The Russian force in Ukraine has mostly parked its armored vehicles and shifted to infantry-led assaults across the drone-patrolled gray zone.

Which is why what happened on or just before 8 July is so bewildering. Despite Russian commanders concluding that vehicles are too easy for Ukraine's tiny first-person-view drones to find and strike, and despite a reported ban on Russian vehicular traffic on eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Ring Road, the Russian Center Group of Forces massed no fewer than 50 vehicles 12 km south of the gray zone stretching between Kostiantynivka and Toretske in Donetsk Oblast.

The outcome was predictable. Drones from the Ukrainian State Security Service's Ivan Franko Group detected and attacked the column of trucks, vans, cars, all-terrain vehicles, and motorcycles just south of the ring road near the village of Malynivka, an important base for Russian forces fighting in Donetsk Oblast. When the smoke and dust cleared, more than 50 vehicles had been hit and immobilized if not destroyed.

"Despite the ban on movement of cargo and military transport on the Donetsk Ring Road, IFG with a firm hand and drones that you donated 'detained' several violators," the Ivan Franko Group quipped.

It's unclear how many Russians were killed or wounded. But the Center Group of Forces clearly failed at whatever it was trying to achieve—and the assembly of the column, in daylight, within drone reach, is the puzzle. Russian commanders knew what the sky over the gray zone does to vehicles. They sent the column anyway.

It's possible the column was trying to reach the Donetsk Ring Road in order to turn west toward Toretske or east toward Kostiantynivka. Russian forces are attacking in both directions, aiming to break through Ukrainian defenses to open a path, any path, toward the twin free cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, 22 km north of Kostiantynivka.

Left or right?

Whether the Russians planned on investing those vehicles in a direct assault in either direction is anyone's guess. It's possible the column was merely transporting infantry closer to the gray zone, sparing them a long foot march ahead of a dangerous foot assault.

But it's also possible that, yes, the Russians meant to send the trucks, vans, cars, all-terrain vehicles, and motorcycles across the gray zone. Vehicular assaults are rare these days, but they still happen from time to time. They almost never succeed. There are just too many drones over and behind the gray zone.

Indeed, the vehicular kill zone is getting wider by the day as Ukraine deploys more and more drones for strikes on Russian supply lines at depths up to 200 km. The Ukrainian counterlogistics campaign that kicked off this spring has struck potentially thousands of Russian trucks as well as trains, bridges, and, more recently, cargo ships plying the Sea of Azov and Black Sea hauling critical war supplies.

The Russians are now adding anti-drone cages to some trucks and guarding the most important convoys and supply routes with gun-armed air defense teams. More convoys are taking back roads, hoping to escape the attention of the ever-present drones.

But these measures aren't working as more Ukrainian drones take flight, including $6,000 AI-assisted fixed-wing models and $500 first-person-view quadcopters with detachable wings for greater range. Scrutinizing official videos for evidence of drone strikes, mapper Clément Molin tallied 600 destroyed or damaged Russian cargo trucks in June and another 240 in just the first week of July.

Importantly, Molin only counted confirmed strikes. There are surely many others that don't leave behind clear, public video evidence.

The pace of strikes is increasing even as the Russians add anti-drone protections. There were 20 hits on Russian trucks every day in June, on average, and 34 hits every day in July. The strike near the Donetsk Ring Road occurred too late to be included in Molin's count. When he adds it, the daily average will be higher still.

All that is to say, more of occupied Ukraine is becoming steadily more hostile to Russian vehicles. Knowing that, why would the Russians line up 50 vehicles so close to the gray zone? On the evidence near Malynivka, they no longer have a good answer.

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Ukraine’s $500 Vyriy FPV drone just flew 110 km to hit Russian logistics. That used to cost $5,000.

Ukraine's drone units are steadily dismantling the air defenses, fuel supplies, and rail links that keep Russia's war effort running across occupied territory, according to the Unmanned Systems Forces. The force used a late-June report to tally its strikes on Russian radars and missile systems over the past month and year. It also listed fresh hits stretching from occupied Crimea to deep inside Russia.

The occupied Crimean peninsula sits at the center of it all as Russia's main southern supply hub, fed through a handful of chokepoints: the Kerch Strait crossing, ferries, and a land corridor that Ukraine keeps hitting until fuel runs short and the occupation starves from behind.

A running scoreboard of downed defenses

Units of the Unmanned Systems Forces struck 31 Russian air defense assets in June alone, the force reported. By the force's own count, 194 elements of Russia's air-defense network have gone down since January.

The count runs far higher over the unit's full life. Since the Unmanned Systems Forces became a full branch of the Armed Forces on 11 June 2025, crews have struck 276 air defense assets. These include 169 surface-to-air missile systems and anti-aircraft guns, 76 radar stations, and 31 electronic warfare systems.

The operators also logged hits on 426 mobile radars and 3,838 mobile jamming systems. Those sit outside Russia's main air defense network but guard individual military sites.

