Ukrainian firm Fire Point is building 100 FP-1 attack drones every day. That’s … a lot of drones.

Building thousands of FP-1s and other long-range attack drones a month, Ukraine is coming close to matching Russia’s own production of Shahed attack drones.

Meanwhile, Fire Point is also building new Flamingo cruise missiles (also known as FP-5s), adding reach and punch to Ukraine’s escalating campaign of deep strikes targeting air bases, factories, oil refineries and other strategic facilities inside Russia.

“Ukraine is increasingly taking the war to Russia now,” American-Ukrainian war correspondent David Kirichenko wrote in a new essay for The Atlantic Council.

The FP-1 production ramp-up, first reported by the Associated Press, is just part of Ukraine’s deep strike build-up. With German financing, Ukrainian industry is also churning out An-196 attack drones, pilotless sport planes modified to drop bombs and Bars “cruise missile drones,” among many other strike munitions.

More drones than expected

Back in December, Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced Ukraine would acquire 30,000 one-way attack drones in 2025. But the accelerating ramp-up means Ukraine will almost certainly exceed that target—by a lot. FP-1 production alone could exceed 36,000 units this year.

Russia’s sprawling drone factory in Yelabuga, 1,200 km from Ukraine, assembles around 5,000 Shahed attack drones every month. The 200-kg drones, each ranging thousands of kilometers under satellite navigation, have become Russia’s most important strike munitions as Ukrainian raids have destroyed much of the Russian air force bomber fleet with its air-launched cruise missiles.

The Shaheds are priced to move at as little as $50,000 per copy, compared to millions of dollars for just one of Russia’s best Kh-101 cruise missiles. The low price translates into bigger deliveries and denser swarms of Shaheds clouding the skies over Ukrainian cities.

There are so many Shaheds over Ukraine on a nearly daily basis that Ukrainian air defense crews struggle to intercept them in ways that don’t deplete Ukraine’s munitions stocks and shatter its finances. “The Kremlin is willing to lose many Shaheds—about 75% of attacks fail—because mass waves are designed to exhaust air-defense systems,” noted “Alchemist,” the head of the Night Watch electronic warfare team in Kyiv.

Now Ukraine can vex Russia with the same problem. As drone deliveries rise and efficiencies increase, the cost goes down. An FP-1 now costs just $55,000. It’s possible the An-196 and other Ukrainian deep-strike munitions are also dropping in price. The result should be a beneficial cycle of increasing orders that further reduce costs as efficiencies accumulate.

The bottom line: Ukraine is already pummeling Russia with thousands of drones a month and inflicting more damage, more widely. “Based on my observations and the data we have collected with the team over the past two months, there has been a noticeable increase in the effectiveness of hits,” reported “Tatarigami,” the head of the Frontelligence Insight analysis group in Ukraine.

Worse is coming for Russia: more Ukrainian drones and, soon, many more of the new Flamingo missiles. Where an FP-1 might motor 1,000 km with a 50-kg warhead, a Flamingo jets a whopping 3,000 km with a 1,000-kg warhead. Fire Point told the Associate Press it aims to ramp up to building seven of the giant missiles every day no later than October.

Explore further

Ukraine just solved the hardest math problem in modern air defense – with a 1970s German gun

After three weeks of hard fighting, the Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps and adjacent units have squeezed and cut up the 15-km salient that Russian infiltrators carved out of Ukrainian territory near the the village of Dobropillya, northeast of the fortress town of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast.

But Russian reinforcements are rolling in, opening a new—and unpredictable—phase in the battle for the Dobropillya salient. “The enemy’s penetration near Dobropillya remains a dynamic section on the front line where neither side can seize the initiative,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies noted.

It’s more apparent than ever that the Russian penetration toward Dobropillya, which sits astride one of two main supply roads into besieged Pokrovsk, was bigger and more dangerous than some analysts initially concluded.

Explore further

Robot counterattack! Ukraine rolls gun-‘bots into brutal Pokrovsk battle.

“Let’s start by describing what this absolutely is not: a breakthrough,” US analyst Andrew Perpetua asserted on Aug. 12. In fact, it was a breakthrough, albeit one that mostly moved at a walking pace.

Over a period of several months, the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army redeployed almost all of its brigades northeast of Pokrovsk, including the 1st, 5th, 9th, 110th and 132nd Motor Rifle Brigades. While the 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade slipped past empty Ukrainian trenches and marched on Dobropillya, the other four brigades attacked toward Rodynsky, at the bottom of the eventual salient.

Heavy Russian losses

The scale of the Ukrainian response, and the resulting spike in Russian losses, underscored the seriousness of the situation for Kyiv. If it had captured Dobropillya, the 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade would’ve cut the T0515 road, leaving the Ukrainian garrison in Pokrovsk dependent on just one other road threading into the town from the northwest—a road that itself is in danger of being overrun.

In addition to the 1st Azov Corps, Ukraine redeployed elements from the 79th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades, 1st and 425th Assault Regiments, 25th Assault Battalion, 2nd Battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade, 32nd and 93rd Mechanized Brigades, 38th Marine Brigade, 14th National Guard Brigade and the Birds of Magyar drone brigade.

It’s a powerful Ukrainian force. And in the first few weeks of its counterattack, it enjoyed a decisive advantage in troops, tanks, armed ground robots and drones. The 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade’s troopers had marched toward Dobropillya “only with weapons in their hands,” Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelenskyy said.

Between Aug. 4 and 20, the Ukrainian corps killed, wounded or captured nearly 1,600 Russians, according to the the Ukrainian general staff in Kyiv. That’s nearly the entire front-line strength of the 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade.

But a few Russian survivors are still clinging to positions in Zolotyi Kolodyaz, at the top of the salient, and now the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army is deploying additional forces at the bottom of the salient.

Despite heavy losses and the near-destruction of its initial penetration toward Dobropillya, the 51st Combined Arms Army isn’t defeated—and probably won’t give up. The army “will try to advance as deeply as possible to Dobropillya,” CDS predicted.

And if it manages to finally capture the village, CDS predicted the 51st Combined Arms Army could “sharply worsen the prospects for the defense of not only Dobropillya and Pokrovsk, but also Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka” on the other side of the salient.

Explore further

Russian infiltrators near Pokrovsk are about to get the tank treatment

Russian infantry slipped past Ukrainian defenses around the city of Kupiansk, in Kharkiv Oblast, on or before Tuesday. A Ukrainian tank, presumably from the 116th Mechanized Brigade, rolled right up to the half-demolished building the Russians were sheltering in—and blasted them at point-blank range.

It’s the latest instance of Ukrainian tanks engaging, and defeating, under-supported Russian infantry in a close fight. But it’s an ominous development for Ukraine. The brutal, zero-distance skirmish took place in Kupiansk, a town with a pre-war population of 25,000 and a key strongpoint anchoring Ukrainian defenses just 90 km east of Kharkiv and its millions of residents.

Russian infantry weren’t supposed to appear inside Kupiansk, some 6 km from what most mappers consider the “front line” in Kharkiv Oblast.

The problem, of course, is that the front isn’t really a line anymore. “The reality is that there isn’t a coherent front line,” American analyst Andrew Perpetua explained.

Instead, there’s a wide no-man’s land between areas of clear Russian and Ukrainian control. That no-man’s-land is largely depopulated except for scattered—and carefully concealed—underground fighting positions for a few harried infantry.

Drones are everywhere all the time. Indeed, the drones—their relentless surveillance and attacks—are why the infantry are so spread out and scared. And why the front line is so indistinct.

This new reality defies the traditional language of wartime reporting. Terms like “front line,” “encirclement” and “breakthrough” have largely lost their meaning. Especially considering Ukraine’s desperate manpower shortage. Kyiv’s roughly 130 combat brigades may be short around 100,000 trained infantry.

Thin front line

“The front line is so thinned out that full-scale encirclements in the traditional sense are unlikely to occur again,” the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team observed. “Instead, the opposing forces are more likely to ‘slip’ through each other’s positions.”

“The front line is actually relatively porous, and there are often fewer than 10 soldiers defending every kilometer of the front, depending on the terrain,” noted analyst Rob Lee from the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. “Many Ukrainian brigades have adopted a different approach to defense where their infantry deliberately try to avoid engaging.”

Instead of actively fighting, the infantry watch for approaching Russians—and relay the coordinates to nearby drone teams. Where in previous conflicts, drones spotted targets for the infantry, in this conflict the roles are reversed.

The porous front line makes infiltration easier and exploitation harder. To “advance,” Russian regiments can “take two men dressed in cloaks to hide their thermal signature,” Perpetua explained. “They are led by a drone through a specified path, the drone ensuring their security and camouflage.”

