Russia and Belarus have begun their joint military drills Zapad-2025, simulating missile attacks and nuclear scenarios. Analysts warn the exercises serve as both a rehearsal for war and a signal to NATO, echoing Soviet-era shows of force.

Missile launches and nuclear decision-making

Zapad-2025 started on 12 September and is scheduled to last until 16 September on Belarusian and Russian territory. One of the declared goals is to conduct missile launches, including tests of the Oreshnik system— a missile that Putin claims to be “unstoppable.”

The official theme is framed as the “application of groupings of troops in the interests of ensuring the military security of the Union State,” — Putin’s long-stalled project to absorb Belarus into a single country.

This year’s exercise will also simulate decision-making around the use of nuclear weapons and the deployment of nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles that Moscow has promised to transfer to Minsk.

While Russia has not disclosed exact numbers, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka claimed last December that “several dozen” tactical nuclear weapons were already on Belarusian soil.

According to the Chief of the General Staff of Belarus, the Zapad-2025 exercises on Belarusian territory will be held at three training grounds located in the Vitebsk, Minsk, and Hrodna regions.

Investigators from Skhemy tracked the buildup of Russian military equipment and the deployment of additional infrastructure in these areas, allowing them to localize the sites of the upcoming drills.

While Belarusian authorities have not officially disclosed the exact locations, Lukashenka confirmed that Zapad-2025 will take place at training grounds near the city of Barysaw.

Polish and NATO concerns grow

The drills follow the latest Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace, incidents that Warsaw says had been prepared for months. In anticipation of Zapad-2025, Poland has reinforced its eastern border with around 40,000 troops.

“Poland has been preparing for the Zapad manoeuvres for many months,” Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk told Polsat News.

Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski warned that “very aggressive scenarios” will be practiced, recalling that earlier Zapad exercises preceded Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

NATO radars and allied aircraft are on high alert, with Lithuania estimating that around 30,000 Russian and Belarusian troops will take part.

Signal to NATO and Ukraine

While Moscow insists the drills are defensive, Western analysts see Zapad as both a rehearsal for potential offensives and a political message. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that the exercise could be “a cover” for further aggression against Ukraine’s western neighbors.

Even if smaller in scale than Zapad-2021, this year’s drills underscore Russia’s reliance on Belarus as a forward base, its willingness to rattle NATO with nuclear signalling, and its long-standing tradition of using military theatre — and now network warfare simulations — as geopolitical intimidation.

Poland has reinforced its eastern border with around 40,000 troops.

“Poland has been preparing for the Zapad manoeuvres for many months,” Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk told Polsat News.

Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski warned that “very aggressive scenarios” will be practiced, recalling that earlier Zapad exercises preceded Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

NATO radars and allied aircraft are on high alert, and Lithuania estimates that around 30,000 Russian and Belarusian troops will participate.

Historical context of Zapad

The Zapad (“West”) exercises date back to the Soviet era of the 1970s, when they were first designed to showcase nuclear strike capabilities and consolidate the unity of the Warsaw Pact.

Zapad-77 simulated nuclear strikes against NATO, while Zapad-81 became the largest Soviet military exercise ever, involving up to 150,000 troops and testing the SS-20 ballistic missile.

Declassified US intelligence reports from the 1980s described Zapad as one of the USSR’s most important military drills, aimed at testing wartime command structures and operational coordination across the Warsaw Pact.

Revived in 1999 under Vladimir Putin, Zapad was incorporated into a four-year cycle of large-scale Russian military exercises. Later versions integrated lessons from Russia’s wars in Crimea, Syria, and Ukraine, such as the use of drones for reconnaissance, tactical missile strikes, and counter-insurgency operations in urban areas.

The Veyshnoria precedent and hybrid “texting technologies”

The exercises have often included invented scenarios aimed at signalling to NATO and shaping perceptions abroad.

In Zapad-2017, Russia and Belarus staged combat against the fictional state of Veyshnoria— a “hostile” territory carved out of western Belarus, close to NATO borders. Analysts saw the scenario as a thinly veiled rehearsal for operations against Lithuania, Poland, or Ukraine, masked under the guise of fighting separatism.

