Vladimir Putin is facing deepening strategic isolation as Israel’s military offensive against Iran threatens to unravel a key alliance underpinning Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, writes Con Coughlin, Defence and Foreign Affairs Editor at The Telegraph.

In a sharply worded column, Coughlin argues that “Putin’s primary concern… will be the impact that Israel’s continuing assault on Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure will have on Tehran’s ability to continue its support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.”

Since last week, Israeli forces have launched targeted strikes against Iranian missile and drone production sites — the same systems that have been regularly supplied to Russia since the summer of 2022. According to Coughlin, the Israeli campaign “appears to have paid dividends,” with a notable drop in attacks originating from Iran.

A strategic blow to Moscow

The deepening Russia-Iran relationship, sealed in January with a 20-year strategic pact, has been critical to sustaining Russia’s campaign in Ukraine. In exchange for military hardware from Tehran, Moscow had promised to boost Iran’s air defenses and air force capabilities. But Coughlin notes that this “has clearly failed to deter Israel from launching its military offensive.”

As Iranian military capacity is degraded, Putin risks losing a crucial source of support. “If the Iranians are unable to provide sufficient weaponry for their own military campaign against Israel,” Coughlin writes, “they will be in no position to support Russia’s offensive in Ukraine.”

Regional influence under threat

The ramifications extend beyond Ukraine. With Syria’s Assad regime reportedly collapsed and now “languishing in exile in Moscow,” Russia’s Middle East strategy appears to be unraveling. Coughlin suggests Putin’s broader effort to project power in the region is now in jeopardy.

The article also highlights the precariousness of Russia’s position within the informal alliance of authoritarian states — Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia — warning that Israel’s attacks could weaken their interconnected military and economic interests.

Coughlin concludes: “Putin’s standing in the region is in danger of precipitous collapse.”

EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen confirmed that the European Union will not resume imports of Russian natural gas—even if a peace agreement is reached in Ukraine.

Russia supplied about 45% of EU gas in 2021, a figure expected to fall to 13% by 2025. Despite progress, the EU imported record volumes of Russian LNG in 2024.

“This is a ban that we introduce because Russia has weaponised energy against us, because Russia has blackmailed member states in the EU, and therefore they are not a trading partner that can be trusted,” Jørgensen said.

“That also means that, irrespectively of whether there is a peace or not—which we all hope there will be, of course—this ban will still stand.”

EU plans full phase-out of Russian fossil fuels by 2028

The gas ban is part of a broader EU strategy to end reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2028. The proposed legislation would prohibit EU companies from importing Russian pipeline gas or providing services to Russian clients at liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. Importers must also declare the source of their fuel to prevent Russian gas from being disguised as coming from another country.

Any new contracts signed after the plan is adopted must end by 1 January 2026. Existing contracts must be terminated by 1 January 2028.

Austria walks back vomments on Russian gas

Austria’s junior energy minister, Elisabeth Zehetner, caused a stir earlier this week by suggesting the EU should remain open to reconsidering Russian gas imports in the event of a peace deal. However, her office later clarified Austria’s position, stating that the country “strongly condemns” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and supports the proposed gas ban.

“The allegation that Austria wants to import Russian gas again after the war, let alone now, is simply false,” the statement read.

Austrian Green MEP Lena Schilling called the initial suggestion “shortsighted and morally irresponsible,” asking, “Have we learned nothing from bombed hospitals, abducted children and a war of aggression in the heart of Europe?”

Austria previously relied heavily on Russian gas, but supplies were halted in 2023 due to a contractual dispute. Deliveries via Ukraine ended the same year.

Hungary and Slovakia maintain opposition

Hungary and Slovakia continue to oppose the EU’s fossil fuel phase-out. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szíjjártó claimed Hungarian consumers could face utility bills four times higher. He also posted a dramatic video on social media to criticize the plan. EU officials have rejected those claims, saying there’s no evidence prices would spike.

The current gas legislation does not affect an existing exemption from the EU’s oil embargo. Hungary and Slovakia were granted a carve-out in 2023 allowing continued imports via the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline—a provision that falls under a separate legal framework.

Russian oil also in the crosshairs

The EU is also targeting Russian oil, aiming to end imports entirely by 2028. Russian oil made up 27% of EU imports in 2021 but has already dropped to around 3%. The oil ban, like the gas proposal, is part of the EU’s broader strategy to cut energy ties with Moscow and boost long-term energy security.

Emergency crews have completed search and rescue operations at a residential building in Kyiv’s Solomianskyi district, where a Russian missile strike on 17 June caused extensive destruction.

The strike was part of a large-scale, coordinated Russian attack on Ukraine that night. One missile directly hit the nine-story residential building, destroying an entire section.

Rescue efforts end after 39 hours

Ukraine’s Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko confirmed that the operation lasted over 39 hours. At 7:20 PM on 18 June, first responders officially concluded search efforts at the site.

“Sadly, 23 lives were lost at this site alone,” Klymenko said. “Across the capital, 28 people died and over 140 were injured as a result of the strike.”

Although search operations have ended, crews continue to dismantle damaged structures and clear debris.

Emergency response faced harsh conditions

The rescue effort was one of the most intensive in recent months and involved:

• Over 400 personnel from the State Emergency Service (SES)
• More than 200 units of specialized equipment
• Drones, search dogs, and heavy engineering machinery

Two people were rescued from beneath the rubble. Around 50 others were evacuated from apartments and stairwells during the response.

Stairwell collapse in nearby damaged building

Later the same day, Kyiv officials reported an internal collapse in a nearby five-story residential building also damaged in the strike. A stairwell between the upper floors gave way, but no injuries were reported. Five residents were safely evacuated.

City in mourning as recovery continues

Kyiv declared 18 June a day of mourning to honor the victims of the attack. More than 2,000 emergency workers have been deployed across the capital to assist with ongoing recovery operations.

Next week’s Nato summit in The Hague will be significantly shortened to accommodate President Donald Trump’s short attention span — and a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be carefully avoided, The Times reports.

Nato format cut to single session

The 25 July summit will consist of just one 2.5-hour session, a major departure from NATO’s usual multi-session format. According to The Times, diplomats hope the streamlined event will reduce the risk of tension or unpredictability.

“It is about keeping the summit focused, short and sweet,” a diplomat told the paper. “Trump can be impatient and has — [he has] said it himself — a short attention span. The shorter the better.”

There will be no joint press conference between Trump and Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte, and the summit’s final communiqué will be just five paragraphs, printed on a single sheet of paper.

Zelenskyy excluded from main talks

President Zelenskyy will be present in The Hague only for a leaders’ dinner on 24 June. He has not been invited to the main summit session, and no meeting of the NATO–Ukraine Council at the heads-of-state level is scheduled. Instead, he is expected to speak at a Defense Industry Forum on the sidelines.

Diplomatic sources suggest the decision aims to prevent any direct confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy. While Euractiv and ANSA reported the US opposed Zelenskyy’s formal invitation, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has denied that claim.

Ukraine dropped from final statement

Despite Ukraine’s long-standing bid to join the alliance, the country will neither be invited to join nor even mentioned in the final NATO communiqué, diplomatic sources told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The statement will label Russia as a “direct threat”, but omit any language about Ukraine’s future in the alliance.

Ukraine’s desire for NATO membership dates back to 2008, and its constitution enshrines the goal of joining. Yet even after three years of full-scale war against Russia, no formal steps toward membership are expected in The Hague.

“This issue is definitely not on NATO’s agenda, and there have been no expectations of an invitation in The Hague,” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys told LRT.

Defence spending target to please Trump

The summit’s main goal will be agreement on a new defence spending target of 5% of GDP by 2032, with a review in 2029. The proposal includes 3.5% for core military budgets and 1.5% for defense-related spending.

The decision will be framed as a personal win for Trump, who has long demanded more spending from European allies.

“Keeping unity in the alliance is as much a priority as spending more on defence,” said EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas.

Trump left G7 early, skipped meeting with Zelenskyy

The decision to avoid a Trump–Zelenskyy encounter at the NATO summit follows a similar scene just days earlier. Trump abruptly left the G7 summit in Canada, skipping a planned meeting with Zelenskyy.

According to The Guardian, Trump exited early, “citing the Israel‑Iran conflict.” Reuters reported that Zelenskyy was denied a meeting with his most powerful ally, leaving the Ukrainian side frustrated and empty-handed after the gathering.

US President Donald Trump says he declined an offer from Russian President Vladimir Putin to mediate rising tensions with Iran, stating that unresolved issues between Washington and Moscow should be addressed first.

“I spoke with him yesterday. He actually offered to help with mediation. I said, ‘Do me a favor—let’s mediate Russia first,’” Trump told reporters, according to Russian news outlet RBC.

Trump calls Russia and Ukraine “foolish”

President Trump also took aim at both Russia and Ukraine, calling them “foolish” during his remarks and once again asserting that the Ukraine war would not have happened had he been in office at the time of its outbreak.

Trump-Putin call on 14 June — the President’s birthday

Although the Kremlin did not officially confirm the exchange, both Moscow and Washington acknowledged a 14 June phone call between the two leaders. The conversation reportedly lasted nearly an hour and focused largely on Middle East tensions, particularly involving Iran.

“The call was substantive, candid, and, most importantly, very useful,” said Yury Ushakov, a senior aide to Putin.

On Truth Social, President Trump revealed that Putin called to wish him a happy birthday and discuss Iran—a country Trump said Putin “knows very well.” He added that Ukraine was only “briefly” discussed.

Ukraine peace talks still in deadlock

President Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine a central focus of his second term. He’s pushing for renewed peace talks and a 30-day ceasefire. While limited humanitarian efforts, such as prisoner exchanges, have occurred, no formal peace deal has been reached.

Sticking points remain over territorial control and long-term security guarantees.

Trump has faced criticism from lawmakers and allies for appearing to pressure Ukraine more than Russia, and for his calls to end all US military aid to Kyiv—a stance that has raised concerns about America’s global commitments and Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

Ukraine will neither be invited to join NATO nor mentioned in the final communiqué of next week’s NATO leaders’ summit in The Hague, according to diplomatic sources.

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has made NATO membership a central pillar of its national security strategy. The country’s constitution enshrines this goal, and public support remains strong. NATO first declared in 2008 that Ukraine “will become a member,” and in recent years, Western leaders have repeatedly referred to Ukraine’s “irreversible path” toward the Alliance.

Yet despite three years of full-scale war fought under the banner of Euro-Atlantic integration—and multiple high-level assurances—Ukraine has not been invited to join. Now, it won’t even be mentioned in NATO’s top-level statement.

