A wave of covert explosions striking tankers tied to Russian energy exports appears to be the work of Ukrainian special forces, according to a detailed analysis by Tom Sharpe OBE in The Telegraph. While no official confirmation has been issued, the precision and pattern of the attacks strongly suggest a coordinated sabotage campaign.
“Someone – and bluntly, that someone is the Ukrainian special forces – is making highly effective use of these weapons,” Sharpe writes.
Sanctions, oil, and the shadow fleet
Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the West imposed sweeping sanctions and a $60-per-barrel oil price cap to choke off funding for the war. In response, Moscow has leaned on a vast and opaque “shadow fleet” of aging tankers operating under obscure ownership and dubious flags of convenience. These vessels now carry more than 60% of Russia’s crude exports, helping sustain the oil revenues that fund Putin’s war.
Despite sanctions, the fleet continues to operate, with the US, EU, and UK stepping up enforcement through ship sanctions, port bans, and insurance crackdowns—efforts that so far have had limited effect.
Limpet mines: Targeted maritime sabotage
Military analysts and investigators believe the attacks were carried out using limpet mines, specifically Russian-made BPM-1 or BPM-2 models. These mines are designed to be manually attached to ship hulls by divers or delivered via unmanned underwater systems—tools of precision sabotage, not broad sea denial.
Their use indicates a high level of operational expertise, likely involving rebreather diving, manual or sonar-based navigation, and possibly mini-submersible delivery systems.
BPM limpet mine. Photo: sappers.com.ua
Sixth incident: Eco Wizard explosion in Ust-Luga
The most recent incident occurred on 6 July, when the Eco Wizard tanker was rocked by two explosions while loading ammonia at the Russian port of Ust-Luga. Though not a direct gas shipment, Sharpe notes that “ammonia is made of natural gas,” making it, in effect, a form of energy export.
This marks the sixth such attack this year. Previous explosions targeted tankers near Libya, Italy, Türkiye, and again in Ust-Luga. Many of the affected vessels had previously anchored near Malta and Libya—regions frequently linked to Russia’s shadow fleet operations.
Legal constraints and the grey zone at sea
Western powers have struggled to interdict the shadow fleet due to legal protections under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which enshrines freedom of navigation. Efforts to board or inspect suspect vessels under environmental or flag-related pretexts have had only limited success.
Sharpe also notes that many of these tankers are now accompanied by Russian warships or warplanes, raising the stakes and making direct intervention politically risky.
The Eagle S tanker off Porvoo on 30 December 2024. Screenshot: YLE
Strategic shift in maritime warfare
The suspected use of limpet mines by Ukrainian forces signals a strategic escalation in the maritime dimension of the war. These covert, deniable strikes target the infrastructure sustaining Russia’s war economy—without crossing into open confrontation.
As Sharpe concludes, this is a clear demonstration of “highly effective” unconventional warfare, exploiting vulnerabilities the West has yet to fully address.
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Lithuania and Finland are preparing to begin domestic production of anti-personnel landmines next year to supply themselves and Ukraine, according to officials from both NATO member states who spoke to Reuters.
The countries are ready to begin manufacturing once their six-month withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention is complete.
The Ottawa Convention banned anti-personnel landmines worldwide. Since 1999, it has drawn 164 countries committed to destroying their mine stockpiles and clearing contaminated land, as mines can cause severe injuries and deaths among civilians. But here’s the problem: Russia, China, and the United States never signed on. Neither did India or Pakistan. The world’s major military powers kept their mines.
This decision reflects growing European concerns that Russia’s military ambitions may extend beyond Ukraine. Recently, NATO states have pledged to increase defense spending up to 5% in line with demands from US President Donald Trump.
Lithuania shares 274 kilometers (170 miles) of border with Russia and 679 kilometers (421 miles) with Belarus, a key Kremlin’s ally, so they are concerned about the country’s security amid continued Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
“We are going to spend hundreds of millions of euros on anti-tank mines, but also on anti-personnel mines. It will be a significant amount,” Lithuanian Deputy Defense Minister Karolis Aleksa told Reuters. How many? Tens of thousands, possibly more.
