A New York networking company sold radios that let signals travel 100 kilometers. Ukrainian civilians say Russian drone crews used them to hunt people in Kherson, and they are asking a Manhattan jury to hold the company responsible.

Ukrainian civilians and relatives of people killed by Russian drones sued Ubiquiti Inc. in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on 11 August, alleging the company's wireless equipment became the backbone of the command network behind Russia's "human safari" against civilians.

The case rests on a comparison that the plaintiffs draw themselves. In February 2026, Starlink terminals that Russian forces had mounted on reconnaissance and strike drones were shut off after Ukraine and SpaceX built a whitelist of authorized terminals. Ubiquiti, the complaint alleges, had the same technical and contractual power over its own devices and did not use it.

That precedent cuts both ways. SpaceX had denied for years that Russian forces were using Starlink systematically, and the whitelist came together only after Ukraine's newly appointed defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, approached the company directly. The fix was technically possible—and it took a government to force it.

What the lawsuit claims

The law firm DiCello Levitt LLP filed the case, Kovalenko et al. v. Ubiquiti, Inc., No. 1:26-cv-06838. The plaintiffs are Ukrainian civilians who were maimed, displaced, or forced to live under drone surveillance, along with family members of civilians killed in drone attacks. They are seeking a jury trial.

Ubiquiti, listed on the New York Stock Exchange as UI, makes long-range wireless "bridges" widely used for internet access in areas without cable. Its radio bridge antennas and airMAX technology are subject to US export restrictions on Russia. The complaint alleges the devices kept reaching Russian forces through intermediary supply chains, and that they now link reconnaissance units, drone operators, attack units, and commanders across roughly 100 kilometers of encrypted battlefield network.

"Battlefield communications are the central nervous system of the Russian occupation forces: without them, they could not coordinate the human safari or maintain the occupation," Scott Gilmore, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs and a partner at DiCello Levitt, said in an interview with Euromaidan Press.

The complaint cites US export-control restrictions, Russian import data, public reporting, Russian military statements, battlefield images and video, and Ubiquiti's own device telemetry. It alleges the company held location data showing where its devices were operating, including inside Russia and occupied Ukrainian territory, and that it was repeatedly warned its products were being smuggled across the border.

It further alleges Ubiquiti continued issuing firmware updates and technical support that kept those devices running, and that it could have cut the pipeline off—by geofencing, by terminating distributors tied to sanctions-evasion routes, or by building a remote-disable feature into its firmware.

"Companies cannot willfully blind themselves when sanctions and export controls are being breached, and their devices are being foreseeably used in dangerous ways," Gilmore said. "US law is clear that companies bear legal responsibility when they entrust dangerous devices to end users who they know or should know are hurting people. This case is not about standard warfare: it's about murdering civilians."

The plaintiffs bring eight causes of action, including negligent entrustment, public nuisance, strict products liability for design defect, negligent product design, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and aiding and abetting assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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How the radios got to the front

The lawsuit follows an investigation published in January 2026 by Hunterbrook Media, which documented widespread use of Ubiquiti products by Russian forces. One Ukrainian communications officer told the outlet that an estimated 80% of the Russian bridges he had observed near the front line were Ubiquiti devices.

Analysis of trade records found the value of Ubiquiti shipments crossing into Russia rose by 66% after the full-scale invasion, despite US and EU export controls, and that the shipments included models released after the bans took effect. The goods moved mainly through distributors in third countries such as Kazakhstan and Türkiye. Russian units often received the bridges from volunteers who bought them with crowdfunded money.

Ubiquiti has been here before. In 2014, the company paid a $504,225 settlement to the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control after its products were delivered to Iran in violation of US sanctions between 2008 and 2011.

The campaign at the center of the case

Russia's "human safari" is a campaign in which small drones hunt and attack civilians, concentrated in Kherson and other front-line areas. Operators use drone cameras to track people, vehicles, and rescuers, and sometimes strike the same target twice.

UN investigators concluded in September 2025 that Russian short-range drone attacks on civilians along the west bank of the Dnipro River amount to the crimes against humanity of murder and forcible transfer of population. The finding covers more than 300 kilometers across Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts. The complaint cites it as evidence.

