Ukraine’s defense factories could triple their current output tomorrow. The technology exists, the production lines are ready, workers are trained—but the contracts aren’t there.

This stark reality emerged from Oleksandr Kamyshin’s appearance at Prague’s GLOBSEC security conference, where Ukraine’s former defense minister made an even more striking admission: Ukraine still lacks the swarm drone technology that could reshape the war’s trajectory.

“We still need the swarm solution, coordinated solution,” Kamyshin told the international security forum. “It’s something we didn’t find across our partners.”

The gap comes as Ukraine’s June Operation Spider Web destroyed a third of Russia’s strategic aviation fleet, highlighting both Ukrainian capabilities and the technology still missing from their arsenal.

In an exclusive interview with Euromaidan Press, Kamyshin revealed how Ukraine is transforming from aid recipient to Europe’s strategic defense partner—if Europe provides the funding to match the potential.

The man who increased Ukraine’s defense production sixfold as minister now serves as President Zelenskyy’s external strategic adviser, bridging Ukraine’s military-industrial complex with European partners increasingly viewing Ukrainian capabilities as their own strategic assets.

The production paradox: capability without contracts

Euromaidan Press: You transformed Ukraine’s defense industry as minister, increasing production sixfold. Now you’re an external adviser to Zelenskyy. How does your role differ?

Kamyshin: I was and still am responsible for the defense industry. But earlier, the question was whether we were capable of production; today, there is no question about that.

This is confirmed by our military leadership, our political leadership, and our international partners. You can see today that Europe perceives us completely differently—we have become their primary vehicle for strengthening European security.

Our defense industry has become strong. This didn’t happen overnight—this is long, painstaking work of a large team, a large industry, with constant support from the president.

Once we understood that we had the capability—that the industry was capable—and that financing was the main bottleneck, the president invited me to serve as his adviser. My role is to help integrate our defense industry into Europe and find opportunities to finance Ukrainian production through European channels.

This is mutual integration. The entire system now works clearly and cohesively. Herman Smetanin is doing excellent work. His team, the deputy ministers, the whole ministry, all our defense companies—both state and private—are delivering results.

EP: What are the main obstacles now standing in the way?

Kamyshin: We need money.

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Europe’s fastest weapons pipeline

EP: What obstacles stand in the way of this money coming to Ukraine?

Kamyshin: Two years ago, no one believed Europe could finance Ukrainian defense production. Today this is reality. The successful cases started with the Danish model.

I will always be grateful to the Danish government and Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen for their leadership. It continued with European funds flowing through the Danish model, then the Norwegian model, now the German model. Other countries are joining. Today we have a working mechanism.

We call this mechanism the Manufacturing Freedom initiative, with subprojects like the Danish model, Norwegian model, German model—and there will be others. We’re ready to create new models. For us, the main thing is that Ukrainian defense industry gets financed.

Today our defense industry is capable of producing three times more than we are currently producing.

At GLOBSEC, Kamyshin emphasized Ukraine’s production philosophy: “We’re not in the competition for high-tech. We are in the fight. So we don’t try to be the most high-tech operation in the world.” Ukraine’s approach prioritizes effectiveness over sophistication, what he calls “smart power”—using intelligence and innovation to overcome numerical disadvantages.

The Danish breakthrough: from order to delivery in two months

EP: What help from the EU does Ukraine need most? Maybe there’s something where not only they should learn from us, but we—from them?

Kamyshin: At this stage, the main help we expect from Europe is financing our production capacities.

Denmark, Germany, the European Union, and other countries joining this model—they all recognized that our defense industry is capable.

1. They assessed this as the fastest way forward: Denmark placed an order in July and received 18 Bohdana artillery systems by September. This delivery timeframe would be impossible anywhere else in the world.
2. Second, this is the most effective approach—Ukrainian weapons today are competitive and offer the highest price-quality ratio.
3. Third, this is the most efficient approach—what we produce works at the front. It’s proven through testing and battlefield application.

It’s fast, effective, and efficient. Our weapons have become smart power. We cannot beat Russia with quantity—we must beat them with quality and intelligence. Smart power is our only path to defeating our enemy.

This rapid innovation cycle was illustrated at GLOBSEC through the example of Shield AI, whose team fixed GPS jamming issues within 24 hours on Ukrainian front lines. The same drone system later participated in operations destroying a $90 million Russian S-400 air defense system—showcasing how proximity to combat drives innovation in ways peacetime development cannot match.

Kamyshin attributes this innovation speed to Ukraine’s existential circumstances: “Well, necessity is the mother of invention. We have to be creative. We have to be smarter. That’s the only way we can survive.”

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Why factory experience matters in defense strategy

EP: This is a dramatic increase in production. We know the EU has certain struggles on this path. What can they borrow from Ukraine, what lessons, to radically increase their production?

Kamyshin: First and foremost, manufacturers should lead production expansion. Today, Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin is the youngest minister in our government, but he has the most production experience—over ten years of manufacturing experience from the factory floor. [Editor’s note: Smetanin’s ministry was dissolved after this interview was recorded; he was reappointed as CEO (General Director) of Ukroboronprom (Ukrainian Defense Industry).]

He started his career at a factory and today manages all of Ukraine’s defense industry. He’s a production specialist who understands how factories work, how production operates, and for him the task of expanding production capacity is clear.

I started my career the same way, working three years as director of the Karliv Machine-Building Plant. For both Smetanin and me, building production capacity is clear.

This is what we understand from experience. Ukraine will be happy to share this experience in building production capacity with our European partners when the time comes.

How Manufacturing Freedom actually works

EP: These Danish, Norwegian, German models – are these essentially grants for Ukraine’s production, free aid?

Kamyshin: These are not grants, these are contracts for production of our weapons and free transfer of these weapons to our armed forces.

EP: What other investment models are available for attracting funding to Ukrainian defense production?

Kamyshin: At this stage, the main task isn’t attracting investment—investment is about expanding capacity. The main task is loading the capacity that already exists. We constantly expand these capacities and build them up further in critical directions.

Investment means building a factory that can produce drones. We have built factories that can produce drones, armored vehicles, missiles, ammunition, and much more. What we lack today are contracts for these factories.

Nordic leadership vs European hesitation

EP: Could you share which countries are most open to participating in Ukrainian defense procurement?

Kamyshin: Nordics, Baltics, Germany, Czech Republic are the most active.

EP: What does this depend on? What determines activity and inactivity?

Kamyshin: It always depends on leadership. That’s why I said I will always be grateful to Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and her team for being the first to believe, the first to implement this story, and then other countries follow her.

