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Ukraine struck Russia’s Kerch bridge again. The EU firms that helped build it barely suffered.

Kerch bridge construction 2017

On 17 November, Ukrainians jubilated: Russia's bridge to Crimea had been struck twice in two days. The arch over its shipping channel and a road span collapsed; whether transport can resume is unclear.

The bridge Ukraine is now dismantling should never have stood. The hardest job in building it—driving piles up to 105 m deep through the Kerch Strait's silt—was done in part with European machinery, sold in breach of the EU sanctions written to prevent exactly that; the Dutch prosecutor later said the bridge was built partly thanks to Dutch knowledge and expertise.

And when the Netherlands and Germany finally caught the suppliers, years late, the reckoning was a handful of fines at a fraction of the profit made, some community service, and a single Dutch court conviction—of a company the court did not name.

That lenience may well have set the tone for today's porous sanctions regime, in which Western chips still end up in Russian missiles, reaching Russia through intermediaries—a flow no one has managed to stop.

The Kerch bridge is seen damaged after the Ukrainian strike. Source: Exilenova+
The Kerch bridge is seen damaged after the Ukrainian strike. Source: Exilenova+

EU companies helped Russia solidify its grip over Crimea

When Russia annexed it in 2014, Crimea had an umbilical cord through its isthmus, relying on Ukraine for over 80% of its power and water. A ferry offered a precarious connection to Russia's Krasnodar Krai.

Yet Russia gradually secured its grip over the peninsula—with the help of EU companies. Two cases stand out.

One is the Siemens turbines: sold to Russia, they were delivered to Crimea in 2017 in breach of sanctions—without its knowledge, Siemens says—and installed in new power plants in Simferopol and Sevastopol.

The other is the Kerch bridge: opened to road traffic in 2018 and rail in 2019, built with equipment from seven Dutch companies and one German one, according to Dutch and German prosecutors.

It played a key role in the 2022 invasion and was Russia's main supply artery to southern Ukraine until July 2023. Crimea still mattered to Russia's war: before this week's strike, an estimated 30–40% of supplies to Russia's forces in the occupied south came through it, according to Oleksii Yizhak of Ukraine's National Institute for Strategic Studies.

Map: the Kerch bridge, struck on 17 November, and Russia's military supply routes to occupied southern Ukraine
Map: Euromaidan Press

Ukraine targeted the bridge at least five times before this week, from a truck bomb in October 2022 to underwater charges in June 2025, and Russia restored traffic each time. The 16–17 November strikes, all with Ukrainian-made weapons, were the first to bring a span down from the air: Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) says its Palianytsia missile-drones dropped the road span, while Neptune and FP-5 Flamingo missiles hit the rail section.

Europe helped Russia build the bridge. It has taken Ukraine nearly five years and at least six tries to start pulling it down.

How the companies that built the bridge were found out

Russia had dreamt of this bridge for well over a century. Tsarist, Nazi, and Soviet planners all tried to cross the Kerch Strait. The only bridge actually completed, a 4.5 km Soviet railway bridge thrown across in 1944, was too lightly built for the strait: drift ice swept it away in February 1945, after about 150 days. Under the water lies the deeper problem: instead of bedrock, the strait's floor is many meters of silt and sand. To reach solid ground, the new bridge's piles had to be driven as deep as 105 m.

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Only after occupying Crimea did Russia build the thing—this time, with the help of the sanctions-breaking Western engineering that drove the pillars past the silt. Dutch companies had the know-how: after all, they had been building on the sea for centuries.

The scheme was meant to stay hidden—Russia insisted only Russian firms had built the bridge. The companies stripped the branding off their equipment to hide whose it was. It surfaced on 1 September 2017, when the Dutch regional daily De Gelderlander revealed that two firms from the Gelderland villages of Dodewaard and Milsbeek had made key equipment for driving the bridge's piles: Dematec Equipment built a special pile-driving hammer, and Bijlard Hydrauliek supplied its key component.

The exposé prompted the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (OM) to open a criminal investigation under the EU's 2014 sanctions, which barred EU firms from helping build Crimea's infrastructure. By May 2018, it covered seven companies.

The OM named only Dieseko, so the other names come from the press and from a 2019 dossier by Ukrainian prosecutors, reported by the Dutch investigative platform Investico:

  • Dieseko Group—at least four vibro blocks (~€1.5 mn each, 2015–16) to drive the bridge's piles into the seabed, shipped via Finland. The company also gave on-site technical assistance to the builders.
  • CAPE Holland—powerful pile-driving hammers.
  • Dematec Equipment B.V.—powerful pile-driving hammers.
  • Allpacks International B.V.—a hammer to vibrate the foundation piles.
  • Allnamics Pile Testing Experts B.V.—the pile-testing and measurement equipment, plus a training course for the Russian builders, to verify the piles were driven correctly and would hold.

A German company from Schleswig-Holstein supplied a hydraulic hammer—also for the hardest construction work, driving the piles into the silt. A court in Kiel later confiscated €1.3 mn from the company and fined its director. Like every Dutch company except Dieseko, it was never named by the authorities.

Ironically, Germany never sent Ukraine its powerful Taurus missiles, which Ukraine had officially requested in 2023. In a call Russia leaked in 2024, senior Luftwaffe officers discussed how Ukraine could use them to bring down the Kerch bridge. A German firm, meanwhile, had supplied the hammer that helped build it.

A slap on the wrist

The Russian firms that did the actual building shrugged off their own penalty. The EU sanctioned six of them in July 2018: Mostotrest, Stroygazmontazh, Stroygazmontazh Most, VAD, GPSM, and Zaliv Shipyard. Arkady Rotenberg, the Putin ally who owns the first three, brushed it off: "We're all proud of our work and if someone doesn't like it that's not our problem."