Ukraine's Security Service has since charged 10 operators from Russia's 404th Motorized Rifle Regiment with war crimes in absentia, in a case that included explosives dropped on ambulances at a city hospital and a double strike on rescuers.

The incidents in the complaint include a married couple attacked in their car, a firefighter hunted and wounded by a drone while responding to a colleague, and an energy worker killed in a double-tap strike as colleagues tried to reach him.

"The human safari is one of the most horrific crimes against humanity of the 21st Century," Gilmore said. "We intend to present evidence of the widespread and systematic nature of this campaign in court, including international documentation. These coordinated attacks do not happen randomly: they require communications systems and a chain of command. That is precisely why the United States banned the export of Ubiquiti's radio bridge antennas to Russia—because they are necessary for Russia's war machine."

Russian state media has shown the equipment in use.

Zvezda, the television channel run by Russia's Defense Ministry, aired footage on 3 July 2025 of a Ubiquiti UISP Litebeam 5AC device; a TASS report in October 2025 showed a serviceman logging into Ubiquiti's airOS operating system, and a Rossiya-1 segment that month showed one climbing a tower to mount an antenna carrying the company's logo.

A Russian seller supplied Hunterbrook with letters she said came from Russian military units, thanking her for wireless bridges they described as necessary for connections over long distances.

Ubiquiti has said nothing

Ubiquiti did not respond to a request for comment at the time of publication.

Neither the company nor its chief executive, Robert Pera, has publicly commented on the January investigation, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. No US or EU authority has announced an enforcement action against Ubiquiti over Russia, and the company has not been formally accused of sanctions violations tied to Ukraine. The allegations in the complaint are untested, and Ubiquiti has not yet filed a response.

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What the case would establish

If it survives, the suit would test whether ordinary US product-liability law reaches a manufacturer whose equipment ends up in a documented atrocity—a theory that does not require proving the company intended any of it, only that it knew or should have known and failed to act.

"The question is this: what would a reasonable company do if it learned its devices were being used to coordinate murder?" Gilmore said. "If it fails to follow reasonable safety measures, shouldn't it be held liable to the civilians who get hurt? Those are the questions we intend to put before a New York jury."

Gilmore, who has investigated war crimes for two decades, said the legal framework needed already exists at national and international levels, and that in mass-atrocity cases from Syria to Sudan, investigations, jurisdiction, and remedies take years. He said he expects accountability for Ukrainian victims to come through criminal prosecutions, civil litigation, and regulatory enforcement together.

"Our clients want to shine a light on the atrocities being committed against civilians in Ukraine and to remind companies that compliance with sanctions and export controls is not a mere technicality: it's a matter of life or death," he said.

"We are at the tip of the spear."

Editor's note: Euromaidan Press correspondent Zarina Zabrisky, who conducted this interview and reports from Kherson, co-developed draft US legislation on the drone campaign—the Liability for Operators and Responsible Authorities (LORA) Act—which would impose targeted sanctions on identified drone operators, restrict exports of drone components, and require public attribution of perpetrators. She has no connection to this lawsuit or to the firm that filed it. Her documentary Kherson: Human Safari is available free at khersonhumansafari.com.

More than 100 drones were detected near Romania over the past 96 hours, with NATO fighter jets scrambled seven times in response to the increased aerial activity, Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruță said, according to Antena 3 CNN.

The figures come as Romania faces a growing number of drone incidents linked to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Romanian forces have recently shifted from monitoring and escorting drones to actively destroying those that enter Romanian airspace, while NATO aircraft are increasingly being called on to respond to aerial threats along the alliance’s eastern flank.

NATO aircraft repeatedly activated

According to Miruță, Romanian authorities detected more than 100 drones in the vicinity of Romanian territory during the four-day period. NATO fighter jets participating in air-policing missions were activated seven times.

Miruță did not report how many of the detected drones entered Romanian airspace, nor how many were identified as Russian or Ukrainian.

Miruță said most of the drones were destroyed by Ukrainian air defenses outside Romania, but close enough for their debris to reach Romanian shores.