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The missing piece: swarm technology gap

EP: What are the biggest defense priorities on the battlefield? What technologies does Ukraine most want to develop now?

Kamyshin: Unmanned systems, air defense, and long-range weapons. These are the new technological solutions. Also, the application of artificial intelligence in all types of unmanned systems.

At GLOBSEC, Kamyshin expanded on this technological vision: “AI is part of all unmanned systems we use at the front line, and we try to integrate it in aerial, naval, and ground systems. Since recently, we’ve been using autonomous targeting for strike drones, for kamikaze drones.”

But he identified the critical missing piece: “The last thing we are still waiting on the front line in scale is the swarm of drones, and that’s something that will give us even bigger change on the front line.”

EP: Can you name some recent Ukrainian achievements that would interest readers?

Kamyshin: We have our first good experience with AutoTargeting, Last mile targeting, and we’re bringing drone swarms to successful application.

The coalition math: why Ukraine can’t win alone

EP: As Zelenskyy’s strategic adviser, please tell me, can Ukraine win with the current level of EU support? Or is radical increase needed?

Kamyshin: Additional support is needed from both Europe and the USA. This is a big war. In this big war, the big country Russia is fighting, and it’s not fighting alone.

It receives substantial support from North Korea, from China, and from Iran. Against this background, Ukraine alone, or Ukraine only with Europe, will be difficult.

The free world, which America definitely belongs to, must stand against all these evils.

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Strategic deterrence beyond current conflict

EP: If Russia rebuilds its army in three to four years, as experts predict, what must Ukraine and Europe achieve to prevent further aggression?

Kamyshin: We must have strategic deterrence weapons, in sufficient quantity, of sufficiently high quality. This must be regardless of when we end our war with our victory. We must have enough of this always.

Operation Spider Web: Europe’s security investment

EP: Ukraine brought the Russian war home to Russia with the help of long-range drones. Should Europe help Ukraine expand these capabilities? And what actually restrains European countries?

Kamyshin: Ukrainian long-range weapons are the best investment in European security. Operation Spider Web is probably the most successful operation to strengthen European security by destroying a third of Russia’s strategic aviation fleet.

Therefore, of course, the best investment in European security is Ukraine, Ukrainian defense industry, Ukrainian long-range operations.

Operation Spider Web, conducted in June 2025, exemplified Kamyshin’s effectiveness-over-sophistication philosophy. The operation destroyed or damaged over 40 strategic bombers using smuggled drones that cost under $3,000 each to eliminate aircraft worth $250 million apiece.

As Kamyshin noted at GLOBSEC: “If that’s an FPV drone over 2,000 kilometers from the front line, it’s fine. We’re fine with that.”

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Denmark leads, Germany follows

EP: Are these investments happening now in this direction?

Kamyshin: Yes, they are happening. And the recent visit of the president to Germany announced that Germany is starting to invest in Ukrainian long-range solutions. And we believe that other countries will also join. This is just practice.

EP: Was Germany the first to pioneer long-range weapons investment, or were there others before?

Kamyshin: Not the first, but it joined. Denmark was before. There are other countries that also do this.

EP: What needs to change in Ukrainian and European legal frameworks to strengthen cooperation?

Kamyshin: We need to integrate into Europe not only at the political and economic level, but also at the legal level. A lot of work needs to be done for defense procurement in Ukraine to work properly.

Shahed production myth debunked

EP: Russia continues increasing Shahed drone production for attacks on Ukrainian cities. Ukraine doesn’t appear to produce similar long-range attack drones. What influenced this strategic choice?

Kamyshin: This is a myth that we don’t produce Shaheds. Shahed is a type of long-range drone that we produce and produce in significant quantities. We hit military targets, they terrorize cities.

But we have such products since autumn 2023, even more competitive ones. And in this regard, we definitely don’t lag behind in anything–neither quality nor quantity.

EP: Thank you very much.

Kamyshin: Thank you.

The meeting between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump on 18 August revealed the kind of peace Trump wants to build and the risks that come with it.

He offered “NATO-like” protection for Ukraine without putting Ukraine in NATO. He said Europe would be the first line of defense, and the United States would help.

That sounds strong, but strength in security talks comes from enforcement. If the guarantee has no teeth, it is a headline, not a shield.

Putin rejects ceasefire proposal

The first early test came over a ceasefire. In Alaska, Trump told Vladimir Putin to halt the fighting. Putin refused.

After that, Trump told Zelenskyy that a ceasefire was not required for talks. Europe pushed back:

• Germany said real talks need a truce;
• France called it a necessity;
• Trump still waved it off and said negotiations could run while the war goes on.

That shift matters. Fighting during talks helps the side with more shells, more men, and more time. Russia benefits from that, not Ukraine.

Proposed diplomatic sequence

Trump then laid out a sequence. First, a Zelenskyy–Putin meeting. Then a three-way meeting with Trump. He said Putin suggested this order. Europeans repeated that claim.

Moscow did not confirm a summit. The Kremlin only said it might be worth “raising the level of representatives.” That is not a yes. It is a maybe. It keeps pressure on Kyiv while giving Moscow room to stall.

Territory discussions remain contentious

The hardest question surfaced next: territory. Trump told European leaders they would discuss possible territory exchanges based on the current line of contact.

Zelenskyy said land issues would be handled directly with Putin and that no land was being ceded in advance. He said he was ready to meet in any format and without preconditions.

A June poll showed a majority “strongly opposed to any territorial concessions.” Those numbers limit any deal that trades land for paper promises.

Ukraine’s $100 billion weapons proposal

One new element stood out. Ukraine offered to buy security, not just receive it. Zelenskyy floated a plan to purchase about $90 to 100 bn in US weapons, with Europe helping to finance it. He even pointed to US purchases of Ukrainian drones once exports begin.

This reframes the relationship. Aid becomes sales. The goal is clear: tie US industry to Ukraine’s survival and make support harder to undo.

Trump’s team welcomed the shift and contrasted it with a blank check approach they blame on the last administration. Trump also refused to rule out some limited US role on the ground as part of future guarantees, though he kept details vague and stressed that Europe should carry most of the load.

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The enforcement challenge

This is foreign policy as a contract. It could make support steadier in Congress because it looks like jobs and deals. It could also push Europe to budget more for a longer war.

If Russia rejects any force that would actually defend Ukraine, then a “NATO-like” promise without NATO risks looking like the Budapest Memorandum in a new suit. The talking point is different. The outcome could be the same if there is no credible tripwire.

Diplomatic choreography and European coordination

The tone at the White House was striking. In February, Trump had confronted Zelenskyy publicly, questioning Ukraine’s war efforts and demanding immediate negotiations.