“These infantry move up into positions and lie in wait, being resupplied by Molniya [drones],” Perpetua added. “They ambush opportunistically, and kill anyone—namely civilians—who threaten to give away their position.”

“Russia then moves up another pair and another pair and another pair to accumulate forces in exacting, specified positions,” Perpetua wrote. “The entire operation is directed from above, the people involved have no initiative. In some cases, once a route has enough of these small rifle teams, they push forward a larger group of light infantry.”

That Ukrainian tank may have interrupted the Russians in Kupiansk before they could accumulate enough troops secure a lodgement. “Ukrainian defense forces defending in the city have counterattacked the enemy that had penetrated the area several times and pushed the enemy back,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies reported.

But the Russians have been probing Kupiansk for a while now—and they’re sure to continue as they leverage their manpower advantage over Ukraine’s depleted brigades. “Provided current dynamics of combat operations are maintained, the enemy will be able to capture Pokrovsk by autumn, Kostyantynivka and Kupiansk by the end of the year,” CDS predicted.

In the late 1970s, Soviet officials tapped the Kirovsky Design Bureau in Saint Petersburg to develop a reconnaissance and command vehicle for nuclear warfare: a sealed, self-contained and thickly-armored turret-less tank with remote cameras and its own oxygen supply.

The Ladoga recon and command vehicle wasn’t just nuke-proof. It was also weirdly cozy.

Kirovsky produced just a handful of the tracked vehicles—maybe four or five. One spent some time in the irradiated zone around the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, in northern Ukraine, following the plant’s catastrophic meltdown in 1986. Aside from another that ended up in a museum, the Ladogas then simply disappeared.

Until March 2024, that is—when a Ukrainian drone spotted, and struck, what appeared to be a Ladoga rolling toward Ukrainian lines near the Kreminna Forest in eastern Ukraine. Seventeen months later, another—or the same—Ladoga appeared at a repair yard somewhere in the Russian occupation zone.

It’s possible half the Ladogas Kirovsky produced—and the majority that aren’t on display or badly irradiated—have made their way to Ukraine.

It’s no secret why. The Kremlin is struggling to generate enough combat vehicles—either through new production or by fetching older vehicles from long-term storage—to make good the loss of new fewer than 22,500 vehicles and other heavy equipment along the 1,100-km front line of Russia’s 42-month wider war on Ukraine.

The “de-mechanization” of what was once arguably the world’s leading mechanized military helps to explain why some very strange vehicles have showed up along the front line. Armored vehicles are much less important in Russian doctrine as front-line regiments have shifted to harder-to-detect infantry and motorcycle assaults.

Vehicular oddities

The de-mechanization of the Russian military doesn’t mean Russia is losing wider war on Ukraine. It does mean the Russian military may struggle to exploit its battlefield victories against manpower-starved Ukrainian brigades. Russian infantry might find gaps in Ukrainian defenses. But there are precious few Russian armored vehicles on hand to rush through the gaps—and drive deep behind Ukrainian lines.

At the same time, unarmored Russian attacks are vulnerable to armored Ukrainian counterattacks. It’s telling that, after a brigade of Russian infantry marched through empty Ukrainian trenches northeast of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine a few weeks ago, the infiltrators clung to their 15-km salient only as long as it took a powerful Ukrainian force to mobilize its tanks and other heavy forces for a devastating counterattack.

To whatever extent Russian troops still ride under armor, they increasingly ride in vehicular oddities that, pre-war, resided in museums—or were totally unimaginable. The Ladoga may belong to both categories. It combines the armored hull of a T-80 tank with a 1,250-horespower gas-turbine engine and a voluminous crew compartment seating four or so people in padded armchairs.

The Ladoga has a mast-mounted television camera and a full suite of radios that would have allowed the vehicle to work in a doomsday command role. Imagine Soviet leaders speeding to safety inside a Ladoga, directing their own nuclear forces as NATO’s own nukes rain down.

Now imagine some Russian colonel commanding his battalion from a Ladoga’s cozy interior during an attack on Ukrainian forces around Kreminna or Pokrovsk. Or, equally likely, Russian infantry using the Ladoga as an improvised assault vehicle.

The tiny force of Ladogas got a workout around Chernobyl but never performed its primary role in an atomic apocalypse. Surely no one at Kirovsky imagined an aged Ladoga or two would eventually find a way to the front line of a non-nuclear war in 2024 and 2025.

But then, it’s hard to imagine the engineers in Saint Petersburg 50 years ago could anticipate Russia losing 22,500 armored vehicles in just three and a half years in a war with, of all countries, Ukraine.

Explore further

Russian infiltrators near Pokrovsk are about to get the tank treatment

Thanks to your incredible support, we’ve raised 70% of our funding goal to launch a platform connecting Ukraine’s defense tech with the world – David vs. Goliath defense blog. It will support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and we are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support.

We’re one final push away from making this platform a reality.

Join us in building this platform on Patreon

The Flamingo, a product of Kyiv-based manufacturer Fire Point, weighs in a staggering 6,000 kg. That’s four times what the American Tomahawk cruise missile weighs. The rocket-propelled Flamingo should be able to haul a 1,000-kg warhead over a distance of 3,000 km while under satellite and inertial guidance.

Speeding along at 950 km/hr, the ramp-launched missile should be able to avoid all but the best Russian air defenses. Ranging twice as far as the best current Ukrainian deep-strike munitions, and with a warhead that several times heavier, the Flamingo has the potential to significantly escalate Ukraine’s strategic bombardment campaign targeting Russian factories, air bases and oil refineries.

While the Flamingo’s existence has long been rumored, it wasn’t until this weekend that Associated Press journalist Efrem Lukatsky confirmed it—with a photo of two of the huge missiles on their trailers at a workshop somewhere in Ukraine.

Explore further

Why is Russia bombing Ukraine with 1990s-era training drones?

If the Flamingo looks familiar, it’s because it’s apparently a development of the FP-5 missile from Emirati firm Milanion. The FP-5 itself seems to borrow heavily from a missile with a storied history in Soviet and Ukrainian service: the Tupolev Tu-141.

The 5,400-kg Tu-141 was a reconnaissance drone—a product of the Kharkiv Aviation Plant in Ukraine. Ranging 1,000 km under inertial guidance at a top speed of 1,000 km/hr, it carried cameras instead of explosives. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it left potentially dozens of Tu-141s behind in Ukraine along with the type’s assembly line.

A few of the 50-year-old Tu-141s were still flyable when Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022. Enterprising Ukrainian technicians got to work repairing the old drones, testing their engines and replacing with cameras with warheads. They may also have added modern satellite navigation to complement or replace their old analogue inertial computers.

Crude cruise missiles

The rebuilt Tu-141s were some of Ukraine’s first deep-strike munitions. Following a difficult teething period that resulted in at least two Tu-141s crashing, the remaining drones attacked. On Oct. 7, 2022, Ukrainian drones—possibly Tu-141s—struck Shaykovka Air Base, 200 km from the Ukrainian border. There were reports of damage to two Tupolev Tu-22M bombers.

Subsequent drones raids on Dec. 5, 2022—possibly also the work of Tu-141s—targeted the bomber bases at Engels-2 and Dyagilevo, both 600 km from Ukraine. More drones hit Engels-2 on Dec. 26, 2022. By March 2023, the last few Tu-141s had crashed or been shot down, it seems. Soon, much more modern drones replaced the Tu-141s as Ukraine struck more targets inside Russia.

But these modern drones lack range and striking power. Arguably the best Ukrainian deep-strike drone, the propeller-driven, satellite-guided Ukroboronprom An-196, ranges 800 km with a 50-kg warhead. And it does so slowly, cruising at just 320 km/hr.

On the eve of Trump–Zelenskyy talks, Ukraine unveiled footage of its new Flamingo missile — 3,000 km range, 1,150 kg warhead, now in mass production and used against targets in Russia.

Defense Minister Shmyhal: “This is very powerful, long-range weaponry — and it’s here.”… pic.twitter.com/N0f8YMgzVB

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) August 18, 2025

With their limited range and small warheads, the drones can damage the closest and most delicate Russian targets such as the distillation towers at oil refineries in western Russia. But they can’t do much to halt operations at bigger, more distant strategic facilities—for instance, the Shahed drone factory that sprawls across nearly 160,000 sq m in Yelabuga, 1,500 km from Ukraine.