“[Russia’s war in Ukraine] is a real war, with real consequences. That is why we are taking every measure we can to limit the indirect consequences that are also being felt here,” Miruță wrote on Facebook.

The report comes shortly after Romania destroyed two Russian Gerbera-type drones that were found drifting in the Black Sea near the Neptun Deep offshore gas project on 11 August. Romanian military divers carried out controlled detonations after Ukraine confirmed the drones were not Ukrainian.

Romania has begun shooting down drones

The latest figures follow a significant change in Romania’s response to drone incursions.

In late July, Romanian F-16s shot down three drones over Romanian territory and territorial waters in three consecutive days. One of the drones was identified as a Russian Shahed-type attack drone, while investigations were conducted into the others.

The July incidents marked a shift from Romania’s previous approach of tracking or escorting drones that crossed into its airspace during Russian attacks on Ukraine. Four of the five drones shot down in EU and NATO countries at that point had been neutralized by Romanian military pilots, according to Miruță.

Romanian President Nicușor Dan called the repeated violations of Romanian airspace “inadmissible and intolerable” and Bucharest prepared a diplomatic protest to Moscow after one of the downed drones was identified as Russian.

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Drone war reaches beyond Ukraine

Romania has repeatedly dealt with drones crossing its border during Russian attacks on Ukrainian territory, particularly in the vicinity of Ukrainian ports on the Danube and the Black Sea.

In June, a Ukrainian sea drone that had lost control, which Kyiv attributed to Russian electronic warfare, exploded near an oil terminal in the Romanian port of Constanța. No one was injured, but more than 1,000 people were evacuated from the area as a precaution.

The incidents have also extended beyond Romania. On 14 August, NATO fighter jets shot down a foreign drone after it entered Latvian airspace. Latvia said the drone had entered its airspace as a result of Russian electronic warfare activity.

The repeated incidents have made drone activity around NATO’s eastern border an increasingly regular consequence of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The scale of Ukrainian forces' counteroffensive in southeastern Ukraine early this year is finally becoming clear. In six months of maneuver starting on 29 January, a clutch of Ukrainian units, including the 78th, 79th, 80th, 82nd, and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 1st and 425th Assault Regiments—tens of thousands of troops, in all—marched through gaps in Russian defenses and, according to Ukrainian officials, liberated around 745 square km and 26 settlements. Mostly in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but also in neighboring Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts.

That is Kyiv's own accounting, and it is the high end. The Institute for the Study of War, which maps control from geolocated imagery, put the figure at roughly 627 square km across the Oleksandrivka direction and the northern Hulyaipole direction—while noting its own conservative method probably undercounts. Either number describes the largest Ukrainian territorial gain since 2023.

The Ukrainian gains helped to offset Russian gains around the last few free cities in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast. Between the start of February and the end of July, Russian regiments captured a net total of just 260 square km of Ukrainian soil, according to a tally by the Black Bird Group. It would've been more than 1,000 square km if those air assault and assault units hadn't been busy clearing the Russians from a wide swathe of the southeast.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive kicked off on 29 January. Three days later, Elon Musk's Starlink bricked Russia's thousands of smuggled and stolen satellite terminals. Practically overnight, the Russians lost their best method for controlling small drones and guiding assault units across the disputed gray zone. Drones couldn't fly. Troops couldn't navigate.

Ukrainian commanders surely knew their communications advantage wouldn't last: the Russians would eventually adapt with new methods of command and control. Seizing the opportunity, Ukrainian paratroopers and assault troops pressed the attack. And in stark contrast to the usual assault tactics for both sides, the Ukrainians attacked in tanks and other armored vehicles, counting on the Russians' connectivity problems to clear a path for heavy forces.

The blackout was not the only thing working in Ukraine's favor. ISW credits the gains to five reinforcing factors: better operational planning, a campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses, deeper strikes on Russian logistics, Ukrainian drone superiority at the tactical level—and the Starlink cutoff. But the cutoff is the one that arrived all at once, and it arrived just as Ukrainian armor was starting to move.

