Today, there is important news from the Sumy direction.
Here, Ukrainian forces are advancing into the Kursk region, turning what was once a defensive stand into a renewed cross-border push. These gains now open the path to outflank and encircle Russian positions from the north to crush the already overstretched enemy lines and reshape the dynamics of the entire front.
A key factor behind this success has been the relentless Ukrainian air strike campaign against Russian reinforcements and command centers across both Sumy and Kursk. This has created openings for Ukrainian ground units to press forward. The Ukrainian Black Swan battalion recently released footage northeast of Kindrativka showing Russian aircraft attempting to bomb new Ukrainian positions, a sign of how far north the battle has shifted.
Despite Russian air activity, Ukrainian advances in this area underscore the collapse of Russia’s ability to maintain pressure in Sumy, with Ukrainian forces now fighting beyond the settlements that were once planned to serve as a foothold for Russia’s push south.
Complementing air strikes, Ukraine’s drone campaign is inflicting devastating damage on Russian positions at the tactical level. Heavy drone platforms like the Vampire hexacopter are proving decisive, flying long-range night missions with payloads up to 20 kilograms. These drones are not just dropping improvised explosives but carrying devastating ordnance, including anti-tank mines and a series of mortar rounds, which complicate Russian attempts to maneuver.
Most notably, Ukrainian engineers working with frontline units have introduced a new drone-dropped munition dubbed the black hole bomb. Developed by the Ukrainian Black Swan unit, the weapon has two confirmed variants. The thermobaric version unleashes a high-temperature blast wave that sucks in surrounding air, annihilating fortifications and suffocating troops caught inside trenches or buildings. The fragmentation variant detonates overhead, scattering lethal shrapnel across wide areas, ideal for clearing entrenched infantry or enemy units on the move.
Combat footage shows these black hole munitions creating huge craters and collapsing Russian firing points, their effect comparable to that of artillery shells but instead delivered with surgical precision from the sky. This innovation allows Ukrainian units to dismantle Russian defenses without waiting for conventional artillery or risking exposure of expensive fighter jets to Russian air defense systems.
With Russian forces concentrated in Sumy and stretched thin after weeks of costly attacks and devastating air strikes, Ukrainian commanders have again opted for tactical maneuvers rather than frontal attrition. Instead of smashing head-on into Russia’s lines, they are methodically cutting off isolated groups, collapsing salients piece by piece, and pushing back into Kursk in the process. This strategy takes advantage of the area, where settlements are small, scattered, and dispersed, making it easier to bypass and encircle Russian detachments rather than fight through each one in sequence.
Ukrainian advances north of Kindrativka and into rural Kursk show this logic in action, turning the international border into little more than a reference line. In practice, the fighting forms a unified battle space where Ukraine’s forces cross back and forth, exploiting Russian vulnerabilities while ignoring state boundaries that no longer reflect realities on the ground.
The result is a steadily deteriorating situation for the Russian command, and what began as an attempt to push into Sumy has now backfired, with Ukraine not only halting the incursion but clawing back ground across the frontier. Russian infantry, deprived of supplies and hammered by Ukrainian air and drone strikes, cannot establish a coherent defense, and by advancing north, Ukraine is opening the possibility of flanking Russian troops still holding pockets of territory in Sumy from behind, threatening their lines of retreat and accelerating their collapse.
Overall, Ukraine’s steady progress highlights how momentum has shifted from a desperate defensive fight to prevent Russian forces from reaching Sumy city into an operation pushing enemy troops back into Kursk.
The border itself is losing meaning in the chaos of battle, and Ukraine is now able to carry the fight onto Russian soil to disrupt the enemy’s remaining footholds. With innovation in drone warfare, effective use of air power, and smart maneuvering, Ukrainian forces are not just defending but are reshaping the frontline to their advantage.
In our regular frontline report, we pair up with the military blogger Reporting from Ukraine to keep you informed about what is happening on the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
The Russian tank factory in Omsk, in Siberia 2,300 km from Ukraine, stopped building new T-80 gas-turbine tanks back in 2001. The simpler diesel-fueled T-72 and T-90 would be Russia’s main tanks for the next quarter-century.
But then Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022—and Ukrainian forces got to work wrecking the Russian tank corps and its 3,000 active tanks, including around 500 upgraded T-80BVs and T-80BVMs.
Forty-three months later, Russia has lost more than 4,000 tanks, including a staggering 1,200 T-80s.
That’s essentially all the active pre-war tanks plus another 700 older T-80s that Russian forces fetched from long-term storage and refurbished in Omsk before shipping them off to the front line.
Increasingly desperate for replacement tanks, the Kremlin has instructed Omsk to resume building T-80s.