This time, they smiled for the cameras, projecting calm and unity.

European leaders treated the day like a careful intervention. Analysts called it a “European family intervention” in Washington.

They posed for a “family photo” with Trump and Zelenskyy. They spoke in one voice about a truce and security guarantees. They worked to keep Trump close to positions they could live with. It was stagecraft with a purpose.

International reactions and momentum claims

Supporters of the meeting said it broke a three-year stalemate. NATO’s acting chief thanked Trump for joining a plan to craft real guarantees. Finland’s president said more progress had been made in weeks than in years.

Within Trump’s circle, officials echoed that line. They said the mix of talks and guarantees opened a new path.

This view places a bet on momentum. Get leaders into a room. Put the US seal on a piece of paper. Lock in Europe’s money and industry. Then rely on that web to hold the line if Russia tests it.

It might work if the web is tight and visible. It will fail if the web is loose and hidden.

The credibility test ahead

Here is the core problem to consider: you can design a plan that looks like NATO without NATO. You can write guarantees, appoint monitors, and schedule summits.

Russia said it views that kind of rule as a threat. That means any promise that truly protects Ukraine will anger Moscow.

The United States and Europe must decide if they are willing to stand behind a line that Moscow threatens to test. If the answer is yes, then the “NATO-like” label can mean something. If the answer is no, the label is a slogan.

What the meeting achieved

What, then, did this meeting achieve?

It created an outline. Security guarantees will be drafted. Talks may proceed while the war continues. A Zelenskyy–Putin meeting is being pursued, though Russia has not confirmed it. No ceasefire was agreed. There was no map to a final deal.

The near term will test whether Europe can carry more of the burden and whether Washington will turn sales into a lasting stake in Ukraine’s defense.

It will also test whether Kyiv can keep the public on side if territorial questions come to the table. The polling suggests that trading land for peace is still a red line for many Ukrainians.

That constraint is real. It will shape what any negotiator can sign and sell at home.

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Combat bargaining and future challenges

By accepting negotiations while the war continues, Trump has chosen combat bargaining. That is a hard road. It tends to reward the side that can absorb more losses.

If the West wants that road to lead to a fair peace, it needs to shorten the journey. That means:

• Quicker air defenses for cities
• Faster ammunition for the front
• Tighter rules around sanctions leaks
• Clarity with Moscow: if Russia tests a guarantee, the response must be automatic.

The day it is tested is the day it proves its worth. If that is clear, a “NATO-like” plan has a chance to deter. If it is not clear, the war will pause, and then it will resume.

Motion, not movement

In short, Washington produced motion, not yet movement:

• the summit showed better tone and a larger cast;
• it aired a new economic link and a draft promise;
• ye, it did not yet solve the enforcement gap at the heart of any deal.

Until that gap closes, Ukraine will keep fighting while diplomacy tries to catch up. That is the reality after 18 August.

It is not defeat. It is not victory. It is the start of a longer test that will measure the will of Europe, the steadiness of the United States, and the patience of the Kremlin.

When NATO militaries examine effective territorial defense, they keep running into an uncomfortable problem: one of the best examples comes from a unit they refused to arm for years.

The 1st Azov Corps was synonymous with far-right extremism. NATO countries wouldn’t send weapons. Today, those same militaries study how Ukraine systematically purged the extremists while keeping the effectiveness.

Why does this matter beyond Ukraine? Because territorial defense just became essential for every democracy with an authoritarian neighbor. And Azov shows it’s possible to transform controversial volunteer forces without losing what makes them effective.

When armies collapse, volunteers fill the gap

Ukraine’s regular army was falling apart in 2014. Corruption, no equipment, units that wouldn’t fight. Russian forces and their proxies grabbed footholds in Luhansk and Donetsk while Ukrainian brigades crumbled.

Someone had to step up. On 5 May 2014, Russian-speaking Ukrainians formed Azov during the initial phase of the Donbas war. Initially called the “Black Corps” for their black masks and urban combat gear, they weren’t your typical volunteer battalion.

They got results fast. Azov helped retake Mariupol in September 2014 and Marinka in June 2015. Effective fighters who could actually push Russian forces out of key cities.

But here’s the thing: effectiveness came with baggage. Among the nationalists and patriots were members with alleged ties to far-right extremists. The Kremlin seized on this, turning Azov into a propaganda goldmine for justifying future aggression.

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The weapons embargo that backfired

NATO countries slapped weapons embargoes on Azov. Understandable, given the extremist connections. The problem? Ukraine now had some of its most effective fighters inadequately armed, just as Russia planned something much bigger than the Donbas.

By late 2014, Azov was restructured into a regiment within Ukraine’s National Guard. The unit continued training and recruitment, becoming one of the most formidable fighting forces in the Ukrainian military. However, the weapons restrictions remained.

Meanwhile, Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion.

How to purge extremists without losing fighters

Can you clean house without destroying effectiveness? Ukraine decided to find out.

Starting in 2017, the remaining far-right elements got systematically discharged, according to Ukrainian political scientist Vyacheslav Likhachev. The unit distanced itself from far-right political movements like the Azov Movement and National Corps.

What replaced loose recruitment? Rigorous training intake that separated recruits who could perform under pressure, become future platoon leaders, and display unit cohesion. British-led Western training programs brought NATO doctrine to units like the 12th Special Forces Brigade.

But training goes beyond classroom work. Azov recruits undergo rigorous field exercises, including close-quarters combat and trench warfare—preparing for real scenarios they’d face in the Donbas. Peak performance and composure under fire get instilled through actual practice.

The transformation worked. NATO countries started lifting weapons bans, recognizing Azov as a professional military unit.

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Mariupol: The ultimate test

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Azov’s transformation faced the ultimate test. At the Siege of Mariupol, the regiment tied down elite Russian units, including the 3rd Guards Spetsnaz and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade.

For three months, Azov held out. They prevented those elite units from reinforcing the initial assault on Kyiv. The strategic impact? Massive.

The cost was brutal. Many Azov members became POWs under grueling conditions, enduring torture as Russia used the unit’s controversial past for propaganda. Hundreds would eventually return through prisoner swaps, but some remain in captivity.

Still, Mariupol proved the transformation worked. The unit that NATO once refused to arm had become essential to Ukraine’s defense.

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From regiment to corps: Scaling up success

What do you do with a proven model? Scale it up.

In April 2025, Azov became a full corps—the 1st Azov Corps. They’re now fighting across critical sectors: Toretsk, Pokrovsk, the Svatove-Kreminna line. The unit attracts recruits through demonstrated competency and trust among soldiers and civilians alike.