Mechanized assaults

Not all the vehicles got through. The assault troops lost one up-armored M-1 Abrams tank in early February. But by March, other assault forces M-1s were engaging Russian troops at point-blank range with their 120-mm main guns. After clearing a few disputed villages along a 45-km front between Dobropillya and Zelenyi Hai, the Ukrainians focused their maneuver and firepower on Komar, 12 km southeast of Zelenyi Hai.

The Ukrainians "started a slow and quiet offensive, with very few videos and small teams, during April and May," mapper Clément Molin recalled. The strict information security obscured the Ukrainian moves for all but the closest observers, allowing Ukrainian commanders to press their attacks without drawing too much attention—and risking a Russian countercounteroffensive.

By summer, the Ukrainians were within mortar range of Komar. Embarrassed Russian commanders resorted to sending out small teams on virtual suicide missions to plant Russian flags in disputed territory. The flags could create the impression of Russian control on terrain that, in fact, neither side controlled. "Russia is trying to intoxicate us with flag videos, which are meant to hide the real situation to both us and their command," Molin wrote.

The reality was that the Ukrainians had gained ground. A lot of it.

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Announcing the results on 12 August, Ukrainian officials also claimed 9,550 Russian troops killed and more than 6,600 wounded—figures no independent body has verified. Former commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, who planned the operation, said it proved the Ukrainian army "is capable not only of steadfastly holding its defences, but also of launching offensives, seizing the initiative, and liberating Ukrainian land."

But the momentum was unsustainable. As the Russians gradually restored command and control through the summer, the Ukrainians encountered more resistance. Now the gray zone is stabilizing again. Observer Moklasen predicted new Ukrainian commander in chief Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi will order his corps and brigade commanders "to dig in positions, consolidate and strengthen more army corps" instead of continuing to attack.

After all, the Russians are pushing hard in Donetsk, and the resources the Ukrainians had devoted to the southeastern counteroffensive could boost the defensive effort in the east. Moreover, there are worrying signs the Kremlin may attempt another mobilization soon, potentially surging hundreds of thousands of fresh troops into Ukraine.

The Ukrainians may soon prioritize holding over attacking.

A Ukrainian court has sentenced a Russian soldier to 12 years in prison for repeatedly raping a 57-year-old civilian woman for about two months in an occupied village in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office said on 14 August.

Ukrainian authorities and international monitors have documented hundreds of cases of conflict-related sexual violence by Russian forces in Ukraine, while warning that the true number is likely higher because many cases go unreported, particularly in occupied territories.

Woman was trapped with Russian soldiers

The 50-year-old Russian serviceman entered a village in the Pokrovsk district in September 2025 as part of a small infantry group, according to prosecutors. He and two other Russian soldiers occupied the basement of a private home where two local civilians were sheltering from Russian attacks.

During one of the attacks, the civilian man was killed. The woman was then left in the basement with the three armed Russian soldiers.

In early October, one of the soldiers began sexually assaulting her. The court found that the abuse became systematic and continued for about two months.

The soldier threatened to kill the woman if she refused. Two other Russian servicemen were present during this period, while the woman was effectively unable to leave the basement or protect herself.

The abuse ended in December, when Ukrainian forces captured the Russian soldier during fighting. The woman was freed.

Convicted Russian soldier had spent 32 years in prison

The convicted man is a resident of Russia’s Sverdlovsk Oblast who had spent a total of 32 years in prison for robbery and armed robbery before joining the Russian military.

He signed a contract with the Russian army while serving his sentence and was later deployed as a rifleman with the 114th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of Russia’s 51st Combined Arms Army.

The defendant denied committing the crime in court. Prosecutors presented evidence that the court found sufficient to establish his guilt in the cruel treatment of a civilian.

He was sentenced to 12 years in prison, the maximum punishment under the provision of Ukraine’s Criminal Code used in the case.

Sexual violence as a weapon of Russia’s war

Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office had recorded 401 cases of sexual violence against civilians allegedly committed by Russian military personnel since the start of the full-scale invasion as of June 2026.

The victims included 250 women and 151 men, including 23 girls and one boy.