Can they actually produce them? “Our national industry will be one of the sources. Our industry can make these,” Aleksa said.
Helsinki had more than 1 million anti-personnel landmines before joining the Ottawa Convention in 2011. They destroyed them all, following the rules. Now they’re rebuilding that capability as Finland’s border with Russia stretches 1,340 kilometers (832 miles)—longer than any other NATO state.
Both countries have concluded the same thing: when your neighbor stockpiles weapons banned by treaties they never signed, you need every defensive option available.
Other Eastern European countries consider mines production amid Russia’s threat
Three additional NATO and European Union states – Poland, Latvia and Estonia – are also exiting the treaty, citing heightened security concerns about Russia due to its war in Ukraine. While these three countries have not announced production plans, officials in Poland and Latvia indicated they could begin manufacturing quickly if necessary, and Estonia views it as a future possibility.
All five NATO countries say they won’t create minefields during peacetime. Instead, they’ll store the mines for rapid deployment if threatened. Poland has already designated zones that could be mined within days as part of future military fortifications along its eastern frontier.
Ukraine has similarly announced its withdrawal from the 1997 Ottawa treaty to better defend against Russia, which is not a party to the agreement.
This decision comes after nearly two decades of compliance since Ukraine joined the treaty in 2005, but the full-scale Russian invasion and Russia’s ongoing use of mines have forced Ukraine to reconsider its position.
Explore further
Ukraine exits global mine ban for self-defense reasons as Russia ignores international law
The Ukrainian government argues that the treaty unfairly restricts its right to self-defense under the UN Charter, especially as Russia cynically employs mines and other weapons without regard for international law.
Lithuania and Finland plan to supply Ukraine with mines
Vincas Jurgutis, head of Lithuania’s defense industry association, said once production is established, Lithuania would be positioned to supply others including Ukraine.
Finland could also supply landmines to Ukraine, Finnish parliament defence committee chair Heikki Autto said. “It is not only right and our duty to support Ukraine, it is also important for Finland’s own security.”
But here’s the humanitarian concern: Anti-personnel mines detonate when triggered by contact, vibration or tripwires, and can harm civilians as well as combatants. Many remain in the ground long after conflicts conclude.
Anti-mine campaigners have criticized the countries leaving the Ottawa Convention, arguing that reintroducing anti-personnel mine production could be expensive and time-consuming to make fully operational.
Russia’s ambassador to Helsinki said in April that Finland’s decision to quit the Ottawa treaty would create risks only for Finnish residents since its military planned to mine only Finnish territory.
The countries’ governments, however, say any minefields must be marked for post-conflict clearance and regard such munitions as deterrence. “When we have them in storage, that is the best guarantee that they will never have to be used,” Autto said.
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Five countries plan to revive the use of a weapon prohibited by treaty for more than a quarter of a century, hoping to strengthen their defenses against any Russian attack.
A demining team clearing a field in 2023 in Makariv, Ukraine, an area near Kyiv that was occupied by Russian forces during the early months of the war.
Depuis 1983, RWE, longtemps l’un des plus grands émetteurs de CO2 en Europe, a exproprié des dizaines de milliers d’habitants pour fournir en énergie le pays. La mine de charbon à ciel ouvert de Garzweiler II a déjà mangé 11 400 hectares de terres.
— Permalien
Ukraine was a signatory to the Ottawa Treaty, banning anti-personnel mines. On 29 June 2025, it officially withdrew, citing Russia’s widespread use of banned mines like the PFM-1 across Ukrainian territory. But stepping away from the treaty won’t protect sappers from the mines already scattered by Russia. In Kherson, I spoke to a Ukrainian sapper who lost part of his foot after stepping on a Russian PFM-1 — one of thousands still buried in civilian areas.
I took a step forward to photograph the piano for her, then stopped, remembering that everything around was mined.