A barrage of Flamingo missiles just might stand a chance of taking out the Shahed factory and similar hard targets. If Ukraine can afford to build the missiles in large numbers. It’s unclear how much a Flamingo costs, but it’s worth noting that most American and Russian cruise missiles set back their taxpayers more than $1 million per round.

It took German financing for Ukraine to ramp up production of the An-196, which costs around $200,000 per copy. Absent a big financial commitment from an ally, Kyiv may struggle to build up an arsenal of hundreds of Flamingos—which is what it might take to make a real dent in Russian industry in the regions currently beyond reach of Ukraine’s deep-strike munitions.

Explore further

Did Ukraine just unleash its first Bars cruise missiles? A 500 km strike deep inside Russia suggests it

Thanks to your incredible support, we’ve raised 70% of our funding goal to launch a platform connecting Ukraine’s defense tech with the world – David vs. Goliath defense blog. It will support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and we are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support.

We’re one final push away from making this platform a reality.

Join us in building this platform on Patreon

Fighting hard to roll back a dangerous Russian incursion around Pokrovsk, in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, the Ukrainian army’s 93rd Mechanized Brigade had a little help—from gun-armed ground robots.

“Ground-based robotic assault systems were used to liberate Ukrainian territories,” the brigade reported. “The robots, equipped with machine guns, fired at the enemy concentration, approaching practically at close range.”

It’s not an isolated incident. All along the 1,100-km front of Russia’s 42-month wider war on Ukraine, more Ukrainian units are deploying ground robots to assist, and in some cases replace, increasingly precious human troops. “These robots are entering logistics, evacuations, mine-clearing and even combat roles,” American-Ukrainian war correspondent David Kirichenko explained.

The 93rd Mechanized Brigade is part of a powerful Ukrainian force counterattacking around Pokrovsk a week after Ukrainian observers confirmed a dangerous Russian infiltration in the sector.

Marching right past empty Ukrainian trenches—an alarmingly common problem as the Ukrainian military struggles with serious manpower shortage—Russian infantry from the 51st Combined Arms Army infiltrated 15 km north of the porous front line and then pivoted west toward the village of Dobropillya, which lies 16 north of Pokrovsk and sits astride the T0515 road, one of two main supply routes into Pokrovsk.

The Russian infiltration, involving potentially thousands of troops from multiple battalions, was “aimed at completing the encirclement of the town of Pokrovsk and possibly Dobropillya, in order to compel Ukrainian forces to withdraw,” the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team noted.

It failed. This week, the Ukrainian national guard’s 1st Azov Corps rushed toward Pokrovsk and counterattacked. Army and air-assault brigades joined in as the Azov guardsmen cut across the 15-km-deep Russian salient in at least two places.

Explore further

Ukraine’s Leopard tanks rush to Pokrovsk—100,000 Russians wait to spring the trap

Search and strike

“Our search-and-strike operations have cleared the enemy” from six villages, the 1st Azov Corps announced. The multi-brigade corps, which at full strength can deploy tens of thousands of troops, claimed it killed 271 Russians, wounded 101 and captured 13.

“The enemy has also lost a considerable amount of equipment and weaponry,” the corps added. “This success was made possible through cohesive and well-coordinated action.” The 93rd Mechanized Brigade was part of that coordinated action. It focused its attention on two villages near Dobropillya: Gruzke and Vesele.

The brigade deployed a reconnaissance company, various types of unmanned systems and artillery. A video the unit posted online depicts drone strikes on Russian troops and vehicles—and the gun-armed ground robots rolling down paved roads and into residential yards, blasting left and right with their stabilized guns.

The robots give commanders options they wouldn’t have with human troops. “The vision of front-line commanders is to deploy robots across the front, for these ground robots to take on the greatest risk and most dangerous missions,” Kirichenko wrote.

Ground robots can take the place of human troops, helping mitigate the Ukrainian military’s deepening shortage in certain critical military specialties. US analyst Andrew Perpetua estimated the Ukrainians are short 100,000 trained infantry. It’s that shortage, and the empty trenches that result, that was probably the root cause of the Russians’ initial success marching on Dobropillya.

But that doesn’t mean the unmanned ground vehicle, or UGV, operations don’t require people. They do. “Deploying each UGV mission still needs a large team to manage everything,” Kirichenko explained. But at least that team, lodged in a fighting position potentially kilometers from the fighting, is relatively safe from Russian attack as it controls its ground robots via wireless radio or fiber-optic cable.

The 93rd Mechanized Brigade’s robotic counterattack was a triumph of technology as Ukraine races to preserve a tech edge over its much bigger invader. But it also belies a major problem. Owing to a serious lack of operational reserves, Kyiv had to poach units from potentially vulnerable sectors in order to build up a force powerful enough to defeat the Russian incursion near Pokrovsk.

The 93rd Mechanized Brigade had been holding the line south of Chasiv Yar, 50 km east of Dobropillya. The Russians are steadily advancing through Chasiv Yar as they attempt to squeeze the fortress town of Kostyantynivka.

Explore further

Russian infiltrators near Pokrovsk are about to get the tank treatment

Thanks to your incredible support, we’ve raised 70% of our funding goal to launch a platform connecting Ukraine’s defense tech with the world – David vs. Goliath defense blog. It will support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and we are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support.

We’re one final push away from making this platform a reality.

Join us in building this platform on Patreon

Russia is building hundreds of new T-90M tanks a year—enough to rebuild some of its battered tank regiments and establish an armored reserve for Russia’s wider war on Ukraine … or for some future war against NATO.

That’s the conclusion of a recent study by the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team. But there’s a problem. According to one expert, CIT is wrong. Sergio Miller, an analyst and former British Army intelligence officer, believes Russia is struggling to complete even 100 T-90Ms a year—and most of those it does complete are revamped T-90As rather than all-new vehicles.

Journalist David Hambling was the first to report on Miller’s claim.

It’s unclear, based on the available public evidence, who is right: CIT’s experts or Miller. But it matters. The scores of tanks CIT believes Russia is producing that Miller thinks are vaporware are enough to equip at least one armored regiment every year.

The 51-ton, three-person T-90M is heavily armored and boasts modern optics and a powerful 125-millimeter main gun. It’s one of the best tanks in the world.

Has there been a “dramatic fall-off” in tank production at Russia’s Uralvagonzavod tank factory, in Sverdlovsk Oblast 1,600 km from Ukraine, to borrow Hambling’s phrasing? Or is Uralvagonzavod churning out fresh tanks at a rate faster than any tank factory in a Western country?

“According to our estimates, Uralvagonzavod produced 60 to 70 T-90M tanks in 2022,” CIT reported. “In 2023, amid efforts to mobilize the defense industry, output may have increased to 140 to 180 tanks, and by 2024, it may have surpassed 200 units annually, possibly approaching a production rate of 250 to 300 tanks per year.”

The word “may” is doing a lot of work here, but it’s worth noting that CIT isn’t alone in perceiving an increasing rate of tank production. A few months ago, Czech analyst Jakub Janovksy concluded Uralvagonzavod has been building between 150 and 200 T-90Ms annually.

For comparison, the US Army’s own tank plant in Ohio, operated by General Dynamics Land Systems, has been producing just a few dozen M-1 Abrams tanks annually—down from 90 a year in the early 2020s.

To be fair to the Americans, they’re not mired in a costly war, and they plan to boost Abrams production with the introduction of a new variant in the coming years. At the same time, the Russian military has shifted to infantry-led assaults in Ukraine, and now deploys—and loses—just a few tanks every month.

That shift means any fresh tanks Russia produces—through new production or by fetching old Cold War tanks from long-term storage and upgrading them—can go toward replacing the roughly 4,000 tanks the Russians have lost in Ukraine. Unless the fighting in Ukraine shifts back to mechanized operations, this restored tank corps can be held in reserve for future conflicts.

Production freefall?

But that’s a moot point if Miller is right and Uralvagonzavod, or UVZ, isn’t building very many T-90Ms. “In total, UVZ only claimed to deliver 100 tanks in 2024,” Miller told Hambling. “I have no idea where the high figures quoted by some Western reporting come from. There is no evidence this is the case.”

In addition to taking Uralvagonzavod’s delivery announcements at face value, Miller scrutinized images of tank shipments in Russia to arrive at his lower production figure. So far this year, he concluded, Russia has completed 10 or fewer T-90Ms.

If Miller is right, Uralvagonzavod could be on track to deliver a fraction of the T-90Ms that Janovsky and CIT anticipate. With so few new tanks, the Kremlin would struggle to restore its depleted armored regiments.

Why T-90M production may be freefalling—if indeed it is—isn’t hard to guess. “Rather than being new builds, the ‘new’ T-90Ms seen in 2024 were in fact upgraded T-90As,” Hambling wrote. “Approximately 300 of the earlier version tanks were produced.”