NATO membership not on the table

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys confirmed that Ukrainian membership is not up for discussion.

“This issue is definitely not on NATO’s agenda, and there have been no expectations of an invitation in The Hague,” Budrys told LRT. “We haven’t heard this from the Ukrainians either.”

According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the final communiqué is expected to be unusually brief—likely a single page. While it will identify Russia as a long-term threat, it is not expected to reference Ukraine at all.

Allies push for higher defense spending

Member states are expected to commit to raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2032, with a review in 2029. That timeline aligns with the end of a potential second term for Donald Trump, who has supported higher military spending but has questioned NATO’s direction and further expansion.

Zelenskyy’s limited role at the summit

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will attend a leaders’ working dinner on 24 June, where Trump is also expected. However, he will not participate in the main summit session, and no meeting of the NATO–Ukraine Council at the heads-of-state level is scheduled. Zelenskyy is instead expected to speak at a Defense Industry Forum held on the sidelines.

On 2 June, Zelenskyy confirmed Ukraine had been invited to the summit in some capacity, but the format and prominence of his involvement remain unclear.

On 15 May, Euractiv reported that, for the first time in three years, Zelenskyy would not be invited to participate in NATO’s main discussions—allegedly to avoid provoking Donald Trump. Around the same time, ANSA reported that the US was reportedly opposed to his formal invitation. However, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio later denied these claims, saying the United States had no objection to Zelenskyy’s participation.

More than 6,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed, wounded, or gone missing while fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, according to a new report from UK intelligence.

The British Ministry of Defence, in its 15 June intelligence update, states that around half of the estimated 11,000 North Korean troops deployed to the area have become casualties.

A costly campaign tied to Ukraine’s cross-border offensive

In August 2024, Ukraine launched a rare cross-border operation into Kursk, briefly capturing territory and forcing Russia to redeploy troops. While initially successful, the campaign was eventually reversed. By March 2025, Ukrainian forces had withdrawn, ending the offensive without holding ground. However, Kyiv claims the operation disrupted Russian logistics and diverted enemy forces from other fronts.

High casualty rates from brutal ground combat

“Significant D​PRK casualty rates have almost certainly been sustained primarily through large, highly attritional dismounted assaults,” the report said, pointing to intense and costly infantry engagements on the ground.

UK intelligence analysts believe these tactics are leading to unsustainable losses for North Korean units involved in front-line fighting.

Shoigu holds talks with Kim Jong-un

On 4 June, Russia’s Security Council Secretary and former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited North Korea for the second time in three months. He met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, signaling deepening military coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Shoigu is believed to be the Kremlin’s lead negotiator managing North Korea’s military support for Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.

North Korean involvement confined to Kursk—for now

As of mid-June, North Korea’s military activity remains limited to the Kursk direction. According to UK intelligence, any expansion beyond Russian borders—particularly into internationally recognized Ukrainian territory—would almost certainly require joint authorization from both Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un.

Casualty estimates reflect rising toll

In April, a South Korean lawmaker citing intelligence sources reported that about 600 North Koreans had died in the conflict. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking in January, estimated that 4,000 North Korean troops had been killed or wounded.

Later, on 25 April, Ukraine’s General Staff announced that more than 4,500 North Korean troops had been neutralized since the launch of the Kursk offensive.

The United States is ending military aid to Ukraine, shifting responsibility for Kyiv’s defense onto Europe — which has so far failed to match its rhetoric with real support. That’s the conclusion drawn by journalist and war analyst Owen Matthews in a recent Telegraph opinion piece.

Speaking at Congressional hearings on the 2026 US defense budget, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the Trump administration has a “very different view” of the war than its predecessor, favoring a “negotiated peaceful settlement.” The move brings an end to the Biden-era policy that sent $74 billion in US military aid to Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion.

That aid included critical systems like Patriot missile defenses, HIMARS, tanks, and long-range artillery—support Kyiv now stands to lose.

Europe promises more than it pays

With the US stepping back, Europe is expected to take the lead. But Matthews points out that Europe’s follow-through has been inconsistent at best.

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s widely publicized ReArm Europe plan suggested €800 billion in defense spending—but the figure relied on easing borrowing rules, not actual funds. A proposed €40 billion EU arms package for Ukraine was blocked by member states, including Hungary and Italy. Only €1 billion, pulled from frozen Russian assets, has so far materialized.

Meanwhile, Europe is projected to spend over €20 billion on Russian oil, gas, coal, and uranium in 2025—more than it is expected to spend on Ukraine’s defense.

“As long as Europe continues to spend more on financing Putin’s war machine than it does on Ukraine’s, its promises… ring rather hollow,” Matthews writes.

Ukraine ramps up but faces gaps

Despite limited external support, Ukraine is expanding domestic arms production. Local output now meets up to 50% of military needs, including howitzers, drones, and electronic warfare tools. Matthews notes that Ukraine’s Limma jamming system outperforms Western and Russian equivalents.

Still, Ukraine remains vulnerable: shortages in ammunition, spare parts, and trained soldiers persist. Reports of forced conscription have triggered online backlash.

Russia, meanwhile, is set to spend $160 billion on defense this year—double Ukraine’s—and benefits from lower production costs.

With US aid gone and European promises still falling short, Matthews argues Kyiv is now fighting for survival with diminishing resources and uncertain allies.

At least five Ukrainian citizens, including three children, were killed when an Iranian missile struck a residential apartment building in Bat Yam, a suburb of Tel Aviv, on the night of 14 June. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the deaths, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

The missile impact caused the collapse of the multi-story building. Rescue efforts are ongoing, with dozens injured and at least 20 residents believed to be trapped beneath the rubble. Israeli authorities report that 61 buildings were damaged in Bat Yam, six of which are considered beyond repair.

Strike follows Israeli air operation across Iran

The Iranian missile attack was a direct response to an Israeli air campaign launched a day earlier, on 13 June. As part of Operation “Rising Lion,” the Israel Defense Forces deployed approximately 200 fighter jets and carried out strikes on more than 100 targets across Iran. The IDF described the operation as a series of “precise preemptive strikes” targeting nuclear infrastructure, missile production sites, and military leadership facilities.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the goal of the operation was to degrade Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons, claiming Iran possessed enough enriched uranium to produce up to nine nuclear warheads.

Nationwide toll: Civilian casualties and widespread damage

Iran’s retaliatory strike, which included ballistic missiles and drones, targeted multiple cities across Israel overnight between June 14 and 15. According to The Times of Israel and emergency service Magen David Adom, at least 10 people were killed and more than 245 were injured. Six remain in critical condition.

Among the victims were four members of a single family in the northern Israeli city of Tamra, a predominantly Arab Muslim community, killed in a separate missile strike.

As of 15 June, Israeli authorities warn that the death toll could rise as search and recovery efforts continue.

On Sunday, Ukrainian drones targeted the city of Yelabuga in Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan, according to reports from Russian Telegram channels. The outlet Baza stated that one person was killed and 13 others were injured.

Tatarstan’s regional head, Rustam Minnikhanov, confirmed the attack. He said the deceased was a factory worker, and one of the injured remains in critical condition. Debris from the downed drones reportedly struck a checkpoint building at a local car factory.

Fires and flight disruptions follow impact

Following the impact, a fire broke out near the Aurus and Sollers automotive plant buildings, Mediazona reported. In response, Russia’s civil aviation authority, Rosaviatsiya, temporarily restricted flights at airports in Kazan, Nizhnekamsk, and Izhevsk.

Repeated targeting of drone production zone

Yelabuga has been hit by drone attacks multiple times in recent months. In April 2024, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate claimed responsibility for a strike on the city. In 2025 alone, attacks have occurred in April, May, and June.

The nearby Alabuga Special Economic Zone hosts drone production facilities reportedly involved in strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian drones have previously targeted the site.

So far, Ukrainian military officials have not commented on the latest strike. Yelabuga is located more than 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

A building used by Boeing in Ukraine’s capital was severely damaged during a massive Russian airstrike on 9 June, in what multiple sources say appeared to be a deliberate strike on the prominent US aerospace company.

The incident was first reported by the Financial Times, which cited six sources — including Boeing employees, Ukrainian officials, and the head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine (ACC). Photos verified by the FT and released by Ukraine’s state emergency service show fire crews responding to heavy damage at the site.

Targeted strike on US aerospace operations

Russia launched a barrage of 315 drones, two ballistic missiles, and five cruise missiles, hitting Kyiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities. The Boeing facility was among the confirmed targets.

“No operational disruption,” said Andriy Koryagin, deputy general director of Boeing Ukraine, confirming no employees were harmed.

Boeing has operated in Ukraine for years, focusing on engineering and technical support, and had largely remained operational despite Russia’s full-scale invasion beginning in 2022.

Boeing’s deepening role in Ukraine’s defense sector

Boeing maintains a close relationship with Ukrainian aircraft manufacturer Antonov, known for its heavy transport and military-capable aircraft. In 2023, Boeing and Antonov signed a memorandum of understanding to explore joint defense-related projects.

In early 2025, Boeing executives met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov to discuss collaboration on ammunition manufacturing and unmanned aerial systems.

The company was still expanding its Ukraine operations as recently as 2 June, when it posted a job opening in Kyiv for an aircraft interior design and certification engineering manager.

A Boeing spokesperson told the FT the company remains focused on employee safety and praised staff for their resilience under “difficult and dangerous circumstances.”

Strike highlights Russia’s shift toward Western defense-linked firms

Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha said the attack on Boeing highlights a growing pattern.

“Russian strikes on American companies in Ukraine are yet another example of Putin’s disregard for US peace efforts,” he told the FT.

Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have warned of increasing Russian sabotage and subversion targeting Western-linked firms involved in weapons production or aid to Ukraine.

US businesses in Ukraine suffer broad impact

Boeing is not alone in being affected. According to ACC President Andy Hunder, 32% of the chamber’s nearly 700 member companies have lost employees in Russian attacks since 2022. Nearly half reported damage to offices, factories, or facilities.

A Coca-Cola plant in Kyiv Oblast was occupied and destroyed early in the war. Hunder noted that Russian soldiers who found a stash of Jack Daniel’s whiskey inside drank it, which unexpectedly slowed their advance toward the capital.

“This is part of a wider Russian campaign to degrade Ukraine’s defense production capacity,” a Ukrainian official told the FT.

Days before Israel launched a sweeping air assault on Iran, dramatically escalating regional tensions, the US quietly diverted critical anti-drone munitions from Ukraine to its forces in the Middle East.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the US redirected proximity fuzes and other components of the APKWS II air defense system to CENTCOM, which oversees military operations across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Red Sea.