The Palace of Culture in Kherson looked like a torn Japanese divider—translucent sheets on a lattice frame, light filtering through squares.
On 25 September 2024, two Russian aerial-guided bombs had turned a beloved community center into a skeleton. Photo: IRS Pivden
A grand piano loomed in the dusk. A few hours ago, my friend Alyona, in tears, showed me the video of this piano in flames—she used to play it as a little girl.
#Kherson A piano in flames in a city arts center after a Russian aerial bomb attack this morning.
Like many Khersonians, Alyona survived nine months of Russian occupation, lost her house in the flood, but rarely showed emotion. Yet now, she wept.
A “Petal” mine. Photo: Zarina Zabrisky
The dark stage in the amphitheater once hosted dance recitals, chorus competitions, and rock concerts. Now, it was a minefield.
A blue-green ballet studio with broken bars and shattered mirrors was once filled with little ballerinas in pink tutus. Now, it was infested with banned anti-infantry mines with the deceptively beautiful name—”Petals.”
Walking through the remains of the Palace of Culture was not just soul-crushing and glass-crashing. It was deadly.
The Russian military remotely mined Kherson. To clear it, an EOD team had to clear the site.
I stepped outside and heard the drone buzzing. Russian killer drones swept back and forth, like angry wasps. They dropped grenades, homemade explosives, incendiary devices, and “Petals.”
I ducked under a tree to wait for the drone to fly toward the Dnipro River, back to the Russian pilot’s nest on the occupied bank.
In an hour, a message flashed on my phone: an EOD lost his foot demining the site. Volodymyr Perepylytsia, head of explosive services for the National Police in Kherson Oblast, spoke to me before, telling me PFM-1 anti-personnel mines, “look like fallen leaves. If you step on them, you lose a limb.”
He was now at the hospital, in need of a blood transfusion.
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How do you measure impossible?
How hard is EOD in Kherson? On a scale of 0 to 100, Volodymyr gives it a thousand. Still, he and his team keep going.
Volodymyr Perepelytsia. Photo: Zarina Zabrisky
A few months later, Volodymyr is back to demining, and I speak to him about that day.
Hunted by a Russian drone, he also had to hide under the tree. He knew that it could be mined, and, of two evils, he chose the lesser one.
Trained to provide first aid, he applied the tourniquet to himself while he waited for the team to rescue him.
Russian drones continued to patrol the sky over the Palace of Culture, aiming for the “double tap” to attack the first responders.
“I was thinking about my wife, my son, my loved ones. It helped,” said Volodymyr.
“And now? I lost my foot, but I can still do my job. I don’t see my life outside of service, outside of defending my country. I volunteered to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2014, when the war began. As long as I can walk, breathe, and talk, I will be in the defense forces.”
Since September 2024, the situation has deteriorated. Russian forces are not just laying mines remotely—they are turning mine clearance into a trap.
Once sappers arrive to demine, they are targeted by drones and artillery. Civilians passing through are also hit. EOD teams face the possibility of being struck mid-defusal, with unstable explosives literally in their hands.
Russian forces continue to evolve their tactics, said Volodymyr. Munitions and drones are now fitted with motion and seismic sensors, touch activation, and remote radio signals. No two devices are the same. Remote-controlled explosive devices (RCEDs) present a growing concern.
Volodymyr Perepelytsia and a colleague. Photo: Zarina Zabrisky
Drones deliver munitions embedded with radio-controlled detonators. These devices may fall or land, then explode, activated by a remote trigger.
Ukrainian EOD teams continue operating under direct fire and risking their lives to clear explosives in civilian areas, but the accident forced the sappers to rethink safety.
“What’s more important: demining or the EOD life? Should the operation proceed urgently, or can it wait?” said Volodymyr.
The decision to enter a location no longer depends solely on the presence of mines or explosive hazards—it hinges on real-time evaluation of Russian drone activity.
Before deployment, teams assess the drone threat level. If there are red flags, operations may be delayed or aborted.