“It is likely that all available T-90As were withdrawn and upgraded to the T-90M standard,” Hambling added. “In theory, UVZ is capable of producing new T-90Ms from scratch,” he added. But manufacturing a T-90M from the tracks up requires precise welding, which in turn requires a skilled workforce and attentive quality control.

Squeezed by sanctions and competing with the war in Ukraine for men, Uralvagonzavod may have labor and supply problems. “The dramatic fall-off suggests that after they ran out of T-90As to upgrade, UVZ has struggled to make new T-90Ms,” Hambling wrote.

We may not know who’s right about T-90M production unless and until Russia either re-deploys tanks to Ukraine in large numbers—or launches an armored assault on NATO’s eastern flank. Maybe it’s best not to know for now.

Explore further

Russia is churning out hundreds of new T-90M tanks — but why aren’t they all in Ukraine?

Ukrainian reinforcements are rushing to the Pokrovsk area in an urgent effort to defeat a Russian infiltration that threatens one of two main supply roads into the besieged city in Donetsk Oblast.

The reinforcements include one of Ukraine’s new multi-brigade corps—and at least one Leopard 1A5 tank.

The Ukrainian army’s 508th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalion—which retrieves, repairs and returns armored vehicles—loaded one of the 40-ton, four-person Leopard 1A5 tanks onto a heavy transport truck and hauled the tank into the Pokrovsk sector under the cover of darkness on Wednesday.

“We’ve been a little quiet the last few days,” the battalion stated on social media, “but another Leopard 1A5 with full ammunition … is successfully delivered to one of the hottest places [in the] Pokrovsk direction.”

Explore further

Ukraine deploys Leopard 1A5 “sniper tanks” with 7 brigades

It’s obvious where the German-made tank wound up: somewhere along the roughly 10-km front stretching from Rodynske in the south to Nove Shakhove in the north. That front, just northeast of Pokrovsk, is the current locus of the fighting after Russian troops slipped past under-manned—or entirely empty—Ukrainian trenches last week and hooked left to threaten Dobropillya, which sits astride the T0515 road threading into Pokrovsk.

Two of the seven Ukrainian brigades that operate the 1980s-vintage—but heavily upgraded and up-armored—Leopard 1A5s are holding the line around Dobropillya: the national guard’s 4th Rubizh Brigade and the army’s 142nd Mechanized Brigade.

Each brigade probably owns a dozen Leopard 1A5s out of 170 that a German-Dutch-Danish consortium has pledged to Ukraine. Around 100 of the tanks have shipped; the Russians have knocked out at least 14 of them. Others have been damaged.

Repaired tank

It’s likely the Leopard 1A5 the 508th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalion sneaked into the Pokrovsk area was a damaged tank that the battalion fetched from the front line and fixed up at its workshop before hauling it back to its operator.

After losing around 4,000 tanks in action in the first 42 months of its wider war on Ukraine, Russia has all but ceased deploying heavy armor along the 1,100-km front line. Production of new T-90M tanks, and the restoration of old Cold War T-72s moldering in long-term storage, simply can’t make good all those losses.

Today, the Russians mostly attack on foot or on motorcycles, counting on these hard-to-spot and fast-moving forces to slip through thinly manned Ukrainian trenches and past Ukraine’s ever-present drones. The Ukrainians still use tanks, however, fearlessly rolling the hulking vehicles from their drone-proof dugouts for close fights with infiltrating Russians.

It’s not for no reason that, last month, Ukraine lost more tanks in action than Russia did—a first in this wider war.

Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelensky insisted the Russian infiltrators threatening Dobropillya marched north and then turned west “only with weapons in their hands.” They’re lightly armed and poorly supplied, potentially making them easy targets for tanks. Assuming, of course, the tanks can shrug off any Russian drones patrolling the Russian salient northeast of Pokrovsk.

There’s a good reason for the Ukrainian tankers to be optimistic. The Leopard 1A5 and Leopard 2A4 tanks that are helping to defend the Pokrovsk sector have proved that, with enough add-on armor, they can survive repeated drone strikes—and keep fighting.

Explore further

“No Russian tank would survive”: German Leopard 2A4 withstands 10 FPV drone strikes in Ukraine

The Ukrainian army and air force teamed up for a precise air strike on a concentration of Russian troops in Bakhmut—with a Sukhoi Su-27 fighter and a mysterious new surveillance drone.

The Aug. 11 raid targeted what the army’s 24th Mechanized Brigade described as “a temporary deployment site of enemy personnel” around 15 km from the front line in Donetsk Oblast.

The personnel were reportedly from Russia’s 98th Airborne Division. The division’s paratroopers have been fighting in Chasiv Yar—and slowly pushing Ukrainian troops out of the ruins of that front-line town.

The twin-engine, supersonic Su-27—one of dozens the Ukrainian air force inherited from the Soviet air force in 1991—probably struck the site with one of its new Western-supplied precision munitions: the French Hammer glide-bomb or American Joint Direct Attack Munition, which can also be fitted with wings for gliding attacks.

A glide bomb can range tens of kilometers when tossed in a fast climb. The combination of satellite guidance, glide kits and the toss-style release method helps Ukrainian pilots attack Russians behind the front line while also staying outside the range of many Russian air-defenses.

But distant strikes require help spotting targets—and then assessing the damage following the strike. For that, the 24th Mechanized Brigade deployed a previously unknown drone type. “You can see the work of the new Ukrainian fixed-wing drone ‘Privet-299,'” the brigade stated.

Aside from the fact it’s got fixed wings—as opposed to rotors—we know almost nothing about the Privet-299. Russian forces operate a “Privet-82” drone that may be broadly similar to the Ukrainian Private-299.

Plywood drone

The mostly plywood Privet-82, which costs just a few thousand dollars, ranges 50 km or farther with a 5-kg payload. Russian drone start-up Oko designed the Privet-82 to be inexpensive and easy to produce.

The Russian Privets are cheap enough to be single-use. Some Russian drone teams are even overloading their Privet-82s with 10-kg TM-62 anti-tank mines and flying them into Ukrainian targets. “This is basically Russia’s answer to the Ukrainian heavy bomber drones,” American analyst Andrew Perpetua observed.

It’s unclear whether the Ukrainian Privet-82 is strictly a surveillance drone—or whether it too can be sent on one-way missions with an explosive payload. For now, we know the mysterious Privet-299 as an airborne spotter for manned fighter raids.

The Privet-299 could meet growing demand for medium-range attack drones.

At present, Ukraine’s FPV drones dominate the battlefield as far as 15 km from the line of contact. Efforts are underway to extend the drone kill zone to 40 km. “The goal: deny Russian forces the ability to move undetected across the front,” American-Ukrainian war correspondent David Kirichenko wrote.

The Privet-299 should range 40 km with a meaningful payload, filling a critical gap between the FPVs and Ukraine’s much bigger—and much more expensive—deep-strike drones, which range thousands of kilometers, but at a unit cost of potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Ultimately, the Ukrainians will seek to establish “layers of drone superiority,” Perpetua said. They’ll need slightly heavier, but still affordable, drone models to patrol layers 50 km and 100 km from the front line.

As it happens, the Russian Oko drone firm is developing a bigger Privet drone, the Privet-120, which should range 200 km with a 20-kg payload.

Explore further

Ukraine’s Liutyi drone warhead grew by 50%—at the cost of 400 km of range

Slipping past empty Ukrainian trenches northeast of the fortress city of Pokrovsk in recent weeks, Russian infantry quickly marched 15 km to the north. Now the Russians are threatening the village of Dobropillya, which sits astride one of two main supply lines into Pokrovsk.

“The development of the operational situation in the Dobropillya direction causes particular concern,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies warned. But you might know it reading the latest public social media post by Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, the Ukrainian commander-in-chief.

“Reported on the details of the operational situation at the front,” Syrsky wrote as the first reports of Russian troops in Dobropillya appeared online.

“It’s a tough one,” Syrsky wrote. “But the opponent is held back.”

The opponent is not held back. The Russian 51st Combined Arms Army’s foot- and motorcycle-borne breach of the Ukrainian line northeast of Pokrovsk has deepened fast. And for good reason: Ukraine is desperately short of trained infantry, largely owing to an inefficient and sometimes corrupt mobilization system.

In many sectors of the 1,000-km front line, as few as eight Ukrainian soldiers defend a 900-m length of trenches, according to the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team. Normally, at least 200 troops would defend that much of the front. It’s no wonder the Russians were able to simply walk past empty trenches in Donetsk Oblast.