Donetsk Oblast had the second-highest number of documented cases, with 92, behind Kherson Oblast’s 124. Ukrainian prosecutors had sent 64 indictments involving 81 people to court, while Ukrainian courts had issued 19 verdicts against 26 individuals. All those convicted received prison sentences.

The documented figures do not capture the full scale of the abuse. The Prosecutor General’s Office has noted that the actual number may be higher because these are cases victims have been able to report.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukrainian special services are conducting targeted operations against collaborators in Russian-occupied territories who assist Russia’s attacks against Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Speaking after a meeting of Ukraine’s top military leadership on 14 August, Zelenskyy said he received a separate briefing from Ukraine’s special services on the progress of these operations.

He specifically mentioned occupied Sevastopol, where Ukrainian officials have previously accused local collaborators of supporting Russia’s military operations.

“Responsibility for collaborators is inevitable,” Zelenskyy said.

Operations target those helping Russia

Zelenskyy did not identify the individuals targeted or provide operational details, saying only that the special services had reported on the implementation of “targeted operations” against collaborators in occupied territories.

He said the targets include people who participate in Russian attacks against Ukraine and Ukrainians.

The comments signal that Ukraine is continuing to pursue individuals in occupied territory who assist Russian forces, including through intelligence, military support, or other forms of cooperation.

Sevastopol explosion on 13 August

The statement comes shortly after an explosion in occupied Sevastopol on 13 August killed a Russian military officer.

Russian and Ukrainian sources have circulated claims that the victim was Robert Shageyev, reportedly a former Ukrainian Navy officer who joined Russia after the occupation of Crimea and later served in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. 

His identity and the circumstances of the explosion have not been officially confirmed by Ukrainian authorities.

Russian sources had suggested Ukrainian involvement in the incident, but Ukraine has not publicly claimed responsibility.

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Ukraine prepares for Russia’s next moves

The discussion of operations against collaborators was part of a broader meeting focused on Ukraine’s military preparations for the coming months.

Zelenskyy said the main issue was securing funding for Ukraine’s defense and security forces through the fall and winter. Officials identified funding gaps and additional requirements for expanding production of advanced weapons.

Among the priorities are faster production of Ukrainian strike weapons and new defensive systems, including jet-powered interceptor drones designed to counter Russian aerial threats.

Ukrainian intelligence also provided updated information about Russia’s plans, according to Zelenskyy. He said Ukraine is preparing countermeasures, including asymmetric responses.

The meeting also covered the effectiveness of Ukraine’s long-range and medium-range sanctions against Russia. Zelenskyy said the existing sanctions plan is being implemented and that priorities are being adjusted to ensure Ukraine has the capabilities needed to achieve its objectives.

Ukraine’s 425th Separate Assault Regiment Skelia is moving under the operational command of the 1st National Guard Corps Azov, as the Ukrainian military works to consolidate scattered Skelia units under a single command and eventually deploy them on the same section of the front.

The move comes amid scrutiny of Skelia following an investigation into dozens of non-combat deaths among its recruits and ongoing criminal proceedings over alleged abuse. It also forms part of broader reforms being carried out by newly appointed Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi, who made the decision to place Skelia under Azov’s operational command, according to the regiment.

Oleksii Bratushchak, head of communications for the Skelia regiment, announced the change on 13 August on the YouTube channel “Butusov Plus”. He stressed that Skelia is not becoming part of Azov’s organizational structure. The arrangement concerns operational command, meaning Azov will direct the regiment’s combat employment.

Skelia’s scattered units are being brought together

Bratushchak said Skelia is currently carrying out combat orders under Azov Corps command, although not all of its units have yet been transferred.

The regiment’s units have been spread across several areas and operating under different higher commands. The plan is to gradually bring them together so they can operate on the same part of the front.

Part of Skelia will move to the Dobropillia direction, where Azov Corps is deployed. Other elements remain on their current assignments for now, including the Pokrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kostiantynivka directions.

Bratushchak said Skelia’s command has already met with Azov and established cooperation. He described the decision as one made by Drapatyi and said the regiment views it positively.

