A global law enforcement campaign has dealt a blow to the pro-Russian cyber army known as NoName057(16). Europol confirmed that about 20 countries helped dismantle the network behind thousands of attacks on Ukraine’s supporters.

Europol targets ideological cyber group tied to Russia’s war

Europol reported that between 14 and 17 July, authorities from 12 countries launched Operation Eastwood. Europol and Eurojust coordinated the joint crackdown. The effort reportedly dismantled major parts of the pro-Russian cyber army’s infrastructure, including hundreds of systems.

Germany issued six arrest warrants for suspects based in Russia. Two are accused of leading the group’s activities. Spain issued another arrest warrant. France and Spain also reported one arrest each. All suspects are internationally wanted.

Authorities carried out 24 house searches and questioned 13 individuals across Europe. In Spain alone, 12 searches took place. Investigators also notified over 1,000 individuals believed to support the cyber group. Fifteen of them were administrators.

Attacks tied to political and military events across Europe

Other attacks struck during the European elections. Swedish government and banking websites were affected. In Switzerland, NoName057(16) launched attacks in June 2023, during a speech by Ukraine’s president to the Joint Parliament. Another wave occurred in June 2024 during the Peace Summit for Ukraine at Bürgenstock.

The most recent attack linked to the group targeted the NATO summit held in the Netherlands in June 2025. Europol notes that although the attacks caused disruption attempts, none led to substantial outages.

Recruitment tactics built on crypto rewards and gamified propaganda

Europol identifies NoName057(16) as an ideological cyber network that operated without formal leadership. The group recruited mostly Russian-speaking sympathizers, many with little technical knowledge. Its structure relied heavily on gamified propaganda and incentives.

Volunteers received cryptocurrency payments and recognition through online shout-outs, badges, and leaderboards. Europol notes this method especially appealed to younger users who felt emotionally involved in Russia’s political narratives.

To simplify participation, NoName057(16) distributed guides and tools like DDoSia. Europol also launched a prevention campaign warning suspected supporters of their criminal liability, delivered via the same communication platforms.

A Ukrainian soldier could have gone on a date after meeting someone on Telegram. But before the meeting, he was asked to do a “small favor,” which could have turned deadly if not for law enforcement.

 
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), together with the National Police, thwarted a terrorist attack planned by an FSB agent network. One of the plots involved a fake “romantic date” in Dnipro.

A pair of Russian agents gained the trust of the Ukrainian soldier. Through Telegram, they suggested he meet with the “sister of a fellow soldier.” Before the date, the girl asked him to pick up her brother’s belongings from her friend.

“In reality, it was an accomplice who handed the soldier a bag containing explosives,” the SBU reported.

Afterward, Russian agents tried to detonate the device remotely, but it was defused in time.

It was just one of at least five terrorist attacks planned by them inside Ukraine.

• In Kyiv, two drug addicts tried to plant explosives near a military facility. They were coordinated from a detention center by an inmate who recruited his cellmate and two more accomplices.
• In Vinnytsia, a 19-year-old individual from Zhytomyr Oblast was detained while planting explosives near an apartment building housing military families.
• In Rivne, a terrorist hid explosives inside a soldier’s service vehicle and installed a surveillance camera.

Russian intelligence recruited all perpetrators via Telegram channels advertising “easy money.” According to the SBU, each attack attempt came with promises of financial reward.

All suspects have been charged with state treason, sabotage, and terrorism. They face life imprisonment and confiscation of property.

Russia’s manpower crisis is forcing the Kremlin to rely on covert recruiting networks, where volunteer fighters in mercenary structures are seen as “expendable manpower,” according to leaked recordings cited by RFE/RL.

“Second-rate infantry” in Russia’s strategy

In a conversation leaked late last year, Russian lawmaker Aleksandr Borodai described non-army recruits as “second-rate infantry.” He said their task is to exhaust Ukrainian troops before regular Russian forces attack. In the same recording, he referred to them as “expendable manpower.”

The statement highlights how Russia increasingly treats irregular fighters — often recruited through unregulated or covert systems — as disposable assets in a war now approaching 1 million Russian casualties, according to estimates.

With the memory of the September 2022 “partial mobilization” still fresh, and public opposition strong, the Kremlin is avoiding new mandatory call-ups. Instead, it relies on shadow recruitment structures to sustain frontline numbers without triggering mass unrest.

GRU-controlled Redut and Dobrokor feed the front with mercenaries

Systema, RFE/RL’s Russian investigative unit, reveals that both the Redut and Dobrokor networks are controlled by the GRU, Russia’s main military intelligence agency. The structures are designed to enlist men and women under the guise of “volunteer formations” — but operate effectively as mercenary pipelines.

Unlike Russia’s Defense Ministry contracts, which extend until Russia ends its war in Ukraine, mercenary contracts through Redut or Dobrokor have fixed terms — usually six to twelve months — and do not renew automatically.

Recruits through Dobrokor sign formal contracts and receive legal military status. Monthly pay starts at $2,600. In exchange, they cannot leave before their contract ends without risking prosecution for desertion. Mediazona reported that over 20,000 desertion cases had already reached Russian courts as of May.

Redut: cash, secrecy, and no legal existence

Redut, by contrast, operates in a legal gray zone. It does not require fitness screening, accepts people with criminal records, and allows early departure. It attracts recruits by offering cash payments, which can be hidden from creditors, courts, or ex-spouses.

However, Redut mercenaries are not legally considered military personnel. They are ineligible for state compensation, hospital treatment, or veteran status.

“From a legal point of view, you don’t exist,” a recruiter for the Nevsky unit told Systema, adding: “There’s no service, nothing: No hospitals, no rehabilitation, nothing.”

Redut also provides no gear or uniforms up front. One recruiter told RFE/RL that new fighters are given 50,000 rubles ($640) only with their third paycheck — assuming they survive that long.

Small bonuses, big risks

The Russian Defense Ministry offers up to $46,000 in signing bonuses for official contracts. Dobrokor pays far less — often $640–$1,280. Redut mercenaries get no regional bonus at all.

Despite these risks and limitations, thousands continue to join. Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed over 210,000 people signed military contracts in the first half of 2025. Another 18,000 joined so-called “volunteer” formations — a term now widely used to mask informal, often unregulated mercenary service.

Janis Kluge of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs estimates the actual number of contract soldiers may be closer to 190,000.