Belgium has announced it will accelerate the delivery of surplus Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters to Ukraine. Instead of delivering three flyable F-16s before the end of the year, Brussels will ship 10.

It's unclear how many will be flyable. Previously, Belgian officials explained the first seven secondhand F-16s would include just three airworthy examples. The other four would be broken down for spare parts.

It's good news for Ukraine, but hardly cause for nationwide celebration. The handful of flyable F-16s that should arrive in the coming two months could make good recent F-16 losses. But those shipping-soon Belgian F-16s won't actually grow Ukraine's F-16 fleet by much, if at all.

The dozens of supersonic F-16s in action in Ukraine fly often and fight hard. They shoot down Russian drones and cruise missiles, tangle with Russian warplanes, and lob precision glide bombs at Russian forces on the ground. Russia launched about 2,000 jet-powered drones at Ukraine in September, up from some 350 in June, and F-16s are among the few weapons fast enough to catch them, the Wall Street Journal's editorial board noted. Every 300 flying hours, each jet must go abroad for a lengthy inspection.

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The main constraint on the pace of F-16 sorties, besides maintenance demands and the availability of trained pilots, is munitions: running low or out of air-to-air missiles and glide bombs, the F-16s routinely aim their 20-mm guns at Russian targets. But even 20-mm ammunition sometimes runs low.

The busy F-16s and their equally busy pilots need reinforcement. But reinforcements are slow coming. Belgium is only slightly accelerating its F-16 shipments amid reports it will eventually give Ukraine all 53 F-16s it's gradually retiring as new Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters arrive to re-equip the Belgian air force.

Further complicating the picture, Norway's six F-16s, promised in 2023, were still being refurbished in Belgium this spring. Some arrived there in pieces.

Yes, Ukraine got 24 fight-ready F-16s from the Netherlands and most of the 19 Denmark promised. But it's lost five of those jets since 2024. And others are so worn out from relentless flying that they're badly in need of maintenance. The Belgian firm Sabena, which services Ukrainian F-16s, has struggled to keep up, and President Volodymyr Zelensky has said about half of the jets spend long stretches abroad for repairs. That slows the return of repaired planes and further squeezes the front-line force.

One wing, too few jets

In short, it's possible the Ukrainian air force's 107th Aviation Wing, its sole F-16 unit, has fewer than 40 ready-to-fight F-16s. Those 53 Belgian F-16s will help grow the wing, but piecemeal. Ukraine should expect a handful of operational jets from Belgium this year. Under a schedule from May, the last 27, half the total, may not arrive until 2029.

To be clear, additional F-16s support the 107th Aviation Wing. The Netherlands sold 18 of its old F-16s to Romania for a token price in order to equip a training squadron, funded by a consortium of Ukraine's allies, that feeds trained pilots to the 107th Aviation Wing. But these 18 jets aren't available for front-line use. They don't even legally belong to Ukraine.

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The delays in supplies of combat-ready F-16s matter because the Ukrainian air force is under stress. Its last few dozen ex-Soviet warplanes, including Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, are even older and wearier than the ex-European F-16s are. And they've suffered staggering losses in the air and on the ground in nearly 56 months of hard fighting in the wider war.

The air force does have a few ex-French Dassault Mirage 2000s that are at least as capable as the F-16s, but France has donated only a handful of the supersonic jets—and one has crashed. Any further supplies of Mirage 2000s could be complicated by the French presidential election in April 2027. The leading far-right and far-left parties are both friendly toward Russia and hostile to Ukraine.

Some relief is coming, although not quickly. Sweden has pledged 16 surplus JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters to the Ukrainian war effort; the first of these could arrive early next year. Later on, Ukraine also plans to buy 20 newer JAS-39E/Fs. Kyiv has also negotiated to purchase 16 new Rafale fighters from Paris, but the soonest these could arrive is 2028.

For now, F-16s are the main solution to Ukraine's air defense problems. Kyiv surely wishes it had more of them, sooner.

Overnight on 14 and 15 October, the Ukrainian navy fired a clutch of Long Neptune cruise missiles at Borisoglebsk air base in Voronezh, in western Russia some 260 km from the border with Ukraine.

The results were devastating. The ground-launched Neptunes struck the tarmac where six Russian air force Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers were parked nearly wingtip to wingtip in uncovered positions.

Satellite imagery from the morning of 15 October depicted piles of smoldering wreckage. The navy said it hit all six jets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said four Su-34s were destroyed and a further two were damaged. "I thank the warriors of the Ukrainian navy for their precision!" he wrote.

The jets, he said, were loaded with aerial bombs and ready for new strikes on Ukraine. An analyst reading the imagery counted wreckage of two to four aircraft and two empty spots where damaged jets had been moved.

An Airbus Pléiades satellite image from 11 October, four days before the strike, showed the six Su-34s on open aprons. Next to them were structures that the Russian independent outlet Istories said looked like anti-drone nets or their frames. Nets can snag a small drone. A cruise missile goes through.

At roughly $50 million apiece, by the Ukrainian Air Force's estimate, the four destroyed jets alone cost Russia some $200 million. The twin-engine, two-seat, supersonic Su-34 is the Russian air force's best fighter-bomber. Almost every day, Su-34s lob KAB precision glide bombs at Ukrainian troops and civilians.

In nearly 56 months of hard fighting in Russia's wider war on Ukraine, the Russians have now lost no fewer than 37 Su-34s destroyed, with several more damaged, by open-source counts. Sukhoi continues to deliver new Su-34s in small batches, the latest handed over on 7 October, helping the Russians sustain their overall inventory despite heavy losses.

They've still got plenty of Su-34s, but that doesn't mean the Russians shouldn't worry. As long as they're parking warplanes out in the open within range of Ukraine's best deep strike munitions, those planes are vulnerable to attack. Russia's air defenses are spread too thin to intercept every Ukrainian munition.

The strike may also hit the Russian air force's training pipeline. Borisoglebsk air base is home to the 160th Aviation Training Regiment. The regiment operates Yakovlev Yak-130 trainers for more basic flight training plus—for more advanced training—front-line combat aircraft including Su-34s, Sukhoi Su-35s, and Sukhoi Su-30s.

Russian bloggers are aghast, according to a round-up of posts on Russian social media by analyst ChrisO_wiki. "How is it that, four years after the start of the Special Military Operation, there are no protective structures for aircraft at airfields located within range of Ukrainian air strikes?" blogger Ramsay wrote. "And where did the billions of rubles allocated for their construction go?"

"Much can be said about the need to build a sufficient number of concrete shelters at all airfields," blogger Vladimir Romanov pointed out. "Reality shows that, to date, sufficient measures have not been taken."

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Close parking

Ramsay asked why the Su-34s were concentrated in one area, apparently so that ground crews could quickly service all of them with a single ground power unit, a mobile generator that starts an aircraft's systems before flight. "How is it that the APA, a utilitarian piece of equipment, has become so scarce that it forces an entire group of combat aircraft to be parked in a single area, making them an ideal target for attacks?"

The best defense is an active one, however, the Fighterbomber channel stressed. "Protecting aircraft by the usual method of moving them out of the line of fire at such ranges from long-range strike systems won’t work here; the only way to defend against them is with a full-scale, echeloned air defense system—both ground-based and airborne."

