What happens if Putin refuses to end the war? Donald Trump isn’t saying. But the consequences will be “very serious.”

The warning came during a White House briefing this week, Sky News reports. When pressed by journalists for specifics, Trump declined to elaborate.

“I don’t need to say. There will be very serious consequences.”

Why the cryptic threat now? Trump and Putin are set to meet 15 August in Anchorage, Alaska. The stakes couldn’t be higher.

Trump expects this to be just the beginning. A second meeting could happen within days, he told reporters, possibly including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

“There’s a very high probability that we’ll have a second meeting that will be more productive than the first, because in the first one I’m going to find out where we are and what we’re doing.”

The president was blunt about his track record. When asked whether he believes he can persuade Putin to stop shelling Ukrainian civilians, Trump acknowledged failure. He’d raised the issue before “but it didn’t happen.”

Here’s what’s driving the Alaska talks: Washington and Moscow are pursuing an agreement that would let Russia keep occupied territories. The Wall Street Journal says Putin has already presented Trump’s team with a ceasefire proposal.

The price? Ukrainian territorial concessions.

Trump has suggested any peace deal would require “some territorial exchange for the benefit of both sides.” Russia demands: Ukraine withdraws troops from all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, parts of which are not even occupied. 

Ukraine’s response was swift.

Zelenskyy declared Ukraine “will not give away its lands to anyone.” European Union leaders echoed that position, insisting Ukraine must shape any peace framework.

The timing matters. On 13 August, just two days before the Alaska meeting, Zelenskyy and European leaders arranged their own session with Trump. Their goal: coordinate positions before Trump sits down with Putin.

What emerges from Alaska could reshape the war’s trajectory. Putin arrives with territorial demands. Trump brings unspecified threats. Ukraine and Europe are scrambling to ensure their voices aren’t drowned out.

The consequences, as Trump says, could indeed be serious.

A Ukrainian Orthodox priest was running spies for Moscow. Right from his pulpit in Zaporizhzhia, a city close to the front line in southern Ukraine.

The The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that the network was run by an abbot from a Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) parish who used his religious position to identify and recruit pro-Russian sympathizers. The priest used Sunday sermons to scout for recruits, justifying Russia’s invasion to identify sympathizers in his congregation.

How did Ukrainian counterintelligence find him? They caught a Russian spotter operating in the city first. Under interrogation, he gave up the priest. This led to surveillance of the priest’s activities and the discovery of the broader network.

The cleric had recruited a 41-year-old Ukrainian soldier deployed to a local base. The man was feeding Moscow detailed intelligence about Ukrainian positions, troop numbers, and equipment along the Zaporizhzhia front lines. He photographed classified documents showing new Armed Forces deployments and reported on his own battalion’s activities.

But the network went higher. Both the priest and soldier answered to a handler from Russia’s 316th reconnaissance center—part of the GRU military intelligence service. Ukrainian investigators identified this controller as a former Ukrainian police officer who fled to occupied territory and switched sides.

The evidence was everywhere. During raids, the SBU found phones and computers packed with incriminating communications. In the priest’s possession: a Russian passport, Kalashnikov ammunition, and knives.

Why did the priest risk everything? The SBU says he used his religious position systematically, weaving pro-Russian propaganda into sermons before approaching potential recruits privately.

Both men now face five criminal charges, including high treason during martial law. The most serious carry potential life sentences.

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Yes, Tucker, Christians are really killed in Ukraine — for refusing to spy for Putin

President Trump hates the moniker TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out). But regarding Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine, Trump has repeatedly earned this sobriquet.

Despite repeated warnings that he would impose large secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian energy, Trump has caved to China and instead imposed substantial sanctions on India. This jeopardizes a generation of rapprochement with India and drives it closer to Moscow and Beijing.

When Trump, after six months of finding excuses for Putin and virtually offering him victory, announced his dissatisfaction with Putin’s refusal to commit to peace, many commentators argued he had finally seen the light. Now, they claimed, he would impose crushing sanctions on Russia and its Asian supporters—China and India.

