift to the dictator.”
• Yulia Navalnaya, widow of the Russian opposition leader killed in a Russian prison camp, stressed that Gergiev is part of the regime that killed her husband.
• The Europa Radicale party launched its own petition and started buying tickets to bring protests inside the venue.

Italy’s Culture Minister withdrew approval for the concert, warning that using cultural platforms to amplify propaganda is unacceptable. Despite mounting criticism, the concert remains scheduled for 27 July, with the Caserta Police Headquarters monitoring the event through DIGOS (Italian Special Operations Unit).

There are fears that the protest, promoted by Ukrainian associations as well as Russian dissidents, could spill over into the Royal Palace. Many of the tickets for the front rows have sold out, and those who purchased them were representatives of Italian and Ukrainian associations, as confirmed by the president of one of these.

Deputy Prime Minister Antonio Tajani responded to criticism by noting that Gergiev holds a Dutch passport, so he can travel freely within the EU. The questions about how Gergiev obtained his Dutch passport while maintaining Russian citizenship have remained unanswered for almost a decade.

Russian state media celebrates the “return to Europe”

Russian state media is already hailing the concert as Gergiev’s triumphant “return to Europe,” claiming Italy will not cancel the event.

Once again, culture is weaponized. Since Soviet times, music, ballet, and the arts have been key tools of Kremlin messaging. The KGB had entire departments focused on shaping the regime’s image through culture.

This is not about freedom of expression. It’s about responsibility. Art can either support humanism or whitewash violence. When Gergiev conducts in war zones or imperial ruins, he’s not just waving a baton. He’s legitimizing state terror.

What message is Italy sending by supporting Ukraine politically, but welcoming Kremlin propagandists culturally?

When sanctions are among the few peaceful forms of pressure we have left, any cultural compromise becomes a form of complicity. Those who claim “art is above politics” must ask: above whose politics? Above human rights? Democracy? Solidarity?

And in the end — as always — it is the innocent who pay the price.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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Ukraine can win the war against Russia, but only by building “national resilience” systems and embracing asymmetric technological warfare rather than hoping for traditional military breakthroughs.

That’s the strategic roadmap from Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief and current ambassador to Britain, in a foreword that consolidates his strategic thinking developed over the past year.

Writing for journalist Roman Romaniuk’s upcoming book “What Will Be Used to Fight World War III?”, Zaluzhnyi argues that victory depends on adapting to a new kind of warfare that makes conventional operations increasingly impossible.

“The key to our victory is not just resilience, but decisive and timely responses,” Zaluzhnyi writes. But those responses must target infrastructure protection and technological capabilities, not territorial gains.

His analysis explains why current fighting has devolved into World War I-style stalemate—and why that’s actually creating Ukraine’s path to victory.

Why breakthrough operations won’t work

The precision weapons era that dominated warfare from the 1970s through 2022 has ended. Electronic warfare now blocks most guided munitions. Battlefield reconnaissance drones make troop movement lethal. The result is a grinding stalemate where neither side can achieve major territorial gains.

“When robots began to appear massively on the battlefield, they made any movement of soldiers impossible,” Zaluzhnyi explains. “We couldn’t move forward towards the Russians, and the Russians, accordingly, couldn’t move forward either.”

This isn’t temporary. Zaluzhnyi predicts the technological factors creating this deadlock will persist until around 2027, when new navigation systems and autonomous weapons restore the possibility of offensive operations.

The war is shifting toward “the remote dismantling of a nation’s capacity to resist” through systematic infrastructure attacks rather than front-line advances.

The new victory formula

Rather than lamenting this shift, Zaluzhnyi sees opportunity. Ukraine’s survival strategy becomes its victory strategy: build systems that can withstand remote warfare while developing asymmetric capabilities to target Russian infrastructure.

“The development of technology, along with the demographic and economic situation in the coming years, is likely to favour a war of attrition,” he writes.

Ukraine’s advantage lies in adapting faster to this reality than Russia.

The victory formula requires three elements:

1. National resilience infrastructure: Power grids, transportation networks, and government systems designed to function under constant attack. Ukraine has already begun this transformation out of necessity.
2. Asymmetric technological capabilities: Cheap, scalable autonomous systems that can target high-value Russian assets at minimal cost. Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare exemplifies this approach.
3. Information warfare defense: Protecting public morale and mobilization efforts from Russian psychological operations designed to erode resistance.

“War strategy will focus not so much on capturing territory as on depleting the enemy’s resources and capabilities, creating chaos and ultimately eroding the nation’s capacity to resist,” Zaluzhnyi explains.

Why Ukraine can win this way

Ukraine’s advantages in attritional warfare are real but require strategic focus. The country has already demonstrated superior “tactical application and technological support” compared to Russia’s numerical advantages.

Ukrainian forces achieved decisive victories in 2022 using precision weapons like Javelin anti-tank missiles, HIMARS rocket systems, and Neptune anti-ship missiles that destroyed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship.

But these successes came before electronic warfare created the current deadlock.

The next phase requires different tools. Autonomous drone swarms that can overwhelm air defenses. Cyber capabilities targeting Russian critical infrastructure. Most importantly, resilient systems that allow Ukraine to function while Russian infrastructure degrades.

“Large-scale attacks by autonomous swarms of cheap precision drones using entirely new navigation channels will destroy not only frontline personnel, weapons, and military equipment, but also the enemy’s critical economic and social infrastructure,” Zaluzhnyi predicts.

But if Ukraine builds proper resilience systems, this becomes a contest Ukraine can win.

The timeline factor

Zaluzhnyi’s analysis carries urgency. By 2027, technological advances will restore the possibility of massive conventional operations using “totally ruthless” autonomous weapons.

“Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies continue to develop at a rapid pace,” he writes.

“For the first time ever, human involvement will be fully or partially removed not only from the process of control, but also from decision-making about target engagement.”

The window for building resilience systems and asymmetric capabilities is narrowing. But Ukraine has already demonstrated what’s possible. The challenge is scaling successful innovations while protecting the infrastructure that keeps the country functioning.

Western implications

Zaluzhnyi’s framework has implications beyond Ukraine. Most NATO countries couldn’t handle the scale of attacks Ukraine endures regularly. “In October alone, Ukraine faced over 2,000 air threats, including drones and missiles,” he noted recently. “Few NATO countries could counter such an onslaught without exhausting their air defense systems.”

Western militaries remain focused on expensive legacy systems that become vulnerable in massive conflicts. Meanwhile, the real military revolution is happening in cheap, scalable, autonomous systems that Ukraine pioneered out of necessity.

“Half of winning is knowing what it looks like,” Zaluzhnyi concludes, quoting military strategist Sean McFate. “Brains are more important than brute force.”

Ukraine’s path to victory lies not in outgunning Russia, but in out-thinking it. Building systems that can survive what’s coming while developing capabilities Russia can’t match.

The war of attrition isn’t something Ukraine must endure—it’s something Ukraine can win.

Ukraine’s State Service on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) has issued Metropolitan Onufriy an ultimatum: prove your church actually left Moscow or face dissolution.

The directive gives the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) until 18 August 2025 to produce formal documents severing ties with Russia’s Orthodox Church. Three years after claiming independence, Ukrainian investigators found the church remains canonically subordinate to Moscow through multiple mechanisms—governing documents, institutional structure, and liturgical requirements.

The timing? Two weeks after Ukraine stripped Onufriy’s citizenship for allegedly hiding his Russian passport since 2002, and one week after DESS found that his church is still affiliated with Moscow.

What Ukraine actually wants

The State Service (DESS) isn’t asking for vague promises. They want Metropolitan Onufriy to provide decisions from the UOC MP’s highest governing bodies confirming the church’s exit from Russian structures. He must publicly reject any appointments to Russian church bodies and prepare an official statement terminating all connections with Moscow.

Can he do it? That depends on whether the UOC MP’s governing documents actually allow such independence—something the recent state investigation suggests they don’t.

The DESS investigation found multiple indicators of continued Russian control. The UOC MP still cites the 1990 Gramota (Charter) from then-Patriarch Alexy II as its constitutional foundation, which explicitly states the church is “connected through our Russian Orthodox Church.” The church must still commemorate the Moscow Patriarch in liturgy, have its statutes approved by Moscow, receive holy chrism from Russia, and ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members.

Each requirement demonstrates canonical subordination that contradicts independence claims.

The Moscow test: when push comes to shove

Want to know if the UOC MP really left Moscow? Look at what happened when Russia started grabbing Ukrainian dioceses.

Since 2022, Russian authorities unilaterally transferred three UOC MP dioceses in occupied territories to direct Moscow control—Crimea, Rovenky, and Berdiansk. The UOC MP leadership’s response? Silence.

When 33 UOC MP bishops condemned these seizures in October 2024, did their church’s governing bodies support them? No. Complete silence again.

This stands in stark contrast to protests and condemnation when UOC MP parishes defect to join the rival Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

It shows that the UOC MP can resist when it chooses to. It just doesn’t choose to resist Moscow.

Legal machinery grinding forward

This ultimatum represents the practical implementation of Ukraine’s August 2024 law banning Russian-affiliated religious organizations. The legislation gave religious groups nine months to sever Russian connections—a deadline that’s already expired.

Theologian Cyril Hovorun, who has closely followed the law’s development, argued it’s “not primarily about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, nor is it about banning it outright” but rather about forcing the UOC MP to “get out of this deadlock it’s put itself in” with Moscow.

DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected to the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure. That potentially affects the UOC MP’s approximately 8,000 parishes serving millions of faithful.

Religious scholar Yuriy Chornomorets, who participated in earlier expert evaluations, told Euromaidan Press that “the conclusions use only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter.”

The UOC MP has filed a lawsuit against Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers over the investigation. They consistently maintain they severed ties with Moscow after Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Ukrainian investigators? They concluded these claims lack any documentary foundation.

What’s Moscow’s stake?

The UOC MP represents 23% of the Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes worldwide—the largest concentration outside Russia itself. It remains Moscow’s sole surviving pillar of influence in a Ukraine that has otherwise severed all connections to Russia since 2022.

The church’s ideological power runs deep. The fantasy of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as “Holy Rus” united against the “satanic West” forms the theological cornerstone of Putin’s war.

Ukraine’s Intelligence Directorate previously reported that under the guise of “religious cooperation,” the Russian Orthodox Church functions as an instrument of hybrid influence aimed at destabilizing Ukraine.

The citizenship revocation of Onufriy serves as legal theater. The real drama unfolds in courtrooms where the UOC MP’s survival hangs in the balance.

€50 billion sits waiting. But Ukraine’s solar revolution measures just 102 MW. And Rome just promised more money through the same broken system.

The Ukraine Recovery Conference wrapped up in Rome last week with familiar promises: €2.3 billion in new agreements, including €265 million for “energy security and green transition” and €500 million in guarantees and grants to help Ukraine’s small businesses.

But missing from the announcements was any mention of fixing the fundamental problems that keep Ukrainian communities locked out of the European Union’s flagship funding tool, the Ukraine Facility.

€50 billion Ukraine Facility shows limited renewable energy results

Let’s be clear: this facility, worth €50 billion, is a significant commitment. Pillar II, the part meant to help rebuild Ukraine’s economy and support clean energy projects, has the potential to do real good. But right now, it’s still lagging behind. There is no data, transparency, or investor confidence. Most importantly, there is no access for small and medium-sized businesses.

The money is there. But the results are harder to find. One result was a bank survey conducted by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) with 20 banks, which showed that Ukrainian banks have issued 3,500 loans worth almost UAH 17 billion for energy projects.

It seems like a lot, however, many of the energy projects supported so far rely on diesel or gas, hardly the clean energy transformation we’ve been promised. The numbers tell the story: while solar projects received funding for 102 MW, gas-piston cogeneration units got 185 MW and diesel generators another 102 MW. Ukrainian banks financed nearly three times more fossil fuel capacity than solar power.

The scale of this shortfall becomes clear when you consider what Ukraine had before the war: approximately 9.9 GW of installed renewable energy capacity, including about 6 GW from solar power alone. Ukraine’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan aims for renewables to constitute 27% of electricity consumption by 2030, requiring a total installed capacity of 12.2 GW of solar energy.

Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine commissioned around 660 MW of new renewable energy capacities during 2022-2023, encompassing solar, wind, biogas, and small hydroelectric power plants.

Wind and solar power plants generated about 10% of Ukraine’s electricity as of 2023, with the share of clean energy produced, including large hydropower plants, reaching 20.3%—an increase from the pre-war period.

In 2024, Ukrainian state banks approved loans for the construction of 83 MW of solar power plants on the roofs of private households, which is an absolute record for the country since the implementation of such projects.

It should be noted that before the full-scale invasion, only 0.98 GW of grid-connected solar power plants had been built in Ukrainian households.

Ukraine energy funding lacks basic transparency

Citizens can’t even find a basic map showing where these 3,500 projects are located. No one knows exactly which projects have been funded, which regions are benefiting, or even how many of these projects have actually started working.

Some project details emerge piecemeal – like Mykolaiv’s 20 MW solar plants – but comprehensive data remains elusive. Citizens still can’t answer basic questions: Which oblasts received the most funding? How many small businesses applied versus how many got approved? What percentage went to Ukrainian companies versus international contractors?

These questions remain unanswered even after Rome. More basic transparency is needed, so that citizens and civil society can track where this money goes and whether it’s doing any good.

The small amount of information available in the public domain highlights that financial support for initiatives under Pillar II only started in 2025 and lacks a clear implementation schedule, despite the fact that these steps are crucial to improving Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and sustainable development in the face of current challenges.