When civilians report suspicious items in parks, yards, or homes, EOD’s responses are calculated. If a drone carrying a 5–6 kg payload is active in the area, demining may be postponed.
The immediate response could destroy nearby homes and kill civilians. Residents often understand the risk and agree to wait.
Along the Dnipro River, demining efforts mean near-certain death due to multiple threats, such as mines underfoot, the presence of aerial bombs, and strike drones above.
“It is an art,” Volodymyr says.
What kind of person volunteers to defuse bombs?
A sapper in Kherson Oblast. Image has been altered by AI to conceal his identity for security reasons.
Another EOD won’t give his call names for the interview: the EODs are on the Russian military top priority hit list. Athletic, tall, face calm, my interlocutor goes by “Sapper.”
“It’s like a game, full of surprises, thrills, and traps,” he says. “I love it. The challenges. The rush of adrenaline.”
His eyes are glittering with excitement, and he sounds like a theater director staging an avant-garde play. He echoes Volodymyr’s point,
“A lot of it is art. The art of improvisation. And a lot of it is psychology: To be successful, an EOD expert must think like the adversary. What could be mined? What is it?”
“Our task is to disarm bombs—and not blow up in the process,” a Kherson sapper told me in an interview. “Watch The Hurt Locker to understand about sappers.”
The Hollywood film showed an EOD operator in full gear with a squad backing him up. In Ukraine and in the Kherson region of southern Ukraine, sapper work might look less sci-fi—but the same level of nerve, precision, and trust is a must.
The Sapper lights a cigarette and shows me the lighter, then points at my power bank and my cell phone.
“Could be any of this. Or—is it your laptop? A discarded Sprite can?” he says.
“Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) could be hidden in rubble and then detonated as booby-traps or remotely, by phone. Good EODs recognize each other by their signature style. We can identify the distinctive traits of the explosives maker. Like serial killers, each ordnance maker has his own signature style, rituals, and habits. You read wires’ length and attachments.”
The Kherson EOD team, for instance, knows there are four instructors training Russians on the other side of the river. Their students adopt their signature style, with slight modifications.
The EOD group of Volodymyr Perepelytsia. Image altered with AI to conceal identities of the sappers for security reasons.
–How do you learn to be an EOD?
–I started as a teenager. Basic knowledge, a good teacher, and plenty of experience are essential. Many learn from the Internet, but you have to be careful as it is a minefield of its own, full of traps, with many misleading YouTube manuals for making explosives.
–How does your typical day go?
–A phone call from the residents. A drone attack. I need to drive to the location, but it is not straightforward. Often, another Russian drone follows me or waits for me there. I carry a Kalashnikov to shoot it down. A hunter rifle would be better, as it fires with a spread of pebbles, but it’s $300. I can’t afford that. Both AK and hunter rifle shoot only as far as 75 meters. Drones fly at 120 meters above the ground. If it flies lower—around 30 meters—it is a kamikaze drone. Means an imminent attack.
Sappers in Kherson Obblast. Photo: Zarina Zabrisky
With drone attacks intensifying, EOD experts in Kherson must possess extraordinary combat stress resistance. Since spring 2024, Russian drones have targeted the coastal areas and suburbs of Kherson, and by May 2025, they’ve reached the city’s central and previously considered “safe” districts.
Mavic drones can cover distances of up to 15 km, carrying up to 600 grams, while FPV drones can travel up to 19 km, depending on their load, with the capacity to carry up to 4 kg of explosives.
Both types often carry retransmitter devices, which extend their range or help bypass obstacles like terrain or interference. The larger the battery, the further the drone can fly, but it sacrifices explosive payload.
One of the explosives dropped by a Russian drone. Photo: Zarina Zabrisky
Once the Sapper manages to arrive at the site, he needs to determine whether the suspect device—an FPV drone or explosives—had detonated. He needs to think critically and confront the issue before it becomes uncontrollable. The Russians disguise ordnance as home appliances and trash.