By then, the road bridge was already open. The sanctions meant to stop it—the EU's 2014 ban on helping build Crimea's infrastructure—had not.

The construction of the largest pillars for the bridge took place in July 2017, according to the website most.life, specially developed for the bridge
The construction of the largest pillars of the bridge took place in July 2017, according to the website most.life, specially developed for the bridge

The European suppliers fared better still. The OM settled with six companies and ten individuals out of court, starting with four companies and eight individuals in October 2023. A seventh company was fined €120,000 by an Amsterdam court in November 2024—the only Dutch conviction in seven years. It is still unnamed. Two more individuals were acquitted.

The figures look serious until you read them.

Crimean bridge smoke
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Sanctions lawyer: Dutch firms get slap on wrist for Crimea bridge work

Dieseko paid €1.78 mn; the German supplier, €1.3 mn. But the bulk of both is confiscation—the state clawing back the profit from the job, which leaves the company no worse off than if it had never taken it. The actual fines, on top, are beneath the pain threshold: €180,000 for Dieseko, €18,000 for the German firm's director, €120,000 for the convicted Dutch company, and €160,000 split among the four fined in 2023. Hand back what you earned, add a fine worth a fraction of it, and the account is closed.

For helping build a bridge that would carry an occupying army, eight people agreed to between 20 and 60 hours of community service in settlements with prosecutors.

Heleen over de Linden
Heleen over de Linden, a Dutch lawyer specializing in sanctions. Photo: rechta.com

Importantly, the companies' reputations did not suffer. The prosecutors named no company apart from Dieseko—every other settlement was anonymized, sparing the firms the single penalty a company actually fears: its name in the press beside the word "sanctions."

It was slow, too: the first Dutch penalties came in 2023, six years after the breach surfaced.

"Six years is a very long time in the Netherlands to be under suspicion," the Dutch sanctions lawyer Heleen over de Linden told Euromaidan Press. "This is the only reason for the very mild convictions."

On the penalties themselves she was blunter: "for Dutch standards, these are very low penalties, basically nothing."

What helping Russia costs

A penalty this small is not a deterrent. It is a price—cheap, deferred, and anonymous.

The Kerch Bridge cases put that price on public record: hand back the profit, years later, with your name kept out of the papers. For a firm weighing a lucrative Russian contract, that is hardly a reason to say no.

In 2017, the suppliers' defense was that they had sold to Russia, not Crimea. "EU sanctions state that we are not allowed to work in Crimea, but we can in Russia," Dematec director Derk Van den Heuvel said. Bijlard Hydrauliek's Marcel Bijlard said he had "just delivered a part to a customer in the Netherlands. No more."

That line did not always hold. In the one Dutch case that reached a verdict, the company's own staff working on site came to suspect they were in Crimea, the court found.

The pattern repeats today. Western microchips and parts keep turning up inside the missiles and drones Russia fires at Ukrainian cities, routed in through Kazakhstan, Armenia, Türkiye, and others.

It is the same maneuver the bridge suppliers, and the shippers of the Siemens turbines now running in Crimea's power stations, used back then: sell to "Russia," not "Crimea"; let an intermediary blur the final destination; say you could not have known. The bridge and Siemens cases were an early test: caught in the open, documented—and toothless.

We do not know if more resolute action on the bridge and the Siemens turbines would have slowed the flow of chips into Russian missiles now. We do know that the sanctions regime failed to stop Western help for Russia's occupation back then, and is failing to stop it for Russia's war now.

Kyiv put the road span in the sea this week; it is the only party that has made the bridge cost Russia anything it noticed. European prosecutors learned of the breach nine years ago and, in the end, publicly named only Dieseko. Until helping Russia costs more than handing back the change, there is no reason on earth for the next company to refuse.

Another pointed sanctions violation case

How Siemens chose to ignore the obvious. An investigation into the Crimean sanctions break

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A fake torture chamber, a real riot: Russia scores points on Ukraine’s mobilization crisis

Mobilization crisis Ukraine petropavlivska borshchahivka enlistment center

On 2 November in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, on the outskirts of Kyiv, an enraged crowd rocked a bus with mobilized men inside, threatening to overturn it. These were the men the crowd had come to "free." Hours earlier, a woman in a medic's uniform with impeccable makeup had pulled up to a private house nearby in an ambulance, knelt at its gate, and livestreamed a dramatic plea to be let in to the "unlawfully held mobilized." Their relatives had called her, she said, because the men were in grave condition after "torture."

The video spread like wildfire through networks of anonymous Telegram channels and posts in Facebook groups. There is an underground torture chamber in that house, they alleged. Forty men are kept inside against their will, they claimed.

Mobilization crisis Ukraine petropavlivska borshchahivka enlistment center Russian disinformation campaigns
A woman posing as a medic demands to be let into an army post at Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, 2 November. Screenshot from video shared in social networks

The reality was less dramatic. The kneeling woman was not a medic but the owner of a plastic surgery clinic, investigative outlet Slidstvo.Info found. The private ambulance she arrived in? The medical company that once owned it stopped operating in 2023 and sold the vehicle in 2024, on condition that its logos be removed. The director of the emergency medical center whose uniform she wore told Slidstvo she had never worked there and had bought or sewn the uniform herself.

The house was in fact a temporary deployment point of military unit 3121, part of the 1st Azov Corps of Ukraine's National Guard. The Guard's commander, Oleksandr Pivnenko, came to the scene, and later so did Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Presidential Office, whose arrival signaled a code red. Together they let about ten people from the crowd inside, including the "medic" and the bloggers streaming beside her.

There are signs the story was seeded in advance. The day before the riot, an anonymous source sent soldier Serhii Hnezdilov a tip about a “torture chamber” in Borshchahivka where some forty innocent Ukrainians were held and people were being killed.