Ukrainian planners know this. Which is why, for more than a year now, they've been systematically striking Russian radars, surface-to-air missile batteries, and mobile air defense systems. By March, Ukrainian forces were “collaps[ing] the layered defensive architecture that the Russian integrated air defence doctrine depends upon to function,” according to an in-depth investigation by Tochnyi.info.

The strikes on Russian air defenses—at least 492 of them between June and early March—are part of a carefully scripted plan. Destroying the right air defenses faster than the Russians can replace them has the effect of “facilitating strikes on more critical targets deep within Russian territory,” Tochnyi.info explained.

The critical targets include air bases such as Borisoglebsk and the expensive warplanes parked on its tarmac.

On or just before Wednesday, 14 October, Russian Geran-4 one-way attack drones struck two more cargo ships—one in the Buh River Estuary near Mykolaiv and another in Chornomorsk, 20 km south of Odesa.

They're the latest strikes in competing Russian and Ukrainian countershipping campaigns that have, since this summer, throttled Black Sea grain exports.

The jet-propelled Geran-4s are Russia's weapons of choice for these ship strikes. The drones haul warheads of up to 90 kg at up to 500 km/h and can fly more than 700 km. They already had AI-assisted targeting, and the Russians recently added terrain-matching navigation to make them less reliant on satellites and harder to jam with signal-scrambling electronic warfare.

For months, the Geran-4s and other Russian munitions have pummeled Ukrainian ports and the ships hauling grain from them. But Ukrainian forces were actually the first to escalate the shipping fight in an effort to squeeze Russian logistics.

As recently as early this summer, hundreds of Russian tankers and dry cargo ships plied the Black Sea and adjacent Sea of Azov, hauling fuel and bulk supplies between ports in Russia and Russian-occupied ports in southern Ukraine.

Most of the Russian vessels were unregistered and sailed without transponders, making them a kind of regional adjunct of Moscow’s “shadow fleet” that ships Russian oil and other goods to the global market in defiance of international sanctions.

Ukrainian drones had already hit ships hauling stolen Ukrainian grain out of occupied ports in June.

On 6 July, Ukraine’s deep strike drone force finally started hunting the rest of the Russian ships. By day eight of the countershipping effort, the Ukrainians had hit 105 vessels. By day 12, drones including AI-assisted Fire Point FP-1/2s had struck 159, even a few tugboats sent to assist the damaged tankers.

Just a few days after Ukraine launched its countershipping campaign, Russia launched a retaliatory campaign targeting Ukraine’s Black Sea grain ports as well as the ships, many of them foreign-flagged, that haul grain through Türkiye’s Bosporus Strait out to the Mediterranean Sea and onward to foreign ports.

Soon, the Russian shadow fleet’s hundreds of ships were either drifting, disabled, or sheltering in Russian ports. On the other side of the Black Sea, Ukraine’s lucrative grain trade was in a state of collapse. Ports were under constant attack. International shippers were increasingly reluctant to send their vessels into the Black Sea.

Trade freefall

Grain shipment figures on both sides tell a stark tale. According to the Russian Grain Union, in September approximately 1.36 million tons of wheat shipped from Russian ports, including ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, compared to 5.4 million tons in September 2025—a 75% reduction.

Meanwhile, Ukraine exported 1.094 million tons of wheat in September, down from 2.051 million tons in September 2025—a 47% reduction. The only thing preventing further throttling of Ukrainian grain exports was Izmail, Renia, and Kilia—the country’s three small ports on the Danube River, which forms Ukraine’s southern border with Romania and flows into the western Black Sea a relatively short 435 km from the Bosporus Strait.

But the Russians were beginning to target the Danube ports and the grain ships heading to and from them, too. In October, Russian drones sank the Saint Kitts-flagged M/V Royad Mammadov, bound from Izmail to Ravenna, Italy, with Ukrainian grain, and the Togo-flagged M/V Alfa Watan, and damaged the Palau-flagged M/V Able, killing at least two seafarers.

“The Black Sea grain standoff, in which both Russia and Ukraine continue to suffer losses, persists,” Polish open-source intelligence analyst Thorkill wrote.

With global food prices rising partially as a result of the bottleneck in grain exports through the Bosporus, the United Nations and Türkiye have been trying to arrange talks between Russia and Ukraine regarding a possible Black Sea ceasefire.

A previous grain deal, brokered by Türkiye and the UN in 2022, collapsed a year later. Ukraine kept ships moving through its own corridor until Russian strikes shut it down this summer.

Update, 16 October: Drones hit at least four more merchant ships off Bulgaria and Romania between 13 and 15 October, sinking the HS Dignity off Krapets. At least 17 seafarers are missing. Romanian President Nicușor Dan called the attacks “attempts by Russia” to destabilize Romania and Bulgaria and said NATO’s North Atlantic Council would discuss them.

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“Supplying Crimea is turning into a nightmare”: Ukrainian drones hit Russian trucks 770 times in September, and winter will make it worse, analyst says

The Russians are pouring troops into a key sector just southeast of the town of Dobropillia in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, threatening to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses and march one settlement closer to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the last two big free cities in Donetsk.

But the Russians' push toward Dobropillia isn't without cost. Russian losses in this sector are "colossal," according to the mapper Playfra. And every soldier the Kremlin deploys along the Dobropillia axis is a soldier it can't deploy elsewhere.

And that may help explain why the Russians are falling back in two other key sectors, in northern Donetsk Oblast and in neighboring Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Dobropillia axis is the Russians' clear priority. For the Ukrainians, that's an opportunity to attack elsewhere.

Dobropillia, a former mining town with a pre-war population of around 28,000, is now a fortress. It anchors Ukrainian positions along the highway that threads northeast to Kramatorsk.

Russia has attacked here before. In August 2025, Russian troops pushed a salient toward the Dobropillia–Kramatorsk highway, and Ukrainian counterattacks cut it apart. By October that year, President Volodymyr Zelensky put Russian losses on the Dobropillia front at about 13,000.

Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets describes the push on Dobropillia as the southern flank of a Russian operation to envelop the whole Sloviansk–Kramatorsk urban area. The other approaches are harder going. From the southeast, the Russians are blocked by stubborn Ukrainian forces still clinging to positions in the ruins of Kostiantynivka. From the north, starting this spring, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps rolled back 18 months of Russian gains.

For an army that's been struggling to complete its conquest of Donetsk, to say nothing of breaking through in other front-line oblasts, Dobropillia has become the priority.

And that's why the Russians are channeling fresh forces into the Dobropillia sector. Part of the 41st Combined Arms Army and units of its 90th Guards Tank Division are now fighting there, Mashovets wrote on 9 October, and the Russian command keeps feeding fresh assault infantry into the sector through the village of Nove Shakhove despite heavy losses. The open-source account Unit Observer tracked the buildup as early as September.

Potentially tens of thousands of troops from those formations join the main forces of the 2nd and 51st Combined Arms Armies, according to Mashovets, as well as elements of the Russian naval infantry, facing the Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps and 19th Army Corps around Dobropillia.

The reinforcements give Russian commanders more options. Mashovets expects the 51st CAA to push south and southwest of Dobropillia and the 2nd CAA toward Raksha and Sviatohorivka, enveloping the town and cutting its supply routes from Bilozerske before any direct assault. The neighboring 8th CAA is fighting around Kostiantynivka. The Russians' immediate goal is "to maintain this offensive pressure from summer into the fall," Unit Observer wrote, setting conditions for a possible siege of Kramatorsk next year.