But what makes Azov different from typical territorial defense? Most such units hunker down and wait. Azov deploys anywhere on short notice, more like the US Marine Corps. They combine defensive and offensive capabilities, as seen in recent operations in Luhansk.

What NATO sees in Azov’s model

Here’s what catches NATO’s attention: systematic transformation without losing effectiveness.

The process involved several key elements.

• Professional vetting replaced loose recruitment.
• Integration into formal military structure created clear command hierarchy.
• Western training standards brought NATO doctrine.
• Focus shifted from ideology to patriotism.
• Rigorous selection emphasized competence over politics.

Why does this matter to countries like Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic states? Russia’s invasion forced the rapid expansion of territorial defense across NATO. These countries need effective local units that can operate independently while integrating with national defense.

Azov provides a roadmap. You can take problematic volunteer forces and turn them into professional military units through systematic transformation. The key? Don’t throw out effectiveness while cleaning house.

The global implications

Can other countries replicate Ukraine’s approach? That depends on several factors.

1. First, you need volunteers motivated by genuine patriotism rather than just ideology. Azov formed from strong nationalism and desire to serve in the face of existential threats. That foundation made transformation possible.
2. Second, you need rigorous vetting systems. The controversies that led to arms embargoes actually forced stronger background checks. Without external pressure, other countries might not implement such thorough screening.
3. Third, you need Western training and doctrine. NATO standards provided an alternative identity focused on professionalism rather than politics. Countries without access to such programs would struggle to replicate the transformation.

But here’s the bottom line: territorial defense isn’t optional anymore for democracies facing authoritarian neighbors. You need effective local units ready to fight. Ukraine proved problematic volunteer forces can become professional military units through systematic change.

For NATO planners worried about where Russia goes next, that’s worth studying—even from a source they once refused to arm. The 1st Azov Corps continues fighting across eastern Ukraine, part of a war that has cost Russia over one million casualties according to Western estimates.

The transformation from pariah to NATO standard took years. But it worked.

Julian McBride

Julian McBride is a former US Marine, forensic anthropologist, defense analyst, and independent journalist born in New York. His bylines can be found in the National Security Journal, Byline Times, 19FortyFive, Heritage Daily, The Defense Post, Journal of Forensic Psychology, Modern Warfare Institute, Manara Mag, The Strategist, Pacific Forum, E-International Relations, NKInsider, Cipher Brief, Mosern Diplomacy, and UK Defence Journal.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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After three hours in Alaska, the results are in: Putin scored a perfect diplomatic victory, Trump abandoned his core demands, and Ukraine faces an impossible choice between constitutional suicide and losing American support.

The stunning reversal shows how completely Trump capitulated across every dimension while Putin orchestrated a masterclass in presidential humiliation.

Before Alaska, Trump threatened Putin with “stark economic penalties” and demanded an immediate ceasefire. After three hours with the Russian leader, Trump dropped both threats while pressuring Ukraine to surrender the very fortress belt that has protected its heartland since 2014.

The Alaska report card

The choreography of humiliation

Putin didn’t just win diplomatically—he staged a public humiliation of American power that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War.

Start with the visuals. US soldiers dropped to their knees to unfurl a red carpet for Putin’s arrival. Trump personally drove the Russian leader in the presidential limousine—a gesture so unprecedented that diplomatic protocol experts couldn’t find parallels.

Then came the final briefing, where Putin spoke first from a podium bearing the seal of the US presidency. His remarks ran twice as long as Trump’s, establishing who controlled the narrative.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova captured Moscow’s glee: “Three years [Western media] told us about Russia’s isolation, and today they saw the red carpet that welcomed the Russian president in the USA.”

The optics weren’t accidental—they were psychological warfare. Putin wanted the world to see American soldiers literally bowing before Russian power.

Behind closed doors: Putin controls the agenda

The meeting itself revealed Putin’s control extended beyond ceremony to substance. Russia successfully demanded that General Keith Kellogg—considered too pro-Ukraine by the Kremlin—be excluded from the US delegation.

The summit format also favored Putin. What was supposed to be a broader delegation meeting shrank to just leaders, foreign ministers, translators, and one adviser each. Putin got exactly the intimate setting he wanted, with minimal American institutional pushback.

Even Trump’s famous preference for one-on-one meetings—which led to his Helsinki disaster in 2017, when he publicly sided with Putin over US intelligence agencies, causing a major diplomatic scandal—was limited to a few minutes in the presidential car without a translator. Not enough time for real negotiation, but plenty for Putin to set the tone.

The $205 million daily gift: How Trump saved Putin’s war economy

Here’s what Trump actually abandoned: secondary sanctions targeting countries that buy Russian oil. These weren’t ordinary pressure tactics—they were designed to make Russian energy “too toxic” to purchase by imposing punitive tariffs on entire nations.

Trump had already shown he meant business. Just days before Alaska, he slapped 25% tariffs on India over Russian oil purchases. The threat was credible and escalating.

But three hours with Putin changed everything. “Because of what happened today, I think I don’t have to think about it,” Trump told Fox News about the sanctions. “Maybe I’ll have to think about it in 2-3 weeks, but right now we don’t have to think about it.”

That’s a daily gift worth approximately $205 million to Russia’s war machine. Putin can now fund his military without worrying about economic isolation.

The sanctions relief wasn’t collateral damage—it was Putin’s primary objective.

As Serhiy Sydorenko from European Pravda noted, this became “one of Putin’s key victories” because these nuclear-option sanctions “are considered the most effective for influencing Russia.”

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Trump abandons ceasefire demands, accepts Putin’s timeline

The most revealing shift came in what Trump stopped talking about after Alaska. Before the summit, Trump insisted a ceasefire was his “red line” and told reporters he “won’t be happy if I walk away without some form of a ceasefire.”

After three hours with Putin, the word “ceasefire” disappeared entirely from Trump’s vocabulary. Neither the final briefing nor Trump’s 30-minute Fox News interview mentioned it once.

Axios reporter Barak Ravid explained the reversal: “President Trump told Zelensky and NATO leaders that Putin doesn’t want a ceasefire and prefers a comprehensive deal to end the war. Trump said he ‘thinks a quick peace agreement is better than a ceasefire.'”

This represented complete capitulation to Putin’s negotiating position. The Russian leader had consistently rejected temporary ceasefires, demanding instead a permanent settlement that would legitimize territorial gains and prevent Ukraine from rebuilding its defenses.