At least one former officer is worried Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelensky doesn’t appreciate the scale of the problem—perhaps because he’s getting bad information. “I sincerely don’t know what exactly is being reported to you,” Bohdan Krotevych, who recently quit as the chief of staff of the Azov Brigade, wrote on social media, “but I’m informing you: on the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka line, without exaggeration, it’s complete chaos.”

Growing chaos

“And this chaos has been growing for a long time, worsening with each passing day,” Krotevych added. “The command structures currently being appointed (or already appointed) to ‘fix the unfixable’ will most likely be blamed for the chaos that’s already unfolding.”

“The systemic problem began with the depletion of reserves,” Krotevych claimed. Ukrainian brigades may have suffered thousands of casualties capturing a small swathe of Russia’s Kursk Oblast starting a year ago—and may have suffered hundred more while retreating form Kursk after their supply lines were severed by Russian drones seven months later in February.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s antiquated mobilization system has consistently failed to generate enough new troops. Today, the Ukrainian military’s roughly 130 combat brigades may be short around 100,000 infantry, according to analyst Andrew Perpetua.

Brigades that should have thousands of troops instead have hundreds. “The widespread fragmentation of units across the entire front line, reports of ‘captured villages’ being touted as victories amidst failures of entire sectors, the allocation of mobilization resources to ‘cronies’ and the complete lack of strategic or even operational vision” have combined to undermine Ukraine’s defenses, Krotevych wrote.

But not according to Syrsky. “Our combat units will become stronger by receiving additional funding from the state budget,” the commander-in-chief wrote.

Explore further

Ukraine’s Leopard tanks rush to Pokrovsk—100,000 Russians wait to spring the trap

The coal village Rodynske itself isn’t the objective. The objective is the much larger settlement, with a pre-war population of 60,000, that lies 10 km to the southwest: Pokrovsk, once an important transportation hub for Ukrainian forces in Donetsk.

“A larger push to seize Pokrovsk is expected, potentially with instructions to accelerate its capture” from the Kremlin, the Ukrainian Frontelligence Insight analysis group explained. “The Rodynske area remains a focal point.”

A powerful Russian force numbering 100,000 troops is determined to capture Pokrovsk. But the town is heavily defended by drones, artillery, infantry and even a few Leopard 2A4 tanks belonging to the bad-luck 155th Mechanized Brigade.

So instead, the Russians are trying to surround and cut off Pokrovsk. And that means capturing Rodynske—and then cutting west across the main north-south road, the T0515, threading past Dobropillya and Rodynske into Pokrovsk. There’s only one other main road into Pokrovsk, just west of the town—and it’s in danger of being overrun, too.

The Russian Center Group of Forces, including the 51st Combined Arms Army, spent a year marching on Pokrovsk from the ruins of Avdiivka, 40 km to the east. It was a costly march, and it ground to halt on Pokrovsk’s outskirts around the New Year. But the Kremlin mobilized hundreds of thousands of fresh troops, and deployed many of them to the Pokrovsk sector.

Speeding into battle on motorcycles or marching on foot, the Russians suffered horrendous casualties while probing Pokrovsk’s defenses. But the effort paid off last month, when the Russian 9th Motor Rifle Brigade or an adjacent unit finally found a wide gap in the Ukrainian line around Rodynske. The undermanned Ukrainian national guard brigades defending Rodynske fell back.

Now Rodynske itself is the main battleground. While the Russian air force’s KAB glide-bombs pummel the village, the 51st CAA waits for a chance to advance. “The command of the enemy’s Center Operational Grouping on the Pokrovsk direction completes preparatory actions, actively accelerating preparations for the assault on Pokrovsk,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies reported.

“Northeast of Pokrovsk, the enemy will continue attacks with the forces of the 51st Combined Arms Army in the direction of Rodynske from both Fedorivka and Razyne, at the same time trying to break through as close as possible to Dobropillya,” 65 km to the north, CDS added.

“As soon as the 51st Combined Arms Army blocks communications from Pokrovsk to Dobropillya, the enemy will proceed to assault Pokrovsk with the forces of the 41st and 2nd Combined Arms Armies.”

The push through Rodynske and then into Pokrovsk will be a bloody one for both sides, but especially for the Russians. “We anticipate a spike in Russian losses,” Frontelligence Insight explained, “but also the possibility of a faster tempo of advances.”

Reinforcements rush in

Aiming to delay Pokrovsk’s fall as long as possible, and inflict as many casualties as possible on the Russians in exchange for the town, the Ukrainian army has reinforced the area around Rodynske with elements of the 142nd Mechanized Brigade, which recently received German-made Leopard 1A5 tanks.

Even with reinforcements, the Ukrainian force in and around Pokrovsk is outnumbered by tens of thousands of troops. Where Russia has maintained its high pace of recruitment by spending lavishly on enlistment bonuses, Ukraine has struggled to recruit or draft enough new troops for its weary brigades.

The Russian military is actually slowly growing by around 9,000 soldiers a month as new recruits exceed casualties. The Ukrainian military, by contrast, is short around 100,000 trained infantry. As long as the Ukrainians are badly outnumbered on the Pokrovsk sector, the battle’s outcome is all but certain.

Rodynske will fall—and then Pokrovsk will, too.

But that doesn’t mean the Russians are galloping to victory in Ukraine. They’re struggling to merely capture the eastern Donbas region, of which Pokrovsk is just a small part. “We assess that a complete Russian takeover of Donbas in 2025 is very unlikely,” Frontelligence Insight stated. “Conditions around Kupiansk, Siversk and Lyman remain unfavorable for Ukrainian defenders, but Russian operational goals have not been met and progress is behind the timetable.”

Explore further

Ukraine deploys Leopard 1A5 “sniper tanks” with 7 brigades

Thanks to your incredible support, we’ve raised 70% of our funding goal to launch a platform connecting Ukraine’s defense tech with the world – David vs. Goliath defense blog. It will support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and we are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support.

We’re one final push away from making this platform a reality.

Join us in building this platform on Patreon

Ukraine’s deep strikes are becoming more destructive. The main reason, it seems, is the combination of a largely German-funded attack drone—and the powerful warhead, or warheads, it can carry.

As recently as last year, the Ukrainian military and its supporting agencies—in particular, the state security service, or SBU—struggled to make an impact with long-range drones. “More than half of the recorded strikes between September and February had limited impact,” Ukrainian analysis group Frontelligence Insight concluded in a March study.

But that’s changing as more and better drones with bigger and better-designed warheads strike more frequently many hundreds of kilometers inside Russia.

Tatarigami, Frontelligence Insight’s founder, recently sensed the change. “Based on an early look at several dozen hits over the past two weeks, both the success rate and damage from Ukrainian long-range drones have gone up compared to late 2024 [to] early 2025,” he wrote. “I haven’t put together the data set yet, but even at a glance, the results already look different.”

In recent weeks, Ukrainian drones have hit Russian airfields—destroying several warplanes and helicopters—while also blowing up key components of the refinery in Novokuibyshevsk, which accounts for around 3% of annual refining in Russia.

Explore further

One Ukrainian drone keeps smashing Russia’s top war factories—so Germany’s paying for 500 more

Thanks in large part to German largess, Ukrainian firm Ukroboronprom is building hundreds more of its best An-196 Liutyi attack drones than it had planned earlier this year.

According to German newspaper Die Welt, the government of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is providing around $100 million to pay for 500 of the propeller-driven, satellite-guided Liutyi drones. A Liutyi carries an approximately 50-kg warhead farther than 800 km. The $200,000 drone can follow a complex flight path and change altitude in order to avoid Russian air-defenses. 

Early Liutyi models may have had comparatively simple and light warheads. “One contributing factor” in the limited effectiveness of drone strikes in 2024 and early 2025, Frontelligence Insight concluded, “is the relatively small warhead size of certain Ukrainian drones, such as the Liutyi.”

For comparison, a Russian Shahed drone carries a 90-kg warhead.

It’s possible Ukroboronprom has been improving and enlarging the warhead on the An-196. Roy, a Canadian drone expert, recently observed a 60-kg OFB-60 warhead apparently recovered from the wreck of a crashed Liutyi. “The 60-kg high-explosive shaped-charge munition has a concave metal face for forming an … explosively formed projectile” that can punch through metal, Roy noted.

Warhead options

It’s not clear that all Liutyi drones have the 60-kg shaped-charge warhead. The drones are often described as carrying just 50 kg of explosives. It’s actually possible the drones can carry even bigger payloads. Missile expert Fabian Hoffman even claimed some An-196s are now packing 75-kg warheads.