If the device did not detonate, the Sapper’s task is to neutralize the ordnance. If it did, he often has to sift through the rubble and body parts to establish what kind of drone and ordnance were used.
“You must have high combat stress resistance,” says the Sapper. “Seeing dozens of killed children is not good for your mental health.”
This deadly expertise comes at a price. Chris “Swampy” Garrett, a British Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) expert, was killed on 6 May 2025 during a demining mission near Izium.
In Ukraine since 2014, Swampy joined the Azov Regiment as an instructor and co-founded Prevail Together, a nonprofit focused on mine clearance, medical aid, and risk education. His death underscores the daily risks faced by Ukraine’s sappers—technicians tasked with disarming mines and unexploded ordnance.
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How the game keeps changing
Mavic drones are primarily used for reconnaissance but occasionally drop fragmentation grenades (VOGs), which cause shrapnel injuries, mostly to limbs, but rarely fatal.
An explosive dropped by a drone. Photo: Zarina Zabrisky
FPV drones, however, are used as kamikaze drones or to drop explosives, including both industrially manufactured munitions and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs), often resembling “collars on dogs.”
In addition to standard munitions, the Russian military deploys incendiary devices, such as napalm mixtures produced during the Soviet era. IIDs with such mixtures explode on impact, igniting fires.
Soviet-made K51 chemical grenades with toxic substances have been dropped in Antonivka, causing respiratory burns. The most lethal of these are the fragmentation munitions.
Thermobaric grenade. Image from Russian manual
Smoke bomb. Image from Russian manual
There are also innovative devices, like magnetic target sensors that detonate when metal comes close. If civilians attempt to dispose of ordnance with a spade, these devices can trigger an explosion. Such munitions can be disguised as household items or waste, like a can of Sprite found in Antonivka.
Additionally, grenades from underbarrel grenade launchers are sometimes converted into mini aerial bombs. Each new improvised explosive device presents a unique puzzle—and an ever-deadlier risk. With AI now being incorporated, the challenges for EOD experts in Ukraine continue to evolve.
Hi, I’m Zarina, a frontline reporter for Euromaidan Press and the author of this piece. We aim to shed light on some of the world’s most important yet underreported stories. Help us make more articles like this by becoming a Euromaidan Press patron.
The threat now also includes sabotage and suicide-style attacks. A new tactic has emerged, with Russian special forces recruiting or coercing Ukrainian civilians into becoming saboteurs. Explosives are hidden in bags or parcels and left in public areas. In some cases, individuals detonate themselves, knowingly or unknowingly.
Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention puts it in company with Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—all countries that have either withdrawn or announced their intention to do so since Russia’s invasion began.
These nations, facing direct threats from a neighbor unconstrained by humanitarian law, have chosen military necessity over international idealism.
Still, the sappers keep going. They rely on shared knowledge, sharp instincts, and their love of the work. As Volodymyr puts it, knowing the scale of danger he faces every day: “My motivation is victory in the war against the invader.”
Even in the water
Ukraine deploys demining drones to break Russia’s Dnipro wall
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Ukraine is walking away from a treaty that prohibits anti-personnel mines. Why abandon an agreement designed to protect civilians?
Because Russia never signed it—and has been laying mines across Ukrainian territory for over two years.
Russians scatter landmines across Ukraine to slow down and bleed Ukrainian forces while protecting their own positions. Their doctrine emphasizes grinding down enemies rather than outmaneuvering them, so they plant dense minefields along key routes where Ukrainian troops might advance. Russian forces deploy mines via various methods, including hand emplacement, rocket delivery, and increasingly by drones that scatter antipersonnel mines over urban and rural areas, causing civilian casualties and terror among the population.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the withdrawal decree on June 29. Parliament must still approve the move, but the message is clear: Ukraine needs every defensive tool available.
What exactly is Ukraine leaving behind?
