Ukraine has turned ground robots into a frontline workhorse, and the state is now trying to buy them at scale through its first competitive, ministry-spec tender. Viktor Pavlov, an officer of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade's UGV battalion, laid out the risks of that model to Army Inform, the Defense Ministry's outlet, in an interview. Once a robot clears the military's technical requirements, price becomes the main criterion, Pavlov says. The order is split into lots, and no maker can take more than half a class. He warns the model may not tell a cheap, makeshift machine from one that actually survives at the front.

Robots now handle the war's deadliest chores—driving supplies through kill zones and reaching the wounded where people can't—and Ukraine has already contracted more than 22,000 for 2026. How the military buys them now shapes whether the push yields machines troops trust or a stockpile of cheap ones they don't.

From disposable drones to the next mass weapon

Aerial drones became disposable, mass-produced weapons years ago. Ground robots—the tracked and wheeled machines that haul supplies, pull out the wounded, and attack Russian positions—are only now reaching serial state supply. In August, the Defense Procurement Agency (DOT), the body that buys Ukraine's arms, opened its first competitive tenders for logistics and strike robots built to specs set by the Defense Ministry. Pavlov, founder of Ukraine's UGV School, calls it an experimental format that can work where market prices are inflated. Splitting the order into lots also gives smaller engineering teams a real chance, he said, because many large producers are already busy with state contracts.

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Why the lowest bid may beat the best robot

A tender rewards the cheapest product that formally meets the requirements, not the best one, Pavlov said. A thermal camera, for example, can be listed as desirable rather than mandatory, so a maker chasing the lowest price will most likely leave it off. On any given feature the machines diverge—suspension, cameras, comms channels, a winch—one has it, another doesn't, yet both can land in the same class.

The machines themselves are very different. One carries 250 kilograms, another up to 349, but both fall into the "200-plus" category. Unlike FPV drones, which share standard sizes and parts, ground robots have no common frame—Ukraine fields many local variants. Pavlov compared the choice to picking an iPhone over a cheaper Android: on paper the features match, but soldiers know which machine they can run and repair.

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He also fears the model punishes innovation. A company can spend 18 months and a 20-person team building a robot, then watch a rival copy it, skip the research costs, and undercut it. A design troops already know how to run and repair—like the Ratel—is a known quantity. An untested bargain can break down mid-mission with no spare parts.

A mixed system, not tenders alone

Price competition should be one tool, not the only one, Pavlov argued. New robots should first reach units through pilot buys, letting soldiers test them and say what works. Proven systems can then be contracted in bulk, with tenders saved for classes where the offers are truly comparable. Ukraine's robots are too varied, he said, and what units need can't always be squeezed onto a spec sheet.

Robots will not replace armored vehicles on the battlefield, says a company that builds both. Ground robots are a new tool that lets Ukraine distribute risk more smartly, but they cannot do everything a crewed armored vehicle can, above all pulling wounded soldiers out under fire, says Ukr Armo Tech's chief executive Hennadii Khirhii, in an interview with RBC-Ukraine.

Ukraine has a serious shortage of armored vehicles, from evacuation carriers to tracked fighting vehicles, with the focus shifting to hulls that offer heavy mine protection and built-in electronic warfare. For medical-evacuation armor alone, Khirhii says, the deficit is often put at 80 percent.

Robots can ease some of that, hauling ammunition and supplies to the front without risking a crew, but they are a complement, not a substitute, a view frontline commanders also confirm.

Robots share the load, not replace it

Where a robot can do the job, Khirhii says, there is no sense sending in heavy armor and the people inside it to face danger. For carrying ammunition or food, unmanned ground vehicles are useful. But evacuating the wounded is different: that usually needs, at least for the second leg, a protected medical vehicle in which care can begin on the move, with room for transfusions and resuscitation that a robot's capsule cannot provide.

"A UGV doesn't cancel the armored vehicle, just as the drone didn't cancel artillery," he says.

The limits show at evacuation

Ukraine has leaned hard into robotic logistics and casualty evacuation, running more than 100,000 such missions this year to keep medics and crews off exposed roads, but the robots themselves now draw Russian drone and artillery fire, and they cannot replace medical personnel.

One commander has called ground robots too slow for evacuation and easy targets, arguing brigades still need staffed evacuation teams and light-armored vehicles.

Commanders want both

The lesson from the front is not robots instead of armor, but robots alongside it. What matters, Khirhii says, is a smart combination of machines for each mission, with people's safety and the task's practicality first. The front today needs both armored vehicles and ground robots, he continues, and it needs a great amount of both.

