Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico threatened on June 10 to veto the EU's upcoming 18th sanctions package against Russia if concerns over Slovakia's reliance on Russian gas and energy exports were not addressed.

The comments come as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on June 10 that the 18th package of European Union sanctions against Russia will include additional restrictions on energy, banking, and oil, among other areas.

The EU has proposed for the first time a ban on transactions involving the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines, as well as a reduction in the oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel, as one-third of Russia's government revenue still comes from oil exports, according to von der Leyen.

Fico said on Facebook that he would block additional sanctions unless the bloc finds "a real solution to the crisis situation that Slovakia would face following a complete halt in the supply of gas, oil, and nuclear fuel from Russia."

Historically, Slovakia has been heavily reliant on Russian gas and energy transfer, serving as a key transit hub for Russian exports to Western Europe.

Since taking office in 2023, Fico has also reversed Slovakia's previous pro-Ukraine policy, ending military aid to Kyiv and questioning the value of EU sanctions on Russia.

EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions, require unanimous approval by all member states. A Slovak veto could force concessions or delay enforcement in future rounds.

Fico's comments come as Slovakia’s parliament passed a resolution on June 5 urging the government to oppose any new international sanctions or trade restrictions against Russia, citing alleged negative economic impacts. The non-binding resolution argued that sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have driven up energy prices, disrupted supply chains, and harmed Slovak industry.

Fico subsequently vowed on June 8 that he would veto new sanctions if they harm national interests, adding that he would not support any measure that halts Russian fuel imports that are used to power Slovakia's nuclear power plants.

Unlike Ukraine-skeptic Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has repeatedly obstructed and delayed the bloc's sanctions against Russia and military aid for Ukraine, Slovakia has not previously attempted to block EU sanctions.

On May 6 the EU presented a detailed roadmap to fully sever the bloc’s energy dependence on Russia by 2027. National governments, including Kremlin-friendly Hungary and Slovakia, will be required to submit individual phase-out plans by year’s end.

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The EU has proposed for the first time a ban on transactions involving the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines, as well as a reduction in the oil price cap from $60 to $45 per barrel, among other measures.

The Kyiv IndependentKateryna Hodunova

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said on June 8 that Slovakia will block EU sanctions against Russia if they are deemed to harm the country's national interests.

"If there is a sanction that would harm us, I will never vote for it," Fico told reporters.

Fico's comments come as Slovakia’s parliament passed a resolution on June 5 urging the government to oppose any new international sanctions or trade restrictions against Russia, citing alleged negative economic impacts.

The non-binding resolution argues that the sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have driven up energy prices, disrupted supply chains, and harmed Slovak industry.

The resolution calls on government ministers to “defend national economic interests” in international forums and resist further punitive measures targeting Moscow.

Since taking office in 2023, Fico has reversed Slovakia's previous pro-Ukraine policy, ending military aid to Kyiv and questioning the value of EU sanctions on Russia.

EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions, require unanimous approval by all member states. A Slovak veto could force concessions or delay enforcement in future rounds.

Unlike Ukraine-skeptic Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has repeatedly obstructed and delayed the bloc's sanctions against Russia and military aid for Ukraine, Slovakia has not previously attempted to block EU sanctions.

"I am interested in being a constructive player in the European Union, but not at the expense of Slovakia," Fico said, without elaborating on how he will vote on any upcoming EU sanctions packages.

Fico added that he would not support any measure that halts Russian fuel imports that are used to power Slovakia's nuclear power plants.

Discussions are underway as the EU is preparing an 18th sanctions package against Russia. EU ambassadors on May 14 agreed on the bloc's 17th package of sanctions against Russia, primarily targeting its shadow fleet of oil tankers.

Ukraine's European allies are tightening sanctions against Russia as Moscow refuses to cease fire. Despite Russia's refusal, no new U.S. sanctions have been imposed so far.

