When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met a Lockheed Martin team led by Orlando Sanchez Jr., head of its aeronautics division, in Kyiv on 19 October, the talk was of Patriot interceptors and of repairing the Ukrainian air force's small but growing fleet of ex-European F-16 fighters inside the country. Lockheed designed the F-16 and still builds it.

But the Lockheed officials may have had other things on their minds. They gave Zelenskyy a scale model of a new and improved F-16 variant in Ukrainian livery, according to a photo posted by the MilitaryNewsUA account.

In late September, Ukraine's air force commander, Lt. Gen. Anatolii Kryvonozhko, and Lockheed discussed a possible move to newer F-16s. Now we have a clearer idea what those F-16s might look like—and what they might be capable of. The model Lockheed officials gave to Zelenskyy appears to be based on the Block 70/72 version of the classic supersonic fighter that Lockheed manufactures at its factory in Greenville, South Carolina.

A model of the F-16 Block 70/72 fighter that Lockheed Martin representatives gifted to Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their personal meeting yesterday. pic.twitter.com/tprj5yuj2z

— MilitaryNewsUA (@front_ukrainian) October 20, 2026

It's a world-class jet. But a pricey batch of factory-fresh Block 70/72s isn't actually at the top of the Ukrainian air force's wish list. Not as long as the air force's existing warplanes lack munitions.

The Block 70/72 boasts a better radar, more fuel capacity, and a tougher airframe compared to older F-16 models, which have been flying since the late 1970s. The F-16 is still one of the most numerous fighter types in US Air Force service. Surplus 1980s-vintage F-16s from Denmark and the Netherlands make up the bulk of the Ukrainian air force's front-line fleet. Norway's six are still being refurbished, and Belgium's are coming.

Whether Ukraine ever gets new F-16s is anyone's guess. Kyiv would need to pay around $100 million per copy, or find an ally to finance the purchase. Either could be a heavy lift. And to be sure, Ukraine has options as it rebuilds its battered air force. Sweden is donating 16 older Saab Gripens, the first due early next year, and Kyiv plans to buy 20 newer ones. Kyiv has negotiated to buy 16 Dassault Rafales from France, which may not arrive until 2028. Belgium has promised as many as 53 older F-16s, the last of them perhaps not until 2029.

Welcome jets

But new Block 70/72 F-16s would be welcome. The Block 70/72 builds on what already makes the F-16 great: its agility, flexibility, reliability, excellent electronic warfare systems, and compatibility with a wide array of munitions.

Where the Block 15 Mid Life Update F-16s Ukraine currently flies have the older analog AN/APG-66(V2) radar, the Block 70/72 has a digital APG-83 active electronically scanned array radar. It can also carry overwing conformal fuel tanks for extra range.

Perhaps most exciting for the Ukrainian air force, a newly made Block 70/72 is good for 12,000 hours of flight: enough for about 30 years at 400 flying hours a year. An aging Block 15 has a structural life of about 8,000 hours, and Ukraine's jets fly hard. Zelenskyy has said about half of them spend long stretches abroad for repairs, many at Sabena Aerospace Engineering in Belgium, a process that can take months.

Ukraine F-16 Pilots Rationing Missiles as Russian Attacks Intensify | NEWSMAX2

Ukraine’s American-made F-16 fighter jets are defending the skies against Russian drones and cruise missiles — but a critical shortage of U.S.-made missiles is putting that mission at risk.

In an… pic.twitter.com/WQgbasdks5

— Ukrainian Air Force (@KpsZSU) September 16, 2026

Newer F-16s require less maintenance. They can fly and fight more often. In that sense, 50 Block 70/72s are worth more than 50 Block 15s.

But the availability of airframes isn't the biggest problem in the 107th Aviation Wing, the Ukrainian air force's sole F-16 unit. The wing is desperately low on air-to-air missiles. Its pilots often resort to gunning down Russian drones and cruise missiles with the F-16's built-in 20-mm cannon—a risky tactic given how close a fighter must get to its target to make use of its gun.