Security guarantees “like NATO without NATO”: Ukraine’s one major win

The only positive outcome for Ukraine from the Alaska summit deserves a pause. Trump’s agreement to US security guarantees represents a seismic shift that went largely unnoticed.

For months, Trump insisted America had no role in guaranteeing Ukraine’s post-war security. “European affairs,” he called it. Europe’s problem to solve.

That position crumbled in Alaska. Trump not only agreed to participate but told European leaders the guarantees would be “like NATO.” American troops might participate, he indicated—a complete reversal of his isolationist stance.

French President Macron first revealed this shift on August 13, but Trump confirmed it definitively after meeting Putin. Even Putin acknowledged the arrangement during the final briefing.

For Ukraine, this represents genuine strategic value. America’s absence from plans to give Ukraine real protection from further Russian attacks has scared off EU allies from committing boots on the ground, and could be a major step for Ukraine’s security—if they’re credible and long-term.

Trump confirmed this agreement in his Fox News interview with Sean Hannity, and, according to NBC sources, Trump directly engaged with Zelensky and European leaders by phone Saturday morning about “the US being party to a potential NATO-like security guarantee for Ukraine as part of a deal struck with Russia.”

Putin also acknowledged the arrangement back in Moscow, telling officials that future security arrangements for Ukraine had been discussed and calling the talks “frank and substantive.”

The unprecedented demand: No country has voluntarily surrendered territory since WWII

Putin’s territorial demands represent something virtually unprecedented in post-World War II history: demanding a defending country voluntarily surrender its own sovereign territory to end a war. There are no meaningful examples of this happening since 1945.

Even Israel’s return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt was the opposite scenario—returning previously occupied foreign territory in exchange for peace and recognition.

Yet Trump is asking Ukraine to do what no country has done in nearly 80 years: hand over its own land to an aggressor. And not just any land—the fortress belt that has protected Ukraine’s heartland since 2014.

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The fortress belt ultimatum: Surrender what Russia couldn’t capture

Putin is demanding Ukraine surrender a 50-kilometer chain of fortified cities that Russian forces have repeatedly failed to capture through three years of warfare.

The fortress belt stretches from Sloviansk through Kramatorsk to Kostyantynivka—Ukraine’s eastern shield built over 11 years since 2014. These aren’t just strategic positions; they’re Ukraine’s last major defensive line in the east.

Reuters reports that Trump told Zelenskyy directly: Putin will freeze other front lines if Ukraine surrenders all of Donetsk, including areas Russia doesn’t occupy.

The Institute for the Study of War has repeatedly noted that Russian forces cannot break through or encircle these positions. That’s why Putin wants Ukraine to abandon them voluntarily—he’s asking Trump to achieve what his military couldn’t.

Ukrainian officials called this a “stab in the back.” As one senior official told the Financial Times: “He just wants a quick deal.”

The historical parallel is unavoidable. In 1938, Nazi Germany couldn’t capture Czechoslovakia’s fortified Sudetenland through military force. So Hitler demanded it diplomatically. Six months after Czechoslovakia complied, the entire country was occupied.

Putin’s maximalist agenda: erasing Ukraine entirely

Putin’s demands reveal his true goal isn’t territorial adjustment—it’s systematic elimination of Ukrainian statehood. The New York Times reports Putin also demanded Russian become an official language in Ukraine and protections for Russian Orthodox churches.

These aren’t cultural concessions. They’re tools for permanent Russian influence designed to hollow out Ukrainian sovereignty from within.

Putin also refuses to meet with Zelenskyy, whom he considers “an illegitimate president of an artificial country,” according to European Pravda. That’s not negotiation—that’s denial of Ukraine’s right to exist.

Combined with territorial surrender, these demands would reduce Ukraine to a Russian vassal state while Putin positions himself to complete the country’s elimination.

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Editorial: The summit that peacewashed genocide

Monday’s impossible choice

Zelenskyy flies to Washington Monday facing the choice Putin engineered: accept terms that violate Ukraine’s constitution or risk losing American support.

Ukrainian officials told the Financial Times that Zelenskyy won’t agree to surrender Donetsk and Luhansk—a red line written into Ukraine’s constitution. But he’ll discuss territory with Trump, knowing that refusal could mean isolation.

The Monday meeting will happen in the same Oval Office where Trump and JD Vance gave Zelensky a “brutal public dressing-down” six months ago over Ukraine’s reluctance to accept previous territorial demands.

European leaders are considering joining Zelensky in Washington, but their influence is limited. They can’t replace American military backing, and Putin knows it.

As Ukrainian civil society leader Olga Aivazovska noted, territorial concessions would raise fundamental questions: “It will also open the question of why we’ve been defending ourselves all these years.”

How Putin engineered the perfect trap

Step back and see Putin’s strategy. He went to Alaska not to negotiate but to create an impossible situation for Ukraine. Every path now leads toward Russian victory, just through different mechanisms.

• Accept Putin’s terms and Ukraine loses its strongest defenses while becoming a vassal state.
• Reject them and risk losing the American support needed to prevent conquest.
• Try to find middle ground and Putin can always demand more while Trump increases pressure.

Putin couldn’t break Ukraine’s fortress belt through military force, so he got America’s president to demand Ukraine surrender it voluntarily. He couldn’t cut off sanctions through diplomacy, so he manipulated Trump into providing economic amnesty. He couldn’t achieve legitimacy through reform, so he extracted red carpet rehabilitation through personal charm.

The Alaska summit wasn’t diplomacy, but calculated psychological warfare. Putin understood Trump’s psychology and played it perfectly, turning America’s president from Ukraine’s protector into his unwitting agent of pressure.

Ukraine’s only path forward now is hoping Trump’s security guarantee commitment proves more durable than his sanctions threats. But given what happened in Alaska, that’s a dangerous bet to make with national survival.

Hundreds of demonstrators lined Anchorage streets Wednesday with Ukrainian flags and signs reading “Putin won’t stop at Ukraine” as they protested Vladimir Putin’s arrival for Friday’s 11:00 a.m. summit with Donald Trump at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson.

Trump’s admission of needing “give and take” on boundaries between Russia and Ukraine has protesters worried he’ll legitimize Putin’s demands for complete control of four Ukrainian oblasts while keeping President Volodymyr Zelenskyy out of decisions about his own country’s future. Trump told Fox News Radio there’s a “25% chance” the Alaska talks could fail, as per BBC.

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“I don’t like it at all” – NAACP leader rejects Putin on US soil

Benny Kobert, who leads the Fairbanks National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapter, didn’t mince words about Putin setting foot on US soil. “I don’t like it at all,” he told Euromaidan Press. “There was a reason why Putin was restricted from touching United States soil because of the crimes that he’s been committing all over the world and the genocide that he committed on his own people.”