“We’re going to surge counter-UAS systems to our troops and bases first if we believe there’s a threat,” Hegseth told the Senate Appropriations Committee on Wednesday.

What was diverted?

The system in question is the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) — a guidance kit that converts standard 70 mm unguided rockets into laser-guided munitions. Developed by BAE Systems and used by the US Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marines, it delivers precision at a relatively low cost — roughly $25,000 per round.

The War Zone reports that the diversion included not only APKWS rockets but also specialized proximity fuzes, enabling aerial detonations near small drones. According to TWZ, Defense Secretary Hegseth approved the transfer via a memo to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, labeling it an “urgent” requirement for CENTCOM.

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Where APKWS works

APKWS II is compatible with a wide range of US and allied platforms, including:

• F-16C/D Viper
• F-15E Strike Eagle
• A-10 Thunderbolt II
• AH-64 Apache
• AH-1Z Viper, UH-1Y Venom
• MH-60R/S Seahawks
• VAMPIRE launchers, as used in Ukraine

Originally designed for ground attack, APKWS has been adapted for counter-drone and even air-to-air roles. Its modularity allows rapid integration, and with proximity fuzes — like those just redirected — it’s proven effective against drones and low-flying cruise missiles.

Why it matters

• For Ukraine: APKWS, fielded via VAMPIRE systems since late 2023, has been crucial for defending against Shahed-136 drone swarms. But now, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told ABC News that 20,000 “anti-Shahed” rockets — understood to be APKWS-equipped rounds — are being withheld, creating a serious gap in Ukraine’s air defenses.
• For US Forces: F-15E and F-16 aircraft deployed in the CENTCOM region now carry APKWS pods alongside traditional missiles. Jets operating from Jordan have been outfitted with six seven-shot rocket pods, offering up to 50 drone engagements per sortie — a loadout first tested against Houthi drones over the Red Sea.

Stockpiles and uncertainty

The Pentagon has not disclosed how many APKWS kits or fuzes were diverted or remain in stock. Asked about the possibility of resupplying Ukraine, Hegseth said:

“We’d have to review the capacity… We’ve created some challenges in other places.”

There is also no confirmation whether additional systems — including VAMPIRE launchers or electronic warfare assets — were reallocated.

Regional flashpoint—Israel strikes Iran

Amid this arms shift, Israel today launched Operation Rising Lion, a massive air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear sites, military infrastructure, and senior leadership.

• Over 200 Israeli aircraft struck dozens of high-value sites, including facilities in Natanz and Tehran.
• Major General Mohammad Bagheri and IRGC Commander Hossein Salami were reportedly killed.
• In retaliation, Iran launched more than 100 drones, triggering widespread airspace closures across Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Israel.

According to The Jerusalem Post, the drones included Shahed-129 and Shahed-136 models, both long-range loitering munitions designed for precision strikes.

Expert analysis: A strategic pivot

Ukrainian defense expert Kyrylo Danylchenko commented that the diversion of US anti-drone munitions was directly linked to preparations for an Iranian response.

“Over 300 strikes hit 100 targets overnight. Iran’s air defense was suppressed; bunker-busting bombs were used. Israel neutralized IRGC commanders responsible for Shahed operations against Ukraine,” Danylchenko wrote on Facebook.

He noted that Iran’s Shahed production lines were likely targeted, and that Israel may continue its strikes for up to two weeks if diplomatic efforts fail, exploiting what he called a rare “window of regional vulnerability.”

Bottom line

The diversion of APKWS to the Middle East — just before a major regional conflict erupted — highlights a sharp shift in US strategic priorities. A system once intended to protect Ukrainian cities is now deployed to defend against a rapidly expanding confrontation with Iran.

Whether Ukraine gets resupplied — or left exposed — is still an open question.

Russia has likely used a new jet-powered attack drone, the Geran-3, in a recent missile and drone strike on Kyiv, according to Ukrainian defense outlet Defense Express.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in Moscow’s drone warfare. Russia is now deploying high-altitude, dive-bombing Shahed drones at scale—reportedly producing thousands monthly using Iranian designs and domestic assembly lines. These drones increasingly strike civilian infrastructure, overwhelming Ukrainian defenses and causing mounting casualties and destruction.

Whistling sounds and jet engine wreckage

Photos of the downed UAV show several key components, including a compact jet engine, indicating that the drone was likely the Geran-3 — a Russian variant of the Iranian Shahed-238. This model marks a significant upgrade over the slower Shahed-136 (Geran-2), boasting reported speeds of 550–600 km/h and a range of up to 2,500 km, compared to the Shahed-136’s 185 km/h.

Residents of Kyiv reported hearing a distinct whistling sound during the strike, consistent with a jet-powered drone and unlike the quieter propeller-driven models previously used.

Among the wreckage, investigators found an avionics panel nearly identical to those used in the Shahed-136 — responsible for flight programming, engine control, and onboard systems — suggesting a shared design lineage.

Though the drone was heavily fragmented, Defense Express says the evidence points to either an imported Shahed-238 or a Russian-produced version built with Iranian-sourced components.

Russian production and intelligence warnings

This is not the first suspected use of a jet-powered Shahed-type drone in Ukraine. A similar incident occurred in January 2024, but confirmation was inconclusive at the time.

In February 2025, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (GUR) warned that Russia had begun domestic production of a jet-powered Shahed-style drone, designated Geran-3. It is believed to use a Tolou-10/13 jet engine, an Iranian-made, unlicensed copy of the Czech PBS TJ100.

Defense Express reports that analysis is still underway, but early findings strongly suggest that the drone used in the Kyiv attack was indeed the Geran-3.

Russia has shifted its drone strike tactics, making it increasingly difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to respond, Kharkiv regional governor Oleh Syniehubov said.

The change comes amid a sharp escalation in Moscow’s drone campaign. Russia is now deploying high-altitude, dive-bombing Shahed drones at scale—reportedly producing thousands each month using Iranian designs and domestic facilities. These drones are increasingly hitting civilian targets, overwhelming defenses, and causing growing casualties and destruction.

In a major overnight assault, 15 Shahed drones struck Kharkiv, with two more hitting nearby areas. Eleven sites were hit within minutes, including three residential buildings.

Drones now fly higher before diving at targets

Syniehubov noted that the drones now fly at significantly higher altitudes before striking.

“Russian forces have changed tactics—they’re now launching drones at 4,000 to 5,000 meters, then dropping them sharply just before impact,” he wrote on Telegram.

The latest strike killed four people and injured 64 others, including children. Among the victims was a woman who died in hospital hours after her husband, both wounded in the same attack.

The Osnovianskyi and Slobidskyi districts sustained direct hits on apartment blocks, private homes, playgrounds, public transport, and key infrastructure. Fires were reported at several locations.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy condemned the strikes as “cowardly” and “deliberate,” warning that such Russian attacks have become a grim daily occurrence.

Ukraine’s General Staff has officially confirmed a series of drone strikes on key Russian military targets, putting to rest speculation stemming from local reports and social media activity.

In a statement, Ukrainian officials said that overnight on 11 June, drone units, in coordination with other defense elements, struck multiple facilities across Russia, including the Tambov Gunpowder Plant, an ammunition depot in Kursk Oblast, and the Buturlinovka airfield in Voronezh Oblast.

“A number of critical facilities belonging to Russia were struck,” the General Staff said, adding that the operations were part of an effort to “undermine the enemy’s capacity to produce explosives and use ammunition.”

Targets confirmed by Ukraine:

• Tambov Gunpowder Plant: The facility was hit and fires were recorded. It plays a central role in Russia’s military-industrial complex, producing gunpowder and pyroxylin, an ingredient used in explosives.
• Kursk Oblast: Ukrainian forces targeted an ammo depot linked to Russia’s 106th Airborne Division. Regional officials said one civilian was injured and two medical posts were damaged near Rylsk.
• Voronezh Oblast: The Buturlinovka airfield was also hit. Russian officials reported over 15 drones were intercepted overnight, with no damage on the ground.

The statement noted that damage assessments are ongoing: “The effects of the fire strike are being clarified.”

Ukraine has received the remains of 1,212 fallen servicemembers as part of a recently agreed exchange with Russia, officials confirmed.

The bodies were returned from multiple regions, including Russia’s Kursk area and Ukraine’s Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, according to the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

“Forensic experts and law enforcement will begin the identification process immediately,” the agency said in a statement.

Disputed exchange timing and official statements

The body transfer follows a broader agreement reached during the second round of Ukraine–Russia negotiations in Istanbul on 2 June. The deal covers the exchange of all critically wounded or seriously ill prisoners of war, as well as all servicemembers aged 18 to 25.

Both sides also agreed to repatriate the bodies of 6,000 fallen soldiers from each side.

Russia claimed it delivered the remains on 7 June but alleged that Ukraine initially declined to accept them. Ukrainian officials countered that a final date for the transfer had not been agreed at that time.

“We handed over 1,212 bodies of Ukrainian troops. In return, we received 27 fallen Russian servicemen,” said Vladimir Medinsky, aide to the Russian president and head of the Russian delegation, via Telegram.

New rounds of exchanges underway

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) later released photos of the returned remains and thanked the International Red Cross for its assistance.

Additional exchanges have since taken place. On 9 June, Ukraine and Russia carried out a further transfer of prisoners—reportedly including wounded and severely injured servicemembers, as well as those under 25—though exact figures were not disclosed.

A second phase occurred on 10 June, with more wounded Ukrainian soldiers returning home. “12 June, we will begin urgent ‘medical exchanges’ of severely wounded prisoners from the front line,” Medinsky added.

This large-scale agreement on repatriations remains the only publicly confirmed result of the 2 June Istanbul talks.

When Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian cyber warfare was supposed to be a game-changer. Intelligence agencies worldwide expected devastating digital attacks to cripple Ukrainian power grids, government systems, and military communications within hours.

Instead, the cyber offensive largely failed – and now exclusive leaked documents reveal why. GRU Unit 29155, Putin’s most notorious kill squad responsible for poisoning dissidents with Novichok and bombing weapons depots across Europe, had secretly built a hacking unit specifically for this moment. But their digital army was undone by the very traits that define modern Russia: corruption, incompetence, and personal scandals.

A year-long investigation by The Insider reconstructed this hidden history with surprising ease. By examining call logs, travel records, and leaked internal chats, investigators identified dozens of GRU hackers—convicted cybercriminals, young university recruits, and seasoned saboteurs with no technical training.

Their common weakness? Extraordinary sloppiness.
Many used personal phones and real identities when conducting operations or arranging meetings with mistresses and sex workers. The investigation reveals for the first time how Unit 29155’s hackers prepared for the invasion – and why their own incompetence doomed them to fail.