While a few billion dollars' worth of fresh F-16s could keep the 107th Aviation Wing in fighting shape for decades to come, fresh airframes aren't actually the most urgent priority. Given a choice between getting new F-16s or getting substantial supplies of missiles for its old F-16s, the wing would surely opt for the latter.

Ukraine now builds far more weapons than it can afford to buy. A year ago, it promised to sell the surplus abroad and turn the proceeds back into its own army. However, 12 months later, that promise has barely materialized: a state fee of up to 30% is pricing Ukrainian arms out of foreign markets, and no one can say how much the army has actually gained, said Ihor Fedirko, executive director of the Ukrainian Council of Armorers.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the resumption of controlled weapons exports in October 2025, resting it on four promises: 1) sell what Ukraine makes beyond its own needs, 2) channel part of the proceeds into a special fund for the army, 3) open export offices in Europe and the US, and 4) establish joint ventures abroad.

The surplus is real: Ukraine's defense output is projected to reach $55 billion in 2026, far beyond what the state can finance. A year on, Fedirko checked each promise in turn.

1) Export of surpluses: rules that strangle businesses

On 1 July 2026, the government approved rules for controlled arms exports. They shortened the maximum application review period from 90 to 30 days, but also introduced an export fee: 20% for finished products and technologies, and 30% for components. For finished products exported under the special procedure, the contract value must be at least $334,000.

In September, the Ukrainian Council of Armorers, together with other associations, proposed a zero rate, no advance collection of the fee, refunds for deals that fall through, and simplified test shipments. The industry was promised that its amendments would be taken into account and that the resolution would be rewritten.

Even in early October, however, the rules still needed work. According to Fedirko, the new mechanism has effectively not started working. Whether it can bring in additional funds for defense depends on how acceptable the export terms are to manufacturers.

Fedirko says, though, that judging by current decisions, the state intends to keep the export fee.

“The industry is ready to discuss its contribution to defense financing. But the rate must be economically justified,” he says.

2) Procurement for the Ukrainian military: balance is only being established

He adds that the Ukrainian Council of Armorers intends to push for a rate significantly lower than 20%, one that would let companies fulfill contracts and invest in production.

With such high rates, Fedirko says, the competitiveness of Ukrainian weapons on foreign markets is in question, as is the ability to send even small test batches to potential buyers.

“The fundamental requirement is post-payment: after the contract has actually been fulfilled and the manufacturer has been paid. A company should not pay the state in advance a share of income it has not yet received,” he says.

He added that, given all this, the real export figures remain unclear, as does how much exports have actually brought the military.

“The military and manufacturers must feel the benefit of exports. I sincerely hope that next year will bring much better results,” he says.

In addition, on 12 October, the Ukrainian Parliament passed bill No. 15400 in the first reading. It provides for crediting the export fee to a special fund directed to the Ministry of Defense: 50% for the procurement, modernization, and repair of weapons and equipment, and 50% for the pay of Armed Forces personnel.

The bill has not yet been adopted, but Fedirko says he expects “final adoption and launch of the mechanism.”

3) Export offices: offices in Germany and Denmark

On 3 November, the Ukrainian government named the first cities for export offices: Berlin and Copenhagen. On 15 December, it again spoke of preparing an office in Berlin. In reality, Fedirko says he does not know the office’s status, and it likewise remains unclear how companies can apply to it and how many contracts it has helped close.

4) Joint ventures abroad: There are concrete results in this area

According to Fedirko, eight joint ventures have been created, five of which are already supplying products to Ukraine. He stresses that this is the result of work by Ukrainian companies, foreign partners and the state, and that it deserves recognition.

As early as February 2026, the authorities spoke of plans to create ten joint ventures in Europe within a year. At the same time, they announced Quantum Frontline Industries in Germany, with a planned annual capacity of 10,000 drones for Kyiv.

Beyond the number of ventures and deliveries, however, it is important to understand how other manufacturers can join the Build with Ukraine program.

“Who accepts applications, by what criteria are decisions made, and what support does a company receive?” Fedirko asks.

In other words, joint ventures are already delivering results, but the rules of participation and the state support mechanism must be clear to companies that want to develop production abroad.