The move follows personnel changes that began earlier in August. On 7 August, Ukrainska Pravda reported that Skelia had begun transferring soldiers to around 10 other units, citing sources in the regiment and Ukraine’s Defense Forces. 

The regiment confirmed that personnel were being reassigned on orders from higher command, while stressing that its units remained at their positions and continued carrying out combat tasks. The number of troops being transferred was not disclosed.

The move is part of Drapatyi’s ongoing reforms of Ukraine’s armed forces following his appointment as commander-in-chief. In July, the General Staff launched an audit of how personnel are distributed among brigades, regiments, and corps, reflecting Drapatyi’s focus on addressing imbalances in how Ukraine’s forces are manned.

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Skelia remains a separate regiment under Azov’s operational command

The change does not dissolve Skelia or turn it into an Azov unit. The regiment remains a separate military formation, while Azov Corps takes operational control over its forces for combat tasks.

Ukraine has been reorganizing its ground forces around corps-level commands, intended to give commanders greater control over multiple brigades and regiments operating in the same area.

Azov itself is now the core of Ukraine’s 1st National Guard Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko, known by his call sign “Redis.” The corps has been operating in the Donetsk region as part of Ukraine’s effort to consolidate forces and command structures on the battlefield.

The backdrop: deaths and abuse allegations inside Skelia

The reorganization comes less than two months after a major investigation into conditions inside Skelia’s training system triggered criminal and institutional investigations.

Babel’s investigation published in June documented 25 non-combat deaths among Skelia recruits between late 2025 and spring 2026, including cases where forensic findings raised questions about reported causes of death. Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigations opened a criminal case, and Skelia’s commander was suspended pending the investigation.

Skelia confirmed that 25 of the 26 deaths cited in the investigation had occurred but disputed some of the reported circumstances. The regiment has denied that abuse was systemic.

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The investigation has since produced further legal action. Two Skelia servicemen were placed in pretrial detention in July over allegations of illegally detaining and beating fellow soldiers. 

On 11 August, Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksandr Fediyenko said, citing National Police data, that 103 criminal proceedings had been opened in 2026 over non-combat deaths in the regiment, with three people charged and one case sent to court.

The new operational arrangement does not itself indicate a change in the status of those investigations. Skelia’s communications office has said personnel transfers and organizational decisions are matters for higher military command and part of the management of Ukraine’s armed forces during wartime.

Russian security services are increasingly recruiting Ukrainians to carry out sabotage, terrorist attacks, and killings, with police reporting a sharp rise in attacks linked to such recruitment since 2024, according to independent Ukrainian outlet Babel.

Since the start of 2026, Ukraine’s National Police and Security Service have registered 31 terrorist attacks, 80% of which have been solved, while another 14 were prevented during preparation.

Authorities have also registered 11 cases of military personnel being poisoned that are being investigated for links to Russian recruitment.

From simple tasks to terrorism

Andrii Niebytov, deputy head of the National Police and chief of criminal police, said Russian recruitment became systematic in early 2024, Babel reported.

Russian handlers typically approach people through Telegram channels and chats where users seek work, easy money, or drugs. The first assignment may appear harmless: photographing a location, passing information, moving a package, or delivering an item.

The tasks can then escalate into property damage, arson, terrorist attacks, and killings. Police say handlers can gradually involve recruits in more serious crimes before using threats or blackmail to keep them under control.

The increase is reflected in police figures. Russian operatives used Ukrainian recruits to carry out nine terrorist attacks in 2024, according to data cited by Babel. The figure rose to 61 in 2025, including 27 attacks that police stopped during preparation. Authorities solved 52 terrorist cases that year.

Military personnel targeted through poisoning

One increasingly dangerous part of the recruitment campaign involves attempts to target Ukrainian service members.

Police have registered 11 poisoning cases since the beginning of 2026 in which investigators are examining or have established links to Russian recruitment, Babel reported.

In some cases, Russian handlers have used young women to establish contact with soldiers, arrange meetings, or deliver poisoned items.

In late July, police detained a 20-year-old woman in Poltava who is suspected of poisoning two soldiers with drugs allegedly provided to her by mail.