Hnezdilov is no friend of the mobilization system: in 2024, he publicly went AWOL to protest the lack of fixed terms of service, and he says he will always defend AWOL soldiers when they are in the right. Yet he checked the tip, found a temporary placement point for mobilized men, and published nothing.

The same plants, with supposedly horrific videos and rumors of corpses, were pushed to others too, he wrote, calling it “a well-planned information plant.”

RFE/RL reported that the visitors found no torture chamber, only newly mobilized men and soldiers detained after going AWOL, waiting to be processed before training. The mobilized men said nobody had used force against them, and a mother of one of them said those inside were "fine," though she called the conditions terrible, Ukrainska Pravda reported.

Inside they also found a 14-year-old boy who had been cursing at the police from the fence and had fallen into the yard. Four of the men, whom Pivnenko identified as soldiers detained after going AWOL, did have injuries; how they got them is now under investigation.

Mobilization crisis Ukraine petropavlivska borshchahivka enlistment center
Presidential Office head Kyrylo Budanov talks to the crowd rioting at Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, near Kyiv, 2 November 2026. Marian Kushnir/RFE/RL

From one rumor to 40 hostages in three hours

The mundane reality was a striking contrast to the passions brewing outside: the crowd egged and cussed at the police and servicemen guarding the building, set off flares, shouted, and climbed over the fence. But this was nothing compared to the passions swirling on social media. Among the Telegram channels that opposition MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak tracked in his 25-channel mapping, the first post went out at 13:16, reporting a rumor about one detained and injured person. Half an hour later, another channel claimed 40 were held, citing unnamed local media. An "alarming video" of the "ambulance medics" started circulating on Facebook, and a burst of 34 posts in 40 minutes followed, almost every one adding an alarming unsourced detail.

In three hours, the rumors went from one person to 40, to a basement, to four in critical condition, to men "tortured and killed" in a mobilization center and released only for ransom. The first fact-check, by TV channel TSN, came at 16:47.

According to Ukraine's state Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD), the first public call to go to the house had appeared even earlier, on Threads at 11:34. At 13:57, Russian outlets such as Ukraina.ru joined the campaign, and from 14:00, 361 Facebook posts used one standardized text: "🤯40 people held in a basement by armed men in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka… four in critical condition…" Around 19:00, 110 Russian channels published the same template: "Concentration camp in Borshchahivka, Ukrainians' revolt."

Nothing was clear, except that some kind of scandal was happening in Kyiv and it was related to military service. That morning, Russia had dropped nine guided bombs on an underground school in frontline Komyshuvakha, in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, that served as a humanitarian aid point. At least 31 people who had come for bread and aid were killed, and dozens more are still missing.

Yet it was the chaos on Kyiv's outskirts that caught the attention of Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany's far-right AfD. The next morning, she quote-posted on X a claim that "a torture chamber of Zelensky" held "over 40 mobilized men" and that "the youngest victim was reportedly just 14." The 14-year-old was the boy who had fallen off the fence.

Weidel wrote that she expected the German government to raise it "today in Berlin during the Selensky visit." The post had about 755,000 views by that evening. It did not mention Komyshuvakha. That same day, a Russian drone killed a 14-year-old girl in her home in Khotiv, just outside Kyiv.

Mobilization crisis Ukraine petropavlivska borshchahivka enlistment center
A man smashes the windows of a mobilization bus near an army post at Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, near Kyiv, 2 November 2026. Marian Kushnir/RFE/RL

A familiar Kremlin script

For observers of Russian influence campaigns, this is a familiar script. Hacked emails of Putin's gray cardinal Vladislav Surkov are replete with campaigns in which Russia attempted to fabricate a virtual reality, pushing for such pro-Kremlin outcomes as Ukraine's federalization in 2014–2015, the first years after Russia's occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

As a RUSI study of the leaks I co-authored found, Surkov's office paid local collaborators for protests and rallies that imitated genuine civic engagement, and wrapped Kremlin goals in local causes: in Zaporizhzhia, a push for "special status" ran under an ecological flag. At one Kremlin-curated "All-Ukrainian Constitutional Forum" calling for federalization, the foreign guests included Franz Weise of Germany's AfD.

The 3 October "rally for peace" in Kyiv, which the kneeling "medic" helped organize and whose online promotion bore signs of Russian interference, demanded an end to the war, early presidential elections, open borders, and an international audit of aid to Ukraine, fact-checkers at Zmina found.

However, said observers will be right to note that Russia's influence campaigns work best when they exploit real seams in Ukrainian society, and Ukraine's mobilization crisis is the realest one there is.

Mobilization crisis Ukraine petropavlivska borshchahivka enlistment center
A crowd riots near an army post at Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, near Kyiv, 2 November 2026. Marian Kushnir/RFE/RL

Who was behind it

We do not yet know how large Russia's role was in the riot on 2 November. The CCD says the incident "has signs of a pre-planned campaign with external interference." Law enforcement detained the kneeling "medic" and her driver. Budanov said she had scouted the house at least three days earlier and had corresponded with administrators of "certain Telegram channels."

Officials describe a more mundane motive too. Interior Minister Ivan Vyhivskyi called it "a kind of scheme for extracting draft evaders," and the SBU said the real aim was to snatch one serviceman who had gone AWOL.

