The White House has urged European countries to follow the US and impose restrictive measures on India for its purchases of Russian oil, which fund the war in Ukraine, India Today reports.
US tariffs on Indian goods
In August 2025, the US raised tariffs on goods from India up to 50%, criticizing New Delhi for supporting Russia’s economic machinery. At the same time, Washington has not imposed sanctions on China, the main sponsor of the war and Moscow’s key economic partner.
India has criticized the US decision, pointing out double standards: Europe itself continues to purchase oil from Russia. EU–Russia trade in 2024 reached €67.5 billion in goods and €17.2 billion in services. Europe also imported a record 16.5 million tons of Russian LNG, the highest number since 2022.
Sanctions do not cover key Russian exports
Many critical Russian exports remain unrestricted, including palladium for the US automotive industry, uranium for nuclear power plants, fertilizers, chemicals, metals, and equipment.
Sources report that Trump also pressured India to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. After being rejected, he responded with tariffs. This has prompted India to strengthen its ties with China and reinforced so-called anti-American cooperation among the so-called “axis of upheaval” countries.
Today, the US administration seeks to have Europe join in sanction pressure on New Delhi if India does not stop buying Russian oil.
Russia has continued to pound Kyiv and other areas of Ukraine with airstrikes, including a barrage on Thursday that killed at least 23 people in the capital.
Jinchao Wei provided a Chinese intelligence officer with defense and weapons abilities of U.S. warships, including their vulnerabilities, prosecutors said.
Jinchao Wei was a machinist’s mate aboard the Essex, an amphibious assault ship moored at Naval Base San Diego, which is the home of the Pacific Fleet.
The Hudson Institute has identified eight critical targets across Russia and occupied territories that Ukraine could strike to destabilize Moscow’s war effort. The report, authored by Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoğlu and titled “Breaking the Stalemate: Russian Targets Ukraine Should Strike,” argues that sustained pressure on these chokepoints could undermine Russian logistics, weaken the Kremlin’s control over occupied areas.
The Institute argues that such attacks could reshape the course of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, which started in 2014 with Russia’s occupation of Crimea and the invasion of the Donbas, and escalated into Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Currently, Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign has been largely focused on oil production, transportation, and storage facilities. Additionally, some strikes target railway facilities—such as power substations—in southern Russia.
Volga–Don Canal
The Volga–Don Canal is a 63-mile waterway linking the Caspian and Black Seas. Russia uses it to move vessels from the Caspian Flotilla and to transport Iranian-supplied weapons. The Kremlin has committed $1 billion to modernize the canal, underscoring its importance. Analysts note that damaging Locks 8 and 9, which sit at the canal’s summit, could halt navigation and disrupt water flow, crippling east–west logistics and trade with Iran.
Source: Hudson Institute research
Shahed Drone Plant in Tatarstan
Located in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Russia’s main Shahed drone facility produces multiple variants with Iranian support.
Open-source reporting indicates that Russia’s Shahed drone plant in Tatarstan likely produces 170–190 drones per day. In June 2025 alone, Russia launched around 5,500 Shaheds against Ukrainian cities. Production could rise further, with estimates suggesting up to 2,000 drones per month by late 2025.
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Ukraine’s GenStaff says its deep strikes have erased 4% of Russia’s GDP this year—42% of attacks targeted oil refineries (infographics)
The facility employs thousands, including foreign workers and students, raising civilian risks. The report suggests Ukraine could instead target the plant’s energy lifeline at the nearby Nizhnekamsk Thermal Power Plant to disrupt production indirectly.
Source: Hudson Institute research
China–Russia Land Routes
Russia’s wartime dependence on Chinese imports has soared, reaching $240 billion annually. These include drones, optics, semiconductors, and weapon components. Around 90% of this trade crosses the border by rail through Manzhouli–Zabaykalsk and Suifenhe–Pogranichny. While directly striking at the crossings could be politically fraught, Hudson Institute identifies rail bridges and railyards within Russia as vulnerable chokepoints that, if disrupted, would slow the flow of critical dual-use goods
Source: Hudson Institute research
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Crimea’s Access Routes
Crimea remains a central hub for Russia’s southern operations. The Kerch Bridge has been attacked and damaged three times, but never destroyed. The report stresses that Western-supplied long-range missiles, such as Germany’s Taurus, could finish the job. Analysts also highlight smaller but equally vital routes into Crimea: the Chonhar, Syvash, and Henichesk Bridges. These links connect the peninsula to Kherson Oblast and are more vulnerable to attack than Kerch. Severing them would drastically weaken Russian supply lines into occupied southern Ukraine.