Three days across four regions

Between 27 and 29 June, the force struck Russian air defenses, fuel sites, and military logistics, it said on X. The operations ran in coordination with the group's Deep Strike Center.

The reported highlights:

• In occupied Crimea, the 1st separate center struck a Pantsir-S1 gun-and-missile system, an ST-68 radar, and a 48Ya6-K1 Podlyot low-altitude radar.
• Also in occupied Crimea, the 412th "Nemesis" brigade hit fuel tank railcars. In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it struck a fuel and lubricants storage site.

• In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the same brigade struck two Russian fuel tankers. The 3rd Battalion of the 414th "Magyar's Birds" brigade hit another.
• In Russia's Bryansk Oblast, the 413th "Raid" regiment struck a locomotive used for Russian military logistics.
• In Kherson Oblast, the 20th "K-2" brigade struck a Russian harbor tug.

Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said as a result of strikes on Russia’s logistics arteries, occupied Crimea will soon turn from a peninsula into an island, which would lead to "very unexpected consequences for the Russians."

Fedorov didn’t elaborate on what those consequences would be, but there are several, each worse for Russia than the last. First, the Zaporizhzhia Oblast offensive could grind to even more of a crawl or stall out entirely, pushing Russia’s objective to get close to the regional capital by the end of summer out of reach. 

"We will likely start to see these effects mature in the coming weeks if Ukraine sustains the current tempo," of logistical attacks, said Christina Harward, the Russia deputy team lead at the Institute for the Study of War.  

Second, holding on to occupied Kherson Oblast might become progressively harder. Ukraine forced the Russians to abandon the city of Kherson in 2022 after constant attacks on their logistics made holding the western bank of the Dnipro River untenable. A variation of this scenario may be in the cards. 

In “Kherson Oblast and Crimea—yes,” Azov Corps’ press service responded when asked if a “Kherson 2.0” is possible. “While the administrative borders of the Crimean Peninsula do not fall directly within the operational zone of First Corps Azov, the logic governing transportation hubs there is identical.”

And third, if Crimea can be completely cut off, as Ukraine tried to do with land forces in 2023,  it may force Russia to make a rough decision: continue pouring their efforts into conquering Donbas or redirect them to unblock the peninsula, a choice which may be forced by politics. Except this time, instead of stopping a ground assault with Surovikin lines, they’d have to do it with their dwindling air defenses and even less naval support. 

“Crimea is the center of gravity of this war for the Russians,” said defense analyst Mykhailo Samus. “If they ignore the blockade, it could be an ideological collapse of the Putin regime from inside and a strategic fail on the front line.”

Cutting the tethers

Ukraine has been striking major roadways across the South for months. More recently, bridges connecting Crimea to the mainland were heavily targeted, forcing occupation authorities to close them.

Repeated Ukrainian strikes against the Chonhar Bridge have rendered the bridge essentially unusable for traffic. Russia has been building pontoon bridges nearby, but Ukraine just started hitting those as well. This is the main route for moving ammunition and fuel to the Huliaipole direction in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Ukrainian drones also struck the Henichesk–Arabat Spit crossing, four bridges near Armiansk, and the Dzhankoi checkpoint. Russian-installed officials said no intact bridges remained at the peninsula's land entrances, with traffic rerouted, then halted again under repeated strikes. Multiple railways and locomotives in Crimea were also hit throughout June.

“The enemy's attempts to reroute main supply flows around key bridges or main arteries are impossible both in theory and in practice, as no viable alternative routes exist,” the Azov Corps wrote. 

Attacks along major roadways are up as well. Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, wrote on 9 June that freight traffic plunged by 71% on the M-14 highway from Rostov into Ukraine. Russia's occupation authorities closed the road to military traffic and Russian forces had to reroute to smaller roads along the coast. 

Growing rate of attacks

The rate of Ukraine’s strikes is growing. OSINT analyst Clement Molin, relying on Ukrainian strike videos, found that around 10 trucks are being hit per day and videos went from three per week to nearly three per day. This estimate jives with Ukraine’s K-2 unit's statistics, which recorded 258 strikes in April, 344 in May and 215 as of mid-June. 

“Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign is definitely growing,” Harward agreed. “We see reports daily about multiple Ukrainian strikes on a wide range of Russian military assets in the operational rear. This trend tells us that Ukraine is improving its technology, such as the range of its drones, and that Russia has not figured out effective countermeasures yet.”

Fedorov said that Ukraine has contracted 300% more mid-range attack drones in the first four months of 2026 than in all of 2025.

“Our middle-strike capabilities are expanding through increasing the number of trained crews, scaling the assets deployed in massed attacks, and achieving a significant technological breakthrough,” the Azov Corps wrote.

“New systems are already entering service whose capabilities the enemy is entirely unaware of. They have a substantially greater range and are equipped with next-generation communications systems.”

