Russia could assemble a strike force for an offensive into northern Ukraine by February 2027 if Moscow launches another mobilization, Ukrainian military intelligence's (HUR) deputy chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi told RBC-Ukraine on 18 August.

Skibitskyi said another mobilization could follow Russia’s September parliamentary elections. Depending on its scale, that call-up could produce a strike force by February 2027. Skibitskyi based the February estimate on Russia’s 2022 mobilization. He said some personnel reached the front in December 2022, while combat-ready units arrived in January 2023.

Earlier warnings identified a northern route

The February estimate follows Ukrainian warnings about possible attacks across the northern border. In May, Zelenskyy said Ukraine was tracking five scenarios for expanding the war through the north, including an advance through Chernihiv Oblast toward Kyiv.

Syrskyi called an attack from Russia’s Bryansk Oblast into Chernihiv Oblast Moscow’s most realistic northern option, ranking it above an operation through Belarus. Its purpose, he said, would be to draw Ukrainian forces away from the east and south.

Russia has also struggled to prepare other major campaigns as Ukraine targeted the forces and systems needed to carry them out. ISW assessed that Ukrainian drones likely disrupted preparations for a spring–summer offensive in Donetsk Oblast, while a planned Russian naval-drone campaign reportedly stalled after Starlink access was blocked.

Ukrainian intelligence says Russia lacks the manpower

Skibitskyi said Moscow cannot form the units required for a new offensive without mobilization. HUR estimates Russia lost more personnel than it recruited in both June and July. The shortfall reached 3,000 in June and at least 1,000 in July, meaning monthly contracts no longer replaced battlefield losses.

The agency says Russia’s operational reserve is about one-tenth the size of its combat component against Ukraine. Moscow also lacks enough personnel to expand brigades into divisions, while recruitment for its unmanned-systems forces has reached only 30% of its quota.

CSIS estimated in January that Russia had suffered losses unmatched by any major state since World War II while advancing extremely slowly.

Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) has named 10 people and two institutions it says are teaching Ukrainian children under occupation to handle weapons—and preparing them to serve Russia.

HUR says those named use youth groups, occupation education authorities, and schools to erase children’s Ukrainian identity and prepare them for Russian military service. Publishing their names supports Ukraine’s efforts to document the system and hold its organizers accountable, but HUR announced no charges or sanctions with the update.

How Russia militarizes Ukrainian youth in occupied territory

At a May 2026 “Zarnitsa 2.0” competition, the Kremlin-backed Movement of the First taught children to handle weapons and explosives and operate drones, HUR said.

At the competition’s stage in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast, regional organizer Viktoria Kostromina stated those skills would provide children with a “reliable foundation in life.”

The training sits inside a much larger school system. From 1 September, occupation schools will add a separate basic military-training track alongside a new Russian ideology class and behavior grades. More than 582,000 children across nearly 2,000 schools study under the imposed Russian curriculum, according to the Almenda Center of Civil Education.

Russia is also embedding combat preparation more deeply. “Cossack classes” will make ideological and combat-related drills compulsory for fifth-graders in four occupied Donbas cities. In Crimea, occupation authorities say they have built a pipeline that selects schoolchildren for drone training and ultimately for the Russian military reserve.

The policy has a long horizon. Putin’s 2025 strategy set a 95% “Russian civic identity” target for occupied populations by 2036.

Who HUR says is behind the indoctrination

HUR linked the individuals to the Movement of the First, Yunarmia, occupation education bodies, and a school in Simferopol.

Whom the HUR identified

• Artur Orlov: chairman of the Kremlin-backed Movement of the First.
• Oleksii Lavrentiev, Marina Tsvetinskaya, Ruyal Aliyev, Ekaterina Kozyr, Viktoria Kostromina and Kateryna Popova: regional Movement of the First organizers in occupied Ukraine.
• Svitlana Bespalova: occupation deputy education minister in Crimea.
• Nikita Polyakov: Yunarmia organizer in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• Dmytro Pryvidion: director of School No. 5 in occupied Simferopol.

HUR also identified two institutions: Pryvidion’s School No. 5 and the Selet–Ak Bars youth center in Foros. It says the school holds militaristic activities and produces devices for loading rifle magazines, while the center stages pro-war events for children.

All 12 entries now appear in the “Child Kidnappers” section of HUR’s War&Sanctions database.

Ukraine has previously pursued individual organizers through criminal cases. In 2024, the SBU accused a Crimea occupation official of using schools and military camps to indoctrinate pupils and encourage enlistment in Russia’s forces.

Ukraine’s ombudsman later asked the ICC and Ukrainian law enforcement to recognize systematic child militarization as a crime against humanity.

Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) sees no battlefield signs that Russia is preparing for a ceasefire, deputy chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi said in an interview with RBC-Ukraine on 18 August 2026. The agency expects no peace agreement before the end of 2026.

Russia’s General Staff plans to capture the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by year-end, Skibitskyi said. Meanwhile, HUR estimates that Russian personnel losses exceeded contract recruitment in June and July, leaving Moscow unable to create new military formations without mobilization.

HUR estimates Russia lost more troops than it recruited in both June and July. Losses exceeded new contract personnel by 3,000 in June and by at least 1,000 in July, leaving recruitment unable to replace battlefield losses. The agency says Russia’s operational reserve is only about one-tenth the size of the part already engaged in combat against Ukraine.

Russia has set a 2026 target of recruiting 409,000 personnel. Without mobilization, however, Moscow cannot create new formations or turn existing brigades into divisions because it lacks personnel, Skibitskyi said. The recruitment plan for Russia’s unmanned-systems forces is only 30% complete, and the command is trying to fill the gap with personnel from other military branches, he added.

If Russia mobilizes after its September parliamentary elections, it could assemble a powerful strike group by around February 2027, according to HUR. Skibitskyi did not rule out its use for a northern offensive. At present, however, HUR sees no conditions, indicators, or troops for such an operation.

Russia previously targeted September for Donbas

In April, Skibitskyi told the Financial Times that Moscow aimed to capture all of Donbas by September, after missing its deadlines to take Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. Russia was transferring 20,000 troops from strategic reserves to sustain the offensive, although this amounted to less than one month's worth of its battlefield losses.

By early August, DeepState reported 36 square kilometers of additional Russian-controlled territory across Ukraine in July, a figure that included map corrections for May and June. Without those corrections, Russia gained about 88 square kilometers.

DeepState reported limited progress near Rodynske and Kostiantynivka and toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the heart of Ukraine’s “fortress belt.” At that pace, Russia had “no chance” of capturing all of Donetsk Oblast even by 2027, the group said. It cautioned that another wave of mobilization or a wider deployment of North Korean troops could change the forecast.