The outlook for the Ukrainian defenders of Dobropillia is "worsening," Playfra warned on 13 October:

The Ukrainians aren't without options, Playfra explained. They should double down on their current strategy of saturating the fields around Dobropillia with drones in a ring at least 2 to 3 km deep, forestalling large-scale Russian movements until the winter strips the leaves off the trees, depriving the Russians of their best cover from overhead surveillance. This could buy Dobropillia "much more time," Playfra predicted.

Mashovets puts a date on how long Dobropillia has to hold. If it and Druzhkivka, the town just south of Kramatorsk, hold until mid-to-late December, he wrote, the whole Russian plan for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk would collapse and have to be rewritten almost from scratch.

Help isn't coming

Just don't expect a lot of Ukrainian reinforcements along the Dobropillia axis. Many of Ukraine's best troops are busy attacking.

Taking advantage of the surge of Russian manpower in the direction of Dobropillia, Ukrainian forces have counterattacked where the Russians are weakest: in northern Donetsk Oblast and also in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, just south of Donetsk.

In months of carefully planned assaults supported by ground robots and intensive drone strikes, Ukrainian forces have liberated hundreds of square kilometers in northern Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk largely removed the immediate northern threat to Sloviansk and neighboring Kramatorsk.

But it didn't do anything to help in the direction of Dobropillia, where the Russians have many more troops, much more firepower, and—equally importantly—a singular focus: closing the southern jaw around the last big free cities in Donetsk.

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Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps took the lessons of the failed 2023 counteroffensive into Operation Vivaldi. It fought small, and won.

For the second time in two weeks, Ukraine's 475th Assault Regiment has demonstrated how armored vehicles can fight and survive on a battlefield buzzing with enemy drones.

The regiment encased a tank and an American-made M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle in metal frames and welded hundreds of metal spines onto those frames, transforming them into "hedgehog" vehicles. The cage makes the tank impossible to identify from the footage, and the regiment hasn't said what model it is. The frames support the spines, which trigger incoming drones' warheads a safe distance from the vehicles' hulls.

But that's not all. To shepherd the two-vehicle formation across the disputed gray zone for a close engagement with a Russian position, presumably somewhere in northeastern Ukraine's Kharkiv Oblast, the 475th Assault Regiment deployed drones: both single-use first-person-view models and grenade-dropping, reusable Vampire models.

The vehicles and their crews didn't fight alone. They fought in mixed ground-air "combined arms" formations. The tank and fighting vehicle provided the firepower. The escorting drones provided the aerial protection. Vampire drones drop grenades to suppress Russian positions and clear mines and loitering Russian drones. FPV drones dive down to intercept the Russians' own FPV drones as they zoom in to strike the vehicles.

The 475th Assault Regiment cut together a video montage of the most recent assault. The video depicts the tank and the Bradley rolling along a well-traveled route as at least one friendly FPV and at least one friendly Vampire drone flew overhead and an additional drone watched from a short distance away.

The vehicles repeatedly came under attack from Russian FPVs and heavier loitering munitions. An escorting Ukrainian FPV moved to intercept, with unclear results. A couple of Russian drones managed to score hits on the vehicles, but their hedgehog armor held—and both vehicles appear to have survived the there-and-back daytime trip into battle.

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A way forward for vehicles

It's at least the second time the 475th Assault Regiment has deployed vehicle-drone teams. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps used a related approach in its months-long counteroffensive in northern Donetsk Oblast, which began this spring: it sent in ground robots first, suppressing Russian strongpoints, fraying Russian supply lines, and clearing routes for manned vehicles to follow.

The unmanned aerial escorts lend the 475th Assault Regiment's hedgehog vehicles situational awareness they might not have on their own. It's well known that hedgehog armor can obscure a vehicle crew's view of the surrounding terrain. But friendly drones flying directly overhead can act as eyes in the sky for the crews on the ground.

The drones also help the vehicle crews compensate for a lack of mobility. The metal cages that support the metal spines that make up hedgehog armor tend to prevent a vehicle's turret from fully rotating. In order to aim its gun, a hedgehog vehicle has to meticulously point its whole self—turret and hull—at the enemy.

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That takes trial and error, and time. The longer it takes, the more vulnerable a vehicle is to enemy drones. Friendly drones, running interference for the vehicles, can reduce that exposure long enough for the vehicle to fire a few shots.

The 475th Assault Regiment and 3rd Army Corps, among other units in Russia's wider war on Ukraine, are pointing the way forward for traditional armored vehicles in this new drone age. Yes, vehicles are more vulnerable to aerial attack than they were just a few years ago.

But no, armored vehicles aren't obsolete or useless. They just need a little help—or a lot of it—from the same kinds of drones that also make their existence so perilous.

Five months after launching Operation Vivaldi, a local counteroffensive in northern Donetsk Oblast, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps has eliminated the Russian bridgehead on its most important long-term objective: the Zherebets River, which flows south through eastern Ukraine and forms a natural defensive barrier east of the last big free cities in Donetsk: Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Attacking methodically under strict secrecy, the 3rd Army Corps has pushed back the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies and returned 176 sq km of northern Donetsk to Ukrainian control as of 30 September, according to Ukraine's presidential office. The figure could not be independently verified. Operation Vivaldi netted the Ukrainians hundreds of Russian prisoners and erased 18 months of Russian advances toward Sloviansk.

"Ukrainian forces have defeated the 2026 Russian campaign to seize Donetsk Oblast," the Institute for the Study of War in Washington concluded.

It's a remarkable feat for the overall outgunned and outmanned Ukrainian forces. Equally remarkably, the Ukrainians deftly dodged several potentially fatal traps as they flanked the 20th and 25th CAAs. They didn't get stuck in the Russians' dense minefields. They didn't expose themselves to devastating air attack. Perhaps most importantly, they didn't set their sights on distant objectives. They thought small instead of big, stacking small gains on top of small gains until those wins amounted to a big victory.

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A trio of US Army officers—Col. Timothy Price, Capt. Patrick Visser, and Capt. Andrew Carter—described this achievement in academic terms. The corps' defeat of the Russian bridgehead on the Zherebets "had little to do with maneuver warfare," the officers wrote for the Modern War Institute at the US Military Academy in West Point, New York.

In military parlance, "maneuver" generally involves heavy ground forces supported by air strikes and artillery decisively breaking through enemy lines and then rushing vehicles and troops into the panicking enemy's unguarded rear area to quickly inflict maximal destruction and achieve maximal territorial gains.

That's not what the 3rd Army Corps did in its five-month—and ongoing—counteroffensive. No, the Ukrainians "won through systematic, geometric interdiction and positional pressure," Price, Visser, and Carter wrote. Put plainly, the corps carefully probed for tree-covered assault lanes toward key settlements, deployed unmanned ground vehicles to clear mines and explode the most important nearby Russian strongpoints, and then rushed in armored vehicles carrying infantry.

They marched step by step, incrementally liberating a kilometer at a time instead of running a marathon toward a major objective tens of kilometers away. In that way, Operation Vivaldi is the very opposite of Ukraine's failed 2023 summer counteroffensive, which massed tanks for what commanders hoped would be a decisive breakthrough around the village of Mala Tokmachka in southern Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The objective at that time was to break into the Russian rear and speed tanks 80 km to the occupied city of Melitopol near the Sea of Azov. That never happened. The Ukrainians got mired in minefields around Mala Tokmachka, suffered badly from Russian air attacks, and, after a grueling season of costly attacks, lost momentum just 10 km south of Mala Tokmachka. Later Russian counterattacks erased even those modest Ukrainian gains.