At the same time, Russia's net monthly advances in Ukraine crashed. Fedorov and Ukraine's commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed that Ukraine managed to recapture 100 square kilometers more than Russia was able to conquer in May. ISW puts Ukraine's net gains even higher, writing that Russia seized 40 square km but lost control of 280 square km last month.

Some analysts are more cautious: the OSINT analytics cooperative Black Bird Group estimated that Russia gained a net 82 square km in May, still a pittance compared to monthly net gains throughout 2025.

The Zaporizhzhia grind

Russian command has set an end-of-summer deadline to get as close to Zaporizhzhia as possible. They’re trying to advance simultaneously in several areas, especially near Orikhiv and Huliaipole, according to Vladislav Voloshyn, spokesman for the Defense Forces of Southern Ukraine.

For the time being, the intensity of Russian attacks with FPV drones and artillery has not slowed down on this part of the front, and airstrikes have only ramped up, he told Suspilne. In the active Stepnohirsk district, there are two to five combat clashes. However, that's nothing compared to the Huliaipole direction where 40-45 engagements happen every day. 

"The enemy here is trying to conduct assault operations in two areas. The first is in the area of ​​the settlements of Charivne, Zaliznychne, and Huliaipilske,” Voloshyn said. “In addition, Russian troops are quite active around ​​Dobropillia, Pryluky, and Varvarivka. Here they are eager to seize control of Ternuvate, Kosivtsevo, and Rizdvianka.”        

In spite of all this, OSINT maps show barely any forward movement for the Russians, with Ukrainian counterattacks occasionally taking back small patches of ground. According to Voloshin, over the past two weeks, Russian troops have not had any significant successes in spite of their claims to the contrary.

“The strikes are likely preventing Russia from fully deploying forces to the frontline and from maintaining a high tempo of assaults in Zaporizhzhia Oblast,” Harward said.

Kherson: edge of a treacherous route

Russian forces in Kherson Oblast heavily depend on the Crimea route. The Dnepr grouping of forces, consisting of the 58th Combined Arms Army and elements of the 18th Combined Arms Army is the most affected by delays and interruptions. 

According to Pasi Paironen, an analyst with the Black Bird Group, the 58th probably relies more on rail and road connections towards Mariupol and Rostov on Don but 18th is more directly affected by the situation in Crimea.

“Crimea is basically the direct support and supply area for the 18th combined arms army as they guard the Dnipro river bank in Kherson oblast,” he said. 

While both can rely somewhat on alternative routes, running along the coast of the Azov Sea, these routes are very long and vulnerable. The 18th sits at the very tip of this supply line. Still, its logistics needs are less pressing, as it is not actively trying to advance and gain ground. However, even standing guard requires uninterrupted lines of supply  

“When enemy infantry holds positions or advances without critical support, it suffers catastrophic losses, and any assault attempts simply collapse,” the Azov Corps wrote.

“Without fuel, the mobility of heavy equipment and transport vehicles grinds to a halt. Without shells, artillery goes silent, FPV drone pilots have nothing to fly when there is simply no power to charge their equipment.” 

Not enough tools to defend Crimea

If the Russians hope to do something about Crimea and supply lines on the mainland, they need to step up their game by destroying or disrupting Ukrainian attacks or seriously reducing their volume. So far, attempts have not been very successful, multiple sources say.

“Russian forces appear to be struggling to adapt and defend against the Ukrainian strikes,” Harward said. “Russian occupation authorities are reportedly having to independently take steps to increase the number of mobile air defense groups in occupied Crimea because the Russian Ministry of Defense's responses have been so lacking.”

The Russians have been seen committing personnel to escort rear-area logistics and moving trained drone observers and EW equipment away from frontline areas to defend Russian logistics in the rear, which have not been enough to defend against the relentless attacks, according to the ISW. 

Several Ukrainian units said that more quixotic solutions, like painting trucks in dazzle camo to confuse AI targeting, or disguising their trucks as civilian vehicles, isn’t very effective either. “Our aerial reconnaissance documents the exact moment military green crates are loaded onto a ‘civilian’ vehicle at bases or depots on Russian territory. We track the target from there,” Azov wrote. 

Air defense shortages are also a growing issue. “Because it's a scarce resource, it's very expensive, and even if they just throw a sack of dollars at the manufacturer, air defense won't just materialize because there's no microchip,” said callsign Charger, a company commander with the 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment “Raid,” whose unit specializes in hunting these systems.  

“There is no device where you feed it money and it gives you a microchip that controls an anti-aircraft missile.” 

Air defense is also required elsewhere. With the growing number of long-range strikes on Russian territory, Russia appears to have moved more air defenses to protect major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, the ISW said. Any such allocation leaves fewer defenses available in the combat zone. 

“They're now forced to deploy air defense systems less frequently. They're losing the concept of layered air defense… so, they're left with blind spots,” Charger said. “Now, thanks to our previous work, we’re reaching through these blind spots and striking soft, unprotected targets.”