The initial order came two years ago. And now the new tanks are “in manufacture,” according to Aleksandr Potapov, CEO of Russian tank-maker Uralvagonzavod.
Be skeptical and adjust your expectations. Before halting production in 2001, the Omsk plant hadn’t manufactured a T-80 totally from scratch since 1991. Instead, it assembled “new” T-80s from a stockpile of chassis and components workers had manufactured years prior.
It’s no wonder that Potapov has been talking about building T-80s from scratch for two years: it might have taken Uralvagonzavod that long just to find new suppliers for the thousands of parts that make up a 46-ton, three-person T-80.
Maybe the Omsk factory is finally piecing together a few new T-80s using 1991-vintage hulls plus recently produced components. The new T-80s could supplement the dwindling number of refurbished T-80s rolling out of Omsk at a rate of around a dozen a month.
There were nearly 1,900 decommissioned T-80s rusting in Russia’s sprawling vehicle parks as recently as 2022. By now, perhaps a thousand of these old tanks have cycled through Omsk for rework. Hundreds of those rebuilt tanks have already been destroyed in Ukraine.
Omsk will eventually run out of old stored T-80s to fix up. At that point, whatever new T-80s it can piece together will be the only T-80s it can deliver to front-line regiments.
1/ From storage base to the battlefield – I’m back with a big research/investigation on Russian T-80 tanks. I’ve tracked the movement of these tanks and am going to uncover refurbishment rates and look closely at storage bases for more insights. Grab a coffee before we start :) pic.twitter.com/yCFvJE36ET
— Just BeCause (@a_from_s) October 17, 2024
It’s worth noting that Russian officials tend to exaggerate how many tanks Uralvagonzavod can produce. It’s possible some independent analysts are guilty of the same tank inflation.
The pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team recently concluded Russian industry was making hundreds of new T-90Ms every year: enough to keep its best tank regiments fully armed for the wider war in Ukraine … or some future clash with NATO.
“According to our estimates, Uralvagonzavod produced 60 to 70 T-90M tanks in 2022,” CIT reported. “In 2023, amid efforts to mobilize the defense industry, output may have increased to 140 to 180 tanks, and by 2024, it may have surpassed 200 units annually, possibly approaching a production rate of 250 to 300 tanks per year.”
But according to one expert, CIT is wrong. Sergio Miller, an analyst and former British Army intelligence officer, believes Russia is struggling to complete even 100 T-90Ms a year—and most of those it does complete are revamped T-90As rather than all-new vehicles.
“In total, UVZ only claimed to deliver 100 tanks in 2024,” Miller told reporter David Hambling. “I have no idea where the high figures quoted by some Western reporting come from. There is no evidence this is the case.”
It gets worse for the Russians. So far this year, Miller concluded, Uralvagonzavod has completed 10 or fewer T-90s. With so few new tanks, the Kremlin would struggle to restore its depleted armored regiments.
There are reasons to trust Miller over CIT. Squeezed by sanctions, Uralvagonzavod is probably struggling to source high-tech tank parts such as optics and electronics. In that context, the lower figure for T-90 production makes sense. Likewise, Potapov’s claims about new T-80s already taking shape in Omsk may be inflated.
New production might not be able to halt the steady “de-mechanization” of the Russian armed forces that began with Russia’s first battlefield defeats in the spring of 2022. There are too few tanks left in open storage … and possibly too few tanks rolling out of Uralvagonzavod’s factories.
A new Ukrainian military robot is rolling out. Oboronka news site reports that the 4-ton ground drone named “Bufalo” is diesel-powered, armored, and built for AI-assisted frontline logistics and demining.
Bufalo’s key advantage is its diesel engine. Fuel tanks can be scaled by mission, giving it a range of 100–200 km without battery swaps. Developers say electric drones can’t meet today’s longer frontlines.
“Electric drones cannot cover the distance to deliver provisions and ammunition to the front,” said company head Vladyslav.
Bufalo’s chassis is armored with European steel. It withstands any bullet and indirect 152 mm artillery if shells land beyond 100 meters. Even if damaged, its wheels remain operational.
The drone uses Starlink with GPS or a radio link for communications. A CRPA antenna protects satellite signal from jamming. If Starlink fails or is disabled, a relay-equipped drone can take over the signal.
Bufalo uses onboard cameras to detect obstacles up to 15 meters away, suggest safe routes, and stop if needed. Navigation is assisted by AI, but decisions stay human-controlled.
“The robot can lock onto and follow a target, but it will not make decisions to destroy equipment or people. I will never allow it to make decisions in place of a human…” said Vladyslav.