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Old thinking versus new

The planners of the failed 2023 counteroffensive were stuck in an old way of thinking about maneuver warfare. The planners of the successful 2026 counteroffensive shrugged off obsolete ideas. They thought smaller—and, ironically, achieved much more as a result.

The 3rd Army Corps couldn't, and didn't, do it alone. Indeed, the corps depended on the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces to fray the Russians' supply lines, electronic warfare teams to jam Russian drones, and the Ukrainian air force to bomb Russian drone operators the EW teams couldn't suppress. By contrast, the Ukrainian forces attacking south from Mala Tokmachka in 2023 did so without much aerial support.

The aerial and electronic preparation was a prerequisite for each of the 3rd Army Corps' incremental advances this spring and summer. The lesson, the officers argue, is that "higher headquarters must degrade key enemy capabilities" before a smaller ground formation can expect to gain ground and keep it. If the support falters, the ground forces won't be able to hold.

Think small. Prepare hard. Now that the Ukrainians know this is how to win on the ground, can they repeat Operation Vivaldi's success?

There's some evidence they're already doing so in the southeast, where a clutch of Ukrainian air assault brigades has been pushing back the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army.

Ukraine's campaign of so-called "middle strikes" targeting Russian supply lines isn't generating the same headlines it did back in the spring, when the campaign was intensifying.

But that doesn't mean Ukrainian units aren't launching thousands of drones a month and blowing up a lot of Russian trucks. Indeed, the pace of Ukrainian strikes, concentrated along the main supply routes threading through occupied southern Ukraine into occupied Crimea, has leveled off without ever really decreasing since an early summer surge.

It's evident Ukraine's middle-strike campaign "didn't stop and wasn't slowed down," noted French mapper Clément Molin, one of the most important observers of the counterlogistics campaign.

For September, Molin tallied 770 confirmed drone strikes on Russian trucks in the logistical zone 10 km beyond the line of contact. That's up from 630 strikes in August, 656 in July, and 586 in June, the month the campaign really got underway. There were just 214 strikes in May and at most a few dozen in each of the previous three months.

Whether Ukrainian troops can take advantage of the Russians' weakening logistics anytime soon is less evident.

Since June, the Ukrainians have hit around 700 Russian trucks a month that analysts can confirm with video and photographic evidence. There are undoubtedly many more damaged and destroyed trucks that left no digital evidence.

There are thousands of Russian trucks on the road in Ukraine every day, so hitting 700 of them in a month won't immediately strangle Russian logistics. But that accumulating destruction does strain Russian logistics—and terrify the truck drivers who are in the drone crosshairs. "Russian drivers post videos on a daily basis, showing how dangerous a ride in southern Ukraine is getting," Molin wrote.

What's remarkable is that the counterlogistics campaign hasn't faltered even as the Russians have adapted. Early on, Russian trucks mostly traveled alone and without protection, making them fairly easy picking for a bevy of Ukrainian middle-strike drone types including the Hornet, the B-2, the RAM 2X, the Chaklun, and various high-endurance first-person-view quadcopters.

The drones ride along Ukraine's overlapping command and control systems, which include Starlink satellite terminals (some dangling from balloons) as well as mesh radio networks. Many of the drones have built-in AI for autonomously detecting and homing in on trucks in the final seconds of flight.

Convoy operations

Reeling from the truck strikes, the Russians adapted this spring. Commanders began requiring all trucks to travel in convoys including mobile fire support groups, analysis group Tochnyi reported in May, citing Dmytro Putiata, a retired command post battle captain from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces 20th Brigade "K2."

Today the Russian convoys have a standard structure, according to Molin. "Convoys usually gather three to five trucks and two to three air-defense trucks." Combined with radio jamming gear that's increasingly common on both the supply trucks and the gun trucks, that's seemingly a lot of protection.

But the drones target the gun trucks, too, peeling back the protection in order to expose the supply trucks to follow-on attacks. In that way, the Ukrainians have sustained their attacks on the supply trucks despite the increase in mobile air defense activity along the most important supply routes.

And it's going to get worse for the Russians as fall wears into winter. "Supplying Crimea is turning into a nightmare and the arrival of winter and more difficult conditions will not help," Molin wrote.

There will be less foliage on the trees lining the roads, and thus less cover from Ukrainian surveillance. Moreover, Molin pointed out, "it will be more difficult to go off-road" and avoid the big paved roads that are the main drone kill zones.

Russian logistics are under pressure, and that pressure is only increasing. Ultimately, the Ukrainians aim to starve Russian forces in Crimea. Strikes on cargo ships plying the Black Sea prevent the Russians from simply shifting the logistics off the coast. Meanwhile, strikes on overland logistics "may lead to substantial softening of front-line positions," Tochnyi noted in May.

Softening those front-line positions to the point of melting away could facilitate what Tochnyi described as "eventual breakthrough operations" in occupied southern Ukraine.

It's not inconceivable. Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps recently proved, by way of its successful Operation Vivaldi, that local Ukrainian counteroffensives are possible.

But that doesn't mean they're easy. To win, the 3rd Army Corps had to carefully husband its forces and meticulously prepare the battlefield under conditions of strict secrecy before attacking. That same kind of preparation is underway along the supply lines into Crimea, but it's unclear whether local Ukrainian forces have enough combat power in reserve to shift from defense to offense and exploit Russia's deepening supply woes.

At least not yet.

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Ukraine retook 240 square km north of Lyman and nobody reported it for three months

Armored vehicles aren't dead in Ukraine—they just need a lot of help. That's one of the biggest lessons from the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi, its recent successful counteroffensive just north of the town of Lyman in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.

Russia spent 18 months building its salient toward Sloviansk; Ukraine took much of it back in three. By 30 September, three of four planned phases in, the operation had returned 176 sq km to Ukrainian control, taken 250 Russian prisoners, and cost Russia more than 5,000 killed and wounded, Ukraine's presidential office said. It also foiled a Russian plan to break into the rear of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban area, the office said.

Defying critics who insisted vehicles couldn't possibly survive in the drone-patrolled gray zone, the 3rd Army Corps repeatedly deployed mechanized forces as it counterattacked across a roughly 100 sq km salient the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies had extended toward Sloviansk, one of the last two big free cities in Donetsk Oblast.

Maneuvering for months under a veil of secrecy, the 3rd Army Corps found and exploited gaps along the flanks of the 20th and 25th CAAs, ultimately breaking into the Russian armies' rears and forcing them to pull back across the Zherebets River in order to avoid encirclement.

Armored vehicles were key to the Ukrainian effort. They sped assault troops into battle, dropped them off under fire, and then supported them as they clashed with the Russians. "Maneuver warfare isn't going anywhere," stated Ryan O'Leary, a US Army veteran who once commanded volunteers in Ukraine.

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3rd Army Corps commanders knew they were taking a risk deploying armored vehicles in a Russian-controlled salient patrolled by first-person-view drones from Russia's elite Rubicon Center drone unit. But they clearly believed that, with adequate support, the vehicles could accomplish their missions—and survive.