The spies who couldn’t keep secrets

Unit 29155’s cyber operations began modestly in 2012 under Tim Stigal (real name probably Timur Magomedov), an ethnic Chechen blogger from Dagestan recruited by then-GRU director Igor Sergun. Operating under the alias “Key,” Stigal initially focused on disinformation in Azerbaijan before expanding to more ambitious false-flag operations.

In 2016, they penetrated Qatar’s largest state bank, stealing 1.5 GB of customer data and falsely attributing the hack to Turkish nationalists. They impersonated Ukraine’s Right Sector, a far-right nationalist group, to inflame tensions with Poland, and created fake “Anonymous” accounts to target Bellingcat, an independent investigative outlet known for exposing Russian intelligence operations.

Their most valuable asset became Dilyana Gaytandzhieva, a Bulgarian journalist who, according to investigators, maintained contact with GRU operatives and published material advancing Kremlin disinformation—most notably, conspiracy theories accusing the US of running secret bioweapons labs in Eastern Europe. In 2019, she launched ArmsWatch.com, a site styled as an investigative outlet but used to publish hacked documents and reinforce Russian intelligence narratives in the run-up to the war in Ukraine.

Preparing for war

By 2021, as Russia prepared for its invasion, Unit 29155’s cyber efforts in Ukraine escalated sharply. The unit paid locals $1–5 to spray anti-Zelenskyy graffiti across Ukrainian cities and infiltrated nationalist groups like the Azov Battalion, with Stigal impersonating Akhmed Zakayev, a pro-Ukrainian Chechen separatist leader living in exile in London, to gain the trust of nationalist groups and individuals—one of whom is now serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

They compiled dossiers on key Ukrainian officials, including Ihor Zhovkva, deputy chief of President Zelenskyy’s office. In October 2021, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at Zhovkva’s home in Kyiv by a 20-year-old who said he had been promised $7,000—the exact sum recorded in Unit 29155’s expense logs for “processing Zhovkva.”

When Colonel Yuriy Denisov, the overseer of Unit 29155’s hackers, saw news of the attack, he left a telling comment in a chat group: “idiots.”

Server records show the hackers spoofed websites for Zelenskyy’s office and Ukrainian ministries, setting up spear-phishing campaigns and credential theft targeting energy providers, anti-corruption agencies, and military infrastructure.

The new generation

Starting in 2019, Unit 29155 began recruiting from university coding competitions in Russia’s Voronezh. These recruits — nicknamed “eaglets” — were managed by GRU officer Roman Puntus and paid salaries of 400,000 rubles ($5,100) per month.

The first recruit, Vitaly Shevchenko, a 22-year-old Moldova-born hacker, successfully breached Estonia’s Ministry of Defense. He and five others — Borovkov, Denisenko, Goloshubov, Korchagin, and Amin Stigal (Tim’s son) — were later indicted by the US Department of Justice for the WhisperGate campaign, a pre-invasion cyberattack that deployed data-wiping malware across Ukrainian government and infrastructure networks.

Sex, lies, and cyber warfare

As the war neared, the cyber unit began to collapse. Stigal resigned or was sidelined due to COVID-19 illness, replaced by Puntus, who turned out to be more invested in romantic escapades than cyber sabotage.

The affair that doomed a cyber war: GRU officer Roman Puntus began a long-term relationship with accountant Darya Kulishova, whom he installed as the nominal head of a shell company called Aegaeon-Impulse. He made frequent luxury trips from Moscow to Sochi to visit her. By November 2023, Kulishova had given birth to his son—while Puntus funneled GRU funds through the company to support his second family.

Meanwhile, Colonel Yuri Denisov left a massive digital footprint: over 687 Telegram messages full of racism, anti-LGBT hate, and criticism of military leadership. He reused a single phone number across four cover identities — exposing the unit’s entire hacker network.

The failed invasion

When the invasion began in February 2022, Unit 29155’s cyber efforts fizzled. Rather than disabling Ukraine’s power grid, they managed only cosmetic website defacements. On January 13–14, they falsely claimed to have deleted government databases — which Ukrainian authorities later confirmed remained intact.

Their main server, Aegaeon, was left unprotected and discovered by hacktivists. Its mythological namesake — a traitorous titan punished for betrayal — proved painfully apt.

A broader shadow war

Though Unit 29155’s cyber operatives failed spectacularly in Ukraine, they haven’t vanished. Intelligence sources say they’ve repurposed their flawed tactics for a broader shadow war across Europe. Using playbooks first developed for Ukraine, GRU agents now recruit saboteurs via Telegram, offering cryptocurrency payments for arson attacks on NATO facilities and critical infrastructure.

The Insider’s investigation exposes how one of Russia’s most feared covert units, built for hybrid warfare, collapsed under the weight of corruption, dysfunction, and internal betrayal. Their mission didn’t fall to enemy fire — it failed from within.

In the end, Russia’s greatest cyber threat wasn’t the West. It was Russia itself.

A large-scale fire continues to burn for the third straight day at the Kristall oil depot in Engels, Russia’s Saratov Oblast, following a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of 6 June. The depot is reported to supply fuel to the Engels-2 airbase, which houses Russia’s Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers used in cruise missile attacks on Ukraine.

Satellite imagery from PlanetLabs shows today’s smoke plume stretching nearly 15 kilometers, visible from multiple areas of the city.

According to Ukraine’s General Staff, drone strikes targeted two Russian military airfields—Engels and Dyagilevo. At least three fuel storage tanks were reportedly damaged in Engels.

Despite the visible impact, Saratov regional authorities claim that air quality in residential areas remains within safe limits. However, Russian Telegram channels report thick black smoke rising over Engels.

Ukraine renews strikes on Russian fuel infrastructure

This marks the first Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian fuel depot in months, signaling a renewed campaign against Russian military logistics. The 6 June attack on Engels came alongside strikes on military and industrial targets across at least six Russian regions.

The broader strategy targets fuel depots, airfields, and defense infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, aiming to disrupt operations supporting the war in Ukraine.

Engels oil depot previously targeted in January

The Kristall depot, located over 600 km from Ukraine, has been targeted before. In January 2025, Ukrainian drones struck the facility twice:

• On 8 January, three fuel tanks with a capacity of 120,000 cubic meters each were destroyed, and six more were damaged. The estimated fuel loss reached 800,000 tons.
• A second drone strike followed on 14 January, while fires from the initial attack were still burning.

Governor Roman Busargin confirmed a fire broke out at “one of the industrial enterprises in Engels” after the recent strike but did not name the site. NASA’s FIRMS satellite system detected thermal anomalies consistent with the reported fire, further confirming the incident.

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said the repatriation of fallen Ukrainian soldiers will begin next week as scheduled, rejecting Russian claims of delay and accusing Moscow of staging a propaganda stunt.

“Everything is proceeding as planned,” Budanov wrote on Telegram, noting that all relevant parties were informed in advance. He called the Russian narrative a “dirty information campaign.”

The return of wounded soldiers, prisoners, and up to 12,000 war dead was the only concrete outcome of the second round of peace talks held in Istanbul on 2 June. While Russia claims to have delivered 1,212 Ukrainian bodies to the designated site for exchange, Ukraine says no specific handover date had been set.

Russia pressures, Ukraine pushes back

Over the weekend, Russian officials including Vladimir Medinsky, a top aide to President Putin, and General Alexander Zorin accused Ukraine of stalling the exchange. Zorin said Russia was waiting for Kyiv’s confirmation and suggested the transfer may occur next week — a timeline consistent with Budanov’s statement.

“Some Russian propagandists are cynically exploiting human grief — grief they themselves caused,” Budanov said, reaffirming Ukraine’s commitment to the agreed terms and rejecting what he called unilateral pressure from Moscow.

Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War also denied that a final date had been confirmed. The agency accused Russia of manipulation and urged an end to what it called “dirty games” surrounding the humanitarian exchange.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense claims that its 90th Tank Division has reached the western border of the occupied part of Donetsk Oblast and is advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The statement was published on the ministry’s official Telegram channel.

Ukrainian officials strongly deny the claim. Andrii Kovaliov, spokesperson for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, told Ukrainska Pravda that Russia’s statement “does not reflect reality.”

“Fighting continues in Donetsk Oblast. The enemy has not entered Dnipropetrovsk,” Kovaliov said.

Regional governor Serhii Lysak also dismissed the reports as “fake,” accusing Russia of trying to spread panic and destabilize the region.

Heavy fighting reported near Dnipropetrovsk border

Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces stated that Russian troops are actively attempting to breach the Dnipropetrovsk border but emphasized that Ukrainian forces are holding firm.

“Our section of the front is in critical condition. They’re coming like cockroaches, nonstop,” said a soldier from the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, describing relentless small-group infantry assaults.

Both the 72nd and 31st brigades reported heavy fighting near the oblast’s borders. The 31st Brigade noted that while the situation remains tense, Ukrainian defenders continue to repel Russian advances.

Military analysts suggest that Russia’s push toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast may be driven more by propaganda goals than strategic necessity. Although the region has faced frequent missile and drone attacks, it has not previously seen ground combat.

Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear agency, plays a central role in Putin’s war machine—not only by controlling the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, the largest nuclear facility in Europe, but also by supporting the Kremlin’s nuclear weapons program.

“People buy Russian nuclear fuel thinking it’s just energy,” says Ukrainian energy expert Mykhailo Gonchar. “They’re actually funding the modernization of Russia’s warheads.”

Yet Rosatom remains largely unsanctioned. It controls 40% of the global nuclear fuel market, operates in dozens of countries, and fosters long-term strategic dependence through cheap fuel, financing, and technology transfers.

In this exclusive interview, Gonchar explains how Western contracts with Rosatom—often treated as standard commercial deals—are, in reality, helping underwrite Russia’s strategic weapons buildup.

Rosatom: A nuclear weapons corporation disguised as energy giant

Rosatom is often mistaken for just another state-owned energy company. In reality, it is a sprawling industrial empire with military priorities.

With over 435 subsidiaries and 340,000 employees—including 88,000 directly involved in nuclear weapons production—Rosatom’s civilian division is actually its secondary function.

This means every customer—from a European utility to an American importer—buying Rosatom fuel or technology is inadvertently supporting the Kremlin’s strategic weapons programs.

Despite this, Rosatom has faced virtually no meaningful sanctions. Only a few top executives have been individually targeted by Western governments.

“They’ve been pinched a bit,” Gonchar says. “The British started, then the Americans, then the Europeans. But nothing that causes critical, let alone fatal, problems for Rosatom.”