The idea for Bufalo came after a drone prototype failed a demo—losing a wheel and flipping. A soldier dismissed the tech, pushing Vladyslav to start from scratch. His new team asked the General Staff for requirements and collected feedback from frontline units.
Requests included smoke grenades, armored wheels, a shielded bottom to resist mines, and Starlink integration. All were implemented.
The Bufalo project launched in January 2025. From March to August, the team built and tested the demining version. That kit includes the drone, a hydraulic system, mulcher, control panel, and trailer.
Bufalo is modular and may get combat features soon. The team is exploring weapon modules and engineering tools like remote trenching scoops. An 11-channel radio jamming system has passed tests and is ready for integration.
“We’re building an infrastructurally simple drone, so one control system can be removed and another installed. We’ve made understandable communication interfaces. The EW manufacturer just needs to provide a connector—we’ll plug it in and it’ll work automatically,” said Vladyslav.
The team plans an official presentation, followed by codification and production. Initial output will be 10 drones per month, with plans to scale.
Poland has begun discussing with the allies the possibility of intercepting Russian drones and missiles while they are still over Ukrainian territory. According to Defense Express analysts, this is technically possible, but it raises a number of complex issues, including avoiding friendly fire.
The idea of intercepting Russian drones and missiles over Ukraine first emerged in 2022, in response to calls to “close the skies.”
Politically, the chances of a massive agreement among all NATO or EU members remain low. More realistic are limited missions by individual countries, such as the UK, France, and Germany.
Meanwhile, Moscow denied targeting Poland with drones. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that no targets on Polish territory were intended, responding to accusations after 19 Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace on 10 September for approximately six hours.
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stated that the West should consider intercepting Russian drones and missiles in Ukraine’s airspace. He emphasized that Poland cannot make this decision alone; it must be coordinated with allies.
Analysts note that the final decision is primarily political, and the chances of alliance-wide approval are low. However, initiatives by a limited number of countries are much more likely to be implemented.
If ground-based air defense systems and placing fighters at Ukrainian airfields are excluded, the most realistic scenario is air patrols from NATO’s eastern flank bases.
This would involve F-16s, F-35s, Rafales, and Eurofighters stationed at Polish or other border airbases, conducting patrol flights within effective range. Existing deployments show few logistical obstacles: in August, German Eurofighters were based at the 23rd Air Base near Warsaw. From there, fighters could reach Volyn Oblast in Ukraine, bordering Poland, in approximately 15 minutes without afterburners.
Key technical parameters include:
The key issue is coordination between partners and the Ukrainian side. A practical solution could be the creation of a conditional “no-fly, no-AAA” zone for Ukrainian forces, within which only allied fighters would operate.
This approach reduces the risk of friendly fire but significantly limits patrol areas. Analysts emphasize that real interception zones will be localized, mostly covering Ukraine’s border regions.
The US and EU continue to buy Russian energy and goods despite the war in Ukraine. In the fourth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the US and the EU continue to import oil, gas, metals, and fertilizers from Russia. The total trade volume is estimated in the billions of euros, Reuters reports.
Russian oil remains a key source of revenue that funds its military aggression against Ukraine. In 2025, profits from the oil and gas sector account for about 77.7% of Russia’s federal budget.
After sanctions were imposed as the Kremlin attacked Ukraine, EU exports to Russia fell by 61%, and imports from Russia dropped by 89% from Q1 2022 to Q2 2025. At the same time, in Q2 2025, EU exports to Russia increased slightly while imports decreased, resulting in a trade surplus of €0.8 billion.
Four years ago, Russia was the largest oil supplier to the EU. The ban on maritime imports of crude oil reduced its share from 28.74% in 2021 to 2.01% in 2025. In Q2 2025, Russian oil accounted for only 2% of total EU imports.
Russia’s share of the EU’s natural gas imports fell to 12% in Q2 2025, down from 48% in 2021. Algeria is now the largest supplier (27%), while Norway increased its share by 10%. Nevertheless, Russian gas still reaches some countries, including Hungary and Bulgaria, via the Turkish Stream.
Imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia fell to 14% in Q2 2025, down from 22% in 2021. The largest LNG supplier to the EU in 2025 was the US (54%).
Russia’s share in the EU’s iron and steel imports decreased from 18% in 2021 to 6% in Q2 2025.
However, Russia remains the largest supplier of fertilizers to the EU, with its share increasing from 28% to 34% over four years.
US imports from Russia totaled $2.50 billion in the first half of 2025, down from $14.14 billion four years ago. Overall, since January 2022, the US has imported $24.51 billion worth of Russian goods.