Source: Hudson Institute research
Rail Bridges in Western Russia
Russia’s military depends heavily on rail, moving up to 30,000 tons of ammunition and fuel daily. Each division requires about 1,870 tons of cargo, with artillery munitions accounting for half. While trains in motion are difficult to strike, Hudson Institute stresses that rail bridges, transformers, and substations are fixed and exposed. Recent Ukrainian strikes in Samara and along the Oryol–Kursk line show this tactic is viable. Sustained attacks could cripple supply lines across the Russian heartland.
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Three fires, one night: Ukraine hits refinery, military base, and railway in deep Russian strike (video)
Emerging Russian Base in occupied Abkhazia
Moscow is shifting parts of its Black Sea Fleet to Abkhazia’s Ochamchire port, on occupied Georgian territory, after heavy losses in Crimea. The new base remains under construction and vulnerable. The coastline is exposed, infrastructure is weak, and supply routes rely on a single road and rail link with a bridge that forms a critical choke point. Hudson Institute concludes that striking early could delay or halt Russia’s efforts to diversify its naval footprint in the Black Sea.
Source: Hudson Institute research
Transnistria
The Russian garrison in Moldova’s Transnistria enclave is another fragile point. About 1,500 troops remain there with outdated equipment and no realistic way to reinforce them. Ukraine, the report argues, could eliminate the pocket if necessary, relieving pressure on Odesa. But the analysis also warns that such a move would risk humanitarian fallout in Moldova and Romania, especially near the massive Cobasna ammunition depot.
Source: Hudson Institute research
Russian Pacific Fleet Bases
Though far from the battlefield, Russia’s Pacific Fleet has quietly supported the war. It has transferred naval brigades to Ukraine and redeployed ships to the Black Sea. These distant bases lack the dense defenses seen in Crimea, making them potential targets. Analysts suggest Ukraine could adapt maritime drones to reach the area. Even limited strikes would force Moscow to disperse defenses and reconsider its global naval posture.
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The European Union has reached a long-term trade agreement with Ukraine, marking the end of wartime trade liberalisation measures, though key details of the deal remain undisclosed.
EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic and Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen announced the agreement on June 30, calling it a "predictable" and "reciprocal" framework. However, they did not reveal the final quotas or volumes included in the deal. Sefcovic noted that the finer points would be finalised "in the coming days."
The new deal replaces the autonomous trade measures (ATMs) that allowed Ukrainian agri-food exports to enter the EU tariff-free since 2022. Those temporary measures expired on June 5, reinstating pre-war trade conditions for a brief period.
Structured in three tiers, the new framework introduces modest increases in quotas for products considered sensitive by EU member states, such as eggs, poultry, sugar, wheat, maize, and honey. A second group of products—including butter, skimmed milk powder, oats, barley, malt, and gluten—will see their quotas adjusted to reflect peak import levels reached since the start of the war. A third category, which includes items such as whole milk powder, fermented milk, mushrooms, and grape juice, will be fully liberalised.
Once finalised, the text of the agreement will be submitted to the Council for ratification.
Sefcovic said negotiations concluded over the weekend, less than a month after formal talks began. However, some critics claim the EU delayed the process to avoid backlash from farmers ahead of Poland’s presidential election.
The agreement also benefits EU producers, granting them greater access to the Ukrainian market for goods like pork, poultry, and sugar. But Hansen made it clear that expanded access for Ukrainian exports will depend on Ukraine’s compliance with EU agricultural standards by 2028, including rules on animal welfare and pesticide use. "This commitment also fits perfectly with Ukraine's EU accession path," he said.
The deal includes safeguard provisions, allowing the EU or individual member states to restrict imports if domestic markets face serious disruptions. “Both EU and Ukrainian producers deserve a stable and predictable basis for the future development of bilateral trade,” Hansen added.