Kobert worries about Trump’s track record of following through on his most controversial promises. “With all the misinformation, this is something that we really need to pay attention to because everything Trump is touting and wanting to do, he’s finding some way of doing it. And this is detrimental to our democracy.”

Russia wants everything, Ukraine gets nothing

Russia’s ceasefire conditions aren’t exactly subtle: complete control of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, full occupation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, NATO membership ruled out for Ukraine, and limits on Ukraine’s armed forces. Ukraine rejects these terms as surrender.

Svetlana Pestronak brought both personal pain and professional insight to Wednesday’s protest. The longtime Alaskan researcher was born in Soviet Belarus, and her Ukrainian husband Igor hails from Odesa. She described standing “in solidarity with Ukraine” while honoring “the victims of mass rape, including child rape, the victims of torture and mutilation and murder.”

She criticized Alaska’s leadership for embracing what she called “a very misleading and dangerous message” about the summit’s supposed benefits, warning it plays into “long-standing Russian propaganda that we take Ukraine first, Alaska is next.”

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Putin came for the summit. Trump brought the white flag.

“Zelenskyy should be here” – fury over exclusion from own country’s fate

Carmen Brooks couldn’t hide her outrage that Zelenskyy wasn’t invited to Friday’s discussions about his country’s future. “Putin is a war criminal and he is being welcomed here to Alaska,” she told Euromaidan Press. “Not inviting Zelenskyy to a meeting that involves his country and major decisions doesn’t seem very right.”

What makes this worse? European leaders had to extract assurances from Trump in a separate call about five principles including keeping Ukraine “at the table” for follow-up talks and avoiding land swaps before a ceasefire.

When asked whether Putin should be arrested, Brooks replied simply: “Yes.”

“These parents deserve answers” – Trump’s war crimes data purge

Protester after protester brought up Trump’s elimination of the State Department unit tracking Ukraine’s kidnapped children. “Trump deleted the department that was tracking the missing children of Ukraine and I have a real big problem with that,” one protester said. “These parents deserve answers.”

The discontinued Yale University program had documented over 30,000 Ukrainian children abducted by Russian forces before Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency cut its funding.

Environmental activist Cass said she came because: “I’m here protesting to show support for Ukraine and the war effort, but also to protest a war criminal being on US soil, specifically Alaska soil, and also protesting authoritarianism and fascism in general, which Putin and Trump both embody.”

From Cold War fortress to Putin’s welcome mat

Friday’s summit happens at the same military installation once used to counter Soviet expansion. Protesters see the irony: Putin’s presence validates exactly the imperial ambitions this base was built to deter.

Andrew Keller demanded that “Alaskans need to have input” in any resource negotiations rumored to be part of potential deals, “not Trump.” He called Putin’s presence “totally inappropriate” and argued that “you don’t invade the borders of a democratically elected free state.”

The protests come as Trump suggested he would know “in the first few minutes” whether Friday’s meeting was worth continuing, adding it would “end very quickly” otherwise.

Igor Pasternak, who left Odesa in 1999 and now calls Alaska home, told Euromaidan Press that seeing local support provided “a little bit healing” despite his pain over “not only what Russia does to Ukraine but also the reaction from some members of our government.”

Meanwhile, Russian propagandists are using the summit to revive territorial claims to Alaska itself, leveraging the summit’s symbolic venue choice to fuel imperial fantasies about reclaiming the territory Russia sold to the United States in 1867.

When Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin meet in Alaska this Friday, the headlines will focus on the show: a US president hosting the Russian leader in a state once sold by the Russian Empire, with Ukraine’s fate hanging in the balance. But what’s invisible to many is a fundamental problem. The two men are not even negotiating the same war.

Trump and his advisers frame the war as a territorial dispute.

In Trump’s mind, ending the war is a matter of finding the right chunk of land to trade, a deal that can be signed quickly, sold to voters, and wrapped up before the next election cycle.

Putin’s view is entirely different. For him, this war is not about lines on a map. It is about the structure of Europe’s security order. His core demand, repeated for more than a decade, is a legally binding halt to NATO expansion, not just for Ukraine, but as a principle. That means rewriting the post–Cold War rules so that Moscow has a permanent veto over the alliances its neighbors may join.

But Putin’s demands go far beyond strategic reordering. According to Russian officials, Moscow seeks Ukraine’s complete “demilitarization,” “denazification”—Putin’s euphemism for regime change—and permanent “neutrality” barring any Western security guarantees.

Russia also wants all sanctions lifted and NATO forces rolled back from Eastern Europe entirely.

In other words, Putin is not negotiating over Ukrainian territory. He is negotiating over whether Ukraine will continue to exist as an independent state.

• Trump is playing a game of Monopoly;
• Putin is erasing countries from the map.

What Ukraine cannot accept

This fundamental mismatch leaves Ukraine in an impossible position. Trump is willing to trade away frozen conflict lines, delayed NATO membership, and limited sanctions relief. But Ukraine needs what Putin refuses to give: genuine security guarantees, territorial integrity, and the sovereign right to choose its own alliances.

These are not positions Ukraine can compromise on—they are requirements for survival as an independent nation. Yet they are precisely what Trump’s deal-making approach treats as negotiable.

History’s warnings

There is no shortage of historical warnings about what happens when talks are built on such mismatches. Land swaps have been tried before as a way to paper over deeper disputes.

• Kosovo and Serbia explored trading territory to normalize relations; it collapsed under nationalist backlash.
• Serbia and Croatia’s postwar boundary negotiations left core tensions untouched, producing only fragile arrangements.
• Estonia and Russia agreed to a border treaty in 2005; Moscow withdrew when Estonia joined NATO.

In each case, the failure came from mistaking a strategic conflict for a cartographic one.

Negotiating with shadows

There is a deeper risk that analysts have largely overlooked: Trump is negotiating with his own misunderstanding of Putin’s objectives. Because he believes the dispute can be solved by trading territory, he will interpret any territorial discussion as progress.

Putin, meanwhile, will see territorial concessions only as a means to secure the larger prize of a rewritten security order.

This misunderstanding becomes Putin’s greatest asset. Russian analysts describe Trump’s dealmaking approach as a “can’t-lose proposition” for Moscow. Putin can appear reasonable and open to compromise while presenting terms designed to eliminate Ukrainian independence.

Even if Trump rejects specific demands, Putin achieves his goal of being treated as Ukraine’s equal in determining the country’s future.