Russia's latest jet-propelled Geran-4 and Geran-5 one-way attack drones fly at 500 km/h or more, nearly three times as fast as an older, propeller-driven Geran-2.

That's too fast for many of Ukraine's air defenses. In particular, the inexpensive interceptor drones that Ukrainian forces deploy by the thousand.

Russia launched more than 2,700 jet Gerans at Ukraine in September, and Ukraine is shooting down only about 55% of them, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The speed disparity is a big part of the problem.

Ukrainian forces are scrambling for new defenses against the speedy Gerans. Among the best is actually a Ukrainian take on the Geran-4 and Geran-5: a fast, jet-propelled one-way attack drone that the Ukrainians have modified for air-to-air use.

Against jet drones, the air-to-air Bars have a hit rate of around 30%, Zelensky said during a joint press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Kyiv on 4 October. "The Bars have shown positive results," Zelensky said. "They currently have the highest percentage. Others are also catching up."

In July, Ukraine and Germany agreed to jointly produce Bars, with Germany financing the first phase. Ukraine has reportedly been launching Bars at targets on the ground since at least the summer of 2025. But it was only recently that clear photos and videos of the drones have circulated.

Over the weekend, Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade released footage of one jet drone hunting another. Observers identified the interceptor as a Bars and its target as a Geran-5. After launching from an elevated ramp with help from a rocket booster, the drone's operator—seeing what the drone saw through a front-facing infrared camera—steered the drone toward the Russian drone, possibly destroying it.

Exactly how the operator controlled the Bars—whether by satellite or mesh radio or some other command and control system—is unclear. Equally unclear: what kind of warhead a Bars would employ in the air-to-air role. Many smaller interceptor drones lack warheads. Instead, they simply slam directly into their targets, wrecking them in the collision.

Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade has released the first footage of the Ukrainian Bars jet-powered drone in its interceptor configuration engaging a Russian Geran-5 drone. https://t.co/FRBKZQR9lF pic.twitter.com/njPJWXsDwo

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) October 17, 2026

Mystery drone

Bars isn't small. It likely packs an explosive warhead. Potentially one that the operator can remotely trigger when the interceptor passes near its target.

Bars is adaptable. Its maker has reworked it from a 22-kg warhead and a 700-km range to a 60-kg warhead and a stated range of more than 1,000 km, and a heavier variant can carry a 105-kg warhead.

In the air-to-air interceptor role, long range is terribly important but speed is everything. There's an obvious way for the Ukrainians to boost the Bars' speed from its reported 700 km/h top speed to potentially even faster. They could shrink the drone's warhead and its fuel load, making it lighter in order to make it faster.

That may explain how a Bars can chase down a Geran-5 even as the Russians, by one Ukrainian analyst's estimate, try to push the Geran-5 toward 700 km/h or more.

Cost is important, too. Russia churns out Gerans for an estimated $100,000 or so per drone. The cheaper the drone, the more copies the Russians can fling at Ukrainian cities. If it takes three or more interceptor drones to take down each of those 2,700 jet Gerans, Ukraine may need to deploy 8,000 to 10,000 interceptors a month.

Ukraine already builds more than 2,000 Bars a month, its maker says, but mostly in strike versions. How many go to air defense, and how much each costs, isn't public.

The supply of small jet engines could be a constraint. “Engines are a key element; we really import them in large quantities,” Zelensky said in an interview with Financial Times. "There are also domestically produced engines, but there are not enough of them.” A Ukrainian-made engine for Bars passed final tests in September.

Belgium has announced it will accelerate the delivery of surplus Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters to Ukraine. Instead of delivering three flyable F-16s before the end of the year, Brussels will ship 10.

It's unclear how many will be flyable. Previously, Belgian officials explained the first seven secondhand F-16s would include just three airworthy examples. The other four would be broken down for spare parts.

It's good news for Ukraine, but hardly cause for nationwide celebration. The handful of flyable F-16s that should arrive in the coming two months could make good recent F-16 losses. But those shipping-soon Belgian F-16s won't actually grow Ukraine's F-16 fleet by much, if at all.