They were right. A dramatic video shot by 3rd Army Corps troopers depicts the troopers disembarking from their armored trucks and rushing into the fight while small arms fire clatters all around them.

Given the intensity of the Russian fire, a mechanized assault "was the only real way to push positions in an effective manner to keep losses low as well as gain and hold momentum and aggression," O'Leary wrote. Walking into battle under the cover of trees might help the infantry avoid the attention of overhead drones, but it takes too long to sustain an aggressive assault, and it can be difficult to mass enough footborne infantry to overcome stiff enemy defenses.

"This is something that hasn't changed even with the advent of drone warfare coming of age," O'Leary added. "Suppression tactics and such have changed and now there is more than just indirect fires and counterassaults that you must be able to suppress and plan for."

But the concept of the infantry-carrying armored vehicle "isn't going anywhere," O'Leary stressed. "Especially when it takes a drone tens of minutes to get to target area, acquire target and hit the target. Right now, the front is extremely susceptible to maneuvering forces on assaults if it is planned right and executed properly."

The 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi is an excellent example of an operation that was planned right and executed properly—in ways that helped the corps' mechanized forces fight and survive.

Careful preparation

The corps explained that it deployed footborne scouts to find the best paths for follow-on vehicular assaults—and subsequent medical evacuations. Scouts "conducted recon of the front lines, ensured the breakthrough of equipment and led adjacent units along secret paths while evacuating the wounded," the 3rd Army Corps stated.

Before the armored vehicles rolled into action along the pre-scouted paths, the 3rd Army Corps deployed robotic engineering vehicles to clear Russian mines. After that, the corps sent in old BTR-60 wheeled armored vehicles modified for remote control and packed with anti-tank mines. These "robotic kamikaze complexes ... were used to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications," the corps said.

Only after the assault routes were scouted and cleared of mines and Russian strongpoints did the manned vehicles and their precious infantry cargo roll out. We don't know how many losses the 3rd Army Corps' mechanized infantry suffered on the attack, but we do know they ultimately prevailed—when the battered Russian 20th and 25th CAAs retreated.

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"Recent Ukrainian operations demonstrate that maneuver is not dead," stressed Mick Ryan, a retired Australian army general. "Despite the difficulty in ground operations maneuver observed in eastern Ukraine over the past few years, offensive operations are still possible in modern war. But they need the intellectual effort to develop new techniques to make them viable and repeatable at scale."

In addition to the reconnaissance and robots-first engineering and suppression tactics the 3rd Army Corps employed, Ryan recommended commanders deploy more drone-grounding electronic warfare and use AI tools to help plan attacks.

But ages-old human elements are still essential, Ryan wrote. "Developing viable methods for offensive tactical and operational maneuver in the 21^st century also demands the inclusion of older ideas about the employment of mass, logistic support and casualty evacuation [and the] maintenance of morale and leader's provision of purpose to their people."

Even when the assault route is clear, it's understandably terrifying to ride in an armored vehicle across drone-patrolled terrain. But a good leader can motivate their troops to try.

Ukraine has reportedly purchased Korkut self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAGs) from Türkiye. Effectively a Turkish take on the classic German-made Gepard SPAAG, a mainstay of Ukraine's defense against Russian one-way attack (OWA) drones, the Korkuts could help stiffen Ukrainian air defenses as winter looms and Russia intensifies its terror attacks on Ukrainian cities and power plants.

The problem for Ukrainian air defenders is that the latest jet-propelled Russian drones, the Geran-4 and Geran-5, are getting through. They fly at around 500 km/h, nearly three times as fast as an older, propeller-driven Geran-2, and in September Ukraine shot down just 55% of them, by Zelenskyy's count, against at least 90% of the slow ones, one analyst calculated. The Korkuts arrive in that gap. Ground-based guns are arguably Ukraine's most cost-effective anti-drone weapons, but they may not work so well against the fastest drones.

That means more Russian munitions are getting through. More Ukrainian homes are burning. More power plants are going dark. It's a crisis now. It'll be an even greater crisis when winter arrives and the temperature drops.

All that is to say, the handful of Korkut systems Ukraine has received from Turkish firm Aselsan are welcome, but they're not silver bullets against Russian drones.

A Korkut battery includes a command vehicle plus three tracked or wheeled vehicles armed with pairs of fast-firing, radar-cued 35-mm autocannons. The exact variant Ukraine received hasn't been disclosed; Middle East Eye's mention of 25-mm ammunition suggests it may be the smaller Korkut 100/25, built mainly to stop frontline drones. The Ukrainian Korkuts join a sizeable fleet of SPAAGs in Ukrainian service, most notably including potentially 90 or more 1960s-vintage Gepards with twin radar-cued 35-mm guns.

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The tracked Gepards are old but effective. They, like all SPAAGs, can only engage incoming drones and other targets at fairly short range: just a few kilometers. But they're cheap. A SPAAG might fire a few hundred dollars' worth of shells to bring down a $50,000 Geran. A surface-to-air missile can hit a Geran from much farther away, but even the cheapest missiles cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece—and the supply is limited.

Gepards and other gun-based air defenses, along with wide-area strategic radio jamming, were the twin keys to Ukraine's temporary victory over Russian Gerans as recently as late last year. That's when the Russians were still mostly launching propeller-driven Gerans, and the Ukrainians were shooting down most of them.

Slipping interception rates

Vanquishing the slow Gerans didn't solve a separate air defense problem—how to shoot down supersonic ballistic missiles—but it did minimize Ukrainian casualties and mitigate the overall damage to Ukrainian infrastructure. Only the best, priciest, and rarest Ukrainian air defenses such as the Patriot and SAMP/T can hit incoming ballistic missiles. As missiles have run out for those batteries, more Russian ballistic missiles have gotten through.

But now more Gerans are getting through, too. On 26 September, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia had launched more than 2,730 jet-powered Gerans at Ukraine that month and that Ukrainian air defenses were shooting down 55% of them. Analyst and mapper Clément Molin set that against Air Force totals: of 5,437 drones launched between 1 and 26 September, the remaining 2,707 were slow Geran-2s and Gerbera decoys, and at least 90% of those were downed. The overall interception rate, he calculated, has fallen to close to 70%, from 86% to 90% earlier this year.

Ukrainian forces are scrambling to acquire more inexpensive surface-to-air missiles as well as faster interceptor drones. But they're racing against time and the growing preponderance of jet-propelled OWA drones. The Ukrainians' air defense problem may get worse before it gets better.

"Ballistic missile defense is a serious problem, but the increasing production of Geran-4, Geran-5, Banderol, and Filin jet-powered OWA drones/cheap cruise missiles will also be a growing challenge this fall and winter," Rob Lee, an analyst with the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, warned in August.

Winter weather reduces the effectiveness of interceptor drones and helicopters, Lee noted, and Ukraine will need more high-speed interceptors to counter the jet drones. "The interception rate for OWA drones will likely decrease."

But that doesn't mean the Korkut isn't helping forestall an even worse dip in the overall interception rate for incoming Russian drones. Ukrainian officials are reportedly pleased with the Turkish gun. "Korkut has been pretty much successful in countering the Russian attacks," a Ukrainian official told Middle East Eye. "There were of course some problems but nothing that couldn't be overcome through some small adjustments."

According to Middle East Eye, the Ukrainians are considering acquiring more Korkuts.

