Russia destroyed most of Ukraine’s big warehouses. Now the country is scrambling to build small ones everywhere

On the morning of 30 August, I went to a central Lviv branch of Silpo, a Ukrainian supermarket chain operated by Fozzy Group. It had run out of buckwheat, peas, pearl barley, and other dry goods.
Telegram reports from Lviv showed partially empty shelves at other supermarkets as shoppers stocked up on flour, salt, and cereals. Similar gaps appeared in Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Vinnytsia. Russian strikes have also damaged some of Ukraine's largest wine warehouses, raising the prospect of shortages of wine and other alcoholic beverages.
As replacement space runs short, the state has stepped in: on 4 September, on Zelenskyy's order, oblast military administrations switched to round-the-clock operation, opening a single window for businesses and forming working groups to find them relocation sites and connect utilities, deputy Head of the President's office Viktor Mykyta said.
Overall, Russia has destroyed about 90% of Ukraine's modern storage—including 80% of the refrigerated warehouses around Kyiv—faster than it can be rebuilt. So retailers, parcel carriers, and now the government are scrambling to replace one centralized system with dozens of scattered sites. Whether they can do it before winter, and at what cost to prices, is the question now hanging over the country's food supply.
Replacement warehouses become new targets

Each time a company disperses its stock to survive, the new sites become the next targets. Russia hit a warehouse used by Fora, a nationwide "store next door" Ukrainian grocery chain, four days after the company began using it—the third strike on Fora's logistics in 22 days, and the chain had only just spread its stock across several warehouses to reduce exactly this risk. Another warehouse added during that rebuilding was destroyed on 20 August, one week after Fora began using it.
The same pattern caught Ukraine's largest private parcel carrier Nova Poshta: lost its most advanced robotic fulfillment center and a sorting depot in Sviatopetrivske near Kyiv overnight on 28 August and is now doing what Fora did—pushing stock out to its local branches, according to CEO Yevhen Tafiichuk's Facebook statement. "Nova Poshta's cargo and postal branches across the country are becoming local warehouses," he wrote.
Clients' stock will be divided among those locations, reducing dependence on a few large centers. Nova Poshta is also contacting publishers and shops whose books were destroyed and will compensate them for their losses, Tafiichuk said.
And it continues daily. On 29–30 August alone, Russian strikes hit PepsiCo, an Auchan warehouse, and food stores in Odesa Oblast.
The Agriculture Ministry told Euromaidan Press that Ukrainian farms continued to supply the domestic market in full and that the country faced no danger of famine. Individual supermarket chains could nevertheless carry a narrower selection.
Fozzy freezes office hiring

Fora's parent company, the Fozzy chain of wholesale supermarkets, told Forbes Ukraine that ten of its distribution centers had been damaged during August. Rebuilding delivery routes and restoring supplies had substantially increased logistics costs.
The increased costs have hit company development. Fozzy has frozen office hiring and canceled its planned autumn salary review for office employees. However, recruitment for supermarkets, warehouses, and production continues. The company will reconsider the restrictions once its financial results and cash flow become clearer.
Replacement storage falls short

Kyiv's commercial warehouse space had returned to prewar levels by the end of 2025. Yet only 2.5% was vacant at the end of June 2026, according to Yaroslav Horbushko's August assessment. Horbushko, an executive at commercial property consultancy Expandia, said a business seeking a 10,000-square-meter warehouse could not find one because only scattered smaller premises remained available.
Available refrigerated storage in and around Kyiv could replace only 20–30% of the refrigerated space destroyed by Russian attacks, Investment Programs Bureau CEO Oleksandr Bondarenko estimated on 11 August. He put the destroyed space at 80,000–100,000 square meters, compared with 20,000–30,000 square meters still available to rent.
The destroyed warehouses kept meat, dairy products, fruit, and vegetables chilled before delivery to shops. Even a small new refrigerated terminal would take six to twelve months to build.
Logistics company Global Ocean Link outlined one option on 17 August: keeping some imported stock in Central European warehouses and bringing it into Ukraine in smaller batches. Factories can also bypass distribution centers and deliver directly to shops. However, three-quarters of Ukrainian dairy producers lack enough vehicles and staff to supply individual stores across large retail networks, said Arsen Didur, executive director of the Union of Dairy Enterprises of Ukraine.
Export bottleneck strains grain storage
A separate shortage is developing in the storage of crops awaiting export. The Agriculture Ministry expects Ukraine to harvest approximately 84 million tonnes of grain and oilseeds this season—far more than the country consumes—while civilian agricultural exports through deepwater sea routes have stopped completely following intensified attacks on ports and warehouses.
Alternative routes carried approximately 1.5 million tonnes of agricultural products in August, only 33% of the estimated requirement, the ministry told Euromaidan Press. Grain shipments reached 822,000 tonnes, or 21% of potential export demand.
Even if fully expanded, the Danube ports, railways, and roads could carry no more than half of the required export volume. Slower exports could leave Ukraine short of storage for 11 million tonnes of agricultural products by November.
The government is seeking temporary storage capacity. With international donors, it is also providing large polymer sleeves to farmers whose warehouses have been damaged in nine oblasts. The sleeves allow crops to be stored temporarily at individual farms.
Who pays for new routes?
Bondarenko's cost estimates suggest that replacing one large refrigerated warehouse with several smaller facilities could increase logistics costs by 10–15%. He estimated that the smaller sites would collectively require 60–70 workers, compared with 20–30 at one large automated warehouse, as well as additional loading and sorting equipment.
Some retail chains were demanding that manufacturers cover all logistics risks, according to Didur's RBC-Ukraine interview. He warned that suppliers could seek other sales channels if those demands spread.
Ukrainian supermarket chain VARUS, the fifth-largest on the Ukrainian market, said it was trying to absorb additional logistics costs. Higher delivery costs would not automatically raise shelf prices by the same percentage, the chain said, because purchasing costs, exchange rates, and other factors also influence what shoppers pay.
Shops remain open, and the ministry sees no famine threat. The lasting damage appears in the capacity and money consumed by each workaround: more workers and vehicles, smaller shipments, deferred hiring and salary reviews, and fewer warehouses available when the next strike comes.
In the pessimistic scenario, producers would refuse to work under the new logistics rules and prefer going down the export route, which would lead to a stable deficit of goods on the shelves of Ukrainian supermarkets by October-November, Bondarenko assessed.
But from a broader perspective, if the pace of Russian strikes continues, Ukrainian businesses could be forced to close or relocate their production facilities to neighboring Romania, Slovakia, and Poland—leading to losses in employment and taxes to the Ukrainian budget, he added.








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