Trump and Putin will leave Alaska believing they have moved closer to a deal, but they will be moving along two separate tracks that never meet.

• Trump will think he has made progress toward a territorial settlement;
• Putin will have advanced his goal of erasing Ukraine as a sovereign state.

Asymmetry in preparation

If this were merely a matter of clashing goals, careful preparation could at least surface the differences and test for overlap. But here too, the asymmetry is visible. Putin arrives in Alaska with a tightly controlled plan, informed by months of private discussions with his closest advisers, and with clear red lines. Trump arrives without a detailed framework.

Successful summits rarely happen spontaneously.

• Camp David in 1978 followed 13 days of intense, private negotiation and years of backchannel talks.
• The 1986 Reykjavik meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev, itself considered a failure at the time, was built on months of arms control groundwork.

Alaska has none of this. The meeting was triggered by a visit from Steve Witkoff, a real estate developer turned envoy, who came back from Moscow with little more than a handshake agreement to meet.

That imbalance gives Putin the advantage. He can use the summit to appear open and constructive while presenting terms designed to lock in strategic gains.

Even if Trump refuses those terms, Putin will have succeeded in demonstrating to his domestic audience, and to wavering countries in the Global South, that Russia is negotiating directly with Washington, sidelining Kyiv.

A timeline mismatch

Time itself favors Putin. Trump is thinking in months, hoping for a quick foreign policy win before the 2026 midterms.

Putin thinks in decades. His inner circle, according to Russian sources, has told him that Ukrainian resistance will collapse within months if Russia maintains military pressure.

• For Putin, a pause is not a compromise. It is a tactical stage in a longer campaign.
• For Trump, a pause can be sold as peace.

This is why a meeting that produces no concrete concessions from Moscow can still be useful to both men, but deeply damaging to Ukraine.

The symbolism problem

Then there is Alaska itself. Meeting on American soil might seem like a show of strength from Trump, but to Putin, it means something else. Alaska was once Russian territory. Hosting the summit there sends an unintended message: that borders are temporary and land can be transferred through negotiation. In a war where Russia’s central claim is that borders can be rewritten by force, this is a gift.

Diplomats understand the power of location. In 2010, Serbia and Kosovo’s EU-sponsored talks were held in Brussels precisely to avoid symbolic claims to sovereignty. Choosing Alaska to discuss Ukraine’s future undermines the very principle the US claims to defend: that states have the right to keep their internationally recognized borders.

The real danger of Alaska is not that it produces a signed surrender. The danger is that it produces the illusion of progress.

Trump could emerge declaring the talks a first step toward peace, while Putin uses the meeting to reinforce his narrative: that Washington, not Kyiv, is the true counterparty in this war, and that Russia’s demands are the baseline for any serious negotiation.

What success would require

Could Alaska succeed? Only if both leaders arrived with a shared understanding of the core dispute, a set of pre-negotiated principles, and Ukraine’s active participation.

None of those conditions exist.

Without them, the meeting is not a step toward resolution but a set piece in two domestic political dramas: Trump’s need to appear as the great dealmaker, and Putin’s need to appear as the indispensable architect of Europe’s future.

But the stakes are higher than political theater. Trump’s misunderstanding could lead him to pressure Ukraine into accepting a “peace” that eliminates its independence while allowing Putin to claim he negotiated rather than conquered.

That is why the Alaska summit may be remembered not as a turning point toward peace, but as the moment when the West negotiated away a democracy’s right to exist.

You show Russians footage of their soldiers dying in Ukraine. They get angry—and mobilize to avenge them. You appeal to their humanity with pictures of Ukrainian children killed by Russian bombs. They shrug. You try facts about war crimes. Nothing.

But tell them criminals are being released from prison to join the army? That their sons might get raped by fellow soldiers? That crime is soaring back home while they’re dying in Ukraine?

Now you’ve got their attention.

This counterintuitive discovery comes from Ukrainian psychological operations teams who’ve spent three years learning what British propagandist Sefton Delmer figured out fighting the Nazis: facts don’t defeat propaganda. Self-interest does.

“People see the corpses of dead Russians and they’re like, well, I’m going to go and defend them,” Peter Pomerantsev tells me, describing Ukrainian research into failed propaganda attempts.

The author of “How to Win an Information War” has spent years studying both Soviet disinformation and Western attempts to counter it. His latest book, just translated into Ukrainian, resurrects Sefton Delmer, a forgotten genius who ran Britain’s “black propaganda” operations against Nazi Germany.

What Delmer understood—and what Ukraine is rediscovering—is that authoritarian propaganda doesn’t work through logic. It works through permission.

The inner pig dog strategy

Delmer called it appealing to the “inner pig dog”—that part of human nature that’s selfish, greedy, and looking for an excuse to save its own skin.

While the BBC broadcast noble appeals to German democracy, Delmer’s radio stations told Germans it was fine to be corrupt because their officers were stealing everything anyway. Why die for these scum?

“He’d never say that, though,” Pomerantsev explains.

One of Delmer’s most successful creations was “Der Chef,” a fake German radio station that posed as an underground voice of disgusted German soldiers. Der Chef would rail against SS corruption with stories so scandalous they became irresistible. When the Nazis converted the monastery of Münsterschwarzach into a military hospital, Der Chef spun a lurid fantasy:

“Two hundred SS men marched into the monastery… A bawdy house was made out of the monastery for the SS men and their whores. The holy mass gowns are used as sheets, and the women wear precious lace tunics made out of choir robes with nothing underneath them… Like this, they go into the chapel and drink liquor out of the holy vessels…”

Der Chef was outraged at such blasphemy—but always returned to these topics, the way tabloids show disgust at depravity while giving readers an excuse to enjoy it.

But Delmer’s genius wasn’t just in the sensational content.

His operations provided genuinely useful information to Germans—warnings about which districts would be bombed, updates on cities that had been struck, so soldiers could take guaranteed leave to help their families.

The stations posed as German broadcasts, so listeners wouldn’t get in trouble if overhead. They treated Germans as human beings, even while subverting them.

“His radio shows were full of pornography, aggression, a lot of color. It was definitely more than the BBC. It was very tabloid and really rather remarkable,” Pomerantsev explains.

But Delmer’s method was always indirect: “He tells stories about people deserting and we’ll always be like, how horrendous, these traitors are deserting, and give details how they desert with the intention of making people want to desert.”

The parallels to Russia today are striking. Ukrainian research has found similar patterns:

“Several research groups have found the same thing—that the most effective messaging is around the rise of crime rates in Russia to undermine the desire of people to send their families to the war,” Pomerantsev notes.