Ukraine has fired its new Fire Point FP-7 ballistic missile in anger for the first time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on Thursday, 1 October.

Kyiv hasn't said what the missile targeted or how much damage it caused. The Wall Street Journal, citing an unnamed source, reported that it struck a target in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Zelensky was ecstatic on social media. "Thank you for the result," the Ukrainian president wrote. "Next up: production. Glory to Ukraine!"

The FP-7 can hit back at Russia, but it can't stop the Iskander ballistic missiles Russia fires at Ukrainian cities. Its twin is meant to. Fire Point is building an interceptor version, the FP-7.X, as the core of Freyja, its bid for a cheaper alternative to the American Patriot, and the company aims for a first ballistic missile interception by mid-2027.

Kyiv drone- and missile-maker Fire Point, most famous for its FP-1 and FP-2 one-way attack drones and FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles, has been hard at work on ballistic missiles for at least a year. Ballistic missiles can cost millions of dollars per round, making them much more expensive than a $50,000 drone or $500,000 cruise missile.

But the extra expense buys a lot more destructive potential. An FP-1 packs a 60-kg warhead; an FP-7's warhead weighs about 200 kg. While an FP-1 might motor as far as 1,000 km, it's slow and fairly easy to shoot down. An FP-7 possesses less range—up to 250 km under the best conditions—but it streaks through the atmosphere at several times the speed of sound, making it extremely difficult to intercept.

The only Russian air defense systems that stand any chance of swatting down an incoming FP-7 are also among the most in-demand in the Russian inventory and thus the most over-stretched: the S-400 surface-to-air missile batteries.

Ukrainians know better than anyone the kind of damage and terror ballistic bombardment can inflict. Since effectively running out of Patriot surface-to-air missiles earlier this year, Ukraine has been unable to defend itself against weekly Russian bombardment that now usually includes several Iskander ballistic missiles.

The Russian bombardment threatens to disrupt commerce, throttle electricity generation, and grind down Ukrainian morale at a critical juncture in Russia's wider war on Ukraine. Ukrainian troops are holding their own along the 1,200-km front line, but behind the front line everyday Ukrainians are suffering under missile and drone impacts.

That suffering will only get worse as winter closes in, temperatures drop, and the Russians resume intensive attacks on the electrical grid, potentially depriving millions of people of household heating. Ukrainian batteries firing FP-7s can't directly prevent Russian attacks. But they can retaliate for the attacks.

Expect the ballistic tit for tat to intensify. It may not be the first Ukrainian ballistic missile fired in anger: in June, Russia said it shot down a Ukrainian ballistic missile over Moscow, and Kyiv never said what it was. But the FP-7 is the first Kyiv has confirmed using in combat, and it has the range and payload to inflict serious damage on targets inside Russia. But an even more powerful Ukrainian missile, the Fire Point FP-9, is coming soon. It reportedly ranges 850 km with an 800-kg warhead.

The ballistic phase

The FP-7 can smash Russian depots, air bases, and factories in oblasts bordering Ukraine. The FP-9 could wreak havoc as far as Moscow. The only major constraint on the Ukrainian bombardment will be Fire Point's production capacity, and Kyiv's ability to finance that production.

The Ukrainians will be incentivized to produce as many FP-7s—and, later, FP-9s—as possible. The same factories that produce surface-to-surface FP-7s will also churn out a surface-to-air variant, the FP-7.X.

That missile, which is overall similar to the standard FP-7 but includes a sophisticated seeker head, is the main munition for Ukraine's new mostly homemade air defense system being developed by Fire Point and various foreign partners under the auspices of the European missile defense program Freyja.

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If the FP-7.X works as advertised and Fire Point can scale production, it could bolster Ukraine's defenses against Russian ballistic missile strikes while the standard FP-7 and its bigger cousin the FP-9 retaliate for Russian ballistic missile strikes.

A new phase of the wider war is about to begin—the ballistic phase, where both sides can pummel the other with hard-to-intercept missiles.

The side that makes the most and best missiles, for offense and defense, will prevail in the coming ballistic fight.

Ukraine has lost another Mikoyan MiG-29 fighter and its pilot. The Thursday shoot-down extends the steady attrition of the Ukrainian air force MiG fleet, potentially drawing down the fleet to its pre-war strength.

That means Ukraine may have lost as many of the twin-engine, supersonic MiG-29s as it has received from its allies or restored from surplus stocks since February 2022.

It's an ominous milestone. The Soviet-vintage MiG-29 is no longer the Ukrainian air force's most important fighter. That honorific belongs to the air force's ex-European Lockheed Martin F-16s.

But the MiG-29 is still the air force's second most important fighter—and will remain so through 2027 as Ukraine awaits its first ex-Swedish Saab Gripens, due early next year, and French-made Dassault Rafales, due from 2028. Ukraine sorties MiG-29s for ground attack missions targeting Russian troop concentrations, strikes on Russian air defense systems, and air defense sorties over Ukrainian cities and ports.

The air force announced the loss of the MiG-29 and its pilot, Capt. Marat Mambetov, shortly after it occurred on Thursday. Mambetov, 25, was a flight commander in the 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade, known as the "Ghost of Kyiv" brigade. "Flying a MiG-29 fighter jet, [Mambetov] carried out missile and bomb strikes against Russian occupiers along one of the front-line directions," the air force stated. "During the mission, his aircraft was hit by an enemy missile. The pilot ejected, but tragically did not survive."

It's the 37th confirmed combat loss of a Ukrainian MiG-29 since Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022, according to a tally by the Oryx open-source intelligence collective. Oryx has also registered damage to an additional three Ukrainian MiG-29s.

Thirty-seven write-offs, plus the likely grounding of several previously flyable MiG-29s owing to intensive wear and tear since 2022, may have reduced the Ukrainian air force's MiG-29 fleet to around three dozen active jets.

Fighter subtraction

The math is simple. The air force probably had between 30 and 35 MiG-29s in service when Russia attacked in February 2022. As losses cut into the fleet, Poland donated 14 surplus MiGs, Slovakia donated 10, and Azerbaijan reportedly donated three. Meanwhile, Ukrainian engineers tapped a global pipeline of spare parts to reactivate an estimated 20 grounded MiG-29s moldering in hangars at various Ukrainian airfields.

That's as many as 82 MiGs in and, as of Thursday, 37 out owing to Russian action—plus additional jets grounded due to airframe fatigue. The resulting active fleet should number around three dozen planes, around as many as Ukraine had on the eve of the wider war.

There aren't many more old MiGs that Ukraine could obtain to bolster the fleet. Poland still has as many as nine very tired airframes, but Kyiv and Warsaw have consistently failed to negotiate a transfer. There may yet be a few ex-Soviet MiG-29s, grounded for years or even decades, that Ukrainian engineers can restore to flightworthy status. Other than that, options are scarce.

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The three dozen MiGs still in the inventory may have to last a little while alongside the few survivors of Ukraine's other Soviet-vintage warplanes, including Sukhoi Su-27s, Sukhoi Su-24s, and Sukhoi Su-25s.

Older Western types—the 80 or so F-16s European allies have pledged, about half delivered, as well as potentially a dozen or so ex-French Dassault Mirage 2000s—are steadily replacing the ex-Soviet jets. (So far, Ukraine has lost five F-16s and one Mirage.) Next year, the transformation of the Ukrainian air force from a largely Soviet-equipped force to a largely Western-equipped force will accelerate when the first of 32 Gripens arrive. Sixteen Rafales are to follow from 2028.