Last year, the US imported $1.27 billion in Russian fertilizers (compared to $1.14 billion in 2021), enriched uranium and plutonium worth $624 million (down from $646 million in 2021), and palladium worth $878 million (down from $1.59 billion in 2021).
Romania became the latest Nato member to scramble fighter jets after a Russian drone entered its airspace
© AFP/Getty
Ukrainian troops pay with blood for every Russian strike they repel — this is the cost of true defense. Colonel Yury Ihnat, head of the Communications Department of the Ukrainian Air Force, emphasizes that partners, especially Poland, have a unique opportunity to learn from Ukraine’s experience by observing the work of its air defense and avoiding their own mistakes.
After Russia first launched a massive drone attack against a NATO country, it became clear that defenses were not ready to repel such strikes. Nineteen drones entered, the most advanced aircraft were scrambled, yet only four were shot down. Ukraine, without F-35s or modern aviation, shoots down 400–500 drones per night over a single city. That’s why Ukraine offered Poland its operational experience in neutralizing this threat.
“You cannot account for everything when the enemy attacks with new systems. You have to try, experiment, and use innovative tools. Today, mobile fire groups are equipped with every possible gadget — from thermal imagers to optical and laser sights,” Ihnat explained.
Mobile fire groups are specialized air defense units armed with heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft cannons, and MANPADS, mounted on mobile chassis, usually pickups. This setup allows the units to move quickly and shoot down Shaheds, ArmyInform reports.
Ukrainian forces distribute aircraft, helicopters, small air defense units, interceptor drones, and electronic warfare systems across the country. The Air Force commander and regional commanders ensure even and efficient resource allocation, creating a unified air defense network.
Ukraine’s experience allows allies to witness real air defense operations on the front lines. Ukrainian forces regularly report on bomber takeoffs and ballistic launches from Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk regions.
“A few days ago, a drone flew over northern regions. An alert was issued in Poland, and several voivodeships received warnings about a potential UAV attack,” Ihnat said.
Partners receive complete information about drone movements and modern interception methods, helping them better organize their own defenses and train air security systems.
Repelling air attacks is an extremely complex task that costs lives. Ukrainian troops learn from their own mistakes and share this knowledge with allies. This allows Europe to prepare for modern threats while avoiding the errors that have cost Ukraine dozens of lives and hundreds of injuries.
© Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
I remember the shock of standing in a Lviv supermarket last summer, staring at egg prices that had tripled almost overnight. What used to cost 30 hryvnias ($0.70) for a 10-pack suddenly jumped to 60, then 85, even 90 hryvnias ($2.15).
I stopped eating eggs for a while, checking prices each time I went grocery shopping. By spring 2025, the price eventually settled around 55-75 hryvnias ($1.30-1.80) and has more or less stayed that way.
Those eggs tell a bigger story about Ukraine’s economic transformation. Russian attacks on energy infrastructure decimated the power grid, creating electricity shortages that drove power costs soaring.
Higher electricity prices pushed up the cost of lighting, heating, and water, while transport costs exploded as fuel became more expensive and imports more essential. With continuous inflation pressure, chicken farms faced higher energy bills and workforce costs and had to pay more for bird feed.
Each link in the chain passed costs down until they landed on ordinary people like me, standing wide-eyed in supermarket aisles.
This cascade effect captures something unprecedented in modern economics: Ukraine now operates under a triple burden where record-breaking military spending, household survival pressures, and long-term sustainability questions intersect in ways not seen anywhere since World War II.
As Ukraine faces a $20 billion funding shortfall and a $7 billion defense crisis, its economic model offers a real-time case study of how democratic societies reorganize themselves—from state budgets to breakfast choices—around survival demands.
Ukraine has achieved a dubious global record: spending 31% of its GDP on military expenses, the highest of any country worldwide. By the first quarter of 2025, Ukraine had already spent 75% of its entire state budget on defense, burning through resources at a pace that would exhaust most nations.
Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced Ukraine needs “at least $120 billion” for military spending in 2026, even if the war ends.
The International Monetary Fund calculates that Ukraine’s total funding requirements will reach $47.5-57.5 billion over the next two years—$20 billion more than Kyiv’s projections.
This creates an unusual fiscal reality: Ukraine’s domestic revenues fund the military while international aid covers civilian needs. The $172 million allocated to defense daily—more than half of all government spending—comes from domestic sources, but the government continues funding civilian programs through external assistance.
The parallel funding model means Ukrainian taxpayers see their contributions disappear into defense, while civilian improvements depend on donor generosity.
Even as officials warn of a 300 billion hryvnia ($7.27 billion) defense shortfall for the final months of 2025, the government still announces new spending: increased “National Cashback” funding—a program that reimburses households for part of their utility spending and also rewards purchases of Ukrainian-made products—grants for small entrepreneurs, and teacher salary bonuses.