Zapad-2025 builds on this legacy, introducing new layers of digital and communications warfare.

The discovery this summer of Russian drones using Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards reveals how Moscow tests invasion routes before using them. Since late 2023, Russia has equipped its Shahed attack drones with cellular modems—first Ukrainian SIM cards, then expanding to NATO countries.

In July, investigators found Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards in Russian drone wreckage shot down over Ukraine. Drones use cellular towers to triangulate navigation and transmit real-time targeting data while appearing as domestic mobile traffic.

Two months later, on September 9-10—just two days before Zapad-2025 began—Russian drones using Polish SIM cards violated Polish airspace. NATO fighters shot down at least four of 19 drones that crossed into Poland during Russia’s massive 415-drone attack on Ukraine.

Just as Veyshnoria was a fictional enemy created to test ground scenarios, Russia’s hijacking of local telecom networks signals Moscow’s intent to blend conventional and hybrid tactics in future conflict.

Russian forces had been preparing strikes on Poland and Lithuania for months, using 4G modems with Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards to test drone connectivity as early as June, according to the Ukrainian defense news outlet Defense Express.

SIM cards from Poland and Lithuania found in downed drones

In early July, Polish investigators revealed that wreckage from Russian drones shot down in Ukraine contained 4G modems equipped with SIM cards from Polish mobile operators, as reported by Polish journalist Marek Budzisz. Later, a SIM card from a Lithuanian operator was also discovered in another drone.

Analysts say this detail directly points to Russia’s preparation for drone incursions into NATO airspace, as Moscow tested mobile network connections in advance. The findings were reported to partners in Poland and Lithuania. Still, the revelations triggered little reaction domestically — even as Russian drones began entering Polish airspace regularly during the summer.

 

“Whether the Russian drones that attacked Poland today had such capabilities remains unknown. At the same time, the assumption that one of the tasks of this Russian attack was precisely reconnaissance of Poland’s air defense system is quite justified,” Defense Express wrote, noting that the Russia-Belarus military drills Zapad 2025 kick off today.

Nighttime drone raids over Poland

During Russia’s air attacks against Ukraine, Moscow’s drones violated the Polish airspace on multiple occasions. For example, on 7 September, a Russian drone bearing with “Cyrillic inscriptions” crashed near the Terespol border crossing with Belarus, according to Polish media. Poland and NATO forces, however, refused to shoot down such drones up until 10 September.

And in the early hours of 10 September, Russian drones once again violated Polish airspace. The incident prompted Polish aviation to scramble and temporarily shut down airports in Warsaw, Lublin, and Rzeszów amid fears of a wider attack. NATO fighter jets shot down at least four of reportedly 19 drones that crossed into Poland.

Ukraine’s Air Force said on 10 September that Russia launched 415 drones and 43 missiles, while the country’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stated that at least eight Shahed explosive drones were deliberately “aimed toward Poland,” calling the incident “a perilous precedent for Europe” and urging a united response from Western partners.

Despite clear evidence of intent, NATO has so far avoided classifying the violation as an act of aggression.

Romania is accelerating the revival of its defense industry with American and German support, prioritizing the domestic production of drones, explosives, and gunpowder, Radio Free Europe Romania reports.

The move comes as the country consolidates its role as a key NATO hub on the Alliance’s eastern flank and a critical logistics lifeline for Ukraine amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.

Brașov to become drone and explosives hub

In spring, Romania’s Ministry of Economy announced that the Transylvanian city of Brașov would host new facilities for the production of drones, explosives, and ammunition.

The local Carfil military plant is expected to produce drones using components supplied by American defense company Periscope Aviation.

“This is not a simple acquisition; it is a complete technology transfer, meant to build an indigenous industrial capacity in Romania — a long-term strategic objective for many NATO member states that want to reduce their dependence on imports and strengthen their defense industrial base,” stressed Economy Minister Bogdan Ivan.

Mr. Ivan also confirmed that drone production is scheduled to begin this summer, with an annual target of approximately 3,500 units.