This expression of irritation with Putin’s stalling was allegedly a turning point. Alas, it was not to be.

Trump’s unilateral concessions

On 7 August, Trump and the Russian government announced that instead of draconian sanctions being imposed on Russia, Trump and Vladimir Putin would hold a summit next week. Trump would probably meet with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy afterward.

But Moscow refused to commit to meeting Zelenskyy, although it might meet with other Ukrainians—again implying the illegality of Zelenskyy’s tenure. Trump duly conceded that Putin did not have to meet Zelenskyy, just hours after a White House aide stated that Putin indeed had to meet with Zelenskyy.

Russia rubbed salt in this wound by claiming the idea for a summit was Trump’s, emphasizing that he, not Putin, was the supplicant. Russian media, now exulting that Washington will finally accept Moscow as an equal by meeting with it, suggest this summit will not even discuss Ukraine but other bilateral issues.

Whether such claims have validity cannot be known. But they indicate Putin’s belief, shared by the Russian elite, that even if the West had the fortitude to impose greater sanctions or furnish Ukraine with more assistance, it would not matter—Russia is going to win.

Russian elite confidence

As Mikhail Zygar has written, the Russian elite is not scared and treats Trump’s earlier threats with disdain. This episode reveals that for all his bravado, Trump has imposed no sanctions on China or Russia but rather attacked America’s allies and partners in an act of extreme strategic incompetence.

Trump has already made two unjustified and unreciprocated concessions to Putin: asking to hold a summit with him and agreeing to exclude both Ukraine and Europe. When asked about this summit, a European official stated he was distraught:

“For all the bluster, Trump has not put a single iota of pressure on Putin—yet. Zero, zip.”

Cosmetic Russian concessions expected

Beyond these unilateral gestures to Putin, speculation suggests Russia will present nothing but cosmetic concessions—for example, suspending aerial and missile attacks on civilian targets. This costs Russia very little but impedes Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy and logistics targets. This approach was reportedly what Belarusian President Lukashenka communicated to Washington.

Putin will not change his government to suit Russia’s taste, nor will he give ground regarding the five Ukrainian provinces Russia has seized since 2014: Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.

Instead, this “agreement” will likely pave the way toward Russia’s annexation of those provinces, as Putin and the Russian government have long embarked upon their Russification. There is little to expect here unless Trump magically departs from his fear of Putin and his steadfast refusal to understand what this war is about and how it connects to both international security in general and European security in particular.

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Nordic-Baltic nations remind before Trump-Putin meeting: international borders must not be changed by force

Putin’s broken promises

We already know in advance of this summit—even if Trump does not—that any agreement with Putin will not be worth the paper it’s written on. In invading Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022, Putin broke eight international treaties guaranteeing Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty.

He has also broken or walked out of virtually every arms control treaty except the ABM treaty and is obviously not interested in talks on a new one. Even assuming Russia negotiated such a treaty, it is unlikely to adhere to it. Apart from the eight treaties he broke, Putin also refused to abide by the terms of the Minsk agreements following Russia’s 2014 invasion.

Echoes of Munich 1938

This summit, taking place over the heads of the most directly interested parties, has already triggered considerable anxiety—like the Munich summit of 1938.

That anxiety, based on the first six months of Trump’s second term and his summits with Putin during his first term, is all too justified.

Stephen Blank

Dr. Stephen J. Blank, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is an expert on Russian foreign policy, Eurasian security, and international relations.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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A Polish man attempted to join Putin’s army by swimming across an Estonian river on an inflatable mattress. Estonian border guards stopped him. Now he is arrested.

The 49-year-old was caught last week trying to cross the Narva River, which separates Estonia from Russia, according to RMF24. His plan? Float across on a mattress and enlist in Russian forces fighting Ukraine, according to prosecutors.

