Ukraine's assault regiments, the troops built to storm trenches, have taken on a new role in 2026, reaching far into the Russian rear with their own strike drones, according to a feature by Ukrainska Pravda. Two of them merged their drone teams into a single experimental command and now plan deep strikes and ground assaults together, hitting the roads that feed Russian forces before the infantry moves.

Through 2026, Ukraine has turned drones into a way to choke the logistics that keep the invasion moving, backed by dedicated funding aimed squarely at the enemy's rear. The shift now under way puts that reach in the hands of the units doing the ground fighting, so the same troops who storm a position can first starve it from dozens of kilometers away.

Assault troops with a long reach

For most of the war, deep strikes behind the front belonged to specialized drone units. That is changing. The 475th Separate Assault Regiment, known as CODE 9.2, was possibly one of the first non-specialist units to run mid-strikes, flights by medium-range attack drones that hit targets 50 to 150 kilometers past the front.

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Then CODE 9.2 and the 1st Separate Assault Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo built a joint command for multidomain operations, code-named Phalanx (Falanha), so they could plan and strike as one. Before that center existed, each unit fought its own stretch of front at its own pace. In plain terms, ground units now own part of the fight far beyond their own trenches.

Drones go in before the infantry

Reporters watched a soldier follow a live feed from a mid-strike drone called Darts as it flew over occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast toward the Tokmak–Melitopol road, one of three the report calls key for Russian forces on that stretch. Crews log every flight in Ukraine's Delta battlefield system. When several drones go down in one area, an analyst reroutes the next ones around Russian air defenses. The goal is to wear down the enemy's supply before the infantry ever advances.

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Where the shift began

CODE 9.2 launched its first mid-strikes at the end of 2025, during the Kupiansk operation, its commander Oleksandr Nastenko, call sign Flint, recalled. In the interview, the two commanders trace the center back to a build-up of heavy bomber drones, then a plan to isolate the enemy's transport and supply. For assault units, that kind of reach is recent. The regiments had already worked together earlier in 2026 to strike Russian routes into occupied Crimea, hitting bridges and trucks that keep the peninsula fed.

A Ukrainian ground robot used to run 12-15 missions. Near Kupiansk, it now survives three or four. The lifespan is collapsing under the denser Russian FPV drone and mining fire, Andrii Kopach, call sign "Matematyk", who commands a ground-robot unit in the "Lava" unmanned regiment of the "Khartia" corps, told Oboronka.

Ground robots have become a daily part of the front in Ukraine. Ukrainian units ran 16,676 logistics, strike, and evacuation missions with them in June, up 122 percent since January, and the military has contracted more than 22,000 for 2026, nearly double the 2025 total. That scale runs into a wall at the front, where Russia now assigns FPV crews, including fiber-optic drones, specifically to kill the robots.

The lifespan keeps shrinking

The pace of technological change is the core problem, Matematyk said. Ukrainian makers keep improving the platforms, but cannot always keep pace with how quickly the fighting evolves.

A machine may last only three or four missions now, as in Kharkiv Oblast, where it was eight or nine before and 12 to 15 earlier still, he said. Mining, Russian fiber-optic activity, FPV activity, and a targeted focus on countering robots all drive the decline.

Speed is the missing requirement

Most robots at the front are technologically outdated in speed and suspension, Matematyk said. Current figures of 10 to 15 kilometers per hour no longer allow a machine to cross logistics routes safely.

He put the problem in an image. Gun-armed combat robots, he said, are "Persian elephants", fearsome but so slow to reach the objective that "a couple of centuries" pass first. What the army needs are "Arabian steeds" that gallop in, do the job, and gallop back.

AI defense is in development

Ukrainian troops are working with Brave1 and the Digital Transformation Ministry on AI-based active-protection systems that could autonomously detect and neutralize enemy FPVs, Matematyk said. The approaches vary, from a camera to a mini-radar to a camera paired with sound.

The countermeasures could be net launchers, or for fast machines, shotgun blasts and shrapnel, he said. The detection and response are trained on models built from the data his unit has logged over previous years. Ukraine still holds a quality edge over Russian robots through better Starlink-based communications and decentralized robot groups in its units, he added.

Ukrainian partisans say they crippled a locomotive moving Russian military supplies to the front. Agents of the ATESH movement carried out a sabotage operation near Voronezh, destroying the cab of an electric locomotive used to support military transport, ATESH reported.

Disabling a single locomotive cripples the entire supply line. The locomotive was supposed to continue its journey toward the Kupiansk direction, and after the cab was damaged, operating the machine at its former pace became impossible, disrupting the schedule for forming and dispatching the next trains.

The target was a rail supply line to the front

ATESH said the sabotage hit a link in Russia's military logistics chain. The locomotive was part of the rail transport that moves Russian military cargo, and it was bound for the Kupiansk direction, one of the active sectors of the front in Kharkiv Oblast.

Russia depends heavily on railways to supply its forces. Its army moves ammunition, fuel, weapons, and heavy equipment to the front largely by rail, so the locomotives and the lines they run on are critical arteries of its war effort. A partisan network can reach them behind the front lines at a vulnerable point.

One damaged locomotive slows the whole chain

ATESH framed the value of the strike in terms of the cascade it sets off. The loss of even one link in the mainline causes delays in the delivery of ammunition, fuel, weapons, and heavy equipment.

Those delays compound at the front. When rear supply operations are interrupted, units lose combat effectiveness and suffer significant personnel losses, ATESH said, casting a single sabotaged locomotive as a blow that reaches the soldiers, depending on what it was carrying.

The strike fits ATESH's partisan campaign

Euromaidan Press cannot independently verify the Voronezh sabotage, which is ATESH's own account. But rail sabotage is a documented feature of the war behind Russian lines, and the movement's focus on the logistics that feed the front reflects a real vulnerability in an army that runs on rail.