The dozens of supersonic F-16s in action in Ukraine fly often and fight hard. They shoot down Russian drones and cruise missiles, tangle with Russian warplanes, and lob precision glide bombs at Russian forces on the ground. Russia launched about 2,000 jet-powered drones at Ukraine in September, up from some 350 in June, and F-16s are among the few weapons fast enough to catch them, the Wall Street Journal's editorial board noted. Every 300 flying hours, each jet must go abroad for a lengthy inspection.

The main constraint on the pace of F-16 sorties, besides maintenance demands and the availability of trained pilots, is munitions: running low or out of air-to-air missiles and glide bombs, the F-16s routinely aim their 20-mm guns at Russian targets. But even 20-mm ammunition sometimes runs low.

The busy F-16s and their equally busy pilots need reinforcement. But reinforcements are slow coming. Belgium is only slightly accelerating its F-16 shipments amid reports it will eventually give Ukraine all 53 F-16s it's gradually retiring as new Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters arrive to re-equip the Belgian air force.

Further complicating the picture, Norway's six F-16s, promised in 2023, were still being refurbished in Belgium this spring. Some arrived there in pieces.

Yes, Ukraine got 24 fight-ready F-16s from the Netherlands and most of the 19 Denmark promised. But it's lost five of those jets since 2024. And others are so worn out from relentless flying that they're badly in need of maintenance. The Belgian firm Sabena, which services Ukrainian F-16s, has struggled to keep up, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said about half of the jets spend long stretches abroad for repairs. That slows the return of repaired planes and further squeezes the front-line force.

One wing, too few jets

Donor	F-16s promised	Reached Ukraine	Status
Netherlands	24	24	Complete
Denmark	19	At least 12	Further deliveries due
Norway	6	0	Being refurbished in Belgium
Belgium	53	0	10 by end of 2026, the last in 2029
Total	About 100	At least 36, five since lost	Fewer than 40 in service

In short, it's possible the Ukrainian air force's 107th Aviation Wing, its sole F-16 unit, has fewer than 40 ready-to-fight F-16s. Those 53 Belgian F-16s will help grow the wing, but piecemeal. Ukraine should expect a handful of operational jets from Belgium this year. Under a schedule from May, the last 27, half the total, may not arrive until 2029.

To be clear, additional F-16s support the 107th Aviation Wing. The Netherlands sold 18 of its old F-16s to Romania for a token price in order to equip a training squadron, funded by a consortium of Ukraine's allies, that feeds trained pilots to the 107th Aviation Wing. But these 18 jets aren't available for front-line use. They don't even legally belong to Ukraine.

The delays in supplies of combat-ready F-16s matter because the Ukrainian air force is under stress. Its last few dozen ex-Soviet warplanes, including Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, are even older and wearier than the ex-European F-16s are. And they've suffered staggering losses in the air and on the ground in nearly 56 months of hard fighting in the wider war.

The air force does have a few ex-French Dassault Mirage 2000s that are at least as capable as the F-16s, but France has donated only a handful of the supersonic jets—and one has crashed. Any further supplies of Mirage 2000s could be complicated by the French presidential election in April 2027. The leading far-right and far-left parties are both friendly toward Russia and hostile to Ukraine.

Some relief is coming, although not quickly. Sweden has pledged 16 surplus JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters to the Ukrainian war effort; the first of these could arrive early next year. Later on, Ukraine also plans to buy 20 newer JAS-39E/Fs. Kyiv has also negotiated to purchase 16 new Rafale fighters from Paris, but the soonest these could arrive is 2028.

For now, F-16s are the main solution to Ukraine's air defense problems. Kyiv surely wishes it had more of them, sooner.

Bulgaria gave Ukraine 110 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers. They are 1960s vehicles, too thinly armored to carry infantry anywhere near a front line patrolled by explosive drones. So Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps found another use for them during Operation Vivaldi, its counteroffensive north of Lyman. Fill one with anti-tank mines, rig it for remote control, drive it at a Russian bunker, and set it off.