For ordinary Ukrainians, the state’s military spending creates economic pressures that ripple through daily life. Grocery shopping now involves checking multiple stores for better prices, timing fruit and vegetable purchases around seasonal peaks, and constantly substituting proteins based on what families can afford.
This isn’t just inflation—it’s a reorganization of household economics. Food prices rose 23.9% annually through August, but the impact varies dramatically by region and income.
While someone earning Kyiv’s average salary of 40,546 hryvnias ($983) can absorb price shocks, families in central Ukraine’s Kirovohrad Oblast—where salaries average just 19,500 hryvnias ($473)—face different calculations entirely.
The Ukrainian average wage is 26,499 hryvnias ($642), but regional disparities reflect factors beyond geography: proximity to fighting, economic structure, and workforce availability are unexpectedly reshaping local economies.
Many families adapt through the shadow economy—a network of unreported work representing 30% of Ukraine’s GDP. This includes everything from tutoring lessons paid in cash to small repairs that never appear on tax forms.
For many households, shadow income provides the margin between getting by and going under. The government largely tolerates this parallel economy, recognizing that families need survival strategies even as the IMF pressures Ukraine to formalize more economic activity.
Ukraine’s economic model raises fundamental questions that extend far beyond its borders. The country cannot indefinitely spend three-quarters of its budget on defense while depending on international donors to fill civilian gaps. Yet military necessity does not allow a reduction in security spending.
This challenge confronts every democracy supporting Ukraine: how long can societies sustain unprecedented military spending while maintaining the civilian welfare that legitimizes democratic governance?
Ukraine’s triple burden experiment offers uncomfortable previews of choices other nations may face as global security deteriorates.
The sustainability question for Ukrainian families comes down to endurance versus adaptation. Those with education, connections, or cross-border skills may emigrate—but only women can cross borders easily, as military-age men face severe travel restrictions.
Others continue the daily calculus of survival economics: choosing between heating and food, present needs and future planning, individual comfort and collective security.
These pressures are reshaping Ukraine’s economic geography. Western regions—Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Zakarpattia—maintain relatively stable economies with strong international connections. Eastern areas near fighting zones struggle with basic economic functions. Central regions find themselves between these extremes, while Kyiv operates as an economic island with its own dynamics.
This four-zone division could persist long after combat ends, creating lasting internal development challenges requiring targeted policy responses.
Unlike historical conflicts where entire populations mobilized for war production, Ukraine demonstrates how economies can simultaneously maintain civilian functions while dedicating unprecedented resources to defense.
However, the funding crisis revealed by the IMF exposes a deeper question: whether democratic societies can sustain the dual burden of military effectiveness and civilian welfare that legitimizes their governance.
Ukraine’s model of separate defense and civilian funding streams—necessitated by Western aid restrictions—creates structural imbalances that force impossible choices between accountability and efficiency.
The government faces parallel pressures: cracking down on the shadow economy that helps families survive versus accepting reduced tax collection during wartime. At the same time, the IMF demands higher taxes on war-weary citizens.
These tensions preview challenges that may extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders as global security environments deteriorate. If Ukraine—with massive international support and existential motivation—struggles to balance military necessity with civilian welfare, how would other democratic societies handle similar pressures?
The triple burden model offers sobering implications for Western democracies watching from the sidelines.
Ukraine’s adaptation strategies continue to prove that societies can endure far more economic disruption than most economists thought possible. But whether this resilience can outlast Russian aggression depends not just on military aid or economic support but also on resolving the fundamental tension between democratic accountability and wartime efficiency—one grocery bill at a time.
Nizhyn suffers the largest Russian attack since the start of the war. Oleksandr Kodola, the mayor of the city in Chernihiv Oblast, which has a population of 73,000, reported that on 14–15 September, the city endured more than 16 hours of continuous air alerts.
Chernihiv Oblast is the only region in Ukraine that borders both Russia and Belarus. From its territory, Russia launches most of its Shahed drones and missiles that target Kyiv and central regions of Ukraine, with attacks reaching 500–600 drones per day. In addition to strikes to the east, launches are also directed westward, including toward Volyn Oblast, which borders Poland.
Russia launched dozens of drones against Nizhyn, striking critical infrastructure, both attack and reconnaissance.
According to the mayor, one of the drones crashed in the city center. Later, the enemy targeted a private oil depot, Suspilne reports.
“There was a strike on a large oil depot. More than 20 units of equipment were deployed to extinguish the fire. One rescuer was poisoned, and during the repeated strike in the evening three more rescuers were injured,” Kodola said.