A bigger warhead comes at a cost, however. “Given the long distances these [Ukrainian] drones must travel, increasing their warhead size would require adjustments to weight, fuel capacity and overall design,” Frontelligence assessed. In short, there’s a direct tradeoff. A bigger warhead means more destruction but a shorter range.

The reported recent development of a Liutyi model capable of traveling 2,000 km may imply some of the drones are carrying lighter warheads rather than heavier ones—trading away explosive payload in order to add fuel capacity.

So when Tatarigami senses Ukrainian drone strikes are becoming more destructive, there may be caveats. The most destructive raids might be the one striking closest to the Ukrainian border. Yes, a few An-196s or other drone types may range 2,000 km into Russia. But the ones dealing the real damage—potentially with the most powerful shaped-charge warheads—are probably hitting targets no more than 800 km from Ukraine.

Not coincidentally, SBU drones pummeled Saky air base in Russian-occupied Crimea on 3 August, reportedly destroying one Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jet and damaging another—and also damaging three Sukhoi Su-24 bombers. Saky is fewer than 300 km from the front line in southern Ukraine.

That’s well within range of a harder-hitting Liutyi drone.

Explore further

Putin built concrete castles for his bombers—Ukraine’s drones burned them down

After 42 months of grueling fighting in Ukraine, Russia’s stocks of modern armored vehicles are low. So low, in fact, that Russian technicians are pulling out of long-term storage derelict tanks that, until now, were widely considered unfit for combat.

Closely inspecting recent satellite imagery of Uralvagonzavod, the sprawling Russian tank plant in Nizhny Tagil 1,600 km from Ukraine, open-source analyst Jompy spotted something he’d long anticipated as Russian tank losses exceeded 4,000 earlier this year. That’s as many tanks as Russia had in front-line service before widening its war on Ukraine in February 2022.

“Just like that, there are a lot of likely T-72As parked in the yards outside UVZ now,” Jompy wrote, using the abbreviation for Uralvagonzavod. When tanks appear outside Uralvagonzavod, it’s usually because they’re gradually being brought inside the factory for refurbishment and possibly upgrade before being shipped off to front-line regiments, including those fighting in Ukraine.

Explore further

Russia’s last tank yards go dark as every inch in Ukraine demands more sacrifice

The 46-ton, three-person T-72A isn’t the oldest T-72 variant, but it’s close. Just one model of T-72, the Ural, preceded the T-72 into Soviet service in the early 1970s. Russian industry produced thousands of T-72 Urals and T-72As, but the much-improved T-72B—with a stabilized 125-millimeter gun, thicker armor and a more powerful engine—succeeded it in the 1980s.

The older T-72s went into storage at bases such as the 349th Tank Storage Base, in Russia’s Topchikhinsky District 2,000 km from Ukraine. And there they remained for decades, useful only as sources of spare parts—until Ukrainian mines, artillery, missiles and drones wiped out entire generation of more modern tanks.

Too few new tanks

With Uralvagonzavod building just 300 or so of the latest T-90M tanks annually, the Kremlin has had little choice but to dip into stocks of very old T-72s in order to partially replace its tank losses in Ukraine. The 40-year-old T-72Bs began arriving at Uralvagonzavod by the dozens earlier this year, but there were just a few hundred T-72Bs in storage. There are around 1,000 T-72 Urals and T-72As.

As recently as last summer, High Marsed—another open-source analyst—concluded the first-generation T-72s weren’t of much use as long as Russia still had some of the slightly newer (but still very old) T-80Bs, T-80BVs and T-72Bs in storage. “I expect that at some point they will have to create an upgrade program for these tanks,” High Marsed wrote about the T-72As. That “should be a sign that there aren’t many T-72B, T-80B/BV left in storage.”

The sign has appeared. The T-72Bs and other 1980s-vintage tanks are running out. Now it’s the T-72As’ turn to fight in Ukraine on those increasingly rare occasions when the Russians risk tanks along the drone-patrolled front line.

How many of the 1,000 or so rusty early-model T-72s are still repairable after decades in open storage is unclear. It’s equally unclear how much Russia will invest in their refurbishment and upgrade. The T-72As lack many of the features that makes a modern tank modern—in particular, stabilized main guns that are accurate even when a tank is moving.

Ukraine’s oldest front-line tanks, its Leopard 1A5s, were last upgraded in the 1980s—but even they have stabilized guns.

The T-72As’ impending return to front-line service is the latest evidence of the steady “de-mechanization” of the Russian army as it suffers catastrophic losses in heavy equipment in Ukraine. The T-72As’ resurrection doesn’t mean the Russians are losing, however. What the Russian army lacks in modern tanks, it more than makes up for with manpower.

These days, Russian regiments in Ukraine mostly attack on motorcycles or on foot. They suffer heavy losses usually totaling more than 20,000 killed and wounded a month. But with generous signing bonuses and deceptive contracts, the Kremlin manages to recruit 30,000 fresh troops a month.

They fight without modern tanks, but they still fight. And they can still push back Ukraine’s own manpower-starved brigades.

Explore further

Russia is churning out hundreds of new T-90M tanks — but why aren’t they all in Ukraine?

Thanks to your incredible support, we’ve raised 70% of our funding goal to launch a platform connecting Ukraine’s defense tech with the world – David vs. Goliath defense blog. It will support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and we are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support.

We’re one final push away from making this platform a reality.

Join us in building this platform on Patreon

According to aviation expert Tom Cooper, the Russian air force began Russia’s wider war on Ukraine in February 2022 with potentially just seven active Beriev A-50Us—four-engine Ilyushin Il-76 airlifters with radar radomes on their fuselages and stations for up to 15 crew and battle-managers.

In the aftermath of the 1 June Operation Spider Web—coordinated strikes on five Russian air force bases by short-range attack drones that the Ukrainian state security service, or SBU, smuggled near the bases in hijacked long-haul trucks—the Russians may be down to just four flyable A-50Us. Five if they managed to repair one of the radar planes the Ukrainians damaged in a February 2023 drone attack.

The analysts at AviVector, which scrutinizes satellite imagery of Russian air bases, may have spotted one of them. But this A-50U isn’t anywhere near Ukraine. Instead, it’s staging from Vorkuta air base in northern Russia, 2,400 km from Ukraine.

“The A-50U airborne early warning aircraft arrived in June and is likely conducting missions over northern Russia, escorted by MiG-31BM interceptors,” AviVector reported.

Satellite images of Vorkuta Airfield as of August 2, 06:58 UTC

The airbase housed 1 A-50U (Mainstay), 1 Tu-134UBL (Crusty), and 3 MiG-31 (Foxhound).

The A-50U airborne early warning aircraft arrived in June and is likely conducting missions over northern Russia, escorted… pic.twitter.com/z1p6vwVZrR

— AviVector (@avivector) August 3, 2025

Precious planes

The A-50U, like the US Air Force’s Boeing E-3, flies behind the front line in order to scan the horizon for enemy aircraft and missiles. Soaring high above the ground cover and capable of repositioning as needed, the A-50Us have helped Russian commanders to keep an eye on the Ukrainian air force—and to detect, minutes in advance, incoming Ukrainian missiles and drones.

If there are four operational A-50Us and one is in northern Russia, it’s possible no more than two are within reach of Ukraine—and useful for Russia’s defensive effort against Ukrainian deep strikes. Analysts have long assumed at least one of the radar planes is in the Russian Far East for patrols along Russia’s eastern waters and its border with China.

Two A-50Us aren’t terribly useful, given that it takes at least three of the lumbering planes to maintain anything approaching around-the-clock coverage of a given area for even a limited span of time.

Early in Russia’s 42-month wider war on Ukraine, the A-50Us “flew an average of two–three sorties per day, providing higher-resolution early-warning and vector information” in southern and eastern Ukraine, Justin Bronk, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds wrote in a November 2022 report for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

That was possible because the Russian air force had nine A-50Us prior the wider Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Now it has many fewer. The radar coverage Russian forces enjoyed in 2022 is no longer possible.

Explore further

Did Ukraine just unleash its first Bars cruise missiles? A 500 km strike deep inside Russia suggests it

A Ukrainian drone damaged an A-50U on the ground in Belarus in February 2023. In January 2024, a long-range Ukrainian missile—reportedly a US-made Patriot—shot down an A-50U over the Sea of Azov in southern Ukraine. Six weeks later in February 2024, another Ukrainian missile, an ex-Soviet S-200, struck a third A-50U in the same area.