As of today, all renewable energy projects implemented in Ukraine since 2022 are supported by leading international partners, rather than under Pillar II.

Even EU-supported analysis confirms the system’s dysfunction. A recent report by climate campaign group Razom We Stand found that there is “no comprehensive, publicly accessible database or consolidated statistical reporting” on funded projects. The report calls for establishing “a robust, transparent reporting system” – acknowledging the very transparency problems Ukrainian communities have been experiencing.

Small Ukrainian businesses shut out of EU energy funding

Then there’s the issue of who’s actually able to access these funds. Most of the financing so far seems to flow through international banks. But Ukraine’s recovery won’t come from top-down aid alone. Local businesses, especially small and medium-sized ones, are the backbone of any real rebuild. And right now, they’re shut out.

• Start with the money: many grant windows under Pillar II require €1 million minimum funding, which automatically excludes smaller regional providers or community energy initiatives. Then add excessive documentation requirements—multi-part technical, financial, and environmental submissions that mirror EU-level procurement formats.
• Most materials are available only in English or bureaucratic EU-style Ukrainian, with no clear summaries for local implementers.
• There’s little structured guidance to help applicants navigate these technical procurement rules. Local governments and SMEs are left to figure out highly complex eligibility criteria on their own.
• The scoring and selection criteria remain opaque, discouraging applicants who can’t afford dedicated bid writers or consultants.

Three months after Rome, the EU announced another €1.6 billion initiative for Ukrainian SMEs, scheduled for implementation in “the second half of 2025.” The pattern continues: more announcements, delayed implementation, while Ukrainian companies wait for access.

Despite all this, and against the backdrop of this devastating war, Ukraine is pushing forward with its clean energy revolution. Andriy Konechenkov, Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian Wind Energy Association, recently announced that seven new wind power plants are currently under construction in Ukraine, with a total capacity of 4 GW of projects ready for implementation.

Last month, international consulting company Boston Consulting Group predicted an increase in the share of renewable sources in the structure of Ukrainian electricity production from 15% (2022 figure) to 28% until 2040, with the potential for further growth.

Balint Silhavi, Principal of the Boston Consulting Group, said: “We expect that about 50% of new generation will be solar and wind power plants. This means that the entire energy sector will become greener and greener.”

Rome chose more billions over basic fixes

These renewable energy projects and optimistic predictions show that Ukraine is working independently to push for renewable energy rebuilding. Rome was the moment to address the systemic dysfunction keeping Ukrainian communities locked out of their own recovery funding.

Instead, the EU chose to announce more billions flowing through the same broken channels.

Ukraine needs more than big promises. We need smart, targeted support that strengthens our economy, protects our communities, and builds toward long-term energy independence through renewables. Pillar II was meant to help deliver that. Rome should have fixed the system instead of feeding it more money.

This isn’t Ukraine’s first attempt at energy transformation that foundered on bureaucratic dysfunction.

In the late 2000s, Ukraine launched regional energy service companies like UkrESCO, which proved highly successful at implementing energy efficiency and investment projects. But the state failed to support their full privatization, retaining partial ownership through state enterprise shares.

The initiative lost momentum and never scaled—despite clear demand and early success.

That example shows what happens when system-level support disappears: even strong models fail to grow. Ukraine cannot afford to repeat that mistake with Pillar II, especially not while fighting for its survival.

Rome was the chance to course-correct. Instead, the EU chose to pour more billions into a system that systematically excludes the Ukrainian actors who should be rebuilding their own country.

As EU-funded research acknowledges, “continued collaboration with the Ukraine Facility and the European Commission is essential to prioritise renewable energy sources (RES) projects.” The question is whether this collaboration will finally deliver results or produce another year of billion-euro announcements while Ukrainian communities build their energy future independently.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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The Ukrainian capital has new rituals. At midnight, Kyiv moms drag their camping gear and babies to the nearest metro station, where they try to catch a few hours of Z’s while Russia pummels killer drones into apartment buildings all night. Others take the risk of the “bathroom shelter.“

The Iranian-designed Shahed drones whirr like lawnmowers but screech when diving on their final descent, too fast for missiles to intercept. Hiding behind two walls of the bathroom doesn’t guarantee survival if it’s a direct hit—your entire apartment will likely be vaporized.

While NATO countries study drone threats in war games, Ukraine is finding the answer to a riddle nobody has solved yet—how to counter swarms of cheap, mass-produced, deadly drones if the missiles needed to down them are ten times as expensive.

Russia says it will soon be launching up to 1,000 of these $35,000 Iranian-designed drones each night. They’ve gotten too upgraded to be shot down by gunfire, too high-flying for mobile air defenses. The West can’t produce enough interceptor missiles to match this volume, and even if they could, the cost would be prohibitive.

Is this the end of the war—will Russia terrorize Ukrainian civilians into accepting the Kremlin’s enslaving conditions?

Not so fast, said President Zelenskyy in Rome last week. Ukrainian engineers have cracked something no NATO country has figured out: how to hunt these drones cheaply.

“We will shoot down everything. Scientists and engineers have found a solution. This is the key. We need finances. And we will raise it.”

Hours earlier, those same swarms had just finished a 10-hour bombardment of Kyiv with 400 drones and 18 missiles, leaving two people dead, 16 wounded, and apartment buildings burning across Ukraine’s capital.

Russia’s bureaucracy finally finds its groove

The pattern is consistent throughout the entire war. Ukraine is nimble with decentralized innovation. Russia’s bureaucracy moves slowly, but eventually overpowers with sheer numbers. Numbers of bodies thrown into the trenches. And now, numbers of Shaheds rammed into apartment buildings.

Putin called for 1.4 million drones annually in 2025—ten times Russia’s 2023 production. At the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, Russia aims to build 6,000 drones by summer 2025 using Iranian blueprints and Western electronics that somehow keep trickling through sanctions.

The plan is working. Russia quintupled its Shahed campaign from 200 launches per week in September 2024 to over 1,000 weekly by March 2025. Experts warn Moscow could launch over 1,000 Shaheds daily by the end of 2025.

The upgraded Shaheds are nastier than the originals. Russian engineers reprogrammed them to approach at 2,800 meters altitude—beyond the reach of mobile air defenses—then dive at targets traveling 600 km/h while carrying 90-kilogram warheads, double the original payload.

Russian forces now target one or two cities at time instead of deploying 500 drones nationwide, flying at altitudes above 2km to stay out of reach of machine guns, Counteroffensive.Pro reported.

For months, the pendulum swung Russia’s way. Civilian casualties reached record levels—June 2025 alone saw 232 civilians killed and 1,343 wounded from drone attacks.

“Another night hunched over mobile phones in the dark,” reported Al Jazeera’s correspondent from Kyiv, describing how residents track incoming threats while “listening for that change in pitch that a Shahed engine makes when it goes into its terminal descent.”

What NATO discovered it couldn’t do

NATO has been trying to solve the same problem with typical Western approaches: expensive, complex systems designed by committee.

• The Pentagon’s most ambitious counter-swarm test in June 2024 successfully defended against up to 50 attacking drones using eight different weapon systems.
• The UK just tested radio frequency weapons against multiple drone targets simultaneously—but only at ranges up to one kilometer.

But when 400 Shaheds converge on Kyiv simultaneously from multiple axes, even a perfect grid of 1-kilometer defense bubbles would get overwhelmed by the sheer numbers attacking each sector at once. NATO’s September 2024 exercise showcased over 50 counter-drone technologies, yet Ukrainian officials who attended warned that defending European cities against drone swarms would be “near impossible.”

Ukrainian creativity strikes back

Then Ukrainian engineers did what they do best: find a cost-effective solution no Western country could crack.

The breakthrough came from Ukraine’s decentralized innovation ecosystem. Sixteen companies developed interceptor drones costing as little as $1,000 each—a fraction of Western missile costs. The budget Сhaika costs just 39,900 UAH ($950) on the Brave1 marketplace, while Sky Defenders’ ZigZag interceptor costs 128,000 UAH ($3,000), still dramatically cheaper than $430,000 IRIS-T missiles.

Ukrainian interceptors achieved a 70% kill rate against Shaheds in optimal conditions—nearly double the 35-40% success rate of traditional mobile fire groups using machine guns. Over 100 strike drones have been destroyed by Ukrainian interceptor drones as of March 2025.

The “Clean Sky” program intercepted 550 Russian drones during pilot testing, with one remarkable night operation destroying 33 enemy aircraft.

Three developers told Counteroffensive.Pro the minimum requirements:

• speed over 200 km/h (regular FPV flies at 120 km/h),
• ability to climb to 6 km altitude, terminal guidance systems,
• warheads between 600-1200 grams.

“The bigger the target, the bigger the warhead needed for more precise detonation. Because you can hit a wing, but it will only tear it off and not destroy the target itself,” Olha Bihun, CEO of Anvarix, told Counteroffensive.Pro.

Ukraine’s approach creates a budget version of Israel’s Iron Dome concept. Where Iron Dome uses $40,000-$100,000 interceptor missiles against cheap rockets, Ukraine deploys $1,000-$5,000 interceptor drones against $35,000 Shaheds. The economics look promising—but proving they work at scale remains the challenge.

Anti-Shahed strategy still a work in progress

But intercepting Shaheds isn’t like shooting down tanks with FPV drones.

Operator training takes six months, Taras Tymochko of the Come Back Alive Foundation told Counteroffensive.Pro, but Ukraine has very few training centers, forcing experienced units to spend time teaching new operators instead of focusing on interceptions.

The economics get messier under real combat conditions. While a single $2,000 interceptor against a $35,000 Shahed sounds like a winning trade, operators often need multiple attempts. Counteroffensive.Pro found that five interceptors are sometimes required to down one Shahed—suddenly that’s $10,000-$25,000 per successful intercept.

Operational challenges compound the complexity. Ukrainian electronic warfare systems meant to jam Shaheds also interfere with interceptor communications, creating coordination nightmares between different units with different equipment. Counteroffensive.Pro reported the average wait time for radar stations from Ukrainian producers reached 13 months, up from six months just half a year ago.

Weather remains a formidable enemy: rain and snow significantly degrade performance, with moisture damaging electronic components. Strong winds above 10 m/s affect flight stability, while cold temperatures reduce battery performance by up to 50%.

Current deployment covers only frontline regions and Kyiv, leaving major cities like Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia vulnerable. Despite interceptor successes, civilian casualties continue mounting. Falling debris from successful intercepts creates additional casualties: a drone intercepted above Kyiv can still fall on an apartment building, killing those beneath.

Ukraine pioneers asymmetric warfare solutions at global scale

Ukraine faces what no NATO country has solved: how to defend sleeping cities against hundreds of simultaneous drone attacks designed to terrorize civilians into political submission.

Russia’s nightly Shahed campaigns aren’t random terror. They’re a calculated military strategy to force Ukrainian mothers into metro stations with their babies, to exhaust entire populations, to break morale until Ukraine accepts Moscow’s political demands.

People settle in for the night in the Kyiv metro as sirens continue to wail across Ukraine.

Video: Yan Dobronosov pic.twitter.com/Qyk0XBtk6g

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) July 3, 2025

Every intercepted drone above Kyiv isn’t just a military victory; it’s a family that gets to sleep in their own bed.

Throughout Russia’s invasion, Ukraine keeps pulling this off: finding cheap and effective solutions that redefine how wars are fought:

• When Russia’s Black Sea Fleet dominated Ukrainian waters, Ukraine developed naval drones that forced the entire fleet to retreat from Sevastopol.
• While Western capitals worried about escalation, Ukraine trucked in dirt-cheap drones to destroy Russian bombers right in their bases in Operation Spiderweb.

Now, with Shahed swarms, Ukraine is inventing the rules for hunting cheap attack drones with even cheaper interceptors.

NATO allies are watching closely. Iranian proxies are already copying Russian tactics. The technology being tested over Kyiv tonight could be protecting London, Berlin, or Washington tomorrow. Ukraine isn’t just defending itself; it’s developing the playbook for asymmetric drone warfare that every major city will eventually need.

Can Ukraine scale innovation faster than Russia scales terror?

The crucial test: can Ukraine’s decentralized creativity scale to match Russia’s industrial bureaucracy?

In 2024, Ukraine’s drone industry operated at only 37% capacity due to lack of government contracts. However, the recent $4 billion in G7 funding secured for interceptor manufacturing could turn that around.

Component shortages plague the industry. Defense Express noted that interceptor drones require expensive night vision cameras to catch Shaheds, which are typically launched in dark hours, driving up costs compared to regular FPV drones.

Russian forces adapted faster than Ukraine could scale defenses. New Shahed variants feature rear-facing cameras for evasion, programmed evasive maneuvers when detecting interceptors, and enhanced warheads carrying 90kg payloads. Russia launches dense formations of 10-15 drones simultaneously, mixing decoy drones with armed Shaheds to deplete defenses.

In previous cycles, Ukraine innovated, Russia adapted and scaled, forcing Ukraine to innovate again. But interceptor drones represent something different—a technology that demands both innovation and industrialization.

Can Ukrainian engineers prove they can master mass production too? The answer determines whether families in Ukraine sleep safely in their beds or pack camping gear for another night underground. Ukraine must win at Russia’s own game: turning clever ideas into industrial reality fast enough to counter a terror campaign designed to break civilian morale and force political submission.

Ukrainian authorities charged prominent anti-corruption activist Vitaliy Shabunin with military service evasion on 11 July, prompting widespread condemnation from civil society groups who view the prosecution as political retaliation.

The charges involve $5,400 in alleged improper military salary payments while Shabunin was on official assignments to civilian institutions. Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, facing corruption charges worth millions, remains in office and participates in international conferences—highlighting what critics call selective prosecution.