The Ottawa Convention banned anti-personnel landmines worldwide. Since 1999, it has drawn 164 countries committed to destroying their mine stockpiles and clearing contaminated land, as mines can cause severe injuries and deaths among civilians.
Ukraine joined in 2005, dutifully following the rules for nearly two decades. The country destroyed its mines and cleared old minefields.
But here’s the problem: Russia, China, and the United States never signed on. Neither did India or Pakistan. The world’s major military powers kept their mines.
Why break the promise now?
“Ukraine found itself in an unequal and unfair situation,” the Foreign Ministry stated. The treaty limits Ukraine’s right to self-defense under UN Charter Article 51.
When Ukraine joined in 2005, Russian tanks weren’t rolling toward Kyiv. The full-scale invasion changed everything.
In 2005, Ukraine ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction, commonly known as the Ottawa Convention, and since then has faithfully fulfilled its obligations.
“We are convinced that this step is both necessary and proportionate to the level of threats, as it concerns the survival and preservation of Ukraine as a sovereign, independent, and free state,” the Ministry stated.
Zelenskyy put it bluntly: Russia uses mines “extremely cynically,” not just against Ukraine but wherever it fights. Chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, landmines—Moscow deploys whatever kills.
What’s Ukraine supposed to do? Fight by rules Russia ignores?
“Anti-personnel mines are an instrument that very often has no alternative for defense,” Zelenskyy explained. Especially for countries sharing borders with Russia.
Who else is rethinking the ban?
Ukraine isn’t alone in this calculation. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Finland have all decided to leave the treaty.
Notice the pattern? Every country borders Russia or sits within striking distance. The Baltic states remember Soviet occupation. Poland knows Russian history. Finland fought Stalin’s army.
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Warsaw joins Baltic States in exiting Ottawa landmine treaty, struggles to find new supply
This decision was also driven by Russia’s increasing military threat to NATO’s eastern flank with some reports claiming Russia might attack NATO within the next five years.
Each of these countries concluded the same thing: when facing Russia, defensive options matter more than international agreements Moscow never joined.
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President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, a step that follows the Baltic nations and Poland's move to boost their defense as the war rages on in Ukraine.
The 1997 treaty, joined by over 160 countries, bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines in efforts to protect civilians from the scattered explosives that could still injure them long after the conflict is over.
"Russia has never been a party to this convention and uses anti-personnel mines extremely cynically," Zelensky said in justifying the decision. "And not only now, in the war against Ukraine. This is the signature style of Russian killers — to destroy life by all methods at their disposal.
Earlier in March, the Baltic states and Poland announced their intention to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, a significant shift in defense policy that shows how countries near Ukraine are preparing for a potential war in Europe.
Anti-personnel mines are scattered across the battlefield in Ukraine, with soldiers and civilians often losing their feet or limbs due to detonations. Territories liberated by Ukraine since 2022 have been heavily covered with mines, making it extremely difficult and dangerous to clear them. Russia has used more than a dozen variants of anti-personnel mines since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, according to Human Rights Watch's June report.
In a surprise move that angered Moscow, the Biden administration in 2024 approved the provision of anti-personnel mines to Ukraine. Then Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said it was to help Ukraine stall the Russian advances in the east as the front-line situation deteriorated.
"This is a step that the reality of war has long demanded," lawmaker Roman Kostenko, secretary of the parliament's defense committee, said in the Facebook post announcing a significant move forward in withdrawing from the major mine treaty.
Now that Zelensky signed the decree enacting the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, it will land on the parliament's table, Kostenko said. The dates when the decision will take effect are still unclear.
Today, there are interesting updates from the Kostiantynivka direction, Donetsk Oblast.
Here, after facing repeated humiliating setbacks at Pokrovsk, the Russian command redirected their offensive toward Kostiantynivka, as they collided with the Ukrainian defense line. The Russians sent a massive assault group with dozens armored vehicles to break through, but were funneled into a devastating kill zone.