Veteran Anton Kolumbet, a former deputy minister of veterans affairs, has described a shadow business of "rapid response groups" (a lawyer, a doctor, a blogger, a driver, muscle, and social media support) hired to pull recruits out of military custody before they reach their units. Russia, he wrote, is involved only indirectly, by amplifying the anti-mobilization channels.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi (center), reviewing a military map with Ukrainian officers in Donetsk Oblast on 4 October 2025
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A crisis Russia did not have to invent

We do know that resistance to mobilization in Ukraine has reached an inflection point. For too many Ukrainians, mobilization brigades are now seen as the number one enemy, an attitude which, inflamed by Russian channels, blossomed as anonymous Telegram channels turned every reported abuse into proof of a system. Complaints to Ukraine's human rights ombudsman about the conduct of recruitment centers rose from 18 at the start of the full-scale invasion to 6,127 in 2025.

The acute feeling of an existential threat to family and nation has plunged since the climactic moment of February 2022, when so many men volunteered to take up arms that recruitment centers sent some home. Instead, a split reality has set in, in which Putin's demands are rejected and the nation must be defended, but the defending is seen as the obligation of others.

More and more people on the home front go on living their best lives, as much as they can under incessant Russian strikes, while nearly a million soldiers are stuck plugging the Russian deluge, outmanned, with no hope of being replaced. Too many eligible men are busy overturning mobilization buses, are too spooked to go outside lest their documents be checked, or have escaped over the border. There is no mandatory draft for women.

The only army Ukraine has

Granted, Ukraine's army system is far from ideal. Mobilization groups have been reported to use force, and the human rights ombudsman has documented men held unlawfully for up to 48 days at a recruitment center in Uzhhorod. Journalists at Babel documented alleged abuse and more than 20 deaths among mobilized men in the Skelia assault regiment, drawing on more than 30 testimonies.

Yes, the prevalent Soviet mentality in the army has led commanders to sacrifice soldiers' lives for the sake of positions on paper. Nevertheless, these cases are known because journalists published them, the ombudsman inspected, and the State Bureau of Investigation opened criminal cases; in the Skelia case, the bureau served a notice of suspicion, the first formal step toward charges, on a junior sergeant accused of beating two fellow servicemen.

Yet this is the only army Ukraine has, it is improving each day, and it is the only reason Ukraine still exists as an independent nation.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi met the senior sergeants. Source: Drapatyi
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It is also the only reason the crowd at Borshchahivka could shout at soldiers and walk home. Russia's own army has held soldiers who refused to fight in basements and pits in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, Russian independent media reported. The Russian outlet Astra knew of no case in which those holding them were brought to justice, though some of the men held there were prosecuted.

"The uniform in no way strips a person of the right to dignity, safety, and protection from threats, humiliation, and violence," Ukraine's General Staff said on 3 November. "Respect for a serviceman is not a reward for being flawless." It backed an impartial investigation and warned that "Russia is trying to use internal conflicts to undermine trust in the Defense Forces."

Among the men stationed at the house were soldiers who had fought for Mariupol and Azovstal, survived Russian captivity, and returned to service, Ukraine's military ombudsman Olha Reshetylova wrote. "The population repaid them with spit, eggs, smashed windows, and swearing teenagers." Whether trust between the army and society can be restored, she added, "is an open question."

Standing before the crowd that night, Pivnenko warned that the enemy now knew the location. "If we die here, then in principle there's no problem, but it will all be on your conscience, dear Ukrainians," he said.

The unit now has to move. The commander of Azov, Denys Prokopenko, called the events "sabotage in the rear in Russia's interests."

Mobilization crisis Ukraine petropavlivska borshchahivka enlistment center
National Guard commander Oleksandr Pivnenko inside the room with men awaiting distribution to service. Screenshot from a video by Oleksandr Pivnenko

Nobody wants to be the adult in the room

War is hell. The problem in Ukraine is that too many have forgotten that a Russian occupation is a greater hell. The psyche adapts: Russia's daily drone and missile obliteration has become the new normal. Hoping that the problem of Russia's war will somehow go away by itself is prevalent; the drive to join the fight is not. But the psyche still demands an explanation for the problems surrounding us. The mobilization brigades yanking Ukrainians out of their comfortable, false reality have taken the place of the enemy.

Opposition MP Volodymyr Viatrovych writes of "Russian breakthroughs on the front of trust." Russia's operations work, he argues, because they wrap around real problems: corruption and incompetence, unresolved mobilization, lies and hype in the media. Zelenskyy, he wrote, slid into "systematic avoidance" of problems, from corruption scandals to mobilization. Trust at war, he wrote, matters "not only at the front and in the rear, but, most importantly now, between them."

The issue has become politically toxic and nobody in the Ukrainian establishment wants to become the adult in the room: announce to Ukrainians that if preserving nationhood is important, mobilization is here to stay and all must serve. Even if the war is frozen, somebody will have to man the 1,000 km front line facing Russian troops, until Russia invades again.

Political commentator Valeriy Pekar puts it bluntly: the political leadership is "the main evader" on mobilization, going for five years without decisions or public communication.

President Zelensky, who was in Berlin on 3 November, has not commented publicly on Borshchahivka as of this writing. That, opposition MP Inna Sovsun says, is a problem: the commander-in-chief should stand up for one of his most effective units. Refusing to talk about mobilization will lead to more incidents like this, she warned. Similar incidents have erupted elsewhere, including the patriotic city of Lviv, where a crowd overturned a recruitment center vehicle this July.

overturned draft-office vehicle in sykhiv district in lviv
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Some moves are underway. In May, President Zelenskyy announced an army reform to start in June, with higher pay and phased demobilization, and lawmakers registered ten bills on mobilization and military service, including one to turn recruitment centers into an online “service.”

On 26 October, Prime Minister Serhii Koretskyi promised a “new social contract” on mobilization and draft exemptions by 1 December, under which companies would commit to sending a predictable share of their workers to the army. If such a solution were found, he said, “the need to search for people on the streets would disappear,” though he called it an “idealistic model.”

None of it amounts to telling Ukrainians that everyone must serve.