True to form, Shabunin didn’t mince words in his response.

“Using the war, Volodymyr Zelensky is taking the first but confident steps toward corrupt authoritarianism,” he wrote in his first public statement after the searches, accusing the president of weaponizing criminal proceedings to “catch, intimidate, and show everyone by example that, if he wants, he can do anything to anyone.”

A flawed but dedicated reformer

Shabunin is a polarizing figure who has drawn substantial criticism even from reform advocates.

A Texty.org.ua editorial argued that the anti-corruption movement led by groups like Shabunin’s has prioritized creating “new punitive bodies” over addressing systemic causes of corruption, generating “a witch hunt [that] deflated the reformist passion.”

Yet, Ukrainian civil society is remarkably united in defending the nonconforming, vocal activist.

Prominent civil society leader Olga Aivazovska, chair of the election monitoring organization OPORA, decried Shabunin’s prosecution as “obvious revenge.”

“Vitaliy often focused on individuals, and this did not solve the problems of the system, but it is individuals who decide to take revenge,” she explained. “Selective justice is evil, because it will not contain even a gram of justice.”

Since co-founding the Anti-Corruption Action Center (ANTAC) in 2012, Shabunin has become one of Ukraine’s most polarizing anti-corruption figures.

Critics describe his methods as “too categorical and emotionally harsh,” the editorial board of Dzerkalo Tyzhnia acknowledged. He admitted to physically attacking a pro-government blogger in 2017, and his house was set on fire in 2020 in an apparent arson attack.

Shabunin’s confrontational methods have made him and his organization the target of smear campaigns: in 2017, a film aired in parliament accused ANTAC of embezzling funds, and in 2016, the Prosecutor General’s Office opened a probe against the NGO for alleged embezzlement of US Embassy funds—closed after the embassy issued an official statement.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Shabunin voluntarily enlisted on 25 February 2022. He participated in Kyiv’s defense and later served in territorial defense units across multiple regions.

What is Shabunin accused of?

The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) formally charged Shabunin with two crimes: systematically evading military service under martial law and large-scale fraud. The total alleged damages: UAH 224,000, roughly $5,400.

Notably, while the bureau’s press release mentions allegations about illegal vehicle use, the Anti-Corruption Action Center notes this accusation doesn’t appear in the formal charges—only in the public statement, apparently to create a more damaging impression.

But did Shabunin actually do anything wrong? According to ANTAC, the charges hold zero water.

1. The accusation of evading military service is “absurd, ANTAC says: Shabunin always followed the instructions of his military unit.

In September 2022-February 2023, when the unit was stationed near Kyiv, he was seconded to the National Agency for Anti-Corruption Prevention, ANTAC wrote. There, he played a key role in establishing Ukraine’s prized Delta operational awareness system, which irritated some gain-seeking generals, said anti-corruption journalist Yuriy Nikolov. As well, he worked on other anti-corruption measures, ANTAC said.

ANTAC claims that the DBR pressured Shabunin’s commander to falsely testify against the anti-corruption activist, pointing to a coordinated intimidation campaign.

2. The DBR accusation that Shabunin fraudulently obtained “combat bonuses” while in Kyiv is equally absurd, according to ANTAC.

He received the regular 20,000 UAH serviceman’s salary and the extra UAH 30,000 that all soldiers received at the time ($1,200/month), not any “combat bonuses,” ANTAC says.

Incredibly, the sum that he is accused of illegally gaining (UAH 224,000) includes the UAH 40,000 in taxes that Shabunin never even saw, ANTAC adds.

When $5,400 matters more than millions

Compare this to cases the same bureau ignores. Deputy Prime Minister Chernyshov faces charges involving millions in state damages, yet remains in his government position. The High Anti-Corruption Court refused to remove him from office on 2 July.

Even more telling is the case of Oleh Tatarov, deputy chief of the Presidential Office. Charged by anti-corruption investigators in 2020 with bribery, his case was systematically obstructed and quietly closed in April 2022.

Tatarov continues wielding significant influence over law enforcement—the same agencies now pursuing Shabunin.

Most tellingly, the State Bureau of Investigation—created specifically to investigate high officials, judges, and law enforcement—is pursuing a civil society activist for minor violations while ignoring the very officials it was designed to target.

The procedural violations were equally telling. According to the Anti-Corruption Action Center, investigators conducted searches at Shabunin’s home and military unit without court orders, seized his phone without a warrant, and confiscated personal devices belonging to his wife and children.

Ukrainska Pravda, one of Ukraine’s largest independent outlets, revealed the extent of presidential involvement: President Zelensky personally raised Shabunin’s case at high-level military meetings, while officers were ordered to photograph the activist daily and send the images to the Presidential Office.

Questions from the trenches

The most damning assessment comes from an unexpected source: the front lines themselves. Yehor Firsov, a former Ukrainian MP who left parliament to serve in the army, posted a stark warning on social media.

“We are fighting not for a president or ‘parliamentary majority,’ we are fighting to preserve democracy and freedom—which is precisely why Putin attacked Ukraine,” Firsov wrote.

“And if there is less democracy and freedom in the country […] what should we suffer or die for? For the officials who resort to repression to prevent criticism of their power?”

His words capture what makes the Shabunin case so dangerous. Ukrainian soldiers volunteered to defend democratic values, not to preserve a system where critics face prosecution while corrupt officials enjoy impunity.

“The Shabunin case showed that every serviceman today is vulnerable if they have the courage to criticize the authorities,” Firsov continued. “‘Find the person, and there will always be an article in the Criminal Code for them.'”

“You can be a supporter of Vitaliy Shabunin, you can criticize him—this is what freedom and democracy are all about. But right now, it looks like outright political persecution, which may turn into a system tomorrow,” Firsov added.

Civil society responds

Remarkably, even former President Poroshenko—under whom Shabunin faced charges in 2017—condemned the current prosecution. “I see the searches of Vitaliy as something much bigger – a manifestation of the authorities’ full-scale offensive,” Poroshenko wrote, expressing gratitude for Shabunin’s role in establishing anti-corruption infrastructure during his presidency.

VoxUkraine editor Natalija Shapoval described the Shabunin charges as “crossing the red line,” noting this marks the first time during the war that criminal cases have targeted prominent anti-corruption figures.

Even the Texty.org.ua editors who had criticized anti-corruption approaches joined the condemnation, recognizing the Shabunin case as representing “the worst practices of Yanukovych’s time,” harking back to Ukraine’s pro-Russian president ousted in the Euromaidan revolution of 2014.

International silence, domestic consequences

Perhaps most troubling is the international response, or lack thereof.

According to the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia editorial, the government’s authoritarian turn stems partly from changing international dynamics:

“Today, when neither civil society nor the media feel clear support from the United States anymore, because Donald Trump’s team is completely indifferent to the values that used to be the cornerstone, the government in Ukraine has finally allowed itself to be itself.”

The Shabunin prosecution fits within a troubling sequence of events. In June, the government cancelled the results of a transparent competition for the head of the Bureau of Economic Security after the winning candidate wasn’t controlled by the Presidential Office.

“This is not about BEB and not about Shabunin,” the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia editorial concluded. “This is about the long-standing, deeply hidden desire of several corrupt and unprofessional authorities to deal with those they could not destroy before, only because of existing external support.”

The choice ahead

Ukraine’s international partners built their support on the premise that they’re backing a democracy fighting for survival. If that democracy is eroding from within—using wartime as cover for suppressing dissent—the foundation of Western backing becomes questionable.

For Shabunin himself, some technical violations may be real, and his confrontational methods have earned him enemies across Ukraine’s political spectrum. But technical violations exist for everyone—as Firsov noted, “there will always be an article in the Criminal Code” for anyone authorities want to target.

The question isn’t whether Shabunin followed every bureaucratic rule perfectly, or whether his methods were always appropriate. The question is whether Ukraine will use those rules selectively to silence critics while ignoring far more serious violations by allies.

The Shabunin case tests whether those principles will survive the war that was meant to defend them.

As the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia editorial warned: “While Russia is gnawing away at our villages, the authorities are gnawing away at rights and freedoms throughout the rest of the country—and therefore at Ukraine’s prospects of being other than Russia.”

The morning of 10 July started like any other for Colonel Ivan Voronych. Around 8 AM, the veteran Ukrainian Security Service officer stepped out of his apartment building in Kyiv’s Holosiivskyi district, likely heading to another day of what had become Ukraine’s most dangerous work – running covert operations against Russia.

He never made it past the parking lot.

A gunman approached and fired five shots from a silenced pistol. Voronych died instantly from multiple penetrating wounds. The killer vanished in an SUV, leaving behind a crime scene that would send shockwaves through Ukraine’s intelligence community.

According to Roman Chervinskyi, the former intelligence officer who broke the news, this wasn’t random violence. The five point-blank shots, the silenced weapon, the clean escape – everything pointed to a professional hit.

Commander of the gray zone

This wasn’t just another intelligence officer. The New York Times reports that Voronych (also spelled Voronich in some reports) served in the SBU’s elite Alpha Special Operations Center and had spent decades building Ukraine’s most sensitive capabilities against Russia.

His career reads like a spy thriller. Starting in the mid-1990s, Voronych eventually commanded what the NYT describes as “a unit that received technical support from the CIA” and was responsible for eliminating high-level Russian proxy commanders.

This CIA-supported Fifth Directorate eliminated Russian proxy commander Arsen Pavlov (“Motorola”) in Russia’s puppet Donbas “republics” in 2016. His unit played a key role in Ukraine’s August 2024 cross-border offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast.

But the decades between reveal little about his other operations – a silence that speaks to the classified nature of Ukraine’s most sensitive work against Russia.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion, Voronych became part of what sources call an elite unit operating in the “gray zone” between front lines. 

Chervinskyi described Voronich as “one of those who started a direction in the Service that now creates many problems for the orcs” – Ukrainian slang for Russian forces.

An unprecedented target

What makes this killing significant isn’t that it represents some fundamental shift in the shadow war—both sides have been targeting each other’s operatives for years. Ukrainian intelligence has assassinated “dozens” of Russians since the invasion began, reaching deep into Russian territory with car bombs and targeted shootings.

Russia has struck back before. Maksym Shapoval, a key figure in Ukraine’s 2016 Crimea operations, was assassinated in 2017. There was an attempt on current military intelligence head Kyrylo Budanov in 2019 and his wife in 2025.

But the targeting of someone like Voronych appears unprecedented in terms of seniority and operational significance since the full-scale war began. This was a decades-long veteran with deep CIA connections who had been instrumental in some of Ukraine’s most sensitive operations against Russia.

The Russian fingerprints

More than 24 hours after the killing, Ukrainian police and the SBU continue investigating, but no suspect has been publicly identified. The silence is telling.

Former SBU officer Ivan Stupak doesn’t buy into any domestic motive.

“99%—Russian special services chose him as a target,” he told Espreso TV. “Five bullets with a silencer rules out any possibility this was some personal dispute or neighborly grudge. This was a professional hit.”

The targeting itself suggests serious intelligence penetration. The FSB infiltration of Ukrainian security services is well-documented – this February, SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk personally arrested a high-ranking traitor in the SBU’s Anti-Terrorist Center who had been feeding intelligence to Moscow since 2018.

Russian military bloggers welcomed the killing and suggested Moscow was responsible. The Rybar channel, linked to Russian military intelligence, said there were “plenty of motives for eliminating this SBU employee.”

Voronych played key role in Kursk incursion

The timing and target suggest this may be long-delayed payback. Voronych’s involvement in the 2016 Motorola assassination has now been made public through NYT reporting. Pavlov was a beloved figure among Russian-backed forces—his killing was a major psychological blow that Russian commanders never forgot.

Former SBU chief Ivan Bakanov, who knew Voronych personally, told the NYT the implications are stark: “If the motive is a domestic murder—that’s one thing. But if this is a public execution carried out by Russians—that’s a completely different story that requires an immediate response.”

After Russia’s full-scale invasion, Voronich became part of what sources call an elite unit operating in the “gray zone” between front lines. His unit played a key role in Ukraine’s bold August 2024 cross-border offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast, according to NYT.

The Kursk operation marked a watershed moment in the war. Although the strategic outcomes of the incursion remain debated, it undoubtedly demonstrated to Ukraine’s Western partners that Ukraine has the capability to conduct daring raids and that Russia is not invincible.

As US and UK intelligence chiefs noted, the operation was “a significant tactical achievement” that exposed Russian vulnerabilities.

Perhaps most importantly, the offensive laid Russia’s nuclear threats bare—showing them to be empty rhetoric designed to manipulate Western support for Ukraine. The operation “succeeded in making a complete mockery of Vladimir Putin’s red lines,” as one analyst put it, yet no nuclear escalation followed. This pattern of nuclear intimidation remains the main constraint on Western support for Ukraine’s victory plans.

Escalation of the shadow war

The assassination doesn’t change the fundamental rules of the shadow war – those have been evolving for years as both sides have escalated their targeting campaigns. But it does represent something significant:

It also raises uncomfortable questions about security. How did assassins penetrate Kyiv’s defenses to eliminate such a high-value target? Ukrainian security experts note that more than a day has passed without any official suspect description or wanted notice – suggesting this was no ordinary crime.

Ukraine’s capital not safe for its own spies

This assassination fits into an escalating shadow war where both sides have been eliminating each other’s operatives with increasing sophistication. Ukrainian intelligence has been actively targeting Russian officers implicated in war crimes since the full-scale invasion began.

The targets have been high-profile and devastating to Russian operations.

