Germany’s intelligence chief disclosed that Russia intends to challenge NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense pact, which states that an armed attack against one NATO member in Europe or North America is considered an attack against all members. 

“We are absolutely certain and have intelligence evidence confirming that Ukraine is just one stage on its path westward,” Kahl stated.

“They don’t need to send tanks for that,” Kahl added. “They just have to send ‘little green men’ to Estonia to defend the allegedly oppressed Russian minority.”

However, Kahl clarified that German intelligence does not anticipate conventional military operations involving large armored formations moving from east to west. This suggests Russia may pursue alternative methods, such as cyberattacks or energy coercion, to challenge NATO’s resolve.

Sinan Selen, deputy head of Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), reported escalating Russian cyber operations and sabotage activities targeting Western nations. According to Selen, Russian aggression in Ukraine has intensified pressure on German cyber defense and counterintelligence capabilities.

According to Kahl, Russia’s objectives include reversing NATO’s eastward expansion to 1990s boundaries, removing American military presence from Europe, and expanding Russian influence regardless of cost. The intelligence chief emphasized the need to counter these efforts immediately. Despite tensions, Kahl noted that German-American intelligence cooperation remains stable. 

Previous warnings of NATO-Russia conflict 

Earlier, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned that Russia could potentially attack NATO countries by 2029 or 2030 due to its rapid military industrialization and expansion of armed forces, which are expected to reach 1.5 million troops by 2026.

He highlighted that Russia currently produces more weapons and ammunition in a few months than all EU countries combined produce in a year, signaling a significant buildup. 

NATO intelligence sources told a Finnish newspaper that Russia is actively maintaining and updating plans for a potential multi-front offensive against NATO’s eastern flank, targeting Finland, Norway, and the Baltic states, with intelligence indicating it could amass up to 600,000 troops along these borders despite its main forces being engaged in Ukraine. 

NATO officials and intelligence sources, including Sweden’s Armed Forces Commander and US Vice Admiral Douglas Perry, assess a Russian attack as inevitable rather than hypothetical, emphasizing Russia’s willingness to accept massive casualties and use missile strikes on civilian targets, mirroring tactics used in Ukraine.

Day 1192

On 29 May, there are interesting updates from the Baltic Sea. 

Here, a Russian ship was caught almost red-handed near an underwater power cable between Poland and Sweden. The Polish government decided to act immediately and chased the suspicious ship away, but Russia took a step further and decided to provoke a direct confrontation with NATO.

Following the European Union’s recent tightening of sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet, Poland has emerged as one of the most assertive NATO members in enforcing compliance.

These measures, aimed at disrupting Russia’s covert maritime oil exports, have coincided with a noticeable uptick in Russian sabotage attempts from the same fleet across the Baltic Sea.  

The most recent incident came when Polish intelligence detected a sanctioned Russian-linked vessel, identified as the Sun, sailing under the Antiguan flag, performing suspicious maneuvers near the critical Poland-Sweden power cable. This 600-megawatt undersea line is essential for energy exchange between the two nations, and Polish prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed that the Polish military intervened. A patrol flight forced the vessel to alter course, and the Polish Navy’s reconnaissance ship, ORP Heweliusz, was dispatched to the site. Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz emphasized the seriousness of the situation, stating that since Sweden and Finland joined NATO, the Baltic Sea has become a key marine area, where the largest number of incidents related to cable breaks and sabotage occur.

Poland has made it clear that any threat to Baltic infrastructure will be met with a firm response.

This latest episode follows a string of Russian sabotage efforts in the region. Russia has been linked to numerous incidents of undersea tampering with 11 known undersea cables taken out since 2023 as stated by a deputy commander of the Finnish coast guard. The most recent confirmed damage occurred end of 2024, involving the Estlink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia. Investigations revealed a huge anchor drag mark on the seafloor, attributed to the Russian-linked oil tanker Eagle S. These acts are widely seen as components of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy: destabilizing European states without overt military confrontation.

However, according to Finnish Defense Minister Antti Haekkaenen, Russia has begun militarily escorting its shadow fleet tankers through the narrow and sensitive waters of the Gulf of Finland. While Russian naval presence in the Baltic is not new, deploying warships to directly shield shadow oil tankers is a significant escalation.

Tankers, like the Jaguar, which Estonia unsuccessfully attempted to escort to one of its ports for identification, which has since changed name to Blint and was re-registered in Comoros, travel now with direct military protection. This reduces the risk of boarding or interception by European states, especially in areas like the Gulf of Finland.

This militarization raises the stakes significantly. By placing its armed forces directly alongside illicit shipping, Russia is attempting to deter NATO intervention, not by warning, but by baiting. If a European navy enforces sanctions or tries to halt undersea sabotage, it must now face Russian military escorts. Any interception could lead to confrontation.

The strategic intent is clear: provoke a reaction, ideally forcing NATO to fire the first shot. This would allow the Kremlin to portray the alliance as the aggressor, both to its domestic audience and to sympathetic foreign observers. It’s an asymmetric gambit, a military shield for a commercial operation, daring NATO to test the limits of escalation.

At the same time, with the Russian economy heavily reliant on oil revenues, the Kremlin views the shadow fleet as a vital artery. Russian analysts have acknowledged the importance of these military escorts but raised doubts about the Russian Baltic Fleet’s ability to sustain such missions. Given the aging condition of Russian naval vessels and ongoing shipbuilding issues, NATO’s Baltic Sea fleet outmatches the Russian both in modern capability and collective tonnage, with superior surveillance, submarine-hunting, and rapid-response assets from multiple member states on duty.

Overall, as tensions in the Baltic intensify week by week, Poland’s role as a front-line enforcer of EU sanctions becomes ever more crucial with its readiness to act. Meanwhile, Russia continues to use the shadow fleet to provoke, probe, and project strength—all while trying to control the narrative that it is under siege. What began as covert sabotage and evasive tanker operations is fast becoming a military flashpoint, and the next Baltic incident could determine whether the fragile balance holds or breaks.

In our daily frontline report, we pair up with the military blogger Reporting from Ukraine to keep you informed about what is happening on the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

The Chinese Communist Party and its army command are closely analyzing the Russia-Ukraine war, according to Newsweek. The lessons Beijing is drawing from it are helping shape its strategy of strategic competition with the US, as well as possible scenarios for a war over Taiwan, says the American think tank RAND in a new report.

However, China’s strategic interest lies not in just supporting Russia’s war machine, but in avoiding its mistakes.

The RAND report notes that Chinese military leaders are studying Russia’s failures and drawing conclusions about hybrid warfare. They also assess that the US technological advantage will diminish over time and prepare for a protracted, not a lightning-fast, conflict. Additionally, Beijing regards its defense mobilization capacity as an advantage in a war of attrition. 

China has the world’s largest navy by number of ships and 35 military shipyards. By comparison, the US has only four state-owned shipyards. This industrial potential could become a decisive factor in a prolonged conflict over Taiwan.

Beijing is also rethinking the role of non-military tools. Having seen how Russia failed to prevent escalation through information and economic levers, China is preparing for hybrid war. The US government has previously accused China of running disinformation campaigns, and this tool remains a key focus.