In the meantime, Ukraine’s mobilization crisis remains the Kremlin’s dream come true: Ukrainians who see their own soldiers, not the Russian invader, as the enemy, something no number of Surkov’s paid rallies could ever buy.

Mobilization crisis Ukraine petropavlivska borshchahivka enlistment center
A crowd rocks a mobilization bus near an army post at Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, near Kyiv, 2 November 2026. Marian Kushnir/RFE/RL

What we know about the riot at Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, and what we don't

What we know

  • The house was a temporary deployment point of military unit 3121, part of the National Guard's 1st Azov Corps, Azov said. Troops are dispersed in rented buildings so they can't be struck in one place. "We can't hold 100, 200, 300 men at one point," said National Guard spokesman Ruslan Muzychuk.
  • Inside were 18 servicemen being processed before training, four of them detained after going AWOL, according to Pivnenko. Police counted 26 people inside.
  • Debunked: the "40 hostages" and the dead man (Kyiv Oblast police) and the "broken spine" (National Guard spokesman, via UP).
  • Casualties: 16 National Guard soldiers working outside were injured, none seriously, when the crowd threw stones and sprayed gas, Pivnenko told reporters. Four of the men inside had injuries and were taken to a National Guard hospital.
  • Detentions: the "medic" and her driver are detained. The SBU has identified about 100 active participants and opened three criminal cases.
  • The campaign: coordinated, by every dataset so far (CCD; LetsData via UP; Zhelezniak). Within hours on 2 November, Telegram posts about the incident gathered over 4mn views, the Stop Panika service found.

What we don't know

  • How the four men inside were injured. The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) has opened a criminal case for exceeding authority by a military official and says it will check "the legality of the actions of all involved."
  • Who organized the riot, and why. Budanov said investigators are weighing whether the motive was personal, anti-state, a bid for attention, or money. Yuriy Honcharenko, head of the InfoLight.UA Research and Analysis Group and chairman of the Ukrainian Security Club, who says he has long tracked clashes over mobilization, believes that the riot was organic, not staged.
  • Whether Russia ordered it, or joined and amplified it.

Ukrainian officials promise to investigate. The DBR, the Prosecutor General's Office, and the SBU have opened cases. Military ombudsman Reshetylova's office was at the scene and at the hospital that night; its inspection will examine how recruits and returned AWOL soldiers ended up at the house, their medical fitness findings, and how they were returned to service.

Human rights ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets has asked law enforcement to establish the legal basis for holding the men there, and to assess the actions of the civilians who attacked the soldiers.

Whatever the investigation finds, one thing is clear: it is being led by public bodies, and that is the biggest difference with the Russians. In occupied Luhansk Oblast in 2022, independent Russian outlet Verstka found at least 234 Russian soldiers who refused to fight held in basements in Bryanka, guarded by Wagner mercenaries. Mediazona reported that the most stubborn were put in "pits" and beaten. No investigation of comparable openness followed.

So far, the result is that 16 National Guard soldiers were hurt by the crowd that came to "free" the men inside. Four men in the house had injuries, and the state authorities, including the military ombudsman, promise to investigate how they got them.

Editor's note: article was updated after publication to include Hnezdilov's statement.

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Meet Zakon, the Ukrainian font designed to write Russian type out of state documents

zakon typeface

For more than 300 years, since Peter I's 1708 script reform, Ukrainian lettering has been shaped by imperial Russian norms. Zakon, presented on 29 October 2026, aims to break that pattern and decolonize the letters of Ukraine's state acts and awards.

The national font for official state communication draws on the work of Ukrainian artists, including Heorhii Narbut, who designed a 1918 banknote for the Ukrainian People's Republic, the short-lived independent state that fell to the Bolsheviks. It is meant to replace Izhitsa, Petersburg, and other Russian-origin fonts still often used on honor certificates, letters of thanks, diplomas, battle flags, and signs, adding a visual touch to the country's push to boost its national culture amid the fifth year of Russia's full-blown invasion.

Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk presented Zakon on 29 October, nine months after parliament adopted a resolution that called for a national font and said Russian-origin fonts had no place in official acts or on state awards. The Ministry of Culture developed it with money from the job site Work.ua and its co-owner Artur Mikhno, and the font is still in beta testing, the ministry says.

“The letters in which the word ‘Ukraine’ is written are also part of our state identity,” Stefanchuk wrote. “Decolonization should also concern how Ukraine presents itself.”

"Ukraine" written in Zakon font. Screenshot from mincult.gov.ua
"Ukraine" written in Zakon font. Screenshot from mincult.gov.ua

“The creation of a national typeface is an important step toward ensuring that state institutions represent Ukraine through our artistic tradition and contemporary Ukrainian design. [...] We want Ukrainian design to shape the image of our country, and for our cultural heritage to become a source of new solutions,” said Tetiana Berezhna, Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Policy and Minister of Culture.

Three typefaces, one of them free for anyone

Zakon comes in three versions. Zakon Text is designed for everyday official paperwork and is free for anyone to use; it's available for download here. Zakon Decor, for ceremonial inscriptions, and Zakon Letterpress, for printing the originals of legal acts, have closed licenses.

Zakon Text has four styles: regular, italic, bold, and bold italic. The ministry asks users to test it and send feedback before a wider rollout, which Stefanchuk said will be gradual.

The designers are Oleksii Chekal, Hennadii Zarechniuk, Dmytro Rastvortsev, and Andrii Shevchenko, with Taras Ishchyk leading the project.

Example of an Antiqua font
Example of an Antiqua font

The ministry calls Zakon a “classic Ukrainian antiqua.” Antiqua, or roman, is the family of upright serif letters that grew out of a script Renaissance Italian humanists modeled on Carolingian handwriting, which they took for ancient Roman.