Packing potentially dozens of TM-62 anti-tank mines, the speedy BTR-60s become what's called vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, or VBIEDs. Once a favorite weapon of insurgents battling US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, VBIEDs have found a new niche in Russia's wider war on Ukraine as unmanned demolition systems.

"To break through the enemy's defenses, the 3rd Army Corps employed its own invention, Soviet BTR-60s converted into robotic kamikaze complexes," the corps stated. "They were used to demolish the enemy's strongest fortifications." If an enemy strongpoint is too heavily protected to bomb from the air but exposed to attack from the ground, send in a VBIED.

Білецький: «Противник був введений в оману і проспав справжній удар»

Третій армійський корпус звільнив Нове, Рідкодуб і Катеринівку та відновив контроль над Карпівкою і Новомихайлівкою. Втрати противника — 2000 живою силою, понад 250 росіян захоплені в полон. Так закінчився… pic.twitter.com/GSV4LFG3gj

— Третій армійський корпус (@ab3army) September 28, 2026

The Russians were the first to deploy vehicular IEDs in the current war, but the Ukrainians may have mastered the tactic. It's one thing to rig an explosives-filled MT-LB tractor or T-55 tank to roll straight forward without direct human control, as the Russians once did. It's another to rig an explosive BTR-60 to maneuver before going off, as the 3rd Army Corps' VBIEDs clearly did.

On 28 September, announcing the close of Vivaldi's third phase, the 3rd Army Corps released drone footage depicting one of the explosive BTRs blasting a Russian strongpoint north of the town of Lyman. The sheer scale of the explosion is testimony to the VBIED's destructive potential. And the trail the BTR leaves in the grass in the heavily edited video indicates the Ukrainians can steer their VBIEDs around obstacles and guide them to precision strikes.

Why it gets there

A slow wheeled vehicle crossing open ground toward a fortified position should not survive the trip. In most sectors it would not. What makes the tactic work north of Lyman is a condition the 3rd Army Corps built into Vivaldi before its assault groups moved: Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare threw a protective dome over the battle area, blinding Russian drones so they could not read the operation's design or strike what was moving through it.

Robots have played critical roles in each phase of Vivaldi. Surveillance drones have watched from overhead. One-way attack drones have pummeled Russian positions and supply lines. Heavy bomber drones have not only dropped bombs, they've also airlifted explosive unmanned ground vehicles into position so the UGVs can roll right through the front doors of Russian bunkers.

The self-exploding BTR-60s are too big to airlift, but that's the point. A small UGV might carry a few tens of kilograms of explosives. A remote-controlled BTR-60 can easily haul hundreds of kilograms.

The arithmetic

It's not impossible to take out a VBIED before it strikes, of course. Mines, anti-tank missiles, and even concentrated gunfire can stop a vehicular bomb in its tracks. But losing one of the aged BTR-60s costs Ukraine very little. The vehicles are too thinly armored for use as front-line infantry transports anyway. You might as well convert them into bombs.

That is the whole case for the tactic. A manned fighter jet lobbing a precision glide bomb is the preferred approach to bunker-busting. But it costs tens of thousands of dollars an hour to keep a jet in the air, and a single glide bomb can cost tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's unclear how much it costs to convert a BTR into a VBIED. It could be just a few thousand.

And it reduces Russian fortifications without risking any Ukrainian lives. That's the philosophy underpinning all of the 3rd Army Corps' robot-first tactics. "This is exactly the direction of the corps' development set by Brig. Gen. Andrii Biletskyi," the corps stated, "to reduce the number of fighters in the most dangerous areas and replace them with robots."

Vivaldi began in mid-April under an information blackout that held for five months. The corps says it has regained control of 176 sq km across three of a planned four phases, around half of that de-occupied outright, and taken more than 250 Russian prisoners. Those figures are the corps' own and have not been independently verified.

Sometimes the robots doing that work are 60-year-old APCs modified for an explosive one-way mission.

1960s-vintage, Soviet-made T-62Ms aren't the oldest tanks in the Ukrainian inventory. That dubious honorific belongs to Ukraine's ex-Slovenian M-55S tanks, which are based on Soviet-made T-55s from the 1950s.