“We are beneficiaries of the European SAFE Mechanism, financed by the European Commission with up to €150 billion. We have submitted Romania’s production capacities for the next ten years, along with proposals on how we can evolve, what we can build, and where we can be competitive,” Ivan said in an interview with Digi24.

Rheinmetall invests €400 million in gunpowder

At the same time, Germany’s Rheinmetall defense conglomerate is building in Brașov what will be the largest military gunpowder factory in Europe, with an investment of €400 million.

Romania’s leadership has emphasized that domestic production of gunpowder is a top priority, as the country currently imports it from Serbia, where much of the supply originates in Russia.

“This is essential for Romania’s security and independence,” said former Economy Minister Radu Oprea, underlining the need to reduce reliance on foreign sources.

Last year, Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu also declared that Romania would soon host the “most modern gunpowder plant in Europe.”

Broader industrial revival

The new projects in Brașov are part of a broader national strategy to revitalize Romania’s defense industry. German investments are also reinforcing the Mediaș plant, which is set to expand production of military vehicles.

In Satu Mare, plans are underway to launch production of Leopard tanks, further strengthening Romania’s heavy weapons capabilities.

These initiatives align with NATO’s push to ramp up production capacities across Europe in response to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Romania’s geographical position and existing infrastructure make it a frontline state in both logistics and industrial support for Kyiv.

Photo: Rheinmetall Automecanica SRL plant in Mediaș, Romania. May, 2024. Romania. Frame from the Nova Tv Medias video channel

Continuing tradition

Since the 1990s, Romania has cultivated increasingly close ties with major foreign defense companies.

Israel’s Elbit Systems was the first, establishing a joint venture with Aerostar Bacău in 1997 to modernize the Romanian MiG-21 fleet to the LanceR standard. The company also operates a local branch, Elmet International SRL, which produces avionics and drone technology.

Partnerships with US companies such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon Technologies have resulted in:

• creating an F-16 maintenance center
• the production of Patriot system components
• an assembly and production line for Piranha V armored personnel carriers in Romania.

Meanwhile, France’s Airbus, Naval Group, and Thales have supplied military communication systems, taken over and modernized the Ghimbav aircraft components factory, and entered into partnerships with the Constanța Naval Shipyard.

In addition, Poland’s PGZ has signalled interest in competing with its Borsuk model in the upcoming tender for Romania’s new infantry fighting vehicles.

Bayraktar drones stand lined up at a production facility in Brasov, which received massive investments from Airbus in 2024. Photo: Profimedia Images, Hotnews

Strategic significance for NATO and Ukraine

Romania is boosting its defense sector under the new 2024–2030 National Defense Industry Strategy, raising military spending above 2% of GDP and prioritizing advanced technologies such as AI, cybersecurity, and drones.

The plan focuses on:

• joint UAV production with Ukraine
• potential submarine manufacturing
• modernization of naval forces,
• fostering research and development, NATO–EU cooperation, and public–private partnerships to strengthen national security and position Romania as a competitive global defense producer.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Romania has re-examined its security posture as a direct neighbor of the war zone. Hosting vital NATO facilities and serving as a transit hub for military aid, Romania has become indispensable to both Ukraine’s defense and NATO’s deterrence strategy.

Moscow has taken another step towards international isolation. Russia has launched the process of withdrawing from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports. 

Since 2014, Russia has violated over 400 international agreements, and since 2022, it has ignored 22 fundamental international documents. These include violations of:

• The Geneva Conventions
• The 1994 Budapest Memorandum
• The 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership with Ukraine

At the same time, Moscow has been found guilty by international courts for grave violations, including unlawful detention, forced displacement, torture, and the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, killing 298 civilians.

However, it is still not clear how to hold Russia accountable for its crimes against thousands of people. 

Putin submits withdrawal bill to the Russian parliament

Recently, Russian ruler Vladimir Putin submitted to the State Duma a draft law denouncing the convention. If adopted, the move would relieve Russia of its obligation to admit international inspectors to its prisons.

It will also bar the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture from receiving complaints from Russian inmates.

Kremlin cites lack of representation

In an explanatory note, the Kremlin argued that Russia has had no representative in the European anti-torture committee since 2023, following the Council of Europe’s blockage of the election of a new Russian member. Moscow has claimed its appeals for reinstatement were ignored.