The reason, he adds, is straightforward: “The Russian nuclear octopus—after the Cold War—deeply infiltrated Western political and industrial structures by tempting everyone with cheap fuel and materials.”

The “nuclear octopus”: How Rosatom quietly took hold

A long game of strategic infiltration

Unlike Gazprom, Rosatom didn’t use flashy PR or pipeline diplomacy. It worked in silence—offering cut-rate uranium, maintenance contracts, and technical support to build influence across borders.

“Gas pipelines can be shut overnight, as Gazprom did in 2006 and 2009. But nuclear dependency is quiet, long-term—and far more dangerous.”

Rosatom doesn’t even need to be the top uranium miner. Its control over extraction in Kazakhstan gives it global leverage—making it a critical player in nuclear supply chains even when it isn’t the producer.

Country by country: How Rosatom built global influence

Hungary and Slovakia: Kremlin’s reliable allies

These two countries remain heavily dependent on Rosatom, ignoring EU pressure. “Hungary and Slovakia are Russia’s Trojan horses in Europe,” Gonchar says.

France: Europe’s biggest enabler

Despite having its own nuclear technology, France resists sanctions. A key project under Framatome in Lingen, Germany, is building a fuel facility licensed by Rosatom—under the guise of “diversification.”

A striking example is Framatome’s project in Germany, where a Rosatom-licensed facility is being developed in Lingen under the pretense of fuel diversification.

“They say it’s an alternative to American fuel,” Gonchar says. “But that’s misleading. Westinghouse hasn’t been a truly American company for a long time—and the fuel for Europe is made in Sweden, not the US.”

Specifically, Westinghouse produces European nuclear fuel at its plant in Västerås, Sweden—acquired over two decades ago from the Swedish industrial group ABB. These European operations were created precisely to serve European clients independently of US or Russian supply chains.

Bulgaria: Strategic indecision

“Bulgaria swings between the Americans and the Russians—often under the same leadership of Boyko Borisov,” Gonchar notes. “That’s why true energy independence hasn’t materialized.”

Finland: A model of disengagement

One of the few success stories, Finland fully cut nuclear ties with Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The US and Rosatom: A dangerous dependency

Even the US has quietly bought Russian nuclear fuel for decades, often through front companies like Uranium One.

Cheap fuel was the excuse: “The Biden administration hesitated—where else would we get fuel that cheap?” Gonchar recalls.

While Congress passed a law in 2024 to phase out Russian imports, future reversals are a concern. “We’ve seen what happens to Biden-era laws under Trump,” he warns.

The dependency dates back to the 1990s, when Russia dumped MOX fuel—made from weapons-grade uranium and plutonium—on the market.

“It was a deliberate strategy,” Gonchar says. “Moscow wanted to hook the West on cut-rate uranium. Everyone applauded it back then. But the long-term damage was huge.”

Even environmental groups contributed:

“They lobbied to shut down US nuclear facilities. ‘Let’s outsource to Russia—it’s cheaper and safer,’ they said. And now we’re paying the price.”

Zaporizhzhia: A dormant burden with explosive risks

Rosatom oversees the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, seized from Ukraine in 2022. All six reactors remain in cold shutdown. After Russia destroyed the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023, the plant lost its main source of cooling water. Only shallow, inadequate groundwater remains.

Still, the Kremlin is pushing for a restart—not to produce energy, but to assert symbolic control. A reactivated reactor would serve as a geopolitical showpiece, signaling dominance over Europe’s largest nuclear facility ahead of any peace talks.

But according to Gonchar, restarting the plant is “technically impossible” at this stage.

Key barriers to restart:

• Incompatible safety systems (Russia vs. EU standards)
• Insufficient skilled staff (only 1/3 of Ukrainian personnel remain)
• Damaged or missing grid infrastructure
• High risk of incident or meltdown
• No step-by-step IAEA safety approval

“Likhachov is scared,” Gonchar says of Rosatom’s chief. “Even a minor incident could create massive political fallout. No one wants to take the blame.”

Rather than a genuine restart, Rosatom may stage a theatrical “activation”—what Gonchar calls a Potemkin village ZNPP. But behind the performance lies deep anxiety. Moscow wants the appearance of control—without the risk of catastrophic failure.

The real mission: Weapons, not watts

Rosatom is more than just a reactor operator—it is a state tool for strategic weapons development. It also serves as a legal channel for importing dual-use goods under civilian pretexts.

This is how Rosatom circumvents export controls—while continuing to operate freely in US, EU, and Asian markets.

Conclusion: Time to name the threat

Rosatom is not a partner in clean energy—it’s the backbone of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Its business empire allows Moscow to fund warhead development, import banned technology, and exert quiet influence abroad.

“The window for action is still open,” Gonchar warns. “But only if the West recognizes what Rosatom really is—a nuclear weapons company hiding behind civilian contracts.”

As long as Rosatom remains unsanctioned, Western governments are funding both ends of Russia’s war effort—from battlefield drones to strategic warheads.

Concerns are growing over Russia’s efforts to restart the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear facility in Europe. While official statements suggest the plant could soon reconnect to Russia’s grid, the technical and political reality on the ground is far more complex.

Meanwhile, Rosatom—the state-owned corporation now managing ZNPP—remains largely unsanctioned by the West, even though it plays a central role in Russia’s nuclear weapons program.

In this in-depth report, energy analyst Mykhailo Gonchar explains what’s really happening inside the plant—and why it matters far beyond Ukraine.

The water crisis that changed everything

The current phase of the nuclear crisis began in March 2022, when Russian forces took control of the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Despite the occupation, the facility initially continued to operate. But the risks from military activity soon became too great. By September 2022, all six reactors were placed in cold shutdown.

The real turning point came on 6 June 2023, when the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed, eliminating the plant’s primary source of cooling water. Since then, ZNPP has been forced to rely on limited groundwater reserves.

“Zaporizhzhia NPP was built in that exact location for a reason—because a lot of water is needed,” says Gonchar.

The plant was originally intended to be the world’s largest, with 10 reactors. Only six were completed, as plans were scaled back following the Chornobyl disaster—but it still became Europe’s largest nuclear facility—and one that now lacks the essential infrastructure for safe operation.

Behind Moscow’s messaging: The real plan

Since occupying the plant, Russia has made repeated claims that ZNPP will be reconnected and restarted. According to Gonchar, those claims are politically driven and technically misleading.

“They’re considering launching one or maybe two units — that’s the internal plan,” he says. “But publicly, they act like everything is ready and will work immediately.”

Gonchar notes that the Kremlin is exerting intense pressure on Rosatom. Former chief Sergey Kiriyenko, now a senior presidential adviser, is pressuring his successor, Alexey Likhachov, to show progress. But the technical team is hesitant.

“The reactors have sat idle for three years, with no proper maintenance or inspections. Restarting even one poses a serious danger.”

The stakes are high. If something goes wrong—even a minor incident—the political fallout could be severe.

Why restarting the plant isn’t technically possible

One of the least understood obstacles is technological incompatibility between Ukrainian and Russian nuclear systems.

“People assume the VVER reactors in Ukraine and Russia are the same,” Gonchar says. “Yes, the core hardware is similar. But everything around it—the energy periphery—is completely different now.”

Beginning in the mid-2000s, Ukraine partnered with Westinghouse —a company of American origin— and European firms to modernize its entire nuclear infrastructure. These upgrades weren’t just about fuel—they included safety systems, control units, and compliance with EU and WENRA standards after the Fukushima disaster.

With only a third of the original Ukrainian staff remaining at ZNPP, and Russian replacements unfamiliar with the Westernized systems, a safe restart is not technically feasible.

“They say they can. They claim they know everything. But in reality—they don’t.”

Is Russia rebuilding the grid?

Recent satellite imagery shows new transmission lines and towers between occupied areas like Mariupol and Berdiansk. Some reports suggest these could be used to reconnect ZNPP to Russia’s grid.

But Gonchar says appearances are misleading.

Electricity from ZNPP is generated at 750 kilovolts, far above consumer-level power. For it to be usable, it needs to pass through multiple step-down substations—none of which currently exist in the occupied zone.

“You can’t launch anything—nuclear or conventional—without a complete transmission chain. If any part is missing, nothing works.”

Why Russia wants Zaporizhzhia online (it’s not about power)

According to Gonchar, Russia’s motivations are geopolitical, not economic or technical.

“For the Kremlin, commercial considerations are secondary. What truly matters is the ability to use the plant as a powerful tool of nuclear blackmail.”

If even one reactor were restarted, the risk of a nuclear incident would rise significantly. That risk could be used as leverage in negotiations—particularly if Moscow blames future sabotage or drone attacks on Ukraine.

There’s also a regional energy incentive. Russia’s southern grid has long suffered from shortages, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Reconnecting ZNPP could relieve pressure on those systems—if it were actually possible.

The real threat: Rosatom is a nuclear weapons enterprise

Rosatom presents itself as a civilian nuclear energy firm. But its primary mission is nuclear weapons production. Of its approximately 340,000 employees, around 88,000 work in nuclear weapons divisions, while about 62,000 are involved in civilian nuclear energy.

This matters because every contract signed with Rosatom—for fuel, reactors, or services—helps fund Russia’s military-industrial complex, including warhead production.

Rosatom is also a vehicle for importing dual-use technology. Many of its international transactions are labeled as “machine-building products”—a category broad enough to cover nearly anything—allowing it to sidestep sanctions and obtain components that can be used in both civilian and military applications.

“They say it’s for the Rostov or Leningrad NPPs,” Gonchar adds, “but the same components can be used in missiles, drones—anything.”

The global fallout if ZNPP fails

A nuclear incident at Zaporizhzhia wouldn’t just be a local disaster. It would undermine Rosatom’s global operations, including major projects in:

• Hungary (Paks NPP expansion)
• Türkiye (Akkuyu NPP)
• India (Kudankulam)
• Egypt (El Dabaa)
• Bangladesh (Rooppur)

Yet ironically, project delays often benefit Rosatom financially, since extended timelines mean higher costs and more revenue.

“Delays only work in Rosatom’s favor,” Gonchar notes. “Timelines stretch, costs rise—and Rosatom gets paid more.”

What about the IAEA?

Russia cannot restart ZNPP without the approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While the agency has allowed limited inspections under occupation, it retains final authority on operational safety.

According to Gonchar, if IAEA teams report no restart preparations, that likely reflects the truth. Even hidden activities would eventually be detected.

The real strategy: Optics over operation

What Russia can do, says Gonchar, is stage a performance—an on-camera ceremony to make it look like the plant is operational.