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The Kyiv IndependentAlex Cadier

Slovakia’s parliament passed a resolution on June 5 urging the government to oppose any new international sanctions or trade restrictions against Russia, citing alleged negative economic impacts, Slovak news outlet Noviny reported.

The non-binding resolution argues that the sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have driven up energy prices, disrupted supply chains, and harmed Slovak industry.

The resolution calls on government ministers to “defend national economic interests” in international forums and resist further punitive measures targeting Moscow.

The motion was introduced by the far-right Slovak National Party (SNS) and passed with the support of 51 of the 76 lawmakers present.

All SNS deputies backed the measure, along with most members of Prime Minister Robert Fico's left-wing Smer-SD party, several from the coalition partner Hlas-SD, and some independents.

Only one Hlas-SD lawmaker, Jan Ferencak, voted against the resolution; 23 others from the same party abstained. Opposition lawmakers boycotted the vote entirely.

While Fico's Smer party has drawn criticism for its increasingly pro-Russian rhetoric, the SNS promotes a "pan-Slavic brotherhood" narrative that aligns closely with Kremlin talking points.

The resolution does not carry legal force but sends a political signal that could complicate Brussels' efforts to maintain consensus on sanctions.

EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions, require unanimous approval by all member states. A Slovak veto could force concessions or delay enforcement in future rounds.

Since taking office in 2023, Fico has reversed Slovakia's previous pro-Ukraine policy, ending military aid to Kyiv and questioning the value of EU sanctions on Russia.

The EU's sanctions regime currently targets over 2,400 Russian individuals and entities involved in the war, as well as key sectors of the Russian economy, including energy, finance, defense, and technology.

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The Kyiv IndependentLinda Hourani

Hungary and Slovakia continue to rely heavily on Russian oil, gas, and nuclear fuel, despite having technical and economic capacity to switch to alternative sources, according to a detailed joint report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD, Bulgaria) and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA, Finland). Both countries “have shown no real intention of phasing out Russian crude oil,” the report states. Similar conclusions are made regarding the Russian gas and nuclear projects.

The report, titled The Last Mile. Phasing Out Russian Oil and Gas in Central Europe, reveals that both countries have used EU sanctions exemptions not as a path to energy independence, but as a shield to deepen ties with Russian suppliers, significantly undermining EU unity and energy security strategy.

No real effort to reduce Russian dependency

The report presents a stark picture: Hungary and Slovakia have not reduced their imports of Russian oil and gas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. On the contrary, Hungary increased its Russian crude reliance from 61% in 2021 to 86% in 2024. Slovakia’s dependence remained at nearly 87% that same year. Combined, the two countries imported 8.7 million tonnes of Russian crude oil in 2024, which is 2% more than in 2021.

Since the beginning of the invasion, these imports have sent the Kremlin approximately €5.4 billion in tax revenue. As the report emphasizes, that amount could theoretically fund the production of 1,800 Iskander-M missiles—missiles used to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian areas.

Despite disruptions in the Druzhba pipeline in 2024 and multiple opportunities to diversify through the Adria pipeline, both Hungary and Slovakia continued to rely on Russian supply chains. Slovakia began marginal non-Russian crude imports in the latter half of 2024, while Hungary saw its non-Russian crude intake fall to nearly zero.

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MOL and the role of state-linked energy networks

The report highlights the central role of Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, which owns the only refineries in both Hungary and Slovakia. MOL’s strategic decisions on crude origin determine national energy sourcing. Although the Hungarian state does not directly own MOL, it controls over 30% of the company through government-aligned foundations, effectively shaping its energy policy.

MOL secured multiple contracts for non-Russian oil via the Adria pipeline—2.2 million tonnes in 2023 and 2.1 million tonnes in 2025—but actual delivery in 2023 was less than half that amount. Meanwhile, MOL continues to process discounted Russian crude, profiting from price gaps that are not passed on to consumers. In fact, gasoline and diesel prices in Hungary remained 5% above the EU average in 2024.