The goal of Russian forces west of Kostiantynivka is to achieve a decisive penetration through Ukrainian defensive lines, creating opportunities to outflank and encircle both Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka simultaneously. This would disrupt Ukrainian defenses across two crucial sectors, potentially destabilizing a massive portion of the frontline.
A screenshot from the RFU News – Reporting from Ukraine YouTube video, 26 June.
Following a relatively rapid Russian advance in this area last month, Ukrainian forces swiftly redeployed elite units to stall further gains, successfully buying time for reserves to reinforce secondary defense lines. Despite incremental Russian progress since the initial breakthrough, Ukrainian defenders succeeded in slowing down enemy momentum, preventing the frontline collapse that Russia urgently sought. Now, Russian forces find themselves confronting fortified Ukrainian positions to the southwest of Kostiantynivka, where they’ve been unable to advance further over the past two weeks.
A screenshot from the RFU News – Reporting from Ukraine YouTube video, 26 June.
The Russians currently hold one significant advantage, the establishment of a bridgehead across the important Bychok River. This allows them to transfer larger numbers of troops and equipment across the water barrier, increasing their offensive potential and the intensity of their attacks.
The geographic position of the bridgehead offers flexibility for attacks against Kostiantynivka or Pokrovsk, but given limited resources, Russian commanders seem focused primarily on pushing toward Kostiantynivka. This tactical choice also threatens the nearby Ukrainian defense lines near Toretsk, increasing the reward of any successful maneuver for the Russians.
A screenshot from the RFU News – Reporting from Ukraine YouTube video, 26 June.
However, Ukrainian defenses around Kostiantynivka are robust and carefully designed, significantly shaping Ukrainian tactics and granting a decisive defensive advantage. Elaborate anti-tank ditches and natural terrain features effectively funnel Russian forces along the heavily fortified Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway.
Ukrainian engineers have constructed a sophisticated network of layered fortifications along this critical road, establishing a formidable defense in depth. Additionally, rows of dragon teeth along the highway serve as concrete barriers to halt Russian armored assaults, while hidden Ukrainian positions in the fortifications deliver devastating fire. Ukrainian artillery and drone operators wait in concealed positions, ready to unleash intense fire on enemy formations entering these well-prepared kill zones.
A screenshot from the RFU News – Reporting from Ukraine YouTube video, 26 June.
Faced with mounting difficulties and aware of the increasingly reinforced Ukrainian positions, the Russian command opted for a desperate gamble. They planned to launch one large-scale mechanized assault rather than their more typical smaller infiltration tactics they had been relying on recently. Hoping to surprise and overwhelm Ukrainian defenders, the Russians dispatched one of the largest mechanized columns seen in this sector for months, consisting of at least 23 armored vehicles and over a dozen motorcycles.
However, the column drove directly into a carefully prepared Ukrainian kill zone along the fortified highway. To avoid running into mines on the road itself, the Russians drove beside it, but the Ukrainian minefields extended into the fields, destroying several of their vehicles. The battle was brutal and chaotic, lasting over 3 hours as Ukrainians obliterated this massive Russian assault part by part. Ukrainian FPV drone operators and artillery systematically dismantled the Russian formation as it struggled to advance due to the obstacles.
A screenshot from the RFU News – Reporting from Ukraine YouTube video, 26 June.
The engineer vehicle destined to clear a path through the dragon’s teeth was destroyed, as were the soldiers on motorcycles that could have blown a path through them with explosives, causing the Russian armor to bunch up and be devastated by artillery. Of the approximately twenty-five armored vehicles engaged, eighteen were decisively destroyed.
Some of them detonated on carefully placed anti-tank mines; others, attempting to escape Ukrainian fire, panicked and drove directly into anti-tank ditches, becoming stationary targets swiftly finished off by Ukrainian drones. Nearly two hundred Russian troops were killed in the failed assault, underscoring the catastrophic nature of failing an attempted breakthrough.
A screenshot from the RFU News – Reporting from Ukraine YouTube video, 26 June.