A Ukrainian ground robot drove toward the front, reached the water in its path, and kept going, swimming across with ammunition and food aboard and no soldier at risk. It ran the first logistics mission with an amphibious ground robot, covering more than 40 kilometers over land and water to resupply positions, the Defense Ministry said.

Water is one of the front's quiet chokepoints: rivers, canals, and marshes that stop ground robots and force risky detours, and that air resupply cannot always solve. The amphibious robot drives like a normal ground vehicle, then switches to swimming in seconds, letting one machine cross terrain that halts the rest.

It is the latest of Ukraine's battlefield-robot firsts, which this year have included air-dropping robots behind Russian lines.

Water stops the others

The robot was developed through Brave1, Ukraine's state-backed defense-innovation cluster, which links developers with the military and government.

The one such robot gains additional capabilities to carry out missions across different terrains.

For this operation, the system was refined over several months in close cooperation with the military, taking into account real tasks, operational experience, and the specifics of frontline terrain. The Brave1 defense innovation cluster provided grant support for the system, helping bring the solution to practical use.

The ministry says it is "expanding the capabilities of robotic systems" so soldiers have more tools for the fight.

Robots with grenade launchers

Earlier, Ukraine employed a new tactic during its major Operation Vivaldi in Donetsk Oblast. During the 3rd Army Corps' offensive, fighters from the world's first experimental unit of unmanned ground-strike vehicles, "NC13", upgraded their kamikaze ground drones with grenade launchers.

During the operation, UGVs equipped with two Bullspike grenade launchers attacked Russian positions, then detonated directly inside their shelters. The occupiers believed they were being attacked by an entire assault group. In reality, they were being torn apart by robots from the 3rd Assault Corps.

Ukraine has employed a new tactic during its major Operation Vivaldi in Donetsk Oblast. During the 3rd Army Corps' offensive, fighters from the world's first experimental unit of unmanned ground-strike vehicles, "NC13", have upgraded their kamikaze ground drones with grenade launchers.

Vivaldi is the counteroffensive the corps is running near Lyman in northern Donetsk Oblast. Over its first two "seasons," the 3rd Army Corps and attached units have retaken more than 125 square kilometers, half of it de-occupied outright, and inflicted more than 3,000 casualties on Russian forces.

Through this offensive operation, the 3rd Army Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Andrii Biletsky, disrupted Russian forces' plans to encircle the fortress-belt cities in Donetsk Oblast from the north and south. Among them are Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. These cities have helped hold back Russian forces since 2014.

From intensive training to the world-first operations

The NC13 unit has been through Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and other of the toughest sections of the front.

Among its achievements: the world's first robotic assault carried out without infantry involvement, resulting in the capture of two Russian soldiers, a sabotage operation in the enemy's rear — blowing up a crossing and disrupting an offensive — using UGVs alone, and Ukraine's first fully robotic defense of a position for 45 days without involving infantry.

"No one in the history of warfare has used this kind of tactic before," the soldiers commented on the offensive.

The defenders say that a lack of combat experience is no barrier to joining the unit. Every recruit goes through an intensive training course led by experienced instructors.

Grenade launchers were developed based on the Soviet RPG-22

During the operation, UGVs equipped with two Bullspike grenade launchers attacked Russian positions, then detonated directly inside their shelters. The occupiers believed they were being attacked by an entire assault group. In reality, they were being torn apart by robots from the 3rd Assault Corps.

"Yes, the UGVs carry out three tasks at once: they strike, they exert psychological pressure, and they clear the position. And most importantly, this happens without risk to our infantry," the force says.

The Bullspike grenade launchers were developed based on the Soviet RPG-22 anti-tank grenade launcher, which was previously manufactured under license by a Bulgarian defense company.

According to data from the manufacturer's website, the Bullspike RPG has a maximum aimed firing range of 350 meters, a direct-fire range of 150 meters, and armor penetration of 400 mm, Militarnyi reports.

The total weight of the launch unit, together with the 72.5 mm PG-22 grenade, is 3.4 kg. The length of the launcher is 780 mm.

The manufacturer states that the Bullspike-AT round is designed to destroy tanks, self-propelled artillery, and other armored vehicles, as well as to target enemy personnel located in bunkers, field fortifications, and urban-type brick fortifications.

The robots were controlled by operators from a safe shelter dozens of kilometers from the line of contact.

Earlier, for the first time in the world's history, the 3rd Army Corps dropped ground robots behind Russian lines from the air. The soldiers behind the mission say their heavy drones delivered kamikaze unmanned ground vehicles more than 10 kilometers into the Russian rear during the "second season" of Operation Vivaldi, letting Ukrainian troops flank them and clear another 40 square kilometers.