The name set it apart from blackletter, the Gothic script, and its forms became the basis of the roman typefaces Nicolas Jenson and Aldus Manutius cut in 15th-century Venice.

Built on the lettering of six Ukrainian artists

Zakon brings Ukrainian letter forms back to Cyrillic. The Ministry of Culture says that its developers “generalized most of the characteristic features” of six Ukrainian graphic artists’ lettering.

Heorhii Narbut (1886–1920) is credited with 13 of the 24 banknotes issued in 1917–1920, the first Ukrainian postage stamps, and an illustrated Ukrainian alphabet he never finished. His letters drew on Cossack baroque motifs and floral ornament.

Design of the 100 hryvnia note of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Typography, illustration, ornamentation. Heorhii Narbut, 1918.
Design of the 100 hryvnia note of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Typography, illustration, ornamentation. Heorhii Narbut, 1918.

Vasyl Krychevskyi (1873–1952) drew the trident that became the coat of arms of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918, along with its seals and banknotes.

Vasyl Krychevskyi. Coat of Arms of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Poster, 1918.
Vasyl Krychevskyi. Coat of Arms of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Poster, 1918.

Robert Lisovskyi (1893–1982), a follower of Narbut, made prints, book covers, and emblems, and later led the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain.

Cover of the magazine *For the Unity of the Nation*. Lettering and coat of arms by Robert Lisovskyi, 1955.
Cover of the magazine *For the Unity of the Nation*. Lettering and coat of arms by Robert Lisovskyi, 1955.

Vasyl Khomenko (1912–1984) created New Ukrainian, a typeface he worked on from 1963 to 1970. Zakon co-designer Zarechniuk is one of the authors of Homenko, a typeface based on his work.

Homenko Font Family
Homenko Font Family developed by Zarechniuk

Yakiv Hnizdovskyi (1915–1985) emigrated to the United States in 1949, later settling in New York, and made close to 250 woodcuts, along with book covers and bookplates.

Book cover. Calligraphy, ornamentation. Yakiv Hnizdovskyi, 1949, Regensburg.
Book cover. Calligraphy, ornamentation. Yakiv Hnizdovskyi, 1949, Regensburg.

Vasyl Chebanyk (1933–2025) began studying the Ukrainian alphabet in 1971 and in 2001 launched the Rutenia project to restore older Ukrainian forms in a modern shape. Rutenia later grew to more than 60 fonts and won him the Shevchenko National Prize. One of them is on the cover of the ceremonial copy of Ukraine’s Constitution.

The "Rutenia" decorative typeface, designed by Vasyl Chebanyk. Illustrative image
The Rutenia decorative typeface designed by Vasyl Chebanyk. Illustrative image

How Ukraine's state started dropping Russian fonts

Russia's full-scale invasion turned fonts into a state matter. On 29 September 2022, days after Russia's sham "referendums" in four occupied Ukrainian oblasts, Anna Yakupova, CEO of ParaType, the Russian studio whose Cyrillic versions of Petersburg and other fonts Ukraine's state institutions still use, congratulated colleagues in a chat that "our country got bigger," prompting a campaign to shun the fonts.

In August 2023, MPs from three factions registered bill 9606 to ban the Russian font Izhitsa from Verkhovna Rada documents and move parliament's honor certificates to Volja, a Ukrainian font made in 2022 by Marchela Mozhyna from the lettering of artist Nil Khasevych. A month later, the culture ministry announced plans for a bank of Ukrainian fonts to replace Russian ones.

In July 2026, the fight reached Ukraine's money. The National Bank of Ukraine said it would redraw the lettering on its new 2,000-hryvnia note featuring poet Vasyl Stus, after type designer Bohdan Hdal said the denomination lettering resembled an unofficial Cyrillic adaptation of Bickham Script made by a Russian designer. “No Russian shadows on a banknote with a poet whom Russia killed,” NBU Governor Andrii Pyshnyi said.

The "Two thousand hryvnias" inscription on Ukraine's new banknote will be redrawn after critics said it resembled a Russian designer's unofficial adaptation of a font
The "Two thousand hryvnias" inscription on Ukraine's new banknote will be redrawn after critics said it resembled a Russian designer's unofficial adaptation of a font

Some readers balk at the Z

Not everyone liked the name. Among the top comments under Stefanchuk’s post, readers objected that the Latin spelling starts with Z, the letter Russia painted on its vehicles for the full-scale invasion. Others welcomed the font itself.

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A Russian disinformation campaign cloned Euromaidan Press to blame Ukraine for Russia’s own strike on Kramatorsk (we took the fake down)

A screenshot of the fake Euromaidan-press website that is supposedly part of the Russian disinformation Storm 1516 operation. Collage by Euromaidan Press

Euromaidan Press has been impersonated as part of a Russian disinformation campaign. A copycat website was created, with a hyphen added to our name, which published a fabricated article alleging a Ukrainian drone had killed civilians in Kramatorsk that cites anonymous "Ukrainian OSINT channels" amid copies of our real news reports. In reality, that 8 October strike was a Russian aerial bombing of two public buses that killed 33 civilians.

The fabrication is part of a years-long Russian disinformation campaign to impersonate and clone trusted news brands, predominantly in Europe, and publish false reports under their names. The disinformation research project Gnida tied our case to Storm-1516, one of several overlapping Russian operations, alongside the older Doppelganger, and NewsGuard, which reached out to us while preparing its own debunk, attributes the fake to the same operation. The fabricated Kramatorsk report comes amid an ongoing effort to erode Western support for Ukraine, as Russia's war goes on, and to sow distrust among Western political elites.