The timing may be strategic. As potential geopolitical talks (e.g., a Trump–Putin meeting) loom, Russia may try to present ZNPP as a fait accompli—even if the reactors never truly come back online.

Bottom line: Nuclear risk as political leverage

The key technical and operational barriers:

• No cooling water
• Incompatible systems with Russian technology
• Loss of qualified staff
• Incomplete infrastructure
• Required IAEA approvals
• Elevated incident risk

But the bigger threat isn’t the restart itself—it’s the narrative of activity, the coercion, and the continued acceptance of Rosatom as a civilian actor.

The opportunity to act remains—but the cost of further delay could be devastating.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Latvia — a small country of under 2 million people — has emerged as one of Ukraine’s most committed and proactive allies. Despite its size, Latvia considers supporting Ukraine a national priority, driven by its own history of Soviet occupation and the reality of having an aggressive Russia as a direct neighbor. For Latvia, Ukraine’s fight is not just about territorial defense — it’s about the future of European security and the rules-based international order.

As a NATO and EU member, Latvia has consistently provided Ukraine with military aid, humanitarian assistance, and political support, far surpassing expectations for a country of its size.

This commitment was formalized in April 2024, when Latvia became the first Baltic nation to sign a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine, reaffirming its role as a key strategic partner. This 10-year agreement outlines comprehensive support across multiple areas — from defense industry cooperation and military training to sanctions and energy infrastructure restoration.

In collaboration with the Dnistrianskyi Center, Euromaidan Press presents this English-language adaptation of Dariia Cherniavska’s analysis on Latvia’s role in Ukraine’s defense, recovery, and pursuit of justice.

Military aid: A small nation with big impact

Latvia’s military support is both substantial and strategic. Under the security agreement, Latvia committed to dedicating 0.25% of its GDP annually to military assistance for Ukraine from 2024 through 2026. In practice, it exceeded that pledge in 2024, delivering €170 million in military aid — well above its promised €112 million.

This aid included a mix of essential defense equipment:

• 42 Patria 6×6 armored personnel carriers, manufactured in Latvia
• 9 CVR(T) reconnaissance vehicles donated from British stock
• A batch of NBS air defense systems
• Participation in the Czech initiative with a €10 million contribution to purchase 3,000 artillery shells

But one of Latvia’s most impactful contributions is in the drone warfare domain. Together with the UK, Latvia co-launched the Drone Coalition in February 2024 — a multinational effort to scale Ukraine’s unmanned aerial capabilities. Latvia contributed €20 million to this initiative in its first year, delivering nearly 5,000 drones, with 12,000 more UAVs scheduled for delivery in the first half of 2025.

In a bold policy stance, Latvia authorized Ukraine to use all weapons provided — including drones — to strike inside Russian territory, reinforcing Ukraine’s right to defend itself fully.

Building defense industry ties

Latvia’s commitment doesn’t end with deliveries. It is also fostering long-term defense industry cooperation with Ukraine. At least €10 million of Latvia’s drone funding in 2024 was invested in Latvian companies producing UAVs specifically for Ukraine.

In 2025, that investment continues, and Latvia has pledged another €10 million for joint defense manufacturing projects. Two Latvian companies — unnamed for security reasons — are producing the 12,000 drones being delivered in early 2025.

Additionally, the Finnish company Patria opened a production facility in Latvia in 2024, which now builds the armored vehicles supplied to Ukraine. This move strengthens Latvia’s own defense sector while reinforcing Ukraine’s ground capabilities.

Training Ukrainian forces to NATO standards

Latvia has provided crucial training for Ukrainian soldiers, ensuring they meet NATO military standards. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, over 4,000 Ukrainian troops have undergone training in Latvia.

The programs have covered a wide range of specializations: snipers, sappers, engineers, commanding officers, and, more recently, UAV operators. Latvia began drone operator training in mid-2024 as part of its support to the Drone Coalition.

In 2025, Latvia plans to train an additional 4,000 soldiers and has joined efforts to form and train the Nordic-Baltic Brigade — a 3,000–5,000-strong Ukrainian formation supported by Latvia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, and Lithuania.

Latvia’s role in sanctions and legal accountability

As a member of the European Union, Latvia plays a vital role in implementing and advocating for sanctions against Russia and its enablers. Between April 2024 and April 2025, the EU announced three new sanctions packages — with Latvia consistently supporting stronger measures.

Latvia has also taken individual steps. In February 2024, it became the first EU country to ban agricultural imports from Russia and Belarus, setting a precedent later followed by others. Latvia also contested EU decisions to remove certain Russian individuals from the sanctions list and maintained national sanctions against those dropped at Hungary’s request.

Beyond sanctions, Latvia is deeply involved in international justice efforts. It is an active member of the Joint Investigation Team on Russian war crimes and has helped draft the legal framework for a special tribunal on aggression against Ukraine. In March 2025, Latvian courts sentenced a citizen to five years in prison for participating in the war on Russia’s side — a rare case of domestic enforcement.

Cybersecurity and non-military security support

Latvia’s support extends into the information and digital realm. In 2024, it joined the IT Coalition, helping to raise €482 million for Ukraine’s cyber defense and communications capabilities.

Through this partnership, Latvia provided:

• €100,000 worth of frontline communications equipment
• Over 1,000 computers and monitors to bolster cybersecurity in Ukrainian government institutions
• A bilateral cybersecurity memorandum, establishing protocols for cooperation and intelligence sharing

This kind of digital support is crucial as Ukraine faces increasingly complex cyber threats from Russian-linked actors.

Humanitarian aid and reconstruction: Focus on Chernihiv Oblast

Latvia has also made post-war recovery a core part of its Ukraine strategy, particularly in the Chernihiv region, where it has pledged €15 million for 2024–2026.

In 2024 alone, Latvian funding helped rebuild:

• The Talalayivka Lyceum, damaged by shelling
• The Chernihiv Regional Children’s Hospital
• Educational and preschool facilities in surrounding communities

Latvia also delivered medical equipment worth €345,000, including 36 ventilators, and helped supply Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Hospital after a missile attack.

Its support for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been equally significant. Latvia donated over 70 transformers, dozens of diesel generators, and even a 250 MVA high-voltage transformer formerly used at Riga’s hydroelectric power station.

During mass Russian attacks on Ukraine’s power grid in 2024, Latvia and 13 other countries sent 2,400 tons of emergency energy equipment, aiding 57 Ukrainian utility companies.

Demining: Clearing the path to recovery

Latvia plays an active role in humanitarian demining through the Demining Coalition, which raised over €50 million in 2024. The coalition provided Ukraine with armored vehicles, demining machines, mine detectors, and obstacle-clearing systems.

Latvia specifically contributed €270,000 to HALO Trust, supporting the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance in liberated and front-line territories.

The coalition announced a long-term commitment of €700 million through 2034, with €130 million allocated for 2025 — a critical investment in civilian safety and rebuilding efforts.

Macro-financial support and international programs

Latvia also participates in key international financial initiatives aimed at stabilizing Ukraine’s economy and institutions. It contributed to:

• The Ukraine Capacity Development Fund (UCDF), managed by the IMF, raising $36 million
• The World Bank’s URTF, which gathered $2 billion from donor countries for recovery and reform

Through the EU’s ERA program, Latvia supports Ukraine’s access to loans financed by frozen Russian assets. By April 2025, Ukraine had received €5 billion in three tranches, and a total of €35 billion is planned through the EU’s broader Ukraine Facility.

Latvia has also taken part in the Medevac medical evacuation program, treating 545 wounded Ukrainian soldiers in Latvian hospitals since 2022.

Conclusion: Latvia’s leadership in Ukraine’s fight and future

Latvia has emerged as one of Ukraine’s most consistent and impactful supporters. It has provided some of the highest levels of military aid per capita, led innovative efforts like the Drone Coalition, helped rebuild war-torn communities, and pushed for legal accountability for Russian aggression.

This support is part of a broader framework of long-term commitments. Latvia’s 10-year security agreement with Ukraine is one of 29 such agreements signed as of February 2025 — 27 with G7-aligned nations, one with the EU, and one with Croatia. These agreements stem from the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, adopted at the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023.

While they offer structure and stability, they remain a substitute for what Ukraine ultimately seeks: full NATO and EU membership, neither of which yet has a clear timeline.

Until then, Latvia — driven by its history, geography, and commitment to European security — continues to lead by example. Its sustained and strategic military aid to Ukraine places it among the most steadfast contributors.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke by phone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy this week, urging Ukraine and Russia to resume presidential negotiations. The call comes just days ahead of a planned round of peace talks in Istanbul on 2 June.

While Moscow has proposed the meeting, Kyiv has not confirmed its participation and continues to insist that Russia publish its proposed peace terms in advance.

Erdogan calls for direct presidential talks “without delay“

According to a statement from Erdogan’s office, the Turkish president told Zelenskyy that direct talks between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia would benefit the peace process and should take place “without further delay.”

Zelenskyy confirmed the call on social media, saying they discussed the potential second round of talks in Istanbul and the conditions under which Ukraine would agree to attend.

“We both agree that this meeting cannot and should not be empty,” Zelenskyy wrote.

He added that they also discussed the possibility of a four-party summit involving the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and the United States.

Zelensky presses for transparency before talks

Zelenskyy has previously proposed a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.

Ahead of the first Istanbul meeting, Zelenskyy invited Putin to hold direct talks, but Russia instead sent a delegation led by presidential advisor Vladimir Medinsky.

Zelenskyy said he also reviewed the outcome of that earlier meeting with Erdogan, noting that its only result was a prisoner exchange.

“A ceasefire must be the basis for further progress toward peace,” he wrote.

An uncertain path to Istanbul

Erdogan echoed that view, saying that discussions around a potential ceasefire at the upcoming talks could help lay the groundwork for peace. He also emphasized the need for strong delegations from both sides.

Ukraine has not formally confirmed it will attend the June 2 talks, though officials in Kyiv say they remain open to negotiations in any format.

Ukrainian authorities continue to call on Moscow to publish its negotiating terms ahead of time, a request the Kremlin has so far refused.

US Senators Lindsey Graham (R–SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D–CT) met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv this week to reaffirm bipartisan support for Ukraine and promote a Senate bill proposing significant new sanctions on Russia.

The senators, known for their strong backing of Ukraine, are co-authors of a bipartisan bill that would introduce major new sanctions on Russia and impose 500% tariffs on countries continuing to import Russian oil, gas, and other critical resources.

Zelenskyy expressed gratitude for their efforts, stating, “We have a shared understanding that Russia is making a mockery of diplomacy—pretending to negotiate while preparing new offensives and rejecting all ceasefire proposals.”