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This arrangement has allowed MOL’s operating income to rise significantly: to $26.4 billion in 2022 and around $25.3 billion in both 2023 and 2024. The company’s profits helped stabilize Hungary’s strained budget through a windfall tax—initially 25%, later raised to 95%. By 2024, the tax yielded only $15 million, compared to $521 million in 2022, as discounts narrowed and fiscal benefits declined.

Between 2022 and May 2024, Hungary and MOL earned an estimated €1.7 billion in “extra profit” from this setup, according to a Hungarian nonprofit G7 investigation cited in the report.

Exploiting legal loopholes and export exemptions

The report details how both Hungary and Slovakia used EU exemptions to re-export petroleum products made from Russian crude to Czechia. Originally set to expire in December 2023, this export exemption was extended twice—first to December 2024, then to June 2025—despite Czechia’s objection.

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In 2024, Slovakia exported 710,000 tonnes of petroleum products to Czechia, worth €520 million, while Hungary added another 39,000 tonnes worth €40 million. Slovnaft, MOL’s Slovak subsidiary, is identified as the primary beneficiary.

Gas dependency entrenched via TurkStream

Hungary has positioned itself as a regional hub for Russian gas, increasing imports via TurkStream and re-exporting to Slovakia. Hungary’s 15-year contract with Gazprom, signed in 2021, was expanded in 2024 with an additional 2 billion cubic meters per year.

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Slovakia, whose contract with Gazprom runs until 2034, has likewise expanded imports from Hungary, effectively bypassing Ukraine as a transit country. The report notes that this arrangement severely weakens the EU’s diversification efforts and severely weakens “the EU’s collective energy security strategy and reinforce long-term risks of political leverage by the Kremlin.”

Hidden networks, offshore intermediaries, and Kremlin ties

Central to the report is the exposure of intermediary networks, particularly Normeston Trading SA—a company tied to Soviet-era oil traders and Russian oil majors. Normeston, once based in Belize and later in Cyprus and Switzerland, acted as a shadow intermediary for Russian crude shipments to Hungary and Slovakia.

The company has long-standing ties to MOL executives and Russian oil firms, including Lukoil and Bashneft. The report alleges that Normeston facilitated massive markups on Russian oil imports by acting as a middleman, effectively skimming profits outside the scope of EU oversight.

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The nuclear dimension

Although Slovakia signed a fuel supply deal with US-based Westinghouse, and Hungary with France’s Framatome, both continue to receive large volumes from Rosatom. The Paks II nuclear project in Hungary, led by Rosatom and financed 80% through a Russian loan, is flagged as a long-term strategic risk that locks Hungary into Russian influence for decades.

The report points out that the key contract details for Paks II are classified, and oversight is minimal. It describes the entire project as lacking transparency, with regulatory bypasses and rising costs now estimated at €15 billion—about 12% of Hungary’s GDP.

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Infrastructure and alternatives: No technical barriers

Tests confirm both MOL refineries can process non-Russian crude. In 2019, during a Druzhba contamination crisis, Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil temporarily dropped to 48% as it switched to Adria-supplied crude.

Similarly, alternatives to Russian gas exist through expanded LNG infrastructure in Greece, Croatia, and Poland, and new interconnectors with Austria, Romania, and Poland. The report insists that technical constraints do not justify continued Russian dependency.

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Recommendations: End exemptions, enforce traceability, dismantle capture networks

The report urges the EU to:

• Terminate the crude oil import exemptions under Regulation 833/2014 by 30 June 2025.
• End the loophole allowing oil product exports derived from Russian crude.
• Audit and enforce transparent pricing in the Adria pipeline to dispel Hungary’s cost-related claims.
• Impose full traceability of oil and gas origin.
• Sanction Rosatom and all subsidiaries to reduce nuclear dependence.
• Investigate MOL’s role in prolonging dependency through the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).

It concludes that continued exemptions and reliance on Russian energy sources serve no technical or economic rationale and must be ended to protect European energy security, reduce Kremlin revenues, and restore EU sanctions integrity.