• In December 2024, chemical weapons chief Igor Kirillov was killed by a remotely detonated explosive outside his Moscow apartment building.
• In April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik died in a car explosion near Moscow. Russian drone program chief Colonel Aleksey Kolomoytsev was eliminated in Moscow Oblast in September 2024.

• These operations have reached beyond military targets. In May 2025, former Ukrainian official Andrii Portnov, who fled Ukraine and supported Russian aggression, was shot dead outside an elite Madrid school where he was dropping off his children.

For Ukraine’s intelligence services, Voronich’s death represents both a devastating loss and a troubling escalation. The decades of operational knowledge that died with him cannot be replaced overnight. While senior Ukrainian intelligence officers like Budanov already live under heavy security after multiple assassination attempts, Voronich’s killing suggests Russia’s capabilities in Kyiv have improved.

The success of this operation – no arrests, no public suspect description – indicates a level of operational sophistication that should concern Ukraine’s remaining intelligence leadership.

Read the follow-up:

Russia’s foreign hit squad eliminated in Kyiv shootout after assassination of SBU colonel

Czech intelligence has confirmed what economists suspected: Ukrainian refugees are now contributing more to the Czech economy than they receive in government assistance, according to the Security Information Service’s (BIS) annual report for 2024.

The intelligence assessment reveals that Ukraine’s displaced population has successfully integrated into Czech society while their economic output has already exceeded government expenditures since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

This finding highlights a troubling pattern across Europe: even clear economic benefits from refugee contributions have failed to prevent political backlash, as Poland’s recent election of an anti-Ukrainian president demonstrates despite refugees generating 2.7% of Polish GDP. Czech Republic now faces similar risks with anti-Ukrainian parties leading 2025 election polls.

Czech success follows European pattern

The BIS reported that by end-2024, over 390,000 Ukrainian citizens held temporary protection status in the Czech Republic. The intelligence service documented their successful integration, noting “their economic contribution having already exceeded the volume of financial support and social benefits they have received from the Czech government since the beginning of the war.”

This fiscal turnaround happened faster than many expected. The Czech Labor Ministry estimated Ukrainian workers contributed up to 15 billion Czech crowns annually in taxes. Meanwhile, their presence helped solve chronic labor shortages across key sectors—services, healthcare, and social assistance.

People in Need tracked the numbers closely. By 2023, Ukrainian refugee support reached perfect balance: spending and revenues both hit approximately 22 billion crowns. The organization noted a clear trend: “while spending exceeded income in the year’s first half, income dominated in the second half.”

Political storm clouds gathering

But here’s the catch: positive economic data doesn’t guarantee political survival. Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s SPOLU coalition faces probable defeat in October 2025 parliamentary elections. Polls show ANO party crushing the competition with 35% support compared to SPOLU’s meager 19.5%.

What’s ANO’s position on Ukraine? Former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has made it clear: the war is “not our war.” His party reportedly plans to kill the Czech munitions initiative that has supplied Ukraine with critical ammunition. ANO recently joined the “Patriots for Europe” faction alongside Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen—hardly Ukraine’s biggest fans.

The far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party makes ANO look moderate. Polling at 12.5% and likely to partner with ANO, SPD’s Tomio Okamura calls for ending Czech military aid and starting peace talks with Russia. His party pushes “welfare-chauvinist” arguments—social benefits should go to Czech citizens, not refugees.

Security picture remains positive

Czech intelligence found no serious downsides to Ukrainian refugee presence. The BIS assessment noted refugees “have not had a negative impact on the crime rate in the Czech Republic.” No evidence emerged of Ukrainian involvement in illegal arms trafficking, though the service warned such activity could develop after the war ends.

Current numbers tell a success story: 75% of economically active Ukrainians have jobs, with 88% working legally. But there’s room for improvement. International Organization for Migration data shows massive underemployment—68% of female and 50% of male refugees work below their qualification levels.

The skills mismatch represents missed opportunities. People in Need calculated that a single mother earning minimum wage generates 7,600 crowns monthly for the state. But put her in a job matching her qualifications at 32,000 crowns? She’d contribute 15,555 crowns monthly instead.

European warning signs

Poland offers a stark warning about political sustainability. Despite Ukrainian refugees generating a stunning 2.7% of GDP—worth €16 billion—Polish support for helping Ukrainians crashed from 94% to 57%. The result: Karol Nawrocki won the presidency promising to cut refugee benefits.

The Czech Republic shows similar vulnerabilities. Interior Minister Vít Rakušan indicated that roughly 60% of refugees plan to stay permanently, suggesting successful long-term integration. Yet authorities are already exploring return facilitation centers, following Germany and Poland’s lead.

The intelligence assessment suggests refugee flows will remain stable unless “Ukrainian defense were to collapse and Russia made a significant breakthrough on the front line.” But political stability? That’s another question entirely.

Three years of war have created a dangerous template: economic evidence of refugee benefits gets overwhelmed by war fatigue and anti-immigrant sentiment. Czech Republic’s pro-Ukrainian government may soon learn that fiscal success doesn’t guarantee electoral survival.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine documented 232 civilian deaths and 1,343 injuries in June 2025, marking the highest monthly casualty toll in three years as Russian forces launched ten times more missile strikes and drone attacks than in June 2024.

Russia’s unprecedented escalation of violence against civilians coincides with military recruitment reaching 30,000 troops monthly while Ukrainian territories face daily bombardment from an estimated 600,000 Russian forces—the highest troop presence since the invasion began.

The surge demonstrates Moscow’s strategic shift toward terrorizing populations across practically every Ukrainian region as Russian military casualties exceed one million, forcing reliance on terror tactics against defenseless civilians rather than battlefield advances.

Escalating campaign targets all regions

The June statistics reveal Russia’s expanding geographical scope of civilian terror, with casualties documented in at least 16 oblasts and Kyiv, regardless of distance from frontlines. The UN monitoring mission noted Russia’s tenfold increase in long-range missile strikes and loitering munition attacks compared to the same period in 2024.

“Civilians across Ukraine are facing suffering we haven’t seen for more than three years,” said Danielle Bell, head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. “The increase in long-range missile strikes and drone attacks has brought even more death and harm to civilian populations in areas far from the front lines.”

The 9 July assault exemplified this unprecedented escalation, with Russian forces deploying 741 projectiles—728 drones and 13 missiles—in the largest single-night attack since the full-scale invasion began, primarily targeting the western city of Lutsk with 50 drones and five missiles.

Since then, Russia had launched massive aerial assaults each night, with the latest—12 July—targeting west Ukraine, hitherto considered a safe haven from Russia’s terror.

Children forced underground as trauma spreads

The psychological impact on Ukrainian children has reached alarming levels as families adapt to constant aerial threats. “Children are sleeping not in beds, but in corridors, basements or bathrooms, covering their ears with their hands so as not to hear the sounds of sirens and explosions,” Bell emphasized. “Such experiences leave deep psychological trauma.”

The broader 2025 trend confirms systematic deterioration in civilian protection. During the first half of 2025, total civilian casualties reached 6,754 people—a 54% increase compared to the same period in 2024, when 4,381 casualties were documented. Deaths among civilians rose 17%, while injuries surged 64%.

Russian weapons evolution drives casualty surge

Three primary factors drove the dramatic increase in civilian casualties: Russia’s deployment of powerful long-range missiles and drones against urban areas, enhanced destructive capacity of these weapons, and growing frequency of attacks. The expanded use of short-range drones has proven particularly deadly for communities near frontlines.

“In many regions, daily life has been reduced to constantly seeking shelter,” Bell noted. “During mass bombings, people remain in shelters for hours, and when they emerge, they often see that their homes or workplaces have been damaged or completely destroyed. This cycle of seeking shelter and suffering losses has become harsh everyday reality for many communities.”

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, the UN mission has documented at least 13,580 civilian deaths, including 716 children, and 34,115 civilian injuries, including 2,173 children.

Background

Russia’s escalating civilian casualties occur as military losses mount exponentially. Ukrainian officials announced in June that Russian military personnel losses reached 1,000,340 since 24 February 2022, with more than 628,000 deaths occurring in just the last 18 months. Despite these massive losses, Russia continues recruiting approximately 30,000 troops monthly while maintaining about 600,000 forces in Ukraine.

The June civilian casualty surge follows April 2025 becoming the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since September 2024, with 209 deaths and 1,146 injuries primarily from ballistic missile strikes on major cities including Kryvyi Rih, Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv.

In the wee hours of 12 July, Russia struck the west-Ukrainian cities of Lviv, Lutsk, and Chernivtsi. East-Ukrainian Kharkiv was also affected.

The attack comes one day after Russia’s record aerial missile attack on Kyiv as President Zelenskyy warns that Russia is ramping up its capacities to launch up to 1000 Shahed kamikaze drones at Ukraine daily.

The attack involved 597 drones (339 of them were Shahed kamikaze drones, the rest — imitator drones) and 26 cruise missiles, the air force reported. 319 Shaheds and 25 cruise missiles were reported downed.

The drone attack lasted 11 hours, while the missile attack started at 3:34 and lasted 1.5 hours, according to the monitor TG channel.

A 26-year-old woman and a 43-year-old man were killed in Chernivtsi due to falling drone wreckage, which has seen relatively few attacks since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Lviv, another relatively safe haven, has also come under the brunt of Russia’s escalating attacks. 46 buildings were damaged, and 500 windows smashed in an attack that also damaged the Lviv Polytechnic University.

A private house was destroyed in Lviv; cars also suffered damage.

Poland scrambles jets, but no help to Ukraine

The attack forced Poland to scramble its military aircraft overnight, the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported.

Poland has previously scrambled its jets in response to Russia’s attacks on western Ukraine, as it is standard procedure for Poland’s military to scramble jets and increase the readiness of air defense systems when “there is a danger of Russian air strikes on western Ukraine and potential assumptions that [the] border of Poland might be impacted.|

Throughout the war, Russian missiles and attack drones have repeatedly infringed the airspace of Romania, Latvia, Poland, and other NATO members, with Ukraine asking EU and NATO ministers in late August 2024 to start shooting down Russian missiles and drones heading toward NATO over Ukraine.

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has stated that his and other countries have a duty to intercept Russian missiles before they enter NATO territory, though NATO maintains it “will not become a party to the conflict.”

Ukrainian authorities have confirmed that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) remains legally subordinate to Russia’s Orthodox Church despite its claims of independence.

The State Service of Ukraine on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) concluded in a 21-page investigation that Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination has maintained canonical ties to Moscow through its governing documents and institutional structure.

The timing proves significant as it comes just one week after Ukraine stripped UOC MP leader Metropolitan Onufriy of Ukrainian citizenship for allegedly concealing his Russian passport since 2002.

Russian church charter still governs Ukrainian operations

The DESS investigation revealed that the UOC MP continues to cite the 1990 Gramota (Charter) from then-Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow as its constitutional foundation. The document explicitly states that “the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is connected through our Russian Orthodox Church to the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.”

According to the findings, the UOC MP must still commemorate the Moscow Patriarch in liturgy, have its statutes approved by Moscow, receive holy chrism from Russia, and ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members.

Religious scholar Yuriy Chornomorets, who participated in earlier expert evaluations, told Euromaidan Press that “the conclusions use only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter.”

Limited response to Russian diocese seizures

The commission noted that Russian authorities have unilaterally transferred three UOC MP dioceses on occupied territories to direct Moscow control since 2022, including dioceses in Crimea, Rovenky, and Berdiansk. The UOC MP leadership offered no resistance to these transfers.

When 33 UOC MP bishops condemned Moscow’s diocese seizures in October 2024, their own church’s governing bodies remained silent, the investigation found.

Legal implications under Ukraine’s church ban

The findings provide legal justification for implementing Ukraine’s August 2024 law banning Russian-affiliated religious organizations. The legislation gave religious groups nine months to sever Russian connections or face dissolution through court proceedings.

DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected to the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure, potentially affecting the UOC MP’s approximately 8,000 parishes.

The UOC MP has consistently maintained it severed ties with Moscow after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, but the Ukrainian investigation concludes these claims lack documentary foundation.

The historically Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox Church is still affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church despite claims to the contrary, a Ukrainian state committee has found.

In a lengthy investigation, the Ukrainian State Service of Ukraine on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) has concluded that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP) is still legally part of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The law gave religious organizations nine months to sever relations with Russia. Now, DESS is probing whether the connections are still there.

But, how does one establish such matters? After all, the UOC MP insists it supports Ukraine and that it already cut its Russian ties back in 2022.

Moreover, it is leading a global campaign decrying alleged state religious persecution. This initiative has been particularly fruitful among American Republicans, in part thanks to lavish lobbying efforts.

Canonically speaking

The path of an Orthodox church to autocephaly (independence) is notoriously vague and complicated. Unlike the Catholic Church, governed by a single primate from Rome, global Orthodoxy is defined as a constellation of amicable jurisdictions that received independence according to pastoral needs.

Ideally, of course. In practice, however, the path to church independence has been fraught with political strife, stonewalling, and competition between two centers of Orthodox gravitas—the Moscow and Ecumenical patriarchates.

Enter the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The UOC MP’s predicament stems from centuries of imperial church politics. The 1686 transfer of the Kyiv Metropolitanate from Constantinople to Moscow began Russian control over Ukrainian Orthodoxy—control that outlasted the Soviet Union and continued into independent Ukraine.

This pattern wasn’t unique to Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church historically granted limited “autonomy” to Orthodox communities in its sphere—a status somewhere between full independence and direct diocesan control. The Japanese Orthodox Church, Latvian Orthodox Church, Estonian Orthodox Church, and Ukrainian Orthodox Church all received similar arrangements.