Senator Blumenthal emphasized the bill’s intent to send a strong message to buyers of Russian energy: “The Senate’s response will be clear—500% tariffs on anyone buying Russian oil, gas, or petrochemicals. That includes China and India, which currently buy most of these exports.”

Senator Graham added that the Senate could begin reviewing the bill next week, highlighting its broad support with backing from 82 US senators.

Kyiv pushes for stronger global pressure ahead of talks

The visit comes as Ukraine and Russia prepare for a new round of peace talks scheduled for June 2 in Istanbul. While Moscow has proposed the meeting, Ukraine has not confirmed its attendance and is demanding that Russia publish its proposed peace terms in advance.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha warned that Moscow continues to use diplomatic platforms to delay rather than negotiate, and said Kyiv would not attend “on blind terms.” The last round of talks, held in mid-May, led to a major prisoner exchange but little progress toward a lasting ceasefire.

International observers are watching closely, as Kyiv insists that without serious Russian concessions, negotiations will remain superficial.

Russia’s UN ambassador, Vasily Nebenzia, said Moscow is willing to consider a ceasefire — but only if Ukraine stops mobilizing troops and the West ends arms deliveries.

Nebenzia’s remarks come ahead of the new round of peace talks scheduled for 2 June in Istanbul. Ukraine has urged Russia to publish its proposed peace plan beforehand. Officials in Kyiv fear Russia will issue demands they view as unacceptable, including troop withdrawals from areas Russia is trying to annex.

“We are ready to consider a ceasefire,” Nebenzia said, “but we expect reciprocal steps.”

He called for a halt in Western military support and Ukraine’s mobilization efforts as a minimum requirement.

Ukraine has dismissed similar conditions before, warning that Moscow could use any pause to regroup and gain ground on the battlefield.

Moscow escalates rhetoric at UN

Nebenzia also claimed Russia would not tolerate what he called “an anti-Russian neo-Nazi entity” near its borders — language often used by Moscow to delegitimize Ukraine’s Western orientation.

“If necessary, we will fight for this as long as it takes,” he added.

Ukraine urges immediate international pressure

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha condemned the speech, saying Moscow was using the UN platform to threaten rather than negotiate.

“This is a slap in the face to everyone calling for peace,” Sybiha wrote on X.
“Pressure on Moscow must be increased — immediately.”

Ukraine’s Supreme Court Judge Nadiia Stefaniv resides in a luxury apartment in Kyiv owned by a Russian citizen whose official income records raise serious questions about how the property was acquired. The findings come from an investigation by Schemy, the investigative journalism unit of Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).

Russian relative owns property — but denies it

The 2,207-square-foot (205 m²) apartment is located in the upscale Andersen residential complex in central Kyiv. Ukrainian property records show it was purchased in June 2016 by Valentyna Khoroshavtseva, a citizen of the Russian Federation and niece of Judge Stefaniv.

In her 2024 asset declaration, Judge Stefaniv reported using the apartment rent-free since 2020. She identified the owner as a “foreign citizen” and named Khoroshavtseva.

However, when contacted by journalists, Khoroshavtseva stated:

“I absolutely did not buy any apartments.”
She then abruptly ended the call.

Incomes don’t match property values

The apartment was declared at ₴1.8 million (about $135,000 USD) — but real estate listings at the time show the market value to be ₴5 million (approximately $375,000 USD).

From 2008 to 2016, Khoroshavtseva’s total official income in Russia was around 1.6 million rubles, which was approximately ₴600,000 or $45,000 USD — not enough to afford even the declared price, let alone the market value.

Judge’s daughter also lives in property owned by Russian niece

Judge Stefaniv’s daughter, Nadiia Mykytyn, a judge at the Ivano-Frankivsk District Administrative Court, lives in a 1,055-square-foot (98 m²) apartment in western Ukraine. That property is also owned by Khoroshavtseva, who reportedly bought it in 2011 when she was just 23 years old. It was acquired for around ₴400,000 (~$50,000 USD) — again, a purchase unsupported by verified income.

In addition, Khoroshavtseva owns another apartment in Ivano-Frankivsk (1,098 ft² / 102 m²), acquired in 2014, and a garage.

Contradictory explanation from Judge Stefaniv

Judge Stefaniv claimed her relatives planned to relocate to Ukraine and purchased property using money from selling real estate in Russia. However, her sister Oksana Khoroshavtseva — the mother of Valentyna — died in January 2016, five months before the Kyiv apartment was purchased.

“They were ready to relocate, but she died — it was a tragedy,” Stefaniv told Schemy.

However, records show that after acquiring apartments in Ukraine, the family continued buying property in Russia — not selling it, as the judge claimed.

Connection to Russian nuclear industry

Khoroshavtseva and her husband both worked at the Siberian Chemical Combine, a Russian state enterprise that, according to Ukrainian think tank DixiGroup, produces materials supporting the Kremlin’s nuclear weapons program.

Her husband earned about 120,000 rubles per month (~$1,600 USD) as of 2020, drove a 2008 Ford Mondeo, and lived in a 1,022-square-foot (95 m²) apartment in Seversk, Tomsk Oblast.

Legal concerns over hidden assets

Experts warn that using foreign relatives to hold property may be a tactic to conceal assets from anti-corruption scrutiny.

“A judge can hide assets potentially obtained illegally by registering them under relatives in Russia. During wartime, this makes official verification extremely difficult,” said Karina Hasymova from the anti-corruption watchdog DEJURE Foundation.

Judge Mykytyn declined to comment publicly but said she would address the matter during a 29 May judicial interview. However, she requested that discussions about family property be held behind closed doors and without live broadcast.

Background on Judge Stefaniv

Judge Stefaniv studied law in Russia and began her career as an investigator in Tomsk Oblast before moving to Ukraine in 1986. She became a judge in 1990, later heading the Ivano-Frankivsk Court of Appeal. In 2017, she was appointed to the Cassation Criminal Court of the Supreme Court, and in 2023, she temporarily served as its acting head.

During the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, she supported controversial laws that expanded government powers and restricted civil liberties. She justified the measures as necessary for ensuring “access to justice” and backed a ban on revealing judges’ home addresses.

Thousands of tanks have been destroyed by drones in Ukraine, but British military expert Hamish de Bretton-Gordon argues the tank is not obsolete—just outdated.

Writing in The Telegraph, the former commander of the UK’s Joint CBRN Regiment and NATO’s Rapid Reaction CBRN Battalion argues that next-gen tanks equipped with electronic jammers and Active Defence Systems (ADS) can survive and dominate on today’s drone-filled battlefield.

“A properly equipped modern tank… will survive and win,” he writes, pointing to Israel’s Merkava tanks, which remain effective even under drone threat.

The tanks being destroyed in Ukraine, he notes, are mostly outdated Soviet models. Western forces must not assume the same fate for modern, tech-integrated armour.

War for the airwaves

Victory today often comes down to electronic dominance. Controlling the electromagnetic spectrum—jamming enemy signals while maintaining your own—can decide who controls the skies.

“He who controls this, controls the battle space and will win the war.”

Ukraine has shown how to fight in this space, using tools like Starlink and high-flying relay drones to outmaneuver Russian jamming. Some drones even use fibre-optic cables—an old but effective way to stay connected when signals fail.

“Old-fashioned methods are overcoming the latest and most brilliant electronic-warfare systems,” de Bretton-Gordon notes.

UK forces lag behind

Britain, he warns, is “almost totally unequipped” for this kind of warfare. With the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) due next week, de Bretton-Gordon says urgent action is needed.

“We need to be able to operate on a drone battlefield without being cut to pieces.”

He attributes the SDR’s delay to the sheer pace of change, not indecision—highlighting how quickly military tech becomes outdated.

Leadership still wins wars

Technology aside, strong field leadership remains essential. De Bretton-Gordon calls for renewed focus on Mission Command, the British Army’s tradition of empowering junior officers to act quickly without waiting for top-down orders.

“A commander who waits to hear back… when an opportunity appears… is not a real officer at all.”

The future is hybrid: steel and signal

For all the talk of drones and AI, war still comes down to fundamentals—adaptability, decision-making, and force protection.

“The principles of war have not changed… some of the new generation will dominate the electronic battlespace.”

And yes—they may still ride to war in tanks.

Two explosions in the early hours of 30 May near Desantnaya Bay in Russia’s Vladivostok were part of a planned operation by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR), according to Ukrainian outlets RBC-Ukraine and UNIAN.

Sources say the blasts targeted the 47th Separate Air Assault Battalion of Russia’s 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Unit No. 30926). One explosion reportedly struck a checkpoint, the other hit an area housing personnel and commanders.

This brigade has been actively involved in combat against Ukraine, including documented deployments in Mariupol, Vuhledar, and Kursk Oblast.

Injuries and equipment losses reported by media

According to the same sources, the attack caused injuries and material damage.

“Personnel, military equipment, and special assets were hit,” the reports quoted unnamed intelligence sources as saying.

Citing local residents, RBC reported that at least ten ambulances and an evacuation helicopter arrived at the scene. Damaged military hardware was reportedly removed from the site using Russian military URAL trucks.

Russian media report explosions in Russian Vladivostok in the area of a marine training ground.

It is reported that the road in the area of the incident was blocked, eyewitnesses reported a helicopter flying over the site. Special and emergency services arrived at the scene, and… pic.twitter.com/QUYtRbXumo

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) May 30, 2025

Russian officials: Gas leak caused the blasts

Russian authorities confirmed two explosions but denied any casualties or damage. The Anti-Terrorism Commission of Primorsky Krai attributed the incident to the ignition of gas cylinders.

Emergency services cordoned off the area, and traffic between Shamora Bay and the village of Shchitovaya was partially restricted.

“The threat has been neutralized,” officials stated.

Tightened security and conflicting accounts

Local media and Telegram channels, including VChK-OGPU and Vladivostok1.ru, reported heavy police and military presence in the area. Roads were blocked, vehicles inspected, and helicopters were seen flying before the blasts.

Witnesses described the removal of large, tarp-covered objects—possibly military vehicles—under guard. The Telegram channel The True Story reported that the location is used for loading and unloading military equipment for naval deployment.

According to Radio Svoboda, Desantnaya Bay may also house a training ground for the Pacific Fleet’s naval infantry, which has taken part in combat operations against Ukraine.

The European Union is creating a new Black Sea Maritime Security Hub to enhance surveillance of Russian activities, including monitoring potential ceasefire violations in Ukraine and tracking sanction-busting oil tankers, The Telegraph reports.

The hub is part of the EU’s effort to boost real-time awareness and protect vital infrastructure in the region.