The Polish citizen had traveled to Estonia from Serbia and was carrying items that demonstrated support for Russian military actions in Ukraine—possibly a St. George ribbon or the letter “Z” that Russian supporters display.

Can foreigners just decide to join Russia’s military? Not through Estonia. The country’s internal security service treats this as a criminal act under national law.

“Joining the army of the Russian Federation indirectly threatens the security of Estonia, as well as all European Union member states,” prosecutor Gardi Anderson told reporters.

The Viru district court ordered two months detention. Why so long? Prosecutors argued the man might flee or try crossing again if released immediately.

Estonian Internal Security Service spokesperson Marta Tuul explained their approach:

“To prevent such actions, we also prosecute citizens of other states who try to support Russia’s military actions through Estonia.”

What happens next? The Polish citizen faces charges under Estonian law that criminalizes participation in foreign acts of aggression. His case could set precedent for how Baltic states handle similar attempts to reach Russian military recruiters.

The French president took ‘very tough positions,’ and reportedly told Trump that the meeting was ‘a very big thing’ to give Putin

Can an airline walk away from a tragedy by invoking international payment caps? Not this time.

Ontario’s Superior Court just delivered a crushing blow to Ukraine International Airlines, upholding a ruling that strips the carrier of its right to limit compensation for the 176 people killed when flight PS752 was shot down over Tehran, Iran, in 2020.

The court’s reasoning? UIA acted negligently because it “failed to assess the risks associated with operating flights from Tehran.” That single finding changes everything for the families seeking justice.

Here’s why this matters. Under international aviation law, airlines typically pay up to $180,000 per passenger when fault is proven. But when negligence enters the picture? Those caps disappear. 

This determination allows victims’ families to seek compensation beyond the standard international aviation limits.

The Ontario Court of Appeal wasn’t buying UIA’s challenge either. “I dismiss the appeal, ordering court costs to be paid by the appellant in favor of the defendants,” the court stated. 

What actually happened that January morning?

January 8, 2020. Tehran’s airport. A Boeing 737-800 climbs into the dawn sky carrying 176 people on board—11 Ukrainians, plus citizens from Iran, Canada, Britain and Afghanistan, all of them died.

Minutes later, Iranian forces shoot it down. 

Why? They mistook the civilian aircraft for a hostile military target. Iran initially denied responsibility, then admitted what officials called a “catastrophic mistake” three days later.

The timing tells the story. Hours earlier, Iran had launched missile strikes on US military bases in Iraq, retaliating for the assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. Tensions were sky-high.

Could this have been prevented?

That’s the million-dollar question the Canadian court answered with a resounding yes.

French investigators decoded both flight recorders in July 2020. The data confirmed what Ukraine suspected: the aircraft was functioning normally when the missile struck. No mechanical failure. No pilot error.

The plane was fine. The decision to fly wasn’t.

Why is Iran’s investigation controversial?

The Iranian probe has drawn fire from multiple countries. In February 2021, UN special rapporteurs accused Iran of violating international law and conducting a non-transparent investigation riddled with “inaccuracies.”

Ukraine joined that criticism. So did other affected nations.

Iran did sentence 10 military personnel in April, according to reports. But details? Those remain classified.

What happens now?

UIA can no longer hide behind international treaty provisions that would have capped compensation payments. The airline faces potentially massive financial exposure.

For the families, this ruling represents more than money. It’s acknowledgment that their loved ones died because of preventable negligence—not just Iranian missiles, but Ukrainian miscalculation.

Two people died when a Russian drone hit their car on a highway in Kherson Oblast on 13 August morning. But that wasn’t the end of it.

When police arrived to help, Russian forces struck again. Three officers were wounded in the second attack.

Why target rescue workers? Ukrainians authorities describe this pattern as what appears to be a coordinated campaign to cause terror among the civilian population.

Three separate attacks, same target – civilians

Russian forces hit civilian vehicles in three locations on 13 August. In another part of Beryslav district, a drone killed one person and wounded a woman in a passenger car. Emergency crews pulled out the dead and got the injured woman to medical care.