True autocephaly, by contrast, means complete independence—as Moscow granted to the Polish Orthodox Church in 1948 and the Orthodox Church in America in 1970. The language was unambiguous: full canonical independence with no mention of accessing global Orthodoxy “through” another church.

What the documents say

So what about Ukraine’s status today?

The 21-page report reads like a forensic autopsy. It dissects the UOC MP’s claims using two key criteria:

1. What the church’s foundational documents say
2. and what its actions reveal.

The smoking gun lies in a 1990 document: the Gramota (Charter) issued by then-Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow. The UOC MP still cites this in its governing statutes. It grants the Ukrainian church “independence and autonomy in its governance”—but with a crucial caveat.

“The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is connected through our Russian Orthodox Church to the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church,” the Gramota declares.

Emphasis ours

For DESS investigators, this single line proves subordination. Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination remains canonically tied to Moscow.

But wait—doesn’t the UOC MP claim it severed these ties after Russia’s 2022 invasion? The church leadership has repeatedly insisted they’re no longer part of the Russian Orthodox Church structure.

The investigation reveals a different story. A 2017 addition to the Russian Orthodox Church’s statutes—Chapter X, titled “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church”—still mandates that the Ukrainian church must:

• Commemorate the Moscow Patriarch’s name in all Ukrainian churches
• Have its statute approved and confirmed by the Moscow Patriarch
• Have its primate blessed by the Moscow Patriarch
• Submit decisions about creating or dissolving dioceses to Moscow’s Archiereus Council for approval
• Ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members
• Accept Moscow’s Holy Synod decisions as binding
• Receive holy chrism (consecrated oil) from the Moscow Patriarch

What about the 27 May 2022 Local Council at Feofania Monastery? The UOC MP points to this gathering as proof of their independence. The council did adopt changes to the church statute, removing some explicit references to Moscow.

But the DESS investigation calls this a “notable step toward independence” that “did not mean the withdrawal” from the Russian Orthodox Church. Why not?

The Gramota remains the constitutional foundation.

The investigation found no documents from the UOC MP’s governing bodies—its Sobor, Bishop’s Council, or Holy Synod—declaring withdrawal from the Russian Orthodox Church structure. The silence is deafening.

UOC MP actions speak louder

But documents only tell half the story. What have the churches actually done?

Russian church authorities have been unilaterally transferring UOC MP dioceses on Russian-occupied lands to direct Moscow control since 2022. Three Crimean dioceses in June 2022. The Rovenky diocese in October 2022. The Berdiansk diocese in May 2023.

Some UOC MP bishops have publicly supported Russian aggression. Metropolitan Panteleimon of Luhansk and Alchevsk participated in pro-war events and attended celebrations for Patriarch Kirill’s anniversary.

True, some clergy operate under Russian occupation, where resistance could mean imprisonment. But the church’s response reveals its priorities.

The UOC MP aggressively condemns priests who defect to the rival Orthodox Church of Ukraine, granted independence by Constantinople in 2018. It bans them from serving.

When Moscow transfers entire dioceses? Silence.

In October 2024, 33 UOC MP bishops condemned Moscow’s unilateral diocese transfers. Were they supported by their colleagues? No. The church’s governing bodies said nothing.

This shows they can resist when they choose to. They just don’t choose to resist Moscow.

The grassroots revolt

Between 2022 and 2024, multiple groups of clergy and laypeople issued appeals to Metropolitan Onuphrius. They demanded complete canonical separation from Moscow.

Were these appeals considered? The investigation notes they were “left without consideration by the highest organs of church authority and governance of the UOC MP.”

The verdict

The DESS conclusion is unequivocal: the Kyiv Metropolitanate remains affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church under all four criteria established by Ukrainian law:

1. the UOC still belongs to Moscow’s structure
2. its documents still reference Russian control
3. Moscow still makes binding decisions for Ukrainian dioceses
4. Ukrainian bishops still sit on Russian church councils.

For Ukrainian authorities, this provides legal justification for potential further action. For the church itself, it represents a canonical Catch-22. It must maintain the Russian connection that legitimizes its existence while operating in a country that has banned that very connection.

Is the commission biased?

While the UOC MP hasn’t responded officially to the DESS conclusion, prominent figures like Iona Cherepanov have decried it as “Soviet,” implying that the commission is biased and implements state decisions to, allegedly, persecute the UOC MP.

These aren’t interpretations—they’re documented facts.

Why doesn’t the UOC MP break free from Russia?

This question haunts Ukrainian religious observers. The UOC’s response reveals a stunning contradiction.

“Today the UOC admits it remains part of the Russian Orthodox Church but claims it intends to become autocephalous,” Chornomorets notes. “Yet it demands Ukrainian authorities treat it as if it already achieved independence.”

The duplicity runs deeper. “When UOC bishops operate outside Ukraine—in Europe, for instance—they demand local Orthodox hierarchs treat them as Russian Orthodox Church representatives,” he explains. They want to be independent in Ukraine but Russian abroad.

Novinskyi’s funding could be part of the explanation, Hovorun believes. But not all of it.

Meanwhile, Smyrnov believes the UOC MP hasn’t declared autocephaly “because it would place them in a schism.” Breaking away unilaterally would leave the church without recognition from other Orthodox patriarchates.

“But really, over three years they could have appealed to church primates, could have restored communication with the Ecumenical Patriarch [severed in 2018 – ed] and asked for help,” he says.

The irony is palpable. While Chornomorets notes that 74% of UOC faithful support immediate separation from Moscow, their bishops cling to Russian ties that Ukrainian law now explicitly forbids.

What happens next?

DESS expert Viacheslav Horshkov, one of the report’s authors, outlines the immediate next steps. “It’s too early to talk about parishes now,” he tells Euromaidan Press. “The next step is a directive to the Kyiv Metropolitanate of the UOC to eliminate signs of affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church.”

The church will have 30 days to comply, with a possible 60-day extension upon request. If they meet the requirements—which Horshkov considers realistic—the matter closes.

If not, the Kyiv Metropolitanate will be officially recognized as affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, and the case goes to court.

The timeline remains uncertain. But if the court strips the Kyiv Metropolitanate of its legal entity status, questions will arise for subordinate structures—diocesan administrations, monasteries, missions, and spiritual educational institutions.

Parishes face different options. “Parishes can peacefully transition to independent status or exist without legal entity status,” Horshkov explains. “They have several options for determining their fate. They can even register a new association.”

“The new law preserves Russians’ right to worship freely, hold gatherings, and maintain their own temples,” Chornomorets explains. “But it strips them of privileges to use approximately 3,000 religious buildings belonging to the state as historical monuments or local communities.”

He notes the law’s limitations.

“The sanctions are too mild—loss of legal entity status for religious communities, monasteries, seminaries, dioceses, and the Kyiv Metropolitanate, but nothing that would constitute a real ‘ban on the Russian Orthodox Church.'”

DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected with the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure. “If a parish ends up on the list and doesn’t comply with the directive to eliminate affiliation, and uses state property, then the lease agreement will be terminated,” Smyrnov says.

But there won’t be mass prosecutions. The focus remains on the Kyiv Metropolitanate itself.

Smirnov expects Metropolitan Onuphrius might convene a bishops’ council to declare the UOC independent in response to the DESS directive.

But the 75-year-old Metropolitan, who came of age in Moscow’s Holy Trinity-St.Sergius Lavra, represents a generation of church leaders whose worldview remains fundamentally tied to the Russian Orthodox tradition, regardless of political circumstances.

Why does it matter if the UOC MP is still affiliated with Russia?

Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine has attempted to prod the UOC MP with its 8,097 parishes, vs the roughly 9,000 of rival independent OCU, into ditching Moscow, thus reducing the amount of Russian soft power in the embattled country.

The UOC MP has been viewed as Russia’s soft power tool for decades, promoting a version of the “Russian world” ideology that envisions Ukraine as part of a “Holy Rus” rather than an independent state.

As Andriy Smyrnov notes, the church spread Russian narratives that Ukraine should exist as Russia’s province, not a sovereign nation.

The stakes extend beyond theology.

Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination faces a choice: genuine independence or continued subordination to a church that blesses the bombs falling on Ukrainian cities.

Editor’s note: the article was updated to include comments from Viacheslav Horshkov

Euromaidan Press is expanding and searching for professional soulmates who believe in independent journalism.

If you would like to become part of Ukraine’s global voice, please don’t hesitate to get in touch!

Ukraine’s strongest ally just elected a president who wants to cut refugee benefits, block EU membership, and exploit historical grievances. How did Poland—once Ukraine’s loudest champion—turn against its neighbor?

To the south, Romania nearly elected the far-right and pro-Russian George Simion. To the west, Slovakia’s Robert Fico and Hungary’s Viktor Orban have long parroted Kremlin talking points and tried to block aid to the embattled country. Now Poland, long one of Kyiv’s most consistent, vocal, and strongest allies, has begun to sour on its neighbor as well.

Since Russia initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Kyiv has received tremendous diplomatic support, especially from its neighbors in the region. However, after more than three years of war, cracks in this support are beginning to show.

The culmination of this trend was in June 2025 with the election of Karol Nawrocki. An arch-conservative and nationalist, Nawrocki has promised to limit benefits to Ukrainian refugees, block Kyiv’s accession to NATO and the EU, and has stoked historical trauma between the states.

A nail biting contest

For weeks, journalists, analysts, and politicians had been watching Poland’s presidential election cycle. What was initially predicted to be a walk in the park for the liberal centrist candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, has become a neck-in-neck race with his conservative challenger, Karol Nawrocki.

A few months ago, many Poles would have struggled to even identify Karol Nawrocki in a photo lineup. The former head of the Institute of National Memory (IPN), many were surprised when Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the conservative party Law and Justice (PiS), selected him to run for president.

After spending weeks catching up to Trzaskowski, Nawrocki barely snatched victory on 1 June.

Why was Nawrocki successful?

Nawrocki’s previous obscurity made his victory surprising. His main challenger appeared to be a tailor-made presidential candidate, while Nawrocki was dogged by scandals—allegations of football hooliganism, exploiting an elderly man for cheap rent, potentially soliciting prostitutes.

The ruling government coalition, headed by Donald Tusk, is an unwieldy creature comprising the progressive left, centrist liberals, and conservatives. Since coming into power in 2023, it has become incredibly unpopular.

United more in their antipathy towards PiS, the parties have proved adept at angering most segments of Polish society.

Tusk’s coalition had promised everything and delivered few of its core pledges. The abortion liberalization bill failed by just three votes because members of Tusk’s own coalition voted it down. Meanwhile, there has been no movement on legalizing same-sex marriage.

Conservative voters were incensed at the government undoing many of PiS’s former policies, while liberal and progressive urban supporters felt betrayed by broken promises.

Another factor playing in Nawrocki’s favor were efforts by the United States’ current Trump administration to back him.

In early May, Nawrocki attended the White House National Prayer Day and met with Donald Trump. Later that month, Homeland Security Director Kristi Noem urged Poles to vote for the conservative Nawrocki during a speech at the CPAC.

Tired of the new neighbors

The question is, why? Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland has been one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies. It has taken in millions of Ukrainian refugees since February 2022; it has provided billions of złoty in aid; and has vociferously backed Kyiv on the global stage.

The transformation has been dramatic. Over one million Ukrainians now comprise nearly 7% of Poland’s population.

War fatigue has set in after three years of conflict with no end in sight

• More Poles now believe that Ukraine should give up territory to Russia to halt the war.
• The majority want military-aged Ukrainian men to return home.
• There is a growing sense that Ukrainian refugees take advantage of state benefits.

Economic competition narratives have taken hold despite evidence to the contrary. Ukrainian refugees have founded around 60,000 enterprises and boosted Poland’s GDP by 2.7% in 2024.

Many Poles are now receptive to restricting Ukrainian refugee benefits. Both major candidates proposed cutting the 800+ złoty monthly child benefit—roughly $170—that helps Ukrainian families, with Nawrocki promising outright cuts and Trzaskowski proposing to limit it only to working Ukrainian refugees.

This targets largely women with children, and the administrative costs of determining employment status would likely exceed any savings from the cuts.

A harsh new reality

So, what does Karol Nawrocki’s election mean for Kyiv? The consequences are mixed. While Poland’s crucial wartime support remains secure, longer-term strategic goals face new obstacles.

1. No threat to military support

Ukraine can breathe easy on one front: Poland’s military backing will continue. Nawrocki has declared support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and resistance to Russian aggression and explicitly supports giving military aid to help Ukraine fend off Russia’s invasion.

Poland will remain Ukraine’s vital logistics hub for Western arms deliveries and a vocal diplomatic advocate for Ukraine’s fight against Russia. The fundamental strategic partnership against Russian aggression stays intact—Nawrocki may be skeptical of Ukrainian integration, but he’s firmly anti-Russian.

2. Immediate impact on refugees

Unfortunately, this support will not extend past helping Ukraine fight Russia. As it relates to Poland’s treatment of Ukrainian refugees, Nawrocki has taken a hardline position and has vocally targeted the vulnerable group fleeing Russia’s vicious war.

In April, the then candidate declared that he would push for and sign a law that prohibited immigrants be treated better than Poles, “in their own country.” Ukrainians comprise the largest immigrant group, making the intent clear.

If Nawrocki were alone in pushing for these restrictive policies, life would be complicated for Ukrainian refugees, but still secure. The president has very few domestic affairs powers outside of the veto.

What is cause for concern is that many of Poland’s political class have also adopted anti-Ukraine stances. The current ruling coalition has voiced support for cutting child benefits for certain categories of refugees.