Barring catastrophic combat losses among Western types and assuming Ukraine can maintain and arm these new warplanes, by the end of 2027, the air force may not need its remaining MiGs and Sukhois, which by then could be very tired.

Russian missiles are steadily reducing the MiG and Sukhoi fleets, effectively forcing Ukraine to switch to new types.

Russian infiltrators have been slipping into villages and towns along Ukraine's northeastern border with Russia, likely aiming to draw Ukrainian troops away from the bigger fights farther south around the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

Desperate to clear out the infiltrators without dedicating too many precious infantry to the task, the Ukrainian 475th Assault Regiment formed a unique team: two heavily up-armored tanks plus three different types of drone. The drones scouted ahead of the tanks and protected them as they trundled through Russia's own drone kill zone on their way to a point-blank clash with Russian troops.

In this mission, the blend of mechanized and unmanned forces worked: the tanks accomplished their mission and survived to fight another day. If the tank-drone pairing keeps working, expect it to become more common all along the 1,200-km gray zone as Ukraine struggles with a deepening shortage of manpower.

It's unclear what kinds of tanks the 475th Assault Regiment operates. It is clear how the regiment protects the tanks from ever-present Russian drones. The unit wraps the tanks in metal cages and then welds hundreds of metal spines on the cages. The spines trigger incoming explosive drones at a safe distance from the tank's hull. The cage supports the spines and catches any drones the spines may miss.

We call these kinds of tanks "hedgehog tanks." The Russians developed the hedgehog application but, seeing that it worked, deflecting potentially dozens of drones at a time, the Ukrainians copied it.

Hedgehog helpers

But even the best-protected hedgehog tank might struggle to get through the enemy's kill zone when that kill zone may include bomber and one-way attack drones in the air and loitering ambush drones waiting on the ground as well as mines and other threats.

Sometimes the best defense against a drone is another drone, and the 475th Assault Regiment put that truism into practice. To shepherd those two hedgehog tanks into battle with Russian infiltrators in the village of Vilkhuvatka, in Kharkiv Oblast 9 km from the border with Russia, the regiment deployed a Vampire heavy bomber drone, at least one explosive first-person-view (FPV) quadcopter, and at least one surveillance quadcopter.

The surveillance drones could scout ahead. The bomber drone could blast mines and loitering ambush drones. The FPVs could intercept incoming enemy FPVs. The layered protection was effective. As evident in the 475th Assault Regiment's video depicting the two-tank counter-assault, the tanks took multiple hits from Russian drones and mines, but not enough hits to slow them down.

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Both tanks reached an intersection inside Vilkhuvatka, fired their cannons at nearby Russian infiltrators, and then withdrew.

It should come as no surprise that the 475th Assault Regiment is pioneering mixed formations of drones and tanks. The regiment recently partnered with the 1st Assault Regiment to develop new "multi-domain" tactics combining ground, air, and cyber forces. "We came to the conclusion that fighting in only one domain makes no sense," said "Perun," the 1st Assault Regiment commander. "We'd simply lose because the enemy would bring another domain into play."

The key takeaway is that, despite the serious threat that drones and mines pose to tanks in the fifth year of Russia's wider war on Ukraine, tanks can still fight, win, and survive—if they have plenty of support from the same kinds of drones that, in enemy hands, vex them along every kilometer of disputed terrain. The tank isn't dead yet. It just needs a little help.

A Russian air force Tupolev Tu-95 Bear bomber crashed on takeoff, apparently from Ukrainka air base in Amur Oblast in Russia's Far East. The Russian defense ministry said the plane was on a training flight without munitions and blamed a technical fault. The crash, while reportedly accidental, is still a win of sorts for Ukraine. Every bomber the Russians lose is a bomber they can't immediately replace—and sortie for missile strikes on Ukrainian cities.

The problem for Ukraine is that Russia still has bombers to spare. It'll take more than a few crashes or drone raids on Russian bomber bases to cut into Russia's capacity to bombard Ukraine.

That's why Ukraine needs missile-armed fighters, ground-based self-propelled guns, speedy interceptor drones, and long-range surface-to-air missiles such as American-made Patriots, among other air defenses. The Ukrainians can't prevent missile attacks by destroying bombers or waiting for bombers to crash; they need to shoot down missiles as they near their targets.

A security camera on the ground recorded a large aircraft plunging toward the ground in Amur Oblast on Tuesday night. Video from the crash site confirmed it was one of the Russians' four-engine, propeller-driven Tu-95s, aging workhorses in Russia's escalating campaign of missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities.

The crash killed six crew and left one survivor injured, according to Russian state media. It is the first Tu-95 to go down in 11 years, Defense Express notes, and the first known non-combat loss of the type since the full-scale invasion.

It's potentially the 11th Tu-95 Russia has lost since widening its war on Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian drones caught two Bears on the ground at Engels-2 air base in Saratov Oblast in July and August. On 1 June 2025, Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb—coordinated strikes on Russian bomber bases by more than 100 small drones smuggled across Russia in trucks—destroyed as many as four Bears at Olenya air base on the Kola Peninsula and another four at Belaya air base in Irkutsk Oblast.

Now the Russian air force may be down to somewhere between 36 and 44 working Tu-95s, depending on the count, the youngest of which rolled out of the factory in the 1990s. That matters because the Tu-95 is, like the jet-propelled Tupolev Tu-22M bomber, out of production. Vendors have gone out of business. The skilled workers who assembled the types retired decades ago.

While the Russians can still build one or two Tupolev Tu-160 jet bombers every year, slowly growing a fleet that currently stands at around 18 active planes, that's far too few new bombers to replace combat losses as the wider war grinds through its 56th month.

Slow attrition

The Russians have also lost at least nine Tu-22Ms, and possibly far more: Defense Express estimates losses at up to 70% of the combat-ready fleet since 2022. All told, Russia's bomber force has shrunk to around 105 planes since the wider war began, or fewer.

Equally problematically for the Russians, the old Tu-95s and Tu-22Ms that carry out the majority of air-launched cruise missile strikes on Ukraine are wearing out from heavy use; not all are available for front-line use as more airframes spend more time in deep maintenance.

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But a Tu-95 carries as many as eight Kh-101 cruise missiles at a time; a Tu-22M carries up to three Kh-22s or Kh-32s. A Russian drone and missile strike might include just a dozen or so air-launched cruise missiles launched by a handful of bombers. A raid on 8 September involved just four Tu-95s and two Tu-160s.

The Russians don't need 105 bombers to sustain six-bomber raids once or twice a week, even as those bombers suffer more and more wear and tear. Ukraine would have to take out a lot more Russian bombers, and fast, to put a dent in Russian strikes.

Unless and until that unlikelihood happens, Ukraine will still need to defeat Russian raids inside Ukraine—by shooting down hundreds of incoming drones and missiles at a time. But that's getting harder as the Russians deploy faster jet-propelled Geran drones and more ground-launched Iskander missiles, combining them with the bomber-launched missiles in complex packages that routinely overwhelm ammunition-starved Ukrainian air defenses.