Then came the ambulance strike. Russian forces hit the emergency vehicle directly, sparking a fire that local firefighters had to extinguish, the State Emergency Service reported.

Over in Donetsk region? Same story, different location. A Russian drone slammed into a car carrying three people, sending it careening into a roadside ditch. Police pulled two men from the wreckage while rescue teams freed the third passenger and handed him to medics.

Ukraine documents more Russian war crimes

The Beryslav prosecutor’s office isn’t treating this as random violence. They’ve opened a war crimes investigation under Article 438 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code—the section that covers war crimes resulting in death.

What makes this a war crime? Deliberately targeting civilians. And the follow-up strike on police during rescue operations? That crosses another line entirely.

Sir Keir Starmer has said that a ceasefire in Ukraine is only “viable” thanks to the actions of Donald Trump.

Russia would have both economic and military control of the occupied parts of Ukraine under the proposal

Volodymyr Zelensky has insisted that any peace deal discussed between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump at their upcoming Alaska summit on Friday (15 August) must include Ukraine.

For months, Russia’s official inflation rate has hovered around 10%. In June, the Central Bank of Russia boasted that the rate had fallen to 9.4%, but it then dampened the celebration by reporting that expectations for inflation one year from now are 13% (which may well be the actual inflation rate today). Yet, on 25 July, the central bank dared to cut its very high interest rate, which has weakened growth and caused a severe credit crunch, from 20% to 18%.

Deceitful appearances

True, Russia’s economy appeared surprisingly dynamic in 2023 and 2024, with the official growth rate reaching 4% each year. But this was largely because the Russian government revived dormant Soviet military enterprises beyond the Ural Mountains. Moreover, real growth figures may have been exaggerated because some inflation was hidden by state-owned enterprises selling their goods to the state at administered prices.

In any case, official growth has fallen this year, probably to 1.4% in the first half of 2025. Since October 2024, the Kremlin itself has begun to report that Russia is experiencing stagflation – a message that was reinforced at the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June.

Improvement is unlikely. The country’s financial reserves are running out, energy revenues are declining, and there are increasingly severe shortages of labor and imported technology. All are linked to the war and Western sanctions.

Since 2022, Russia has had an annual budget deficit of about 2% of GDP, implying that it needs $40 billion each year to close the gap. But owing to Western financial sanctions, Russia has had virtually no access to international financing since 2014.

(Indeed, two small Chinese banks were just sanctioned by the European Union for such sins.) So, Russia must make do with the liquid financial resources held in its National Wealth Fund. Having fallen from $135 billion in January 2022 to $35 billion by May 2025, these are set to run out in the second half of this year.

Dwindling oil revenues

Traditionally, half of Russia’s federal revenues have come from energy exports, which used to account for two-thirds of its total exports. But in the face of Western sanctions, Russia’s total exports have slumped, falling by 27%, from $592 billion to $433 billion, between 2022 and 2024.

The federal budget for 2025 assumed an oil price of $70 per barrel, but oil is now hovering closer to the Western price cap of $60 per barrel, and the EU has just set a ceiling of $47.6 per barrel for the Russian oil that it still purchases. In addition, the West has sanctioned nearly 600 Russian “shadow fleet” tankers, which will reduce Russian federal revenues by at least 1% of GDP.

Against this backdrop, the Kremlin has announced that while it intends to spend 37% of its federal budget – $195 billion (7.2% of GDP) – on national defense and security this year, it must cut federal expenditures from 20% of GDP to about 17%. But since the government has already cut non-military expenditures to a minimum, it claims that it will reduce its military expenditures by some unspecified amount in 2026.

Reducing military expenditures at the height of a war is rarely an auspicious signal. As the commentator Igor Sushko points out, “The Confederacy did this in 1863-1865 (American Civil War), Germany in 1917-1918 (WWI), Japan in 1944-1945 (WW2),” and the outcome every time was “total military defeat.”