3. The long run

The second danger lies in Ukraine’s post-war future. Nawrocki has explicitly conditioned EU and NATO membership on resolving “civilizational issues”—primarily allowing Polish exhumations of Volyn massacre victims.

He declared that “a country that cannot answer for a very brutal crime against 120,000 of its neighbors cannot be part of international alliances.”

Despite Ukraine having acquiesced to exhumations earlier in 2025, Nawrocki has previewed how he will use the issue. In early June, Nawrocki publicly chastised Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy over the need to “[solve] overdue historical issues.” Days later, Poland passed a law establishing a day of remembrance for victims of “genocide.”

This triggered a diplomatic spat, with Ukraine taking umbrage over the word “genocide.”

This controversy represents a major point of contention between the two countries. Were the massacres of Poles in Volyn in 1943 a genocide, or a tragedy of war? Many Poles, not only conservatives, view the killings as a form of genocide. Ukraine believes that the matter should be viewed with more nuance, especially in the context of Polish animosity towards Ukrainians in the lead up to WW2.

Many conservative politicians in Poland would prefer to keep the Volyn massacres in the public eye. Much like with demands for war reparations from Germany, there is little reason for them to actually sit with the opposing side and come up with a sensible solution. Rather, it is advantageous to use these historical points of contention for political support.

Unfortunately, the current governing coalition, despite being opponents of Nawrocki, has signaled that they will also use this historical point of contention to gin up support.

Nawrocki has also identified agriculture as a pressure point, promising to prevent “unfair competition with Ukraine for Polish agriculture.”

This matters not because of agriculture’s economic weight—it comprises only around 3% of Poland’s GDP—but because of its political significance. Farmers represent a key constituency for conservative parties, and Ukrainian grain has triggered Polish farmer protests and border blockades.

4. The extremist threat

Like in the United States, Poland, despite being a parliamentarian and multiparty system, is largely divided into two blocs, conservative and centrist liberal. These two groups have been in power for decades.

Similar to their US peers, many young people in Poland reject this duopoly. Furious at the rising cost of living and economic instability, many youth voters sprinted to the far ends of the political system.

While some have thrown their weight behind the leftwing party Razem, far more have thrown in their lot with the far-right Sławomir Mentzen and his party Konfederacja. Mentzen has used the Ukraine war to his political advantage—organizing border blockades against Ukrainian trucks and targeting Ukrainian refugees with his rhetoric.

While the young firebrand’s support fell from a high of 18%, he still came in third during the first round with nearly 15% of the vote share, making inroads across demographics.

A gloomy forecast

If the governing coalition were to collapse, the far-right Konfederacja would have a huge advantage. It would be able to point to the inability of the two large parties to govern and play on the resulting disaffection. While Razem fully supports Ukraine’s fight and welcomes refugees, Konfederacja has shown that it has a larger support base.

Ukraine is currently faced with two major dilemmas.

1. Putin and the Russian army continue to push westward, making small and costly gains, yet still stretching the limits of Ukraine’s manpower and logistics.
2. Two of its closest allies, the US and Poland, have elected leaders who are either sympathetic to Russia, or view Ukraine as a tool to advance their nationalist agenda.

When the war finally ends, Ukraine will need all of the assistance it can get to both recover and quickly accede into the EU (NATO looks like it is out of reach). It is a shame that its future is clouded by the self-serving nationalism of its friends.

For the past three years, I’ve spent many nights sleeping in the bathroom. That puts at least two walls between me and the street—thick walls, made of concrete and brick. I naively hope they’ll protect me from shrapnel if there’s an explosion nearby.

I don’t even think about what would happen if a drone flew straight into my window. It’s a sort of fatalism. In case of a direct hit, there are too many factors you can’t predict. And if you can’t predict something—you try not to think about it.

I barely remember the time before the war anymore. And I’m not talking about 2022—I mean 2014. The war has been close one way or another all this time: funerals, hospitals, friends, fundraisers, work on the frontline, news from the occupied territories. Only a completely unempathetic fool can claim the war is far away and doesn’t really concern them.

In case you missed it: the war in Ukraine started in 2014, when Russians occupied Crimea. Sometimes I hear nonsense like “Well, that was a long time ago, what’s the difference now.” Huge difference. Occupied territories remain occupied even decades later.

Since 2022, Russia stopped pretending altogether and decided to wage full-scale war. So here you are, living in the capital of a country whose right to exist Russians completely reject, whose entire people’s existence they deny.

Two beds, every night

Every night I prepare two beds: a regular one in the bedroom, and one in the bathroom, made of several sleeping pads and sleeping bags. Before going to sleep, you check the air raid map and make a decision.

Will you start the night in a normal bed, or is it better to go straight to the bathroom so you don’t end up running around the apartment in the middle of the night? You also bring your go-bag into the bathroom—tech, documents, first aid kit, flashlight. So that if something happens, everything is within reach.

Sometimes, if you don’t forget, you also bring a bottle of water. Since I’m tall, sleeping in the bathroom isn’t very comfortable. Despite its size, I still don’t fit on the floor.

та тут підвал дуже так собі історія й найближче укриття в 17 хвилинах)

тому в мене тут боковушка біля туалєта pic.twitter.com/S7IUfVcvhM

— пінгвін соціологічний (@hokage_penguin) July 3, 2025

Reading the patterns

You learn to predict the attacks. If Russians attacked neighboring regions—Poltava or Cherkasy—for several nights in a row, that means you should expect an attack on Kyiv soon.

Several extremely loud explosions in Kyiv; several ballistic missile strikes reported

Ballistic missiles at Dnipro

Shahed kamikaze attack ongoing pic.twitter.com/Cenk7BcvBK

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) June 5, 2025

It’s easy to tell when drones are headed for Kyiv. If they are, they arrive early, while it’s still light out, and can come not just from Sumy Oblast, but also from Chernihiv. If you see that happening, you head straight to sleep in the bathroom.

If drones are only flying from Sumy Oblast, there’s a chance they’ll target somewhere else that night, and you might be able to sleep in a normal bed without interruption. But not always—there are different scenarios.

Around 100 Russian Shahed kamikaze heading west

Missile strikes on Ukraine expected closer to early morning

InsiderUA/TG pic.twitter.com/mbqcCuJ4Ch

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) June 28, 2025

Just before dawn, you might jolt awake because ballistic missiles are flying toward Kyiv. Sometimes the air raid alert goes off at the same moment as the explosions, or just a minute or two before the strike. There’s no time to get to a shelter. Only the bathroom.

What sleep deprivation actually looks like

If you spend the whole night in the bathroom—it’s hard to call that real sleep. Your joints ache, no matter how many sleeping pads you lay down. The floor is never going to feel like a bed. And because of that damn joint pain, you can’t fall asleep.

But that’s not even the worst part. Aching joints are the least of your worries. When your windows rattle and your doors slam because something gets shot down nearby—it’s pretty hard to sleep. And if it’s a ballistic missile—the whole city hears it.

Or you might wake up to a horrible buzzing right over your building. That’s a modified Iranian Shahed drone, which of course no one ever officially supplied to the Russians. Trust me—that’s not a sound you ever want to hear.

On nights like last night, the number of these drones can reach the hundreds. Literally. The monitoring channels even stop reporting which districts they’re flying over and how many—because there’s just no point. This shit is everywhere.

Then the reports start coming in about impacts. Every time, they’re somewhere near your friends or family. Because I have friends all over Kyiv. So you start messaging them, asking if they’re okay. You get nervous when they take too long to reply.

Від дитячої кімнати майже нічого не залишилося

Шахед розніс квартиру киянки в Оболонському районі. В момент удару вона разом з дитиною ховалася у ванній. pic.twitter.com/2qtQRvAvko

— Сергій Погребецький (@pogrebeckij) June 10, 2025

Morning after

By morning, the air raid alert is over. All in all, you got maybe three hours of sleep. That’s how it’s been for three years.

When you read articles about how sleep deprivation is a threat in wars between countries on another continent—you want to laugh hysterically. Because I know what that is. And I want to tell you that you get used to it too.

When you go outside in the morning—you see the coffee shop near your home is already open. The supermarket too. You get your coffee, buy cigarettes, and head to the metro.

You walk there angry and sleep-deprived. But alive. And not injured. And as awful as it sounds—you’re grateful for that. Because if you made it through the night, then today you can do something important. Someone else wasn’t as lucky.

People sit in cafés, eat croissants, drink their coffee. But before that, they might have spent the night in a metro station, an underground parking garage, or a basement. Or in the bathroom. This is now the fourth year. The war itself—the twelfth.

What peace actually means

I’m not even going to try describing how people live in Kharkiv, Sumy, or Odesa. And especially Kherson, where Russians literally hunt people using FPV drones. That’s a whole different level of terror and trying to survive within it.

That’s why any news about Putin’s so-called “desire for peace” makes us furious. We hear that damn “desire for peace” several times a week. And Kharkiv or Sumy—every single day. Russia has no desire for peace. So there won’t be any.

Putin only understands strength. That fact is as simple as two times two. But some people—some politicians—pretend things aren’t so black and white. Countries that once gave your country security guarantees can’t even close the skies over you.

They not only refuse to give you air defense missiles for free—they refuse to sell them. Ukrainians are very angry about that. Incredibly. Because they have every right to be. We’ve lived three years under full-scale war and nightly terror.

Learning how to live in full-scale war isn’t a skill anyone should ever have to acquire. I hope you never have to experience anything like this.

But here we go again:

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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The Pentagon has suspended shipments of critical air defense missiles to Ukraine amid concerns about depleted US stockpiles.

The timing is especially concerning: Russia just launched record-breaking missile and drone attacks last month.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga captured the stakes: Russian attacks killed 37% more civilians in the past six months, he noted, while emphasizing Ukraine’s willingness to “buy or borrow” air defense systems if needed.

Why this matters for Ukraine’s survival

How many missiles did Russia fire at Ukraine in June alone? Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported Russia launched over 330 missiles, including almost 80 ballistic missiles, plus over 5,000 attack drones and 5,000 KABs (guided bombs).

Now the US has halted 30 Patriot missiles, nearly 8,500 155mm artillery shells, and over 250 precision GMLRS missiles.

Ukraine loses its primary shield against Russian ballistic missiles without sustained Patriot resupply. But the vulnerabilities run deeper.

Ukraine’s defense architecture faces critical gaps

Defense Express analysis reveals how heavily Ukrainian air defense relies on American systems:

• Long-range protection: Patriot systems are Ukraine’s main shield against ballistic missiles—the fast-moving projectiles that can hit anywhere in the country. European alternatives? Ukraine operates French-Italian SAMP/T systems, but Ukrainian air defense expert Serhii Morfinov notes “the question of whether there are enough missiles for SAMP/T systems is very big.”
• Medium-range coverage: Norwegian NASAMS launchers fire American AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles to intercept aircraft and cruise missiles. Aging American HAWK systems also depend on US resupply.

• Precision strikes: American HIMARS rocket launchers lose their GMLRS guided missiles—the precision weapons that hit Russian supply lines and command posts up to 80 kilometers away.
• Close-range defense: Portable Stinger missiles and truck-mounted Avenger systems protect troops and installations from low-flying aircraft and drones.

What Ukraine can use without American support

Which air defense systems don’t depend on US supplies? Defense Express breaks down Ukraine’s non-American options:

• Short-range systems (up to 10km): Polish Piorun, French Mistral, Swedish RBS-70, and British Martlet missiles provide portable defense. German systems using FZ275 LGR missiles offer additional coverage. Ukraine also operates modified “Osa” systems converted to use R-73 missiles.
• Medium-range systems (up to 20km): German IRIS-T SLS and British Raven systems with ASRAAM missiles on SupaCat chassis. Spain’s Spada systems were promised in 2022 but haven’t appeared in combat.

• Long-range coverage: Only German IRIS-T SLM systems provide medium-range coverage without American missiles. The problem? Ukraine has far more Norwegian NASAMS systems, which depend entirely on US-supplied AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles.
• Soviet-era systems: If Ukraine still has missiles, aging S-125, “Tor,” and “Buk” systems remain operational. But Soviet ammunition became scarce years ago, forcing Ukraine to create “FrankenSAMs”—Soviet launchers modified to fire American AIM-7 missiles.

The critical gap? Anti-ballistic missile defense. France and Italy provided only two SAMP/T batteries compared to roughly 10 Patriot systems. SAMP/T missiles are also reportedly in short supply.

Suspension shows aid used as leverage

This marks the second major aid suspension under Trump. The first occurred in March 2025 after a heated 28 February Oval Office confrontation where Trump told Zelenskyy “you’re not winning this” and “you don’t have the cards right now.”

That March suspension reportedly pressured Ukraine into negotiations and signing a minerals deal. Within weeks of the aid cutoff, Ukraine had abandoned its victory plan and shifted to promoting ceasefire proposals.

This suspension, like the one in March, also came out of the blue. Ukrainian MP Fedir Venislavskyi told RBC-Ukraine that Kyiv had “worked out various scenarios” for such contingencies but confirmed the decision was “very unpleasant for us.”

How significant is this suspension? Russian responses provide the answer. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that “the less weapons are supplied to Ukraine the closer the end of the special military operation.” Moscow recognizes the strategic opportunity.

Ukraine’s growing vulnerabilities

Ballistic missile exposure becomes critical

What happens without PAC-3 interceptors? Ukraine becomes “very vulnerable to Russian ballistics,” Morfinov writes. Russia can systematically target:

• Aviation at airfields
• Command centers and military headquarters
• Defense production facilities
• Critical infrastructure and logistics hubs
• Air defense systems themselves during drone swarm attacks

The cascading effect threatens everything. Russian forces use drone swarms to locate Ukrainian air defense positions, then target them with ballistic missiles that depleted Patriot batteries cannot intercept.