The T-62M hasn't gotten better. The job has changed. These days, many tanks on both sides function as mobile artillery, angling their guns high to fire a few rounds at targets kilometers away. They rarely work as tanks, closing with the enemy and firing directly from a few hundred meters. The threat from tiny explosive drones has pushed armor back from the gray zone, and at that distance a T-62M is not much less effective than a T-64BV. Or, for that matter, than a far more precious Leopard 1, Leopard 2, or M-1.

That is one reading of a war that has changed shape, and nobody has published a study of it. Ukraine's T-64, Leopard, and Abrams fleets have all taken heavy documented losses. Oryx, which logs a loss only where photos or video exist, lists no Ukrainian T-62Ms at all.

These tanks, all captured from the Russians, are also available. And that matters in a military struggling to sustain its tank force. As Russia's war on Ukraine grinds through its 56th month, Ukraine is running low on its newest and best tanks. Older and less capable ones fill in ... for lack of a better alternative.

Observer Stevius, who closely tracks developments in the Ukrainian armor corps, recently highlighted the ongoing importance of former Russian T-62Ms to the Ukrainian war effort. "Captured T-62Ms still out there!"

Specifically, Stevius noted an ex-Russian T-62M belonging to the Ukrainian National Guard's 19th Brigade participating in a recent competition for best tank crew in the National Guard. According to Stevius, at least two other Ukrainian units have operated the survivors of at least 45 T-62Ms that Ukrainian troops have captured. Most of the captures took place during the Ukrainian counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine in late 2022.

T-62M capturés toujours là!
45 T-62M (ou MV) russes ont été capturés par les Ukrainiens, presque exclusivement en 2022 et beaucoup à Kherson.
Certains ont été transformés en BREM, d'autres en BMPT, mais une partie d'entre eux ont été maintenus comme chars de combat malgré… pic.twitter.com/bysFtEUNnI

— STEVIUS (@Stevius21) September 23, 2026

Lesser tanks

The 40-ton, four-person T-62M is Ukraine's second-oldest tank, and where the slightly older M-55S got a deep upgrade in 1990s Slovenia, the T-62M has not. In its DNA it is still a vehicle of the early Cold War. The Ukrainian army's 110th Mechanized Brigade temporarily operated T-62Ms before swapping them out for much newer and more capable T-64BVs. Where the T-62M has a 115-millimeter main gun loaded by hand by a fourth crew member, the T-64BV has a more powerful 125-millimeter gun loaded by a fast mechanical autoloader.

The fast-firing capability of the made-in-Ukraine T-64BV was central to the Ukrainian 1st Tank Brigade's successful defense of the city of Chernihiv during the early weeks of the wider Russian invasion starting in February 2022. The Ukrainian tanks engaged passing Russian tanks at point-blank range, and out-shot them.

That is the kind of fight the T-62M would lose. It is a kind of fight fewer tanks now get.

Surely some of the 60-something-year-old T-62Ms in Ukrainian service have been withdrawn owing to wear and tear and a possible shortage of spare parts. But there's a good chance most of the 45 Ukrainian T-62Ms are still in, or near, the action.

But not all are still tanks. Seeing the value in the thickly protected hull and reliable chassis that carries the T-62M's turret and gun, Ukrainian volunteers and units have converted some captured T-62Ms into specialist vehicles that benefit from the tanks' sturdy bottoms but don't need their obsolescent tops.

A few ex-Russian T-62Ms have undergone conversion into recovery vehicles by losing their turrets and guns and adding a heavy-duty winch for towing other armored vehicles. Volunteers working with the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation turned another into a heavy infantry fighting vehicle. The recipe is simple. Just pop off the existing turret and replace it with a smaller one fitted with a 30-millimeter autocannon, in this case one pulled from a captured Russian BMP-2.

Potentially dozens of Ukrainian T-62Ms are still T-62Ms, however, and still adding bulk and firepower to units that otherwise might struggle to deploy any tanks at all.