In reality, the Council of Europe expelled Russia from the organisation in March 2022, shortly after the start of the all-out war against Ukraine. Despite this, Russia remains formally obliged to comply with European Court of Human Rights rulings issued before its expulsion. The Kremlin, however, has openly stated it will ignore them.

Convention’s global importance

The convention, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1984, obliges member states to prevent torture within their jurisdiction and prohibits extradition to countries where individuals face the risk of torture.
Russia ratified the treaty in 1996, with its provisions taking effect two years later.

Part of a broader retreat from human rights commitments

Moscow’s withdrawal continues a broader pattern: last year, Russia withdrew from the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Rights of National Minorities.

Earlier, Euromaidan Press reported that Russia had suspended monitoring of facilities holding Ukrainian POWs, where electrocution and beatings have become routine.

According to Ukraine’s Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets, Russia’s withdrawal from the Convention paves the way for even greater crimes against imprisoned Ukrainians.

European intelligence services have dismantled a spy network run by Belarus’ KGB across several EU states, the Czech counterintelligence agency (BIS) announced on 8 September evening. Among the suspects is Alexandru Balan, a former deputy head of Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) and later a diplomat to Ukraine, who was arrested in Romania.

The case highlights how Belarus continues to serve as a channel for Russian influence and espionage inside the EU, testing European security architecture and raising calls for tighter controls on Belarusian and Russian diplomatic movements across Schengen states.

Network linked to Belarus’ KGB

According to BIS, operatives from the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania uncovered the network, which relied heavily on Belarusian diplomatic cover to move agents across Europe. The operation was coordinated under the supervision of the EU’s judicial cooperation agency Eurojust.

The Czech Foreign Ministry later confirmed the expulsion of a Belarusian diplomat involved in the case, who was given 72 hours to leave the country. 

“To successfully counter these hostile activities in Europe, we need to restrict the movement of accredited diplomats from Russia and Belarus within the Schengen area,” BIS chief Michal Koudelka stated.

Moldovan connection revealed

Romania’s anti-organized crime agency DIICOT said that between 2024 and 2025, the Moldovan suspect met twice with Belarusian KGB officers in Budapest. Investigators have “reasonable suspicion” that the meetings involved transmitting instructions and receiving payments in exchange for state secrets, compromising Romania’s national security.

Romanian and Moldovan media later confirmed the suspect’s identity as Alexandru Balan, a former deputy director of the SIS. Possessing both Moldovan and Romanian citizenship, Balan is accused of leaking classified information and high treason in favour of the Belarusian spy institution (KGB).

Diplomatic mission in Ukraine

After leaving Moldova’s intelligence service, Balan was appointed as a diplomat at the Moldovan Embassy in Kyiv. This fact was not highlighted in this particular case, but it raises a significant concern regarding Mr. Balan’s previous record of activities within his diplomatic position. 

The case highlights the vulnerability of diplomatic postings during wartime and the regional risks posed by compromised officials.

Balan’s record of abuses

Commenting to the Romanian press, Moldova’s former Defense Minister Anatol Salaru described Balan as “the main anti-Romania figure in Moldova’s SIS.” 

Salaru accused him of recruiting Bessarabian students in Romania for intelligence purposes, orchestrating bribery schemes, and protecting criminals.

Balan also played a role in the notorious 2018 case, when Turkish teachers from a Turkish-Romanian high school in Chișinău were kidnapped and handed over to Ankara at the request of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The teachers were taken directly from the streets of Chișinău, flown to Türkiye, and immediately jailed, leaving their families behind.

Wider security implications

The exposure of Belarus’ European spy network comes as Minsk deepens its alignment with Moscow. Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a staging ground for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and later approved the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear missiles. 

Belarus, under dictator Alexander Lukashenko, remains a close ally of Russia. Moscow not only uses Belarusian territory to stage its war against Ukraine but also seeks to empower pro-Russian forces in neighboring countries, including Moldova. The spy network thus illustrates a broader Kremlin strategy to undermine security across Eastern Europe and destabilize Ukraine’s allies.