The claim and the actual 8 October attack

The fake started circulating on 24 October, one day after the forged publication appeared on our website. It started making rounds on X together with a forged video with a version of our logo claiming that "newly obtained footage" featured the remains of a Liutyi drone that "independent OSINT channels" claimed were "quickly removed from the scene." No specific OSINT channels were named; no sources were linked.

The forged video, apparently produced with AI, and the link were spread by X accounts such as @vick55top, @indiaTales7, @TheWorld_Update, @Wonder_star21, @Theunk5555, @SilentBriefHQ1, and @Suriyakmaps, where it was subsequently removed. The videos on those accounts averaged 400,000 to 500,000 views, far more than the accounts' modest follower counts and their usual engagement would produce, a likely sign of inauthentic amplification.

On 25 October, the Russian disinformation monitor Gnida Project flagged this as a case of the Storm-1516 disinformation campaign. Other recent cases flagged by Gnida included advertisements of Russian Geran drones, claims of the Shamonda virus being leaked from a "Ukrainian biolab," smears against US Democratic candidates, and a fake on a similar copycat "toronto-sun.ca" website alleging that President Zelenskyy purchased a nuclear bunker in Nova Scotia.

The latest Storm-1516 disinformation campaign is targeting Ukraine. The campaign promotes a false narrative that a deadly strike in the Ukrainian city Kramatorsk was performed by a Ukrainian drone based on a fake "Ukrainian OSINT investigation" pic.twitter.com/Klpm9UVCf2

— gnida project (@gnidaproject) October 25, 2026

As for the actual content of the fake, the real event is one of the most thoroughly documented atrocities of the month. On 8 October 2026, Russian forces struck two public buses in Kramatorsk with an aerial bomb, killing 33 people and wounding about 18. Such attacks are, sadly, a daily occurrence in cities on the frontline. There was no Ukrainian drone and no removed wreckage. The fabrication simply reassigns a Russian mass killing of civilians to its victim, which is the entire point.

The fake site was not a single page. It scraped our entire website, mirroring our genuine articles, and injected the fabricated one among them, so the lie traveled under the credibility of real reporting. The look-alike domain was registered on 15 October, eight days before the fake appeared, according to who.is data.

Storm-1516

Gnida Project identified the fake as part of Storm-1516, a Russian influence operation that clones trusted news brands to spread fabricated stories, and NewsGuard, which contacted us about the impersonation, attributes it to the same operation. NewsGuard has documented the tactic generating some 900 false reports over three years; the same operation has targeted France and Germany and has recently impersonated other outlets, including in Ukraine, such as this fake report on a copycat website pretending to be the New Voice of Ukraine.

Storm-1516 is one of several overlapping Russian operations that impersonate real media. Since 2022, the Doppelganger network has cloned whole Western outlets and government sites, and it is still active, flooding France with more than 200 fake sites before its 2026 elections. Polish fact-checkers literally call the tactic “attack of the clones.” A second operation, Matryoshka, floods social media with cheap fake videos credited to real outlets. Storm-1516, first identified in late 2023 and later named by Microsoft, grew out of Russia's Prigozhin-era troll operations, is the most elaborate of the three, and has overtaken RT and Sputnik as Russia's main disinformation machine. Its attacks combine cloned websites and fake videos.

NewsGuard counts some 906 fabricated reports impersonating 163 outlets from 21 countries since 2023, Euronews, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and France 24 most of all, as well as the Kyiv Independent. The fakes nearly all bend one way, to erode Western support for Ukraine. Some smear Ukraine's leaders, a fabricated story that 20,000 Ukrainian soldiers evacuated to France had deserted into criminal gangs, invented claims that first lady Olena Zelenska fled abroad. Others, like the one aimed at us, flip Russian actions onto Ukraine. A separate Storm-1516 fabrication, a false claim that Ukrainian officials bought yachts with misappropriated US aid, was repeated in 2023 by JD Vance, then a US senator.

We filed a copyright and abuse complaint with the host, Namecheap, and a phishing report with Cloudflare, and pressed the registrar. The complaints worked: the clone has been taken down.

How to take down a cloned news site

Impersonation is cheap to set up, and any outlet can be next, so here is the procedure our technical team used, which other newsrooms can follow to take a clone down quickly.

  1. Cut the scraping pipeline. Run a DNS lookup (ping, nslookup, or dnschecker.org) on the cloned domain to expose the hosting IP behind any basic masking, then add a custom block rule in your Cloudflare WAF (Security, WAF, Custom Rules) targeting that IP, which cuts off the scraping scripts in real time. Watch the WAF logs over the next 48 hours in case the attackers rotate to new scraping proxies.
  2. Unmask the infrastructure and send formal notices. Run an IP WHOIS lookup (ipinfo.io) to identify the host, for example Namecheap or DigitalOcean, and the registrar, then submit DMCA takedown and phishing notices to the host's legal portal or abuse address. Include side-by-side URL comparisons of the original and cloned pages, clear documentation of the brand spoofing and the injected disinformation, and a good-faith legal statement with full contact details.
  3. Block access and de-index from search. Report the clone to Google Safe Browsing under social engineering and impersonation, which, once verified in 24 to 48 hours, makes Chrome, Firefox, and Safari show a full-page red warning to anyone who tries to open it. Then file a Google Search Console DMCA removal request to pull the cloned URLs out of search results.
  4. Escalate to the registrar. Submit a registrar abuse complaint demanding a full suspension of the domain, a ClientHold status, on the grounds of bad-faith typosquatting and identity theft, and push your open abuse ticket IDs through your Cloudflare account to skip the standard queue.

Be sure to read the automated replies from the host and Cloudflare and answer them promptly. Those acknowledgments often ask for specific additional information, and a fast, complete reply keeps the ticket moving instead of stalling in a queue.