Artillery ammunition shortage compounds frontline pressure

Can Ukraine maintain counter-battery fire with 8,500 fewer 155mm shells?

Morfinov explains this creates “weakening during the great summer offensive by the Russians along the entire front line.” Ukrainian production and alternative sources provide some mitigation, but gaps remain.

The loss of GMLRS precision rockets hits harder. Ukraine must rely more on F-16s carrying Storm Shadow missiles, which increases pilot risks.

Strategic implications extend beyond battlefield

Military analyst Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute warned that “this decision will cost Ukrainian lives and territory.” The psychological impact compounds material losses as Ukrainian forces and civilians question Western resolve.

NATO Chief Mark Rutte argued on Fox News that “Ukraine cannot do without all the support it can get” for ammunition and air defense. His framing challenges the administration’s logic: “It is also in the interests of the US for Ukraine not to lose this war.”

Rutte’s formula—”secure Europe means secure US”—positions Ukrainian victory as essential for American security, directly contradicting the “America First” rationale.

Pentagon justification reveals broader shift

Why suspend aid now? Defense policy chief Elbridge Colby stated the review ensures “US forces’ readiness for Administration defense priorities.” Translation: Pacific focus amid China concerns takes precedence.

The Pentagon cited recent Middle East operations, including Iran’s retaliatory attack on Qatar that prompted “the largest single engagement of Patriot air defense missiles in US history.” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly’s statement about putting “America’s interests first” suggests strategic repositioning rather than temporary inventory concerns.

Ukraine scrambles for alternatives

How prepared was Ukraine for this scenario? Venislavskyi confirmed that “Ukraine has a certain reserve capacity” for such contingencies, while diplomatic efforts intensify to reverse the decision.

The suspension accelerates Ukraine’s pivot toward domestic production.

Previous reporting shows Ukraine produced over two million FPV drones in 2024 and developed long-range variants capable of 1,700-kilometer strikes.

But critical vulnerabilities remain in air defense and precision strike capabilities. European capacity constraints limit immediate alternatives—the EU faces supply shortages and slower production timelines. Frozen Russian asset proceeds provide funding, but cannot address immediate ammunition shortfalls.

The question facing Ukraine: Can domestic production and European alternatives fill the gaps before Russia exploits the opening?

Metropolitan Onufriy, leader of the Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP), has had his Ukrainian citizenship revoked, the Ukrainian Security Service announced.

The announcement comes amid growing tensions over the UOC MP’s allegiance in a war increasingly recognized to be driven by the quasi-religious ideology of the “Russian world,” promoted by the Moscow Patriarchy, which is still recognized as the mother church by many UOC MP faithful.

The Security Service (SBU) reported that Onufriy, birthname Orest Berezovskyi, had willingly received Russian citizenship in 2002, while still holding the status of a Ukrainian citizen.

At the time, dual citizenship was prohibited by Ukrainian law, and while a groundbreaking law allowing dual citizenship is pending approval by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, it still prohibits allegiance to “unfriendly states” like Russia for Ukrainian citizens.

Reportedly, Zelenskyy has signed the decree stripping Onufriy of citizenship, although it has not been published.

UOC MP denies everything, vows to fight back

A UOC MP spokesman rejected the claim that the UOC MP primate has a Russian passport and stated that Onufriy has only Ukrainian citizenship.

Metropolitan Onufriy of the UOC (MP) will also appeal the presidential decree and prove that he has no other citizenships than Ukrainian, the spokesman said in a comment to Suspilne.

The issue of Onufriy’s citizenship had already come up in 2023, when a media report found that he and 20 other UOC MP hierarchs had Russian passports.

After the publication, the UOC MP’s top hierarch decried Russia’s invasion and claimed that his Russian citizenship was extended by default from the time when he lived and studied in Moscow. Nevertheless, now he does not have a Russian passport now and considers himself only a Ukrainian citizen, he said without specifying when he stopped being a Russian citizen.

However, media reports from NV and Agenstvo have circulated scans of Onufriy’s allegedly valid passport, casting doubt on these refutations.

Can Ukraine actually strip its citizens of citizenship?

Ukraine’s Constitution prohibits stripping citizenship—but allows terminating it for those who voluntarily acquired foreign passports without resolving their Ukrainian status.

Parliament member Serhiy Vlasenko explained that Onufriy now automatically becomes a foreigner in Ukraine, losing all citizen rights. He must register as a foreign resident, obtain residence and work permits—”the same procedures as any Russian Federation citizen coming to Ukraine.”

The legal distinction matters. President Zelensky previously terminated citizenship for oligarchs Igor Kolomoisky, Viktor Medvedchuk, and businessman Hennadiy Korban using identical grounds: holding undeclared foreign passports.

Onufriy can challenge the decree in court. But if judges confirm he holds a Russian passport, the presidential decree stands. And renouncing Russian citizenship isn’t simple—it requires a “long, complex, bureaucratized procedure” involving personal participation in Russian consular processes.

The citizenship revocation transforms Ukraine’s top Moscow-aligned cleric into a legal foreigner in the country where he leads 8,000 parishes.

What will happen to Onufriy?

Ukrainian law technically gives stateless individuals three months to leave before facing deportation. But reality operates differently. As Archbishop Iona of the St. Iona Monastery casually noted on Facebook, many UOC bishops stripped of citizenship “continue to live and serve the church and people of Ukraine. Don’t panic.”

Namely, 13 UOC hierarchs lost their citizenship in January 2023. Five more followed in February 2023. None were deported. They remain in Ukraine, conducting services, managing parishes—functionally unchanged despite their legal limbo.

The SBU’s move creates a different kind of pressure. If Onufriy attempts international travel, he faces the fate of businessman Hennadiy Korban and others stripped of Ukrainian passports: denied re-entry, effectively trapped inside the country they call home.

But deportation? Unlikely. Ukraine lacks both political will and practical mechanisms to forcibly remove an 80-year-old religious leader whose 8,000 parishes still serve millions of faithful. The state has bigger battles, like the ongoing court proceedings under August 2024’s law banning Moscow-linked religious organizations.

The nine-month transition period for churches to prove independence has expired. The UOC MP now faces potential dissolution of its entire network—a far more existential threat than one prelate’s passport problems.

The citizenship revocation serves as legal theater while the real drama unfolds in courtrooms where the UOC MP’s survival hangs in the balance.

Is the UOC MP aligned with Moscow?

The status of the UOC MP in Ukraine became especially contentious after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The Moscow-aligned church, which enjoyed privileged status for years while promoting “Russian world” ideology, came under increased pressure to clarify its allegiance.

And while the UOC MP claimed to sever ties with its mother church, the Russian Orthodox Church, in May 2022, it did not walk the talk, a Ukrainian expert committee found in 2023.

Reportedly, there is a split within the church, with hardliner parishes ignoring the instructions to no longer pray for the Moscow Patriarch during liturgies.

As well, the alleged severance of ties is not followed up by recognition of the UOC MP as a separate entity in the Orthodox world’s constellation of independent churches. The UOC MP hierarchs are also, apparently, still part of the Moscow Patriarchy’s ruling structure—the Synode.

The Ukrainian state has attempted to curb the UOC MP’s influence—not only via the August 2024 law, but by opening 174 probes into the collaboration of separate church hierarchs with Russia, with 31 guilty sentences.

However, many UOC MP faithful insist they are patriots of Ukraine, with select church voices stressing that UOC MP faithful defend Ukraine in the ranks of the Ukrainian army.

Thus far, the UOC MP’s status is hybrid: while some leaders like Metropolitan Iona have flipped from “Russian world” advocate to self-declared Ukrainian patriot, leaflets promoting Russian chauvinistic and imperialistic views are still observed in other church centers.

Growing church drama in Ukraine

The UOC MP’s precarious position is complicated by competition with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), granted independence by Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s nemesis, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in 2018.

Both structures have roughly similar numbers of parishes (8,097 UOC MP vs 9,000 OCU). 687 parishes have ditched affiliation with the UOC MP to join the OCU since 2022. However, these transitions are increasingly marred by accusations of forceful takeovers amid state backing.

What is Moscow’s stake? The UOC MP represents a whopping 23% of the Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes worldwide, and is the largest concentration of parishes outside Russia itself.

The UOC MP remains Moscow’s sole surviving pillar of influence in a Ukraine that has otherwise severed all connections to Russia since 2022. Its ideological power runs deep: the fantasy of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as “Holy Rus” united against the “satanic West” forms the theological cornerstone of Putin’s war.

This, as well, as revocations of leases on historic churches in state property, has prompted the UOC MP to lead a campaign decrying alleged religious persecution in Ukraine. This messaging has had impressive success among American Republicans, largely due to the lobbying efforts of lawyer Robert Amsterdam.

The Ukrainian state would indeed prefer a single Orthodox Church, and public opinion increasingly backs decisive action.

A June 2025 SOCIS poll found 34.7% of Ukrainians support liquidating the UOC MP as a legal organization, while 10.8% favor forcing its merger with the OCU.

Combined, 45.5% want the state to act decisively.

Yet 31.7% believe the government shouldn’t interfere in religious affairs, revealing Ukraine’s deep ambivalence about using state power against a church that still claims millions of faithful.

The resistance of even Ukraine-oriented UOC MP parishes to joining the OCU structure hints at deeper issues beyond historical animosity between two competitors.

Clashing allegiances, models of religious life, and the OCU’s desire to occupy the privileged state-promoted status once held by Moscow’s church in Ukraine will continue to stir Ukraine’s religious life for many years ahead.

Editor’s note: This article was updated to include the section “Can Ukraine actually strip its citizens of citizenship?”

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry summoned the top US diplomat Wednesday to address concerns over military aid delays, warning that any slowdown would “encourage the aggressor to continue war and terror.”

Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha requested the meeting with Chargé d’Affaires John Ginkel as the Pentagon suspends critical air defense shipments and precision munitions to Ukraine. The timing could not be worse—Russia is unleashing its heaviest bombardments on Ukrainian civilians in months while Washington halts the very weapons needed to protect them.

Ukrainian warnings on aid consequences

Deputy Foreign Minister Mariana Betsa expressed gratitude to the United States for support provided since Russia’s full-scale invasion began but emphasized the critical importance of continuing delivery of previously allocated defense packages, especially focusing on strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses.

“Any delay or slowing down in supporting Ukraine’s defense capabilities would only encourage the aggressor to continue war and terror, rather than seek peace,” Betsa told the American diplomat, according to the ministry statement.

The Ukrainian side emphasized that Russia not only rejects the full and unconditional ceasefire that Ukraine agreed to on 11 March, but also continues to escalate aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities and communities, killing civilians, and conducting battlefield assaults.

“In these circumstances, strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and increasing coordinated transatlantic pressure on the aggressor are critically important,” Betsa said.

Pentagon cuts air defense amid Russian escalation

The Pentagon’s decision to halt air defense missiles and precision munitions shipments follows an internal review showing American arsenals had dropped to concerning levels. Officials justified the suspension as “putting America’s interests first,” even as Russia intensifies bombardments of Ukrainian cities.

The White House confirmed Wednesday that the Pentagon suspended deliveries due to concerns that US weapons stocks had been depleted. Ukrainian officials said they had not received official notification of the suspension or revision of delivery schedules for previously agreed defense assistance.

• Since February 2022, the US has provided $66.9 billion in military aid to Ukraine. The last package worth $500 million was announced by the Biden administration on 9 January, with the US not announcing new packages in the five months since Trump took office.
• The Trump administration suspended all military aid in March following a confrontational meeting, only to resume deliveries weeks later. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned that Ukraine “cannot do without” US support as European allies cannot fill the gap.

North Korea plans to send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 troops to assist Russia against Ukraine, Ukrainian intelligence assessments reveal, tripling Pyongyang’s military commitment from the original 11,000 soldiers deployed in November 2024.

North Korean military build-up accelerates

The new troop deployment could arrive “in the coming months,” according to Ukrainian intelligence assessments reviewed by CNN. Russian defense ministry documents indicate Moscow can provide “needed equipment, weapons, and ammunition” to further integrate North Korean units into Russian combat operations.

Satellite imagery from the Open Source Centre shows a Russian personnel carrier arriving at Dunai port in May, matching patterns from last year’s initial North Korean deployments. Additional activity at North Korea’s Sunan airport in June revealed cargo planes, potentially IL-76 aircraft, consistent with troop transport operations.

“This appears to indicate the routes previously used to move D​PRK troops are active, and could be used in any large-scale future transfer of personnel,” Joe Byrne, senior analyst at the Open Source Centre, told CNN.

Heavy casualties fail to deter expansion

Around 4,000 of the original 11,000 North Korean soldiers were killed or injured in Kursk Oblast, according to Western officials. Yet rather than deterring further deployment, these losses have prompted deeper military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov warned Thursday that Kim Jong Un risks destabilizing his own government by exposing elite troops to high casualty rates. “Russia’s use of elite North Korean troops demonstrates not only a growing reliance on totalitarian regimes but also serious problems with its mobilization reserve,” Umerov said.

Russian media footage from the Kursk region reveals extensive North Korean military preparations, including dugout accommodations and translation materials for basic military Russian terms. Videos show North Korean and Russian troops conducting joint training exercises, marking greater integration than initially observed.

Strategic implications for Ukraine’s defense

The timing coincides with Russia amassing 110,000 troops near Pokrovsk, a strategic population center in eastern Ukraine, according to Ukraine’s military chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. This concentration suggests preparations for a major offensive against Ukrainian defensive positions.