Overall, while Russian forces initially achieved limited success southwest of Kostiantynivka, the newly improved and manned Ukrainian defensive setup decisively halted the recent ambitious mechanized assault. The scale of losses incurred in this latest attack represents another severe setback for Russian commanders, reflecting both poor operational planning and underestimation of Ukrainian preparations.
Nevertheless, previous patterns suggest that Russians will regroup and return, refusing to abandon their objective. Ukrainian commanders expect that Russia is already mobilizing additional units and equipment, preparing another offensive effort against the long coveted Kostiantynivka sector.
In our regular frontline report, we pair up with the military blogger Reporting from Ukraine to keep you informed about what is happening on the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
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The area of potentially mined territories in Ukraine shrunk by over 20% since the end of 2022 to approximately 137,000 square kilometers, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced following a meeting on humanitarian demining measures at the State Emergency Service’s Mine Action Office.
The remaining contaminated area consists predominantly of agricultural land, according to Shmyhal.
“The resource of 112 certified operators, eight of which are foreign currently working in Ukraine, includes over 9,000 specialists, 278 demining and earthmoving equipment units, and over 13,000 metal detectors,” the Prime Minister said.
Following the meeting, the Prime Minister assigned ministries and responsible officials several tasks, including accelerating the launch of the Register of Territories Contaminated with Explosive Ordnance and developing an action plan to attract international financing directly for demining activities.
Ukraine has formed an international anti-mine coalition of over fifty states and secured $1.2 billion in aid for territory clearance, according to Shmyhal.
“Humanitarian demining is a key element of rapid recovery. Our goal is to constantly increase the pace of work to clear Ukrainian fields, villages, cities, and infrastructure from mines as quickly as possible,” the Prime Minister concluded.
Earlier, the government announced allocation of over 22 billion UAH ($528 mn) in partner-provided financial resources for recovery needs, with nearly 18.5 billion UAH ($445 mn) from the Japan International Cooperation Agency designated for medicine, education, agriculture, humanitarian demining, and restoration of municipal services in Ukrainian cities.
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Finland's parliament voted on June 19 to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, citing growing security concerns from Russia's aggressive posture and the threat it poses to the region, Reuters reported.
The vote aligns Finland with its Baltic allies, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose parliaments have already approved similar exits from the treaty.
Defending the decision earlier this week, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said the security reality along Finland's 1,300-kilometer (800-mile) border with Russia had changed dramatically since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to TVP.
"The reality in the endgame is that we have as our neighboring country an aggressive, imperialist state called Russia, which itself is not a member of the Ottawa Treaty and which itself uses landmines ruthlessly," Stubb said.
Russia has widely deployed landmines across Ukrainian territory since launching its invasion in 2022, a tactic condemned by human rights organizations and Western governments.
Finland, which joined NATO in 2023, has significantly ramped up its defense posture amid growing concern over potential Russian provocations. The country closed its border with Russia over a year ago, accusing Moscow of orchestrating a "hybrid operation" by directing asylum seekers toward Finnish territory. Helsinki claims such hybrid tactics have intensified since it joined the alliance.
The Finnish Border Guard completed the first 35 kilometers (22 miles) of a planned 200-kilometer (124-mile) fence along its eastern frontier on May 21. The move came amid growing evidence of Russian military infrastructure expansion near the Finnish border.
Finland is "closely monitoring and assessing Russia's activities and intentions," Finland's Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen told AFP on May 22.
"We have excellent capabilities to observe Russian operations. As a member of the alliance, Finland holds a strong security position."
Russia's Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said in December 2024 that Moscow must be ready for a potential conflict with NATO within the next decade. Western officials have repeatedly warned of the possibility that Moscow could target NATO members in the coming years.
Depuis 1983, RWE, longtemps l’un des plus grands émetteurs de CO2 en Europe, a exproprié des dizaines de milliers d’habitants pour fournir en énergie le pays. La mine de charbon à ciel ouvert de Garzweiler II a déjà mangé 11 400 hectares de terres.
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