Real-time monitoring from space to seabed

The command center will deliver live intelligence across the Black Sea, covering:

• Movements of Russian military and commercial vessels
• Activity by Russia’s so-called shadow fleet of tankers
• Early alerts on sabotage risks to undersea infrastructure, including energy cables and offshore rigs

The system aims to give EU countries full-spectrum visibility, “from space to seabed,” according to officials.

“The exact size, shape and location of the monitoring station is still up for negotiation,” said EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas.

Core of the EU’s new Black Sea Strategy

The surveillance hub is central to the EU’s first comprehensive Black Sea Strategy, which focuses on:

• Reducing Russian influence
• Securing maritime trade routes
• Strengthening logistics and defense readiness

The plan includes infrastructure upgrades and deeper cooperation with neighboring states.

“Getting equipment to the region faster strengthens deterrence and also supports NATO,” Kallas noted.

Ukraine’s naval advances shift the balance

The EU’s move follows Ukraine’s successful use of maritime drones and Western weapons like Storm Shadow and Atacms, which forced much of Russia’s fleet back to home ports.

With Ukraine now maintaining a protected grain corridor along the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts, trade route security remains a top priority.

Regional cooperation — with limits

Out of the six Black Sea-bordering countries, Bulgaria and Romania are EU members. Ukraine is an applicant nation and key military partner. The strategy also seeks to connect the EU with the southern Caucasus and Central Asia through new energy and digital corridors.

However, Türkiye presents diplomatic challenges. Though a NATO member and EU candidate, it continues commercial ties with Russia and controls the Bosphorus Strait.

“This is also an invitation for closer cooperation with all countries around the Black Sea, including Türkiye,” Kallas said.

Ukrainian startup launches fully autonomous drone strikes deep into Russian territory, rewriting the rules of modern warfare, Forbes reports.

In a historic military breakthrough, Ukrainian defense startup Strategy Force Solutions has successfully deployed autonomous drone motherships in real combat operations against Russian forces — a world first that could reshape global defense strategies.

Their breakthrough system, GOGOL-M, swaps out traditional $3–$5 million missile strikes for AI-driven missions costing just $10,000.

Ukraine surges ahead in drone warfare innovation

While global powers like the US and China continue testing autonomous weapons, Ukraine has leapfrogged ahead, deploying AI-powered drone swarms on the battlefield today, not years from now.

The GOGOL-M mothership, boasting a 20-foot (6-meter) wingspan, can autonomously fly up to 300 km behind enemy lines. It then releases two smaller attack drones that identify and destroy targets without human control.

How it works: AI-powered precision at scale

At the core of the system is SmartPilot, an onboard AI that mirrors the instincts of a human fighter pilot. It uses multi-sensor fusion — combining cameras, LIDAR, and communications — to navigate and strike in environments where GPS and radio signals are jammed.

“In some ways, it’s like a self-driving car,” says CTO Andrii.

He explains that while there aren’t many obstacles in the air, the system still needs to remain lightweight. To achieve that balance, the team engineered a streamlined setup using cameras, LIDAR, and communication tools to enable real-time navigation and coordination.

LIDAR, which acts like laser radar, generates a detailed 3D map of the surroundings and functions in all lighting and weather — essential for reliable autonomous missions in hostile conditions.

This gives the drones the ability to:

• Destroy parked jets and air defenses
• Hit oil depots and infrastructure
• Strike deep into Russia with precision

One military operator described the experience:

“It feels like a video game. I set the waypoints and watch it work.”

Silent and deadly: Drones that wait to strike

In one of its most striking features, the drone can land near enemy targets, remain hidden, and wait for hours before launching a surprise strike — a capability described as “autonomous ambush mode.”

This gives Ukrainian forces a powerful edge in asymmetric warfare, allowing for stealth operations previously thought impossible with drone tech.

Ukraine beats US and China to real-world AI combat

While the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit and China’s drone makers remain in testing phases, Ukraine is already in full-scale production. Strategy Force Solutions now builds 50 GOGOL-Ms and 400 attack drones per month, constrained only by military demand.

The company’s software-first approach also allows easy adaptation to new platforms — from flying drones to unmanned boats and ground vehicles.

Russia faces a new kind of threat

Military analysts suggest that Russia must now defend against autonomous swarms that don’t need GPS, live control, or constant communication — a nightmare for traditional air defense systems.

As Forbes tech correspondent David Hambling notes:

“The crucial first step — long-range autonomous drone delivery — has now been taken. It may be Version 1.0, but it’s already a problem for Russia.”

A childhood idea that sparked a military revolution

The origin of this breakthrough? A childhood memory. As a boy, the system’s creator Andrii saw a woman walking railway tracks to check for defects. He thought, “This should be done by a robot.”

That early insight grew into AI systems for infrastructure inspection — and later, with the onset of war in 2022, a pivot to battlefield autonomy.

On 16 May, Serhiy Kyslytsya, Ukraine’s First Deputy Foreign Minister, participated in the first direct peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials in over three years. The previous round had also taken place in Istanbul during the early weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since then, negotiations had stalled completely.

Vladimir Putin himself proposed Istanbul as the venue — yet notably did not attend, instead sending his confidant Vladimir Medinsky to lead the Russian delegation.

The talks, held behind closed doors and hosted by Türkiye, concluded with two concrete outcomes: completion of the largest prisoner exchange to date (1,000 for 1,000) and an agreement to meet again. However, no progress was made on a ceasefire.

What happened behind closed doors remained secret — until now.

Details emerged when Kyslytsya broke his silence in a revealing interview with Ukrainian broadcaster My-Ukrayina. His remarks, later summarized by Euromaidan Press and corroborated by reporting from The Economist and Reuters, exposed Russia’s shocking negotiation tactics and what they reveal about Putin’s real strategy.

Why this meeting was unlike any other

The meeting was unprecedented as the first direct diplomatic contact since early 2022, but Putin’s approach revealed even more. By proposing Istanbul — site of the stalled 2022 talks — while refusing to attend himself, Putin sent a clear message about control and conditions.

Russia’s most telling demand was excluding the United States entirely. Russian officials claimed they “didn’t have a mandate to talk if the US was in the room,” exposing their need to control both narrative and participants.

Türkiye handled the logistics professionally, providing interpreters in four languages and seating arrangements that maintained deliberate distance between the hostile delegations.

But Russia’s constraints were immediately apparent.

“This was an experienced delegation, but they had no mandate to move even one step left or right,” Kyslytsya observed. “They rigidly followed the directives they received.”

Most revealing was their categorical rejection of Ukraine’s core demand: “Several times during negotiations they said: ‘An unconditional ceasefire is categorically unacceptable,'” Kyslytsya recalled.

“I don’t believe their instructions included any option to reach an agreement with Ukraine on a ceasefire,” he concluded.

“Maybe you’ll lose more loved ones” – Russia’s personal threats

From the opening moments, the Russian delegation adopted what Kyslytsya described as a campaign of psychological pressure designed not to negotiate, but to destabilize their Ukrainian counterparts.

“It was all part of the pressure campaign — to provoke, to insult, to break our composure,” he said.

The atmosphere in the room was described as deliberately hostile. Russian delegates reportedly used aggressive interruptions, historical revisionism, and calculated provocations to keep their Ukrainian counterparts off-balance.

The most chilling moment came when Medinsky reportedly warned:

“Maybe some of those sitting here at this table will lose more of their loved ones. Russia is prepared to fight forever.”

For Kyslytsya, whose nephew died defending Ukraine, the threat was deeply personal. The targeting of family members represented a crossing of diplomatic red lines that shocked even experienced negotiators.

But the psychological warfare extended beyond personal threats. The Russian delegation systematically attempted to deny Ukrainian identity itself, framing the conflict in ways that would erase Ukraine’s sovereignty and national legitimacy.

At one point, the Russian side declared:

“This war… it’s basically just Russians killing Russians. With some nuances.”

“They tell you: ‘You’re not Ukrainian, you’re Russian,'” Kyslytsya recounted. “It was not just disrespectful; it was dehumanizing.”

This denial of Ukrainian nationhood wasn’t merely rhetorical — it represented a core element of Russia’s justification for the invasion.

Russia’s “detached from reality” territorial demands

Russia’s verbal threats were matched by territorial ultimatums that made meaningful negotiation impossible. According to both Kyslytsya and external reporting, Russia demanded Ukraine withdraw from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia — including areas Ukraine still controls.

Medinsky reportedly invoked historical precedent:

“We fought Sweden for 21 years. How long are you ready to fight?”

The Russian delegation also warned that if Ukraine rejected current demands, “next time we’ll come for six or even eight regions instead of four.”

One Reuters source called the demands “detached from reality,” while Ukrainian officials described them as Russia’s “minimum requirement.”

“These weren’t negotiations,” Kyslytsya concluded. “These were pressure tests.”

The surprising reason Russia didn’t walk out

Despite their hostility and impossible demands, the Russian delegation never walked out. To Kyslytsya, this was the most telling aspect of the entire encounter.

“They couldn’t afford to walk out. They needed to come away with something.”

Russia had initially hoped to frame the talks as a continuation of the 2022 Istanbul negotiations. When Ukraine refused this framing, Russia’s narrative strategy collapsed—yet they stayed.

Kyslytsya believes this revealed Russia’s need to signal to the United States that they remained diplomatically engaged, even while excluding American participation from the talks.

“They live in a world of illusions. Of greatness, of control, of denial,” he said.

Even Medinsky’s direct access to Putin, Kyslytsya argued, meant little in practice.

“Access and courage are not the same thing. You don’t report reality to a dictator. You report a version of events that flatters power.”

What this really means for Ukraine war

While the prisoner exchange brought 1,000 Ukrainians home — a meaningful humanitarian victory — no broader diplomatic progress emerged. No timeline was set for future summits, and no framework established for de-escalation or a future ceasefire.

Türkiye managed the logistics professionally, providing interpreters in four languages and maintaining careful neutrality. But Russia’s insistence on excluding American participation exposed the process’s fundamental constraint.

“This is a dictatorship,” Kyslytsya observed. “There are no councils or parliaments. Everything is in the hands of one man.”

That man is Vladimir Putin. And until he enters the room himself, substantive peace negotiations remain impossible.

The hidden truth about Putin’s strategy

The Istanbul talks produced no diplomatic breakthrough, but they revealed something crucial about Russia’s position under pressure.

The combination of personal threats and rigid demands, paired with an unwillingness to actually leave the negotiating table, exposed a regime trying to project strength while managing serious constraints.

The bottom line: Putin’s delegation stayed seated even when their objectives failed — potentially revealing more about Russian limitations than any formal diplomatic outcome.