Sergei Shoigu, a top Putin adviser, announced during his 17 June Pyongyang visit that 1,000 North Korean sappers and 5,000 military construction workers would join Russian forces to clear mines and “restore infrastructure destroyed by the occupiers” in Kursk Oblast.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service briefed lawmakers that North Korea has begun selecting personnel for overseas deployment as early as July or August, indicating the expansion could begin within weeks.

Weapons technology exchange deepens

Beyond manpower, North Korea has supplied Russia with extensive military hardware since 2023. Ukrainian intelligence documented 82 strikes by North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, including a January 2024 attack that killed 11 civilians in Pokrovsk.

A UN member states report revealed North Korea sent at least 100 ballistic missiles and 9 million artillery shells to Russia in 2024. Training manuals for North Korean artillery, translated into Russian, demonstrate the increasing interoperability between the two militaries.

Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center, suggested the assessment of 30,000 troops “sounds high… but they can certainly come up with that number.” She told CNN 10,000 to 20,000 troops might deploy in stages, with Russian generals potentially training forces inside North Korea.

Background

The expanding North Korean-Russian military partnership represents a significant shift in the war’s dynamics. Previous reporting revealed Russia’s plans to deploy North Korean troops to new offensives in eastern Ukraine, with forces expected to wear Russian uniforms while claiming to defend “Russian territory” in occupied Ukrainian oblasts.

Recent intelligence assessments indicate that more than 6,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed, wounded, or gone missing while fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, according to UK intelligence, representing over half of the estimated 11,000 troops initially deployed to the area.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said he understands the US administration’s desire to prioritize its own interests, but at the same time calls for continued military support for Ukraine.

The statement, delivered after the White House confirmed the suspension of systems approved under President Biden, a move that raises alarm as Ukraine fights against ever-increasing Russian missile and drone attacks.

Speaking on Fox News, Rutte said he “fully understands” the US desire to ensure American security interests are met first.

“But when it comes to Ukraine, in the short term, Ukraine cannot do without all the support it can get when it comes to ammunition and air defense systems,” Rutte said.

The NATO secretary general referenced discussions between Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump during last week’s NATO summit, describing “a very good discussion, in particular focusing on air defense systems.”

The White House confirmed Wednesday that the Pentagon suspended deliveries of air defense missiles and precision-guided munitions to Ukraine due to concerns that US weapons stocks had been depleted.

“Yes, I understand that the US has to take care of its own weapons stockpiles. At the same time, we must allow for some flexibility,” Rutte said.

Ukrainian officials said they had not received official notification of the suspension or revision of delivery schedules for agreed defense assistance.

European limitations acknowledged

Rutte said European countries are increasing defense spending and aid to Ukraine, “but we cannot do without practical support from the US.”

“It is also in the interests of the US for Ukraine not to lose this war… And a secure Europe also means a secure US. This all is completely connected,” the NATO secretary general said.

Ukrainian prosecutors have documented 273 Ukrainian prisoners of war killed by Russian forces since the invasion began, but only two Russians face convictions for these systematic executions.

The Prosecutor General’s Office revealed these figures in response to a LIGA.net information request, exposing a massive accountability gap as Ukraine fights for survival while its captured soldiers face execution rather than protection under international law.

Russian executions surge while prosecutions stagnate

The numbers paint a stark picture. In the first six months of 2025 alone, prosecutors documented 22 separate killings involving 56 Ukrainian prisoners. Russian forces have accelerated their execution campaign while facing minimal consequences.

Seven Russian soldiers have been charged with these specific war crimes across 77 criminal cases. Only three cases reached trial. Two received convictions—though prosecutors won’t say if these were real trials or symbolic in absentia verdicts.

The latest case surfaced 1 July when Russian troops tied a Ukrainian prisoner to a motorcycle and dragged him through a field. Russian military bloggers filmed it. They celebrated it. They shared it online.

From “Glory to Ukraine” to mass executions

Each killing follows documented patterns that reveal systematic policy, not battlefield chaos.

March 2023: Russian soldiers executed Ukrainian sniper Oleksandr Matsievskyi after he said “Glory to Ukraine” while standing in a trench. They forced the 42-year-old to dig his own grave first.

February 2024: Russian forces promised to evacuate wounded Ukrainian defenders from Avdiivka’s Zenit plant for prisoner exchange. Instead, they shot six soldiers: Heorhii Pavlov, Andrii Dubnytskyi, Ivan Zhytnyk, Oleksandr Zinchuk, and Mykola Savosik. The execution videos appeared on Russian Telegram channels.

December 2023: Russian troops forced three Ukrainian prisoners to kneel before shooting them at close range near Robotyne. The same month, they killed two surrendering soldiers near Avdiivka after the Ukrainians emerged from bunkers with raised hands.

Russian commanders issue direct execution orders

Ukrainian intelligence has documented over 150 additional prisoner executions with evidence showing direct orders from Russian commanders.

“Prisoners are not needed—shoot them on the spot,” one Russian deputy brigade commander told troops, according to UN investigators who interviewed Russian deserters.

The Financial Times identified Russian soldiers posting execution videos online while their units received honors from Putin. Russia’s 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade earned “Guards” status in July 2024 despite documented involvement in prisoner executions.

Torture, branding, and systematic dehumanization

For prisoners who survive initial capture, Russian facilities offer systematic torture. UN investigators found 95% of returned Ukrainian prisoners experienced torture including beatings, electric shocks, sexual abuse, and mock executions.

The brutality extends beyond beatings. A Ukrainian soldier recently revealed how a Russian surgeon burned “Glory to Russia” into his stomach while he was unconscious after surgery. Guards forced prisoners to memorize the Russian national anthem, beating those who failed “until they couldn’t get up.”

At least 206 Ukrainian prisoners have died in Russian custody, according to Ukrainian government figures reported by the Associated Press. Forensic analysis of returned bodies shows untreated infections, missing organs, and extensive trauma, according to forensic expert Inna Padei.

Escalating execution methods target psychological impact

Recent cases show calculated cruelty designed for maximum psychological damage:

• Forced labor before death: Russian forces make wounded prisoners conduct dangerous demining work before execution.
• ISIS-style killings: Russian Telegram channels shared videos of Ukrainian soldiers being beheaded, with executioners wearing Russian military symbols.
• Mock evacuations: Russian commanders promise prisoner exchanges, then execute captured soldiers and film the results.
• Public degradation: Prisoners shot in legs for “not speaking clearly” before final execution shots to the back.

War crimes documentation outpaces accountability

Ukraine has opened 125,000 war crimes cases since February 2022. Prosecutors call prisoner executions their “priority number one.”

But documentation far exceeds accountability. Russian forces operate across multiple front sectors with apparent impunity. They film their crimes. They share them online. They receive military honors.

The Olenivka prison massacre alone killed 49 Ukrainian prisoners—more than the total number of Russians even charged with prisoner executions. Ukrainian prosecutors determined Russian forces used thermobaric weapons to kill prisoners and hide torture evidence.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian treatment of Russian prisoners follows international law. While some Russians faced mistreatment during initial capture, UN investigators confirmed abuse stopped once they reached official Ukrainian facilities.

Euromaidan Press, an independent English-language online media outlet covering Ukraine, is looking for a Fundraising Communications Manager to expand our funding channels and strengthen our Patreon community.

About Us:

We fight against Russian disinformation and bring the truth about Ukraine to the world. We value effective, meaningful actions and have no patience for the mere appearance of activity.

You’re the right fit if you can:

1. Increase media revenue through consistent and systematic fundraising efforts.
2. Create compelling ideas and messages, write fundraising content, design visuals, and publish on our website and social media.
3. Work with the leadership team to launch and evaluate the feasibility of commercial partnerships.
4. Identify, attract, and retain patrons and sponsors to support the media.
5. Grow and engage our Patreon community through strategic, ongoing campaigns.
6. Build and nurture relationships with donors, patrons, partners, and our community.
7. Continuously refine and enhance our fundraising strategy to maximize effectiveness.

Candidate requirements:

• Results-driven mindset with a focus on achieving tangible outcomes.
• Ability to quickly learn new skills and adapt to evolving tasks.
• Previous experience in fundraising, sales, partnership management, or related fields.
• Be able to convey the value of partnerships persuasively.
• Ability to run effective communication campaigns in collaboration with the team—from developing ideas and writing texts to setting up and analyzing website tracking (we’ll provide guidance and support).
• Creativity and initiative, consistently generating new ideas for fundraising.
• Strong self-organization skills, capable of developing, planning, and managing structured processes and projects from scratch.
• Good command of Ukrainian, proficiency in English (B2+), both written and spoken.

Bonus Points If You Have:

• Experience working in media.
• A track record of building engaged communities.

What we offer:

• Full-time remote position with a flexible schedule.
• 24 calendar days of paid vacation + 10 paid sick days.
• Competitive salary: fixed monthly rate + commission based on funds raised.
• A supportive, values-driven team.
• A chance to directly impact independent media growth and promote Ukraine’s global image.

Apply by sending your resume to euromaidanpress (a) gmail.com with the subject “Vacancy: Fundraiser.”

Менеджер з фандрейзнингових комунікацій

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Про нас: боремо російську дезінформацію, доносимо світові правду про Україну. Любимо ефективні, осмислені дії, не любимо імітацію бурхливої діяльності. 

Ви наша людина, якщо зможете: 

1. Збільшити доходи медіа через постійний та системний фандрейзинг
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7. Покращувати ефективність фандрейзингової стратегії 

Вимоги до кандидата/ки:

1. Працювати на результат
2. Швидко освоювати нові навички та задачі
3. Мати попередній досвід у фандрейзингу/продажах/управлінні партнерствами або зв’язаних сферах
4. Вміти переконливо доносити цінність партнерства
5. Могти проводити ефективні комунікаційні кампанії в співпраці із командою: від розробки ідей до написання текстів до налаштування та аналізу міток на сайті (все покажемо і пояснимо)
6. Бути креативним та ініціативним: постійно генерувати нові ідеї для залучення коштів 
7. Мати добру самоорганізацію: розробляти, планувати та управляти системними процесами та проектами з нуля
8. Мати добру англійську, як усну, так і письмову: В2 +

Буде перевагою: 

1. Досвід роботи в медіа 
2. Досвід розбудови спільнот 

Умови роботи:

• Повна зайнятість
• Дистанційна робота та гнучкий графік 
• Відпустка 24 к.д та 10 к.д. лікарняних
• Конкурентоспроможна заробітна плата: фіксована помісячна ставка + відсоток від залучених коштів
• Ціннісна та підтримуюча команда 
• Можливість прямого впливу на розвиток незалежних медіа та просування бренду України в світі 

Надсилайте резюме на адресу euromaidanpress (a) gmail.com з темою Vacancy: Fundraiser

 

Euromaidan Press, an independent English-language online media about Ukraine, is searching for a defense tech reporter who will inform our international readers about everything they need to know in the fast-evolving world of Ukrainian defense technology.

Main responsibilities:

• Identify important topics about defense technology and its impact on the war and regularly cover them. Formats include interviews, adaptations of Ukrainian materials, news, and analysis.
• Create engaging and compelling multimedia content about Ukrainian defense startups.
• Lead the development of our defense tech coverage project in a way that will be most meaningful for Ukraine’s defense scene, ensuring its success for both our media and the defense sector.

Candidate requirements:

• Advanced understanding of military topics and technology.
• A good network of contacts in defense circles.
• Well-versed in the political, social, economic, and military situation in Ukraine and abroad.
• Experience in English-language journalism and international communication.
• English level C1 or higher, good knowledge of Ukrainian/Russian.
• Ability to quickly and efficiently write, adapt, translate, and edit English-language texts.
• Proficiency in cross-cultural communication.
• Ability to confidently use social networks and have a general understanding of digital trends.

Working conditions:

• Full-time employment.
• Remote work and flexible schedule.
• 24 calendar days of vacation and 10 calendar days of sick leave.
• Competitive salary.
• Value-driven and supportive team.
• Opportunity to directly influence the development of independent media and promote Ukraine’s brand in the world.

Please submit your CV, motivation letter, and examples of prior work to euromaidanpress (a) gmail.com with the subject: Vacancy: Defense tech reporter

EuromaidanPress.com, an independent English-language media about Ukraine, is searching for a journalist to deliver the most interesting and relevant news to our curious global readers on our website and social media.

We fight against Russian disinformation and bring the truth about Ukraine to the world. We value effective, meaningful actions and have no patience for the mere appearance of activity.

What we require:

• Excellent English (starting from C1) and Ukrainian.
• Experience in journalism and communicating with international audiences.
• Knowledge of journalistic standards.
• A good memory and erudition.
• The skills of writing and editing texts and expressing thoughts quickly and easily.
• Fact-checking and critical thinking as a reflex.
• The skill of separating the wheat from the chaff.
• Good knowledge of the political/military/media situation in and around Ukraine.
• Experience in SMM.
• Knowledge of SEO is a plus.

What we offer:

• Remote job.
• Flexible schedule.
• Corporate training.
• Competitive salary.
• Friendly team.
• Growth opportunities.
• Creative freedom and an outlet with genuine editorial freedom.
• A chance to defend Ukraine with the pen (no less important than with the sword).

As we expand our team, you will have the opportunity to take on other journalistic formats, not only news.

We are looking for a member who will become part of the team and plans to stick around. Please do not apply if you are looking for a temporary job before moving on.

Please send your motivation letter, CV with examples of prior work to euromaidanpress@gmail.com.