The crime messaging works because it targets what Putin supporters actually value:

• Order and stability – Rising crime rates suggest Putin’s “strong hand” is failing
• Personal safety – Stories about criminals in the army threaten families directly
• Elite competence – Military chaos reflects broader governmental failure

“People who support the war the most are very authoritarian. They want Putin’s strong hand. They want order,” Pomerantsev explains. “The idea that chaos is growing because of the war undermines their entire worldview.”

Why facts bounce off

Delmer worked with Cambridge’s first professor of psychoanalysis to understand Nazi psychology. They identified three elements that make authoritarian propaganda work:

• Identification with the leader – Leaders who normalize aggression, sadism, and narcissism, creating what Pomerantsev calls “a carnival of evil feelings”
• Toxic collective identity – A sense of superiority over others based on supremacism
• Ersatz agency – The illusion of control when people actually have none

“The less control we have over our lives, the more propaganda we need,” Pomerantsev quotes Delmer as observing.

This explains why showing Russians their casualties backfires. In an authoritarian mindset, those deaths demand vengeance, not reflection. Appeals to humanity assume a moral framework that propaganda has already dismantled.

“It’s not that he didn’t believe in facts. He just wanted to find the facts that worked for his aims,” Pomerantsev notes about Delmer’s approach.

“I don’t think there’s an important democratic movement in Germany to support,” Delmer concluded about Nazi Germany.

The same pragmatism should guide effective operations against Russia today. As opposed to the current Western strategy of supporting Russian opposition media, which can influence only 11% of critically-minded Russians, disruptive propaganda operations should focus on themes that resonate with authoritarian mindsets rather than moral appeals.

Pomerantsev’s research reveals the psychological mechanism behind this.

Working with teams in Russia, he found “the largest correlation between being ready to send your kids to die in the war is to do with belief in Russian supremacism”—the conviction that Russia is superior to others while simultaneously being victimized by them.

When Russians are primed with messages reinforcing this supremacist-victim narrative, their support for war actually increases. However, other messages do work: those hinting at rising crime inside the army and China humiliating Russia.

For Russians who actively support Putin (55% of the population), messaging about personal safety could undermine war support

For Russians who are passive loyalists, (34 % of the population), messages suggesting China’s advantage over Russia decrease war support

It is precisely these kind of messages that Ukraine is using in successful offensive propaganda operations against Russia, Pomerantsev suggests, hinting at the presentation of his book in Kyiv that the Delmers of today are sitting in the room, incognito.

The resource problem

The tragedy is that Ukraine knows what works but lacks the resources to scale it.

“Delmer had the backing of a state which allowed him to experiment,” Pomerantsev points out. “He had a team of hundreds of people working in this beautiful vast country estate outside of London. He managed to persuade the government to give him the most powerful radio transmitter in the world.”

Ukraine has no such luxury. While fighting for survival, it can barely manage domestic information space, let alone mount the massive multimedia campaign needed to truly destabilize Russian mobilization.

“If we were fighting this war as we did the war on terror, we would have set up dozens of radio stations like in Afghanistan,” Pomerantsev notes.

“We had huge information operations during our intervention in Iraq. If we were doing this, it would be such a key element of what we were doing. But we want to undermine mobilization, we say we want to slow down Russia’s war machine, and we haven’t done the ABCs of undermining mobilization and military morale. It just shows you how fundamentally pathetic Ukraine’s partners are.”

The Kremlin’s real fear

What would work if resources were available? Pomerantsev outlines the pressure points that actually worry the Kremlin:

• Putin’s approval rating – Which collapsed to under 60% during Ukraine’s Kursk operation
• Economic stability – The ruble’s weakness, rising short-term loan defaults, a growing credit crisis
• Military compensation – Soldiers’ families not getting paid, creating resentment
• Elite loyalty – Growing mistrust between different power centers
• China’s reliability – Deep anxiety about Beijing potentially abandoning Moscow

“Any attempt to deter Russia has to be linked into their sense of control,” he argues.

The Kremlin’s leadership remains traumatized by how quickly the Soviet system collapsed. When they sense loss of control, they retreat.

The Kursk incursion proved this. Putin’s rating plummeted. The government panicked, posting and deleting contradictory messages. That was the moment to pile on pressure—NATO exercises, shadow fleet blockades, secondary sanctions. Add coordinated information operations targeting those specific vulnerabilities.

Instead, nothing.

Beyond good and evil

Delmer’s approach offends our democratic sensibilities. He promoted desertion, normalized corruption, used pornography to grab attention.

His radio shows were, by his own admission, an exercise in encouraging Germans to be “bad.”

“I think we have to think very carefully when we think about good and bad in politics,” Pomerantsev reflects. “If you’re stimulating someone to think for themselves, if you’re provoking them to act for themselves, if you’re provoking them to break through a kind of passivity which has been fed to them by authoritarian propaganda—I think that’s good.”

He sees Delmer’s work as fundamentally liberating:

“I think at the core of it was a deeply anti-authoritarian project because in stimulating people to think and act for themselves, he was giving them a way to break through authoritarian psychology.”

The Nazis used the language of nobility and sacrifice to enable genocide. Delmer used the language of greed and self-interest to stimulate individual thinking. When you’re deserting or stealing from your factory, you’re reclaiming agency from an authoritarian system.

As Pomerantsev puts it:

“The Nazis used the language of noble and the nation and sacrifice in order to enable genocide and rape, while Delmer was using the language of naughtiness, greed, corruption, sexual hanky-panky in order to stimulate good.”

The inversion is profound: Nazis told Germans they would be good by doing very bad things, while Delmer told Germans to be bad, achieving a very good thing.

This isn’t about making Russians good people. It’s about making them bad soldiers.

Radio then, full-spectrum now

If Delmer were alive today, he wouldn’t pick just one channel.

“We live in a multimedia age, so you need everything and you need scale,” Pomerantsev explains. “You’d be using radio, you’d be using satellite TV where it’s relevant, some of the great things the Ukrainians do—hacking into Russian local TV and playing content. You want all of those. You want to have a sense that you’re everywhere. Robo calls, SMSs, everything. You’re using everything and you’re thinking how they work together to create a full spectrum movement.”

As Pomerantsev puts it: “The Ukrainians are doing a lot, and I think, like with Delmer, we’ll find out after the war.”

The question is whether Ukraine’s partners will provide the resources for a real information offensive before it’s too late. Because knowing what works means nothing if you can’t execute it at scale.

Facts don’t defeat propaganda. But appealing to fear, greed, and self-preservation might. Delmer knew it. Ukraine has proven it.

The pig dog is waiting.

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