The attacks destroyed significant property at the facility, while the city experienced disruptions in electricity and water supply.
Several districts of Nizhyn were left without power, with one street completely cut off from electricity.
In general, over the past day, the Russian army carried out 42 strikes on Chernihiv Oblast, hitting 20 settlements.
Western promises to defend Ukraine in the event of a new Russian attack lack real strength. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski said that no one is willing to wage a war against the Kremlin, which makes the guarantees unconvincing, according to Europeiska Pravda.
Fear of Russia, and of its possible collapse, has become a key foundation of international policy and security approaches in many countries since Moscow’s annexation of parts of Georgia in 2008. It became evident, especially after Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine that began in 2014 and escalated in 2022, which in turn provoked further military moves by the Kremlin. This position of fear became particularly apparent after the attack on Poland, when no corresponding actions followed.
Sikorski recalled that Ukraine already had guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum, but they failed. The new arrangements, in his view, are also incapable of deterring Moscow.
“If we provide security guarantees to Ukraine, it means we may start a war against Russia. Whoever wants to fight – can start now. But I don’t see anyone willing,” said the Polish foreign minister.
The head of Poland’s Foreign Ministry stressed that worse than having no guarantees is offering ones nobody trusts. He urged to acknowledge honestly that the current talks are more about “monitoring peace and strengthening Ukraine” than about true guarantees.
According to Sikorski, politicians should focus on military support and financing for Ukraine in 2026–2027, rather than declarative documents that demobilize allies.
Earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy outlined three key blocks of security guarantees effective for his country:
© Telegram
Norway has established Camp Jomsborg, one of the largest Norwegian military camps abroad, in the forests of southeastern Poland to train Ukrainian soldiers with Norwegian instructors, NRK reported on 15 September.
The camp, built from scratch starting this summer, currently houses hundreds of Norwegian military personnel and has begun receiving its first groups of Ukrainian trainees – experienced combat veterans from the front lines.
“They are at war. There are drones and artillery strikes. There is close combat and firefights daily. We try to recreate that, so we follow the principle ‘train as you fight,'” a Norwegian Defense instructor told NRK.
The training focuses on realistic combat simulations, with the first module addressing stress management in combat conditions. During one exercise observed by NRK, a camouflaged soldier crouched against a pine tree with wide-open eyes while Ukrainian soldiers around him slapped his cheeks, struggling to make contact. White smoke drifted between the trees as explosions echoed through the forest.
“We must prepare soldiers as well as possible so they survive at the front,” Ukrainian brigade instructor “Darius” told NRK.
Darius, now 23, was studying international politics in Kyiv when Russia launched its full-scale invasion three and a half years ago. He has since fought in Zaporizhzhia, Bakhmut – nicknamed “the meat grinder” before it fell in spring 2023 – and currently serves at the front in Kharkiv.
The camp is part of Operation Legio, led by Norway and including all Nordic countries, the Baltic states, and Poland. The operation encompasses both weapons deliveries and soldier training.
According to Brigadier Atle Molde, chief of Operation Legio, this marks the first time Norway has led an international operation abroad.
The exact location of Camp Jomsborg remains classified, but thousands of pine trees have been felled to make room for tents and shooting ranges. Construction equipment operates continuously between tents and containers across the sprawling site.
Ukrainian instructors help design the training programs based on current battlefield conditions. “We contribute by being a testing ground where we can test all possible weapons systems,” Darius explained about the Ukrainian battlefield.
Logistics presents one of the biggest challenges, according to Darius. Equipment and weapons must be carried on foot for many kilometers, leading Ukrainians to experiment with unmanned vehicles for supply delivery.
“Soldiers must stay at their positions for two to three months,” he said. “Getting them out is extremely dangerous. Most of our losses occur when people are traveling to or from the front line.”
The training program includes tactics, trench warfare, and extensive drone operations for both surveillance and attacks. “We need a safe place to train where Russian missiles and attack drones cannot reach us,” Darius noted.
Knowledge exchange flows both ways. Ukrainian instructors provide Norwegian personnel with insights into front-line challenges and emerging battlefield trends.
The Norwegian stress management instructor described the impact of working with Ukrainian soldiers: “You notice there’s a bit more seriousness in the room when you’re teaching soldiers who come straight from the front and have been in sharp combat actions just days before arriving here. You know that what you’re teaching has a direct impact on those guys when they return to battle.”
Camp capacity will vary depending on training type – fewer for specialized courses, more for basic military education. When completed, the facility will accommodate several hundred Ukrainian soldiers.
Recent weeks have been marked by high-level politics, including conversations between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and summits in China where Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un were invited. European leaders have emphasized strengthening cooperation in supporting Ukraine, with European support now at record levels.