The Russian air force swiftly grounded its surviving A-50Us and scrambled to replace the two or three lost planes. That meant cycling at least one older and possibly unflyable A-50U—out of several dozen Beriev built in the 1980s—through Beriev’s Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex in the city of Taganrog, on the Azov Sea coast just 130 km from the front line.

So of course the Ukrainians promptly droned the Taganrog factory the following month.

The Kremlin reportedly canceled the effort to replace the A-50U with newer A-100 radar planes back in June. The upshot is that, by this spring, the Russian air force may have been down to five or fewer active A-50s—with no clear plan for complementing or replacing them.

And then, on 1 June, the SBU smuggled more than 100 short-range attack drones into Russia in modified truck trailers. The drones targeted Dyagilevo, Ivanovo, Olenya, Belaya and Ukrainka air bases. Ivanovo, 750 km from Ukraine, is the home base for the entire A-50U fleet, including active and derelict airframes.

Post-raid satellite imagery of Ivanovo depicted at least one suspicious pile of wreckage as well as a possibly scorched A-50. The imagery may point to one or more destroyed or damaged A-50U, but AviVector for one concluded the affected airframes were already derelict. At best, they were useful as sources of spare parts for the active A-50Us.

In any event, the A-50U fleet is still in very bad shape. Its few surviving jets are apparently scattered far and wide from northern Russia to the Russian Far East, leaving at most three—and potentially just two—for flights supporting the war in Ukraine.

For the Ukrainians, that’s an opportunity: to exploit gaps in Russian air-defenses … and launch more missiles and drones at targets inside Russia.

Explore further

Putin built concrete castles for his bombers—Ukraine’s drones burned them down

On the night of 3 August, the SBU’s attack drones “visited” Saky airfield, 240 km from the front line in Russian-occupied Crimea, according to the SBU.

The explosive drones destroyed one Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jet and damaged another—and also damaged three Sukhoi Su-24 bombers, the SBU claimed. An aviation depot, potentially containing weapons or fuel, was also hit, according to the SBU. 

“The successful special operation of the SBU in Saky is another step towards weakening the enemy’s ability to wage a war of aggression against Ukraine,” the SBU announced. “The occupiers should remember that they will never feel safe on our land!”

What’s especially embarrassing to the Russians is that they’d just finished building at least 12 concrete bunker shelters at Saky to house the aircraft operating from the often-attacked base. “Inside these reinforced shelters, we’ve identified both jets and larger drones, including the Orion,” reported Tatarigami, the head of the Ukrainian Frontelligence Insight analysis group.

The shelters didn’t fully protect the planes at Saky, if the SBU’s claims are accurate.

The Saky raid brings to 27 the number of Russian aircraft Ukrainian drones have destroyed or damaged since 1 June. It’s not the worst month for the Russian air force since Russia widened its war on Ukraine 42 months ago, but it’s close. In all, Russian forces have lost 162 planes and 157 helicopters.

The SBU’s deep-strike campaign, mostly targeting Russia’s own deep-strike assets, dramatically widened this summer. Frustrated in their attempts to intercept Russian aircraft and their munitions in mid-air closer to their targets, Ukrainian forces are increasingly aiming “left of the boom,” to borrow the US Army’s phrasing—and hitting the aircraft and munitions on the ground, before they can launch.

On 1 June, the SBU smuggled long-haul trucks full of explosive first-person-view drones close to five Russian bomber bases.

Around 100 of the tiny FPVs, each weighing just a few pounds, swarmed the bases. Relaying signals back to their operators via Russia’s own cellular phone network, the drones homed in on bombers and other warplanes parked on the bases’ tarmacs.

Bomber massacre

In the immediate aftermath of the 1 June raid, the SBU claimed its drones had struck around 40 warplanes at Dyagilevo, Ivanovo, Olenya, Belaya and Ukrainka air bases.

But close scrutiny of satellite imagery seemed to confirm just 13 or 14 losses, including seven or eight Tupolev Tu-95 bombers, four Tupolev Tu-22M bombers, a Beriev A-50 radar plane and a transport plane. Alongside Tupolev Tu-160s, the Tu-22Ms and Tu-95s are Russia’s main platforms for long-range cruise missile strikes on Ukrainian cities. 

By eliminating a portion of Russia’s missile-carriers, the 1 June Operation Spider Web could have “significant effect that should dramatically reduce Russia’s ability to launch missiles against Ukrainian cities and kill civilians,” noted Ben Hodges, a retired US Army general. 

On the night of 27 June, the SBU’s long-range attack drones—potentially Ukroboronprom An-196s—“dealt another painful blow to the occupiers,” according to the service. The explosive drones struck the Russian airfield in Kirovske, 130 miles from the front line in southern Ukraine.

“Fire damage was inflicted on the locations of the aviation component, air-defense systems, ammunition storage depots, as well as reconnaissance and strike UAVs of the enemy,” the SBU reported.

The SBU claimed it destroyed Mil Mi-8 and Mi-26 transport helicopters and a Mil Mi-28 attack helicopter as well as a Pantsir air-defense vehicle. A reported secondary explosion may point to Russian ammunition stocks—or parked drones—cooking off.

“The SBU is systematically working to reduce the Russian Federation’s capabilities to deliver air and bomb strikes on the territory of Ukraine,” the service explained. “The occupiers should realize that their expensive military equipment and ammunition are not protected anywhere: neither on the line of combat contact, nor in temporarily occupied territories, nor in the deep rear of the enemy.”

The very same night drones struck Kirovske, the SBU and Ukraine’s special operations command, the SSO, struck a second time—and damaged if not destroyed as many as five Russian air force Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers at Marinovka air base in Volgorod Oblast, 290 km from the front line. 

The 150 or so Su-34s that are left, after several dozen have been lost over Ukraine, are Russia’s primary platforms for dropping KAB winged glide-bombs on Ukrainian positions. The 500- and 1,000-kg KABs range as far as 64 km. They can be jammed, but the sheer number of KABs raining down on the Ukrainians—thousands per month—makes them among the most damaging munitions in the Russian arsenal.

The 27 June strikes capped a painful month for the Russian air force. The 3 August raid extended the costly summer into early August.

Explore further

Russia’s jets dropped 250 bombs to stop Ukraine’s advance—the Bradleys rolled anyway

A dramatic video, captured by the Ukrainian 225th Assault Regiment’s Black Swans drone unit and translated by Estonian analyst WarTranslated, depicts an increasingly common phenomenon: Russian soldiers exploding after a nearby drone strike cooks off the ammunition the soldiers are carrying.

The blast apparently took place somewhere in Sumy Oblast in northeastern Ukraine, where Ukrainian brigades have been slowly pushing back an incursion by Russian infantry.

Infantry self-immolation is one of the second-order effects of the accelerating “de-mechanization” of the Russian armed forces as Russia’s wider war on Ukraine grinds into its 42nd month. The Russians have written off more than 20,000 combat vehicles and other heavy equipment—far more than they can immediately replace through new production and the reactivation of increasingly scarce stored vehicles.

With only a few exceptions, Russian troops now march into battle in Ukraine—or ride on motorcycles. Even cargo trucks are in short supply, meaning the troops themselves are the supply line. But in carrying bullets, grenades and mines on their persons, they risk self-destruction from drone near-misses.

American analyst Andrew Perpetua noted Russia’s human supply lines while scrutinizing the battlefield just south of the eastern city of Pokrovsk earlier this year. 

Perpetua recently identified, in one shocking video, around 150 destroyed Russian trucks on a two-mile stretch of one of the several roads threading west from the Russian stronghold of Selydove toward the village of Shevchenko, a few miles south of Pokrovsk. That’s a wrecked Russian truck every 70 feet.

Roads of death

That “road of death,” which the Russians persist in using—with predictably bloody results—was patrolled by the drone team supporting one particularly aggressive Ukrainian battalion that held the line around Shevchenko and, in December, waged a successful campaign against a Russian force 20 times its size. The Ukrainian campaign halted the grinding, yearlong Russian advance on Pokrovsk—although temporarily.

The Ukrainians “moved these drone units down to this area and that’s when they started setting up their kind of drone superiority, where they took complete control of the sky,” Perpetua recalled.

“The Russians basically couldn’t fly drones,” he added. “Their drone would take off, Ukraine would shoot it down and then attack the drone pilots—and they couldn’t fly drones. The Russians were complaining of, like, a 10-to-one or worse drone ratio.”

“That drone advantage is what eventually led to this stopping the Russian attack through shutting down all of these roads,” Perpetua said. The Ukrainian drone pilots “had this policy, where they wanted to first take out the Russian drones and then—once those drones were taken out—go for the supply routes.”