Bulgaria gave Ukraine 110 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers. They are 1960s vehicles, too thinly armored to carry infantry anywhere near a front line patrolled by explosive drones. So Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps found another use for them during Operation Vivaldi, its counteroffensive north of Lyman. Fill one with anti-tank mines, rig it for remote control, drive it at a Russian bunker, and set it off.

Packing potentially dozens of TM-62 anti-tank mines, the speedy BTR-60s become what's called vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, or VBIEDs. Once a favorite weapon of insurgents battling US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, VBIEDs have found a new niche in Russia's wider war on Ukraine as unmanned demolition systems.

"To break through the enemy's defenses, the 3rd Army Corps employed its own invention, Soviet BTR-60s converted into robotic kamikaze complexes," the corps stated. "They were used to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications." If an enemy strongpoint is too heavily protected to bomb from the air but exposed to attack from the ground, send in a VBIED.

The Russians were the first to deploy vehicular IEDs in the current war, but the Ukrainians may have mastered the tactic. It's one thing to rig an explosives-filled MT-LB tractor or T-55 tank to roll straight forward without direct human control, as the Russians once did. It's another to rig an explosive BTR-60 to maneuver before going off, as the 3rd Army Corps' VBIEDs clearly did.

On 28 September, announcing the close of Vivaldi's third phase, the 3rd Army Corps released drone footage depicting one of the explosive BTRs blasting a Russian strongpoint north of the town of Lyman. The sheer scale of the explosion is testimony to the VBIED's destructive potential. And the trail the BTR leaves in the grass in the heavily edited video indicates the Ukrainians can steer their VBIEDs around obstacles and guide them to precision strikes.

Why it gets there

A slow wheeled vehicle crossing open ground toward a fortified position should not survive the trip. In most sectors it would not. What makes the tactic work north of Lyman is a condition the 3rd Army Corps built into Vivaldi before its assault groups moved: Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare threw a protective dome over the battle area, blinding Russian drones so they could not read the operation's design or strike what was moving through it.

Robots have played critical roles in each phase of Vivaldi. Surveillance drones have watched from overhead. One-way attack drones have pummeled Russian positions and supply lines. Heavy bomber drones have not only dropped bombs, they've also airlifted explosive unmanned ground vehicles into position so the UGVs can roll right through the front doors of Russian bunkers.

The self-exploding BTR-60s are too big to airlift, but that's the point. A small UGV might carry a few tens of kilograms of explosives. A remote-controlled BTR-60 can easily haul hundreds of kilograms.

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The arithmetic

It's not impossible to take out a VBIED before it strikes, of course. Mines, anti-tank missiles, and even concentrated gunfire can stop a vehicular bomb in its tracks. But losing one of the aged BTR-60s costs Ukraine very little. The vehicles are too thinly armored for use as front-line infantry transports anyway. You might as well convert them into bombs.

That is the whole case for the tactic. A manned fighter jet lobbing a precision glide bomb is the preferred approach to bunker-busting. But it costs tens of thousands of dollars an hour to keep a jet in the air, and a single glide bomb can cost tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's unclear how much it costs to convert a BTR into a VBIED. It could be just a few thousand.

And it reduces Russian fortifications without risking any Ukrainian lives. That's the philosophy underpinning all of the 3rd Army Corps' robot-first tactics. "This is exactly the direction of the corps' development set by Brig. Gen. Andrii Biletskyi," the corps stated, "to reduce the number of fighters in the most dangerous areas and replace them with robots."

Vivaldi began in mid-April under an information blackout that held for five months. The corps says it has regained control of 176 sq km across three of a planned four phases, around half of that de-occupied outright, and taken more than 250 Russian prisoners. Those figures are the corps' own and have not been independently verified.

Sometimes the robots doing that work are 60-year-old APCs modified for an explosive one-way mission.

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1960s-vintage, Soviet-made T-62Ms aren't the oldest tanks in the Ukrainian inventory. That dubious honorific belongs to Ukraine's ex-Slovenian M-55S tanks, which are based on Soviet-made T-55s from the 1950s.

The T-62M hasn't gotten better. The job has changed. These days, many tanks on both sides function as mobile artillery, angling their guns high to fire a few rounds at targets kilometers away. They rarely work as tanks, closing with the enemy and firing directly from a few hundred meters. The threat from tiny explosive drones has pushed armor back from the gray zone, and at that distance a T-62M is not much less effective than a T-64BV. Or, for that matter, than a far more precious Leopard 1, Leopard 2, or M-1.

That is one reading of a war that has changed shape, and nobody has published a study of it. Ukraine's T-64, Leopard, and Abrams fleets have all taken heavy documented losses. Oryx, which logs a loss only where photos or video exist, lists no Ukrainian T-62Ms at all.

These tanks, all captured from the Russians, are also available. And that matters in a military struggling to sustain its tank force. As Russia's war on Ukraine grinds through its 56th month, Ukraine is running low on its newest and best tanks. Older and less capable ones fill in ... for lack of a better alternative.

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Observer Stevius, who closely tracks developments in the Ukrainian armor corps, recently highlighted the ongoing importance of former Russian T-62Ms to the Ukrainian war effort. "Captured T-62Ms still out there!"

Specifically, Stevius noted an ex-Russian T-62M belonging to the Ukrainian National Guard's 19th Brigade participating in a recent competition for best tank crew in the National Guard. According to Stevius, at least two other Ukrainian units have operated the survivors of at least 45 T-62Ms that Ukrainian troops have captured. Most of the captures took place during the Ukrainian counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine in late 2022.

Lesser tanks

The 40-ton, four-person T-62M is Ukraine's second-oldest tank, and where the slightly older M-55S got a deep upgrade in 1990s Slovenia, the T-62M has not. In its DNA it is still a vehicle of the early Cold War. The Ukrainian army's 110th Mechanized Brigade temporarily operated T-62Ms before swapping them out for much newer and more capable T-64BVs. Where the T-62M has a 115-millimeter main gun loaded by hand by a fourth crew member, the T-64BV has a more powerful 125-millimeter gun loaded by a fast mechanical autoloader.

The fast-firing capability of the made-in-Ukraine T-64BV was central to the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade's successful defense of the city of Chernihiv during the early weeks of the wider Russian invasion starting in February 2022. The Ukrainian tanks engaged passing Russian tanks at point-blank range, and out-shot them.

That is the kind of fight the T-62M would lose. It is a kind of fight fewer tanks now get.

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Surely some of the 60-something-year-old T-62Ms in Ukrainian service have been withdrawn owing to wear and tear and a possible shortage of spare parts. But there's a good chance most of the 45 Ukrainian T-62Ms are still in, or near, the action.

But not all are still tanks. Seeing the value in the thickly protected hull and reliable chassis that carries the T-62M's turret and gun, Ukrainian volunteers and units have converted some captured T-62Ms into specialist vehicles that benefit from the tanks' sturdy bottoms but don't need their obsolescent tops.

A few ex-Russian T-62Ms have undergone conversion into recovery vehicles by losing their turrets and guns and adding a heavy-duty winch for towing other armored vehicles. Volunteers working with the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation turned another into a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. The recipe is simple. Just pop off the existing turret and replace it with a smaller one fitted with a 30-millimeter autocannon, in this case one pulled from a captured Russian BMP-2.

Potentially dozens of Ukrainian T-62Ms are still T-62Ms, however, and still adding bulk and firepower to units that otherwise might struggle to deploy any tanks at all.