Molde acknowledged Russian interest in monitoring camp activities but dismissed immediate attack threats: “A direct attack on a NATO country where we are now is a very big red line to cross. So I don’t consider that a very big threat.”
Following NRK’s visit, several drones have entered Polish and Romanian airspace on multiple occasions. Russia was accused of deliberately sending drones into Polish airspace, which the country denied. According to the Defense Ministry, these incidents have not affected Camp Jomsborg activities.
Darius expressed concern about potential erosion of allied support, noting shortages of ammunition, equipment, and soldiers. “I hope for good news, but our mission is to do the job ourselves.”
The casualty count from a Russian airstrike on Kramatorsk in Donetsk Oblast has risen to 15 civilians, according to the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office.
Prosecutor’s office spokeswoman Anastasia Medvedevasaid that the injured have been diagnosed with “mine-explosive injuries, concussions, bruises and cut wounds of various parts of the body, fractures.” One person remains in moderate condition.
Russian occupation forces struck the central part of Kramatorsk late on the evening of 14 September using three high-explosive aerial bombs equipped with UMPK modules, according to the prosecutor’s office. Initial reports Monday morning indicated nine injured civilians.
The overnight assault extended beyond Kramatorsk. Russian forces attacked Zaporizhzhia district during the night of 15 September, causing fires in private houses, regional officials report. No casualties have been confirmed in Zaporizhzhia at this time.
The Zaporizhzhia strike formed part of a broader Russian offensive that began at 7:00 PM on September 14. Russian forces launched three S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, along with 84 strike drones including Shahed, Gerbera, and other types from six directions: Kursk, Bryansk, Orel, Millerovo, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, according to Ukrainian military reports. Approximately 50 of the drones were Shaheds.
Russian military leadership denies targeting civilian infrastructure during the full-scale war, despite documented strikes on hospitals, schools, kindergartens, energy facilities, and water supply systems. Ukrainian authorities and international organizations classify these attacks as war crimes committed by the Russian Federation.
After provocative incursions over Poland and Romania by Russian drones, Nato’s response – to deploy military equipment along its eastern flank – might actually suit Vladimir Putin, says Mark Almond
© Dariusz Stefaniuk
© Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
American military officers attended the Russian-Belarusian joint military exercise West-2025 in Belarus on 15 September, where they were personally met by Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin, Reuters reported.
Khrenin called the visit of the American military a “surprise” and made an unusually open offer to the officers.
“We will show whatever is of interest for you. Whatever you want. You can go there and see, talk to people,” the minister told the American officers, according to Reuters.
The Belarusian Defense Ministry released video footage showing two uniformed US officers thanking Khrenin for the invitation and shaking his hand. The American representatives declined to speak with reporters.
According to Reuters, the presence of American officers represents the latest sign of warming relations between Washington and Minsk. The Americans were among representatives from 23 countries observing the exercises, including two other NATO member states – Türkiye and Hungary.
The West-2025 exercise began on 12 September at training grounds in both Russia and Belarus, occurring during heightened tensions with NATO. The maneuvers started two days after Poland shot down Russian drones that had crossed into its airspace.
The warming of US-Belarus relations follows recent diplomatic contacts. Trump representative John Coale visited Minsk last week for talks with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko. Following those negotiations, Lukashenko agreed to release 52 prisoners from jails, including journalists and political opponents.
In exchange, the United States announced sanctions relief for Belarus’s national airline Belavia, allowing it to service and purchase components for its fleet, which includes Boeing aircraft.
According to Coale, Trump wants to reopen the US embassy in Belarus, normalize ties, and revive the economic and trade relationship. Trump has been cultivating closer ties with Lukashenko, who regularly holds talks with Putin, as part of efforts to broker an end to the war in Ukraine. Last week, Trump sent Lukashenko a hand-signed letter through Coale.
The West-2025 exercises are scheduled to run from 12-16 September 2025, in Belarus. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had earlier warned of possible threats from Belarusian territory under cover of summer military exercises. Belarus subsequently announced it would move the main maneuvers deeper into the country to “reduce tensions.”
In June 2025 NielsenIQ’s Russian subsidiary began treating occupied Ukrainian territories as “new Russian regions” in its market surveys, prompting condemnation from Ukraine and concerns about the company’s adherence to EU and US sanctions.
No democratic country recognizes these annexations. By referring to Ukraine’s occupied regions as “new territories of Russia,” Nielsen’s Russian branch effectively legitimizes Moscow’s illegal land grab and undermines international law. Such framing not only echoes Kremlin propaganda but also contradicts the global effort to hold Russia accountable for war crimes and aggression.