Of course, actual economic strength is not the issue. Ukraine spends about $100 billion per year on its defense, which amounts to 50% of its GDP, but no one bothers to question this, because for Ukrainians, the war is existential. Ukraine would not survive if the war was lost.

If he had a popular mandate, Russia could spend much more on the war. But he apparently does not think his popularity could withstand devoting much more of the budget to the effort.

Short of everything — except corruption

Meanwhile, it is increasingly clear that something else is rotten in Russia besides the economy. Russia has fallen to 154th place out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s authoritative Corruption Perceptions Index, while Ukraine is in 105th place. Since the start of the war, a dozen or so senior Russian energy managers have fallen out of windows.

And more recently, former Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov was sentenced to no less than 13 years in prison for corruption; Transportation Minister Roman Starovoit allegedly committed suicide just hours after Putin fired him; and a gold-mining billionaire was arrested, and his company was nationalized to help the treasury.

These were high officials. Ivanov was a top protégé of former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and Starovoit was the right-hand man of Putin’s close friend Arkady Rotenberg. Such developments are clear signs of Russia’s economic instability.

Officially, unemployment stands at only 2%, but that is partly because many Russians have left. Since the start of the war, and especially after Putin attempted a minor mobilization in 2022, approximately one million people fled the country, including many young, well-educated men.

He has not dared to pursue another mobilization since.

Now, labor scarcities are holding back production and driving up wages, while Western export controls limit Russia’s supply of high-tech goods (though Chinese supplies have mitigated the impact).

Russia’s economy is fast approaching a fiscal crunch that will encumber its war effort. Though that may not be enough to compel Putin to seek peace, it does suggest that the walls are closing in on him.

Anders Åslund

Anders Åslund is the author of Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy (Yale University Press, 2019). Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025. www.project-syndicate.org

The head of Norwegian intelligence has identified the Russian Federation as the primary security threat facing Norway, according to VG.

Nils Andreas Stensones made the declaration during an event titled “Hybrid attacks against Norway: are we at war?” While opening his remarks, Stensones clarified that he does not consider the current situation equivalent to wartime conditions.

“However, Russian President Putin believes that Russia is in constant conflict with the West… Russia is currently the biggest threat to Norway,” Stensones said.

The intelligence chief expressed his assessment that Russia does not aim to influence this year’s elections in Norway.

At the same event, the head of Norway’s domestic intelligence service revealed evidence of Russian involvement in a cyber sabotage operation targeting a dam in the western part of the country during spring 2024.

The Norwegian assessment aligns with broader European security concerns. A French top general believes Russia could pose a real threat to Europe by 2030, according to France’s National Strategic Review for 2025, which calls for preparations for high-intensity warfare in Europe.

Norway’s Police Security Service (PST) believes pro-Russian hackers orchestrated a cyber attack on a Norwegian dam in spring 2025, according to VG.

PST chief Beate Gangas said the service considers the April 2025 cyber sabotage of a dam a work of pro-Russian hackers. The incident occurred at a dam on Lake Risevatnet in southwestern Norway, where cybercriminals seized control of the system. The gates remained open for four consecutive hours and released large volumes of water before staff detected the intrusion and took action.

“Over the past year, we have seen a change in the activities of pro-Russian cyber actors. In April, a dam in western Norway became the target of such an operation,” Gangas said. “Our Russian neighbor has become more dangerous.”

The PST chief explained that Russia employs multiple methods in its activities against Norway and Western countries generally.

“This can be subversive activity, influence, polarization, covert intelligence operations – methods aimed at weakening our security, but which cannot be characterized as acts of war,” Gangas said. “The goal is to influence Norwegian society, create feelings of unrest and instability, and identify our strengths and weaknesses.”

She added that similar activities are expected to continue against various European countries. “They don’t necessarily aim to cause damage, but intend to show what they are capable of,” the intelligence chief said.