How to spot Russian Storm-1516 attacks

Many users on X called out the signs: a look-alike domain (our only website is euromaidanpress.com, with no hyphen), a claim sourced to unnamed "OSINT channels," and a story that reassigns a Russian attack to Ukraine.

We never publish an image or video without crediting its source, and we never cite anonymous OSINT experts: our reporting traces to a first source. Trust only reports that name the first source of a claim and label the origin of their images and video. If you cannot trace the source, you cannot trust the report.

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Romania finally holds Russia responsible for the drone attacks on ships off its coast, and wants a joint NATO command for the Black Sea

The San Marino-flagged chemical tanker Wine Trader near Sulina, Romania, on 15 October 2026, after it was hit by drones about 14 nautical miles off the coast. Seven of its 12 crew were reported missing. Photo: ARSVOM

Romania has proposed a joint NATO military command for the Black Sea, as drones hit four merchant ships in 24 hours, three of them off its coast, and its foreign minister said Russia "bears full responsibility." NATO ambassadors will discuss the attacks next week.

Russia’s strikes on merchant ships in the Black Sea have escalated this autumn and reached NATO shores. Drones have attacked at least eight merchant vessels near Romania and Bulgaria since 5 October, two of them inside Romania’s territorial waters. Until now, neither country had named the attacker, and Bulgaria still says it cannot prove who it was. Romania’s patience appears to have run out, and next week’s NATO meeting will show whether the alliance is ready to go further as Russia’s war spills beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Acting Defense Minister Radu Miruță wrote on Facebook on 14 October that "the Black Sea needs a joint military command of the NATO riparian states." "The Black Sea incidents, involving drones, sunk ships, and naval mines, oblige us to act, not wait," he wrote, after a call with his Bulgarian counterpart. Leadership and location would rotate among the member states. Romania is ready to host the command on its coast from 2028 and would accept a start on Türkiye's coast until then, he said. He proposed that Romania and Bulgaria send NATO a joint letter backing the idea.

The next day, Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu wrote on X that four commercial ships had been attacked over the previous day, including in Romania's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, and that eight people had died. "Russia is turning the Black Sea into a dangerous area for civilian ships," she wrote. "Killing sailors from commercial ships, both in this region and anywhere in the world, is a crime. Russia bears full responsibility for these developments."

Earlier that day, as two tankers burned off Romania's coast, Bucharest had said it was still checking whether drones were involved.

two tankers burn off romania’s sulina bulgaria says lacks proof russia behind black sea ship attacks · post burned superstructure tanker wine trader seen rescue helicopter 15 2026 romanian interior
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Two tankers burn off Romania’s Sulina as Bulgaria says it lacks proof Russia is behind the Black Sea ship attacks

Țoiu said NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte had agreed to convene the allies within days, after he met Romanian President Nicușor Dan and Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in Brussels. NATO ambassadors will meet next week, France 24 reported. No date has been announced.

An escalating drone strike campaign

Black Sea grain war between Ukraine and Russia escalates
Map: Euromaidan Press

Drones have been hitting merchant ships for weeks on the route from Ukraine's Danube and Odesa ports to the Bosporus. Besides the latest strikes off Romania, Reuters counts at least five cargo ships hit near Romania and Bulgaria in the past 10 days, with 23 sailors dead or missing, most of them outside any NATO member's territorial waters. This week the strikes reached Romania's own waters.

  • The Comoros-flagged tanker Yara J was hit inside Romanian territorial waters late on 14 October, off Sulina, the port at the mouth of the Danube. Its crew was unharmed, and it was towed to the Romanian port of Constanța.
  • Early on 15 October drones struck the San Marino-flagged chemical tanker Wine Trader about a mile outside Romanian waters, also southeast of Sulina. Five of its 12 crew were rescued. Seven were still missing on 16 October, when rescuers returned to search the ship.
  • Two more ships were also targeted, Reuters reported: the Marshall Islands-flagged Sea Destiny, inside Romanian waters according to NATO, and the Tanzania-flagged Dania J, moored at the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail.

Țoiu did not say which ships her eight dead were from, and Reuters still lists the Wine Trader's seven as missing. A NATO military source told Reuters the drones that hit both tankers came from Russia.

The chemical tanker Wine Trader
The chemical tanker Wine Trader. Photo: VesselFinder

Romania's president says too early to say

Romania's president has not gone as far as his foreign minister. Dan told reporters in Brussels it was "obvious" that the attacks were Russian attempts to destabilize Romania and Bulgaria and reduce support for Ukraine. But he also said it was too early to say definitively that Russia had launched the drones, according to Politico.

Bulgaria, Romania's partner on the command proposal, says it suspects Russia but cannot prove it. Two ships were hit off its coast on 13 October, and one, the HS Dignity, sank. The other, the Chelsea 3, is Ukrainian-owned.

Radev told parliament on 14 October that the attacks worked in Russia's favor and that "logic leads there." "The problem is that we cannot prove it," he told MPs. Sofia summoned the Russian ambassador. Radev also said EU leaders would discuss a moratorium on attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea.

Bucharest has blamed Russia for drones before, though over its airspace, not its shipping. On 27 July it expelled a Russian diplomat after prosecutors confirmed that fragments of drones downed on Romanian territory were Russian. Russia, Romania's Foreign Ministry said then, "bears exclusive responsibility."

Ukraine ships most of its farm exports across the Black Sea. Euromaidan Press's David Axe has written on how the fight over shipping there has escalated.

Bulk carrier "Royad Mammadov" under the flag of Saint Kitts, partially sunk after an attack by Russian sea and air drones on October 5, 2026, 20 nautical miles off the coast of Romania. Photo: Romanian Interior Ministry
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Russia is losing the Black Sea grain war it started. Its answer is to sink civilian ships off Romania and Bulgaria

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