Heavy hexacopter “vampire” drones fitted with night-vision gear and carrying loads of grenades or mines, many of them flown by the famed Ukrainian Birds of Magyar drone group, inflicted the most damage on the roads to Shevchenko.

The Russians are adept at downing the 50-pound vampires with two-pound first-person-view drones that blow up on contact. But having suppressed the Russian drone teams around Shevchenko, the Ukrainian drone teams could fly their vampires with impunity.

Smaller FPV drones joined the vampires, including some fiber-optic models. After blasting every Russian supply truck in sight, the drones ranged farther south and east—and located the depots where the Russian regiments were storing the trucks and other vehicles that remained.

“They went to every vehicle depot and just blew them all up so they had, like, no tanks, no BMPs,” Perpetua mused. “They took out all their MRAP [armored trucks] and then they just shut down every single road, so they starved out the Russians.”

To reinforce Shevchenko, the Russians had to walk … for kilometers. “Their engineers were saying, ‘We have to build a minefield, but we can’t bring any trucks up. So everyone has to carry two mines,’” Perpetua laughed. “So there’s these videos of infantry marching up and, you know, they’re being told that you have to march 20 kilometers. You have to bring all of the food and ammo to last two weeks and you have to carry two landmines.”

The practice is now widespread in the de-mechanized Russian military. Already harried by Ukrainian drones, artillery and mines, Russian infantry now have another problem: their own explosive baggage. 

Explore further

Russia’s last tank yards go dark as every inch in Ukraine demands more sacrifice

Thanks to your incredible support, we’ve raised 70% of our funding goal to launch a platform connecting Ukraine’s defense tech with the world – David vs. Goliath defense blog. It will support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and we are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support.

We’re one final push away from making this platform a reality.

Join us in building this platform on Patreon

A bulky, lumbering Russian vehicle that recently appeared along the 1,100-km front line of Russia’s 42-month wider war on Ukraine boasts the qualities of Russia’s “turtle tanks” as well as the qualities of its more recent “porcupine tanks.” That is: layers of shell-like metal sheeting and, atop that, metal quills that project outward. 

The quills help to detonate incoming first-person-view drones before they strike the tank itself. The plating blunts the impact of any drones that get through.

As ugly and ungainly as the hybrid turtle-porcupine tank is, it might actually work under the right circumstances. Examples abound of up-armored vehicles absorbing dozens or even scores of FPVs, which normally weigh just a few pounds and lack explosive power.

If there’s a downside to all this add-on armor, it’s that it almost certainly impedes the vehicle’s mobility by heaping weight onto its original 40- or 50-ton chassis. The extra protection surely also obstructs the driver’s visibility—and probably makes it extremely difficult for the three crew and any infantry passengers to climb onto and off of the vehicle.

This dismount speed can be a matter of life and death when an up-armored tank comes under attack—and any passengers need to get off the vehicle and spread out.

One Russian “porcupine tank”—one of two involved in an assault on Ukrainian defenses outside the ruins of Toretsk, in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, on or before 9 July—survived more than 70 drone strikes before finally succumbing. “It was very difficult to find a weak spot,” the Ukrainian Deep State analysis group noted.

And yes, the infantry riding on that tank and other vehicles struggled to dismount as Ukrainian drones rained down. “After several hits, the tanks tried to disperse along the forest belts to safely land the infantry among the greenery,” the Ukrainian army’s 28th Mechanized Brigade reported. “In the end, there was almost no one to land. And those who still managed to escape … were eliminated.”

The rubber Stryker

Ukrainian forces have deployed their own super-armored vehicles, albeit with a different armor mix. Open-source analyst Andrew Perpetua recently noted the latest example of a drone-proof Ukrainian vehicle—potentially an American-made Stryker wheeled fighting vehicle.

“There was a Russian video attacking a Ukrainian Stryker that Ukraine turned into an invincible tank,” Perpetua observed. “This Stryker ate every single … drone Russia sent at it without even taking a scratch.”

“The armor plan was this,” Perpetua added. “You take a Stryker with the slat armor on top. On top of the slat armor you apply a thick layer of rubber. All over. Whole vehicle is now rubber. Then, take slat armor and put that over the rubber.”

“It went: Stryker, slat, rubber, slat.”

The downside, as always, is all the extra weight on top of the 19-ton basic vehicle. “This had to be the heaviest … Stryker to ever stryke,” Perpetua quipped.

To be clear, the base vehicle may not have been an 11-person Stryker, Perpetua conceded. It may have been a Soviet-style BTR weighing 18 tons and accommodating 10. In any event, “that little porker probably weighs as much as a [69-ton, four-person M-1] Abrams [tank]. But it ate drones like no tomorrow.”

Of course, add-on armor is no panacea. Yes, the most heavily up-armored vehicles stand a decent chance of surviving a few—or even a lot—of drone strikes. Most vehicles remain extremely vulnerable not just to drones, but to all the myriad dangers along the front line. Mines. Artillery. Missiles.

It’s not for no reason that the Russians have parked most of their surviving vehicles—and now mostly attack on foot or on motorcycles. Under the cover of drones, of course. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians usually defend with infantry sheltering in trenches. Also under the cover of drones.

Explore further

The Russians creep toward Siversk, losing tanks on the way

Thanks to your incredible support, we’ve raised 70% of our funding goal to launch a platform connecting Ukraine’s defense tech with the world – David vs. Goliath defense blog. It will support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and we are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support.

We’re one final push away from making this platform a reality.

Join us in building this platform on Patreon

In the span of two weeks starting in early July, the German government signaled separate investments in Ukraine’s best attack drone—the Ukroboronprom An-196 Liutyi—as well as its first mass-producible cruise missile, apparently the Bars.

With substantial stocks of the new drones and missiles, Ukrainian forces should be capable of striking Russian targets as far away as 800 km. The drones would fly slower and may carry lighter, 50kg warheads. The missiles should fly faster and hit harder with heavier warheads weighing perhaps twice as much.

There’s some evidence the German spend is already making a difference. The An-196 and Bars “are being deployed on the front line with increasing frequency,” the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team noted. On July 26, drones slammed into the Signal plant in Stavropol, in southwestern Russia 500 km from the front line in Ukraine. The plant manufactures radar and electronic warfare systems.

Explore further

Ukraine has a secret jet drone that Russia still can’t see—and it’s back

A photo that circulated on Russian social media the same day may depict, for the first time in public, wreckage of one of the Bars missiles. 

In funding Ukraine’s expanding deep-strike complex, Germany is helping Ukraine do to Russia what Russia has been doing to Ukraine throughout its 42-month wider war on the country: disrupt Russian command, logistics and production where the Russians are most vulnerable—at home.

Major Gen. Christian Freuding, the head of the German defense ministry’s Situation Center Ukraine, announced the missile deal in early July. The weapons, apparently Bars, would begin arriving in Ukraine within weeks—meaning now.

Drones galore

Just days prior, Welt broke the news that Germany would also finance as many as 500 of the An-196 drones. The propeller-driven, satellite-guided Liutyi carries a 50-kg warhead farther than 800 kg. The $200,000 drone can follow a complex flight path and change altitude in order to dodge Russian defenses.

The An-196 already had German connections. The 3.5-m drone sports a German-made Hirth F-23 aviation engine producing 50 horsepower.

The Liutyis have been responsible for some of the most damaging strikes on targets deep inside Russia. Before Ukraine largely paused strikes on Russian oil facilities this spring, possibly bowing to pressure from the United States, the An-196s accounted for up to 80% of hits on refineries.

The turbojet Bars ranges around as far as the propeller-driven Liutyi does, but should hit harder thanks to a bigger warhead. And it should be more survivable owing to its likely higher speed. An An-196 motors along at slower than 320 km/hr; most cruise missiles travel twice as fast. 

The Bars is reportedly capable of ground and aerial launch. The Ukrainian air force has modified its Sukhoi Su-24 bombers to carry British-made Storm Shadow and French-made SCALP cruise missiles that are 5 m long and weigh nearly 1,400 kg. The Bars should be smaller and lighter, and may also be compatible with the Su-24s.

We don’t know how much a Bars costs, but it’s almost certainly less than the millions of dollars a Western-made cruise missile can cost. “Its main advantage is reportedly its potential for mass production within Ukraine,” CIT explained.

“The extent to which the new Bars missile will affect the front line will depend entirely on how many are made available to the Ukrainian military,” CIT wrote. Considering that Russia produces 600 or so of its best Kh-101 cruise missiles every year, the hundreds of Bars the Germans may be financing should help the Ukrainians chip away at the Russians’ missile advantage.

Explore further

Ukraine just solved the hardest math problem in modern air defense – with a 1970s German gun