The hackers took control of the digital control system managing water flow at the Risevatnet dam in Bremanger in April. For four hours, valves remained open, releasing nearly 500 liters per second before the breach was discovered and stopped. Both Kripos and PST have investigated the incident.

“The purpose of this type of action is to contribute to influence and create fear or unrest among the country’s population,” Gangas said.

The security service reports that Russia uses composite measures against Norway and the West. Gangas described this as state actors’ use of various tools against specific vulnerabilities in an opponent’s society.

“These are tools and methods that Russia uses to influence the security situation in other countries. The goal is to influence Norwegian society, spread unrest and instability, and map our strengths and weaknesses,” the PST chief said.

She said that Russia will likely carry out more actions against various targets in Europe.

“Since the end of 2023, Russian intelligence has been behind several dozen actions in Europe. Last year they targeted an IKEA warehouse in Estonia, a shopping center in Poland, and a warehouse with Ukraine deliveries in Britain. So far this year, a Ukrainian restaurant in Estonia has been hit and there were plans to send incendiary devices by plane from Germany to targets in Ukraine,” she said.

In Poland, six individuals have been charged with subversive activities on behalf of another country. Romania suspects sabotage in a fire at an arms factory producing small arms and ammunition.

Intelligence chief Nils Andreas Stensønes opened by dismissing that Norway is at war, but noted: “Russia’s President Putin considers Russia to be in a permanent conflict with the West.” He called Russia “an unpredictable neighbor” and stated: “It is Russia that is primarily the greatest threat to Norway today.”

Regarding potential election interference, the intelligence chief believes autumn’s parliamentary elections are not a target. “Together with PST, we assess that foreign states do not intend to significantly influence the outcome of this autumn’s parliamentary elections. But Russia has an interest in influencing us from a more long-term perspective,” he said.

The Ukrainian army and air force teamed up for a precise air strike on a concentration of Russian troops in Bakhmut—with a Sukhoi Su-27 fighter and a mysterious new surveillance drone.

The Aug. 11 raid targeted what the army’s 24th Mechanized Brigade described as “a temporary deployment site of enemy personnel” around 15 km from the front line in Donetsk Oblast.

The personnel were reportedly from Russia’s 98th Airborne Division. The division’s paratroopers have been fighting in Chasiv Yar—and slowly pushing Ukrainian troops out of the ruins of that front-line town.

The twin-engine, supersonic Su-27—one of dozens the Ukrainian air force inherited from the Soviet air force in 1991—probably struck the site with one of its new Western-supplied precision munitions: the French Hammer glide-bomb or American Joint Direct Attack Munition, which can also be fitted with wings for gliding attacks.

A glide bomb can range tens of kilometers when tossed in a fast climb. The combination of satellite guidance, glide kits and the toss-style release method helps Ukrainian pilots attack Russians behind the front line while also staying outside the range of many Russian air-defenses.

But distant strikes require help spotting targets—and then assessing the damage following the strike. For that, the 24th Mechanized Brigade deployed a previously unknown drone type. “You can see the work of the new Ukrainian fixed-wing drone ‘Privet-299,'” the brigade stated.

Aside from the fact it’s got fixed wings—as opposed to rotors—we know almost nothing about the Privet-299. Russian forces operate a “Privet-82” drone that may be broadly similar to the Ukrainian Private-299.

Plywood drone

The mostly plywood Privet-82, which costs just a few thousand dollars, ranges 50 km or farther with a 5-kg payload. Russian drone start-up Oko designed the Privet-82 to be inexpensive and easy to produce.

The Russian Privets are cheap enough to be single-use. Some Russian drone teams are even overloading their Privet-82s with 10-kg TM-62 anti-tank mines and flying them into Ukrainian targets. “This is basically Russia’s answer to the Ukrainian heavy bomber drones,” American analyst Andrew Perpetua observed.