In Rivne, investigators are examining the death of a soldier allegedly poisoned by a minor girl with a drug mixed with alcohol. The Russian handler reportedly installed tracking software on the girl’s phone and remotely monitored her actions.

A toolkit built around vulnerability

Russian operatives use different entry points depending on the target. Some recruits are drawn in by promises of easy money or drugs, while others are manipulated through personal relationships or threatened with supposed criminal prosecution.

One scheme involves fraudulent call centers operating in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. Callers impersonate Security Service of Ukraine officials and accuse targets of offenses such as buying Russian-made goods or financing Russia.

Police are investigating 449 fraud cases involving this scheme. But according to Babel, the same tactic is now also being used for recruitment.

After intimidating targets, callers send fake summonses, notices of suspicion, or other documents through messaging apps. They then offer to help the person avoid prosecution in exchange for carrying out criminal assignments.

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Children used as disposable operatives

Russian handlers have also targeted minors, who can be easier to manipulate and may be used as intermediaries or perpetrators.

The National Police said 260 children have independently contacted authorities after being approached by Russian recruiters, according to Babel. Their reports helped prevent terrorist attacks in which minors were allegedly intended to be used as perpetrators.

Police say Russian intelligence services are constantly changing their methods, while the basic pattern remains consistent: identify a vulnerability, offer or impose an initial task, and gradually draw the recruit into more serious criminal activity.

Ukrainian authorities are urging people approached with suspicious offers or assignments to stop contact and report the recruitment attempt immediately.

Ukraine’s Defense Forces struck a Russian Nebo-U long-range radar in occupied Sevastopol and several other military targets in Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories during a series of overnight attacks on 13 August, the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces reported.

The strikes are part of Ukraine’s broader “Middle-Strike” campaign, which targets Russian military infrastructure beyond the immediate front line.

Nebo-U radar hit in Sevastopol

The most significant overnight target was a Russian Nebo-U radar station in Sevastopol, occupied Crimea.

The Nebo-U is a Russian long-range, three-coordinate radar operating in the meter wavelength range. It is designed to detect and track airborne targets, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.

The General Staff said disabling the radar weakens Russia’s ability to detect and track incoming aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, potentially making it harder for Russian forces to detect future Ukrainian strikes and giving Ukrainian weapons a better chance of reaching their targets.

The Nebo-U is estimated to cost around $100 million, making it a high-value Russian surveillance system.

The radar strike supposedly came during a broader Ukrainian drone attack on Sevastopol that also damaged energy infrastructure, according to Russian occupation authorities. The attack caused a citywide blackout before power was later restored through a temporary setup. Ukrainian drones also reportedly targeted the Balaklava power plant, one of Crimea’s two main power stations.

Earlier strikes hit Crimean military infrastructure

The General Staff also reported strikes on Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea on 12 August, including a control tower at the Saky airfield.

Ukrainian forces also struck a communications relay near Chornomorske used to control Russian Geran and Gerbera strike drones, according to the General Staff. It said the strikes weaken Russia’s ability to operate the military airfield and control its attack drones.

Russian logistics and supply sites targeted

Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian drone control center near Myrne in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, a fuel and lubricants depot near Dovzhansk in occupied Luhansk Oblast, and an ammunition depot near Novyi Hai in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Another strike hit a Russian logistics and equipment depot near Kalanchak in occupied Kherson Oblast.

The General Staff said these strikes disrupt Russian logistics and reduce the military’s ability to accumulate and use ammunition, equipment, and personnel.

Strike reported inside Russia

Ukraine also reported striking a Russian personnel concentration area near Butyrky in Russia’s Belgorod Oblast.

The General Staff did not provide details on the weapons used, the scale of damage, or possible casualties at the individual sites.

The latest report is part of Ukraine’s continued campaign to strike Russian military infrastructure beyond the battlefield. The “Middle-Strike” concept focuses on targets that support Russia’s ability to conduct and sustain combat operations, including command, logistics, air defense, and other military facilities.

The General Staff said Ukrainian forces continue to carry out strikes against key Russian military targets.