Nielsen Russia’s data shows how including these areas inflated market growth figures. The company claims these territories account for 2–3% of beer sales. Growth rates jumped from 6% to 10% when including the new regions. This framing legitimizes Russia’s attempted annexations. It creates an illusion that the occupation has become normalized.
Konstantin Loktiev, executive director of Nielsen Russia, made even more cynical statements. He called residents of occupied territories a “new consumer group.” He speculated about the “economic potential” of regions that Russia’s war has devastated. He added that companies entering the market first would gain loyalty from this “new audience.”
The Ukrainian coalition B4Ukraine unites more than 90 organizations. It sharply condemned Nielsen’s move:
“Recognizing illegally occupied Ukrainian territories as ‘new Russian regions’ makes an unacceptable concession to the aggressor. Such steps legitimize Russia’s attempted annexation and undermine international efforts to stop its war,”
NielsenIQ’s Chicago headquarters has remained silent. The company ignores repeated media inquiries. This refusal to comment deepens suspicions that Nielsen deliberately disregards sanctions.
Nielsen claims it deconsolidated Russian operations. However, company documents confirm Nielsen still owns Russian subsidiaries, including Nielsen Data Factory LLC. Official figures show Russia accounted for about 0.6% of NIQ revenues in 2024. The company insists its Russian entities operate with local management and autonomy. But financial ties remain murky.
Nielsen has faced criticism before. In March 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine Nielsen limited some operations but chose not to exit the Russian market entirely. Hundreds of other international brands made complete exits. More than two years later, questions about Nielsen’s compliance with sanctions and international norms have intensified.
B4Ukraine urges US and EU authorities to investigate Nielsen’s practices. The coalition wants officials to determine whether Nielsen breaches sanctions:
“Nielsen must face consequences for effectively siding with the Kremlin’s war criminals. This involves more than ethics it’s about international security,”
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Ukrainian defense units operating in the area of responsibility of the 1st National Guard Corps “Azov” have cleared the settlement of Pankivka and adjacent territories from Russian forces, according to the corps’ press service.
Pankivka in Donetsk Oblast is crucial because its liberation by Ukrainian forces disrupts Russian control on the Dobropillia front, strengthening Ukraine’s strategic position in the oblast.
The liberation came as a result of coordinated actions between Armed Forces of Ukraine and National Guard units on the Dobropillia direction, the press service reports on social media.
Russian command has reinforced its grouping in the sector by relocating additional reserves to the 1st NGU “Azov” Corps zone of responsibility. The reinforcements include four infantry brigades and one marine regiment, according to the Ukrainian military.
“The enemy continues to build up military groupings. In order to strengthen offensive potential, the Russian army command relocated additional reserves to the area of responsibility of the 1st NGU ‘Azov’ Corps consisting of: four infantry brigades and one marine regiment,” the corps reported.
Ukrainian forces are working to halt the Russian advance and prevent breakthrough of defensive lines. “The Defense Forces of Ukraine are making every effort to stop the enemy’s advance and prevent a breakthrough of the defense,” the press service said.
The clearing of Pankivka represents continued territorial liberation efforts by Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillia sector, where Russian forces have been attempting to advance with reinforced units.
Ukraine’s Armed Forces deploy CATA-type launcher systems from Estonian manufacturer Threod Systems to launch long-range strike drones, the company’s commercial director Ranno Paduri revealed at the DSEI exhibition held 9-12 September.
“Every time you see a long-range drone hitting a target on Russian territory, it’s quite likely that our launcher was used by Ukrainian military,” Paduri said, according to the Defense News.
Ukraine’s Defense Forces have operated CATA launchers since 2022, according to Paduri. The systems provide silent operation and maintain four-minute intervals between launches – a capability he described as crucial for conducting mass drone strikes given the dangerous nature of such operations.
Defense Express said that Threod Systems’ official website lists an even shorter interval of less than three minutes between launches.
Beyond Ukraine, Estonian company Threod Systems supplies CATA launcher systems to multiple countries across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, according to the report.
The CATA launcher handles strike drones weighing up to 400 kilograms and traveling at speeds up to 55 meters per second. The company emphasizes the system’s operational simplicity, featuring remote control capabilities, two-operator requirements, and one-week training periods.
The launcher system includes a remote control unit that allows operators to maintain distance from the launch site. This configuration reduces personnel exposure during high-risk operations while maintaining operational effectiveness.
Defense Express previously reported that Ukraine will receive a record number of battle-tested THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles from Estonian company Milrem Robotics.
Honouring Donald Trump with a second state visit is a diplomatic strategic necessity for King and country, explains world affairs editor Sam Kiley
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