It’s unclear whether the Ukrainian Privet-82 is strictly a surveillance drone—or whether it too can be sent on one-way missions with an explosive payload. For now, we know the mysterious Privet-299 as an airborne spotter for manned fighter raids.

The Privet-299 could meet growing demand for medium-range attack drones.

At present, Ukraine’s FPV drones dominate the battlefield as far as 15 km from the line of contact. Efforts are underway to extend the drone kill zone to 40 km. “The goal: deny Russian forces the ability to move undetected across the front,” American-Ukrainian war correspondent David Kirichenko wrote.

The Privet-299 should range 40 km with a meaningful payload, filling a critical gap between the FPVs and Ukraine’s much bigger—and much more expensive—deep-strike drones, which range thousands of kilometers, but at a unit cost of potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Ultimately, the Ukrainians will seek to establish “layers of drone superiority,” Perpetua said. They’ll need slightly heavier, but still affordable, drone models to patrol layers 50 km and 100 km from the front line.

As it happens, the Russian Oko drone firm is developing a bigger Privet drone, the Privet-120, which should range 200 km with a 20-kg payload.

Explore further

Ukraine’s Liutyi drone warhead grew by 50%—at the cost of 400 km of range

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz received Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at his chancellery, where Zelenskyy arrived by helicopter for a videoconference with US President Donald Trump and other European leaders.

Bild reported on 13 August that Zelenskyy landed directly on the grounds of the German chancellor’s office, where Merz greeted him upon arrival.

The leaders are expected to have lunch together before beginning online negotiations with European partners and US President Donald Trump. The virtual meeting precedes Trump’s scheduled summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska.

Zelenskyy’s spokesman Serhiy Nykyforov said the visit includes the videoconference and bilateral meeting with Merz, plus an online session of the “coalition of the resolute.”

“Following the meeting, around 4:00 pm Berlin time, statements by Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Friedrich Merz to the media are possible,” the spokesman added.

Earlier, American media cited local officials reporting that President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance will participate in Wednesday’s virtual meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European allies.

Belarus will practice “planning the use” of nuclear weapons and Oreshnik missiles during joint military exercises with Russia scheduled for 12-16 September, Defense Minister Viktor Krenin announced, according to Belarusian state news agency BELTA.

“We will, of course, within the framework of the West-2025 exercise, together with our Russian colleagues, work out issues of planning the use of this type of weapons,” Krenin said when asked whether the drills would include planning for nuclear weapons and the Oreshnik missile system.

The Belarusian defense chief emphasized that “nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on potential adversaries” while describing them primarily as “an important element of strategic deterrence.”

Krenin repeated Russian narratives about the alleged “militarization” and “military activity” of the West along Belarus’s western and northern borders. He warned that NATO leadership was supposedly using West-2025 as a pretext for conducting their own exercises and threatened a “response.”

“What worries us most is the decision of the Polish military leadership to create a grouping of more than 30-34 thousand servicemen. In our opinion, this is already a serious grouping. We need to monitor this very carefully (and we will do this) and react. If they show any aggression towards the Republic of Belarus, we have something to respond with,” the minister expressed particular concern about Polish military plans.

Historical Context

Russia accumulated military forces in Belarus before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, officially citing joint exercises as justification. In February 2022, Russian forces attacked Ukraine from Belarusian territory and subsequently launched ballistic missiles at Ukrainian targets from Belarus.

In December 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Oreshnik systems could be deployed in Belarus in 2025, using the weapon system to pressure the West after Ukraine received permission for long-range strikes against Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded that Putin was “waving the Oreshnik” to prevent US President Donald Trump from ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced Ukraine was developing its own air defense system and missile system as a deterrent against Oreshnik strikes.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has made contradictory statements about receiving the Oreshnik system, claiming in January 2025 that Belarus would receive it “any day,” then acknowledging in March that the promised weapons had not arrived. In July, Lukashenko stated the Oreshnik would allegedly be deployed in Belarus by year’s end.